On Language (was Re: Comments on Owl's critique of relativism.)
Gordon G. Sollars
...
> Gordon Sollars:
> > I don't see how this analogy helps you. A chimpanzee is not a
> > monkey. I am trying to account for the difference between "I find
> > ice cream delicious" and "Ice cream is delicious".
>
> How about the difference between "Pauly Shore is funny" and "I find
> Pauly Shore funny"?
If by "funny" you mean "makes me laugh", nothing. But people sometimes
say, "That really wasn't funny. I shouldn't have laughed." In doing so,
they are implicitly referring to a standard of what is funny. There
could
be many standards for what it funny, but perhaps there is a common core
in these standards. If so, then maybe Shore is in it, and so "Pauly
Shore is funny". Or it might not be that "funny", in this latter sense,
picks out a "common core", but is instead a homeostatic property cluster
(hpc). But I hate to invoke /that/ possibility without more thought;
heck, I could win 'em all with that one. ;-)
However, people can give reasons for their standards; standards for funny
are contestable. Even if there is no common core and no hpc, some
standards could be better than others. Here "better" is the best "better
(in funny)" that stands among all reasonable candidates for "better (in
funny)", or any one of the "better (in funny)" from the most highly
ranked "betters". If they all pick out Shore, then "Pauly Shore is
funny" is true; if none, false; if it various, then the statement has no
definite truth value.
This is the idea I have been defending for "delicious" and "beautiful" as
well "funny" and "most important", and of course I could do this for
"good" as well.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Mark Young
>> How about the difference between "Pauly Shore is funny" and "I find
>> Pauly Shore funny"?
Gordon Sollars:
> If by "funny" you mean "makes me laugh", nothing. But people
> sometimes say, "That really wasn't funny. I shouldn't have laughed."
They sometimes say that. And sometimes they mean that they no longer
think it was funny; other times they mean that it was bad to show
their amusement in that situation. But it was funny at the time --
people say that, too.
> In doing so, they are implicitly referring to a standard of what is
> funny.
No, they're not.
> There could be many standards for what it funny,
Precisely one for each thing that can be amused.
> [...] Or it might not be that "funny" [...] is instead a homeostatic
> property cluster (hpc). But I hate to invoke /that/ possibility
> without more thought; heck, I could win 'em all with that one. ;-)
Perhaps you could. Maybe you could reason it out on-line for me. I'd
like to know what a HPC is.
> However, people can give reasons for their standards;
Anybody who has standards for things being funny has no sense of
humour.
Lessee -- banana, check; monkey, check; blonde, check -- it's funny, so
laugh. Hahahahahahahaha!
This is very different from knowing what makes you laugh....
...mark young
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Gordon G. Sollars
...
> Gordon Sollars:
> > If by "funny" you mean "makes me laugh", nothing. But people
> > sometimes say, "That really wasn't funny. I shouldn't have laughed."
>
> They sometimes say that. And sometimes they mean that they no longer
> think it was funny; other times they mean that it was bad to show
> their amusement in that situation. But it was funny at the time --
> people say that, too.
So? Since people talk about unicorns, do you conclude that when they
talk about cats, there are no cats? I can't help it if people fail to
confine their conversation to what is real. But I can point out when
they might be.
> > In doing so, they are implicitly referring to a standard of what is
> > funny.
>
> No, they're not.
Yes, they are, whenever they are not indicating simply that they no
longer think it funny. That's the same as saying "I wouldn't laugh now".
Saying "I shouldn't..." implies a standard.
> > There could be many standards for what it funny,
>
> Precisely one for each thing that can be amused.
Could be; needn't be; let's see! (The new motto of the realist of
funny.)
> > [...] Or it might not be that "funny" [...] is instead a homeostatic
> > property cluster (hpc). But I hate to invoke /that/ possibility
> > without more thought; heck, I could win 'em all with that one. ;-)
>
> Perhaps you could. Maybe you could reason it out on-line for me. I'd
> like to know what a HPC is.
But that would be work. ;-) I will try to get to it, but I need to
understand it much better myself. As I said, I am simply following
Boyd's line with that.
> > However, people can give reasons for their standards;
>
> Anybody who has standards for things being funny has no sense of
> humour.
Now, /that's/ funny. You think that comedy isn't work?
