[PATCH v3 1/2] mm: Add PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN macro

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David Gow

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Jun 30, 2022, 3:48:07 AMJun 30
to Vincent Whitchurch, Johannes Berg, Patricia Alfonso, Jeff Dike, Richard Weinberger, anton....@cambridgegreys.com, Dmitry Vyukov, Brendan Higgins, Andrew Morton, Andrey Konovalov, Andrey Ryabinin, David Gow, kasan-dev, linu...@lists.infradead.org, LKML, Daniel Latypov, linu...@kvack.org, kuni...@googlegroups.com
This is just the same as PAGE_ALIGN(), but rounds the address down, not
up.

Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvy...@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gow <davi...@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Morton <ak...@linux-foundation.org>
---

Please take this patch as part of the UML tree, along with patch #2,
thanks!

Changes since v2:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220527185600.1...@google.com/
- Add Andrew's Acked-by tag.

v2 was the first version of this patch (it having been introduced as
part of v2 of the UML/KASAN series).

There are almost certainly lots of places where this macro should be
used: just look for ALIGN_DOWN(..., PAGE_SIZE). I haven't gone through
to try to replace them all.

---
include/linux/mm.h | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 9f44254af8ce..9abe5975ad11 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -221,6 +221,9 @@ int overcommit_policy_handler(struct ctl_table *, int, void *, size_t *,
/* to align the pointer to the (next) page boundary */
#define PAGE_ALIGN(addr) ALIGN(addr, PAGE_SIZE)

+/* to align the pointer to the (prev) page boundary */
+#define PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN(addr) ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PAGE_SIZE)
+
/* test whether an address (unsigned long or pointer) is aligned to PAGE_SIZE */
#define PAGE_ALIGNED(addr) IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)(addr), PAGE_SIZE)

--
2.37.0.rc0.161.g10f37bed90-goog

David Gow

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Jun 30, 2022, 3:48:44 AMJun 30
to Vincent Whitchurch, Johannes Berg, Patricia Alfonso, Jeff Dike, Richard Weinberger, anton....@cambridgegreys.com, Dmitry Vyukov, Brendan Higgins, Andrew Morton, Andrey Konovalov, Andrey Ryabinin, kasan-dev, linu...@lists.infradead.org, LKML, Daniel Latypov, linu...@kvack.org, kuni...@googlegroups.com, David Gow
From: Patricia Alfonso <trisha...@google.com>

Make KASAN run on User Mode Linux on x86_64.

The UML-specific KASAN initializer uses mmap to map the ~16TB of shadow
memory to the location defined by KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET. kasan_init()
utilizes constructors to initialize KASAN before main().

The location of the KASAN shadow memory, starting at
KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET, can be configured using the KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET
option. The default location of this offset is 0x100000000000, which
keeps it out-of-the-way even on UML setups with more "physical" memory.

For low-memory setups, 0x7fff8000 can be used instead, which fits in an
immediate and is therefore faster, as suggested by Dmitry Vyukov. There
is usually enough free space at this location; however, it is a config
option so that it can be easily changed if needed.

Note that, unlike KASAN on other architectures, vmalloc allocations
still use the shadow memory allocated upfront, rather than allocating
and free-ing it per-vmalloc allocation.

If another architecture chooses to go down the same path, we should
replace the checks for CONFIG_UML with something more generic, such
as:
- A CONFIG_KASAN_NO_SHADOW_ALLOC option, which architectures could set
- or, a way of having architecture-specific versions of these vmalloc
and module shadow memory allocation options.

Also note that, while UML supports both KASAN in inline mode
(CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE) and static linking (CONFIG_STATIC_LINK), it does
not support both at the same time.

Signed-off-by: Patricia Alfonso <trisha...@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.w...@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.w...@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gow <davi...@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <joha...@sipsolutions.net>
---
This is v3 of the KASAN/UML port. It should be ready to go.

