Why China Waits
Beijing Is Playing a Long Game on Taiwan
A Chinese military takeover of Taiwan is often portrayed as inevitable and imminent. For many observers, including those writing in Foreign Affairs, U.S. President Donald Trump’s ambivalent public statements about the United States’ commitments to Taiwan’s defense and apparent indifference to the island’s fate might tempt Beijing to achieve unification with Taiwan through military force soon—possibly before the end of 2026. Washington’s war with Iran and the redeployment of U.S. defenses from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East have further raised concern that China could seize the island without having to fear a U.S. response.
But these speculations misunderstand Beijing’s strategy. China wants to unify with Taiwan at the lowest possible cost, and it currently believes that unification will become easier and less costly as time passes. As China develops the military and economic capabilities to deter U.S. intervention to defend Taiwan, it believes that it can compel the island into capitulation without necessarily needing a full-scale invasion. And in the meantime, Beijing is confident that it can prevent Taiwan from trying to become formally independent.
Of course, China has not ruled out the use of force. There are circumstances in which it would still invade or blockade the island, including if Taiwan were to declare independence, if Washington were to give Taiwan official diplomatic recognition, or if Beijing were to become convinced that there is no pathway to unification that does not require force. But there is little risk of military action in the near term because Beijing increasingly believes that its long-term strategy to bring Taiwan into the fold is working. Polls, for instance, show decreasing support for independence among Taiwan’s youth. And in April, Cheng Li-wun, the chair of Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang (KMT), met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing and reaffirmed her party’s opposition to independence and support for the so-called 1992 Consensus, the political formulation centered on the idea that the two sides of the strait belong to “one China.”
Beijing’s belief that time is on its side will face a major test in 2028, when presidential elections in Taiwan and the United States could shake Beijing’s confidence in its strategy. If Taiwan reelects its current president and China judges that he is creating momentum and justification for formalizing the island’s independence, Beijing could reassess its approach—though it would still be unlikely to conclude that a military takeover is necessary—and decide to apply sharper forms of pressure, such as sending ships and aircraft into Taiwan’s territorial waters and airspace or imposing a quarantine around the island. For now, however, Chinese leaders see patience as a winning strategy.
THE LONG GAME
Beijing’s strategy is rooted in the conviction that the balance of power is tilting in its favor against Washington. Over the past year in particular, China has become more assured of its rise and of the United States’ decline. Beijing believes that its model of governance delivers better outcomes than Western democracy, which it sees as increasingly dysfunctional. It also feels that it has the capacity to withstand U.S. economic and technological pressure and has amassed effective tools to shape Washington’s decision-making on trade, technology, and Taiwan.
China’s growing confidence stems partly from how it handled the Trump administration’s trade war in 2025. Beijing retaliated against Trump’s escalating tariffs by imposing its own reciprocal duties and implementing restrictions on exports of rare-earth elements—moves that it concluded quickly led Washington to capitulate on its threats. China has also become more optimistic about its ability to develop technologies that it sees as crucial to strengthening its national power despite U.S.-led sanctions and export controls. In artificial intelligence, for example, the emergence of DeepSeek, a Chinese large language model that rivals the performance of U.S. models but was made at a fraction of the cost, buoyed state and investor confidence that China could eventually close the gap with the United States.
Still, Beijing remains clear-eyed about the economic and political challenges it faces. The most recent five-year plan, which sets medium-term development priorities and targets through 2030, highlights the “risks and hidden dangers” in the Chinese economy, including mounting local government debt, persistent deflation, an ongoing property market crisis, and slowing productivity growth. It also identifies “threats of hegemonism,” an indirect reference to the many levers that Beijing worries Washington can pull to block China’s rise.
Beijing’s assessment that its development path is both widening and perilous shapes how it approaches Taiwan. China is convinced that its eventual strength will dissuade the United States and Taiwan from putting up much of a fight, and its expanding national power will attract the people of Taiwan to the benefits of unification. Even if Beijing decides that using force to achieve unification becomes necessary, it is sensitive to the costs of doing so before China has realized its developmental potential and while the United States maintains economic and technological advantages.