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Mark Young
>> Anybody who has standards for things being funny has no sense of
>> humour.
Gordon Sollars:
> Now, /that's/ funny. You think that comedy isn't work?
Think of someone saying totally deadpan "That's funny." Would you
believe them? I wouldn't. They must mean something else, because if
they really thought it was funny, they wouldn't say it that way (except
possibly to *be* funny in their turn).
Comedy is work because you have to come up with stuff that *others* will
find funny. Writers' standards for comedy are not their standards for
what's funny; they are their standards for what will amuse their
audience. If they're lucky, their sense of humour is in tune with their
audience's, and all they have to do is look and see -- not apply some
set of rules.
Gordon G. Sollars
In article <8p65au$808$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, Mark Young writes...
> Mark Young:
> >> Anybody who has standards for things being funny has no sense of
> >> humour.
>
> Gordon Sollars:
> > Now, /that's/ funny. You think that comedy isn't work?
>
> Think of someone saying totally deadpan "That's funny." Would you
> believe them? I wouldn't.
It depends. I can easily see one comedy writer saying that to another,
to describe a fact (or, as you would say, "his reaction").
> They must mean something else, because if
> they really thought it was funny, they wouldn't say it that way (except
> possibly to *be* funny in their turn).
It might both be funny /and/ be said that way to pretend it wasn't funny
- and so be funny as a result. You know, "funny" is really funny,
sometimes.
> Comedy is work because you have to come up with stuff that *others* will
> find funny. Writers' standards for comedy are not their standards for
> what's funny; they are their standards for what will amuse their
> audience.
Are you making my point or yours? ;-)
We started with "X is funny" and "I think X is funny". If you like, you
can maintain that these two sentences mean the same for you; who am I to
argue. You can maintain that they mean the same "for most people"; I'm
not going to do the research to test that. But for me, the first implies
a standard, indeed, the second could as well, although it is less sure of
itself.
Again, if "X is funny" or "I think X is funny" simply /means/ "X makes
(made) me laugh", then there is not a reference to a standard, only to an
event. But that is not what I take "X is funny" to mean.
> If they're lucky, their sense of humour is in tune with their
> audience's, and all they have to do is look and see -- not apply some
> set of rules.
Depends on what you mean by "set of rules". Perhaps no great comic can
/articulate/ such a set. That does not say that he can not apply such a
set.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Mark Young
> > Think of someone saying totally deadpan "That's funny." Would you
> > believe them? I wouldn't.
Gordon G. Sollars:
> It depends. I can easily see one comedy writer saying that to another,
> to describe a fact (or, as you would say, "his reaction").
I still wouldn't believe him.
[...]
> We started with "X is funny" and "I think X is funny". If you like, you
> can maintain that these two sentences mean the same for you; who am I to
> argue. You can maintain that they mean the same "for most people"; I'm
> not going to do the research to test that. But for me, the first implies
> a standard, indeed, the second could as well, although it is less sure of
> itself.
So they mean different things for you. I'd say that unless you have a
language group to support you, you're wrong.
> Again, if "X is funny" or "I think X is funny" simply /means/ "X makes
> (made) me laugh", then there is not a reference to a standard, only to an
> event. But that is not what I take "X is funny" to mean.
But it doesn't mean that and it's not a reference to an event. It means
something like that, but it's a reference to the thing that the speaker (or
other implied subject) thinks is funny.
> > If they're lucky, their sense of humour is in tune with their
> > audience's, and all they have to do is look and see -- not apply some
> > set of rules.
>
> Depends on what you mean by "set of rules". Perhaps no great comic can
> /articulate/ such a set. That does not say that he can not apply such a
> set.
I'd agree that there might be a "set of rles" that a person conforms to.
Perhaps that's all you mean by "apply".
....mark young
Gordon G. Sollars
> Mark Young:
>
> > > Think of someone saying totally deadpan "That's funny." Would you
> > > believe them? I wouldn't.
>
> Gordon G. Sollars:
>
> > It depends. I can easily see one comedy writer saying that to another,
> > to describe a fact (or, as you would say, "his reaction").
>
> I still wouldn't believe him.
Surely you know that comedians don't fall down laughing at every joke
they think is funny; why assume that they even have to crack a smile?
...
