Eternity
David Tomlin
The proposition that matter is eternal seems to
contradict the proposition that there can be no
actual infinities.
If it doesn't, then why not?
Kyle Bennett
"David Tomlin" <jet...@home.com> wrote in message
news:f8576779.01120...@posting.google.com...
The contradiction goes away if time is not infinite. Of course there's
problems in imagining time as bounded, as well, but don't just assume that
it is infinite. I don't know of any convincing arguments either way.
--Kyle Bennett
Rob
says...
Take a look at "An Inconsistent Triad" at
http://personal.bgsu.edu/~roberth/triad.html
I point out that there are three beliefs that Rand almost certainly held (that
time is not cyclical, that every event has prior causal conditions, and that
there are no actual infinities) that are not mutually consistent. At least one
must be false.
Rob
malenor
374b...@posting.google.com>...
I don't know what you mean by 'matter is eternal.'
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
Kyle Bennett <kyl...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:KrRQ7.42548$WC1.4...@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net...
I think it would help with definitions.
Time is the measurement of motion, and as long as there is anything moving,
even subatomic particles, there is time.
Infinity is not a place. It is just another way of saying "don't stop".
--
Arnold
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:5851837b.01120...@posting.google.com...
>
> I don't know what you mean by 'matter is eternal.'
My answer to that, is that there never was a time without matter.
Time is a 'dimension's of matter.
--
Arnold
Tom S.
"Arnold Broese-van-Groenou" <bro...@ozemail.com.au> wrote in message
news:m6WQ7.89714$li3.6...@ozemail.com.au...
> >
> > I don't know what you mean by 'matter is eternal.'
>
> My answer to that, is that there never was a time without matter.
> Time is a 'dimension's of matter.
Or as one scribe put it, "Time exists in the universe, the universe does not
exist in time".
Tom
--
"Wisdom is the integration of knowledge" -- Eratosthenes
Rob
>
>
>"Arnold Broese-van-Groenou" <bro...@ozemail.com.au> wrote in message
> news:m6WQ7.89714$li3.6...@ozemail.com.au...
>> >
>> > I don't know what you mean by 'matter is eternal.'
>>
>> My answer to that, is that there never was a time without matter.
>> Time is a 'dimension's of matter.
>
>Or as one scribe put it, "Time exists in the universe, the universe does not
>exist in time".
But that's not an answer to the point David Tomlin raised. The question isn't
whether time is in the universe or not, but how much time there is. If there
have been infinitely many days or what-not in the universe, then there has been
an actual infinity. If there has been an actual infinity, then (of course!)
it's
a mistake to deny that there are actual infinities.
Rob
Kyle Bennett
Does that mean then that if the universe can be said to have a beginning,
that time also began with it?
> Infinity is not a place. It is just another way of saying "don't stop".
It sounds to me like you are saying that infinity is an abstraction, not a
concrete measurement?
Both make sense to me.
--Kyle Bennett
malenor
VQ7.89705$li3.6...@ozemail.com.au>...
In other words, time is eternal, which takes you back to the beginning
of the original question, creating an unresolvable infinite loop.
In another post on this thread we are given a choice between, a. the
universe is in time, or b. time is in the universe. And we are advised
to choose the latter. I think you have too when you say, time is
motion, without motion there is no time.
Then I wonder, how are you aware of motion without some previous
concept of time? Doesn't time make your perception of motion possible?
How do you account for the order in your perceptions before you have
conceived of any time, or space for that matter? Why are your
perceptions ordered and not chaotic? Many things existed before you
conceived of them. It is therefore conceivable that the same is true
for time, but even to a greater extent, as you could not even become
aware of objects at all if your perceptions were in chaos. From this
viewpoint, time must be more than just a concept abstracted from
things in motion.
Even if you accepted that (which I doubt), does that leave us with the
first alternative: the universe is in time? This is the view of Newton
and modern physics in general. The question then becomes, how can
there be a something, an existent, that serves the purpose of
containing all other existents? Assuming this, as does physics with
its notion of a space/time containing all matter and energy, this
still doesn't explain why we perceive an orderly universe and not a
chaotic one. It's an answer that does a lot to explain laws of nature,
but not our consciousness of them.
Ayn Rand showed that we derive our concepts from percepts. But how do
percepts derive from sensations? These are quite different species of
event. Sensation is physical, perception is mental. How does a
physical event become a mental event? Ayn Rand was primarily concerned
with concepts and abstraction, but seemed to leave other important
questions taken for granted. For example, Peikoff merely waves his arm
in a circle and asserts, "This is existence." But then he finds it
impossible (understandably) to derive truth inductively.
I think if you can answer these problems with relative confidence,
then the question posed by the starter of this thread becomes a little
clearer (although he didn't explain what he means by 'matter is
eternal').
Matt Ruff
>
> Infinity is not a place. It is just another way of saying
> "don't stop".
So in other words, it's a Fleetwood Mac song.
-- M. Ruff
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
>
> > >
> > > "David Tomlin" <jet...@home.com> wrote in message
> > > news:f8576779.01120...@posting.google.com...
> > >
> > I think it would help with definitions.
> >
> > Time is the measurement of motion, and as long as there is anything
> moving,
> > even subatomic particles, there is time.
>
> Does that mean then that if the universe can be said to have a beginning,
> that time also began with it?
Since time is in the universe, there never was time without the universe.
this means there was no beginning. A beginning assumes time flowing, and
THEN existence arriving.
>
> > Infinity is not a place. It is just another way of saying "don't stop".
>
> It sounds to me like you are saying that infinity is an abstraction, not a
> concrete measurement?
>
> Both make sense to me.
That is correct. No matter how far you count, the ACTUAL number is finite.
--
Arnold
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
Matt Ruff <Storyt...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:3C14F306...@worldnet.att.net...
--
Arnold
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
> Arnold Broese-van-Groenou wrote in message news:<PM
> VQ7.89705$li3.6...@ozemail.com.au>...
> > I think it would help with definitions.
> >
> > Time is the measurement of motion, and as long as there is anything
moving,
> > even subatomic particles, there is time.
> >
> > Infinity is not a place. It is just another way of saying "don't stop".
>
> In other words, time is eternal, which takes you back to the beginning
> of the original question, creating an unresolvable infinite loop.
Yes you could say time is eternal. That is unless nothing in the universe
moves.
But the concept of 'no limit', in counting, is not the same as no limit in
the amount of matter. Infinity is an epistemolgical concept, not an
existent.
>
> In another post on this thread we are given a choice between, a. the
> universe is in time, or b. time is in the universe. And we are advised
> to choose the latter. I think you have too when you say, time is
> motion, without motion there is no time.
Yes
> Then I wonder, how are you aware of motion without some previous
> concept of time? Doesn't time make your perception of motion possible?
Time _is_ motion. If a brick falls on your toe, the motion is from top to
bottom.
This means it was at the top, then bottom. We call the order "before" place,
if the object motion was required to reach "now" place.
> How do you account for the order in your perceptions before you have
> conceived of any time, or space for that matter?
A bird flying through trees has a remarkable perception of motion and space.
This is not conceptual. We evolved with the abilty.
Why are your
> perceptions ordered and not chaotic?
Those guy's all died.
Many things existed before you
> conceived of them. It is therefore conceivable that the same is true
> for time, but even to a greater extent, as you could not even become
> aware of objects at all if your perceptions were in chaos. From this
> viewpoint, time must be more than just a concept abstracted from
> things in motion.
Chaos doesn't exist, so I'm not surprised we don't perceive it. Not normaly
anyway.
> Even if you accepted that (which I doubt), does that leave us with the
> first alternative: the universe is in time? This is the view of Newton
> and modern physics in general.
I think they agree that time is a dimension of existence, not the other way
around.
The question then becomes, how can
> there be a something, an existent, that serves the purpose of
> containing all other existents? Assuming this, as does physics with
> its notion of a space/time containing all matter and energy, this
> still doesn't explain why we perceive an orderly universe and not a
> chaotic one. It's an answer that does a lot to explain laws of nature,
> but not our consciousness of them.
I think of time as the three dimentions in action.
> Ayn Rand showed that we derive our concepts from percepts. But how do
> percepts derive from sensations? These are quite different species of
> event. Sensation is physical, perception is mental. How does a
> physical event become a mental event?
I suspect it has all to do with computing in the bio-electrical sphere.
Sensations are transformed into representations.
We know it happens, and the 'how', is for the researchers to find out.
Ayn Rand was primarily concerned
> with concepts and abstraction, but seemed to leave other important
> questions taken for granted. For example, Peikoff merely waves his arm
> in a circle and asserts, "This is existence." But then he finds it
> impossible (understandably) to derive truth inductively.
All the same, we _do_ know things to be true. There is evidence for that.
> I think if you can answer these problems with relative confidence,
> then the question posed by the starter of this thread becomes a little
> clearer (although he didn't explain what he means by 'matter is
> eternal').
The big problem of trying to comprehend the totality of existence, is
reference.
Anything within existence can be related to other things in existence. But
what do you relate all of existence to? This goes outside our normal
thinking patterns.
I think that comprehending that alone, is a step toward the answers we seek.
--
Arnold
malenor
WQ7.89714$li3.6...@ozemail.com.au>...
I see two totally different propositions here:
1. there never was a time without matter;
2. time is a dimension of matter.
Or to rephrase this in terms of Tom S.'s scribe:
1. the universe is in time;
2. time is in the universe.
This only leaves me with two possible alternative views
of David Tomlin's question, and I still don't know which one he meant.
I think he left it up in the air in order to create a certain
ambiguity. Well obviously the question was ambiguously stated
anyway. I think the first respondent, Kyle Bennett, was most honest
in not knowing any convincing answers. He simply resolves it by
declaring that time is not eternal. I think that involves answer
number (2), time is in the universe; the universe is finite,
therefore time is not eternal. In other words, if you claim that
time is not eternal, then neither is the universe.
But don't Objectivists contend that the universe is eternal? Then
time must be eternal, so this leaves us with "actual infinities,"
in David's terms. "Actual" implies "real," as if infinity were
an actual place. But infinity is not a place, it is the absence
of a beginning or ending point. If (1) the universe is in time, then
is there any reason why we can't conceive of an empty time? And
therefore of a finite universe.
Either answer is arbitrary because opposites cannot both be true.
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
> > >
> > > I don't know what you mean by 'matter is eternal.'
> >
> > My answer to that, is that there never was a time without matter.
> > Time is a 'dimension's of matter.
>
> I see two totally different propositions here:
> 1. there never was a time without matter;
> 2. time is a dimension of matter.
The are not different, because if time is a dimension of matter, there
cannot be time without it. It depends on it, so to speak.
> Or to rephrase this in terms of Tom S.'s scribe:
> 1. the universe is in time;
> 2. time is in the universe.
I agree with 2. but 1. contradicts it.
>
> I think the first respondent, Kyle Bennett, was most honest
> in not knowing any convincing answers. He simply resolves it by
> declaring that time is not eternal. I think that involves answer
> number (2), time is in the universe; the universe is finite,
> therefore time is not eternal. In other words, if you claim that
> time is not eternal, then neither is the universe.
That would be so. But existence cannot disappear into nothing, so I think
that means it won't.
> But don't Objectivists contend that the universe is eternal? Then
> time must be eternal, so this leaves us with "actual infinities,"
> in David's terms. "Actual" implies "real," as if infinity were
> an actual place. But infinity is not a place, it is the absence
> of a beginning or ending point.
I agree with this.
If (1) the universe is in time, then
> is there any reason why we can't conceive of an empty time? And
> therefore of a finite universe.
>
> Either answer is arbitrary because opposites cannot both be true.
Modern physics regards time as the 4th dimension of existence, not something
that exists independently of existence.
If you understand that time is measured by comparative motion, such as sand
through an hourglass, or the earths rotation, you will better understand
that it is motion. The fastest motion is light, and it is our ultimate
clock.
That is why, should you travel that fast, time will stand still. Nothing is
relatively faster.
--
Arnold
malenor
cR7.90514$li3.6...@ozemail.com.au>...
> malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:5851837b.01121...@posting.google.com...
> > Arnold Broese-van-Groenou wrote in message news:<PM
> > VQ7.89705$li3.6...@ozemail.com.au>...
> > > I think it would help with definitions.
> > >
> > > Time is the measurement of motion, and as long as there is anything
> moving,
> > > even subatomic particles, there is time.
> > >
> > > Infinity is not a place. It is just another way of saying "don't stop".
> >
> > In other words, time is eternal, which takes you back to the beginning
> > of the original question, creating an unresolvable infinite loop.
>
> Yes you could say time is eternal. That is unless nothing in the universe
> moves.
> But the concept of 'no limit', in counting, is not the same as no limit in
> the amount of matter. Infinity is an epistemolgical concept, not an
> existent.
I still don't know if the original question concerned the amount of
matter or the duration of the universe. Since it involved time, I
suspect it concerned the infinity of matter throughout time, not
space. There is no metaphorical 'end of time.'
But since time is just a concept derived from observing motions of
objects, one can say that time will end when there is no being in the
universe to conceive of it. Infinity, eternal time, therefore time
itself, is just a (epistemological) concept anyway.
> >
> > In another post on this thread we are given a choice between, a. the
> > universe is in time, or b. time is in the universe. And we are advised
> > to choose the latter. I think you have too when you say, time is
> > motion, without motion there is no time.
>
>
> > Then I wonder, how are you aware of motion without some previous
> > concept of time? Doesn't time make your perception of motion possible?
>
> Time _is_ motion. If a brick falls on your toe, the motion is from top to
> bottom.