China cannot rule out the possibility that the United States may respond to an invasion with military or economic measures or both. Trump, for instance, may interpret aggressive action as a personal affront and lash out. (Trump has publicly framed Xi’s restraint toward Taiwan as a personal commitment, claiming that Xi promised to not invade while Trump is president.) Xi’s unprecedented purges and the removal of about half of his top military commanders have also likely degraded the People’s Liberation Army’s ability to plan and conduct complex military operations and slowed its weapons modernization efforts.
A major conflict with the United States could thus result in a costly failure for China, with economic devastation on the order of trillions of dollars, domestic instability that could threaten the regime’s security, and deep international isolation. As long as Beijing is confident about its ability to win in the long term, the near-term risks are not worth the gamble. As Liu Guoshen, a professor at Xiamen University and a leading voice in China on cross-strait relations, argued at a forum in February, the United States’ relative decline means that Beijing should not “deplete too much national strength on the Taiwan issue” in the near term but instead allow China’s continued development to resolve the question of Taiwan’s status over time.
WINNING WITHOUT FIGHTING
Beijing’s calculation of whether it can afford to wait also depends on the United States and Taiwan. A strategy of patience works only if Washington and Taipei do not take meaningful steps toward formalizing Taiwan’s independence as China accumulates strength. On this front, too, Beijing believes its campaign of legal, economic, military, and diplomatic pressure is increasingly effective. It also sees signs that its efforts to enhance its appeal to the people of Taiwan and push the island away from the United States are gaining momentum.
China continues to firmly believe that Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te is a diehard advocate of independence and fiercely opposes him. But Beijing sees him as weakened. Last summer, Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party supported an effort to recall KMT legislators in Taiwan’s parliament but failed to remove even one lawmaker—an embarrassing blow to Lai and the DPP. The KMT, together with the smaller Taiwan People’s Party, has a majority in the legislature and has become a formidable constraint on Lai’s policy agenda. It is blocking passage of a special defense budget totaling $40 billion, advocating instead for a significantly smaller allocation for arms purchases from the United States in the coming eight years. Cooperation between the KMT and the TPP also keeps alive the possibility of an opposition joint ticket winning the 2028 presidential elections and ushering in a more China-friendly presidency.
The rise of Cheng, the KMT chair who has unequivocally embraced a Chinese identity and the 1992 Consensus, has boosted Beijing’s confidence that China has a willing new partner to work with in Taiwan. Previous KMT leaders were more circumspect about their support for the 1992 Consensus, which is unpopular among Taiwan’s electorate because it is seen as tied to unification with China. Cheng’s readiness to stake out such politically risky positions has enhanced her appeal in Beijing, which sees her as an important conduit for countering the Lai government’s narratives that cross-strait engagement invites deeper Chinese penetration of Taiwan’s society and that strengthening the island’s defenses is the only reliable way to safeguard Taiwan’s future.
Beijing’s embrace of Cheng was evident in the high-profile visit to China it arranged for her in early April; Xi met with Cheng and even signaled patience on unification. Surveys conducted by a leading public opinion platform in Taiwan, My Formosa, suggest that the trip increased public trust in Cheng and improved the favorability of the KMT. Even if such shifts prove temporary, and although a majority still expressed distrust of Cheng, they reinforce Beijing’s view that its long-term strategy of cultivating ties with opposition forces in Taiwan can be effective.
Although decades of polling show that an increasing share of people in Taiwan do not identify as Chinese and do not favor unification with China, Beijing has latched on to several emerging trends in public opinion. Surveys in Taiwan indicate growing skepticism toward the United States, driven by doubts about the reliability of Washington if a crisis were to break out. Opinion within Taiwan has also become more polarized on core security questions, including whether Washington would intervene militarily in a cross-strait conflict and how much Taiwan should spend on U.S. arms. This polarization helps Beijing because it creates political space for competing narratives about cross-strait security that China can exploit to weaken the ties between Taipei and Washington.
