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LABOR: PUBLIC POLICY & REGULATION eJOURNAL
"Did Age Discrimination Protections Help Older Workers Weather the Great Recession?" 
Michigan Retirement Research Center Research Paper No. 2013-287
DAVID NEUMARK, University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Email: dneu...@uci.edu
PATRICK BUTTON, University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics
Email: pbu...@uci.edu
We examine whether stronger age discrimination laws at the state level moderated the impact of the Great Recession on older workers. We use a difference-in-difference-in-differences strategy to compare older workers in states with stronger and weaker laws, to their younger counterparts, both before, during, and after the Great Recession. We find very little evidence that stronger age discrimination protections helped older workers weather the Great Recession, relative to younger workers. The evidence sometimes points in the opposite direction, with stronger state age discrimination protections associated with more adverse effects of the Great Recession on older workers. We suggest that this may be because during an experience like the Great Recession, severe labor market disruptions make it difficult to discern discrimination, weakening the effects of stronger state age discrimination protections, or because higher termination costs associated with stronger age discrimination protections do more to deter hiring when future product and labor demand is highly uncertain.
"Pay as Risk Regulation"
Florida State University Law Review, Forthcoming
ANDREW LUND, Pace University School of Law
Email: al...@law.pace.edu
How do we prevent financial institutions from taking excessive risk when the public fisc serves as their ultimate creditor? This is one of the central questions left over after the recent financial crisis and, for the past five years, there has been no shortage of proposed answers. Two of the more popular candidates for ex ante regulation – proprietary trading restrictions and enhanced capital requirements – are on their way to being enacted in one form or another, albeit with some controversy over their cost and ultimate efficacy. Meanwhile, a third, more indirect approach has been touted under which bank managers’ compensation packages would be adjusted to include bank debt thought to alter their risk preferences. This approach has even been adopted at certain non-U.S. financial institutions. This Article offers a critical appraisal of regulating bank risk-taking through executive pay design. "Regulation by pay" is less likely to ameliorate risk-taking because bank managers with career concerns will continue to face significant incentives to take on high levels of firm risk. Moreover, regulating by pay is an inapt solution where marginal monitoring costs for the government are relatively low as is the case given the existing bank monitor regime. Instead, the case for regulating bank risk through pay redesign is best grounded in a pessimistic view of regulator agency costs. It is hard, however, to see how compromised regulators, given broad discretion, would be much better at implementing a pay regulation regime. Even worse, the very fact of risk regulation by pay, no matter how modestly proposed, makes it more likely that traditional direct monitoring will further atrophy, potentially leaving the government-as-creditor worse off.
"Say-on-Pay: Changing How Executives Get Paid"
Financial Executive, September 2013
JAMES F. REDA, Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. Human Resources Consulting - New York Office
Email: james...@ajg.com
DAVID M. SCHMIDT, Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. Human Resources Consulting - James F. Reda & Associates
Email: dsch...@jfreda.com
Legislative and regulatory activity is slowing down, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act rulemaking by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission continues to be much slower than expected. For example, companies have resisted CEO pay to average worked ratio disclosure as being too costly to implement. This and other Dodd-Frank rules seem to be caught in a tug of war between Congress and industry, with the SEC being caught in the middle. With regard to the non-binding “say on pay” (SOP) vote, companies are not required to take any specific action when faced with a negative vote. However, a public company is required to disclose in its proxy statement whether or not it has failed, and if so, how the company has responded to the results of the prior year say-on-pay vote in determining compensation policies and decisions. This article covers how SOP has changed proxy statements and disclosures.
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About this eJournal
This eJournal distributes working and accepted paper abstracts focused on research of public policy issues concerning, and the regulation of, the labor market. Topics include welfare and poverty, migration and immigration, public policies, the law and economics of labor markets, and employment and labor regulations. The topics in this eJournal include but are not limited to Sections I3 part of H5 of the JEL Classification System.
Editors: Michael J. Gibbs, University of Chicago Booth School of Business, and Mario Macis, Johns Hopkins University
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Directors
LABOR EJOURNALS MICHAEL C. JENSEN
Harvard Business School, Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc., National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Email: mje...@hbs.edu
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