New IZA DPs -- Politicians & Elections
1 view
Skip to first unread message
IZA DP Alerts
Jun 5, 2026, 9:21:19 AM (9 days ago) Jun 5
to it...@umich.edu
New IZA Discussion Papers brought to you by IZA@LISER
Dear Italo Gutierrez,
Please find another batch of new papers below. We are taking a short break from these daily alerts to allow new research to accumulate. By waiting until we reach a critical mass of IZA DPs, we can continue to deliver these updates to you in convenient, topic-grouped batches. We will be back in your inbox in a few days, as soon as the next batch is ready.
We value your feedback: Please feel free to contact us at iza...@liser.lu if you have any suggestions regarding our new DP alerts.
These new IZA Discussion Papers are now available online:
DP 18510 - Uberti/Imami/Mendola:
Votes for Work? Job Patronage and Electoral Mobilization in Albania
DP 18527 - Cerqua/Nocito/Pinto:
Pay Incentives to Run for Local Governments
DP 18533 - Fontana/Nannicini/Snyder:
Goodbye, Montesquieu: Executive Spillovers in Judicial Elections
DP 18534 - Mattozzi/Nocito/Sobbrio:
Fact-Checking Politicians
DP 18559 - Frémeaux/Maarek:
Give More, Receive More? Gender and Cooperativeness Among Politicians
DP 18576 - Neisser/Wehrhöfer:
Outside Income as a Signal: Evidence from Politicians and Voters
DP 18587 - Boelmann/Stapper:
Missing Men and Women’s Demand for Political Representation
DP 18638 - Folke/Rickne:
The Seniority Ceiling: Why Some Immigrants Struggle to Rise in Political Office
Please find the abstracts and download links below.
IZA DP No. 18510
Luca Jacopo Uberti, Drini Imami, Mariapia Mendola:
Votes for Work? Job Patronage and Electoral Mobilization in Albania
Abstract:
We study the impact of an election campaign on the labor market outcomes of incumbent party supporters. Using unique data on voters’ political preferences during a pre-election period in Albania and a DiD design that compares the evolution of outcomes among close neighbours, we show that supporting the ruling party significantly increases individuals’ employment and earnings. This labor market premium is particularly large among individuals with low costs of campaign participation, while patronage jobs are concentrated in lower-tier public sector positions. Administrative data further reveal that the allocation of jobs to party supporters is strongly associated with a higher vote share for the incumbent. These findings suggest that parties strategically allocate public employment to reward grassroots supporters and mobilize votes, a practice that fosters corruption and weakens democratic institutions.
https://docs.iza.org/dp18510.pdf
IZA DP No. 18527
Augusto Cerqua, Samuel Nocito, Gabriele Pinto:
Pay Incentives to Run for Local Governments
Abstract:
Local governments in advanced democracies have increasingly struggled to attract political candidates, weakening electoral competition and accountability at the municipal level. While several factors may contribute to this trend, politicians’ salaries represent one of the few policy levers that can be directly adjusted by policymakers. We study a large-scale reform that substantially increased local politicians’ pay, exploiting quasi-experimental variation in election timing across municipalities. We find that higher salaries increase political entry, particularly among first-time candidates. Importantly, effects are heterogeneous across local contexts: in less affluent municipalities and in areas with lower entry barriers, higher pay also raises female candidacies and their probability of election. In the poorest areas, the reform further alters the composition of local political elites, shifting recruitment toward candidates with different educational and occupational backgrounds.
https://docs.iza.org/dp18527.pdf
IZA DP No. 18533
Nicola Fontana, Tommaso Nannicini, James M Snyder:
Goodbye, Montesquieu: Executive Spillovers in Judicial Elections
Abstract:
We study whether the partisan affiliation of U.S. state governors affects the outcome of partisan judicial elections. Exploiting close gubernatorial races from 1946 to 2023, we find that electing a Democratic (Republican) governor significantly increases the subsequent vote share of Democratic (Republican) judicial candidates. This executive spillover effect arises despite the formal institutional independence of the judiciary and holds in contexts with similar levels of polarization and partisanship. Our findings show that, under partisan judicial elections, even narrow shifts in executive power can erode the separation of powers, as some voters adjust their judicial choices in response to the partisan control of the executive. This effect is stronger when executive and legislative powers are unified and when the judicial election occurs soon after the governor's race.