Note that this will fail to build if UML is linked statically due to:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220526185402.9...@google.com/
- Don't define CONFIG_KASAN in USER_CFLAGS, given we dont' use it.
(Thanks Johannes)
- Update patch descriptions and comments given we allocate shadow memory based
on the size of the virtual address space, not the "physical" memory
used by UML.
- This was changed between the original RFC and v1, with
KASAN_SHADOW_SIZE's definition being updated.
- References to UML using 18TB of space and the shadow memory taking
2.25TB were updated. (Thanks Johannes)
- A mention of physical memory in a comment was updated. (Thanks
Andrey)
- Move some discussion of how the vmalloc() handling could be made more
generic from a comment to the commit description. (Thanks Andrey)

Changes since RFC v3:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220526010111.7...@google.com/
- No longer print "KernelAddressSanitizer initialized" (Johannes)
- Document the reason for the CONFIG_UML checks in shadow.c (Dmitry)
- Support static builds via kasan_arch_is_ready() (Dmitry)
- Get rid of a redundant call to kasam_mem_to_shadow() (Dmitry)
- Use PAGE_ALIGN and the new PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN macros (Dmitry)
- Reinstate missing arch/um/include/asm/kasan.h file (Johannes)

Changes since v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20200226004608.81...@google.com/
- Include several fixes from Vincent Whitchurch:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220525111...@axis.com/
- Support for KASAN_VMALLOC, by changing the way
kasan_{populate,release}_vmalloc work to update existing shadow
memory, rather than allocating anything new.
- A similar fix for modules' shadow memory.
- Support for KASAN_STACK
- This requires the bugfix here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220523140403.236104...@axis.com/
- Plus a couple of files excluded from KASAN.
- Revert the default shadow offset to 0x100000000000
- This was breaking when mem=1G for me, at least.
- A few minor fixes to linker sections and scripts.
- I've added one to dyn.lds.S on top of the ones Vincent added.

---
arch/um/Kconfig | 15 +++++++++++++
arch/um/include/asm/common.lds.S | 2 ++
arch/um/include/asm/kasan.h | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/um/kernel/Makefile | 3 +++
arch/um/kernel/dyn.lds.S | 6 +++++-
arch/um/kernel/mem.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++
arch/um/os-Linux/mem.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++
arch/um/os-Linux/user_syms.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/um/Makefile | 3 ++-
arch/x86/um/vdso/Makefile | 3 +++
mm/kasan/shadow.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
11 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/um/include/asm/kasan.h

diff --git a/arch/um/Kconfig b/arch/um/Kconfig
index 8062a0c08952..289c9dc226d6 100644
--- a/arch/um/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/um/Kconfig
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ config UML
select ARCH_HAS_STRNLEN_USER
select ARCH_NO_PREEMPT
select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
+ select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if X86_64
+ select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC if HAVE_ARCH_KASAN
select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
select HAVE_ASM_MODVERSIONS
select HAVE_UID16
@@ -220,6 +222,19 @@ config UML_TIME_TRAVEL_SUPPORT

It is safe to say Y, but you probably don't need this.

+config KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET
+ hex
+ depends on KASAN
+ default 0x100000000000
+ help
+ This is the offset at which the ~16TB of shadow memory is
+ mapped and used by KASAN for memory debugging. This can be any
+ address that has at least KASAN_SHADOW_SIZE (total address space divided
+ by 8) amount of space so that the KASAN shadow memory does not conflict
+ with anything. The default is 0x100000000000, which works even if mem is
+ set to a large value. On low-memory systems, try 0x7fff8000, as it fits
+ into the immediate of most instructions, improving performance.
+
endmenu

source "arch/um/drivers/Kconfig"
diff --git a/arch/um/include/asm/common.lds.S b/arch/um/include/asm/common.lds.S
index eca6c452a41b..fd481ac371de 100644
--- a/arch/um/include/asm/common.lds.S
+++ b/arch/um/include/asm/common.lds.S
@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@
}
.init_array : {
__init_array_start = .;
+ *(.kasan_init)
+ *(.init_array.*)
*(.init_array)
__init_array_end = .;
}
diff --git a/arch/um/include/asm/kasan.h b/arch/um/include/asm/kasan.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0d6547f4ec85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/um/include/asm/kasan.h
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __ASM_UM_KASAN_H
+#define __ASM_UM_KASAN_H
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/const.h>
+
+#define KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET _AC(CONFIG_KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET, UL)
+
+/* used in kasan_mem_to_shadow to divide by 8 */
+#define KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT 3
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+#define KASAN_HOST_USER_SPACE_END_ADDR 0x00007fffffffffffUL
+/* KASAN_SHADOW_SIZE is the size of total address space divided by 8 */
+#define KASAN_SHADOW_SIZE ((KASAN_HOST_USER_SPACE_END_ADDR + 1) >> \
+ KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
+#else
+#error "KASAN_SHADOW_SIZE is not defined for this sub-architecture"
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+
+#define KASAN_SHADOW_START (KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
+#define KASAN_SHADOW_END (KASAN_SHADOW_START + KASAN_SHADOW_SIZE)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+void kasan_init(void);
+void kasan_map_memory(void *start, unsigned long len);
+extern int kasan_um_is_ready;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_STATIC_LINK
+#define kasan_arch_is_ready() (kasan_um_is_ready)
+#endif
+#else
+static inline void kasan_init(void) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
+
+#endif /* __ASM_UM_KASAN_H */
diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/Makefile b/arch/um/kernel/Makefile
index 1c2d4b29a3d4..a089217e2f0e 100644
--- a/arch/um/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/um/kernel/Makefile
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK) += early_printk.o
obj-$(CONFIG_STACKTRACE) += stacktrace.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_PCI_IOMAP) += ioport.o