> This means it was at the top, then bottom. We call the order "before" place,
> if the object motion was required to reach "now" place.
Ouch. I preferred the 'before' place.
That's sort of an argument per example. I perceived a brick falling on
my toe; there is an order to this perception I call "before" and
"now"; therefore, time is motion.
That's not quite your argument though. You are not saying that I
actually perceived the brick. Just that there *was* a brick that moved
in a particular sequence of events. The fact that it had to occur in
this order, you say below, was planted in my brain before birth, by
evolution; it is innate. I have an instinct for perceiving time from
which I form the concept of time.
This does rather fly in the face of scientific evidence suggesting
that newborn babies are not born with an instinct for time-perception.
Their young brains are receptive to receiving impressions from the
world, and certain patterns are imprinted on the brain, habitualized
as order and a certain expectation that this order will continue
increases day by day until the baby takes it for granted.
I'm still wondering how the physical phenomenon became mental. How
does the order in the universe at large happen to coincide with the
order that this image takes in my mind? I find it hard to believe that
you became aware of the possibility of bricks falling on toes without
any perception of these things
happening, from which you drew the example in imagination.
That's important to remember, that you drew the example from
imagination, and somehow that proves that time is motion (not that
motions occur in time or that time is in motion). It can be allowed
granted that imaginings also occur in a time-sequence. Then I must
wonder: how do I know the difference between imaginary time sequences
and real ones -- real ones are those that made the first impressions
on my brain. Or are they? Is it just a habitual way of regarding the
real world, a prejudice that keeps me from going insane? It is
possible to perceive the brick in motion while not comprehending that
it was the same on both ends of the event. I see: brick 1, brick 2,
brick 3. I conceive of each brick differently; for example, I conceive
of brick 3 as a heavy object that caused me pain, while brick 2 is an
object that can fly.
I am just too respectful of the mind's functions to see these things
in terms such as "there was a brick," etc. Without reference to the
relationship between mind and the universe, it is possible to fall
into the grip of a deadly idealism; when the two become disjointed,
the mind tends to go its own way and finds its own order.
And then I brought in the problem of how "habit" and "expectation" of
orderly events makes this order necessary. I expect that bricks 1, 2
and 3 in my example above are the same bricks. But what if they're
not? Things may have been that way for eons; that doesn't prove
they'll remain that way forever.
Let's say we evolved such that we have this expectation; this
evolution is dependent on the external world remaining the same. But
if it doesn't, we are surely doomed.
> > How do you account for the order in your perceptions before you have
> > conceived of any time, or space for that matter?
>
> A bird flying through trees has a remarkable perception of motion and space.
> This is not conceptual. We evolved with the abilty.
Interesting, you did not say a perception of *time* and space. Perhaps
time and motion are not equivalent?
> > Why are your perceptions ordered and not chaotic?
>
> Those guy's all died.
Now all you need to do is find the missing link.
> > Many things existed before you
> > conceived of them. It is therefore conceivable that the same is true
> > for time, but even to a greater extent, as you could not even become
> > aware of objects at all if your perceptions were in chaos. From this
> > viewpoint, time must be more than just a concept abstracted from
> > things in motion.
>
> Chaos doesn't exist, so I'm not surprised we don't perceive it. Not normaly
> anyway.
>
> > Even if you accepted that (which I doubt), does that leave us with the
> > first alternative: the universe is in time? This is the view of Newton
> > and modern physics in general.
>
> I think they agree that time is a dimension of existence, not the other way
> around.
Time is motion; motion is a dimension? Somehow these two concepts
become farther and farther separated in my mind as we go along.
It seems to me that physics can consider time/space from either
perspective, depending on the needs of the moment. They chart planets
in space, and then consider their spatial dimensions, without noticing
the difference between these two different conceptions of space.
> > The question then becomes, how can
> > there be a something, an existent, that serves the purpose of
> > containing all other existents? Assuming this, as does physics with
> > its notion of a space/time containing all matter and energy, this
> > still doesn't explain why we perceive an orderly universe and not a
> > chaotic one. It's an answer that does a lot to explain laws of nature,
> > but not our consciousness of them.
>
> I think of time as the three dimentions in action.
I'm sure that's a useful concept so long as the universe at large is
obedient to it.
> > Ayn Rand showed that we derive our concepts from percepts. But how do
> > percepts derive from sensations? These are quite different species of
> > event. Sensation is physical, perception is mental. How does a
> > physical event become a mental event?
>
> I suspect it has all to do with computing in the bio-electrical sphere.
> Sensations are transformed into representations.
> We know it happens, and the 'how', is for the researchers to find out.
Yes, there's that faith that somehow physics and chemistry can explain
consciousness. Scientists are known for bringing much more than those
two things into the mix, often intermingling their science with
eastern mysticism.
It's a shame they can't seem to turn to philosophy for the answers. It
doesn't seem to offer any.
>
> > Ayn Rand was primarily concerned
> > with concepts and abstraction, but seemed to leave other important
> > questions taken for granted. For example, Peikoff merely waves his arm
> > in a circle and asserts, "This is existence." But then he finds it
> > impossible (understandably) to derive truth inductively.
>
> All the same, we _do_ know things to be true. There is evidence for that.
Granted as long as the universe obeys the dictates of our theories. I
have seen no reason for it to from this thread, just habit and
expectation. Induction never brings 100% certainty, only probability
and statistics.
For example, we *know* causality to be a true law of nature. (Or
substitute whatever law you accept.) How do we know this? Expectation,
based on a lifetime of evidence, previous lifetimes of evidence down
through the ages of man, and the fact that we ourselves never happened
to witness events unexplainable to our scientific minds (ie.,
miracles) -- despite the fact that they've been reported from time
immemorial into the present day.
> > I think if you can answer these problems with relative confidence,
> > then the question posed by the starter of this thread becomes a little
> > clearer (although he didn't explain what he means by 'matter is
> > eternal').
>
> The big problem of trying to comprehend the totality of existence, is
> reference.
> Anything within existence can be related to other things in existence. But
> what do you relate all of existence to? This goes outside our normal
> thinking patterns.
> I think that comprehending that alone, is a step toward the answers we seek.
That's for a new thread. I wasn't looking for "general metaphysical
answers to the problems plaguing mankind" (ie., "answers we seek") on
this thread. Just separating out two notions of time and hoping
someone will see that both alternatives are fallacious and
unproductive. It was very helpful when someone mentioned the notion of
time in the universe vs. the universe in time. I was only daunted by
the ambiguity of the primary question. It needed to be fleshed out,
not further confused with other, vaguely-related notions. David Tomlin
noticed a contradiction in denying the notion of an infinity to
reality (except when one calls it merely epistemological), while
supporting the idea that the universe is eternal (under the definition
that eternity is infinite time). If matter is eternal, and time is
bound up with matter as motion, so that time and motion are
inseparable from matter, then infinite time becomes infinite motion.
If matter is eternal, then the universe will never stop moving, and
infinity of time becomes a very real notion.
Bert Clanton
David Tomlin <jet...@home.com> wrote:
It does.
But since we don't know, and IMHO can't know, whether matter is eternal,
we don't know, and can't know, whether there are actual infinities. If
matter is eternal, then there is at least one actual infinity. If matter
is not eternal, then IMHO there may or may not be other actual
infinities.
But I'm profoundly sceptical of any attempt to tell the Universe how it
has to be, on the basis of our thought about what can or can't exist.
Sounds like primacy of consciousness to me.
Best wishes,
Bert
malenor
iR7.90754$li3.6...@ozemail.com.au>...
Many perceptions of things change at relativistic speeds, according to
the observer. But the person traveling at such speeds notices no
differences. Relativity does not mean relative to the speed of light
(which speed does change depending on the environment of the wave,
whether it's propogating in empty space or in water). Einstein's
thought-experiments always included an observer. This fact reveals the
influence of Kant on his thinking. He is not saying that a body
traveling at relativistic speeds changes its mass, but that it
*appears* to change its mass. The same goes for time. And of course I
realize the concepts of mass and time are bound together in modern
physics. But to say they are in the universe is too simplistic, when
all is relative to the subject, the subjective. And though subjective,
grounded in law.
That's why I made the point on another thread (Interrelatedness, Was:
What is the context of context?), the context of context is "the
general coherence that holds together the structure of our knowledge,
because the concept of a context assumes that our concepts have
internal coherence, an interrelatedness based on rules of cognition."
It's interesting to note that special relativity originated not from
observing relativistic objects, but out of theoretical geometry -- an
invention of the mind. It is this theory which grounds relativity, not
observations or experimental evidence, which only give inductive
knowledge, true so long as the universe continues to obey whatever
theory. Because of the facts of geometry and their necessary, logical
coherence, we *know* that relativity is true. One then only need to
validate it, in reality, at one's convenience. Reality only gives
examples of truths that are subjectively combined, but not therefore
arbitrary. The context of context is not the universe. If it was, the
next question would be, What is the context of the universe? Infinite
logical regress. This is true of all attempts to see things as they
are outside the context of our knowledge.
David Tomlin
VQ7.89705$li3.6...@ozemail.com.au>...
> Infinity is not a place.
Who said it is?
That's one of the silliest strawmen I've ever seen.
David Tomlin
813...@posting.google.com>...
> This only leaves me with two possible alternative views
> of David Tomlin's question, and I still don't know which one he meant.
> I think he left it up in the air in order to create a certain
> ambiguity.
On the contrary.
What I want is to get a deeper understanding of Objectivism. I
was asking for people who understand Objectivism better than I,
(Objectivists or not) to explain its tenets.
I regret using the word "matter." It should have been "nature"
or "the universe."
From "The Metaphysical Versus The Man-Made", by Ayn Rand:
"To grasp the axiom that existence exists, means to grasp the fact
that nature, i.e., the universe as a whole, cannot be created or
annihilated, that it cannot come into or go out of existence."
> But don't Objectivists contend that the universe is eternal? Then
> time must be eternal, so this leaves us with "actual infinities,"
> in David's terms.
Again, the terms are not mine. I don't know if Rand used the phrase,
but Peikoff and other Objectivists do.
> "Actual" implies "real," as if infinity were
> an actual place.
Of course infinity is not a "place." I don't get how that word
comes in.
malenor
1320...@posting.google.com>...
> malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<5851837b.0112101804.6c
> 813...@posting.google.com>...
>
> > This only leaves me with two possible alternative views
> > of David Tomlin's question, and I still don't know which one he meant.
> > I think he left it up in the air in order to create a certain
> > ambiguity.
>
> On the contrary.
>
> What I want is to get a deeper understanding of Objectivism. I
> was asking for people who understand Objectivism better than I,
> (Objectivists or not) to explain its tenets.
>
> I regret using the word "matter." It should have been "nature"
> or "the universe."
Great, thanks. It could have been misconstrued as the quantum of
matter in the universe, although the context of your question
was time and eternity.
I believe you have found a real contradiction in the Objectivist
system. Individuals may assert this and that, or cite other
sciences to erase the contradiction, so I am glad you clarified
that it was a question about Objectivism.
I got my start with Objectivism and I know pretty much all its
tenets, so I was impressed with your question.
Looking at your other posts, I see you are good at finding the crux
of an issue and stating it briefly, forcing people to think (if they
are so inclined).
> From "The Metaphysical Versus The Man-Made", by Ayn Rand:
>
> "To grasp the axiom that existence exists, means to grasp the fact
> that nature, i.e., the universe as a whole, cannot be created or
> annihilated, that it cannot come into or go out of existence."
>
> > But don't Objectivists contend that the universe is eternal? Then
> > time must be eternal, so this leaves us with "actual infinities,"
> > in David's terms.
>
> Again, the terms are not mine. I don't know if Rand used the phrase,
> but Peikoff and other Objectivists do.
I was not familiar with the Peikoff lectures and didn't know he used
that phrase. And he does.
> > "Actual" implies "real," as if infinity were an actual place.
>
> Of course infinity is not a "place." I don't get how that word
> comes in.
One of your first respondents asserted that infinity was not a place:
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou <bro...@ozemail.com.au> wrote in message news:<PM
VQ7.89705$li3.6...@ozemail.com.au>...
snip
> Infinity is not a place. It is just another way of saying "don't stop".
--------------------
I then put this in different words, stating that infinity was the
absence of a beginning or ending point.
I don't see anything wrong with clarifying what is meant by 'infinity.'
But I then stated that infinity becomes 'actual' when it is connected
with matter in its eternal existence. In other words, it's an actual
fact that the existence of matter is infinite with regard to time,
in Objectivist doctrine. Yet they assert that the entire notion of
infinity is valid only mathematically (not epistemologically for
Objectivism, as someone claimed). Here it is:
"There is a use of 'infinity' which is valid, as Aristotle observed, and
that is the mathematical use. It is valid only when used to indicate
a potentiality, never an actuality... Infinity exists only in the
form of the ability of certain series to be extended indefinitely;
but however much they are extended, in actual stop, wherever you stop
it is finite." [Peikoff, lecture series (1976), lecture 3].
Ayn Rand also comes close to that phraseology:
"An arithmetical sequence extends into infinity, without implying
that infinity actually exists..." (Intro. to Obj. Epist., 22.)
Infinity is not an actual existent, but, according to Peikoff,
a potential... what? A potential existent? Isn't a potentiality
a possible existent? If the universe is eternal, then its infinity
through time is a potential, meaning a possible existent. For all
intents and purposes, infinity, in this view, is an actuality,
only "not yet."
This is why someone had to deny that infinity is a 'place.'
Once again, I think you are on to something. The Objectivists are
logically forced to give up their notion of the universe as eternal
by their ostracizing of the notion of infinity to the mathematical
realm.
malenor
"...but however much they are extended, in actual fact,
David Tomlin
cR7.90499$li3.6...@ozemail.com.au>...