https://docs.iza.org/dp18533.pdf
IZA DP No. 18534
Andrea Mattozzi, Samuel Nocito, Francesco Sobbrio:
Fact-Checking Politicians
Abstract:
We study how politicians respond to the fact-checking of their public statements. Our research design employs a difference-in-differences approach, complemented by a randomized field intervention conducted in collaboration with a leading fact-checking organization. We find that fact-checking discourages politicians from making factually incorrect statements, with effects lasting several weeks. At the same time, we show that fact-checking neither increases nor displaces correct statements. Politicians who are fact-checked tend to substitute incorrect statements with either no statements or unverifiable ones, suggesting that they may also respond by increasing the “ambiguity” of their language to avoid public scrutiny.
https://docs.iza.org/dp18534.pdf
IZA DP No. 18559
Nicolas Frémeaux, Paul Maarek:
Give More, Receive More? Gender and Cooperativeness Among Politicians
Abstract:
This paper investigates gender-based differences in cooperativeness among French parliamentarians by analyzing legislative behaviors, such as cosponsorship and voting patterns. Using a comprehensive dataset covering all bills and amendments authored in France’s Lower House between 2012 and 2022, we show that female parliamentarians attract fewer cosponsors, particularly from members of their own parties, despite being more likely to support their colleagues’ initiatives and exhibit higher voting participation. This asymmetry highlights a paradox: while female legislators display greater cooperative and altruistic behaviors, they receive less reciprocal backing, limiting their legislative influence. The observed patterns are driven by behavioral gender differences rather than differences in observable characteristics, thematic alignment, or the quality of the politicians.
https://docs.iza.org/dp18559.pdf
IZA DP No. 18576
Carina Neisser, Nils Wehrhöfer:
Outside Income as a Signal: Evidence from Politicians and Voters
Abstract:
We study how public disclosure of politicians’ outside income affects their behavior. We exploit a disclosure reform targeting German federal MPs and tax-return data in a difference-in-differences setup using unaffected state MPs as controls. MPs increase their outside income by 24%, driven by likely right-leaning MPs. A representative survey experiment uncovers that right-leaning voters interpret outside income as a signal of competence and hard work, while left-leaning voters associate it with weaker representation. Consistent with this, we show that newspapers cover right-leaning MPs’ outside activities more favorably. Our findings suggest that politicians strategically use public disclosure as a signaling tool.
https://docs.iza.org/dp18576.pdf
IZA DP No. 18587
Barbara Boelmann, Carola Stapper:
Missing Men and Women’s Demand for Political Representation
Abstract:
We shift the perspective from why men extended political rights to women toward what shaped women’s own demand. Exploiting World War I drafting variation, we study how male absence affected German women’s demand for the franchise. We construct a new panel of all suffragette clubs - a revealed-preference measure given high wartime costs. Women were more likely to keep clubs open where more men were absent, especially where women led war relief efforts, highlighting agency and leadership experience as the central mechanism. Demand persisted after enfranchisement, with more female candidates and higher female turnout in high-absence counties with a wartime club.
https://docs.iza.org/dp18587.pdf
IZA DP No. 18638
Olle Folke, Johanna Rickne:
The Seniority Ceiling: Why Some Immigrants Struggle to Rise in Political Office
Abstract:
First-generation immigrants face a seniority ceiling that limits their political incorporation as candidates and officeholders. Career ladders that require qualification time in lower positions create structural barriers for this group. We use linked data from Swedish electoral ballots and administrative records to examine this idea. A novel identification strategy isolates the effect of seniority-based promotion structures from immigrant-specific disadvantages by comparing immigrants’ incorporation patterns to those of internal movers—native-born Swedes who relocate between municipalities. The seniority ceiling explains about half of the immigrant-native gap in holding political positions and almost the entire gradient of worsening incorporation at higher levels. We find strong selection effects at both the individual and group level. The seniority ceiling restricts incorporation at higher career steps for those with fewer opportunities to accumulate qualification time: those who arrived more recently or at older ages.
https://docs.iza.org/dp18638.pdf
Please find another batch of new papers below. We are taking a short break from these daily alerts to allow new research to accumulate. By waiting until we reach a critical mass of IZA DPs, we can continue to deliver these updates to you in convenient, topic-grouped batches. We will be back in your inbox in a few days, as soon as the next batch is ready.