> > We started with "X is funny" and "I think X is funny". If you like, you
> > can maintain that these two sentences mean the same for you; who am I to
> > argue. You can maintain that they mean the same "for most people"; I'm
> > not going to do the research to test that. But for me, the first implies
> > a standard, indeed, the second could as well, although it is less sure of
> > itself.
>
> So they mean different things for you. I'd say that unless you have a
> language group to support you, you're wrong.
A group begins with the second person to join it. Any group of
naturalist philosophers, such as Aristoteleans, I think would be willing
to join me. Perhaps many others already have.
> > Again, if "X is funny" or "I think X is funny" simply /means/ "X makes
> > (made) me laugh", then there is not a reference to a standard, only to an
> > event. But that is not what I take "X is funny" to mean.
>
> But it doesn't mean that and it's not a reference to an event. It means
> something like that, but it's a reference to the thing that the speaker (or
> other implied subject) thinks is funny.
Once you get away from the simple event, you've got problems. If "is
funny" defines a set of things, we can then ask if a person thinks
something is still in the set, and if not, we can ask if they have a
reason for the change. We can ask if all such sets have common elements
or structure. And, more controversially, I'm sure, we can ask of any set
if it is reasonable.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Mark Young
>>>> Think of someone saying totally deadpan "That's funny." Would you
>>>> believe them? I wouldn't.
Gordon G. Sollars:
>>> It depends. I can easily see one comedy writer saying that to
>>> another, to describe a fact (or, as you would say, "his reaction").
Mark Young:
>> I still wouldn't believe him.
Gordon Sollars:
> Surely you know that comedians don't fall down laughing at every joke
> they think is funny; why assume that they even have to crack a smile?
They might have facial paralysis and so not smile at anything.
They find it funny if it amuses them. How their amusement manifests
itself is unimportant. I said I wouldn't believe a person who didn't
crack a smile, but I guess I would if I knew they could hide their
amusement well -- or, at least, I wouldn't *dis*believe them.
[...]
> A group begins with the second person to join it. Any group of
> naturalist philosophers, such as Aristoteleans, I think would be
> willing to join me. Perhaps many others already have.
The members have to talk to each other for it to be a language group.
But I was unfair. You don't need a language group -- tho it would be
the best thing to support your case -- you could get away with just
demonstrating that our community is not settled into my usage -- that
large proportions of the population agree that some things actually are
funny even tho they don't find them the least bit amusing.
So, just go out and ask people at random -- do you know of anything
that's funny but you don't find amusing? Funny-ha-ha, you can say when
they ask (or assume you mean funny-strange, as I would, I think). Let
me know if anyone gives you anything other than an ironic answer, or an
answer of the form "Well, there are things that *other* people find
funny, but I don't -- is that what you mean?"
>>> Again, if "X is funny" or "I think X is funny" simply /means/ "X
>>> makes (made) me laugh", then there is not a reference to a
>>> standard, only to an event. But that is not what I take "X is
>>> funny" to mean.
>> But it doesn't mean that and it's not a reference to an event. It
>> means something like that, but it's a reference to the thing that
>> the speaker (or other implied subject) thinks is funny.
> Once you get away from the simple event, you've got problems. If "is
> funny" defines a set of things, we can then ask if a person thinks
> something is still in the set, and if not, we can ask if they have a
> reason for the change. We can ask if all such sets
What's the "such", here, that other sets are of the same such?
> have common elements or structure. And, more controversially, I'm
> sure, we can ask of any set if it is reasonable.
You mean, of course, if it is reasonable to consider it a set, or
perhaps if this set is a reasonable set to attach to the whatever-it-is
this set is supposed to be attached to, which I still don't know what
it is.
To say <<X is funny>> is to say something about X -- but what it is you
say about X is related to some person or people (usually the speaker,
but not always). Likewise, if I say "I am an uncle", I am saying
something about myself, but it relates to other people. I am someone's
uncle; it was funny to someone. I am not uncle to all, and not all
others may have found it funny.
Gordon G. Sollars
...
> But I was unfair. You don't need a language group -- tho it would be
> the best thing to support your case -- you could get away with just
> demonstrating that our community is not settled into my usage -- that
> large proportions of the population agree that some things actually are
> funny even tho they don't find them the least bit amusing.
