Sequestration is not the best time to be
doling out foreign aid, surely the most unpopular item
in the federal budget. Especially when the recipient is President Mohamed
Morsi of Egypt.
Morsi
is intent on getting the release of Omar Abdel-Rahman
(the Blind Sheik), serving a life sentence for masterminding the
1993 World Trade Center attack that killed six and
wounded more than a thousand. Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood is openly
anti-Christian, anti-Semitic and otherwise prolifically intolerant. Just three
years ago, Morsi called on Egyptians to nurse their children and grandchildren
on hatred for Jews, whom he has called “the descendants of apes and pigs.”
Not exactly Albert Schweitzer. Or even Anwar Sadat. Which left a bad taste
when Secretary of State John Kerry, traveling to Cairo,
handed Morsi a cool $250 million. (A tenth of which
would cover about 25 years of White House tours, no longer affordable under
sequestration.
Says the administration.)
Nonetheless, we should not cut off aid to Egypt. It’s not that we must
blindly support unfriendly regimes. It is perfectly reasonable to cut off aid
to governments that are intrinsically hostile and beyond our influence.
Subsidizing enemies is merely stupid.
But Egypt is not an enemy, certainly not yet. It may no longer be our
strongest Arab ally, but it is still in play. The Brotherhood aims to
establish an Islamist dictatorship. Yet it remains a considerable distance
from having done so.
Precisely why we should remain engaged. And engagement means using our
economic leverage.
Morsi has significant opposition.
Six weeks ago, powerful anti-Brotherhood demonstrations
broke out in major cities and
have continued sporadically ever since.
The presidential election that Morsi won was decided
quite narrowly — three points, despite the Brotherhood’s advantage of superior
organization and a history of social service.
Moreover, having forever been in opposition, on election day the Islamists
escaped any blame for the state of the country. Now in power, they begin to
bear responsibility for Egypt’s miserable conditions — a collapsing economy,
rising crime, social instability. Their aura is already dissipating.
There is nothing inevitable about Brotherhood rule. The problem is that the
secular democratic parties are fractured, disorganized and lacking in
leadership. And are repressed by the increasingly authoritarian Morsi.
His partisans have attacked demonstrators in Cairo. His security forces
killed more than 40 in Port Said. He’s been harassing
journalists, suppressing freedom of speech, infiltrating the military and
trying to subjugate the courts. He’s already rammed through
an Islamist constitution. He is now trying to tilt, even
rig, parliamentary elections to the point that
the opposition called for a boycott and an
administrative court has just declared a
suspension of the vote.
Any foreign aid we give Egypt should be contingent upon a reversal of this
repression and a granting of space to secular, democratic, pro-Western
elements.
That’s where Kerry committed his mistake. Not in trying to use dollar
diplomacy to leverage Egyptian behavior, but by exercising that leverage
almost exclusively for economic, rather than political, reform.
Kerry’s major objective was getting Morsi to apply for a $4.8 billion loan
from the International Monetary Fund. Considering that some of this
$4.8 billion ultimately
comes from us, there’s a certain comic circularity to
this demand. What kind of concession is it when a foreign government is
coerced into . . . taking yet more of our money?
We have no particular stake in Egypt’s economy. Our stake is in its
politics. Yes, we would like to see a strong economy. But in a country ruled
by the Muslim Brotherhood?
Our interest is in a non-Islamist, nonrepressive, nonsectarian Egypt, ruled
as democratically as possible. Why should we want a vibrant economy that
maintains the Brotherhood in power? Our concern is Egypt’s policies, foreign
and domestic.
If we’re going to give foreign aid, it should be for political concessions
— on unfettered speech, on an opposition free of repression, on alterations to
the Islamist constitution, on open and fair elections.
We give foreign aid for two reasons: (a) to support allies who share our
values and our interests, and (b) to extract from less-than-friendly regimes
concessions that either bring their policies more in line with ours or
strengthen competing actors more favorably inclined toward American
objectives.
That’s the point of foreign aid. It’s particularly important in countries
like Egypt, whose fate is in the balance. But it will only work if we remain
clear-eyed about why we give all that money in the first
place.