Fwd: INARM Message - The physics of terror

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Dave Ingram

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Oct 19, 2013, 10:46:37 AM10/19/13
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Begin forwarded message:

From: Seamus Creedon <seamus....@gmail.com>
Date: April 28, 2013 2:41:58 PM EDT
To: inarm inarm <in...@list.soa.org>
Subject: INARM Message - The physics of terror

Interesting article by Gillian Tett in FT of 27/4 with above title - I am motivated to explore sources mentioned - Clauset, Woodard.

Regards

Seamus Creedon FSAI FIA CERA MAAA






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Dave Ingram

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Oct 19, 2013, 10:46:44 AM10/19/13
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Begin forwarded message:

From: Dave Ingram <davei...@optonline.net>
Date: April 28, 2013 5:54:51 PM EDT
To: Seamus Creedon <seamus....@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: INARM Message - The physics of terror

Here is the link to the study that she references.  

http://arxiv.org/pdf/1209.0089v1.pdf

Estimating the historical and future probabilities of large terrorist events
Aaron Clauset and Ryan Woodard

Abstract
Quantities with right-skewed distributions are ubiquitous in complex social systems, including
political conflict, economics and social networks, and these systems sometimes produce extremely
large events. For instance, the 9/11 terrorist events produced nearly 3000 fatalities, nearly six
times more than the next largest event. But, was this enormous loss of life statistically unlikely
given modern terrorism’s historical record? Accurately estimating the probability of such an event
is complicated by the large fluctuations in the empirical distribution’s upper tail. We present a
generic statistical algorithm for making such estimates, which combines semi-parametric models of
tail behavior and a non-parametric bootstrap. Applied to a global database of terrorist events, we
estimate the worldwide historical probability of observing at least one 9/11-sized or larger event
since 1968 to be 11–35%. These results are robust to conditioning on global variations in economic
development, domestic versus international events, the type of weapon used and a truncated history
that stops at 1998. We then use this procedure to make a data-driven statistical forecast of at least
one similar event over the next decade.

Dave
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