We value your feedback: Please feel free to contact us at iza...@liser.lu if you have any suggestions regarding our new DP alerts.
These new IZA Discussion Papers are now available online:
DP 18510 - Uberti/Imami/Mendola:
Votes for Work? Job Patronage and Electoral Mobilization in Albania
DP 18527 - Cerqua/Nocito/Pinto:
Pay Incentives to Run for Local Governments
DP 18533 - Fontana/Nannicini/Snyder:
Goodbye, Montesquieu: Executive Spillovers in Judicial Elections
DP 18534 - Mattozzi/Nocito/Sobbrio:
Fact-Checking Politicians
DP 18559 - Frémeaux/Maarek:
Give More, Receive More? Gender and Cooperativeness Among Politicians
DP 18576 - Neisser/Wehrhöfer:
Outside Income as a Signal: Evidence from Politicians and Voters
DP 18587 - Boelmann/Stapper:
Missing Men and Women’s Demand for Political Representation
DP 18638 - Folke/Rickne:
The Seniority Ceiling: Why Some Immigrants Struggle to Rise in Political Office
Please find the abstracts and download links below.
IZA DP No. 18510
Luca Jacopo Uberti, Drini Imami, Mariapia Mendola:
Votes for Work? Job Patronage and Electoral Mobilization in Albania
Abstract:
We study the impact of an election campaign on the labor market outcomes of incumbent party supporters. Using unique data on voters’ political preferences during a pre-election period in Albania and a DiD design that compares the evolution of outcomes among close neighbours, we show that supporting the ruling party significantly increases individuals’ employment and earnings. This labor market premium is particularly large among individuals with low costs of campaign participation, while patronage jobs are concentrated in lower-tier public sector positions. Administrative data further reveal that the allocation of jobs to party supporters is strongly associated with a higher vote share for the incumbent. These findings suggest that parties strategically allocate public employment to reward grassroots supporters and mobilize votes, a practice that fosters corruption and weakens democratic institutions.
https://docs.iza.org/dp18510.pdf
IZA DP No. 18527
Augusto Cerqua, Samuel Nocito, Gabriele Pinto:
Pay Incentives to Run for Local Governments
Abstract:
Local governments in advanced democracies have increasingly struggled to attract political candidates, weakening electoral competition and accountability at the municipal level. While several factors may contribute to this trend, politicians’ salaries represent one of the few policy levers that can be directly adjusted by policymakers. We study a large-scale reform that substantially increased local politicians’ pay, exploiting quasi-experimental variation in election timing across municipalities. We find that higher salaries increase political entry, particularly among first-time candidates. Importantly, effects are heterogeneous across local contexts: in less affluent municipalities and in areas with lower entry barriers, higher pay also raises female candidacies and their probability of election. In the poorest areas, the reform further alters the composition of local political elites, shifting recruitment toward candidates with different educational and occupational backgrounds.
https://docs.iza.org/dp18527.pdf
IZA DP No. 18533
Nicola Fontana, Tommaso Nannicini, James M Snyder:
Goodbye, Montesquieu: Executive Spillovers in Judicial Elections
Abstract:
We study whether the partisan affiliation of U.S. state governors affects the outcome of partisan judicial elections. Exploiting close gubernatorial races from 1946 to 2023, we find that electing a Democratic (Republican) governor significantly increases the subsequent vote share of Democratic (Republican) judicial candidates. This executive spillover effect arises despite the formal institutional independence of the judiciary and holds in contexts with similar levels of polarization and partisanship. Our findings show that, under partisan judicial elections, even narrow shifts in executive power can erode the separation of powers, as some voters adjust their judicial choices in response to the partisan control of the executive. This effect is stronger when executive and legislative powers are unified and when the judicial election occurs soon after the governor's race.
https://docs.iza.org/dp18533.pdf
IZA DP No. 18534
Andrea Mattozzi, Samuel Nocito, Francesco Sobbrio:
Fact-Checking Politicians
Abstract:
We study how politicians respond to the fact-checking of their public statements. Our research design employs a difference-in-differences approach, complemented by a randomized field intervention conducted in collaboration with a leading fact-checking organization. We find that fact-checking discourages politicians from making factually incorrect statements, with effects lasting several weeks. At the same time, we show that fact-checking neither increases nor displaces correct statements. Politicians who are fact-checked tend to substitute incorrect statements with either no statements or unverifiable ones, suggesting that they may also respond by increasing the “ambiguity” of their language to avoid public scrutiny.
