How To Remove Eset Remote Administrator Agent Without Password
Nikita Desjardins
I have an installation with an old version of eset remote administrator and i am trying to unistall it because i will use installation without an esete remote administrator server and i have forget the unistall password. Do you have any idea how i will unistall it without the password?
how to remove eset remote administrator agent without password
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If you're using PowerShell, make sure that you have the latest PowerShell module installed and configured and are signed in to your Azure subscription. You can also perform these steps for VMs created with the classic deployment model.
If you enter a different name than the current local administrator account on your VM, the VMAccess extension will add a local administrator account with that name, and assign your specified password to that account. If the local administrator account on your VM exists, the VMAccess extension will reset the password. If the account is disabled, the VMAccess extension will enable it.
Reset remote access to your VM with the Set-AzVMAccessExtension PowerShell cmdlet. The following example resets the access extension named myVMAccess on the VM named myVM in the myResourceGroup resource group:
At any point, a VM can have only a single VM access agent. To set the VM access agent properties, use the -ForceRerun option. When you use -ForceRerun, ensure you use the same name for the VM access agent that you might have used in any previous commands.
If you still can't connect remotely to your virtual machine, see Troubleshoot Remote Desktop connections to a Windows-based Azure virtual machine. If you lose the connection to the Windows domain controller, you will need to restore it from a domain controller backup.
If you're unable to reset the password using the VM access extension then you can reset the local Windows password offline. This method is more advanced and requires you to connect the virtual hard disk of the problematic VM to another VM. Follow the steps documented in this article first, and attempt the offline password reset method only if those steps don't work.
I'm setting up a few ubuntu boxes, and using opscode's chef as a configuration tool. It would be fairly easy to install public keys for each user on each of these servers, and disable password authentication.
If I want to use the users' public keys as a method of access management and allow the users sudo privileges, does that mean I should also set up the users with NOPASSWD: ALL in visduo, or is there a way that a user can change their own password if they only have public key authentication?
Sudo, in its most common configuration, requires the user to type their password. Typically, the user already used their password to authenticate into the account, and typing the password again is a way to confirm that the legitimate user hasn't abandoned their console and been hijacked.
In your setup, the user's password would be used only for authentication to sudo. In particular, if a user's SSH key is compromised, the attacker would not be able to elevate to root privileges on the server. The attacker could plant a key logger into the account, but this key logger would be detectable by other users, and could even be watched for automatically.
A user normally needs to know their current password to change it to a different password. The passwd program verifies this (it can be configured not to, but this is not useful or at all desirable in your scenario). However, root can change any user's password without knowing the old one; hence a user with sudo powers can change his own password without entering it at the passwd prompt by running sudo passwd $USER. If sudo is configured to require the user's password, then the user must have typed the password to sudo anyway.
You may want to allow some administrative users to log in with a password, or to allow password authentication on the console. This is possible with PAM (it's pretty flexible), but I couldn't tell you how off the top of my head; ask a separate question if you need help.
Now every user can either authenticate to sudo via a (forwarded or local) SSH agent or their password. It may be wise to ask your users to use ssh-add -c such that each sudo call will at least require some confirmation.
> This should allow you to have users who can login only using public keys and can not use passwords for login. However he will be forced to change the password the first time he logs in...but without having to tell him somedummy password up front...The users will be simply asked to reset the password and subsequently they can use it only for sudobut will not be able to login(ssh) using that password. Note that the trick here is to not to have told users some dummy password which they would then be required to input at the time of login once they are required to to change their password ...In nut shell no communication from admin(root) to the actual user is required.
Yes you should enable all your users to use sudo without using a password. If you don't want to alter the default sudo group on your distribution you can create another group, as example sudoers_without_password, and say that this new group and only this one can sudo without password. But in any case, if you are creating users that don't have passwords and should be able to use sudo, they must be able to use it without passwords.
Creating users without passwords that can only login using an SSH public keys using tools like chef, ansible, puppet, etc... is a common practice nowadays and can be considered a quite good practice for a lot of reasons (notably because ssh keys are very secure and managing passwords is both a pain and quite insecure).
Now that you've created all your users you have a small problem: some of these users at least should be able to use sudo and a lot of distributions recommend to use a password to be able to use sudo... but your users don't have a password!
It is completely possible to create a user without any password and allow that user to change its own password. The answer is given in this man page. (I won't explain it fully because you shouldn't do it anyway).
The problem is that passwordless users are very very discouraged because anyone can login as them. Usually OpenSSH will deny login as one of these users (that's still a thing), but:
That's why creating a passwordless user account is heavily discouraged and usually prevented by most automation tools. That is the reason why, when creating your users with chef, it created disabled users instead of passwordless users. Most other similar tools (ansible, puppet, etc...) will do the same because their creators don't want you to shoot yourself in the foot.
So, in order to allow users to log in using SSH with public keys, it's still the best practice to create disabled users, even if that mean they won't be able to create a password for themselves later.
These two best practice cannot be respected both at the same time, so we have to make a choice. But there is a strong winner here: it's way more dangerous to allow passwordless users than allowing sudo without password.
The point of the password is to ensure that hackers who obtain a user's key, or find an unattended terminal can't gain root access. For this reason I wouldn't recommend any solution that involves passwordless sudo.
I suggest you keep it simple: perhaps email a user the default password with strict instructions to change it ASAP, or else insert a script in their .profile or .login or something such that it demands a new password on their first login. It could disable itself when completed, and you could use expect to enter the existing password so they never have to know it.
There is a way, but it is fraught with pitfalls. Incredibly easy to either brick the system by misconfiguring PAM, or to open an inadvertent security hole. Don't do this unless you really know what you are doing.
WARNING: by itself, this step is extremely insecure. We'll secure it later. Change the password to an empty password (the password field in /etc/shadow should be empty, instead of containing !! or * or whatever other character may be placed there by default).
The effect of this in a default configuration (checked on RedHatEnterprise Linux 9) is that a user is allowed to log on without apassword, run passwd without being prompted, run sudo without apassword, etc. Obviously, we only want one of those things (passwd),but not the others.
Next, you expire the password. This will force the user to change it the first time they log on, so they can't leave the password empty (Note: I'm not sure if that works for SSH key-based logins, so be sure to test).
Finally, to make this setup secure again, you will need to manipulate the PAM configuration. Some of that is specific to your system and may vary. Generally, you will want to remove the nullok parameter to pam_unix.so in the appropriate configurations (and getting this right is non-trivial!) I deliberately leave out details, both because they may vary depending on your specific authentication configuration, and I'd rather have you fully understand PAM and be able to figure these things out on your own before you try this approach.
On Mobile Access Check Point Software Blade on a Security Gateway that provides a Remote Access VPN access for managed and unmanaged clients. Acronym: MAB. and IPsec VPN Check Point Software Blade on a Security Gateway that provides a Site to Site VPN and Remote Access VPN access. Security Gateways, you can configure multiple login options. The options can be different for each Security Gateway Dedicated Check Point server that runs Check Point software to inspect traffic and enforce Security Policies for connected network resources. and each Software Blade Specific security solution (module): (1) On a Security Gateway, each Software Blade inspects specific characteristics of the traffic (2) On a Management Server, each Software Blade enables different management capabilities.. Users select one of the available options to log in with a supported client.
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