[PhilPhys] Upcoming Talks - David Barack 11/11, Jonathan Fuller 11/14, Kate Finley 11/18, Samuel Schindler 11/21, Lucy Mason 12/2, and Armin Schulz 12/5
Center for Phil Sci
Lunch Time Talk - David Barack - https://dbarack.com/
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning at the University of Pittsburgh.
Much contemporary philosophy seeks to answer the question, what is disease? Yet, more so than ‘disease’ attribution, diagnosis is one of the central concerns of medicine, and philosophers have only just begun to articulate and offer answers to problems of medical diagnosis that should be field-defining for the philosophy of medicine. What is diagnosis? And what is its purpose? Some have argued that diagnosis aims to causally explain the ills that bring people to medical attention, as an answer to a ‘why?’ question. I offer an instrumentalist alternative, in which diagnosis is an answer to a ‘what’s wrong?’ question that seeks to usefully classify medical conditions to achieve instrumental benefit. Understanding the nature and aim of diagnosis will allow us to clarify several concepts currently receiving much-deserved medical and societal attention such as diagnostic error, diagnostic excellence, and overdiagnosis.
Join us in person in room 1008 on the 10th floor of the Cathedral of Learning at the University of Pittsburgh.
This talk will also be streamed through Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/99923676453.
Title: What’s in a diagnosis? Towards a philosophy of diagnostic medicine
Abstract:
Much contemporary philosophy seeks to answer the question, what is disease? Yet, more so than ‘disease’ attribution, diagnosis is one of the central concerns of medicine, and philosophers have only just begun to articulate and offer answers to problems of medical diagnosis that should be field-defining for the philosophy of medicine. What is diagnosis? And what is its purpose? Some have argued that diagnosis aims to causally explain the ills that bring people to medical attention, as an answer to a ‘why?’ question. I offer an instrumentalist alternative, in which diagnosis is an answer to a ‘what’s wrong?’ question that seeks to usefully classify medical conditions to achieve instrumental benefit. Understanding the nature and aim of diagnosis will allow us to clarify several concepts currently receiving much-deserved medical and societal attention such as diagnostic error, diagnostic excellence, and overdiagnosis.
A reception with light refreshments will follow in The Center on the 11th floor from 5-6pm.
Lunch Time Talk - Kate Finley - https://www.kate-finley.com/
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor.
Featured Former Fellow – Samuel Schindler - https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/event/featured-former-fellow-samuel-schindler/
Lunch Time Talk - Lucy Mason - https://www.lucymason.co.uk/
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning at the University of Pittsburgh.
Lunch Time Talk - Armin Schulz -http://arminwschulz.com/
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor.
Center for Phil Sci
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Center for Phil Sci via spsp-members
invites you to join us for our upcoming lectures. All lectures will be live
streamed on YouTube at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg.
Lunch Time Talk - David Barack - https://dbarack.com/
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning at the University of Pittsburgh.
This talk will be available online: Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/98752433663
Title: Neural Doctrines
Abstract:
Much contemporary philosophy seeks to answer the question, what is disease?
Yet, more so than ‘disease’ attribution, diagnosis is one of the central
concerns of medicine, and philosophers have only just begun to articulate
and offer answers to problems of medical diagnosis that should be
field-defining for the philosophy of medicine. What is diagnosis? And what
is its purpose? Some have argued that diagnosis aims to causally explain
the ills that bring people to medical attention, as an answer to a ‘why?’
question. I offer an instrumentalist alternative, in which diagnosis is an
answer to a ‘what’s wrong?’ question that seeks to usefully classify
medical conditions to achieve instrumental benefit. Understanding the
nature and aim of diagnosis will allow us to clarify several concepts
currently receiving much-deserved medical and societal attention such as
diagnostic error, diagnostic excellence, and overdiagnosis.
*Annual Lecture Series – Jonathan Fuller -*
https://www.hps.pitt.edu/people/jonathan-fuller
*Friday, November 14th @ 3:30 pm - 6:00 pm EST*
Join us in person in room 1008 on the 10th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning at the University of Pittsburgh. This talk will also be streamed
through Zoom: https://pitt.zoom.us/j/99923676453.
*Title: *What’s in a diagnosis? Towards a philosophy of diagnostic medicine
Abstract:
Much contemporary philosophy seeks to answer the question, what is disease?
Yet, more so than ‘disease’ attribution, diagnosis is one of the central
concerns of medicine, and philosophers have only just begun to articulate
and offer answers to problems of medical diagnosis that should be
field-defining for the philosophy of medicine. What is diagnosis? And what
is its purpose? Some have argued that diagnosis aims to causally explain
the ills that bring people to medical attention, as an answer to a ‘why?’
question. I offer an instrumentalist alternative, in which diagnosis is an
answer to a ‘what’s wrong?’ question that seeks to usefully classify
medical conditions to achieve instrumental benefit. Understanding the
nature and aim of diagnosis will allow us to clarify several concepts
currently receiving much-deserved medical and societal attention such as
diagnostic error, diagnostic excellence, and overdiagnosis.
*A reception with light refreshments will follow in The Center on the 11th
floor from 5-6pm.*
*Lunch Time Talk - Kate Finley -* https://www.kate-finley.com/
*Tuesday, November 18th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm*
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor.