Young adults in Taiwan are also softening their views on the island’s sovereignty. Between May 2015 and November 2025, for instance, the percentage of 20-to-29-year-olds who agreed that the mainland and Taiwan do not belong to “one China” fell from 82.1 percent to 65.8 percent, according to My Formosa. (The percentages increased for every other age group.) Between October 2023 and November 2025, meanwhile, the percentage of 20-to-29-year-olds who favored independence dropped from 26.7 percent to 17.9 percent, while those in favor of unification increased from 1.4 percent to 6.8 percent. With overall support for independence and unification at 24.0 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively, the youngest cohort is now less in favor of independence and more pro-unification than almost all other age brackets.
What is driving these shifts is unclear, but Beijing’s efforts likely play a role. China has recruited online influencers in Taiwan to produce content on platforms such as YouTube and TikTok that portray China in a favorable light, including lifestyle vlogs, travel diaries, and videos highlighting consumer affordability and urban modernity in cities such as Shanghai and Shenzhen. Taiwan’s youth are drawn to Chinese apps such as RedNote, a social media platform that blends elements of Instagram, Pinterest, and TikTok. In December 2025, Taiwan banned RedNote for a year because of data security and concerns about fraud.
Changes in U.S. attitudes have further affirmed Beijing’s assessment that Washington’s commitments to Taiwan can and likely will erode over time. Trump has refused to explicitly commit to Taiwan’s defense, demanded that the island pay the United States for its security, and accused Taiwan of stealing the U.S. chip industry. Beijing has been reassured by what it sees as signals that Washington is willing to exercise restraint over Taiwan to prevent backsliding in its relationship with China. Chinese leaders were encouraged, for instance, by Washington’s refusal to allow Lai to transit through New York in July 2025 and the reported postponement of an approximately $14 billion arms package for Taiwan in response to pressure from China. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s warning in 2025 that Taiwan’s dominance of high-performance chip production is “the single greatest point of failure for the world economy” and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick’s 2026 call for Taiwan to move 40 percent of its chip production to the United States have raised expectations in China that the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense will flag once Washington reduces its dependence on the island and revitalizes domestic production of semiconductors.
SLOWLY BUT SURELY
Even if it does not seek a near-term resolution to Taiwan’s status, China will continue to develop new tools and pathways to advance unification and deter independence. Beijing is promoting what it calls “integrated development”—a suite of policies aimed at attracting businesses and talent from Taiwan—in hopes of deepening economic dependence and social integration. Over time, the goal is to increase Taiwan’s susceptibility to China’s leverage while sustaining a constituency on the island that favors closer ties. China will also continue to tighten its grip on Taiwan through its expanding toolbox of political, legal, and military tactics to constrain Taipei’s policy space, erode its autonomy, and shape conditions for eventual unification on Beijing’s terms.
In addition, China is looking to more actively shape Washington’s cross-strait policy. It has been hinting that Xi may ask Trump to affirm Washington’s support for peaceful unification or state that the United States “is opposed to” Taiwan’s independence, in contrast to the long-standing “does not support” it. Even if the differences between the phrases seem minor—and administration officials have privately downplayed them—a change in wording would represent a deviation from existing U.S. policy, which focuses on the peaceful process by which cross-strait differences should be resolved rather than the outcome.
A rhetorical shift is unlikely on its own to reduce the United States’ military support for Taiwan, but it would advance China’s objectives in other ways. Beijing would treat such a shift as precedent and attempt to tie future U.S. administrations and other foreign governments to the same line—and then use that as a new baseline from which to press the United States to adopt positions even more aligned with its preferences. It would also weaken the Lai administration and the DPP, whose foreign policy strategy is closely tied to strong U.S. backing. Opposition parties in Taiwan would likely portray a U.S. statement of opposition to Taiwan’s independence or support for unification as a rebuke of Lai himself, increasing domestic political pressure. Such a development would also hand Xi a political win at home by validating his approach and demonstrating more tangible progress toward unification.
