[PhilPhys] The Center for Philosophy of Science's January Hybrid Talks

[Center for Phil Sci]

The Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh invites you to join us for our upcoming presentations. All of the lectures will be live streamed on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.   

Lunch Time Talk -  Sandra Mitchell

Friday, January 16 @ 12:00 EST 

Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning. 

Title: A Pragmatist Metaphysics:  The view from somewhere

Abstract:

The “practice turn” in science studies, shifted the philosophical focus from abstract theories to the actual, detailed activities of scientists, emphasizing material, social, and psychological aspects of experiments, representation, and persuasion, to understand how science is done, not just what it claims.  In this talk I will defend a pragmatist, practice grounded approach to what science claims, in particular, what practices support claims of realism.

This talk will be available online:  Zoom:  https://pitt.zoom.us/j/99415310511

 

Featured Former Fellow:  Christopher Hill

Tuesday, January 20 @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EST

Online Only - https://pitt.zoom.us/j/96468072623

Title: A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori

Abstract: 

In this talk I will consider the question of whether we are in some sense justified a priori in believing certain propositions – specifically, explicit definitions, implicit definitions, and fundamental principles of belief revision. I will assume a familiar conception of a priori justification, according to which a belief counts as justified a priori just in case (i) there are non-empirical reasons for adopting it, and (ii) it is immune to revision on empirical grounds. And I will be focusing on pragmatic justification, the form of justification that a belief possesses just in case it serves our practical interests to adopt it and maintain it independently of the stream of empirical data. The talk will argue that propositions of the forementioned kinds are pragmatically justified in this sense. It will also consider whether a priori pragmatic justification can be extended to apply to the laws of logic.

Lunch Time Talk -  Atoosa Kasirzadeh

Friday, January 23 @ 12:00 EST 

Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning. 

Title: How should we think about AI risk?

Abstract:

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems become increasingly integrated into the fabric of society, the discourse regarding their risks has fractured into two primary camps: AI Ethics and AI Safety. The former is perceived to focus on immediate societal harms (such as algorithmic bias and transparency), while the latter is perceived to concentrate on long-term, often existential risks from artificial superintelligence. This dichotomy has created a conceptual and practical schism that hinders effective progress. But do these perceptions justify the dichotomy? In this talk, I argue that this dichotomy is a false choice that overlooks profound theoretical and dynamic overlaps. Building on recent work (Kasirzadeh, 2025; Gyevnar & Kasirzadeh, 2025), I present new computational investigations that bridge these perspectives. I then discuss the ramifications of this investigation for conceptualizing and mitigating AI risks going forward.

This talk will be available online:  Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/95838205595

Lunch Time Talk - Mark Risjord

Tuesday, January 27th @ 12:00 EST 

Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning. 

Title: Diligence and Epistemic Caution: An Impartial Account of Inductive Risk

Abstract:

The gap argument from inductive risk asserts that the uncertainty of induction entails that scientists must decide or choose whether to accept an inductive conclusion as true, and such decisions ought to take into account the costs of error.  This chapter argues that the gap argument is sound only if one makes substantial assumptions about the epistemology of inductive inference.  These assumptions are tendentious and have been rejected by many gap-free accounts of induction.  Using the HUD audit study of racial discrimination in the housing market as a case study, and combining Norton’s material theory of induction with Longino’s social epistemology and the epistemic principle of Inquisitive Due Diligence proposed by Khalifa, Millson, and Risjord, this chapter will sketch a gap-free account of induction.  This account throws new light onto the phenomenon of inductive risk, showing how scientific inquiry can (and should) be epistemically cautious when the stakes are high without giving up impartiality.

This talk will be available  Zoom:   https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93939687549

Annual Lecture Series – Felipe De Brigard

Friday, January 23 @ 3:00 EST 

Attend in person in room 1008 in the Cathedral of Learning (10th Floor) 

Title: Remembering as Inverse Causal Inference

Abstract:

The causalism/simulationism debate has become central in contemporary philosophy of memory. Recently, however, I have suggested that the debate is largely ill conceived and have offered instead a particular view of memory reconstruction that, I think, can reconcile a causal and a simulationist view of remembering (De Brigard, 2023). The current paper seeks to elaborate on that suggestion by pursuing two aims. The first one is to clearly articulate why the debate between causalism and simulationism is ill conceived. The second aim is to show how the version of remembering I defend can provide an answer to the causal question that makes causation central to the nature of memory, but in a way that is different from how it features in the causalism/simulationism debate.

Can’t make it in-person? This talk will available online through the following:

 Zoom:  https://pitt.zoom.us/j/95458080464 and 

YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.

[Center for Phil Sci]

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[Center for Phil Sci via spsp-members]

The Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh
invites you to join us for our upcoming presentations. All of the lectures
will be live streamed on YouTube at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg

<https://nam12.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fchannel%2FUCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg&data=05%7C02%7CSnodgrassC%40pitt.edu%7Cf18c65bf2bf045cdfa0008de51da8600%7C9ef9f489e0a04eeb87cc3a526112fd0d%7C1%7C0%7C639038196219882568%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=RO3ugxBwo%2BfuEAJ2%2B6TywQvGxuSErtGgj3X34gqGjus%3D&reserved=0>.