+KASAN_SANITIZE_stacktrace.o := n
+KASAN_SANITIZE_sysrq.o := n
+
USER_OBJS := config.o

include arch/um/scripts/Makefile.rules
diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/dyn.lds.S b/arch/um/kernel/dyn.lds.S
index 2f2a8ce92f1e..2b7fc5b54164 100644
--- a/arch/um/kernel/dyn.lds.S
+++ b/arch/um/kernel/dyn.lds.S
@@ -109,7 +109,11 @@ SECTIONS
be empty, which isn't pretty. */
. = ALIGN(32 / 8);
.preinit_array : { *(.preinit_array) }
- .init_array : { *(.init_array) }
+ .init_array : {
+ *(.kasan_init)
+ *(.init_array.*)
+ *(.init_array)
+ }
.fini_array : { *(.fini_array) }
.data : {
INIT_TASK_DATA(KERNEL_STACK_SIZE)
diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/mem.c b/arch/um/kernel/mem.c
index 15295c3237a0..276a1f0b91f1 100644
--- a/arch/um/kernel/mem.c
+++ b/arch/um/kernel/mem.c
@@ -18,6 +18,25 @@
#include <kern_util.h>
#include <mem_user.h>
#include <os.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+int kasan_um_is_ready;
+void kasan_init(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * kasan_map_memory will map all of the required address space and
+ * the host machine will allocate physical memory as necessary.
+ */
+ kasan_map_memory((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START, KASAN_SHADOW_SIZE);
+ init_task.kasan_depth = 0;
+ kasan_um_is_ready = true;
+}
+
+static void (*kasan_init_ptr)(void)
+__section(".kasan_init") __used
+= kasan_init;
+#endif

/* allocated in paging_init, zeroed in mem_init, and unchanged thereafter */
unsigned long *empty_zero_page = NULL;
diff --git a/arch/um/os-Linux/mem.c b/arch/um/os-Linux/mem.c
index 3c1b77474d2d..8530b2e08604 100644
--- a/arch/um/os-Linux/mem.c
+++ b/arch/um/os-Linux/mem.c
@@ -17,6 +17,28 @@
#include <init.h>
#include <os.h>

+/*
+ * kasan_map_memory - maps memory from @start with a size of @len.
+ * The allocated memory is filled with zeroes upon success.
+ * @start: the start address of the memory to be mapped
+ * @len: the length of the memory to be mapped
+ *
+ * This function is used to map shadow memory for KASAN in uml
+ */
+void kasan_map_memory(void *start, size_t len)
+{
+ if (mmap(start,
+ len,
+ PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_NORESERVE,
+ -1,
+ 0) == MAP_FAILED) {
+ os_info("Couldn't allocate shadow memory: %s\n.",
+ strerror(errno));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+}
+
/* Set by make_tempfile() during early boot. */
static char *tempdir = NULL;

diff --git a/arch/um/os-Linux/user_syms.c b/arch/um/os-Linux/user_syms.c
index 715594fe5719..cb667c9225ab 100644
--- a/arch/um/os-Linux/user_syms.c
+++ b/arch/um/os-Linux/user_syms.c
@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(strstr);
#ifndef __x86_64__
extern void *memcpy(void *, const void *, size_t);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(memcpy);
-#endif
-
EXPORT_SYMBOL(memmove);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(memset);
+#endif
+
EXPORT_SYMBOL(printf);