Perhaps most important, such a move would deepen anxiety in Taiwan about the durability of American commitments to the island. Over time, Taiwan’s population may become more fatalistic about self-defense or hedge by adopting a more accommodating stance toward China, increasing the likelihood of success of China’s strategy down the line.
THE TURNING POINT
China’s assessment that cross-strait dynamics are trending in its favor is likely to hold at least until 2028, when a collision of events could prompt Beijing to rethink its strategy. Taiwan will go to the polls to elect a president in January 2028; if Lai is reelected and his party wins a majority in the legislature, he will have a freer hand to strengthen Taiwan’s defenses, further limit ties with China, and more forcefully assert Taiwan’s sovereignty. In the United States, November 2028 could bring to power a leader who adopts a more explicitly competitive approach to the U.S.-Chinese relationship, reprioritizes the Indo-Pacific, and more overtly supports Taiwan. And in China, Xi is likely to secure another five-year term at the party congress in late 2027 and appoint new members to the Central Military Commission, the country’s top military body. A reconstituted military leadership selected primarily for ideological purity and loyalty to Xi may prove less willing—or less able—to fully inform China’s leader of the costs and risks of using force.
Taken together, these developments could darken Beijing’s outlook and increase its impulse to shape cross-strait developments through more heavy-handed tactics. But they are unlikely to fundamentally alter China’s underlying judgment that the costs of achieving unification through a blockade and, if necessary, an amphibious invasion remain prohibitively high. Beijing knows that the United States retains significant financial, technological, and military advantages; a war over Taiwan could jeopardize the larger objective of achieving “national rejuvenation,” the restoration of China to great-power status, prosperity, and global influence by the 100-year anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 2049.
What could spur China to resort to force would be if it perceives that Washington or Taipei is clearly violating its fundamental redline of Taiwanese independence. If Taiwan reelects Lai and Beijing concludes that he is moving toward formal independence—particularly in tandem with a U.S. administration that is seen as edging toward diplomatic recognition of Taiwan or restoring defense treaty commitments—Xi could judge that deterrence has failed, that prospects for peaceful unification are receding, and that any further delay risks permanent separation from Taiwan.
A more likely scenario is that Chinese leaders perceive Washington and Taipei as approaching but not breaching such a redline. If a reelected Lai, backed by a DPP-controlled legislature, marks his second term with actions that Beijing sees as strong assertions of Taiwan’s sovereignty—similar to what he initiated in March and June 2025, when he gave a series of pointed speeches elaborating the legal case for Taiwan’s de facto independence, emphasizing cross-strait cultural and historical differences, and portraying China as a “foreign, hostile force”—Beijing may conclude that stronger steps are necessary to preempt further moves toward formalizing Taiwan’s autonomy. China could operate its coast guard, navy, and air force closer to the island, including within Taiwan’s 12-nautical-mile territorial airspace and waters. Such moves would represent a significant escalation; in what was already an unprecedented move, Chinese vessels crossed into Taiwan’s larger 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone in late 2025 and early 2026.
If China chose to escalate further, it could also impose a quarantine that selectively restricts and inspects commercial air and maritime traffic to and from the island. It could deny access to Taiwan’s ports and require prior authorization for ships to dock in Taiwan, which could result in a rerouting of shipping lanes around Taiwan. This would enable Beijing to strengthen its claim of de facto jurisdiction and tighten coercive pressure on Taipei while stopping short of a full blockade of the island or an outright use of force.
Chinese leaders continue to weigh the benefits and costs of different pathways to resolving Taiwan’s status. Political developments in 2028 could test the assumptions underpinning Beijing’s current strategy of patience, prompting a recalibration and, potentially, a faster turn toward more coercive options. Yet escalation carries substantial strategic, reputational, and economic costs. A blockade, invasion, or quarantine is not foreordained under present conditions. Given how it sees the trends unfolding and believing itself ascendant, Beijing is in no rush to try to take Taiwan by force.