*Lunch Time Talk - Sandra Mitchell**Friday, January 16 @ 12:00 EST *Join

us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.

*Title: A Pragmatist Metaphysics: The view from somewhere*
*Abstract:*

The “practice turn” in science studies, shifted the philosophical focus
from abstract theories to the actual, detailed activities of scientists,
emphasizing material, social, and psychological aspects of experiments,
representation, and persuasion, to understand how science is done, not just
what it claims. In this talk I will defend a pragmatist, practice grounded
approach to what science claims, in particular, what practices support
claims of realism.
This talk will be available online: Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/99415310511

Featured Former Fellow: Christopher Hill
Tuesday, January 20 @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EST

*Online Only **- *https://pitt.zoom.us/j/96468072623
*Title: A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori*
*Abstract: *

In this talk I will consider the question of whether we are in some sense
justified a priori in believing certain propositions – specifically,
explicit definitions, implicit definitions, and fundamental principles of
belief revision. I will assume a familiar conception of a priori
justification, according to which a belief counts as justified a priori
just in case (i) there are non-empirical reasons for adopting it, and (ii)
it is immune to revision on empirical grounds. And I will be focusing on
pragmatic justification, the form of justification that a belief possesses
just in case it serves our practical interests to adopt it and maintain it
independently of the stream of empirical data. The talk will argue that
propositions of the forementioned kinds are pragmatically justified in this
sense. It will also consider whether a priori pragmatic justification can
be extended to apply to the laws of logic.

*Lunch Time Talk -
<https://www.hps.pitt.edu/people/sandra-mitchell>Atoosa Kasirzadeh**Friday,
January 23 @ 12:00 EST *Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of
the Cathedral of Learning.
*Title: How should we think about AI risk?*
*Abstract:*

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems become increasingly integrated into
the fabric of society, the discourse regarding their risks has fractured
into two primary camps: AI Ethics and AI Safety. The former is perceived to
focus on immediate societal harms (such as algorithmic bias and
transparency), while the latter is perceived to concentrate on long-term,
often existential risks from artificial superintelligence. This dichotomy
has created a conceptual and practical schism that hinders effective
progress. But do these perceptions justify the dichotomy? In this talk, I
argue that this dichotomy is a false choice that overlooks profound
theoretical and dynamic overlaps. Building on recent work (Kasirzadeh, 2025

<https://nam12.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2Farticle%2F10.1007%2Fs11098-025-02301-3&data=05%7C02%7CAHT59%40pitt.edu%7Cded2540fa3ff49d21f1a08de51fc3500%7C9ef9f489e0a04eeb87cc3a526112fd0d%7C1%7C0%7C639038340831870034%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=uaaznf5%2F1zBT6b0h4b05JnfP0R4lR82j4xs78iNy7rM%3D&reserved=0>
; Gyevnar & Kasirzadeh, 2025
<https://nam12.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nature.com%2Farticles%2Fs42256-025-01020-y&data=05%7C02%7CAHT59%40pitt.edu%7Cded2540fa3ff49d21f1a08de51fc3500%7C9ef9f489e0a04eeb87cc3a526112fd0d%7C1%7C0%7C639038340831894888%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=iPNzXl31ucWIrDBTacwFsjOrmYA%2FQGfHqAagjPcyBb4%3D&reserved=0>),

I present new computational investigations that bridge these perspectives.
I then discuss the ramifications of this investigation for conceptualizing
and mitigating AI risks going forward.
This talk will be available online: Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/95838205595

*Lunch Time Talk - Mark Risjord**Tuesday, January 27th @ 12:00 EST *Join us

in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning.

*Title: Diligence and Epistemic Caution: An Impartial Account of Inductive
Risk*
*Abstract:*

The gap argument from inductive risk asserts that the uncertainty of
induction entails that scientists must decide or choose whether to accept
an inductive conclusion as true, and such decisions ought to take into
account the costs of error. This chapter argues that the gap argument is
sound only if one makes substantial assumptions about the epistemology of
inductive inference. These assumptions are tendentious and have been
rejected by many gap-free accounts of induction. Using the HUD audit study
of racial discrimination in the housing market as a case study, and
combining Norton’s material theory of induction with Longino’s social
epistemology and the epistemic principle of Inquisitive Due Diligence
proposed by Khalifa, Millson, and Risjord, this chapter will sketch a
gap-free account of induction. This account throws new light onto the
phenomenon of inductive risk, showing how scientific inquiry can (and
should) be epistemically cautious when the stakes are high without giving
up impartiality.
This talk will be available Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93939687549

<https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93939687549>

*Annual Lecture Series – Felipe De Brigard**Friday, January 23 @ 3:00
EST *Attend

in person in room 1008 in the Cathedral of Learning (10th Floor)

*Title: Remembering as Inverse Causal Inference*
*Abstract:*

The causalism/simulationism debate has become central in contemporary
philosophy of memory. Recently, however, I have suggested that the debate
is largely ill conceived and have offered instead a particular view of
memory reconstruction that, I think, can reconcile a causal and a
simulationist view of remembering (De Brigard, 2023). The current paper
seeks to elaborate on that suggestion by pursuing two aims. The first one
is to clearly articulate why the debate between causalism and simulationism
is ill conceived. The second aim is to show how the version of remembering
I defend can provide an answer to the causal question that makes causation
central to the nature of memory, but in a way that is different from how it
features in the causalism/simulationism debate.

