Scalia's most significant opinions include his lone dissent in Morrison v. Olson (arguing against the constitutionality of an Independent-Counsel law), and his majority opinions in Crawford v. Washington (defining a criminal defendant's confrontation right under the Sixth Amendment) and District of Columbia v. Heller (holding that the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees an individual right to handgun ownership).
In 1939, Scalia and his family moved to Elmhurst, Queens, where he attended P.S. 13 Clement C. Moore School.[14][15] After completing eighth grade,[16] he obtained an academic scholarship to Xavier High School, a Jesuit military school in Manhattan,[17] from which he graduated ranked first in his class in 1953.[18] Scalia achieved a 97.5 average at Xavier, earning decorations in Latin, Greek, and debate, among other subjects, in addition to being a distinguished member of its Glee club.[19] He later reflected that he spent much of his time on schoolwork and admitted, "I was never cool."[20]
While a youth, Scalia was also active as a Boy Scout and was part of the Scouts' national honor society, the Order of the Arrow.[21] Classmate and future New York State official William Stern remembered Scalia in his high school days: "This kid was a conservative when he was 17 years old. An archconservative Catholic. He could have been a member of the Curia. He was the top student in the class. He was brilliant, way above everybody else."[10][22]
In 1953, Scalia enrolled at Georgetown University, where he majored in history. He became a champion collegiate debater in Georgetown's Philodemic Society and a critically praised thespian.[23] He took his junior year abroad in Switzerland at the University of Fribourg.[10] Scalia graduated from Georgetown in 1957 as class valedictorian with a Bachelor of Arts, summa cum laude. Scalia then studied law at Harvard Law School, where he was a notes editor for the Harvard Law Review.[24] He graduated from Harvard Law in 1960 with a Bachelor of Laws, magna cum laude. Harvard awarded Scalia a Sheldon Fellowship, which allowed him to travel abroad in Europe during 1960 and 1961.[25]
Scalia began his legal career at the law firm Jones, Day, Cockley and Reavis (now Jones Day) in Cleveland, Ohio, where he worked from 1961 to 1967.[24] He was highly regarded at the law firm and would most likely have been made a partner but later said he had long intended to teach. He left Jones Day in 1967 to become a professor at the University of Virginia School of Law, moving his family to Charlottesville.[26]
After four years in Charlottesville, Scalia entered public service in 1971. President Richard Nixon appointed him general counsel for the Office of Telecommunications Policy, where one of his principal assignments was to formulate federal policy for the growth of cable television. From 1972 to 1974, he was chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States, a small independent agency that sought to improve the functioning of the federal bureaucracy.[25] In mid-1974, Nixon nominated him as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel.[25] After Nixon's resignation, the nomination was continued by President Gerald Ford, and Scalia was confirmed by the Senate on August 22, 1974.[27]
In the aftermath of Watergate, the Ford administration was engaged in a number of conflicts with Congress. Scalia repeatedly testified before congressional committees, defending Ford administration assertions of executive privilege regarding its refusal to turn over documents.[28] Within the administration, Scalia advocated a presidential veto for a bill to amend the Freedom of Information Act, which would greatly increase the act's scope. Scalia's view prevailed, and Ford vetoed the bill, but Congress overrode it.[29] In early 1976, Scalia argued his only case before the Supreme Court, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba. Scalia, on behalf of the US government, argued in support of Dunhill, and that position was successful.[30]Following Ford's defeat by President Jimmy Carter, Scalia worked for several months at the American Enterprise Institute.[31]
When Ronald Reagan was elected president in November 1980, Scalia hoped for a major position in the new administration. He was interviewed for the position of Solicitor General of the United States, but the position went to Rex E. Lee, to Scalia's great disappointment.[35] Scalia was offered a judgeship on the Chicago-based U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in early 1982 but declined it, hoping to be appointed to the more influential U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Later that year, Reagan offered Scalia a seat on the D.C. Circuit, which he accepted.[36] He was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on August 5, 1982, and was sworn in on August 17, 1982.