This talk will be available online: Zoom:
<https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93343893801>https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93343893801
Title: Mechanisms & Machine Metaphors in Psychiatry
Abstract:
The concept of ‘mechanism’ is ubiquitous in psychiatric research and
practice – yet its intended meaning is often underspecified. While more
minimal New Mechanist accounts avoid the conceptual baggage of machine
metaphors and analogies, I argue that the ambiguous usage of mechanism
concepts in psychiatry creates a conceptual void which prompts defaulting
to intuitive machine metaphors and associated interpretive tendencies.
Specifically, we see an uninterrogated drift from appeals to mechanistic
structures and processes to models and explanatory frameworks implicitly
structured by this thicker, metaphorically-laden understanding of
mechanism. I will then trace the implications of this for psychiatric
research methodology, clinical assessment, and patient self-conception –
illustrating how the deterministic and reductionistic tendencies often
associated with biogenetic accounts of mental disorder emerge not from the
accounts themselves, but rather from the machine-metaphor framework through
which they are interpreted. I will conclude by proposing an alternative
framework to counteract some of the problematic associations of this
dominant metaphor.
*Featured Former Fellow – Samuel Schindler **- *
https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/event/featured-former-fellow-samuel-schindler/
*Friday, November 21st @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EST*
This talk is *online-only*. Follow along via Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97096992508
Title: On the Limits of AI-driven Discovery in Science
Abstract:
There has been much enthusiasm among the public general about recent
developments in AI. The enthusiasm is echoed among scientists, culminating
in the Nobel Prize for AlphaFold. In this paper, I want to dampen this
enthusiasm slightly and articulate limits on attempts to make AI-driven
scientific discoveries – understood as discoveries of new phenomena rather
than ideas. To get a sense of the limitations of AI-driven discovery, I
compare machine learning to standard scientific instrumentation and argue
that the much-discussed opacity of machine learning restricts our ability
to distinguish signal from noise. This constitutes a problem for both
“target-specific” and “target-unspecific” learning regimes, but especially
for the latter – arguably the more promising regime for the discovery of
yet unknown phenomena – and gives rise to what I call the Aggravated
Artifact Problem.
This talk is *online-only*. Follow along via Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/97096992508
Lunch Time Talk - Lucy Mason - https://www.lucymason.co.uk/
*Tuesday, December 2nd @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm*
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of
Learning at the University of Pittsburgh.
This talk will be available online: Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93490558315
Title: Methodological Intersubjectivity
Abstract:
The practical methodology of performing measurements undoubtedly makes
important contributions to creating intersubjective agreement between
scientific agents. Intersubjectivity has become a question of interest for
understanding relational, perspectival, or agent-based interpretations of
physical theories (such as relativity and quantum mechanics), which face
the challenge of explaining intersubjective coordination between
perspectives. It is hence important to examine what bearing methodological
intersubjectivity has on these issues. I will define methodological
intersubjectivity, drawing on the ideas of intersecting and interlacing
from the perspectival realism literature but applying it to individual
physical perspectives rather than scientific communities. As a case study,
I will apply this definition to time measurements in relativistic theories,
looking at how time measurements are globally coordinated, at how we
construct artificial perspectives, and at the inferences needed to produce
agreed-upon time values. This will highlight the role of agency in creating
intersubjectivity and the difficulties of modelling this within physics.
Lunch Time Talk - Armin Schulz -http://arminwschulz.com/
*Friday, December 5th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm*
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor.
This talk will be available online: Zoom:
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94110795330
Title: Agency: The Case for an Eliminative Pluralism
Abstract:
Concepts of agency are invoked in many different sciences, from
evolutionary biology to computer science and economics. In order to
understand and assess the work in these sciences, therefore, it is crucial
to understand these appeals to “agency.” To make progress in this, this
paper makes the case for three interrelated conclusions. First, the best
way to understand the question about the nature of agency is as an account
that lays out defensible scientific uses of the concept of agency—not a
purely metaphysical-philosophical account, or a purely interpretationist
account. Second, the paper seeks to show that there is not one right answer
about what an agent is—that is, we should be eliminativists about the
general concept of agency. Third, though, it also shows that this should
not be conflated with the view that anything goes as far as agency is
concerned: in specific scientific contexts, such as economics and biology,
there are more and less defensible views of agency in that context. That
is, we should be scientific pluralists about agency.
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Center for Phil Sci
Lunch Time Talk - David Barack - https://dbarack.com/
Join us in person in room 1117 on the 11th floor of the Cathedral of Learning at the University of Pittsburgh.
The Neuron Doctrine has long guided neuroscientific research into the brain’s functioning, both cognitive and otherwise. The Neuron Doctrine suggests that single neurons functionally contribute to cognition. However, there are decades of findings about the brain basis of cognition that involve more than a single neuron or do not involve neurons at all. While neural phenomena associated with cognition span a wide range of spatiotemporal scales and types of entities, including neurons, populations, glia, synapses, ion flows and much more, the Neuron Doctrine has proved resilient. This is in part because the doctrine proves to be surprisingly adaptable. In this talk, I state the Neuron Doctrine for cognition, clarify the sense in which neurons functionally contribute to cognition, illustrate sufficient conditions for some evidence to count against the doctrine, and explain the doctrine’s resilience and adaptability.
Center for Phil Sci
This email list is brought to you by HOPOS, the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science. In order to support the list and our other activities, please consider donating to https://subfill.uchicago.edu/JournalPubs/Donation.aspx?webpub=hop
For questions about HOPOS-g, email the list master Erich Reck: erich....@gmail.com
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Center for Phil Sci
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