https://docs.iza.org/dp18534.pdf
IZA DP No. 18559
Nicolas Frémeaux, Paul Maarek:
Give More, Receive More? Gender and Cooperativeness Among Politicians
Abstract:
This paper investigates gender-based differences in cooperativeness among French parliamentarians by analyzing legislative behaviors, such as cosponsorship and voting patterns. Using a comprehensive dataset covering all bills and amendments authored in France’s Lower House between 2012 and 2022, we show that female parliamentarians attract fewer cosponsors, particularly from members of their own parties, despite being more likely to support their colleagues’ initiatives and exhibit higher voting participation. This asymmetry highlights a paradox: while female legislators display greater cooperative and altruistic behaviors, they receive less reciprocal backing, limiting their legislative influence. The observed patterns are driven by behavioral gender differences rather than differences in observable characteristics, thematic alignment, or the quality of the politicians.
https://docs.iza.org/dp18559.pdf
IZA DP No. 18576
Carina Neisser, Nils Wehrhöfer:
Outside Income as a Signal: Evidence from Politicians and Voters
Abstract:
We study how public disclosure of politicians’ outside income affects their behavior. We exploit a disclosure reform targeting German federal MPs and tax-return data in a difference-in-differences setup using unaffected state MPs as controls. MPs increase their outside income by 24%, driven by likely right-leaning MPs. A representative survey experiment uncovers that right-leaning voters interpret outside income as a signal of competence and hard work, while left-leaning voters associate it with weaker representation. Consistent with this, we show that newspapers cover right-leaning MPs’ outside activities more favorably. Our findings suggest that politicians strategically use public disclosure as a signaling tool.
https://docs.iza.org/dp18576.pdf
IZA DP No. 18587
Barbara Boelmann, Carola Stapper:
Missing Men and Women’s Demand for Political Representation
Abstract:
We shift the perspective from why men extended political rights to women toward what shaped women’s own demand. Exploiting World War I drafting variation, we study how male absence affected German women’s demand for the franchise. We construct a new panel of all suffragette clubs - a revealed-preference measure given high wartime costs. Women were more likely to keep clubs open where more men were absent, especially where women led war relief efforts, highlighting agency and leadership experience as the central mechanism. Demand persisted after enfranchisement, with more female candidates and higher female turnout in high-absence counties with a wartime club.
https://docs.iza.org/dp18587.pdf
IZA DP No. 18638
Olle Folke, Johanna Rickne:
The Seniority Ceiling: Why Some Immigrants Struggle to Rise in Political Office
Abstract:
First-generation immigrants face a seniority ceiling that limits their political incorporation as candidates and officeholders. Career ladders that require qualification time in lower positions create structural barriers for this group. We use linked data from Swedish electoral ballots and administrative records to examine this idea. A novel identification strategy isolates the effect of seniority-based promotion structures from immigrant-specific disadvantages by comparing immigrants’ incorporation patterns to those of internal movers—native-born Swedes who relocate between municipalities. The seniority ceiling explains about half of the immigrant-native gap in holding political positions and almost the entire gradient of worsening incorporation at higher levels. We find strong selection effects at both the individual and group level. The seniority ceiling restricts incorporation at higher career steps for those with fewer opportunities to accumulate qualification time: those who arrived more recently or at older ages.
https://docs.iza.org/dp18638.pdf
IZA DP Alerts | www.iza.org
If you have trouble downloading the papers, or for any other questions regarding the IZA Discussion Paper Series, please contact iza...@liser.lu.
IZA@LISER Network
Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER)
11, Porte des Sciences, L-4366 Esch-sur-Alzette / Belval
Privacy Policy | Manage your subscriptions
If you have trouble downloading the papers, or for any other questions regarding the IZA Discussion Paper Series, please contact iza...@liser.lu.
IZA@LISER Network
Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER)
11, Porte des Sciences, L-4366 Esch-sur-Alzette / Belval
Privacy Policy | Manage your subscriptions
IZA DP Alerts
Jun 5, 2026, 9:23:02 AM (9 days ago) Jun 5
to italo...@gmail.com
Reply all
Reply to author
Forward
0 new messages