/* Here, instead, I can provide a fake prototype. Yes, someone cares: genksyms.
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/Makefile b/arch/x86/um/Makefile
index ba5789c35809..f778e37494ba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/um/Makefile
@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ else

obj-y += syscalls_64.o vdso/

-subarch-y = ../lib/csum-partial_64.o ../lib/memcpy_64.o ../entry/thunk_64.o
+subarch-y = ../lib/csum-partial_64.o ../lib/memcpy_64.o ../entry/thunk_64.o \
+ ../lib/memmove_64.o ../lib/memset_64.o

endif

diff --git a/arch/x86/um/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/um/vdso/Makefile
index 5943387e3f35..8c0396fd0e6f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/um/vdso/Makefile
@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
# Building vDSO images for x86.
#

+# do not instrument on vdso because KASAN is not compatible with user mode
+KASAN_SANITIZE := n
+
# Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n

diff --git a/mm/kasan/shadow.c b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
index a4f07de21771..7a7fc76e99a8 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
@@ -295,9 +295,22 @@ int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
return 0;

shadow_start = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr);
- shadow_start = ALIGN_DOWN(shadow_start, PAGE_SIZE);
shadow_end = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr + size);
- shadow_end = ALIGN(shadow_end, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * User Mode Linux maps enough shadow memory for all of virtual memory
+ * at boot, so doesn't need to allocate more on vmalloc, just clear it.
+ *
+ * The remaining CONFIG_UML checks in this file exist for the same
+ * reason.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UML)) {
+ __memset((void *)shadow_start, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID, shadow_end - shadow_start);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ shadow_start = PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN(shadow_start);
+ shadow_end = PAGE_ALIGN(shadow_end);

ret = apply_to_page_range(&init_mm, shadow_start,
shadow_end - shadow_start,
@@ -466,6 +479,10 @@ void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,

if (shadow_end > shadow_start) {
size = shadow_end - shadow_start;
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UML)) {
+ __memset(shadow_start, KASAN_SHADOW_INIT, shadow_end - shadow_start);
+ return;
+ }
apply_to_existing_page_range(&init_mm,
(unsigned long)shadow_start,
size, kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte,
@@ -531,6 +548,11 @@ int kasan_alloc_module_shadow(void *addr, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask)
if (WARN_ON(!PAGE_ALIGNED(shadow_start)))
return -EINVAL;

+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UML)) {
+ __memset((void *)shadow_start, KASAN_SHADOW_INIT, shadow_size);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
ret = __vmalloc_node_range(shadow_size, 1, shadow_start,
shadow_start + shadow_size,
GFP_KERNEL,
@@ -554,6 +576,9 @@ int kasan_alloc_module_shadow(void *addr, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask)

void kasan_free_module_shadow(const struct vm_struct *vm)
{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UML))
+ return;
+
if (vm->flags & VM_KASAN)
vfree(kasan_mem_to_shadow(vm->addr));
}
--
2.37.0.rc0.161.g10f37bed90-goog

David Gow

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Jun 30, 2022, 4:08:40 AMJun 30
to Vincent Whitchurch, Johannes Berg, Patricia Alfonso, Jeff Dike, Richard Weinberger, anton....@cambridgegreys.com, Dmitry Vyukov, Brendan Higgins, Andrew Morton, Andrey Konovalov, Andrey Ryabinin, David Gow, kasan-dev, linu...@lists.infradead.org, LKML, Daniel Latypov, linu...@kvack.org, kuni...@googlegroups.com
This is just the same as PAGE_ALIGN(), but rounds the address down, not
up.

Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvy...@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gow <davi...@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Morton <ak...@linux-foundation.org>
---

Please take this patch as part of the UML tree, along with patch #2,
thanks!

No changes to this patch since v3 (just a minor issue with patch #2):
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220630074757.2...@google.com/

David Gow

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Jun 30, 2022, 4:08:45 AMJun 30
to Vincent Whitchurch, Johannes Berg, Patricia Alfonso, Jeff Dike, Richard Weinberger, anton....@cambridgegreys.com, Dmitry Vyukov, Brendan Higgins, Andrew Morton, Andrey Konovalov, Andrey Ryabinin, kasan-dev, linu...@lists.infradead.org, LKML, Daniel Latypov, linu...@kvack.org, kuni...@googlegroups.com, David Gow
This is v4 of the KASAN/UML port. It should be ready to go, and is
identical to v3 module a minor formatting error.