> A beginning assumes time flowing, and
> THEN existence arriving.
That is an arbitrary definition.
If time has a zero-point, that is what people commonly
mean by the beginning of the universe.
>That is correct. No matter how far you count, the ACTUAL number is finite.
The number you have counted is finite. That doesn't mean that
what you are trying to count has to be.
If time is infinite, we cannot count all its seconds. If space is
infinite, we cannot count all its cubic centimeters. If the cosmos
is infinite, we cannot count all its galaxies. But why should time
and space care if we can measure them? Why should galaxies care if
we can count them?
This seems like an argument from the primacy of consciousness.
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
> Arnold Broese-van-Groenou wrote in message news:<%8
> > A beginning assumes time flowing, and
> > THEN existence arriving.
>
> That is an arbitrary definition.
>
> If time has a zero-point, that is what people commonly
> mean by the beginning of the universe.
In that case, there was no time before the zero point, in which something
could begin. I'm willing to accept that the universe (everything that
exists), has neither an end or a beginning.
> >That is correct. No matter how far you count, the ACTUAL number is
finite.
>
> The number you have counted is finite. That doesn't mean that
> what you are trying to count has to be.
If a number can be placed on it, it is finite. What in existence, could not
have a number placed on it?
> If time is infinite, we cannot count all its seconds. If space is
> infinite, we cannot count all its cubic centimeters. If the cosmos
> is infinite, we cannot count all its galaxies. But why should time
> and space care if we can measure them? Why should galaxies care if
> we can count them?
True, I doubt they care, no matter how large they are.
--
Arnold
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
> objects, one can say that time will end when there is no being in the
> universe to conceive of it. Infinity, eternal time, therefore time
> itself, is just a (epistemological) concept anyway.
Certainly the concept of time depends on concept holders, but motion will
persist regardless. I should have clarified that time is actually the
measurement of the motion.
>[clip to]
> This does rather fly in the face of scientific evidence suggesting
> that newborn babies are not born with an instinct for time-perception.
> Their young brains are receptive to receiving impressions from the
> world, and certain patterns are imprinted on the brain, habitualized
> as order and a certain expectation that this order will continue
> increases day by day until the baby takes it for granted.
I don't have a problem with that view.
> I'm still wondering how the physical phenomenon became mental. How
> does the order in the universe at large happen to coincide with the
> order that this image takes in my mind?
It all comes through the senses, which impress upon memory. Our brains have
evolved to put sensory inputs into a correspondence with reality.
For example, if you never saw food where it actually was, you would never
eat, and live to reproduce. Like other parts of the body, the brain has to
deal with reality accurately, or die.
I find it hard to believe that
> you became aware of the possibility of bricks falling on toes without
> any perception of these things
> happening, from which you drew the example in imagination.
I think we are dealing with two different aspects here. The brain _hardware_
is the result of evolution. Included in that hardware, is hardwired
circuitry, such as that which makes a cock crow, and a chicken sit on eggs.
The software (sensory inputs) is another matter. A sensory image of a rabbit
falling on an eagles retina, is handled differently from the same message
reaching a dove's.
[clip]
> Let's say we evolved such that we have this expectation; this
> evolution is dependent on the external world remaining the same. But
> if it doesn't, we are surely doomed.
We evolved to suite a particular environment. We drown if we breath in
water, and a fish drowns if it breathes air.
> > > How do you account for the order in your perceptions before you have
> > > conceived of any time, or space for that matter?
> >
> > A bird flying through trees has a remarkable perception of motion and
space.
> > This is not conceptual. We evolved with the abilty.
>
> Interesting, you did not say a perception of *time* and space. Perhaps
> time and motion are not equivalent?
Time is a concept involving the _measurement_ of motion.
[clip to]
> >
> > I think they agree that time is a dimension of existence, not the other
way
> > around.
>
> Time is motion; motion is a dimension? Somehow these two concepts
> become farther and farther separated in my mind as we go along.
Time is actually the measurement of motion, much as length is the
measurement
of the three dimensions.
> >
> > I think of time as the three dimentions in action.
>
> I'm sure that's a useful concept so long as the universe at large is
> obedient to it.
>
> > [clip]
> > All the same, we _do_ know things to be true. There is evidence for
that.
>
> Granted as long as the universe obeys the dictates of our theories. I
> have seen no reason for it to from this thread, just habit and
> expectation. Induction never brings 100% certainty, only probability
> and statistics.
We can only be certain of our inductions, in the circumstances they were
made.
If we induce two black swans, then we can be certain of that fact. We cannot
induce from that observation alone, that all swans are black.
> For example, we *know* causality to be a true law of nature. (Or
> substitute whatever law you accept.) How do we know this? Expectation,
> based on a lifetime of evidence, previous lifetimes of evidence down
> through the ages of man, and the fact that we ourselves never happened
> to witness events unexplainable to our scientific minds (ie.,
> miracles) -- despite the fact that they've been reported from time
> immemorial into the present day.
All proof requires a standard. A standard that was beyond humans ability is
of no consequence for humans.
[ ]
> > The big problem of trying to comprehend the totality of existence, is
> > reference.
> > Anything within existence can be related to other things in existence.
But
> > what do you relate all of existence to? This goes outside our normal
> > thinking patterns.
> > I think that comprehending that alone, is a step toward the answers we
seek.
>
> That's for a new thread. I wasn't looking for "general metaphysical
> answers to the problems plaguing mankind" (ie., "answers we seek") on
> this thread.
I meant it only in regard to the nature of existence.
[ ]
> If matter is eternal, and time is
> bound up with matter as motion, so that time and motion are
> inseparable from matter, then infinite time becomes infinite motion.
> If matter is eternal, then the universe will never stop moving, and
> infinity of time becomes a very real notion.
Right, but that is not the so called infinity of existence that is sometimes
meant.
There is a difference between saying the universe is infinite in size, and
infinite in duration. The former is in conflict with the law of identity,
which says everything being what it is, has a limit. The latter says that
changes going on in the universe don't stop with a finite number, since
another change will follow regardless of how large the number reached.
Regardless, every change will have a number.
--
Arnold
David Tomlin
BR7.91660$li3.7...@ozemail.com.au>...
> In that case, there was no time before the zero point, in which something
> could begin. I'm willing to accept that the universe (everything that
> exists), has neither an end or a beginning.
IOW, you will refuse to call the beginning of the universe
a beginning.
Like Humpty Dumpty, you may use words however you like. It
does confuse attempts to communicate.
> If a number can be placed on it, it is finite. What in existence, could not
> have a number placed on it?
I have already given four answers to that question.
1. Seconds before the present.
2. Seconds after the present.
3. Cubic centimeters of space.
4. Galaxies.
I am not claiming that any of these are in fact infinite. I am
saying that I see no a priori reason they could not be.
Edwin Smith
David Tomlin wrote:
> > If a number can be placed on it, it is finite. What in existence, could not
> > have a number placed on it?
>
> I have already given four answers to that question.
>
> 1. Seconds before the present.
The present second is zero. The preceding one is 1. The one preceding that
is 2.
And so on.
> 2. Seconds after the present.
The present second is zero. The one following it is 1. The one following th
at is
2. And so on.
> 3. Cubic centimeters of space.
a. Pick any cubic centimeter of space. Label that 0.
b. Pick a frame of reference such that the cubic centimeter exactly adjacent to
one face of cubic centimeter 0 is said to be above 0, the cubic centimeter
exactly adjacent to the opposite face is said to be below 0, the cubic cent
imeter
exactly adjacent to any other face is said to be left of 0, the cubic centi
meter
exactly adjacent to the left face is said to be right of zero, the cubic
centimeter of space exactly adjacent to the face of 0 exactly to the right
of the
space to the left of 0 is then said to be in front of 0 and the cubic centi
meter
exactly adjacent to the front face is said to be to the rear of 0.
c. Set i = 0. Set n = 1.
d. If the cubic centimeter of space above cubic centimeter number i has not
been
previously assigned a number, assign it n and add 1 to n.
e. If the cubic centimeter of space to the front of cubic centimeter number
i has
not been previously assigned a number, assign it n and add 1 to n.
f. If the cubic centimeter of space to the right of cubic centimeter number
i has
not been previously assigned a number, assign it n and add 1 to n.
g. If the cubic centimeter of space to the rear of cubic centimeter number
i has
not been previously assigned a number, assign it n and add 1 to n.
h. If the cubic centimeter of space to the left of cubic centimeter number
i has
not been previously assigned a number, assign it n and add 1 to n.
i. If the cubic centimeter of space below cubic centimeter number i has not
been
previously assigned a number, assign it n and add 1 to n.
j. Add 1 to i.
k. Go to (d).
>
> 4. Galaxies.
Similar to cubic centimeters of space, except that you will need a continuous
polar coordinate system to define the adjaceny relationships of the galaxies
(assuming they occupy the same universe).
Robert J. Kolker
Edwin Smith wrote:
> David Tomlin wrote:
>
> > > If a number can be placed on it, it is finite. What in existence, cou
> > > ld not
> > > have a number placed on it?
> >
> > I have already given four answers to that question.
> >
> > 1. Seconds before the present.
>
> The present second is zero. The preceding one is 1. The one preceding that
> is 2.
> And so on.
Why do you assume time and distance are descrete. They might be,
or they might not be. On what evidence?
Bob Kolker
Edwin Smith
"Robert J. Kolker" wrote:
> Why do you assume time and distance are descrete. They might be,
> or they might not be. On what evidence?
I made no such assumption. The challenge was to number the seconds and cubic
inches of space not time, or continuous space. I simply answered the specific
challenge.
malenor
BR7.91663$li3.7...@ozemail.com.au>...
> malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:5851837b.01121...@posting.google.com...
> >
> > But since time is just a concept derived from observing motions of
> > objects, one can say that time will end when there is no being in the
> > universe to conceive of it. Infinity, eternal time, therefore time
> > itself, is just a (epistemological) concept anyway.
>
> Certainly the concept of time depends on concept holders, but motion will
> persist regardless. I should have clarified that time is actually the
> measurement of the motion.
You've said "time is motion" and "time is the measurement of motion."
Are these equivalent statements?
> >[clip to]
> > This does rather fly in the face of scientific evidence suggesting
> > that newborn babies are not born with an instinct for time-perception.
> > Their young brains are receptive to receiving impressions from the
> > world, and certain patterns are imprinted on the brain, habitualized
> > as order and a certain expectation that this order will continue
> > increases day by day until the baby takes it for granted.
>
> I don't have a problem with that view.
As it turns out, the implication I was drawing there is that a
certain order of perceptions is necessary for our perception of
time. But time is not the percept, this order is. Time is an empirical
concept derived from orderly events. But I asked 3 posts ago, what
makes this order possible, as a mental phenomenon? We can discuss
brain imprints all day, but nothing will have been gained in answer
the question of how mental events are possible, how they happen
to coincide with physicsal events...
snip
>
> It all comes through the senses, which impress upon memory. Our brains have
> evolved to put sensory inputs into a correspondence with reality.
> For example, if you never saw food where it actually was, you would never
> eat, and live to reproduce. Like other parts of the body, the brain has to
> deal with reality accurately, or die.
So you're saying there are no mental phenomena, only physical, as in
the brain and nervous system?
> > I find it hard to believe that
> > you became aware of the possibility of bricks falling on toes without
> > any perception of these things
> > happening, from which you drew the example in imagination.
>
> I think we are dealing with two different aspects here. The brain _hardware_
> is the result of evolution. Included in that hardware, is hardwired
> circuitry, such as that which makes a cock crow, and a chicken sit on eggs.
But you see you drew your example from imagination, which is a mental
phenomenon after all. I can't explain how this came to be, can you?
> The software (sensory inputs) is another matter. A sensory image of a rabbit
> falling on an eagles retina, is handled differently from the same message
> reaching a dove's.
A computer analogy? Sensory inputs would be analogous to a mouse,
keyboard, mic or IR device, not software.
> [clip]
> > Let's say we evolved such that we have this expectation; this
> > evolution is dependent on the external world remaining the same. But
> > if it doesn't, we are surely doomed.
>
> We evolved to suite a particular environment. We drown if we breath in
> water, and a fish drowns if it breathes air.
Yep, we certainly evolved. And if the air becomes water... point taken?
You may ask, how might the air become water? I don't know, simply not
having cognized such events doesn't mean they will never happen. That's
an implication of the empiricist view.
> > > > How do you account for the order in your perceptions before you have
> > > > conceived of any time, or space for that matter?
> > >
> > > A bird flying through trees has a remarkable perception of motion and
> space.
> > > This is not conceptual. We evolved with the abilty.
> >
> > Interesting, you did not say a perception of *time* and space. Perhaps
> > time and motion are not equivalent?
>
> Time is a concept involving the _measurement_ of motion.
So you've changed your view to, time is a concept derived from
the measurement of motion? I don't think that's quite the empiricist
definition, because you can also have measurement in space (distance)
this way. So what distinguishes measurement in time from measurement
in space?
> [clip to]
> > >
> > > I think they agree that time is a dimension of existence, not the other
> > > way around.
> >
> > Time is motion; motion is a dimension? Somehow these two concepts
> > become farther and farther separated in my mind as we go along.
>
> Time is actually the measurement of motion, much as length is the
> measurement of the three dimensions.
We're spending a lot of time clarifying your own views while mine
get buried in minutiae.
snip
> > Granted as long as the universe obeys the dictates of our theories. I
> > have seen no reason for it to from this thread, just habit and
> > expectation. Induction never brings 100% certainty, only probability
> > and statistics.
