Green Market Seminar with Thomas Reverdy 11 June
Troels Krarup
Dear IPEs,
Here's my invite for a seminar on 11 June 13-14:30 at the AAU Campus (A.C. Meyers Vænge 15, room 2.1.043) - sorry for cross-posting!
Dear colleagues,
I’m very excited to invite you to a research seminar on market design and green transition with our guest from the Université Grenoble Alpes, Professor of economic sociology Thomas Reverdy. For many years, Thomas has studied French and European gas, electricity and carbon markets and has followed the shifting struggles between principles of competition and of state planning through times of market liberalization and of state-led industrial and environmental policy. Thomas will speak for about 45 minutes followed by plenum discussion.
Please feel free to forward this message to interested colleagues.
French
administrative expertise in redesigning the electricity and CO2 greenhouse gas
emissions markets
European institutions have established competition as the principal
governance principle for economic activities, in the name of justice and
efficiency. Market mechanisms and price formation therefore play an
essential role in European energy and environmental policies, and in particular
in the pricing of gas, electricity and greenhouse gas quotas. In France,
however, European competition policy is regularly the subject of severe
criticism. European institutions are accused of weakening French energy policy,
increasing consumer exposure to erratic energy markets, and impeding the
State's ability to finance the ecological transition of its industry. The design
of the European electricity market, the European quota market and European
control of state aid are regularly attacked by elected representatives on all
sides of the political spectrum and by a large proportion of the business
elite.
Several years of investigation enable me to contribute to this debate. On the one hand, the French civil servants have developed extensive expertise in economic diagnostics, in market redesign and in interpreting and negotiating European rules, so as to meet national political demands, particularly in terms of price controls. But this expertise has resulted in a particularly sophisticated electricity market design and complex economic instruments for energy efficiency or decarbonization. This complexity of regulation can have several limitations: it can weaken the accountability of public action, lack resilience in the face of cyclical changes, and allow partial interpretations that facilitate denunciatory discourse. Redesign efforts succeed in reducing price uncertainties, but do not always meet expectations of economic security