ThePassword function in the Golden Sun games is a way to transfer data from the first game to the second game. The password is obtained from the first game's Send menu, which is made accessible by holding left on the D-pad and the R shoulder button simultaneously while pressing Start on the game's main menu. A Clear Data file must be present on the game's Continue menu in order for the Send option to appear.
The Bronze password transfers the characters' names, levels, Djinn collection, and the status of certain events so as to add and influence events in The Lost Age, such as Feizhi giving Felix the Golden Ring if Isaac rescued Hsu in the previous game.
The Silver password transfers all of the above plus the exact stats of the original characters, so that stat boosts from items like Power Bread are not lost. Useful if the player would like to get a head start on maxing out all stats/levels for Isaac's party, particularly if the transferred stats have been amassed through level-grinding in the first game.
The Gold password transfers all of the above plus the total amount of coins Isaac's party has amassed at the end of Golden Sun and every item in the four characters' inventories. The Gold password is obscenely long, weighing in at 260 characters. Although this will be a pain to write down and fill in correctly, it does pay off enormously as you can transfer some items that you can't get in TLA, a notable example being the Cleric's Ring.
The Game Link Cable transfers all of the above plus Pause menu settings. In addition, while the Gold password transfers equipment unequipped and Djinn shuffled, the Cable transfers equipment and Djinn organized amongst the characters exactly as they were at the end of Golden Sun. However, an advantage to the Gold password is that it unequips cursed items for free.
It is possible to transfer all Golden Sun-exclusive items that the player is allowed to retain until the end of that game to The Lost Age. Note that there is no additional reward for amassing a complete inventory in either game, excluding a secret dungeon and summon for collecting all Djinn from both games.
However, the analogy breaks down in one important way: While Charlie and the other children with golden tickets were (mostly) escorted around the candy factory under close supervision, a successful Golden Ticket attack gives the hacker nearly unfettered access to everything in your domain, including all computers, files, folders and domain controllers (DCs). They can impersonate anyone and do just about anything.
With Kerberos, users never directly authenticate themselves to the various services they need to use, such as file servers. Instead, the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) functions as a trusted third-party authentication service. Every domain controller in an Active Directory domain runs a KDC service.
Importantly, before sending a TGT, the KDC encrypts it using the password hash for a special account, the KRBTGT account. That password hash is shared among all the DCs in the Active Directory domain so that they can read the TGTs they receive as users request access to various resources.
The first three are relatively easy to obtain simply by compromising any user account in the domain. To do that, hackers have a wide variety of tactics at their disposal; popular ones include phishing, spyware, brute force and credential stuffing.
In addition to those scheduled updates, I strongly advise changing the password every time a human who had the ability to create a Golden Ticket leaves the organization. Even if you promptly delete their privileged account, they might have left behind TGTs that they could still use to cause havoc in your environment; resetting the KRBTGT password will render all such tickets invalid. Finally, it probably goes without saying that you need to immediately change the KRBTGT password if you spot any evidence of a Golden Ticket attack in your IT environment.
Important: Be aware that changing the KRBTGT password will affect almost all subsequent Kerberos operations. In particular, all the TGTs that have been issued will be invalid since they were encrypted with the old password. However, all authenticated sessions that have been established to a resource (such as a file share, SharePoint site or Exchange server) are good until the service ticket is required to re-authenticate. Microsoft advises that rebooting a computer is the only reliable way to recover functionality, since this will force both the computer account and the user account to log back in again, which in turn ensures that they get new TGTs encrypted with the new KRBTGT password hash.
In addition, regularly change your service account passwords, and be sure to pick relatively long passwords to thwart password-guessing and other brute-force attacks. Another tip is to set up an alert that will notify the security team whenever a service principal name (SPN) is created or modified, so they can check that all relevant policies were followed. Of course, whenever possible, replace regular service accounts with group managed service accounts, which provide automatic password management.
Unfortunately, the native Windows event logs do not include the TGT timestamps and ferreting out suspicious truly activity in the ocean of events can be a real challenge. Consider investing in a third-party Active Directory monitoring solution that can provides the clear, detailed reporting you need to spot activity indicative of Golden Ticket attacks.
Most large enterprises regularly change their Kerberos passwords. Small- to medium-sized businesses, however, might not have changed them since implementing their domain infrastructure. When an attacker wiggles into a network, they can use the golden ticket attack sequence. Active Directory (AD) uses the KRBTGT in the AD domain for Kerberos tickets. If the KRBTGT account password hash is stolen or broken with an attack, the attackers can then grant themselves full access to your network with the necessary authentication.
If you prefer to use PowerShell, several scripts ensure that these passwords are changed. GitHub has several scripts to reset the KRBTGT password on read-writable and read-only domain controllers (RWDCs and RODCs) in a controlled manner.
One script, by Jorge de Almeida Pinto, provides a single password reset for the KRBTGT account in use by RWDCs in a specific AD domain using either TEST or PROD KRBTGT accounts. It also provides a single password reset for the KRBTGT account in use by an individual RODC in a specific AD domain, using either TEST or PROD KRBTGT accounts. Finally, it resets the password/keys of the KRBTGT account, which can be done for multiple reasons such as from a security perspective as mentioned in a 2015 blog post, or from an AD recovery perspective as mentioned in this AD Forest Recovery blog post.
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You can use the AWSSupport-ResetAccess runbook to automatically re-enable local Administrator password generation on Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud Amazon EC2 instances for Windows Server and to generate a new SSH key on EC2 instances for Linux. The AWSSupport-ResetAccess runbook is designed to perform a combination of AWS Systems Manager actions, AWS CloudFormation actions, and AWS Lambda functions that automate the steps normally required to reset the local administrator password.
You lost the EC2 key pair: To resolve this problem, you can use the AWSSupport-ResetAccess runbook to create a password-enabled AMI from your current instance, launch a new instance from the AMI, and select a key pair you own.
You lost your EC2 key pair, or you configured SSH access to the instance with a key you lost: To resolve this problem, you can use the AWSSupport-ResetAccess runbook to create a new SSH key for your current instance, which enables you to connect to the instance again.
If your EC2 instance for Windows Server is configured for Systems Manager, you can also reset your local Administrator password by using EC2Rescue and AWS Systems Manager Run Command. For more information, see Using EC2Rescue for Windows Server with Systems Manager Run Command in the Amazon EC2 User Guide.
The system uses Run Command to run EC2Rescue on the helper instance. On Windows, EC2Rescue enables password generation for the local Administrator by using EC2Config or EC2Launch on the attached, original root volume. On Linux, EC2Rescue generates and injects a new SSH key and saves the private key, encrypted, in Parameter Store. When finished, EC2Rescue reattaches the root volume back to the original instance.
The system creates a new Amazon Machine Image (AMI) of your instance, now that password generation is enabled. You can use this AMI to create a new EC2 instance, and associate a new key pair if needed.
Optionally, you can create and specify an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) role for Automation. If you don't specify this role, then Automation runs in the context of the user who ran the automation.
EC2Rescue needs permission to perform a series of actions on your instances during the automation. These actions invoke the AWS Lambda, IAM, and Amazon EC2 services to safely and securely attempt to remediate issues with your instances. If you have Administrator-level permissions in your AWS account and/or VPC, you might be able to run the automation without configuring permissions, as described in this section. If you don't have Administrator-level permissions, then you or an administrator must configure permissions by using one of the following options.
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