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[Sabel Kantah]

Youcan create your own keyboard shortcuts for menu commands in any macOS app, including the Finder. This might be useful if a global shortcut, which works the same with most apps, conflicts with a specific app shortcut. In this case, you could create a new key combination.

In the Menu Title field, type the menu command for which you want to create a shortcut, exactly as the command appears in the app, including the > character (type ->), ellipses (type three periods without spaces or press Option-; (semi-colon)), or other punctuation.

I recently updated to Windows 10 anniversary update and recentlly noticed the PS/2 Keyboard has stopped working in Windows 10 apps such as the settings menu and the start menu. Desktop apps and control panel work fine including shortcuts buttons such as volume up, web browser etc.

The default driver installed seems to be Lenovo ThinkPad driver PS/2 keyboard (which the keyboard Is not). I uninstalled the driver, un-plugged keyboard and tried changing the driver to the standard driver and HID keyboard driver with no luck.

None of the answers worked for me, so I simply opened Task Manager, killed explorer.exe (Task Manager - Details - locate explorer.exe and kill it) and run it again (Task Manager - File - Run new task - type "explorer").

Is there a way to create an app specific soft keyboard on Android? After reading about InputMethodService docs and checking out alternative keyboard apps out there, I figure the alternate keyboard can only be configured for system wide usage (through Settings -> Locale and Text).

If the answer to above question is no, then is there at least a way to load a custom dictionary and override the default dictionary of the system keyboard (only when my app is in use)? That will help in giving very relevant suggestions to the user when he has only tapped couple of keys.

If you just want a View that looks and acts like a soft keyboard, I did that in my SmallKeyboard class. You just need to extend android.inputmethodservice.KeyboardView and decide on layout. See the onKey and onText methods at the end of that file for the action taken when keys are pressed.

The Android Nethack application has a complete and clear source code example of how to create a custom keyboard for an application, how to display it on screen and how to define multiple keyboard layouts. It contains pretty much everything you need to know.

The vulnerability, which allows the keystroke data that these apps send to the cloud to be intercepted, has existed for years and could have been exploited by cybercriminals and state surveillance groups, according to researchers at the Citizen Lab, a technology and security research lab affiliated with the University of Toronto.

What they discovered was shocking. Almost every third-party app and every Android phone with preinstalled keyboards failed to protect users by properly encrypting the content they typed. A smartphone made by Huawei was the only device where no such security vulnerability was found.

In August 2023, the same researchers found that Sogou, one of the most popular keyboard apps, did not use Transport Layer Security (TLS) when transmitting keystroke data to its cloud server for better typing predictions. Without TLS, a widely adopted international cryptographic protocol that protects users from a known encryption loophole, keystrokes can be collected and then decrypted by third parties.

After the researchers got in contact with companies that developed these keyboard apps, the majority of the loopholes were fixed. Samsung, whose self-developed app was also found to lack sufficient encryption, sent MIT Technology Review an emailed statement: "We were made aware of potential vulnerabilities and have issued patches to address these issues. As always, we recommend that all users keep their devices updated with the latest software to ensure the highest level of protection possible."

Sometimes all it takes is a little additional effort. After two emails about the issue to iFlytek were met with silence, the Citizen Lab researchers changed the email title to Chinese and added a one-line summary in Chinese to the English text. Just three days later, they received an email from iFlytek, saying that the problem had been resolved.

I recently bought a Samsung TV an I install de SmartThings app to manage it. It will be very useful if yo add a keyboard option to the app, so tou can use your phone keyboard to register mails, search webpages, movies I streaming services etc. Is it possible?

The Bluetooth keyboard (and this serverless Bluetooth keyboard app) works with most of the apps I have installed like Netflix, Disney, Apple TV, Google Play Movies, YouTube Video, and the Samsung Web Browser (with mouse input too), but surprisingly not the Amazon Prime Video app.

Between this report and our Sogou report, we estimate that close to one billion users are affected by this class of vulnerabilities. Sogou, Baidu, and iFlytek IMEs alone comprise over 95% of the market share for third-party IMEs in China, which are used by around a billion people. In addition to the users of third party keyboard apps, we found that the default keyboards on devices from three manufacturers (Honor, OPPO, and Xiaomi) were also vulnerable to our attacks. Devices from Samsung and Vivo also bundled a vulnerable keyboard, but it was not used by default. In 2023, Honor, OPPO, and Xiaomi alone comprised nearly 50% of the smartphone market in China.