Note that this will fail to build if UML is linked statically due to:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220526185402.9...@google.com/

Changes since v3:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220630074757.2...@google.com/
- Fix some tabs which got converted to spaces by a rogue vim plugin.
index a4f07de21771..0e3648b603a6 100644

David Gow

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Jun 30, 2022, 4:11:59 AMJun 30
to Vincent Whitchurch, Johannes Berg, Patricia Alfonso, Jeff Dike, Richard Weinberger, Anton Ivanov, Dmitry Vyukov, Brendan Higgins, Andrew Morton, Andrey Konovalov, Andrey Ryabinin, kasan-dev, linux-um, LKML, Daniel Latypov, Linux Memory Management List, KUnit Development
<... snip ...>

> diff --git a/mm/kasan/shadow.c b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> index a4f07de21771..7a7fc76e99a8 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> @@ -295,9 +295,22 @@ int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> return 0;
>
> shadow_start = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr);
> - shadow_start = ALIGN_DOWN(shadow_start, PAGE_SIZE);
> shadow_end = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr + size);
> - shadow_end = ALIGN(shadow_end, PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> + /*
> + * User Mode Linux maps enough shadow memory for all of virtual memory
> + * at boot, so doesn't need to allocate more on vmalloc, just clear it.
> + *
> + * The remaining CONFIG_UML checks in this file exist for the same
> + * reason.
> + */

Whoops: these lines had tabs converted to spaces when I reformatted
them. I've sent out v4 which actually passes checkpatch:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220630080834.2...@google.com/

Sorry for the spam!

-- David

Dmitry Vyukov

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Jun 30, 2022, 5:41:18 AMJun 30
to David Gow, Vincent Whitchurch, Johannes Berg, Patricia Alfonso, Jeff Dike, Richard Weinberger, anton....@cambridgegreys.com, Brendan Higgins, Andrew Morton, Andrey Konovalov, Andrey Ryabinin, kasan-dev, linu...@lists.infradead.org, LKML, Daniel Latypov, linu...@kvack.org, kuni...@googlegroups.com
Why are these needed?
It's helpful to leave some comments for any of *_SANITIZE:=n.
Otherwise later it's unclear if it's due to some latent bugs, some
inherent incompatibility, something that can be fixed, etc.

Otherwise the patch looks good to me.

Vincent Whitchurch

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Jun 30, 2022, 8:54:36 AMJun 30
to Dmitry Vyukov, David Gow, Johannes Berg, Patricia Alfonso, Jeff Dike, Richard Weinberger, anton....@cambridgegreys.com, Brendan Higgins, Andrew Morton, Andrey Konovalov, Andrey Ryabinin, kasan-dev, linu...@lists.infradead.org, LKML, Daniel Latypov, linu...@kvack.org, kuni...@googlegroups.com
On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 11:41:04AM +0200, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
> On Thu, 30 Jun 2022 at 10:08, David Gow <davi...@google.com> wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/Makefile b/arch/um/kernel/Makefile
> > index 1c2d4b29a3d4..a089217e2f0e 100644
> > --- a/arch/um/kernel/Makefile
> > +++ b/arch/um/kernel/Makefile
> > @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK) += early_printk.o
> > obj-$(CONFIG_STACKTRACE) += stacktrace.o
> > obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_PCI_IOMAP) += ioport.o
> >
> > +KASAN_SANITIZE_stacktrace.o := n
> > +KASAN_SANITIZE_sysrq.o := n
>
> Why are these needed?
> It's helpful to leave some comments for any of *_SANITIZE:=n.
> Otherwise later it's unclear if it's due to some latent bugs, some
> inherent incompatibility, something that can be fixed, etc.

I believe I saw the stacktrace code itself triggering KASAN splats and
causing recursion when sanitization was not disabled on it. I noticed
that other architectures disabled sanitization of their stacktrace code,
eg. ARM in commit 4d576cab16f57e1f87978f ("ARM: 9028/1: disable KASAN in
call stack capturing routines"), so I did not investigate it further.

(Note that despite the name, sysrq.c is also just stacktrace code.)

