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| Champagne Problem Series Image |
‘Hey! When you get down, oh you’re a lit one,
Never been a dull one, Always been a big star’
(Amyl and the Sniffers, Big Dreams)
Big star indeed, Amy Louise Taylor. Musician, activist and all-round punk extraordinaire, best known as the songwriter and the lead vocalist of the
ARIA-award winning Australian “pub rock” and punk band called Amyl and the Sniffers alongside viral
award acceptance speeches. Taylor is known for her love of mullets, footy shorts, sense of community and fiery passion against capitalism. But what happens when others not only want to profit from some of that shine, but in the process risk its very (punk) authenticity?
Facts
In March 2025, Taylor was contacted by Jamie Nelson, a commercial photographer, for a photo shoot in May. Taylor alleged that the parties agreed that the resulting images, along with her name and likeness, would be published exclusively in the July 2025 edition of Vogue Portugal (‘Champagne Problems Series’). Taylor was not paid and Nelson footed the bill for production costs. A few months later Taylor discovered that Nelson, through her companies and related websites and social media accounts, was selling “fine art prints” containing her name and likeness.
Nelson apologised and assured Taylor that the ‘offending products/prints would be removed’. However, months later Nelson reversed her position, publishing zines from the Champagne Photos Series.
Taylor
commenced three causes of action in the US District Court for the Central District of California: false association (s. 43(a)
Lanham Act), statutory misappropriation of publicity (
Violation of California Civil Code § 3344) and common law misappropriation of name or likeness. Nelson
requested a tentative ruling to strike Taylor’s complaint on the basis of an
anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) motion, while Taylor
requested a motion to hear the judgement on the pleadings (
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rule 12(c)).
Failing the public-interest limb of California’s anti-SLAPP test
Californian anti-SLAPP legislation (
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(1)) aims to prevent causes of action ‘against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of that person’s right of petition or free speech’. A claimant must demonstrate that the cause of arises from a protected activity. Then the burden shifts to the opposing party to evidence a probability of prevailing on the merits of their claims (
Equilon). Protected activity includes expression connected to an issue of public interest and in exercise of the constitutional right of free speech.
Nelson, representing herself,
argued, without reference to any case law, that ‘[c]ourts have repeatedly recognized that visual art, photography, and editorial publication constitute protected speech under the First Amendment and California’s anti-SLAPP statute’. Unsurprisingly the court found that Nelson failed to evidence the link between expression and the relevant issue in the public interest.
False endorsement or artistic expression?
Taylor’s request for a judgment on the pleadings was strategic. If successful, it could exclude Nelson’s ability to amend the claim on the points of law (c.f. motion to dismiss without prejudice). However, Nelson’s pleadings
stated that Taylor’s trademark infringement action (s. 43(a) of the Lanham Act) must be assessed using the
Rogers test on expressive works. Recently in
Jack Daniels, the Supreme Court of the United States held that this test excludes uses that designate origin. Later in
Hara v. Netflix and
Punchbowl, the Ninth Circuit explained that the test is only applicable to works with ‘artistic relevance’ so long as they do not explicitly mislead the content’s source. Hence
Rogers only applies to works performing some other expressive function; if not, the relevant test is whether there is a likelihood of confusion.
While Taylor
argued that Nelson’s use was a form of commercial advertising, the court found that the advertisements were expressive works, and characterised them as non-commercial speech pursuant to the false endorsement claim. It explained that Taylor failed to prove that her likeness in the images was used as a ‘source identifier’ negating the artistic relevance of the work which explicitly misled consumers on its origin. Citing
Brown, the court emphasize that the risk that ‘use of a celebrity’s name might implicitly suggest endorsement or sponsorship to some people is outweighed by the danger of restricting artistic expression’. So if a use comprises an ‘explicit indication’, ‘over claim’ or ‘explicit misstatement’, it likely causes consumer confusion.
When publicity rights collide with copyright
The court’s dismissal of the above claim was the only federal claim. Though the court had discretion to dismiss the remaining state causes of action (i.e. publicity), last month, it was
reported that the court allowed Taylor to amend her state claims, and encouraged Nelson to settle the dispute and for both parties to proceed to mediation. If the parties fail to settle, the court will likely hear arguments on whether Nelson’s use of the Champagne Photos Series contravenes California’s statutory and common law right of publicity, and the relevance of with freedom of expression and copyright-based rights.
Comment
This Kat ponders whether it is still punk to care about your image. Certainly Taylor’s version of punk
hails from a ‘hippy town’ called Mullumbinby alongside a love of
Mark "Chopper" Read who she likens to
Ned Kelly, Australia’s most famous outlaw and bushranger (think
Robin Hood, but with a much bigger beard and a DIY iron helmet). This is also a personal brand that has boosted commercial appeal. From
shouting punters $35,000 worth of beer at local pubs following the last-minute cancellation of a free gig due to safety concerns, to Taylor’s impromptu
speech at Glastonbury 2025 on Palestine, colonialism, Indigenous rights and AI, it is hard to separate Taylor’s chaotic feminist energy from its commercial success. It is unsurprising that some
view the lawsuit as the ‘least punk operation you’ll ever see’.
Taylor’s concerns echo the ‘well-known professional models’ in
Lopez v. Conchetta, Inc. whose images where used and altered on social media to make it appear that they worked at, endorsed, or were associated with 3 adult entertainment clubs in Philadelphia. They also reflect decisions like
Midler v. Ford Motor Co. and
White v. Samsung which find liability where a celebrity’s identity is used to suggest endorsement. However in Taylor’s circumstances, the court already considered Nelson’s works as non-commercial expression. Though limited to fraudulent endorsement claims, similar arguments will be made regarding Nelson’s counterclaims. This Kat suggests that, to the extent that the contract is ambiguous (cf. the treatment of
copyright preemption), both rights are in principle enforceable. Where the use of Taylor’s image as an endorsement without consent is not an artistic expression or does not fall within the First Amendment, liability pursuant to publicity is likely to follow.
More broadly, the intersection between publicity rights, copyright and freedom of expression is also significant in the context of digital replicas. In particular, the British Fashion Model Agent Association’s ‘
My Face Is My Own’ AI petition emphasises the cross-cutting harm facing the fashion industry, calling for transparency, consent, and standardised principles and practices for fairness. If Taylor has no hope in a straightforward photoshoot agreement, what hope does the fashion industry have against the unauthorised use of digital replicas? And yet, Nelson's counterclaims frame the images as expressive works protected by copyright. Could similar arguments be made in an AI-context? Perhaps.
The case’s reporting is equally interesting. Multiple outlets took down previous articles that echoed Taylors’s counsel highlighting the motion for judgement as a victory. Conversely Nelson
views it as David vs Goliath-esque and signals the importance of asserting her right as an artist against ‘well-funded and highly aggressive legal pressure’. Nelson is herself however, an incredibly
successful commercial photographer, with a similar work ethic to Taylor. But for now, as Taylor sings, this case is ‘doing in my head’: a choice between punk publicity and artistic expression.