We reported these issues to all eight of the vendors in whose keyboards we found vulnerabilities. Most vendors responded, took the issue seriously, and fixed the reported vulnerabilities, although some keyboard apps remain vulnerable. Users should keep their apps and operating systems up to date. We recommend that they consider switching from a cloud-based keyboard app to one that operates entirely on-device if they are concerned about these privacy issues.

While previous work studying the security of keystroke network data in transit investigates single keyboard apps at a time, our report is the first to holistically evaluate the network security of the cloud-based keyboard app landscape in China.

The Android version transmitted keystrokes information via UDP packets to udpolimeok.baidu.com and that the Windows and iOS versions transmitted keystrokes to udpolimenew.baidu.com. The two mobile versions that we analyzed, namely the Android and iOS versions, transmitted these keystrokes according to a stronger protocol, whose payload begins with the bytes 0x04 0x00. The Windows version transmitted these keystrokes according to a weaker protocol, whose UDP payload begins with the bytes 0x03 0x01. We henceforth refer to these protocols as the BAIDUv4.0 and BAIDUv3.1 protocols, respectively. In the remainder of this section we detail multiple weaknesses in the BAIDUv4.0 protocol used by the Android and iOS versions and explain how a network eavesdropper can decrypt the contents of keystrokes transmitted by the BAIDUv3.1 protocol.

Upon opening the keyboard, before the first outgoing BAIDUv4.0 protocol message is sent, the application randomly generates a client Curve25519 public-private key pair, which we will call (pkc, skc). Then, a Diffie-Hellman shared secret k is generated using skc and a pinned public key pks. To send a message with plaintext P, the application reuses the first 16 bytes of pkc as the initialization vector (IV) for symmetric encryption, and k is used as the symmetric encryption key. The resulting symmetric encryption of P is then sent along with pkc to the server. The server can then obtain the same Diffie-Hellman shared secret k from pkc and sks, the private key corresponding to pks, to decrypt the ciphertext.

Re-using the same IV and key means that the same inputs will encrypt to the same encrypted ciphertext. Additionally, due to the way the block cipher is constructed, if blocks in the same positions of the plaintexts are the same, they will encrypt to the same ciphertext blocks. As an example, if the second block of two plaintexts are the same, the second block of the corresponding ciphertexts will be the same.

While BCTR mode used by Baidu does not as flagrantly reveal patterns to the same extent as ECB mode, there do exist circumstances in which patterns in the plaintext can still be revealed in the ciphertext. Specifically, there exist circumstances in which there exists a counter-like pattern in the plaintext which can be revealed by the ciphertext (see Figure 3 for an example). These circumstances are possible due to the fact that (IV + i) is XORed with each plaintext block i and then encrypted, unlike ordinary CTR mode which encrypts (IV + i) and XORs it with the plaintext. Thus, when using BCTR mode, if the plaintext exhibits similar counting patterns as (IV + i), then for multiple blocks the value ((IV + i) XOR plaintext block i) may be equivalent and thus encrypt to an equivalent ciphertext.

To encrypt a protobuf-serialized message, the BAIDUv3.1 protocol first snappy-compresses it, forming a compressed buffer. The 32-bit, little-endian length of this compressed message is then prepended to the compressed buffer, forming the plaintext. A randomly generated 128-bit key km is used to encrypt the plaintext using AESv2 in ECB mode. The resulting ciphertext is stored in bytes 44 until the end of the final UDP payload. Key kf is used to encrypt km using AESv2 in ECB mode. The resulting ciphertext is stored in bytes 28 until 44 of the final UDP payload.

The Android version of iFlytek IME encrypts the payload of each HTTP request sent to pinyin.voicecloud.cn with the following algorithm. Let s be the current time in seconds since the Unix epoch at the time of the request. For each request, an 8-byte encryption key is then derived by first performing the following computation:

The 8-byte key k is then derived from x as the lowest 8 ASCII-encoded digits of x, left-padded with leading zeroes if necessary, in big-endian order. In Python, the above can be summarized by the following expression:

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