On the D.C. Circuit, Scalia built a conservative record while winning applause in legal circles for powerful, witty legal writing which was often critical of the Supreme Court precedents he felt bound as a lower-court judge to follow. Scalia's opinions drew the attention of Reagan administration officials, who, according to The New York Times, "liked virtually everything they saw and ... listed him as a leading Supreme Court prospect".[37]
In 1986, Chief Justice Warren Burger informed the White House of his intent to retire. Reagan first decided to nominate Associate Justice William Rehnquist to become Chief Justice. That choice meant that Reagan would also have to choose a nominee to fill Rehnquist's seat as associate justice.[38] Attorney General Edwin Meese, who advised Reagan on the choice, seriously considered only Scalia and Robert Bork, a fellow judge on the DC Circuit.[39] Feeling that this might well be Reagan's last opportunity to pick a Supreme Court justice, the president and his advisers chose Scalia over Bork. Many factors influenced the decision. Reagan wanted to appoint the first Italian-American justice.[40] In addition, Scalia was ten years younger and would likely serve longer on the Court.[38] Scalia also had the advantage of not having Bork's "paper trail";[41] the elder judge had written controversial articles about individual rights.[42] Scalia was called to the White House and accepted Reagan's nomination.[38]
When Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on Scalia's nomination opened in August 1986, he faced a committee that had just argued divisively over the Rehnquist nomination. Witnesses and Democratic senators contended that before becoming a judge, Rehnquist had engaged in activities designed to discourage minorities from voting. Committee members had little taste for a second battle over Scalia and were in any event reluctant to oppose the first Italian-American Supreme Court nominee.[43] The judge was not pressed heavily on controversial issues such as abortion or civil rights.[44] Scalia, who attended the hearing with his wife and nine children seated behind him, found time for a humorous exchange with Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH), whom he had defeated in a tennis match in, as the nominee put it, "a case of my integrity overcoming my judgment".[45]
The 1989 case of Mistretta v. United States challenged the United States Sentencing Commission, an independent body within the judicial branch whose members (some of whom were federal judges) were removable only for good cause. The petitioner argued that the arrangement violated the separation of powers and that the United States Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the commission were invalid. Eight justices joined in the majority opinion written by Blackmun, upholding the Guidelines as constitutional.[49] Scalia dissented, stating that the issuance of the Guidelines was a lawmaking function that Congress could not delegate[50] and dubbed the Commission "a sort of junior-varsity Congress".[48]
In 1996, Congress passed the Line Item Veto Act, which allowed the president to cancel items from an appropriations bill (a bill authorizing spending) once passed into law. The statute was challenged the following year. The matter rapidly reached the Supreme Court, which struck down the law as violating the Presentment Clause of the Constitution, which governs what the president is permitted to do with a bill once it has passed both houses of Congress.[51] Scalia dissented, seeing no Presentment Clause difficulties and feeling that the act did not violate the separation of powers. He argued that authorizing the president to cancel an appropriation was no different from allowing him to spend an appropriation at his discretion, which had long been accepted as constitutional.[52]
In 2004, in Rasul v. Bush, the Court held that federal courts had jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions brought by detainees at the Guantanamo Bay detainment camp. Scalia accused the majority of "spring[ing] a trap on the Executive" by ruling that it could hear cases involving persons at Guantanamo when no federal court had ever ruled that it had the authority to hear cases involving people there.[53]
Scalia, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, also dissented in the 2004 case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, involving Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen detained in the United States on the allegation he was an enemy combatant. The Court held that although Congress had authorized Hamdi's detention, Fifth Amendment due process guarantees giving a citizen such as Hamdi held in the United States as an enemy combatant the right to contest that detention before a neutral decision maker. Scalia opined that the AUMF (Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists) could not be read to suspend habeas corpus and that the Court, faced with legislation by Congress that did not grant the president power to detain Hamdi, was trying to "Make Everything Come Out Right".[54]
In federalism cases pitting the powers of the federal government against those of the states, Scalia often took the states' positions. In 1997, the Supreme Court considered the case of Printz v. United States, a challenge to certain provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which required chief law enforcement officers of localities in states to perform certain duties. In Printz, Scalia wrote the Court's majority decision. The Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional the provision that imposed those duties as violating the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to the states and to the people those powers not granted to the federal government.[58] In 2005, Scalia concurred in Gonzales v. Raich, which read the Commerce Clause to hold that Congress could ban the use of marijuana even when states approve its use for medicinal purposes. Scalia opined that the Commerce Clause, together with the Necessary and Proper Clause, permitted the regulation. In addition, Scalia felt that Congress may regulate intrastate activities if doing so is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.[59] He based that decision on Wickard v. Filburn, which he now wrote "expanded the Commerce Clause beyond all reason".[60]
7fc3f7cf58