*Can’t make it in-person? This talk will available online through the
following:*
* Zoom: *https://pitt.zoom.us/j/95458080464 and
YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.
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[Center for Phil Sci]

The Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh invites you to join us for our upcoming presentations. All of the lectures will be live streamed on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.   

Lunch Time Talk -  Sandra Mitchell

Friday, January 16 @ 12:00 EST 

Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning. 

Title: A Pragmatist Metaphysics:  The view from somewhere

Abstract:

The “practice turn” in science studies, shifted the philosophical focus from abstract theories to the actual, detailed activities of scientists, emphasizing material, social, and psychological aspects of experiments, representation, and persuasion, to understand how science is done, not just what it claims.  In this talk I will defend a pragmatist, practice grounded approach to what science claims, in particular, what practices support claims of realism.

This talk will be available online:  Zoom:  https://pitt.zoom.us/j/99415310511

 

Featured Former Fellow:  Christopher Hill

Tuesday, January 20 @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EST

Online Only - https://pitt.zoom.us/j/96468072623

Title: A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori

Abstract: 

In this talk I will consider the question of whether we are in some sense justified a priori in believing certain propositions – specifically, explicit definitions, implicit definitions, and fundamental principles of belief revision. I will assume a familiar conception of a priori justification, according to which a belief counts as justified a priori just in case (i) there are non-empirical reasons for adopting it, and (ii) it is immune to revision on empirical grounds. And I will be focusing on pragmatic justification, the form of justification that a belief possesses just in case it serves our practical interests to adopt it and maintain it independently of the stream of empirical data. The talk will argue that propositions of the forementioned kinds are pragmatically justified in this sense. It will also consider whether a priori pragmatic justification can be extended to apply to the laws of logic.

Lunch Time Talk -  Atoosa Kasirzadeh

Friday, January 23 @ 12:00 EST 

Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning. 

Title: How should we think about AI risk?

Abstract:

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems become increasingly integrated into the fabric of society, the discourse regarding their risks has fractured into two primary camps: AI Ethics and AI Safety. The former is perceived to focus on immediate societal harms (such as algorithmic bias and transparency), while the latter is perceived to concentrate on long-term, often existential risks from artificial superintelligence. This dichotomy has created a conceptual and practical schism that hinders effective progress. But do these perceptions justify the dichotomy? In this talk, I argue that this dichotomy is a false choice that overlooks profound theoretical and dynamic overlaps. Building on recent work (Kasirzadeh, 2025; Gyevnar & Kasirzadeh, 2025), I present new computational investigations that bridge these perspectives. I then discuss the ramifications of this investigation for conceptualizing and mitigating AI risks going forward.

This talk will be available online:  Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/95838205595

Lunch Time Talk - Mark Risjord

Tuesday, January 27th @ 12:00 EST 

Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning. 

Title: Diligence and Epistemic Caution: An Impartial Account of Inductive Risk

Abstract:

The gap argument from inductive risk asserts that the uncertainty of induction entails that scientists must decide or choose whether to accept an inductive conclusion as true, and such decisions ought to take into account the costs of error.  This chapter argues that the gap argument is sound only if one makes substantial assumptions about the epistemology of inductive inference.  These assumptions are tendentious and have been rejected by many gap-free accounts of induction.  Using the HUD audit study of racial discrimination in the housing market as a case study, and combining Norton’s material theory of induction with Longino’s social epistemology and the epistemic principle of Inquisitive Due Diligence proposed by Khalifa, Millson, and Risjord, this chapter will sketch a gap-free account of induction.  This account throws new light onto the phenomenon of inductive risk, showing how scientific inquiry can (and should) be epistemically cautious when the stakes are high without giving up impartiality.

This talk will be available  Zoom:   https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93939687549

Annual Lecture Series – Felipe De Brigard

Friday, January 23 @ 3:00 EST 

Attend in person in room 1008 in the Cathedral of Learning (10th Floor) 

Title: Remembering as Inverse Causal Inference

Abstract:

The causalism/simulationism debate has become central in contemporary philosophy of memory. Recently, however, I have suggested that the debate is largely ill conceived and have offered instead a particular view of memory reconstruction that, I think, can reconcile a causal and a simulationist view of remembering (De Brigard, 2023). The current paper seeks to elaborate on that suggestion by pursuing two aims. The first one is to clearly articulate why the debate between causalism and simulationism is ill conceived. The second aim is to show how the version of remembering I defend can provide an answer to the causal question that makes causation central to the nature of memory, but in a way that is different from how it features in the causalism/simulationism debate.

Can’t make it in-person? This talk will available online through the following:

 Zoom:  https://pitt.zoom.us/j/95458080464 and 

YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.

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