Andrey Konovalov

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Jun 30, 2022, 9:29:04 AMJun 30
to Vincent Whitchurch, Dmitry Vyukov, David Gow, Johannes Berg, Patricia Alfonso, Jeff Dike, Richard Weinberger, anton....@cambridgegreys.com, Brendan Higgins, Andrew Morton, Andrey Ryabinin, kasan-dev, linu...@lists.infradead.org, LKML, Daniel Latypov, linu...@kvack.org, kuni...@googlegroups.com
Stack trace collection code might trigger KASAN splats when walking
stack frames, but this can be resolved by using unchecked accesses.
The main reason to disable instrumentation here is for performance
reasons, see the upcoming patch for arm64 [1] for some details.

[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux.git/commit/?id=802b91118d11

David Gow

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Jul 1, 2022, 5:08:40 AMJul 1
to Andrey Konovalov, Vincent Whitchurch, Dmitry Vyukov, Johannes Berg, Patricia Alfonso, Jeff Dike, Richard Weinberger, anton....@cambridgegreys.com, Brendan Higgins, Andrew Morton, Andrey Ryabinin, kasan-dev, linu...@lists.infradead.org, LKML, Daniel Latypov, linu...@kvack.org, kuni...@googlegroups.com
Ah -- that does it! Using READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() in dump_trace() gets rid
of the nasty recursive KASAN failures we were getting in the tests.

I'll send out v5 with those files instrumented again.

Thanks!
-- David

David Gow

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Jul 1, 2022, 5:16:27 AMJul 1
to Vincent Whitchurch, Johannes Berg, Patricia Alfonso, Jeff Dike, Richard Weinberger, anton....@cambridgegreys.com, Dmitry Vyukov, Brendan Higgins, Andrew Morton, Andrey Konovalov, Andrey Ryabinin, David Gow, kasan-dev, linu...@lists.infradead.org, LKML, Daniel Latypov, linu...@kvack.org, kuni...@googlegroups.com
This is just the same as PAGE_ALIGN(), but rounds the address down, not
up.

Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvy...@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gow <davi...@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Morton <ak...@linux-foundation.org>
---
Please take this patch as part of the UML tree, along with patch #2,
thanks!

No changes to this patch since v4:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220630080834.2...@google.com/

No changes to this patch since v3 (just a minor issue with patch #2):
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220630074757.2...@google.com/

David Gow

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Jul 1, 2022, 5:16:32 AMJul 1
to Vincent Whitchurch, Johannes Berg, Patricia Alfonso, Jeff Dike, Richard Weinberger, anton....@cambridgegreys.com, Dmitry Vyukov, Brendan Higgins, Andrew Morton, Andrey Konovalov, Andrey Ryabinin, kasan-dev, linu...@lists.infradead.org, LKML, Daniel Latypov, linu...@kvack.org, kuni...@googlegroups.com, David Gow
This is v5 of the KASAN/UML port. It should be ready to go (this time,
for sure! :-))

Note that this will fail to build if UML is linked statically due to:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220526185402.9...@google.com/

Changes since v4:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220630080834.2...@google.com/
- Instrument all of the stacktrace code (except for the actual reading
of the stack frames).
- This means that stacktrace.c and sysrq.c are now instrumented.
- Stack frames are read with READ_ONCE_NOCHECK()
- Thanks Andrey for pointing this out.

Changes since v3:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220630074757.2...@google.com/
- Fix some tabs which got converted to spaces by a rogue vim plugin.

arch/um/kernel/dyn.lds.S | 6 +++++-
arch/um/kernel/mem.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++
arch/um/kernel/stacktrace.c | 2 +-
arch/um/os-Linux/mem.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++
arch/um/os-Linux/user_syms.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/um/Makefile | 3 ++-
arch/x86/um/vdso/Makefile | 3 +++
mm/kasan/shadow.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
11 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/stacktrace.c b/arch/um/kernel/stacktrace.c
index 86df52168bd9..fd3b61b3d4d2 100644
--- a/arch/um/kernel/stacktrace.c
+++ b/arch/um/kernel/stacktrace.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ void dump_trace(struct task_struct *tsk,

frame = (struct stack_frame *)bp;
while (((long) sp & (THREAD_SIZE-1)) != 0) {
- addr = *sp;
+ addr = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(*sp);
if (__kernel_text_address(addr)) {
reliable = 0;
if ((unsigned long) sp == bp + sizeof(long)) {

Vincent Whitchurch

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Jul 1, 2022, 5:16:55 AMJul 1
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Hmm, do we really want that? In the patch Andrey linked to above he
removed the READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() and added the KASAN_SANITIZE on the
corresponding files for arm64, just like it's already the case in this
patch for UML.