>
> We can only be certain of our inductions, in the circumstances they were
> made.
> If we induce two black swans, then we can be certain of that fact. We cannot
> induce from that observation alone, that all swans are black.
You don't "induce" objects, particulars. You induce generalities.
Then you say that the two black swans do not produce enough evidence.
My question is: when is there enough evidence to absolutely prove the
theory?
> > For example, we *know* causality to be a true law of nature. (Or
> > substitute whatever law you accept.) How do we know this? Expectation,
> > based on a lifetime of evidence, previous lifetimes of evidence down
> > through the ages of man, and the fact that we ourselves never happened
> > to witness events unexplainable to our scientific minds (ie.,
> > miracles) -- despite the fact that they've been reported from time
> > immemorial into the present day.
>
> All proof requires a standard. A standard that was beyond humans ability is
> of no consequence for humans.
NOW you're getting closer to my view. Good going! To determine these
boundaries is a major step in answering the question primarily posed
on this thread. Do humans have the ability to determine actual
infinities? No. All we can do is say, no matter where you arbitrarily
stop, you may potentially go a step farther (in time). We can't say if
there is or is not an actual boundary. Infinity is beyond our ability
to perceive, although we can conceive of it as a sort of marker for
that point we cannot attain. So to claim that the universe is eternal,
infinite through time, goes beyond human reckoning. By Objectivist
standards, the person stating this is claiming omniscience in this
regard.
You have stated that "infinity" has an epistemological importance,
although for Objectivists it is only mathematical. But I think
mathematics touches on the epistemological, as Rand showed in
ITOE. So what does the mathematical concept of infinity have to say
about our cognitive abilities in general? I think you put it very
well when you stated, whatever is beyond that point is of no
consequence to humans (human understanding). It says that we can
know almost up to the point of infinity, approaching it
geometrically without ever touching it. This is as far as our
reckoning can go, and whatever cannot be understood by man's mind,
does not need to be understood.
Infinity is a point just out of reach of our understanding. How, then,
can we conceive of it? We certainly can't perceive it, we can't even
find it on any number line of reals. We can only symbolize it as a
sideways 8 or whatever such concrete you choose. Then where does
infinity as a concept come from? It is not arbitrary, yet it is not
capable of being understood. Could there be more to the human mind
than our simple ability to understand things and build theories
inductively? The concept of infinity was surely not attained
inductively, for there is no evidence to support it. The scientific
mind (the understanding) only works from evidence. I have shown
that it brings no necessity to its theories, only probable truth.
Yet we hold our truths as being necessary and absolute for all time.
I think that at least the notion of an infinity is a pointer to
guide us to understanding our minds, our abilities, our limits, and
our capacities (which are necessarily finite).
The notion of an infinity did not come to us from the world, it came
from our own minds, our ability to conceive of a non-existent,
non-actual quantity that is yet not arbitrarily held by whim or
imagination. In other words, we are not limited in our conceptions
to the world of our understanding. We are simply not limited by
the world.
What grounds our concepts and theories about the universe is not
the universe, but ideas such as infinity. The ultimate context
of our knowledge is not outside us, but conceived within us, not
from the evidence of the senses (which only brings contingent
knowledge), but from concepts alone. Because it is mere concepts
by themselves that make such notions as an "infinite" possible
at all, and this is just one example of a standard that grounds
our knowledge in the necessary.
> [ ]
> > > The big problem of trying to comprehend the totality of existence, is
> > > reference.
> > > Anything within existence can be related to other things in existence.
> But
> > > what do you relate all of existence to? This goes outside our normal
> > > thinking patterns.
> > > I think that comprehending that alone, is a step toward the answers we
> seek.
> >
> > That's for a new thread. I wasn't looking for "general metaphysical
> > answers to the problems plaguing mankind" (ie., "answers we seek") on
> > this thread.
>
> I meant it only in regard to the nature of existence.
Um yes that's general metaphysics, which I implied is not just some
parlor game for armchair philosophers but holds the answers to
the problems plaguing mankind. I don't hold that you can have
a metaphysics that is separate from these problems, although metaphysics
can take place as abstracted from them. And it helps to go about
it very abstractly as the idea of 'problems' carries with it an
emotional impact that can bias one's thinking. But the abstractions
can become entirely separate from the problems, and thus is born
the armchair philosopher, the academician of Nietzsche's nightmares.
> [ ]
> > If matter is eternal, and time is
> > bound up with matter as motion, so that time and motion are
> > inseparable from matter, then infinite time becomes infinite motion.
> > If matter is eternal, then the universe will never stop moving, and
> > infinity of time becomes a very real notion.
>
> Right, but that is not the so called infinity of existence that is sometimes
> meant.
> There is a difference between saying the universe is infinite in size, and
> infinite in duration. The former is in conflict with the law of identity,
> which says everything being what it is, has a limit. The latter says that
> changes going on in the universe don't stop with a finite number, since
> another change will follow regardless of how large the number reached.
> Regardless, every change will have a number.
The question involved eternity, infinite time, not infinite space.
Eternity of matter means infinite duration of matter in this case.
And yet Objectivists claim the notion of an infinite is limited
to the mathematical realm. They can't have it both ways. So either
the notion of an infinite is an actual quantity, or the universe
is not eternal, but finite in duration.
As for the infinity of the universe, that's for another thread, but
physics has it that the universe is finite and unbounded, like a
4-dimensional ball. There are a finite number of points on the ball,
but you can walk on it, theoretically like on the earth, forever
without reaching any end-point.
That is the physics answer. A metaphysical answer would state that
the universe is indeterminately finite and determinately bounded, but
the boundaries mean nothing to us (as you implied above). So of
course they also mean nothing to science, which then declares that
the universe is, in effect, unbounded.
The exciting thing about all this is that, although science can reach
to the stars and galaxies, it can analyze down to the tiniest
quantities, our minds are capable of even more! In thought alone
we can contemplate the vastness beyond the universe (as if there
is such a vastness, but its actual existence or non-existence is
irrelevant to the task), and in this investigation, thoroughly ground
the universe, or really our knowledge of it, in the absolutes sought
by Rand.
malenor
www.newsranger.com>...> says...
> >
> >Eternity is infinite time.
> >
> >The proposition that matter is eternal seems to
> >contradict the proposition that there can be no
> >actual infinities.
> >
> >If it doesn't, then why not?
>
> http://personal.bgsu.edu/~roberth/triad.html
>
> I point out that there are three beliefs that Rand almost certainly held
> (that
> time is not cyclical, that every event has prior causal conditions, and that
> there are no actual infinities) that are not mutually consistent. At leas
> t one
> must be false.
>
>
Wow, excellent page, I got a lot out of it. You said, at the end,
"For my money, the one I'd be most reluctant to give up is the
non-cyclicity of time. I don't have any rock-ribbed proof that time is
not cyclical..."
and then:
"As far as I can see, no very strong argument has been offered either
for the truth of the denial of actual infinities or for the
affirmation of the causal conditioning of every event."
So there's no proof or disproof of any of the three propositions. Then
by what real standard do you choose one to falsify? In response to an
e-mail, you end your response with this:
"In my post, I pointed out that if two other premises that many
Objectivists accept are true, then there must be an actual infinity of
events extending into the past."
So are you acknowledging their truth without proof, simply on the
grounds that it opens up the possibility of an actual infinity? (And
the fact that nobody has disproved the actuality of infinity.)
David Tomlin
1...@ix.netcom.com>...
> The challenge was to number the seconds and cubic
> inches of space not time, or continuous space. I simply answered the specific
> challenge.
For the record, I made no such challenge.
I understand you to be asking me to name things that might
not be finitely enumerable, not things that are absolutely
non-enumerable.
You wasted a lot of words on an undisputed point.
Are you just playing games?
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
> IOW, you will refuse to call the beginning of the universe
> a beginning.
It's just that I have a problem with "nothing", beginning.
I don't know the answers, but this doesn't look like one.
--
Arnold
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
> BR7.91663$li3.7...@ozemail.com.au>...
> >
> > All proof requires a standard. A standard that was beyond humans ability
is
> > of no consequence for humans.
>
> NOW you're getting closer to my view. Good going! To determine these
> boundaries is a major step in answering the question primarily posed
> on this thread. Do humans have the ability to determine actual
> infinities? No. All we can do is say, no matter where you arbitrarily
> stop, you may potentially go a step farther (in time). We can't say if
> there is or is not an actual boundary. Infinity is beyond our ability
> to perceive, although we can conceive of it as a sort of marker for
> that point we cannot attain. So to claim that the universe is eternal,
> infinite through time, goes beyond human reckoning. By Objectivist
> standards, the person stating this is claiming omniscience in this
> regard.
Perhaps I'm not concentrating enough, but I don't know what your point is.
Are you saying that claiming the universe is eternal, is claiming to be
familiar with the infinite, which by objectivist standards, isn't possible?
I don't think that claiming a sequence doesn't stop at a finite number, is
the same as claiming familiarity with the infinite.
>
> You have stated that "infinity" has an epistemological importance,
> although for Objectivists it is only mathematical. But I think
> mathematics touches on the epistemological, as Rand showed in
> ITOE. So what does the mathematical concept of infinity have to say
> about our cognitive abilities in general? I think you put it very
> well when you stated, whatever is beyond that point is of no
> consequence to humans (human understanding). It says that we can
> know almost up to the point of infinity, approaching it
> geometrically without ever touching it.
The whole thing about infinity, is that it isn't a point. It is the absence
of a point.
My point, is that there is no point in searching for a point that isn't a
point.
(couldn't resist:))
This is as far as our
> reckoning can go, and whatever cannot be understood by man's mind,
> does not need to be understood.
>
> Infinity is a point just out of reach of our understanding. How, then,
> can we conceive of it? We certainly can't perceive it, we can't even
> find it on any number line of reals. We can only symbolize it as a
> sideways 8 or whatever such concrete you choose. Then where does
> infinity as a concept come from?
Easy. It is the idea of continuousness. The idea of "don't stop".
[clip]
> The notion of an infinity did not come to us from the world, it came
> from our own minds, our ability to conceive of a non-existent,
> non-actual quantity that is yet not arbitrarily held by whim or
> imagination.
It came from the world and our minds. Your mistake is to think of infinity
as a quantity. If it was, it would be finite. Infinity if a concept of a
sequence that doesn't end, not a very big end.
In other words, we are not limited in our conceptions
> to the world of our understanding. We are simply not limited by
> the world.
Concepts are all tracable to perceptions. I don't know how a brain actually
forms concepts, but it does so with what is in this world.
> What grounds our concepts and theories about the universe is not
> the universe, but ideas such as infinity. The ultimate context
> of our knowledge is not outside us, but conceived within us, not
> from the evidence of the senses (which only brings contingent
> knowledge), but from concepts alone.
You need to look at ITOE, to see that while knowledge is held in conceptual
form, all concepts have their origin in perceptions. After all, you need to
have a concept of _something_.
Because it is mere concepts
> by themselves that make such notions as an "infinite" possible
> at all, and this is just one example of a standard that grounds
> our knowledge in the necessary.
The concept of infinite, is from two other concepts:
1) Sequence
2) Continuous
both of these are founded in the real world.
[ ]
> >
> > Right, but that is not the so called infinity of existence that is
sometimes
> > meant.
> > There is a difference between saying the universe is infinite in size,
and
> > infinite in duration. The former is in conflict with the law of
identity,
> > which says everything being what it is, has a limit. The latter says
that
> > changes going on in the universe don't stop with a finite number, since
> > another change will follow regardless of how large the number reached.
> > Regardless, every change will have a number.
>
> The question involved eternity, infinite time, not infinite space.
> Eternity of matter means infinite duration of matter in this case.
> And yet Objectivists claim the notion of an infinite is limited
> to the mathematical realm. They can't have it both ways. So either
> the notion of an infinite is an actual quantity, or the universe
> is not eternal, but finite in duration.
FINITE means an actual quantity. INfinite means it is not an actual
quantity.
--
Arnold
Edwin Smith
David Tomlin wrote:
> Edwin Smith <ed_s...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message news:<3C17A739.3CC1B1
> 1...@ix.netcom.com>...
>
> > The challenge was to number the seconds and cubic
> > inches of space not time, or continuous space. I simply answered the sp
> > ecific
> > challenge.
>
> For the record, I made no such challenge.
>
> I understand you to be asking me to name things that might
> not be finitely enumerable, not things that are absolutely
> non-enumerable.
I didn't ask you anything. I merely stuck my nose into someone else's threa
d. But
you claimed to have examples of things for that could not be assigned
numbers...sounds to me like you were claiming they couldn't be enumerated.
I was
merely trying to demonstrate otherwise.
> You wasted a lot of words on an undisputed point.
I'm not disputing anything.
> Are you just playing games?
Maybe. What's wrong with games?
Ed
malenor
TR7.92242$li3.7...@ozemail.com.au>...
> malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:5851837b.01121...@posting.google.com...
> > Arnold Broese-van-Groenou wrote in message news:<ms
> > BR7.91663$li3.7...@ozemail.com.au>...
> > >
> > > All proof requires a standard. A standard that was beyond humans ability
> is
> > > of no consequence for humans.
> >
> > NOW you're getting closer to my view. Good going! To determine these
> > boundaries is a major step in answering the question primarily posed
> > on this thread. Do humans have the ability to determine actual
> > infinities? No. All we can do is say, no matter where you arbitrarily
> > stop, you may potentially go a step farther (in time). We can't say if
> > there is or is not an actual boundary. Infinity is beyond our ability
> > to perceive, although we can conceive of it as a sort of marker for
> > that point we cannot attain. So to claim that the universe is eternal,
> > infinite through time, goes beyond human reckoning. By Objectivist
> > standards, the person stating this is claiming omniscience in this
> > regard.
