Americans may come to regret alienating the ‘mighty middle powers’
If Europe and Asian democracies coordinate, they can reshape the global balance.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, in his now-famous speech at the Davos conference, issued a stirring call for the “middle powers” to protect their own interests at a time when the great powers are running roughshod over the “rules-based international order.” Recent examples include not only Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s attempts to claim the South China Sea, but also President Donald Trump’s threats to annex Greenland and his punitive tariffs on America’s closest allies. “Middle powers must act together,” Carney said, “because if we’re not at the table, we’re on the menu.”
The collective potential of the “mighty middle powers” is almost unlimited. I’m not referring to countries like Brazil, India, Indonesia or South Africa, which are often not on the same page as the Western democracies. President Joe Biden learned that it was impossible to mobilize the Global South against Russian aggression in Ukraine, for example. But there is a strong overlap of outlooks between the non-American members of NATO (Europe and Canada) and the great democracies of East Asia and Oceania: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan.
If these countries could act together, they would be a superpower in their own right. The “Eurasia bloc” has a population of nearly 900 million, GDP of $39.5 trillion, defense spending of $830 billion and 3.1 million soldiers. That dwarfs America’s population (338 million) and beats its GDP ($31 trillion) while their defense spending is roughly similar to America’s ($850 billion this year). China, of course, has an even larger population, but it lags in all the other categories; its GDP is roughly half that of the Eurasia bloc. Russia trails even further behind; its GDP ($2.5 trillion) is considerably smaller than California’s.
The only thing holding the middle powers back is their lack of unity. Russia, China and the United States are all nation-states. But NATO is composed of 32 states and the European Union of 27. Europe’s resources are only loosely marshaled together, and there is little coordination with Asian democracies, which in turn are linked by alliances with the United States but not with each other. Those geopolitical realities won’t change anytime soon, but there are small but substantial steps these countries can take to act in greater concert.
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Britain, for example, should rejoin the European Union, and both Ukraine and Canada should be allowed in. (Canada is part of Europe in spirit, if not geographically.) The E.U. should end its requirement for unanimity so that small nations such as Hungary or Slovakia can’t block collective action. A new “quad” dialogue should be established among Europe, Australia, Japan and South Korea, perhaps eventually leading to the globalization of NATO or the creation of an Asian counterpart. The E.U., meanwhile, should work toward the creation of a “European army.” The Nordic-Baltic 8 (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden) are trendsetters in defense integration.
All the Western countries are already reaching free-trade accords to lessen their dependence on the United States — the E.U. concluded trade treaties with India and five South American countries, while Canada struck more limited trade partnerships with China and Qatar. (In response, Trump threatened Canada with 100 percent tariffs; apparently, he’s the only leader allowed to do a trade deal with Beijing.) There is much more that could be done to enhance trade between Europe and Asia; Carney wants to “build a bridge between the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the European Union, which would create a new trading bloc of 1.5 billion people.”
It’s also imperative for the Eurasian countries to expand their defense capabilities so they are no longer as reliant on a fickle United States. And that’s happening: European defense spending has roughly doubled in the past decade, and it continues to grow. One German company soon will be producing more 155mm artillery shells a year than the entire United States. Ukraine, with its battle-tested army and world-class drone force, can be a pillar of European defense for decades to come.
Europe has an advanced defense industry, but European countries are also drawing heavily on South Korea’s factories. Poland, for example, is buying South Korean tanks, howitzers and fighter jets, while Norway just decided to spend $2 billion to buy long-range rocket artillery from South Korea. Given Trump’s threats, it’s understandable that U.S. allies are seeking to reduce dependence on U.S. weapons systems; Canada, for example, is discussing buying more Swedish Gripen jets and fewer F-35s.
Of course, there are still some key capabilities — stealth aircraft, long-range missiles, satellite reconnaissance — where allies lag far behind the U.S. The most important of these is nuclear weapons. Only two U.S. allies in Europe — Britain and France — have their own nukes, and Britain is reliant for launchers on U.S.-made Trident missiles. Now that allies can no longer count on America (a recent poll found that only 18 percent of Germans consider the U.S. a dependable ally), it behooves more of them to acquire nuclear deterrents of their own. There is already a great deal of chatter about Canada, the Nordic states, Germany, Poland, South Korea and even Japan going nuclear. If I were a citizen of any of those countries, I would want my own nuclear deterrent.
America Firsters may be fine with U.S. allies going their own way; Trump even claims credit for higher European defense spending. But future presidents may not be happy with the result: If U.S. allies are less dependent on America for trade and security, they will become much harder to boss around and less likely to do business with America. The U.S. could even lose the overseas bases that it uses to project power. In trying to acquire Greenland, Trump implied that the U.S. is more likely to defend territory it owns. So why should other countries host U.S. bases on their territory?
If the “mighty middle powers” can band together, they may not miss the era of American dominance — but Americans likely will.
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The conversation explores the potential for "mighty middle powers" to unite in protecting their interests against great powers, particularly in the context of the current U.S. administration under Trump. Many comments express concern over Trump's foreign policy and its impact on... Show more
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