[PATCH] kfence: shorten critical sections of alloc/free

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Marco Elver

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Sep 30, 2021, 11:37:18 AMSep 30
to el...@google.com, Andrew Morton, Alexander Potapenko, Dmitry Vyukov, Jann Horn, linux-...@vger.kernel.org, linu...@kvack.org, kasa...@googlegroups.com
Initializing memory and setting/checking the canary bytes is relatively
expensive, and doing so in the meta->lock critical sections extends the
duration with preemption and interrupts disabled unnecessarily.

Any reads to meta->addr and meta->size in kfence_guarded_alloc() and
kfence_guarded_free() don't require locking meta->lock as long as the
object is removed from the freelist: only kfence_guarded_alloc() sets
meta->addr and meta->size after removing it from the freelist, which
requires a preceding kfence_guarded_free() returning it to the list or
the initial state.

Therefore move reads to meta->addr and meta->size, including expensive
memory initialization using them, out of meta->lock critical sections.

Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <el...@google.com>
---
mm/kfence/core.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c
index b61ef93d9f98..802905b1c89b 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/core.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/core.c
@@ -309,12 +309,19 @@ static inline bool set_canary_byte(u8 *addr)
/* Check canary byte at @addr. */
static inline bool check_canary_byte(u8 *addr)
{
+ struct kfence_metadata *meta;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
if (likely(*addr == KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(addr)))
return true;

atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]);
- kfence_report_error((unsigned long)addr, false, NULL, addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr),
- KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION);
+
+ meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr);
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags);
+ kfence_report_error((unsigned long)addr, false, NULL, meta, KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
+
return false;
}

@@ -324,8 +331,6 @@ static __always_inline void for_each_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta,
const unsigned long pageaddr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, PAGE_SIZE);
unsigned long addr;

- lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock);
-
/*
* We'll iterate over each canary byte per-side until fn() returns
* false. However, we'll still iterate over the canary bytes to the
@@ -414,8 +419,9 @@ static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t g
WRITE_ONCE(meta->cache, cache);
meta->size = size;
meta->alloc_stack_hash = alloc_stack_hash;
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);

- for_each_canary(meta, set_canary_byte);
+ alloc_covered_add(alloc_stack_hash, 1);

/* Set required struct page fields. */
page = virt_to_page(meta->addr);
@@ -425,11 +431,8 @@ static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t g
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB))
page->s_mem = addr;

- raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
-
- alloc_covered_add(alloc_stack_hash, 1);
-
/* Memory initialization. */
+ for_each_canary(meta, set_canary_byte);

/*
* We check slab_want_init_on_alloc() ourselves, rather than letting
@@ -454,6 +457,7 @@ static void kfence_guarded_free(void *addr, struct kfence_metadata *meta, bool z
{
struct kcsan_scoped_access assert_page_exclusive;
unsigned long flags;
+ bool init;

raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags);

@@ -481,6 +485,13 @@ static void kfence_guarded_free(void *addr, struct kfence_metadata *meta, bool z
meta->unprotected_page = 0;
}

+ /* Mark the object as freed. */
+ metadata_update_state(meta, KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED, NULL, 0);
+ init = slab_want_init_on_free(meta->cache);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
+
+ alloc_covered_add(meta->alloc_stack_hash, -1);
+
/* Check canary bytes for memory corruption. */
for_each_canary(meta, check_canary_byte);

@@ -489,16 +500,9 @@ static void kfence_guarded_free(void *addr, struct kfence_metadata *meta, bool z
* data is still there, and after a use-after-free is detected, we
* unprotect the page, so the data is still accessible.
*/
- if (!zombie && unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(meta->cache)))
+ if (!zombie && unlikely(init))
memzero_explicit(addr, meta->size);

- /* Mark the object as freed. */
- metadata_update_state(meta, KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED, NULL, 0);
-
- raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
-
- alloc_covered_add(meta->alloc_stack_hash, -1);
-
/* Protect to detect use-after-frees. */
kfence_protect((unsigned long)addr);

--
2.33.0.685.g46640cef36-goog

Alexander Potapenko

unread,
Sep 30, 2021, 11:40:22 AMSep 30
to Marco Elver, Andrew Morton, Dmitry Vyukov, Jann Horn, LKML, Linux Memory Management List, kasan-dev
On Thu, Sep 30, 2021 at 5:37 PM Marco Elver <el...@google.com> wrote:
>
> Initializing memory and setting/checking the canary bytes is relatively
> expensive, and doing so in the meta->lock critical sections extends the
> duration with preemption and interrupts disabled unnecessarily.
>
> Any reads to meta->addr and meta->size in kfence_guarded_alloc() and
> kfence_guarded_free() don't require locking meta->lock as long as the
> object is removed from the freelist: only kfence_guarded_alloc() sets
> meta->addr and meta->size after removing it from the freelist, which
> requires a preceding kfence_guarded_free() returning it to the list or
> the initial state.
>
> Therefore move reads to meta->addr and meta->size, including expensive
> memory initialization using them, out of meta->lock critical sections.
>
> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <el...@google.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko <gli...@google.com>
--
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer

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