Hermeneutical Circle And Hermeneutical Spiral

[Ceola Roefaro]

Thehermeneutic circle (German: hermeneutischer Zirkel) describes the process of understanding a text hermeneutically. It refers to the idea that one's understanding of the text as a whole is established by reference to the individual parts and one's understanding of each individual part by reference to the whole. The circle is a metaphor for the procedure of transforming one's understanding of the part and the whole through iterative recontextualization.

St. Augustine of Hippo was the first philosopher and theologian to have introduced the hermeneutic cycle of faith and reason (in Latin: credo ut intellegam and intellego ut credam). The circle was conceived to improve the Biblical exegesis and it was activated by the personal belief in the truthfulness of God. According to the Confessions, misleading verses of the Bible shall be read at the light of the Holy Spirit God and in the context of "the spirit of the Bible as a whole",[1] intended as a unique and non-contradictory text divinely inspired.[2]

Wilhelm Dilthey used the example of understanding a sentence as an example of the circular course of hermeneutic understanding. He particularly stressed that meaning and meaningfulness were always contextual. Thus the meaning of any sentence cannot be fully interpreted unless we know the historical circumstances of its utterance. And this means that interpretation is always linked to the situation of the interpreter, because one can only construct a history from the particular set of circumstances in which one currently exists. Thus Dilthey says: "Meaningfulness fundamentally grows out of a relation of part to whole that is grounded in the nature of living experience."[5] For Dilthey, "Meaning is not subjective; it is not projection of thought or thinking onto the object; it is a perception of a real relationship within a nexus prior to the subject-object separation in thought."[5][6]

Martin Heidegger (1927) developed the concept of the hermeneutic circle to envision a whole in terms of a reality that was situated in the detailed experience of everyday existence by an individual (the parts). So understanding was developed on the basis of "fore-structures" of understanding, that allow external phenomena to be interpreted in a preliminary way.

Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975) further developed this concept, leading to what is recognized as a break with previous hermeneutic traditions. While Heidegger saw the hermeneutic process as cycles of self-reference that situated our understanding in a priori prejudices, Gadamer reconceptualized the hermeneutic circle as an iterative process through which a new understanding of a whole reality is developed by means of exploring the detail of existence. Gadamer viewed understanding as linguistically mediated, through conversations with others in which reality is explored and an agreement is reached that represents a new understanding.[7] The centrality of conversation to the hermeneutic circle is developed by Donald Schn, who characterizes design as a hermeneutic circle that is developed by means of "a conversation with the situation."[8]

Paul de Man, in his essay "Form and Intent in the American New Criticism," talks about the hermeneutic circle with reference to paradoxical ideas about "textual unity" espoused by and inherited from American criticism. De Man points out that the "textual unity" New Criticism locates in a given work has only a "semi-circularity" and that the hermeneutic circle is completed in "the act of interpreting the text." Combining Gadamer and Heidegger into an epistemological critique of interpretation and reading, de Man argues that with New Criticism, American Criticism "pragmatically entered" the hermeneutic circle, "mistaking it for the organic circularity of natural processes."[9]

Judith N. Shklar (1986) points out the ambiguity in the meaning and function of the "circle" as a metaphor for understanding. It is taken to refer to a geometric circle, rather than a circular process, it seems to imply a center, but it is unclear whether the interpreter him/herself stands there, or whether, on the contrary, some "organizing principle and illuminating principle apart from him [is] there waiting to be discovered."[10] Furthermore, and more problematic for Shklar, "the hermeneutic circle makes sense only if there is a known and closed whole, which can be understood in terms of its own parts and which has as its core God, who is its anchor and creator. Only the Bible really meets these conditions. It is the only possibly wholly self-sufficient text."[10] A further problem relates to the fact that Gadamer and others assume a fixed role for tradition (individual and disciplinary/academic) in the process of any hermeneutic understanding, while it is more accurate to say that interpreters have multiple and sometimes conflicting cultural attachments, yet this does not prevent intercultural and/or interdisciplinary dialogue. Finally, she warns that, at least in social science, interpretation is not a substitute for explanation.

