After Virtue chapters 10-12

[Jordan Simpson]

Chapter 10 - 

After leaving us with the choice of Aristole's classical virtue or
Nietzsche's nihilism, MacIntyre takes the next chapters to explore the
origins of Aristotle's morality. He begins with the stories of heroic
societies, which provided inspiration for Greeks, Irish, and others.
Sagas and epics were more than just tales of heroic societies, they
helped show the form the society took. 

In a heroic society, a person was what he or she did. Morality was
woven into society, and there was no neutral standpoint to observe in
a detached sort of way. It would be impossible to describe heroic
society and heroic virtues separate from one another. 

Virtue, or arte in the Greek, was an excellence of any kind that
enables a person to discharge their role. Central in heroic societies
are the virtues of courage and fidelity, without which society could
not function. Eventually everyone must die, and to courageous follow
ones role in life unto death is the height of that kind of heroic
virtue. 

What MacIntyre sees in the Homeric poems and the Icelandic sagas are
poets attempting to transcend the horizons of their societies, which
is death. He encourages us to do the same. Traditional virtue required
a particular type of society to create a particular type of human
being, but we are no longer living in that type of society which lives
the virtues. MacIntyre hopes we are still able to overcome the
limitations of our society and recover some of the ideas of tradition
and roles in the heroic societies. 

Chapter 11 -

MacIntyre moves to the conception of virtue in classical Greek
society, during the time of Plato, the tragedians, and the beginning
of philosophy. Central in the shift from heroic or Homeric virtue and
classical virtue is that the primary moral community is now the city-
state and not the kinship group. Athenian democracy is the particular
city-state, and this particular moral community produces moral agents
differently from other moral communities. The polis is the place where
a person is given their moral instruction and the virtues are
exercised. In a somewhat simplified explanation, one can see the
virtues moving from competitive to cooperative. 

There are still several completing systems of virtues within classical
Athenian society, and MacIntyre goes through several. The sophists he
basically dismisses, citing only their willingness to describe virtues
in different (and sometimes contradictory) ways. Plato has an
idealized view of virtue that cannot be found in the real world and is
in many ways a dramatic narrative, as was the heroic societies. Here
MacIntyre discusses the concept of dikaiosune, which is almost always
translated as "justice" but does not mean the same as our definition
of justice. He emphasizes that in Greek the word had origins in "the
order of the universe," a connection that had been muddied by
classical times but was still present. Our modern definition of
justice is generally free from any connection to a right order of the
universe. 

Important for Plato was the understanding that all the virtues could
be practiced together, at once and in harmony. The Greek tragedies
strongly disagree and present lives where virtues compete with one
another. The disorder nature of the world often leaves humans with the
choice between two goods, conflict between two equal claims of
authority. However MacIntyre makes sure to distinguish this view of
conflicted virtues from a modern view which also rejects Plato's
harmonious world but believes any system trying to reconcile virtues
into a single moral order is totalitarian. The tragedies do presuppose
an objective moral order, but our muddled human eyes are unable of
clearly perceiving it. 

Like the Homeric poems, the Greek tragedies assume life takes the form
of a dramatic narrative. They simply assume the form is a tragedy, not
an epic or saga. The tragedies are very much concerned with the role
of communities, to the point that the communities become characters
themselves. Yet they go beyond the epic in questioning the social
roles that humans play, while still remaining accountable to death. A
moral life is still possible, humans can still win or lose. With that
MacIntyre moves from the tragedies to philosophy: Aristotle. 

Chapter 12 - 

Now we finally get to MacIntyre's 'hero,' Aristotle. But for all of
his praise, MacIntyre recognizes several issues any contemporary
account of the virtues has with Aristotle. Even placing Aristotle in a
tradition is unAristotelian, as MacIntyre admits. And so for all the
buildup to Aristotle there is actually little of what MacIntyre
actually wants to argue for the virtues in the chapter. It is the
Aristotelian tradition, the features of which we have already
encounter, that MacIntyre wants to reacquire. 

Nevertheless there are some points worth making in discussing
Aristotle. There are few rules within Aristotle's account of ethics,
something that frustrates modern ethical philosophers. Instead a great
deal of emphasis is place on the importance of judgement in making
decision. MacIntyre presents an argument here that virtue and law are
both needed - foreshadowing how he sees Aristotle being adapted by the
great religious traditions. 

Another important takeaway from Aristotle is the role of the community
in finding justice. An important precursor to justice is friendship,
which forms the basis for arriving at a just end. Aristotle views
the polis as a collection of small networks of friends who share and
pursue the same good. It is a far more connected concept than the
modern liberal individualist who sees community as a collection of
persons who band together for mutual benefit.
Aristotle's articulation is based around the premise that conflict is
bad and that the virtues form together in a harmonious way (which we
saw in Plato). MacIntyre ends the chapter by agreeing with the
tragedies over Aristotle, that conflict is not simply due to character
flaws but can arise from competing moral goods. In fact, it can even
be through conflict that we learn what our ends are.