Conference: The Nature
of Quantum Objects
University of Geneva, November 11-13, 2021
Call for Participation
This will be a hybrid (in person/zoom) event. If you would
like to attend,
please register here: https://forms.gle/HcEjyprDjugSDTt6A
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Speakers:
Tomasz Bigaj (Warsaw)
Elise Crull (CUNY)
David A. Glick (UC Davis)
Gabrielle Kerbel & Nina Emery (Mount
Holyoke)
Vera Matarese (Bern)
Matteo Morganti (Roma Tre)
Paul M. Näger (Münster)
Tom Pashby (U Chicago)
Bryan W. Roberts (LSE)
Vanessa Seifert (Bristol)
Alessandro Torza (UNAM)
Alastair Wilson (Birmingham)
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Schedule:
(all times UTC+1:00)
Thursday, November 11, 2021
9-10:15am: Tom
Pashby: TBA
10:30-11h45am: Vanessa
Seifert: Are molecules quantum objects?
12-1:15pm: Bryan
W. Roberts: Matter-Antimatter Exchange as a
Spacetime Symmetry
1:15pm-2:45pm: Lunch
break
2:45pm-4pm: Alessandro
Torza: Derivative Metaphysical Indeterminacy and
Quantum Physics
4:15pm-5:30pm: David
A. Glick: Determinacy as a Desideratum
Friday, November 12, 2021
9:30-10:45am: Paul
M. Näger: The Mereological Problem
of Entanglement
11am-12:15pm: Elise
Crull: Existence Monism from Bare
Quantum Theory
12:15-1:45pm: Lunch
break
1:45-3pm: Matteo
Morganti: Quantum Objects and HaecceitismAlastair
3:15-4:30pm: Gabrielle
Kerbel and Nina Emery: Configuration Space
Realism and Fundamentality
Saturday,
November 13, 2021
9-10:15am: Vera
Matarese: Quantum Fictionalism
10:30-11h45am: Tomasz
Bigaj: Are Quantum Objects Individuals? Why
Should We Care?
12-1:15pm: Alastair Wilson: Fundamentality
and Levels in Everettian Quantum Mechanics
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Abstracts:
Tomasz Bigaj: Are Quantum
Objects Individuals? Why Should We Care?
Abstract TBA.
Elise Crull: Existence Monism from bare quantum theory
Recent work in fundamental mereology tends to consider
the debate between priority monism and priority pluralism
“the only game in town”. Both views take
metaphysical dependence relations (of some kind or other) to
be primitive, and both views make important use of quantum
physics. In this talk I shall try to establish a more
controversial position: Existence Monism. I do this in two
(largely independent) steps: the first is to argue that
quantum physics, construed in an interpretation-neutral way,
raises serious problems for metaphysical dependence
relations as primitive. This undercuts the ``priority’’
qualifier. The second step is to support monism over
pluralism by defending it from the significant objections
raised in Calosi (2014) and Tallant & Baron (2018).
This defense will again call upon central features of
interpretation-neutral quantum theory.
David Glick: Determinacy as a Desideratum
Some have alleged that quantum theory involves metaphysical
indeterminacy. However, this metaphysical claim is
underdetermined—there are accounts of quantum theory that
posit metaphysical indeterminacy and others that do not.
Fortunately, theoretical virtues can help us to resolve this
case of underdetermination. Versions of quantum theory that
posit metaphysical indeterminacy will be less simple or less
informative than their indeterminacy-free
counterparts. Moreover, positing metaphysical indeterminacy
does not provide a clear gain in explanatory power, contrary
to the suggestion of Calosi and Wilson (2021). Thus,
determinacy is a desideratum in an interpretation of quantum
theory.
Gabrielle Kerbel and
Nina Emery: Configuration Space Realism
and Fundamentality
Configuration space realism is an account of
quantum ontology according to which the wavefunction
represents a field in a high-dimensional space. We present a
version of configuration space realism that has largely been
overlooked in the literature to date and argue that this
version should be taken just as seriously as the standard
version. Along the way we show how choosing between these
different versions of configuration space realism will turn
on philosophically nuanced questions about the nature of
grounding, the importance of separability and locality, and
the role of explanation in metaphysics and physics.