Why would I need to find that "large proportions" held this view? For
instance, /moral/ realism is not challenged because we don't find large
numbers of people who think that "X is good/right/just" but have no
motivation to do X. Rather, it is the existence of /some/ persons who
have no motivation to do what is moral, yet seem to understand moral
statements, that is a problem for the emotivist. Realists can explain
such unfortunates by saying that they have failed to develop the proper
moral psychology.
When we move to "funny realism", the situation is analogous, although an
expert comic who never laughed would do far better than a sociopath who
could score well on an ethics exam.
...
> >> But it doesn't mean that and it's not a reference to an event. It
> >> means something like that, but it's a reference to the thing that
> >> the speaker (or other implied subject) thinks is funny.
>
> > Once you get away from the simple event, you've got problems. If "is
> > funny" defines a set of things, we can then ask if a person thinks
> > something is still in the set, and if not, we can ask if they have a
> > reason for the change. We can ask if all such sets
>
> What's the "such", here, that other sets are of the same such?
One such "is-funny set" for each person, in the limiting case of what I
am taking to be your view.
> > have common elements or structure. And, more controversially, I'm
> > sure, we can ask of any set if it is reasonable.
>
> You mean, of course, if it is reasonable to consider it a set, or
> perhaps if this set is a reasonable set to attach to the whatever-it-is
> this set is supposed to be attached to, which I still don't know what
> it is.
The latter. It might not be reasonable to consider it a "set", either,
but I needed something to help explain what I took your view to be. If I
haven't got it right, perhaps you can help me. You didn't seem to like
the idea that "X is funny" said by a speaker simply meant that X made the
speaker laugh.
> To say <<X is funny>> is to say something about X -- but what it is you
> say about X is related to some person or people (usually the speaker,
> but not always). Likewise, if I say "I am an uncle", I am saying
> something about myself, but it relates to other people. I am someone's
> uncle; it was funny to someone. I am not uncle to all, and not all
> others may have found it funny.
And I am saying that "X is funny", as opposed to "I think that X is
funny" or "X makes me laugh", expresses a standard and, implicitly,
argues for the correctness of that standard. This is more like asking if
there are uncles.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Mark Young
>> But I was unfair. You don't need a language group -- tho it would
>> be the best thing to support your case -- you could get away with
>> just demonstrating that our community is not settled into my usage
>> -- that large proportions of the population agree that some things
>> actually are funny even tho they don't find them the least bit
>> amusing.
Gordon Sollars:
> Why would I need to find that "large proportions" held this view?
A proportion that's too small would just be a bunch of people making a
common mistake. But I'd say that it is a matter of degree -- there is
no magic number that flips a definitely-wrong into an objectivity-
breaker.
> For instance, /moral/ realism is not challenged because we don't find
> large numbers of people who think that "X is good/right/just" but
> have no motivation to do X.
Errr -- let me try to parse that summore....
<<It's not the case that the challenge to moral realism comes from
there being large numbers of people who ...>>? OK, that's true.
> Rather, it is the existence of /some/ persons who have no motivation
> to do what is moral, yet seem to understand moral statements, that is
> a problem for the emotivist.
That's just one kind of objection -- and not even one I accept. I
don't think that sociopaths are any more a problem for moral realism
than blind people are for colour realism.
I see two problems for moral realism -- that there is no commonly
accepted theory (or even meta-accepted theory -- a theory I accept even
tho I don't understand it because I accept that the people who *do*
understand it as the arbiters of the truth of such statements) for
deciding between moral claims; and that there is not a consensus that
morality even *is* real -- relativism is quite common, in spite of the
efforts of philosophers to stamp it out.
For funny-realism, the first is still a problem, but the second is
much more a problem -- I am not aware of any sizeable group that deny
that funny is subjective.
[...]
> When we move to "funny realism", the situation is analogous, although
> an expert comic who never laughed would do far better than a
> sociopath who could score well on an ethics exam.
???
> You didn't seem to like the idea that "X is funny" said by a speaker
> simply meant that X made the speaker laugh.
Probably because I've read too many papers where someone argues that X
can't mean Y because then we could just substitute Y for X in any
context and it would mean the same thing. The example that follows is
then equivalent to "John thinks that Pauly Shore is funny", said by me,
would come out as "John thinks that Pauly Shore makes me laugh" also
said by me. Since that's not what John thinks, that's not what "X is
funny" means.
Plus there's the matter of the person who finds it funny but has enough
self-control not to laugh.
