Background
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A Venom fanKat - or perhaps the newest member of the band.. |
Mr Bray had been a member of Venom since March 1978, while Mr Lant joined in the autumn of 1979. Both claimed to have created various artworks for the band’s use, including logos and demonic images, until the late 1980s.
Following the dissolution of the original band, both Mr Lant and Mr Bray entered into licensing agreements with third parties, allowing the use of various Venom artworks and photographs on merchandise.
Interestingly, the case did not involve copyright infringement claims. Rather, both parties asked the court to declare (i) whether copyright subsisted in the works in question and, if so, (ii) who owned such copyright.
Court decision
On Venom Logos 1 and 2
Among the disputed artworks were two logos:
There was no dispute over the originality of Logo 1, likely because both parties claimed authorship. Mr Lant asserted he designed it shortly after joining the band, while Mr Bray argued that Logo 1 was designed by him and was already in use prior to Mr Lant’s arrival. However, neither side’s evidence – a photo allegedly taken before the autumn of 1979, featuring Logo 1 and other band members but deliberately cropped to exclude Mr Lant, and Mr Lant’s undated sketches – was found reliable.
Witness statements, on the other hand, allowed the court to reach a conclusion. Both Mr Jeffrey Dunn and Mr Stephen Ash (who were involved with the band before Mr Lant joined) stated that Logo 1 was created by Mr Bray, while Logo 2 was designed by Mr Lant. The fact that Mr Dunn (who later formed another band with Mr Bray) accepted Mr Lant as the author of Logo 2 – instead of denying his authorship altogether – led the court to conclude that the author of Logo 1 was Mr Bray.
Discussions on Logo 2 were more noteworthy. Mr Bray contested its originality, arguing that it was merely a derivative version of Logo 1 with minimal alterations. While this argument might have been valid in trade mark law when assessing distinctiveness, the IPEC, citing Arnold LJ’s ruling in Lidl Great Britain Ltd v Tesco Stores Ltd [IPKat here], reiterated that even “extremely simple” logos can enjoy copyright protection if some creative freedom has been exercised.
The court listed the differences between the logos: (i) the letter ‘V’ in Logo 2 is more “exaggerated and … more unusual”, (ii) there is a “striking cross stroke” on left leg of the ‘V’ in the second logo, resembling a “whale’s fluke”, (iii) the bottom of the ‘V’ in Logo 2 is “more sharply pointed”, and (iv) the tops and bottoms of the ‘N’ and ‘M’ letters in Logo 2 are “much spikier”. These changes, together with Mr Lant’s various preparatory sketches, made it “abundantly clear” that the second logo was an original artwork, reflecting “a wide degree of artistic freedom” in its creation.
Notably, the judgment appears to have prioritised the creative process over the expressions of the author’s intellectual creation found in the final output.
On Goat Head Lucifer and Sigil of Baphomet
Both illustrations were found to be original copyright works of Mr Lant.
Regarding Goat Head Lucifer, the court was asked whether it qualified as original given its similarity to a painting by Austin Osman Spare, appearing on the cover of a book. After identifying multiple clear differences between the two, the court – adopting a similar rationale to that used in comparing Logos 1 and 2 – had “no hesitation” in concluding that copyright subsisted in Mr Lant’s work.
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Sigil of Baphomet |
Turning to the Sigil of Baphomet, the court ascertained authorship by identifying several spelling mistakes [Wait, what? Spelling mistakes?!] that appeared in the nicknames of the band members accompanying the sketches leading up to the final illustration. These mistakes were found in Mr Bray’s and Mr Dunn’s nicknames, but not in Mr Lant’s. The court found it unlikely that, if the sketches and the names were made and typed by Mr Bray, he would have misspelled his own stage name. Additionally, the sketches were in Mr Lant’s possession and Mr Bray was unable to explain when or how he allegedly drew them.
On the photographs
Two photographs, released in 1982 and 1984, were also in dispute.
Mr Bray initially claimed that he had taken both photographs. However, as the proceedings progressed, he changed his position, stating instead that they were taken with his camera but by third parties that he had commissioned. Mr Lant, contested this, arguing that it was the band’s production company who had commissioned a photographer to take the first photo, intended for use as an album cover. Furthermore, it was revealed that the negatives of the first photo were in the production company’s possession.
Although there was no direct evidence or witness statement about the commissioning of the second photo, the court concluded – on the balance of probabilities – that it too must have been commissioned by the production company, since it was again taken for use on an album cover.
It is worth noting that, since the photos were released prior to 1988, the applicable law was the Copyright Act, 1956. Under sections 4 and 48 of that Act, authorship of photographs depended on who owned the camera and who commissioned the taking of the photograph – rather than the photographer’s creative choices, as per the current law.
Comment
The case, in this Kat’s opinion, is significant primarily for two reasons.
First, it underscores the importance of maintaining a consistent position supported by clear evidence, especially when dealing with works created decades earlier. The main reason for the dismissal of most of Mr Bray’s claims was that he either changed his stance in the middle of the proceedings or asserted facts without properly justifying them.
Second, and more critically, by building upon the Court of Appeal judgment in Lidl v Tesco, this case further illustrates how works can be considered original even when they merely tweak parts of prior works – independent of their infringing nature. Allowing a broad room for derivative works and the re-use of existing materials may encourage artists who rely on appropriation or other imitative practices. However, considering ‘minimal changes or additions to an existing work’ a sufficient indicator of one’s intellectual creativity risks shrinking the public domain by granting protection to almost every creation, eventually preventing the creation of new works that do not infringe others’ copyrights.
The case demonstrates the need of drawing a line between a derivative work which merely makes minimal changes to an existing work and an independent creation that resembles it. Absent an independent creation claim, courts should be cautious in affording originality to works resembling prior ones by carefully assessing whether genuine creative expressions are present, or whether they simply update an existing one with minor touch-ups. Treating even such touch-ups as protectable under copyright could have broader implications – for example, requiring findings of originality in AI-generated outputs or user prompts as soon as they display a pinch of creativity. Since courts are yet to endorse such outcomes, consistency demands restraint in recognising originality in derivations that, for instance, merely sharpen the bottom edge of a letter.
Image credit: ChatGPT