Vera Matarese: Quantum Fictionalism
Are there quantum objects? While
representationalists respond in the affirmative, claiming
that quantum states directly represent quantum beables,
pragmatists and operationalists respond in the negative, the
former interpreting quantum states only prescriptively, the
latter as just calculation tools. In this talk, I propose a
fictionalist view to account for the nature of quantum
objects. The core idea is that quantum objects do not
physically exist, and yet they have an explanatory power
that underwrites the kind of explanations normally given by
representationalists.
Matteo Morganti: Quantum Objects and Haecceitism
In the debate about the metaphysical status of the
entities described by non-relativistic quantum mechanics,
two arguments are traditionally used in favour of the
‘Received View’ that quantum objects are non-individuals:
one having to do with the Identity of the Indiscernibles,
the other with quantum statistics and haecceitism. While the
former has been the object of intense discussion as of late,
the latter has received comparatively little attention. It
basically amounts to the following: if quantum objects
were individuals, then many-particle systems of
‘indistinguishable particles’ would give rise to
haecceitistic differences – i.e., exactly similar physical
states that only differ with respect to which particle is
which; quantum statistics doesn’t exhibit such haecceitistic
differences; hence, quantum objects are not individuals.
This argument certainly looks compelling. However, upon
scrutiny, it turns out to be less straightforward than it
seems. Here, I will reconstruct the argument in detail, and
look at ways to steer clear of its conclusion.
Paul Näger: The mereological problem of entanglement
It is well-known that the entangled quantum state of
a composite object cannot be reduced to the states of its
parts. This quantum holism provides a peculiar challenge
to formulate an appropriate mereological model: When
a system is in an entangled state, which objects are there
on the micro and macro level, and which of the objects
carries which properties? This paper chooses a modeling
approach to answer these questions: It proceeds from a
systematic overview of consistent mereological models for
entangled systems and discusses which of them is compatible
with the quantum mechanical evidence (where quantum states
are understood realistically). It reveals that entangled
quantum systems neither describe undivided wholes nor
objects that stand in irreducible relations. The appropriate
model assumes that the entangled property is an irreducible
non-relational plural property carried collectively by the
micro objects, while there is no macro object. In this
sense, quantum holism is an instance of property holism, not
of object holism.
Tom Pashby: TBA
Bryan Roberts: Matter-Antimatter Exchange as a
Spacetime Symmetry
I argue that the correct local spacetime symmetry group
is not the Poincaré group, but its universal covering
group SL(2,C). Viewing the local existence of a quantum
object in spacetime as a representation of a symmetry group,
this provides an elegant explanation of the relationship
between matter, antimatter, and spacetime: that
matter-antimatter exchange is an automorphism of the local
spacetime symmetries.
Vanessa Seifert: Are molecules quantum objects?
Abstract
TBA.
Alessandro Torza: Derivative metaphysical indeterminacy and quantum
physics
It will be argued that quantum indeterminacy can be
construed as a merely derivative phenomenon. The possibility
of merely derivative quantum indeterminacy undermines both a
recent argument against quantum indeterminacy due to David
Glick, and an argument against the possibility of merely
derivative indeterminacy due to Elizabeth Barnes.
Alastair Wilson: Fundamentality and Levels in Everettian Quantum
Mechanics
Distinctions in fundamentality between different levels
of description are central to the viability of
contemporary decoherence-based Everettian quantum mechanics
(EQM). This approach to quantum theory characteristically
combines a precise fundamental reality (one universal
wavefunction) with an imprecise emergent reality (multiple
decoherent worlds). I explore how the Everettian appeal
to fundamentality and emergence fits within
extant metaphysical frameworks, identify grounding and
concept fundamentality as promising analytical tools, and
use them to characterize a system of explanatory levels
(with associated laws of nature) for EQM. This Everettian
level structure encompasses and extends the ‘classical’
levels structure comprising levels of physics, chemistry,
biology, etc., which are recaptured through a correspondence
with levels of explanation for the emergent quasi-classical
worlds in EQM. There is however a new kind of fundamental
level invoked by EQM, a level below any previously
recognised classical level; I argue that this level is novel
since it is best understood as physically (indeed
metaphysically) non-contingent. This result blocks
supervenience-based accounts of levels from applying to EQM.
Another contrast with classical level structures arises from
the irreducibly self-locating element to probabilities in
EQM; I argue that the role of self-location gives rise to an
additional novel explanatory level within the overall
Everettian levels picture.
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David Schroeren