>
> Perhaps I'm not concentrating enough, but I don't know what your point is.
> Are you saying that claiming the universe is eternal, is claiming to be
> familiar with the infinite, which by objectivist standards, isn't possible?
> I don't think that claiming a sequence doesn't stop at a finite number, is
> the same as claiming familiarity with the infinite.
I don't know what you mean by "familiar."
> > You have stated that "infinity" has an epistemological importance,
> > although for Objectivists it is only mathematical. But I think
> > mathematics touches on the epistemological, as Rand showed in
> > ITOE. So what does the mathematical concept of infinity have to say
> > about our cognitive abilities in general? I think you put it very
> > well when you stated, whatever is beyond that point is of no
> > consequence to humans (human understanding). It says that we can
> > know almost up to the point of infinity, approaching it
> > geometrically without ever touching it.
>
> The whole thing about infinity, is that it isn't a point. It is the absence
> of a point.
> My point, is that there is no point in searching for a point that isn't a
> point.
> (couldn't resist:))
It's not a point in space or time, no. I have converted into entirely
theoretical terms, it is now just a thought not a reality. You can see
that in my last post, there is nothing there but the thought of an
entity
at some point. Sorry. This means I don't have to justify it as a
point, and didn't intend to anyway. But you can deconstruct anything
you want, I
suppose, take the tiny details out of context, then re-define them in
a context
you are more familiar with, as you did here.
It's ok, lots of people know where I'm coming from. They may not be
on this particular NG.
> > This is as far as our
> > reckoning can go, and whatever cannot be understood by man's mind,
> > does not need to be understood.
> >
> > Infinity is a point just out of reach of our understanding. How, then,
> > can we conceive of it? We certainly can't perceive it, we can't even
> > find it on any number line of reals. We can only symbolize it as a
> > sideways 8 or whatever such concrete you choose. Then where does
> > infinity as a concept come from?
>
> Easy. It is the idea of continuousness. The idea of "don't stop".
Yes, and I stated that it was the absence of a beginning or ending
point. That was with regard to time represented as a number line.
But my thinking here is not limited to a number line.
> [clip]
> > The notion of an infinity did not come to us from the world, it came
> > from our own minds, our ability to conceive of a non-existent,
> > non-actual quantity that is yet not arbitrarily held by whim or
> > imagination.
>
> It came from the world and our minds. Your mistake is to think of infinity
> as a quantity. If it was, it would be finite. Infinity if a concept of a
> sequence that doesn't end, not a very big end.
>
> > In other words, we are not limited in our conceptions
> > to the world of our understanding. We are simply not limited by
> > the world.
>
> Concepts are all tracable to perceptions. I don't know how a brain actually
> forms concepts, but it does so with what is in this world.
It starts with the world, but is not limited to the world. It is just
impossible to ground one's theories there, so if we were limited
to concepts of the world, there could be no certainty, not even in
mathematics.
> > What grounds our concepts and theories about the universe is not
> > the universe, but ideas such as infinity. The ultimate context
> > of our knowledge is not outside us, but conceived within us, not
> > from the evidence of the senses (which only brings contingent
> > knowledge), but from concepts alone.
>
> You need to look at ITOE, to see that while knowledge is held in conceptual
> form, all concepts have their origin in perceptions. After all, you need to
> have a concept of _something_.
Lol. You're quoting Randian dogma at me. Text-rattling. 'Infinity' is
a concept, but not of or from anything real. An absence of a point is
a something because it serves a purpose, and yet common-sense tells us
it is just an absence -- a useful absence. How can an absence be
useful? It is a perfect emptiness, an empty concept. It should be
meaningless, but it's not. It has its uses for mathematics, and I
tried to show that it is also useful metaphysically.
Peikoff holds that it is a potential. A potential what? How can a
potential never be possible?
There is nothing in the real world to lead me to the notion of an
infinite.
Why? Because the universe, which for you is the source of all our
concepts, is finite. And since infinity is an absence, there is
nothing in the universe on which to found my notion of a perfect
absence.
If you want a true metaphysics, one that grounds your concepts, you
better leave all reality out of your proofs. As I've said before,
reality only gives inductive evidence, not proof. Infinity is one
example of a concept that is not found in reality -- but founded in
reality? I must ask, even starting with the real notion of a sequence
(of things), how does that by itself lead to the idea of an infinity,
of that which is not bounded by time and space?
I can only attribute the notion of infinity, in your way, to the
illusions created by the contemplation of vastness, such as the sky.
The sky is larger than any possible perception. It creates certain
feelings that cannot be filled adequately by words, they go beyond
words, beyond concepts.... into the infinite void beyond reach of the
understanding.
> > Because it is mere concepts
> > by themselves that make such notions as an "infinite" possible
> > at all, and this is just one example of a standard that grounds
> > our knowledge in the necessary.
>
> The concept of infinite, is from two other concepts:
> 1) Sequence
> 2) Continuous
> both of these are founded in the real world.
> [ ]
Begging the question. You are starting with a preconceived definition
of "infinity" and then declaring its elements founded in reality.
Those are mathematical concepts which aid in the ordering of real
things. The concept of the infinite serves no real purpose. I do agree
that all our knowledge begins with the real, but its necessity is not
grounded there.
To find the necessity, you have to seek beyond the concepts of the
real into the infinite.
snip
> >
> > The question involved eternity, infinite time, not infinite space.
> > Eternity of matter means infinite duration of matter in this case.
> > And yet Objectivists claim the notion of an infinite is limited
> > to the mathematical realm. They can't have it both ways. So either
> > the notion of an infinite is an actual quantity, or the universe
> > is not eternal, but finite in duration.
>
> FINITE means an actual quantity. INfinite means it is not an actual
> quantity.
Their own beliefs contradict those definitions.
The Objectivists have not sufficiently grounded their concepts. Rand
declared that a true philosophy must have a relatively small
metaphysics, while the epistemology is large. She cited Kant as a bad
philosopher who had a large, almost impossible-to-understand
metaphysics, while the epistemology was hardly worth noticing.
That's an interesting observation, but not necessarily true. It's like
saying people with large noses are dumb. (And I read that Rand
believed people with beards are "hiding something." Prejudice must
have been a personality trait of hers.)
Due to these philosophical contradictions, perhaps it may have been
worth her time to create a more sound metaphysics, to research the
whole topic more thoroughly and then decide on the basics. Her
epistemology would have improved. She might not have, for instance,
declared "existence exists" to be an axiomatic expression, when in
fact, for her, it serves the purpose of limiting knowledge to
existence. That is not the function of an axiom.
A true philosophy does not consist of contradictory notions.
Eudaimonus
> Infinity is not an actual existent, but, according to Peikoff,
> a potential... what? A potential existent? Isn't a potentiality
> a possible existent? If the universe is eternal, then its infinity
> through time is a potential, meaning a possible existent. For all
> intents and purposes, infinity, in this view, is an actuality,
> only "not yet."
You seem to be using very confusing language - when Peikoff says that
inifinity is potential, but never actual, he is clearly not saying that
infinity is a potential _extent_. "Infinity" applies only to quantities,
and quantities are not extents - quantity (or extension, if you demand
dealing with the continuous) is a secondary category (in the Aristotelian
sense). So he is saying that it is a potential quantity - _of something_
Well, clearly, of something, but what? Anything? That might be a valid
answer, but it seems clear to put it the statement either as "It is a
potential, that there is something that is infinite in quantity" or "There
is something, that it is a potentiality for it to be infinite in quantity".
Now, if he were saying the former, it would imply that something can be
infinite in quantity. However, if he were saying the latter, it would not
imply that something can be infinite in quantity - for the possiblity would
not apply to being infinite in quantity, but to being potentialy infinite in
quantity - for it would not imply the possiblity of an _extent_ that
_actually is_ infinite, which the former does imply.
More importantly, the question "Can infinity be actual?" is a bad question,
for, formed as it is, it implies that infinity is an extent, instead of an
attribute of an extent. More accurate would be to put it "Can something be
infinite in extent?"
Now, as to saying that it can be potentialy, but can not be actually, let us
consider changing the language a bit, and say that it is "possibly possible,
but not possible". Clearly, that kind of answer does make sense, doesn't
contradict itself, and is itself "possible". Similarly, to say of something
that it is potential, is not to say that the potentiality _neccessarily some
time will be_, or indeed even can be, actuallized. Suppose for a moment,
that I were to become potentially a doctor - I am an intelligent person,
able to handle the sight of blood, ect - but that also, I had a disease that
will kill me sometime betweent he ages of 18-22 (by which time, I could not
have finished school and become a doctor). Now, would you say that, because
it was not possible for me to live long enough to become a doctor, I was not
a potential doctor? Probably not, but would you say that, if I were to die
in that way, but due to an accident, that, since there was no "future actual
doctor", I was never "a potential doctor"? What would this imply for your
notion that, in being a potential doctor, there is an actual doctor "only
not yet"? Now, you might say "But, it was possible for you to actually be a
doctor, but it's supposed to not be possible for there to actually be an
infinity". Good retort that would be, but not compleate - for could I not
argue that, causality being what it is, it was in fact not possible for me
to actually be a doctor (despite the cause of it being classified as an
'accident')? Surely, if I looked only at myself, I would have to say it was
possible, but if I were to look at the whole of the universe, I would have
to say that is was impossible, considering the existence of the causes of
the accident. And indeed, is it not in this fuller sense that it is being
said that an actual infinity "is impossible"?
malenor
Peikoff claims that the idea of an infinity is only useful
for mathematics. So it is a mathematical potential only.
Peikoff must do this, as he has rejected "infinity" as a
valid metaphysical concept. It obviously has its uses
mathematically, as do other odd concepts such as imaginary
numbers. But these concepts are useful when dealing with
real problems too. Infinity is important for calculus and
is used when solving engineering problems. Can't a concept be
useful without being real? Yes, and those are the ones that
are defined by means of a valid system of thought.
It is the system of thought, the thinking that goes into it,
that is important, not its origin in the real. Our minds are
capable, by themselves, of deriving concepts without any
element of the real going into the proofs. This is proven in
the field of mathematics. And in fact, it has been shown
that this is the only method by which to ground one's concepts
in certainty. Proof from the real only brings inductive
probability. Our theories from reality are true only so long as
reality continues to obey our theories. And many times, reality
has subverted our most preciously held theories, causing us to
have to revise them. (Interesting how the younger generations of
thinkers are more open to such revision than the older.)
The concept of Infinity is absolutely necessitated by the structure
of our mathematics. This structure, though reflected in nature, is
not found there. What we find in reality are things, not numbers.
So by means of a system not grounded in or limited by the
finite scope of the universe, we have attained the infinite in
thought.
I can then mark it as a point, although not a point on the real
number line. We can then say that, theoretically, in thought only,
the apex of a suspension bridge continues to infinity. We do this
by representing it mathematically. For those who say we do not
have representations of reality, the absolute validity of math
definitely contradicts you.
This was a sore point with Rand, who did not hold with
theories not connected to any reality. It was a blind spot in her
philosophy. We can connect them to reality without their being
any actual reality to connect them to. We proceed in thought where
reality would necessarily limit us.
I had asked, in a previous post, how is it possible for our minds
to conceive of infinites, whether in quantity or extension or
whatever? Of course we may conceive of many arbitrary things, but
the infinite is not arbitrary. It is derived from the laws of
mathematics, which are considered wholly grounded, necessary and
sound for all eternity (theoretically).
The answer to the question posed by the originator of this thread
is, when attempting to ground one's assertions in existence alone,
one ends up in contradictions. The error is exposed in David's
definition of "eternity." It contains an element of Infinity which,
when applied to the real as in an "eternity of matter," leads to
the contradiction of accepting the real notion of an infinity.
Philosophers (yes, even the evil, modern ones) call this a
category error.
The answer to that particular issue is to retain the notion of an
infinity, but reject the notion of an eternity of matter, and
put it in the file labeled "unsolved mysteries."
Note, I did not call it "unresolveable."
The basis of this error might be found in Rand's idea that
(and I was recently advised to read this work, but I wonder,
how many times must I keep reading it? 20? 30?) "concepts are
not and cannot be formed in a vacuum [at least not valid ones];
they are formed in a context; the process of conceptualization
consists of observing differences and similarities of the existents
within the field of one's awareness..." (ITOE, chap. 4, section 5).
From what I've seen, even Peikoff has rejected Rand here.
(Look up his definition of "context.") She is stating that the
proper context is existents within one's field of awareness.
The validity of mathematics refutes her claim. It is a purely ideal
system, valid for all time, and applicable to real things. But
it's context is not existents, it is the wider field of the
integration
of our ideas.
Eudaimonus <jwsc...@home.net> wrote in message news:<eB8S7.10723$Z03.58535
7...@news1.rdc1.mi.home.com>...
> "malenor" <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:5851837b.01121...@posting.google.com...
>
> > Infinity is not an actual existent, but, according to Peikoff,
> > a potential... what? A potential existent? Isn't a potentiality
> > a possible existent? If the universe is eternal, then its infinity
> > through time is a potential, meaning a possible existent. For all
> > intents and purposes, infinity, in this view, is an actuality,
> > only "not yet."
