New journal: Asian Journal of Philosophy (Springer)

[ISHPSS]

From: Nikolaj Pedersen <nikolaj...@GMAIL.COM>

Dear all,

We are pleased to announce the launching of the Asian Journal of Philosophy—a new Asia-based journal published by Springer. 

The journal publishes high-quality articles in any area of analytic philosophy, but with an emphasis on epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, meta-ethics, value theory, action theory, and the philosophies of mind, language, logic, technology, and mathematics.

The mission of Asian Journal of Philosophy is to serve as a leading platform for analytic philosophy in Asia both in an inward and in an outward sense. Within Asia the journal aims to be a visible go-to outlet for analytic philosophers to communicate high-quality research and share it with the global community. Outside Asia the journal aims to  serve as an authoritative reflection of cutting-edge research in Asia and as an attractive publication outlet for promoting scholarly work to the large community of researchers working in the region. 

An event series has been organized in order to mark the launching of the journal. The series is generously sponsored by Underwood International College, Yonsei University. For details concerning the events series please see below. 

Editor-in-Chief: Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (UIC, Yonsei University). 

Associate Editors: Jie Gao (Zhejiang University), Masashi Kasaki (Hiroshima University), Weng Hong Tang (National University of Singapore). 

Website: https://www.springer.com/journal/44204 

Please direct enquiries to nikolaj...@gmail.com 

Monday, October 18, 8.00 - 9.30pm (UTC+08.00): 

• Jiaming Chen (Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Shanghai Jiao Tong University): Epistemology in China: From Confucianism to the Present.

• Registration: https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZIvce6srzsoG9bkuwbOGsTTNtylV2vNZAtC 

Monday, November 1, 8.00 - 11.00pm (UTC+08.00): 

• Mona Simion (Professor of Philosophy, University of Glasgow): A Puzzle for the Normativity of Inquiry. 
• Hiu Chuk Winnie Sung (Associate Professor of Philosophy, Nanyang Technological University): Ratiocination.

• Registration: https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZ0kdeiuqjsrGdOAOgPkl0FxYXk2Zwwm_eqO

Wednesday, November 17, 9.00 - 10.30am (UTC+08.00): 

• Gila Sher (Professor of Philosophy, University of California San Diego): Truth as a Human Value. 
• Registration: https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZYtfu6rpz8iEtVvRSixWiVtQ_b__Q16yaVT

Wednesday, December 8, 9.00am - 1.00pm (UTC+08.00): 

• Truth in Asian Philosophy.
• Laura Guerrero (College of William and Mary).
• Alexus McLeod (University of Connecticut).

• Jamin Asay (University of Hong Kong) and Frank Saunders Jr. (Yonsei University).

• Registration: https://us02web.zoom.us/meeting/register/tZYoc-2uqTIjHtzKP4ziGMk2xp8XCZ-ZNNJi

Abstract for Chen, Simion, Sung, and Sher:

Jiaming Chen: Epistemology in China: From Confucianism to the Present

The first part of this lecture will focus on the debating question of whether there is epistemology in traditional Chinese philosophy. It argues that there is no epistemology of "knowing that" in Confucianism, but there is epistemology of "knowing how", and discusses its impact on traditional Chinese philosophy, especially to explain “the Needham question” of why modern science did not happen in China. The second part will discuss that as Western learning spread to the east, in the first half of the last century, epistemological studies and writings in the sense of Western philosophy appeared in China, and comments on the writing of its representative Jin Yuelin. Finally, the lecture will introduce the research situation of epistemology in China today.

Mona Simion: A Puzzle for the Normativity of Inquiry. 

This talk looks at a puzzle affecting views that take epistemic norms to be zetetic norms - i.e. norms of inquiry: since garden variety epistemic norms and straightforward norms of inquiry often come in conflict, and since it is implausible, for any given normative domain, that it should be such that it is peppered with internal normative conflict, it cannot be that epistemic norms are inquiry norms. I look at three ways to escape the puzzle, I argue that they don't work, and put forth my own account. On this view, one is only the subject of epistemic normativity proper insofar as one is in a position to know. As such, I argue, normative conflicts do not arise in situations in which one is not in a position to know that p in virtue of inquiring into whether q.

Hiu Chuk Winnie Sung: Ratiocination.

In this paper, I develop an account of ratiocination and argue that the conclusion of ratiocination is the subject judging that she ought to believe that p. I start by suggesting that the way a reasoner’s mind moves in ratiocination is different from the way her mind moves in non-ratiocinative reasoning. Such a difference should motivate an analysis that focuses exclusively on ratiocination. In the first section, I provide a general characterisation of ratiocination and distinguish it from non-self-conscious reasoning. I then argue that given the kind of activity that ratiocination is, the conclusion of ratiocination is I ought to believe p. Finally, I address possible objections to the account and explain why my account does not undermine our general understanding of the nature of theoretical reasoning.

Gila Sher: Truth as a Human Value. 

What is the truth about truth? What is the truth about what truth is and where its importance for human life and human civilization lies? Are deflationists right when they argue that truth is deflationary and its main importance lies in the fact that the truth predicate is a useful technical device for oblique endorsement and generalization? Or are substantivists right when they say that truth is substantive and its main importance lies in something altogether different? In this paper I suggest that the key to understanding what truth is is understanding its importance for human life and civilization, that to understand the latter we need to find a proper perspective from which to understand it, that the present crisis of truth ‒ the “post-truth” crisis ‒ provides such a perspective, and that this perspective sets a new adequacy condition for the philosophy of truth. This adequacy condition, in turn, suggests a new answer to the question what truth is and where its importance lies: truth is, in the first place, a human value and its importance to our life/civilization lies, not exclusively, but principally, in the centrality of this value to our humanity.

--
Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen

Professor of Philosophy
Underwood International College
Yonsei University

Asian Journal of Philosophy, Editor-in-Chief

Web: http://www.nikolajpedersen.com
Academia: http://yonsei.academia.edu/NikolajJangLeeLindingPedersen
Asian Journal of Philosophy: https://www.springer.com/journal/44204