The
defendant, Konektra, initially offered spare and extension components
for the USM Haller furniture system (to which USM Haller did not object)
and started to list all components necessary to assemble complete USM
Haller furniture units in 2017/2018 (to which USM Haller strongly
objected).
USM Haller sued Konektra and invoked copyright
infringement as well as, in the alternative, violation of unfair
competition law.
The District Court of Düsseldorf upheld the
copyright claim. The Higher Regional Court dismissed the copyright claim
but granted claims based on unfair competition law. USM Haller was
dissatisfied and appealed to the GSC. The latter referred several
questions to the CJEU, which were answered in
Mio and Others. Now it was time for the GSC to apply the CJEU’s ruling.
The German Supreme Court's decision The judges upheld USM Haller’s appeal and remitted the case back to the Higher Regional Court.
1.
The Court criticized the lower court’s rejection of copyright
protection for the furniture system as a work of applied art. It
reiterated the CJEU’s case law on the conditions of protection:
First,
the subject matter must be original in the sense that it is the
author’s own intellectual creation. An object is original if it reflects
the personality of its author by expressing the author’s free and
creative choices. This cannot be assumed where the creation of the
object was dictated by technical considerations, rules or other
constraints that left no room for artistic freedom.
Second,
classification as a work is reserved for elements that express such an
intellectual creation, which was not an issue here.
a. The Court took issue with the lower court’s consideration that, according to
Cofemel (IPKat
here),
copyright protection for works of applied art must be the exception in
light of the possibility of design protection. If the lower court
intended to say that the conditions for protection of works of applied
art are stricter than for other works, the lower court would be wrong.
As the CJEU held in
Mio and Others, they are no different than for other categories of works.
The judges understand the statement in
Cofemel
that concurrent protection can be envisaged only in certain situations
to be a descriptive and not a normative statement, meaning that
factually, one and the same product will more likely be protected by
design law than by copyright because the threshold for copyright
protection is higher.
b. The Higher Regional Court took the
author’s subjective perspective into account when assessing originality.
The judges pointed to the GSC’s consistent case law as well as
Mio and Others, where the CJEU excluded subjective elements from the assessment of originality.
c.
The judges also criticised that the lower court did not consider the
presentation of the design in art exhibitions or museums and its
recognition within professional circles when assessing whether the
furniture system constitutes the author’s own intellectual creation.
The
attention a work has received within specialist circles and among the
wider public may constitute an indication of its originality; likewise,
the presentation of a work in art museums and exhibitions may
demonstrate that those with an appreciation of art regard it as an
artistic achievement deserving of copyright protection. However, the
Court makes two important caveats: (1) These circumstances are just
indicators of creativity and (2) they are no indicators of creativity
where the work was recognised solely for its novelty, its technical
achievement or its exceptional utility value.
The judges found
this case law compliant with the CJEU’s preliminary ruling. While the
CJEU has held that external circumstances arising after the creation of a
product, such as the presentation of the object in exhibitions or
museums or its recognition within specialist circles, are neither
necessary nor decisive in establishing that it is an original creation
and therefore entitled to copyright protection (in para. 81 of
Mio and Others), the CJEU did not hold that such circumstances are incapable of constituting evidence of an object’s originality.
d.
Finally, the judges criticised the Higher Regional Court’s finding,
based on CJEU case law, that the aesthetic effect of a design, taken in
itself, does not give rise to copyright protection. The aesthetics of a
design reveal nothing as to whether it is based on free and creative
choices.
The judges were dissatisfied with this reasoning. The
lower court should have considered whether the aesthetic effect of USM
Haller’s furniture system was based on a creative decision. The CJEU has
pointed out that aesthetic considerations may form part of the creative
process (paras. 67 and 68 of
Mio and Others). The aesthetic
effect of a design can justify copyright protection to the extent that
it results from, and gives expression to, an artistic achievement,
namely free and creative choices.
2. For the aforementioned
reasons, the judges lifted the lower court’s decision and remitted the
case but not without providing guidance for the new decision the Higher
Regional Court will have to take. Most of them reiterate the
Mio and Others decision but a few are noteworthy:
a.
With respect to copyright infringement, the CJEU held that the creative
elements of the protected work must be reproduced in a recognisable
form in the allegedly infringing subject matter. This assessment does
not depend on the overall impression produced by the work and the
contested subject matter.
Despite this case law, the judges
require the lower court to consider the overall impression of the
contested furniture. It may not only focus on the copyright-protected
elements that have been taken from the earlier work and incorporated
into the new design. The Court justifies this finding by arguing that
the CJEU required an assessment of whether the appropriated elements are
recognisable in the allegedly infringing subject matter. The judges
inferred that if only the appropriated elements were considered in
isolation, they would invariably remain recognisable where they had been
reproduced without alteration, and copyright infringement could
therefore be found even where, in the overall impression, those elements
are no longer recognisable.
b. The Court also took issue with
the CJEU’s statement that the scope of copyright protection afforded to a
work does not depend on the degree of creative freedom exercised by its
author.
The judges held that the question whether the creative
elements incorporated into a new design remain recognisable also depends
on the level of originality of the work concerned. The Court relied on
practical experience rather than a normative rule: a copyright-protected
work possessing a particularly high level of originality and,
consequently, considerable expressive force because it reflects its
author’s personality especially clearly, will in practice be more
readily recognisable when incorporated into a new design than a work of
lesser originality that has been incorporated in the same manner.
Thus,
with respect to works of applied art, the limitation of the author’s
scope for free and creative choices arising from the need to fulfil the
product’s functional purpose may result in a low level of originality of
the work or of a part thereof and thus – de facto – in a narrow scope
of protection, which may in some circumstances be confined to an
(almost) identical reproduction.
Comment The
GSC leaves the most important question unresolved, namely whether the
USM Haller furniture system is protected by copyright.
The
protection standard is probably one of the hardest to apply in IP law
because it could not be vaguer and more subject to arbitrary decisions.
How is a furniture system supposed to express the personality of its
creator? Psychologists who create a personality profile of the author
might not be able to answer this question, so how should lawyers be able
to do this?
Let us see how the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf will handle the case.