Let 39;s Encrypt Dst Root Ca X3 Download
Esmeralda Rusinski
A quick note: I've been using ZFS encryption on a laptop with non-critical data since before ZoL 0.8.0-rc1, and have encountered and had to recover from both Errata 3 and Errata 4. Errata 3 was particularly troublesome to fix, Errata 4 is easily recoverable by deleting all snapshots of encrypted datasets and upgrading and re-importing your pools. If you're just starting at 0.8.0-rc4, you don't have to worry about either of these.
let 39;s encrypt dst root ca x3 download
Let 39;s Encrypt Dst Root Ca X3 Download ✓ https://shurll.com/2zCUOr
So, let's jump into it. The primary recommendation I have is pretty simple: DON'T USE ENCRYPTION FOR THE ROOT OF ANY POOL unless you're okay having every dataset ever created henceforth in that pool encrypted. In fact, don't anyway. It might seem obvious if you've worked with ZFS for a while, but it still bears repeating with an example.
Since an obvious usecase of ZFS encryption is to prevent data recovery in case of someone unauthorized getting access to your disks, using "whole-pool encryption" like this seems pretty tempting. But, as you'll see, using encryption like this significantly reduces the flexibility of your zpool configuration for little gain.
Don't footgun yourself, use an encryption root that's not the pool root. Sure, this leaves the pool root dataset unencrypted, but no one will ever get anything important out of it if you just leave it configured with mountpoint=none anyway.
All fixes found on the net is related to IIS which is not applicable to our environment, however trying to contact letsencrypt to confirm when a fix will be deployed, they simply shun you away stating they do not supply support.
Secondly I would like to know if anybody have a formal fix for linux servers in this regard as I have not been able to find any method or support on the net on how to set the letsencrypt certificates to not use the R3 CA.
When this is your first post about it and we are assisting YOU with YOUR problem.
Let me explain:
There is nothing technically wrong with the trust path being served by your web site.
See: [SSL Server Test: saicanews.co.za (Powered by Qualys SSL Labs)]
(SSL Server Test: saicanews.co.za (Powered by Qualys SSL Labs))
[OR use any other online certificate verification tool]
You can compare that trust path to the one this very community uses.
See: SSL Server Test: community.letsencrypt.org (Powered by Qualys SSL Labs)
They are exactly the same.
If you don't understand something, then you can also ask for clarification/explanation.
There is no conspiracy, no conscious decision was made to mess up the Internet PKI system.
None of that is happening.
What is happening (by and large) is that systems that have NOT updated their trust stores since 2015 are now having trust issues. And some systems (mainly Windows), that even though they do have updated trust stores fail to see (and trust) the "new" (since 2015) trusted root in the longer trust path.
All of this would be happening with every other CA, had their root cert expired sooner than this one did.
And this will likely continue to happen (also with other CAs) as long as older devices are still being used long long long after their manufacturers have stopped providing any support/updates for them or as long as people don't take any steps to keep their systems updated.
But the problems could have been prevented, if Letsencrypt had decided to start signing with a new intermediate CA that is not cross signed with the old expiring root CA. If they had done that no one would have noticed that there was an old root certificate expiring.
There is no preventing a root cert expiry.
Intermediates are never explicitly entered into any global trust stores - they are trusted because they are signed by a trusted root.
When a trusted root expires, it will also take with it any intermediates that relied on it.
There does not exist another such intermediate that could have been used.
I know very well how certificates etc. work. What I say is the following:
If Letsencrypt had started signing new certificates, let's say half a year ago, with a new intermediate certificate that is not signed by the old root certificate, then all current certificates would not have the old root certificate in the trust chain and we wouldn't have seen all those problems.
There are two trust chains served today by LE.
Both go through "ISRG Root X1".
One merely uses that same root cert as an intermediate (cross-signed by another root cert).
If you are having trouble with one trust path, you can use the other.
Both can't be set as default - only one can.
No matter which one was made default, the other side would have issue with that choice.