>
> You seem to be using very confusing language - when Peikoff says that
> inifinity is potential, but never actual, he is clearly not saying that
> infinity is a potential _extent_. "Infinity" applies only to quantities,
> and quantities are not extents - quantity (or extension, if you demand
> dealing with the continuous) is a secondary category (in the Aristotelian
> sense). So he is saying that it is a potential quantity - _of something_
> Well, clearly, of something, but what? Anything? That might be a valid
> answer, but it seems clear to put it the statement either as "It is a
> potential, that there is something that is infinite in quantity" or "There
> is something, that it is a potentiality for it to be infinite in quantity".
It's not confusing language, I defined a potential as a possible
existent.
I didn't mention quantities at all, or anything about what the
existent
will be. That would be to assume I know what it is in the universe
that
changes when the infinite point is reached (as if there were such a
point.)
www.m-w.com has this definition of "potential": 1 : existing in
possibility : capable of development into actuality. Even definition 2
says 2 : expressing possibility.
If matter is eternal, then it has the potential to attain infinity,
implying "capable of development into actuality." Which is only to
say the infinite duration of the universe is a possible reality.
> Now, if he were saying the former, it would imply that something can be
> infinite in quantity. However, if he were saying the latter, it would not
> imply that something can be infinite in quantity - for the possiblity would
> not apply to being infinite in quantity, but to being potentialy infinite in
> quantity - for it would not imply the possiblity of an _extent_ that
> _actually is_ infinite, which the former does imply.
>
> More importantly, the question "Can infinity be actual?" is a bad question,
> for, formed as it is, it implies that infinity is an extent, instead of an
> attribute of an extent. More accurate would be to put it "Can something be
> infinite in extent?"
>
> Now, as to saying that it can be potentialy, but can not be actually, let us
> consider changing the language a bit, and say that it is "possibly possible,
> but not possible".
You can do that, I'm not sure what the justification is except that
"it works."
(Assuming it does.) But then here's your example:
> Clearly, that kind of answer does make sense, doesn't
> contradict itself, and is itself "possible". Similarly, to say of something
> that it is potential, is not to say that the potentiality _neccessarily some
> time will be_, or indeed even can be, actuallized. Suppose for a moment,
> that I were to become potentially a doctor - I am an intelligent person,
> able to handle the sight of blood, ect - but that also, I had a disease that
> will kill me sometime betweent he ages of 18-22 (by which time, I could not
> have finished school and become a doctor). Now, would you say that, because
> it was not possible for me to live long enough to become a doctor, I was not
> a potential doctor? Probably not, but would you say that, if I were to die
> in that way, but due to an accident, that, since there was no "future actual
> doctor", I was never "a potential doctor"? What would this imply for your
> notion that, in being a potential doctor, there is an actual doctor "only
> not yet"?
There are always possibilities, that your disease goes into
spontaneous remission, that you become a doctor before you die (let's
say a college
grants you an honorary degree), or a cure is found.
> Now, you might say "But, it was possible for you to actually be a
> doctor, but it's supposed to not be possible for there to actually be an
> infinity".
We're not talking about what was possible, in hindsight, but what is
possible for the future. If I said something like that it would
be somewhat like hedging or trying to find a loophole. I'm not here
to do burst somebody's bubble, I have complete confidence in what
you're saying, as far as it goes. Objectivism is fruitful, as far as
it goes. But I find my own bubble being burst, at least attempts at
it, by a certain "purposeful obtuseness" that I have come to expect
from Objectivists, who think every great problem can be solved glibly,
n a few sentences, or just by the magic formula A is A. Sorry, don't
mind my outburst, it's getting late.
> Good retort that would be, but not compleate - for could I not
> argue that, causality being what it is, it was in fact not possible for me
> to actually be a doctor (despite the cause of it being classified as an
> 'accident')? Surely, if I looked only at myself, I would have to say it was
> possible, but if I were to look at the whole of the universe, I would have
> to say that is was impossible, considering the existence of the causes of
> the accident. And indeed, is it not in this fuller sense that it is being
> said that an actual infinity "is impossible"?
You can't look at the whole of the universe without getting outside of
it.
You can say "the universe exists" from the inside, but not much else.
You can't say if the universe itself has a cause or not. You can't say
if
it is eternal, or not, or if its eternality is impossible or possible.
At least, not with normal logic.
David Tomlin
0...@ix.netcom.com>...
> David Tomlin wrote:
>
> > Edwin Smith <ed_s...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message news:<3C17A739.3CC1B1
> > 1...@ix.netcom.com>...
> I didn't ask you anything. I merely stuck my nose into someone else's threa
> d.
Right. It was Arnold who posed the question. Sorry for the confusion.
David Tomlin
TR7.92240$li3.7...@ozemail.com.au>...
> David Tomlin <jet...@home.com> wrote in message
> news:f8576779.0112...@posting.google.com...
> > IOW, you will refuse to call the beginning of the universe
> > a beginning.
>
> It's just that I have a problem with "nothing", beginning.
It occurs to me that Rand's statement could be interpreted as
not including time (or space) as part of "nature" or "existence."
If time has endpoints, in past, future, or both, they would not
correspond to events of nature coming into or going out of
existence. The starting or stopping of time would be events of
a different kind, or, more likely, not "events" at all.
Is this what you have in mind? You don't want to call the
hypothetical zero point of time a "beginning" because it
would not have been an "event"?
I doubt that Rand meant any such thing. Still, such an interpretation
would reconcile her statement with a finite duration of time.
That time (and space) are not part of "existence" doesn't seem
plausible to me. Time and space cannot be illusions, unless their
contents are as well.
> I don't know the answers, but this doesn't look like one.
I don't know what you mean by this.
Eudaimonus
> From what I've seen, even Peikoff has rejected Rand here.
> (Look up his definition of "context.") She is stating that the
> proper context is existents within one's field of awareness.
> The validity of mathematics refutes her claim. It is a purely ideal
> system, valid for all time, and applicable to real things. But
> it's context is not existents, it is the wider field of the
> integration
> of our ideas.
You are ignoring the whole field of concepts of concepts. Starting with the
concepts of unity, division and addition - all able to be found "out there",
indeed, starting, technically, with little more than abstraction and
subsumption as axioms (which are the very basis of the human conceptual
level of thought), one can build up all of mathematics. Mathematics, to
Objectivism, is not "about reality" though it is tied to reality - because
it is considered to not be built by means of concepts of concepts, and
concepts of concepts that are themselves concepts of concepts ... ect ect.
And yet it is valid, because the first-level concepts in this chain of
concepts-of-concepts are all tied to reality - ie. the ones I mentions -
unity (as in the perception of individual objects) and division and
addition - consider a young child learning to add and subtract by means of
moving groups of little blocks together - then consider that child turning
his awareness inward to observe his own mental functioning (and thus
becoming able to do multiplication) and then consider yet a second looking
inward (and thus, he becomes able to understand exponents) ... and so on and
so forth. What matters is that the process "unfolds" back out into
reality - that it isn't some sort of circular loop that remains inside the
mind with no contact with reality.
In short, the mind is in the world - and thus your field of self-awareness
is part of your field of awareness.
> It's not confusing language, I defined a potential as a possible
> existent.
> I didn't mention quantities at all, or anything about what the
> existent
> will be. That would be to assume I know what it is in the universe
> that
> changes when the infinite point is reached (as if there were such a
> point.)
> www.m-w.com has this definition of "potential": 1 : existing in
> possibility : capable of development into actuality. Even definition 2
> says 2 : expressing possibility.
>
> If matter is eternal, then it has the potential to attain infinity,
> implying "capable of development into actuality." Which is only to
> say the infinite duration of the universe is a possible reality.
Beware using a dictionary to define philosophical terms. Better to use the
definition given by the person who introduced the term.
"Potency" means: (a) the source of motion or change which is in something
other than the thing changed, or in it qua other. E.g., the science of
building is a potency which is not present in the thing built; but the
science of medicine, which is a potency, may be present in the patient,
although not qua patient.Thus "potency" means the source in general of
change or motion in another thing, or in the same thing qua other; [20] or
the source of a thing's being moved or changed by another thing, or by
itself qua other (for in virtue of that principle by which the passive thing
is affected in any way we call it capable of being affected; sometimes if it
is affected at all, and sometimes not in respect of every affection, but
only if it is changed for the better).(b) The power of performing this well
or according to intention; because sometimes we say that those who can
merely take a walk, or speak, without doing it as well as they intended,
cannot speak or walk. And similarly in the case of passivity.(c) All states
in virtue of which things are unaffected generally, or are unchangeable, or
cannot readily deteriorate, are called "potencies." For things are broken
and worn out and bent and in general destroyed not through potency but
through impotence and deficiency of some sort; and things are unaffected by
such processes which are scarcely or slightly affected because they have a
potency and are potent and are in a definite state.
Since "potency" has all these meanings, "potent" (or "capable") will mean
(a) that which contains a source of motion or change (for even what is
static is "potent" in a sense) which takes place in another thing, or in
itself qua other. (b) That over which something else has a potency of this
kind. (c) That which has the potency of changing things, either for the
worse or for the better (for it seems that even that which perishes is
"capable" of perishing; otherwise, if it had been incapable, it would not
have perished. As it is, it has a kind of disposition or cause or principle
which induces such an affection.Sometimes it seems to be such as it is
because it has something, and sometimes because it is deprived of something;
but if privation is in a sense a state or "habit," everything will be
"potent" through having something; and so a thing is "potent" in virtue of
having a certain "habit" or principle, and also in virtue of having the
privation of that "habit," if it can have privation; and if privation is not
in a sense "habit," the term "potent" is equivocal).(d) A thing is "potent"
if neither any other thing nor itself qua other contains a potency or
principle destructive of it. (e) All these things are "potent" either
because they merely might chance to happen or not to happen, or because they
might do so well . Even in inanimate things this kind of potency is found;
e.g. in instruments; for they say that one lyre "can" be played, and another
not at all, if it has not a good tone.
"Impotence" is a privation of potency--a kind of abolition of the principle
which has been described--either in general or in something which would
naturally possess that principle, or even at a time when it would naturally
already possess it (for we should not use "impotence"--in respect of
begetting--in the same sense of a boy, a man and a eunuch). [20] Again,
there is an "impotence" corresponding to each kind of potency; both to the
kinetic and to the successfully kinetic.
Some things are said to be "impotent" in accordance with this meaning of
"impotence," but others in a different sense, namely "possible" and
"impossible." "Impossible" means: (a) that whose contrary is necessarily
true; e.g., it is impossible that the diagonal of a square should be
commensurable with the sides, because such a thing is a lie, whose contrary
is not only true but inevitable. Hence that it is commensurable is not only
a lie but necessarily a lie.And the contrary of the impossible, i.e. the
possible, is when the contrary is not necessarily a lie; e.g., it is
possible that a man should be seated, for it is not necessarily a lie that
he should not be seated. "Possible," then, means in one sense, as we have
said, that which is not necessarily a lie; in another, that which is true;
and in another, that which may be true.
(The "power" in geometry is so called by an extension of meaning.)
These are the senses of "potent" which do not correspond to "potency." Those
which do correspond to it all refer to the first meaning, i.e. "a source of
change which exists in something other than that in which the change takes
place, or in the same thing qua other."Other things are said to be "potent"
because something else has such a potency over them; others because it does
not possess it; others because it possesses it in a particular way. The term
"impotent" is similarly used. Thus the authoritative definition of "potency"
in the primary sense will be "a principle producing change, which is in
something other than that in which the change takes place, or in the same
thing qua other." (Arist. Meta. V.xii)
The point here is that potency is something other than possiblity - possible
mearly means "not impossible", ir. "not neccessarily untrue", whereas
potentiality means something more as well as something distinct - rather
than being a lack of something (namely, lack of impossiblity), it is a
precessence of something. When you are potentially x, it is because you
have some property y, such that y is relatable as part of cause of being x -
either as an active power of yours, or as a receptivity to the power of
something else.
In short, the dictionary is wrong to equate "existing in possibility" with
"capable of developement into actuality". For instance, it is possible for
me to do architecture, however, I am not capable of doing architecture.
This is because it would not be a contradiction for me to go to architecture
school, graduate, get a job, and a build a building - yet I have not gone to
architecture school, and thus do not have architectural skills - it would be
wrong to say that I am potentially house-designing (ie. potentially
architecting - an architect) but it would be right to say of me that I am
potentially potentially house-designing (ie. potentially an architect). It
confuses being able, with being able to become able.
> You can't look at the whole of the universe without getting outside of
> it.
> You can say "the universe exists" from the inside, but not much else.
> You can't say if the universe itself has a cause or not. You can't say
> if
> it is eternal, or not, or if its eternality is impossible or possible.
>
> At least, not with normal logic.
I would agree with all of that (to a point - I would prefer to say those
questions are invalid as questions, rather than that they are unanswerable)
However, that is not what I was proposing - I was not making a pronouncement
as to the nature of 'existence as a whole' - but as to some one part of it,
as determined by the whole of it. My logic is this - IF the normal
conception of determinism is true THEN all that is, 'had to be', based on
the previous states of the universe, and THUS IF it must be possible-for-x
in order to be potentially-x, THEN if x, then ~possible(~x), and thus
~potentially(~x) and THUS WOULD Ax(x->~potentially(~x)) and so there would
not only be no unactualizable potentialities, but no unactualiz_ed_
potentialities - which would render the concept of potentiality itself
impotent. Therefor, if you wish to hold to determinism, even if just for
inanimate mater, you would have to get rid of the concept of potentiality
(at least in respect to that of which you hold determinism to hold for) -
that, or you would need to adjust your concept of the relation between
potentiatlity and possibility.
malenor
cR7.90514$li3.6...@ozemail.com.au>...snip
> > Then I wonder, how are you aware of motion without some previous
> > concept of time? Doesn't time make your perception of motion possible?
