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It might help you
Cheers
Thanks Mark and Stephen for your detailed responses.
So in the end, I think that Jenkins has a problem because a user that can create a job has access to ALL credentials.
So by default, any user able to create one job may steal any source code located on a git repo whose Jenkins has the credential for.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/jenkinsci-users/16200f9f-f81f-47cd-9003-2a19943b352a%40googlegroups.com.
Thanks Mark and Stephen for your detailed responses.
So in the end, I think that Jenkins has a problem because a user that can create a job has access to ALL credentials. So by default, any user able to create one job may steal any source code located on a git repo whose Jenkins has the credential for.
Stephen, it would be interesting to test your solution, but I think that i'll advise our IT guys to deploy more than one number of jenkins instances, each with it's own credentials. It may be more maintainable with a small number of instances.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/jenkinsci-users/16200f9f-f81f-47cd-9003-2a19943b352a%40googlegroups.com.
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Le 23 nov. 2015 7:33 PM, "Mark Waite" <mark.ea...@gmail.com> a écrit :
>
> Response in-line.
>
> On Mon, Nov 23, 2015 at 10:41 AM Francois Marot <francoi...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Thanks Mark and Stephen for your detailed responses.
>> So in the end, I think that Jenkins has a problem because a user that can create a job has access to ALL credentials.
>
>
> I'm not clear why you think that a user that can create a job has access to "All credentials". Maybe you omitted a phrase from your sentence?
>
> I'd say that a user that can create a job has access to all credentials that are assigned to the global credentials domain, or which are assigned to a the hostname (or hostname/protocol) for the source repository they reference, or which are assigned to the folder in which they created the job (based on the Cloudbees Folders plugin). I suspect I've missed other cases where credentials access is limited.
>
> If you are concerned about users creating jobs to "steal any source code", then don't place credentials in the global domain and don't assign them to a hostname known to the malicious users. If you can prevent users from creating jobs in a particular folder, then I think you should be able to assign the credentials to specific folders, and then don't grant the malicious users permission to those folders.
>
>>
>> So by default, any user able to create one job may steal any source code located on a git repo whose Jenkins has the credential for.
>
>
> If source code theft is a concern, then you'll need to limit much more than the permission to create jobs. Any user able to browse a Jenkins workspace is allowed to "steal any source code" by browsing that workspace.
Yes, or a variant: depending on how you manage your slaves and so on it can be very easy to use say a shell step to just copy other workspaces on the node, or worse if you allow jobs running on master: you could for example crawl all the config.xml and clone+push code where you want…
Cheers