I think the problem could have been prevented in the past if there would have been a second root in the global root trust store that was not signed by the old root. Then a new intermediate certificate could have been created that was signed by the new clean root certificate, and then this problem wouldn't exist at all.
apparently despite that it was said that LE is included in MS's root Program, on a 21h2 system we just set up, it tried to chain down to the DST Root via the LE root (so leaf -> intermediate -> ISRG X1 -> DST X3)
Also would adding a few extra certs, especially the root of what's probably the most used CA in the whole internet for websites especially with how bloated windows has become, be that much of an issue
So, as @rg305 said, Windows does this "lazy loading" of certificates. If you go to -isrgrootx1.letsencrypt.org/ (or any other Let's Encrypt secured site) in Edge (or Chrome or any other system that uses the system trust store), it will detect that the root isn't one in its list, check with Microsoft for info on that root, and download and add it to its trust store.
It's not clear to me how Microsoft chooses which roots get actually pre-bundled rather than only-download-on-demand. I suppose it's possible that Let's Encrypt might have more luck reaching out to them and asking than you might, but I wouldn't expect a whole lot of luck either way. (To be slightly more optimistic, in this thread Let's Encrypt contacted Microsoft to change the root in their store to be trusted for Client Authentication, so it looks like changes of some sort are at least possible.)
In the meantime, I think that if you're going to have systems without Internet access that need to be able to validate Let's Encrypt certificates, you'll need to add the root to their trust store manually, by like downloading ISRG Root X1 self-signed pem from Let's Encrypt directly and installing it, like via USB stick or adding it to the image you're cloning from or whatever "sneakernet"/non-online method makes sense for you.
For windows to auto populate it's root certificates you need to allow outgoing http/https connections (to a variety of locations), windows update must be active and working and group policy must allow Automatic Root Certificates Update.
As mentioned by others Windows can lazy load roots and intermediates but it only does that when you make an outgoing https request to an resource that uses that root. Installing ISRG Root X1 (self signed) is universally the solution on windows. DST Root X3 will not be trusted by windows.
Unfortunately this does not apply to OpenSSL 1.0.2 which always prefers theuntrusted chain and if that chain contains a path that leads to an expiredtrusted root certificate (DST Root CA X3), it will be selected for thecertificate verification and the expiration will be reported.
The downside is that the servers will be seen as using an untrusted rootcertificate by some older Android clients because these clients do not containthe self-signed ISRG Root X1 certificate in their trust stores.
Does dracut figure out the root partition based on fstab and crypttab automatically, or do I need to explicitly configure it? How do I do that? mk-grub produces root=UID=roo-luks, but that points to the luks container, not to its parent partition roo. I assume that is wrong?
I have the feeling that I still need to specify the root partiton manually in GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT for dracut. (But then, what is dracut --print-cmdline doing? Is that only applicable to systemd-boot?).
Yes, but this was done to see if I could get an existing system to be encrypted. If I change crypttab and it is part of install_file+=" /etc/crypttab ", I should thus not expect drabut-rebuild to pick that changed file up for the initramfs build, correct?
I will stick with racut --regenerate-all --force in that case.
This was an experiment so its not critical. I got the encryption for the root device working.
I had copied its contents with cp, so currently the system is a mess and fixing the permissions is a never ending story, so I only can share a screenshot
As the ISRG Root X1 still contains the information this it was issued by the now expired DST Root CA X3, this trust path is checked (until the end of the chain) and then fails. So the fault is really that the chain was not updated during the automatic renewal of the Let's Encrypt certificates. This is also the case for certificates still renewed in September and October. In our case, the Let's Encrypt certificate of gitlab.infiniroot.net was automatically renewed on September 25th 2021 - yet it still contains the chain leading up to DST Root CA X3, just a few days before this Root CA would expire.
Not sure but I guess that for this it would be easier if the rooot partition would also be on a logical volume. Clear to me, that this could only be established when VPS is started with a rescue system, with all partitions / logical volumes are available, but not mounted. Question: If I move the root parition into a logical volume via the rescue system, what do I have to change to inform GRUB about these changes for the next boot?
I want to set the properties of the root volume for an Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) instance that I created using an AWS CloudFormation template. For example, I want to change the size of the root volume, or enable encryption of the root volume.
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