>
> Time _is_ motion. If a brick falls on your toe, the motion is from top to
> bottom.
> This means it was at the top, then bottom. We call the order "before" place,
> if the object motion was required to reach "now" place.
>
> > How do you account for the order in your perceptions before you have
> > conceived of any time, or space for that matter?
>
> A bird flying through trees has a remarkable perception of motion and space.
> This is not conceptual. We evolved with the abilty.
>
I'd like to focus on this line of the conversation to point out the
method used.
I had asked how you are aware of motion (particularly an order in
perceptions of external things in motion), and you replied, "time
is motion."
Later, you recanted that statement and declared that time is the
measurement of motion.
Since you have recanted the idea that time is motion, the question
remains: How are you aware of this order of time in your perceptual
field? Measurement is conceptual, so time is no longer perceptual
as it was with your view that time is motion (motion is perceptual,
therefore so is time). Now we have a notion of time that is
abstracted out of the perceptual into the conceptual.
Your example of birds, flying expertly through trees, is now no
longer dependent on time, since for you time is a concept and
only a concept. How can these birds be aware of time, when it
is a merely idealized version of motion, based on a conceptual
process of measuring existents in motion? Time, on this view, is
nothing but a useful conceptual invention of humans.
There's no doubt that time is a concept we use. But, we had the
ability to perceive an order in our external world before the
concept of time was thought up.
Sometimes people, even though they like to advise me to read the
works of Rand (I think I've read them sufficiently), forget such
Randian notions as the 'implicit concept.' "Man grasps implicitly
on the perceptual level... the data which are to be integrated
by that concept. It is this implicit knowledge which permits his
consciousness to develop further."
Ohhh?? Hmmmm... Where did this "implicit knowledge" come from?
I didn't ask you. I asked Ayn Rand, the most intelligent human
who ever lived. Unfortunately she's no longer alive.
Apparently this notion of Rand's is a kind of "seed" that is
in our minds, somehow, to start the growth of the rest of our
knowledge. It is a very useful notion, no doubt, and probably
true, and yet Rand does nothing to support it, prove it, or even
demonstrate it except perhaps to say that the growth of our
knowledge proves it. There is no meta-theory governing her
assertions.
Anyway, on the perceptual level we must have some implicit
knowledge of time, whose origin is unknown. You might say,
that the sensible creates impressions on our brains which
lead us to expect this order. But that doesn't explain how
the mental aspect of these impressions becomes actual.
I have said that a few times here. What it is intended to show
is that you have proven nothing until you can draw the
connection between these neural impressions and our perceptions.
Objectivism's theory of knowledge is dancing on the head of a
pin that says: the attempt to disprove the validity of the
senses involves knowledge from the senses in the very attempt.
In other words, it's true because you can't disprove it. The
same idea holds for a belief in God. You can't prove that God
doesn't exist either. So what Objectivism has to begin with
is an awareness of the world (perception) that arises from
out of nowhere, implicit concepts that come from somewhere, and
the growth, furthermore, the *certainty*, of our knowledge
is dependent on this conceptual vacuum in Rand's theory of
knowledge.
The result is contradictions such as that exposed at the
beginning of this thread, and at Rob's webpage. I have given
clues in this thread as how to properly proceed to resolve the
contradictions, but have only been met with what I have recently
come to call a purposeful obtuseness, an unwillingness to think
beyond the comfort of one's belief system even in the face of
obvious self-contradictions. It is exemplified in blunt answers
to difficult questions, for example, "those guys died." Rand
was terse, but not that terse. Her intellectual progenitors are
only taking her methods to their ultimate conclusion, revealing,
like make-up peeling off of an aging starlet's face, the truth
behind the rhetoric.
There still remains a certain faith among those who believe a
connection will be found between the physicality of the sensation
and their synthesis into the mental, the perceptual, and beyond.
Objectivists who may be seeking such a connection (and one can only
praise this attempt, even mistaken as it is), believe that the
answer will be found in a cooperation between intellectual
disciplines, such as biology, chemistry, philosophy, what have you.
This is begging the question. It is relying on the certainty of
knowledge before its certainty has even been proven. It is
impossible to know, by this method, when one has failed the task.
So it is necessary to keep searching, questing, sweating for the
answers which for some reason never develop. It never occurs to
these seekers that their very methodology needs to be questioned.
I have tried to show that the very existence of a concept such as
"infinity," which is certainly valid yet applicable to no existent,
can come to be. I cannot point to any possible existent and claim
that it has the attribute of infinity. On the other hand, I can
point to my phone and say with certainty that it has the attribute
of finiteness, that someday it will be possible to say of it, "that
blob of metal and plastic used to be a phone."
But then there are those who think they can know the same thing
about the universe as a whole. Why? Because of the very notions
that surpass any possibilility or potentiality, iow, our ability
to conceive of such notions can create the illusion that our
perceptions themselves surpass the universe -- that the universe
as a whole can become an object of perception. Once again, this
error is caused by Objectivism's lack of a meta-epistemology,
really, of any metaphysics at all except for a few brief
statements about existence and causality, and swinging one's arm
in a circle.
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
I don't feel this conversation will be productive, but will let you have the
last word after my response here.
> >
> > A bird flying through trees has a remarkable perception of motion and
space.
> > This is not conceptual. We evolved with the abilty.
> >
>
> I'd like to focus on this line of the conversation to point out the
> method used.
>
> I had asked how you are aware of motion (particularly an order in
> perceptions of external things in motion), and you replied, "time
> is motion."
>
> Later, you recanted that statement and declared that time is the
> measurement of motion.
I gave examples of such measurement, and guess what; they involved motion.
One measures motion with motion. A sprint is measured against the motion of
a second hand. Could you not see that time is comparing one motion to
another, but is still motion. It is not a recant, but a clarification.
> Since you have recanted the idea that time is motion, the question
> remains: How are you aware of this order of time in your perceptual
> field? Measurement is conceptual, so time is no longer perceptual
> as it was with your view that time is motion (motion is perceptual,
> therefore so is time). Now we have a notion of time that is
> abstracted out of the perceptual into the conceptual.
Motion is perceptual. Comparing one motion with another (measuring
motion--called 'timing') is conceptual.
> Your example of birds, flying expertly through trees, is now no
> longer dependent on time, since for you time is a concept and
> only a concept. How can these birds be aware of time, when it
> is a merely idealized version of motion, based on a conceptual
> process of measuring existents in motion? Time, on this view, is
> nothing but a useful conceptual invention of humans.
You make things very difficult for yourself.
Birds fly through trees using their perceptions, regardless of what is
understood about it. It happens.
> There's no doubt that time is a concept we use. But, we had the
> ability to perceive an order in our external world before the
> concept of time was thought up.
OK
[ ]
> I didn't ask you. I asked Ayn Rand, the most intelligent human
> who ever lived. Unfortunately she's no longer alive.
If you think Rand is wrong, I have no motive to persuade you otherwise.
This forum is full of folks who agree with some of her ideas, and only wish
to "correct" her mistaken ones.
So far, all such "corrections" have failed to convince me. This isn't
because I'm loyal to Rand, but because I happen to agree with her.
> Apparently this notion of Rand's is a kind of "seed" that is
> in our minds, somehow, to start the growth of the rest of our
> knowledge. It is a very useful notion, no doubt, and probably
> true, and yet Rand does nothing to support it, prove it, or even
> demonstrate it except perhaps to say that the growth of our
> knowledge proves it. There is no meta-theory governing her
> assertions.
>
> Anyway, on the perceptual level we must have some implicit
> knowledge of time, whose origin is unknown. You might say,
> that the sensible creates impressions on our brains which
> lead us to expect this order. But that doesn't explain how
> the mental aspect of these impressions becomes actual.
Who cares? I know I'm conscious, but don't understand the nature of that
either
> I have said that a few times here. What it is intended to show
> is that you have proven nothing until you can draw the
> connection between these neural impressions and our perceptions.
> Objectivism's theory of knowledge is dancing on the head of a
> pin that says: the attempt to disprove the validity of the
> senses involves knowledge from the senses in the very attempt.
> In other words, it's true because you can't disprove it.
No. It means you cannot assume as true, that which you intend to disprove.
The
> same idea holds for a belief in God. You can't prove that God
> doesn't exist either.
I don't claim that God told me he didn't exist. THAT is the equivalent of
trying to disprove the evidence of the senses.
So what Objectivism has to begin with
> is an awareness of the world (perception) that arises from
> out of nowhere, implicit concepts that come from somewhere, and
> the growth, furthermore, the *certainty*, of our knowledge
> is dependent on this conceptual vacuum in Rand's theory of
> knowledge.
As you can now see, your assumptions are all wrong.
> The result is contradictions such as that exposed at the
> beginning of this thread, and at Rob's webpage. I have given
> clues in this thread as how to properly proceed to resolve the
> contradictions, but have only been met with what I have recently
> come to call a purposeful obtuseness, an unwillingness to think
> beyond the comfort of one's belief system even in the face of
> obvious self-contradictions. It is exemplified in blunt answers
> to difficult questions, for example, "those guys died." Rand
> was terse, but not that terse.
I use short simple replies to cut through a haze of words. My answer was
short but to the point. I don't like unnecesary verbage, and regard it a
real challenge to cut it down.
Her intellectual progenitors are
> only taking her methods to their ultimate conclusion, revealing,
> like make-up peeling off of an aging starlet's face, the truth
> behind the rhetoric.
> There still remains a certain faith among those who believe a
> connection will be found between the physicality of the sensation
> and their synthesis into the mental, the perceptual, and beyond.
> Objectivists who may be seeking such a connection (and one can only
> praise this attempt, even mistaken as it is), believe that the
> answer will be found in a cooperation between intellectual
> disciplines, such as biology, chemistry, philosophy, what have you.
> This is begging the question. It is relying on the certainty of
> knowledge before its certainty has even been proven. It is
> impossible to know, by this method, when one has failed the task.
You have a method that is better?
> So it is necessary to keep searching, questing, sweating for the
> answers which for some reason never develop. It never occurs to
> these seekers that their very methodology needs to be questioned.
>
> I have tried to show that the very existence of a concept such as
> "infinity," which is certainly valid yet applicable to no existent,
> can come to be. I cannot point to any possible existent and claim
> that it has the attribute of infinity.
"Continuousness"? I thought I covered that.
On the other hand, I can
> point to my phone and say with certainty that it has the attribute
> of finiteness, that someday it will be possible to say of it, "that
> blob of metal and plastic used to be a phone."
>
> But then there are those who think they can know the same thing
> about the universe as a whole. Why? Because of the very notions
> that surpass any possibilility or potentiality, iow, our ability
> to conceive of such notions can create the illusion that our
> perceptions themselves surpass the universe -- that the universe
> as a whole can become an object of perception. Once again, this
> error is caused by Objectivism's lack of a meta-epistemology,
> really, of any metaphysics at all except for a few brief
> statements about existence and causality, and swinging one's arm
> in a circle.
Perhaps you would do well to create your own philosophy, since you wish to
deal with more than existence and causality.
I myself don't know what part of non existence Rand is ignoring.
(Yes I know..terse)
--
Arnold
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
> Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
> >
> > It's just that I have a problem with "nothing", beginning.
>
> Is this what you have in mind? You don't want to call the
> hypothetical zero point of time a "beginning" because it
> would not have been an "event"?
Events are caused by something happening to something.
That is why an 'event' involving nothing---such as a universe popping into
existence causes me problems.
> I doubt that Rand meant any such thing. Still, such an interpretation
> would reconcile her statement with a finite duration of time.
I'm not aware she thought time had a finite limit.
> That time (and space) are not part of "existence" doesn't seem
> plausible to me. Time and space cannot be illusions, unless their
> contents are as well.
This is not my position.
> > I don't know the answers, but this doesn't look like one.
>
> I don't know what you mean by this.
It means that of suggestions of the nature of existence, this doesn't strike
me as plausible.
--
Arnold
David Tomlin
CS7.94347$li3.8...@ozemail.com.au>...
> Events are caused by something happening to something.
> That is why an 'event' involving nothing---such as a universe popping into
> existence causes me problems.
OK. Do you consider space-time part of the universe? Or is the
universe "in" space-time?
> > I doubt that Rand meant any such thing. Still, such an interpretation
> > would reconcile her statement with a finite duration of time.
>
> I'm not aware she thought time had a finite limit.
I don't think she did. That was my point.
The question is, does endless time contradict the doctrine that
there are no actual infinities? Is there a sense in which time
is not "actual"?
> It means that of suggestions of the nature of existence, this doesn't strike
> me as plausible.
What suggestion are you talking about?
I'm sure I haven't made any such suggestions. I haven't understood us
to be talking about "the nature of existence" at all.
Robert Allen Leeper
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou wrote:
>
> David Tomlin <jet...@home.com> wrote in message
> news:f8576779.01121...@posting.google.com...
> > Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
> > >
> > > It's just that I have a problem with "nothing", beginning.
> >
> >[ ]
> > Is this what you have in mind? You don't want to call the
> > hypothetical zero point of time a "beginning" because it
> > would not have been an "event"?
[...]
--
Best wishes,
RAL
Reason Is Not a Perfect Guide
But There Is No Other
-
-
-
George Dance
374b...@posting.google.com>...
> Eternity is infinite time.
>
> The proposition that matter is eternal seems to
> contradict the proposition that there can be no
> actual infinities.
>
> If it doesn't, then why not?
Off the top of my head, I'd say it does. The idea of matter implies
there are no spatial infinities, but temporal infinity sounds like
another thing entirely.