But anyway it's close, and I should have just accepted it for the sake
of argument.
>> To say <<X is funny>> is to say something about X -- but what it is
>> you say about X is related to some person or people (usually the
>> speaker, but not always). Likewise, if I say "I am an uncle", I am
>> saying something about myself, but it relates to other people. I am
>> someone's uncle; it was funny to someone. I am not uncle to all,
>> and not all others may have found it funny.
> And I am saying that "X is funny", as opposed to "I think that X is
> funny" or "X makes me laugh", expresses a standard and, implicitly,
> argues for the correctness of that standard.
Well it certainly doesn't *express* a standard, tho it might express
that the speaker believes that it falls within a standard. Oh, wait --
is X supposed to stand for stuff like "Someone being highly embarrassed
in a very public place" -- which would, I guess, express a standard?
I was taking X to stand for a particular event, rather than a class of
events....
Damn -- that just occurred to me.
> This is more like asking if there are uncles.
OK, lemme think about it ....
....
Sorry, I still don't see how.
Gordon G. Sollars
> Mark Young:
> >> But I was unfair. You don't need a language group -- tho it would
> >> be the best thing to support your case -- you could get away with
> >> just demonstrating that our community is not settled into my usage
> >> -- that large proportions of the population agree that some things
> >> actually are funny even tho they don't find them the least bit
> >> amusing.
>
> Gordon Sollars:
> > Why would I need to find that "large proportions" held this view?
>
> A proportion that's too small would just be a bunch of people making a
> common mistake. But I'd say that it is a matter of degree -- there is
> no magic number that flips a definitely-wrong into an objectivity-
> breaker.
We've gotten tangled here. Let me try to make this point again.
First, the situation wrt moral realism. It is no problem for moral
realism that some people are not motivated to do what is genuinely,
factually good/right/just. That is, it is a mistake to think that the
existence of a true and correct standard of moral behavior implies that
people must be motivated by it. (You seem to accept this.)
Second, the situation wrt to "funny realism". It is no problem for funny
realism that some people do not laugh at what is genuinely, factually
funny. That is, it is a mistake to think that the existence of a true
and correct standard of funny implies that people must laugh at things
that meet that standard. (If you accept the first, you ought to accept
the second, by symmetry.)
The standard, in both cases, stands independent of the motivation -
whether to act or to laugh. Nevertheless, most people /are/ motivated
(to some degree) to do what is good/right/just, and most people /are/
motivated (to some degree) to laugh at what is funny. So funny realism
does not need large numbers of people who agree that X is funny without
being the "least bit" amused by X. Such a situation would simply be one
in which, for whatever reason, a large number of people did not have the
proper motivation.
...
> I see two problems for moral realism -- that there is no commonly
> accepted theory (or even meta-accepted theory -- a theory I accept even
> tho I don't understand it because I accept that the people who *do*
> understand it as the arbiters of the truth of such statements) for
> deciding between moral claims;
So you would object to physical realism if there were no commonly
accepted physical theory? I think we have been down this path before. I
think that it is the assumption of physical realism that justifies
theorizing in the first place.
> and that there is not a consensus that
> morality even *is* real -- relativism is quite common, in spite of the
> efforts of philosophers to stamp it out.
All manner of strange beliefs remain quite common, despite the efforts of
philosophers. ;-)
...
> > When we move to "funny realism", the situation is analogous, although
> > an expert comic who never laughed would do far better than a
> > sociopath who could score well on an ethics exam.
>
> ???
An expert comic who never laughed could make a lot of money; a sociopath
runs a serous risk of being locked up. Knowing a standard but not acting
on it has very different consequences in the two cases.
...
> > And I am saying that "X is funny", as opposed to "I think that X is
> > funny" or "X makes me laugh", expresses a standard and, implicitly,
> > argues for the correctness of that standard.
>
> Well it certainly doesn't *express* a standard, tho it might express
> that the speaker believes that it falls within a standard.
OK. Jim Klein is wrong hold me up as a standard of precision - as long
as you are around.
> Oh, wait --
> is X supposed to stand for stuff like "Someone being highly embarrassed
> in a very public place" -- which would, I guess, express a standard?
> I was taking X to stand for a particular event, rather than a class of
> events....
>
> Damn -- that just occurred to me.
Me, too!