David Gow

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Jul 1, 2022, 5:43:39 AMJul 1
to Vincent Whitchurch, Andrey Konovalov, Dmitry Vyukov, Johannes Berg, Patricia Alfonso, Jeff Dike, Richard Weinberger, anton....@cambridgegreys.com, Brendan Higgins, Andrew Morton, Andrey Ryabinin, kasan-dev, linu...@lists.infradead.org, LKML, Daniel Latypov, linu...@kvack.org, kuni...@googlegroups.com
Personally, I'm okay with the performance overhead so far: in my tests
with a collection of ~350 KUnit tests, the total difference in runtime
was about ~.2 seconds, and was within the margin of error caused by
fluctuations in the compilation time.

As an example, without the stacktrace code instrumented:
[17:36:50] Testing complete. Passed: 364, Failed: 0, Crashed: 0,
Skipped: 47, Errors: 0
[17:36:50] Elapsed time: 15.114s total, 0.003s configuring, 8.518s
building, 6.433s running

versus with it instrumented:
[17:35:40] Testing complete. Passed: 364, Failed: 0, Crashed: 0,
Skipped: 47, Errors: 0
[17:35:40] Elapsed time: 15.497s total, 0.003s configuring, 8.691s
building, 6.640s running

That being said, I'm okay with disabling it again and adding a comment
if it's slow enough in some other usecase to cause problems (or even
just be annoying). That could either be done in a v6 of this patchset,
or a follow-up patch, depending on what people would prefer. But I'd
not have a problem with leaving it instrumented for now.

-- David

Vincent Whitchurch

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Jul 1, 2022, 6:04:43 AMJul 1
to David Gow, Andrey Konovalov, Dmitry Vyukov, Johannes Berg, Patricia Alfonso, Jeff Dike, Richard Weinberger, anton....@cambridgegreys.com, Brendan Higgins, Andrew Morton, Andrey Ryabinin, kasan-dev, linu...@lists.infradead.org, LKML, Daniel Latypov, linu...@kvack.org, kuni...@googlegroups.com
OK, good to know.

> That being said, I'm okay with disabling it again and adding a comment
> if it's slow enough in some other usecase to cause problems (or even
> just be annoying). That could either be done in a v6 of this patchset,
> or a follow-up patch, depending on what people would prefer. But I'd
> not have a problem with leaving it instrumented for now.

I don't have any strong opinion either way either, so you don't have to
change it back on my account. Thanks.

Dmitry Vyukov

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Jul 1, 2022, 6:34:53 AMJul 1
to Vincent Whitchurch, David Gow, Andrey Konovalov, Johannes Berg, Patricia Alfonso, Jeff Dike, Richard Weinberger, anton....@cambridgegreys.com, Brendan Higgins, Andrew Morton, Andrey Ryabinin, kasan-dev, linu...@lists.infradead.org, LKML, Daniel Latypov, linu...@kvack.org, kuni...@googlegroups.com
I would consider using READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() by default. And then
switching to KASAN_SANITIZE:=n only if there is a real reason for
that. Disabling instrumentation of any part of the kernel makes things
faster, but at the same time we are losing checking coverage.
For arm it was done for a very specific reason related to performance.
While UML can be considered more test-oriented rather than
production-oriented.

Dmitry Vyukov

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Jul 1, 2022, 6:35:43 AMJul 1
to David Gow, Vincent Whitchurch, Johannes Berg, Patricia Alfonso, Jeff Dike, Richard Weinberger, anton....@cambridgegreys.com, Brendan Higgins, Andrew Morton, Andrey Konovalov, Andrey Ryabinin, kasan-dev, linu...@lists.infradead.org, LKML, Daniel Latypov, linu...@kvack.org, kuni...@googlegroups.com
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvy...@google.com>

Andrey Konovalov

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Jul 12, 2022, 4:43:53 PMJul 12
to David Gow, Vincent Whitchurch, Johannes Berg, Patricia Alfonso, Jeff Dike, Richard Weinberger, anton....@cambridgegreys.com, Dmitry Vyukov, Brendan Higgins, Andrew Morton, Andrey Ryabinin, kasan-dev, linu...@lists.infradead.org, LKML, Daniel Latypov, Linux Memory Management List, kuni...@googlegroups.com
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andre...@gmail.com>
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