Numerous helpful features and discussions appear which are not often found in works of this genre. Under general hermeneutics, one learns how to chart a book, separate it into paragaphs and diagram the paragraphs. One sees examples of mechanical layouts and arcing. Brief introductions to textual criticism are followed by tips on looking for the most relevant features of Greek and Hebrew grammar. Common semantic fallacies are identified and illustrated, as are methods for distinguishing sense and reference, semantic range, syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships and deep v. surface structure. One learns to translate with dynamic equivalence, performing back transformations, isolating kernel sentences and recombining them in forward transformations. Figures of speech are labelled and categorized (when was the last time you had epizeuxis, zeugma or aposiopesis clearly explained to you?). A balanced use of social-scientific methodology is presented, as are sources for identifying relevant cultural practices of the biblical period, including family customs, athletics and recreation, and music and art.

Hermeneutics is not complete, however, unless one moves from the exegesis of individual passages to syntheses which combine these exegeses to determine the major themes of individual books, then of authors, testaments, and finally of the entire Bible. Part Three thus begins with a method for biblical theology. But this must then give way to valid syntheses for systematic theology and insightful applications for homiletics. Specific principles and strategies are enumerated for each of these tasks. For example, in assessing the supra-cultural value of a particular command of Scripture one must (1) determine the underlying theological principle which dominates the surface application; (2) look to see if the writer is depending on traditional teaching or responding to specific cultural phenomena; (3) ask if the teaching transcends the cultural biases of the author and readers; (4) ascertain if the language of the command contains indicators of a local custom or cultural institution; and (5) notice if the commands are primarily moral or theological in nature, inasmuch as these will be more closely tied to the timeless will of God.

I found this book immensely valuable reading. To be sure, the insights are often uneven in level, varying from highly technical to quite practical, and the prose can often be dense or turgid. But for scholars who want, in summary form, a one-volume introduction to just about everything going on in the world of hermeneutics today, with the necessary references to pursue topics of interest in more detail, Osborne will give them what they want. On the other hand, I found it inconceivable to imagine assigning the book as required reading to any but the most advanced of my divinity students, apart from those engaged in doctoral studies. Doubtless, others can glean valuable insights here and there, but I fear they will be so over-whelmed with the technical detail that they may despair of becoming competent interpreters (or, more likely, they may simply give up on the kind of scholarship represented here as being of any benefit for them). I would be delighted to be proved wrong, but I remain sceptical. Nevertheless, the book deserves a wide readership among scholars and would-be scholars, not least because Osborne demonstrates in exemplary fashion how evangelicals can gain command of an impressive breadth of scholarship and appropriate valid insights from a wide variety of hermeneutical traditions.

I sometimes hear ... of hermeneutical "methods", such as the grammatico-historal approach, or literal-historical approach, or sensus plenior. ... But in the past, I've been more familiar with hermeneutics as a study of how we interpret the text, and what we are doing when we do so. This is more ... tightly linked with fields like epistemology and semiotics, yielding "approaches" to hermeneutics like the hermeneutical circle, horizons of understanding, the new hermeneutic, etc.

There is no objective truth in the text; only what the text says (and does) to you. We must abandon the concept of a univocal meaning, or "what the text really says". Instead of searching for the meaning of a text, one can impart any meaning one likes.

Even this site itself shows us that perspectives and interpretations abound. If you have been convinced (by scripture) that Jesus is Messiah, you will surely interpret the Old Testament with that in mind. Others on this site do not come from that background of interpretation (again, convinced by scripture), and will likely have a very different interpretation. This would be be similarly true for various Christian denominations, issues surrounding sacraments, or gender roles, etc. The very idea of "scripture interprets scripture" used within Christendom only amplifies this idea.

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