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Mark Young
>>>> But I was unfair. You don't need a language group -- tho it would
>>>> be the best thing to support your case -- you could get away with
>>>> just demonstrating that our community is not settled into my
>>>> usage -- that large proportions of the population agree that some
>>>> things actually are funny even tho they don't find them the least
>>>> bit amusing.
Gordon Sollars:
>>> Why would I need to find that "large proportions" held this view?
Mark Young:
>> A proportion that's too small would just be a bunch of people making
>> a common mistake. But I'd say that it is a matter of degree --
>> there is no magic number that flips a definitely-wrong into an
>> objectivity-breaker.
Gordon G. Sollars:
> We've gotten tangled here. Let me try to make this point again.
>
> First, the situation wrt moral realism. It is no problem for moral
> realism that some people are not motivated to do what is genuinely,
> factually good/right/just. That is, it is a mistake to think that
> the existence of a true and correct standard of moral behavior
> implies that people must be motivated by it. (You seem to accept
> this.)
I do.
> Second, the situation wrt to "funny realism". It is no problem for
> funny realism that some people do not laugh at what is genuinely,
> factually funny. That is, it is a mistake to think that the
> existence of a true and correct standard of funny implies that people
> must laugh at things that meet that standard. (If you accept the
> first, you ought to accept the second, by symmetry.)
And I do that as well.
> The standard, in both cases, stands independent of the motivation -
> whether to act or to laugh. Nevertheless, most people /are/
> motivated (to some degree) to do what is good/right/just, and most
> people /are/ motivated (to some degree) to laugh at what is funny.
> So funny realism does not need large numbers of people who agree that
> X is funny without being the "least bit" amused by X. Such a
> situation would simply be one in which, for whatever reason, a large
> number of people did not have the proper motivation.
No, actually, it wouldn't. It *could* be a situation where a large
number of people were mistaken about what was factually funny (they, for
some reason, believe that the Three Stooges were not funny at all, and
that people who find them funny are applying incorrect standards --
*whether they found the Stooges amusing or not*).
For this is the situation you would have me accept -- that being funny
is a fact about a situation; a fact that correlates well with people
laughing at it, perhaps, but which is logically independent of any
particular person's laughter. In such a world, people could find that
something was funny but does not make them laugh, makes them laugh but
is not funny, both, or neither. *That* is the situation corresponding
to your sociopath -- they "know" what's right and wrong, they're just
not motivated to behave accordingly.
So my challenge to you was to find out whether the word "funny" is
actually used like that. Is it the case that people recognize a factual
funny that over-rides what makes them laugh. "Yes," they might say, "I
am amused by stuff that actually isn't funny -- I can't help it, I just
think it's hilarious and so I laugh." Or, and more importantly (given
that the former could indicate only a concern that they *show* their
amusement at inappropriate times), they might say "Yes, this is funny,
but it doesn't amuse me in the least -- doesn't make me laugh, even tho
you know I like to laugh. I guess I'm just defective."
If people truly do believe "funny" describes something about a situation
that's independent of their amusement, then they will agree that there
are funny things that they don't find amusing -- or they will claim to
have a perfect (not just "good") sense of humour, and that people who
find different things amusing have defective funny-bones.
> ...
>> I see two problems for moral realism -- that there is no commonly
>> accepted theory (or even meta-accepted theory -- a theory I accept
>> even tho I don't understand it because I accept that the people who
>> *do* understand it as the arbiters of the truth of such statements)
>> for deciding between moral claims;
> So you would object to physical realism if there were no commonly
> accepted physical theory?
Yes, I would. That is, I would *at least* object that we have no basis
to decide on the truth/falsity of physical claims in the absense of a
theory that pins down the meanings of those claims.
> I think we have been down this path before. I think that it is the
> assumption of physical realism that justifies theorizing in the first
> place.
It is the possibility of physical realism that justifies theorizing
about it. But it is the success of the theory that justifies using it
as the basis for deciding truth/falsity of physical claims.
I think speculation on moral realism is still justified, but that belief
in it is not. If someone can come up with a good theory, then that
would justify conforming our speech to that theory, and once speech has
sufficiently conformed, we would be justified in regarding moral claims
to be justified/not by reference to that theory.
You may think that Rawls' theory is good, and so conform your speech to
it, but you are not justified in treating others' speech as so
conforming -- because it simply *isn't*.
>> and that there is not a consensus that morality even *is* real --
>> relativism is quite common, in spite of the efforts of philosophers
>> to stamp it out.
> All manner of strange beliefs remain quite common, despite the
> efforts of philosophers. ;-)
Quite so. But most of them do not affect the *meanings* of the terms we
use.
[...]
> An expert comic who never laughed could make a lot of money; a
> sociopath runs a serous risk of being locked up. Knowing a standard
> but not acting on it has very different consequences in the two cases.
Ah.
> ...
>>> And I am saying that "X is funny", as opposed to "I think that X is
>>> funny" or "X makes me laugh", expresses a standard and, implicitly,
>>> argues for the correctness of that standard.
>> Well it certainly doesn't *express* a standard, tho it might express
>> that the speaker believes that it falls within a standard.
> OK. Jim Klein is wrong hold me up as a standard of precision - as
> long as you are around.
I'll take that as a compliment. "Those who refuse to do math are doomed
to speak nonsense." I agreed with it the first time I read it.
>> Oh, wait -- is X supposed to stand for stuff like "Someone being
>> highly embarrassed in a very public place" -- which would, I guess,
>> express a standard? I was taking X to stand for a particular event,
>> rather than a class of events....
>>
>> Damn -- that just occurred to me.
> Me, too!
Oh, good. I'd hate to think I had to eat all my words because of a
reading problem....
Gordon G. Sollars
...
> For this is the situation you would have me accept -- that being funny
> is a fact about a situation; a fact that correlates well with people
> laughing at it, perhaps, but which is logically independent of any
> particular person's laughter.
Logical independence might be stronger than needed, but I don't have a
good replacement to offer. I'll go with it for now.
...
> So my challenge to you was to find out whether the word "funny" is
> actually used like that. Is it the case that people recognize a factual
> funny that over-rides what makes them laugh.
Well, your original challenge was to find "large numbers" of people who
recognize this. I don't expect most people to be any more reflective
about "funny" standards than I expect them to be about moral standards.
And if you do not reflect, you are not likely to find any discrepancy.
> "Yes," they might say, "I
> am amused by stuff that actually isn't funny -- I can't help it, I just
> think it's hilarious and so I laugh."
And some people do say this.
> Or, and more
> importantly (given
> that the former could indicate only a concern that they *show* their
> amusement at inappropriate times), they might say "Yes, this is funny,
> but it doesn't amuse me in the least -- doesn't make me laugh, even tho
> you know I like to laugh. I guess I'm just defective."
I don't see why they would have to assert that they were defective. Does
a sociopath view himself as defective? But I think it is quite possible
to see that something is funny without laughing at it. As I have
suggested, I think that this is true of many comedians, but it could be
true of anyone who was not motivated to laugh, say, because of
preoccupation with something.
> If people truly do believe "funny" describes something about a situation
> that's independent of their amusement, then they will agree that there
> are funny things that they don't find amusing -- or they will claim to
> have a perfect (not just "good") sense of humour, and that people who
> find different things amusing have defective funny-bones.
And I think some people make this claim as well.
...
> > So you would object to physical realism if there were no commonly
> > accepted physical theory?
>
> Yes, I would. That is, I would *at least* object that we have no basis
> to decide on the truth/falsity of physical claims in the absense of a
> theory that pins down the meanings of those claims.
I think that meanings - in any field - are pinned down, until speakers
discover that they are not. I don't think that the connection between
theory and meaning is a one-way function.
...
> It is the possibility of physical realism that justifies theorizing
> about it. But it is the success of the theory that justifies using it
> as the basis for deciding truth/falsity of physical claims.
>
> I think speculation on moral realism is still justified, but that belief
> in it is not. If someone can come up with a good theory, then that
> would justify conforming our speech to that theory, and once speech has
> sufficiently conformed, we would be justified in regarding moral claims
> to be justified/not by reference to that theory.
>
> You may think that Rawls' theory is good, and so conform your speech to
> it, but you are not justified in treating others' speech as so
> conforming -- because it simply *isn't*.
So you say. At one level, I am justified in so treating their speech if
I can successfully communicate with them using Rawls's definition of
"good". At another level, it is justified if it can be shown that they
really do conform their speech to it, which in fact they do much of the
time.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com