The proposition 'there can be no actual infinities' seems provable
only by examining everything that potentially is an infinity, and
measuring it. I fail to understand why a philosopher sees it as
necessary, to have a complete philosophy, to try to prove by argument
whether there are any infinities or not; IMO such metaphysical
speculation subtracts from a philosophy's credibility, rather than
adding anything to it.
malenor
CS7.94348$li3.8...@ozemail.com.au>...
> malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:5851837b.01121...@posting.google.com...
> > Arnold Broese-van-Groenou wrote
>
> I don't feel this conversation will be productive, but will let you have the
> last word after my response here.
Lol, it can be, if you drop your presuppositions based on Rand.
I know, it's difficult. I was in your position once long ago.
Thankfully, I finally snapped out of the hypnotic effect her
writing has on some people.
I won't deprive any interested parties here of my own response.
> > >
> > > A bird flying through trees has a remarkable perception of motion and
> space.
> > > This is not conceptual. We evolved with the abilty.
> > >
> >
> > I'd like to focus on this line of the conversation to point out the
> > method used.
> >
> > I had asked how you are aware of motion (particularly an order in
> > perceptions of external things in motion), and you replied, "time
> > is motion."
> >
> > Later, you recanted that statement and declared that time is the
> > measurement of motion.
>
> I gave examples of such measurement, and guess what; they involved motion.
> One measures motion with motion. A sprint is measured against the motion of
> a second hand. Could you not see that time is comparing one motion to
> another, but is still motion. It is not a recant, but a clarification.
Sounds then like motion is prior to your concept of time. Certainly
percepts precede concepts. Now your saying that time is [results from]
comparing one motion to another. So it is the mental comparing of
percepts that results in time, generated mentally. For instance,
our idea of a second, measured against a single motion of a
second-hand, is arbitrary. The length of this motion must be some
easily perceivable quantity, for practical purposes. Our concept
of a second of time is therefore invented.
On another level, time is subjective. People can experience time
as passing more slowly or more quickly. We have a normal sense
of time, but events, drugs, medications, emergency situations,
can alter this sense.
From this example, it is easy to see that time is a sense, and not
a product of motions.
> > Since you have recanted the idea that time is motion, the question
> > remains: How are you aware of this order of time in your perceptual
> > field? Measurement is conceptual, so time is no longer perceptual
> > as it was with your view that time is motion (motion is perceptual,
> > therefore so is time). Now we have a notion of time that is
> > abstracted out of the perceptual into the conceptual.
>
> Motion is perceptual. Comparing one motion with another (measuring
> motion--called 'timing') is conceptual.
Still ignoring Rand's idea of an "implicit concept."
> > Your example of birds, flying expertly through trees, is now no
> > longer dependent on time, since for you time is a concept and
> > only a concept. How can these birds be aware of time, when it
> > is a merely idealized version of motion, based on a conceptual
> > process of measuring existents in motion? Time, on this view, is
> > nothing but a useful conceptual invention of humans.
>
> You make things very difficult for yourself.
> Birds fly through trees using their perceptions, regardless of what is
> understood about it. It happens.
I have no idea what a bird perceives.
> > There's no doubt that time is a concept we use. But, we had the
> > ability to perceive an order in our external world before the
> > concept of time was thought up.
>
> OK
>
> [ ]
> > I didn't ask you. I asked Ayn Rand, the most intelligent human
> > who ever lived. Unfortunately she's no longer alive.
>
> If you think Rand is wrong, I have no motive to persuade you otherwise.
> This forum is full of folks who agree with some of her ideas, and only wish
> to "correct" her mistaken ones.
> So far, all such "corrections" have failed to convince me. This isn't
> because I'm loyal to Rand, but because I happen to agree with her.
Sometimes I think she's wrong, sometimes I think she's making
unproven assertions, often I think her attempts at philosophy boil
down to nothing more than advice. Her morality comes down to
finding mere empirical advantages for oneself. Yet her novels suggest
a more noble view of man. Her true philosophy is dependent on what
one gleans from her novels. Unfortunately, they are open to
personal interpretation, as is all art.
> > Apparently this notion of Rand's is a kind of "seed" that is
> > in our minds, somehow, to start the growth of the rest of our
> > knowledge. It is a very useful notion, no doubt, and probably
> > true, and yet Rand does nothing to support it, prove it, or even
> > demonstrate it except perhaps to say that the growth of our
> > knowledge proves it. There is no meta-theory governing her
> > assertions.
> >
> > Anyway, on the perceptual level we must have some implicit
> > knowledge of time, whose origin is unknown. You might say,
> > that the sensible creates impressions on our brains which
> > lead us to expect this order. But that doesn't explain how
> > the mental aspect of these impressions becomes actual.
>
> Who cares? I know I'm conscious, but don't understand the nature of that
> either
Ahhhh yes, purposeful obtuseness. It is this kind of view that
leads to self-contradictions.
If Ayn Rand herself didn't really, truly care about philosophy,
but was unable to admit it, obviously her progenitors have no such
qualms. The philosophy is therefore empty words, merely a vehicle
for a fanatical emotional content.
> > I have said that a few times here. What it is intended to show
> > is that you have proven nothing until you can draw the
> > connection between these neural impressions and our perceptions.
> > Objectivism's theory of knowledge is dancing on the head of a
> > pin that says: the attempt to disprove the validity of the
> > senses involves knowledge from the senses in the very attempt.
> > In other words, it's true because you can't disprove it.
>
> No. It means you cannot assume as true, that which you intend to disprove.
We're saying the same thing.
> > The same idea holds for a belief in God. You can't prove that God
> > doesn't exist either.
>
> I don't claim that God told me he didn't exist. THAT is the equivalent of
> trying to disprove the evidence of the senses.
Hehe yeah. It proves nothing one way or the other.
> > So what Objectivism has to begin with
> > is an awareness of the world (perception) that arises from
> > out of nowhere, implicit concepts that come from somewhere, and
> > the growth, furthermore, the *certainty*, of our knowledge
> > is dependent on this conceptual vacuum in Rand's theory of
> > knowledge.
>
> As you can now see, your assumptions are all wrong.
Nothing in philosophy can be resolved using such high school debating
tactics. It is Rand who assumes everything and proves nothing.
Obtuseness is not a form of logic.
> > The result is contradictions such as that exposed at the
> > beginning of this thread, and at Rob's webpage. I have given
> > clues in this thread as how to properly proceed to resolve the
> > contradictions, but have only been met with what I have recently
> > come to call a purposeful obtuseness, an unwillingness to think
> > beyond the comfort of one's belief system even in the face of
> > obvious self-contradictions. It is exemplified in blunt answers
> > to difficult questions, for example, "those guys died." Rand
> > was terse, but not that terse.
>
> I use short simple replies to cut through a haze of words. My answer was
> short but to the point. I don't like unnecesary verbage, and regard it a
> real challenge to cut it down.
The real challenge is to cut through purposeful obtuseness and
teach conceptualization to cult-like followers who never grew
beyond the perceptual level of reading Rand's novels and
memorizing the formulas there.
> > Her intellectual progenitors are
> > only taking her methods to their ultimate conclusion, revealing,
> > like make-up peeling off of an aging starlet's face, the truth
> > behind the rhetoric.
> > There still remains a certain faith among those who believe a
> > connection will be found between the physicality of the sensation
> > and their synthesis into the mental, the perceptual, and beyond.
> > Objectivists who may be seeking such a connection (and one can only
> > praise this attempt, even mistaken as it is), believe that the
> > answer will be found in a cooperation between intellectual
> > disciplines, such as biology, chemistry, philosophy, what have you.
> > This is begging the question. It is relying on the certainty of
> > knowledge before its certainty has even been proven. It is
> > impossible to know, by this method, when one has failed the task.
>
> You have a method that is better?
Of course. I wouldn't come here unarmed with my own intellectual
ammunition. (That last was a "department" in Rand's newsletter.)
> > So it is necessary to keep searching, questing, sweating for the
> > answers which for some reason never develop. It never occurs to
> > these seekers that their very methodology needs to be questioned.
> >
> > I have tried to show that the very existence of a concept such as
> > "infinity," which is certainly valid yet applicable to no existent,
> > can come to be. I cannot point to any possible existent and claim
> > that it has the attribute of infinity.
>
> "Continuousness"? I thought I covered that.
Continuous does not imply infinite. You can have a finite series
that is continuous. That is basic calculus. The concept of infinity,
though derived partially from the continuous, is developed from
a purely mental capacity to conceive beyond the limits, beyond
the universe. What gives us this power?
> > On the other hand, I can
> > point to my phone and say with certainty that it has the attribute
> > of finiteness, that someday it will be possible to say of it, "that
> > blob of metal and plastic used to be a phone."
> >
> > But then there are those who think they can know the same thing
> > about the universe as a whole. Why? Because of the very notions
> > that surpass any possibilility or potentiality, iow, our ability
> > to conceive of such notions can create the illusion that our
> > perceptions themselves surpass the universe -- that the universe
> > as a whole can become an object of perception. Once again, this
> > error is caused by Objectivism's lack of a meta-epistemology,
> > really, of any metaphysics at all except for a few brief
> > statements about existence and causality, and swinging one's arm
> > in a circle.
>
> Perhaps you would do well to create your own philosophy, since you wish to
> deal with more than existence and causality.
> I myself don't know what part of non existence Rand is ignoring.
> (Yes I know..terse)]
She's ignoring the fact that to conceive of an infinity requires more
than what the universe of limits and causality has to offer.
Bert Clanton
George Dance <georg...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> David Tomlin <jet...@home.com> wrote in message news:<f8576779.0112082234.
> 374b...@posting.google.com>...
> > Eternity is infinite time.
> >
> > The proposition that matter is eternal seems to
> > contradict the proposition that there can be no
> > actual infinities.
> >
> > If it doesn't, then why not?
>
> Off the top of my head, I'd say it does. The idea of matter implies
> there are no spatial infinities, but temporal infinity sounds like
> another thing entirely.
>
If "the idea of matter implies there are no spacial infinities", *and*
some modern cosmologists are correct in supposing that the physical
space-time-continuum-in-the-large has the structure of a 4D
hyper-hyperboloid, then we're in trouble. Such a geometric manifold is
unlimited, i.e., infinite, in extent. So under these assumptions, taken
together, if we exist then we're non-material
But IMHO the idea of matter in no way implies that there are no spacial
infinities. In fact, if those cosmologists are correct in their
understanding of the large-scale structure of the physical universe,
there *is* at least *one* "actual infinity", i.e., the extent of the
physical universe.
> The proposition 'there can be no actual infinities' seems provable
> only by examining everything that potentially is an infinity, and
> measuring it.
Or by showing that "there can be no actual infinities" is a necessary
implication of something we know to be true. Which IMHO it is not.
> I fail to understand why a philosopher sees it as
> necessary, to have a complete philosophy, to try to prove by argument
> whether there are any infinities or not; IMO such metaphysical
> speculation subtracts from a philosophy's credibility, rather than
> adding anything to it.
With that I certainly agree. In fact, I fail to understand why a
philosopher feels competent to decide, on metaphysical grounds, what the
characteristics of the physical world are--of which an "actual infinity"
of extent may very possibly be one.
Best wishes,
Bert
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
Robert Allen Leeper <ra...@hcsmail.com> wrote in message
news:3C1B7948...@hcsmail.com...
> Cant antimony help with these problegames?
Never met the guy. Is he smart?
--
Arnold
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
> universe "in" space-time?
If it exists, then it is part of the universe. That would mean that space
and time are in the universe. There was therefore, no time 'before' the
universe. This implies there never was a time the universe did not exist.
[ ]
> The question is, does endless time contradict the doctrine that
> there are no actual infinities? Is there a sense in which time
> is not "actual"?
I don't see why it should. Time is our concept of measuring motion. While
'time' the measurement is consciousness dependent, motion itself is not.
If one says that there is no reason to claim all motion should stop at some
point, I wouldn't equate that with claiming an "actual" infinity.
> > It means that of suggestions of the nature of existence, this doesn't
strike
> > me as plausible.
>
> What suggestion are you talking about?
>
> I'm sure I haven't made any such suggestions. I haven't understood us
> to be talking about "the nature of existence" at all.
OK. The references to the "beginning" of the universe, and whether time and
space were part of existence, led me to believe you were.
--
Arnold
malenor
3.143204...@corp.supernews.com>...snip
>
> If "the idea of matter implies there are no spacial infinities", *and*
> some modern cosmologists are correct in supposing that the physical
> space-time-continuum-in-the-large has the structure of a 4D
> hyper-hyperboloid, then we're in trouble. Such a geometric manifold is
> unlimited, i.e., infinite, in extent.
Ha! This reply is not directed at you, Bert and George, but it wasn't
very long ago that someone claimed physics held the belief that time
and space are in the universe, not vice versa. Now here is another
example of the versa. How can they say time and space is a continuum,
or a "geometric manifold," while at the same time, space/time is in the uni
verse?
Physicists don't know what to believe. Sometimes they claim, along with
Newton (and no amount of purposeful obtuseness is going to convince
me otherwise, after all my studies), that the universe exists or is
held in place by some kind of manifold or continuum. Other times, they
will claim space and time are products of thought. Or do they? Not that
I've ever seen. But a purposefully obtuse individual on this thread
claimed that this was the modern physics view.
Considering the responses I get sometimes, I must be some kind of
nut magnet here.
It is outrageous that physicists will use the language of a Newtonian
mechanist and then, when you put his language into metaphysical terms, he
denies his own beliefs. For example, "I believe in gospel of Christ."
"Then you're a Christian." "Well, I wouldn't go *that* far..."
A simple example, yes, and one not likely to happen in a real
conversation. But it shows the method of those who resist labeling,
in order, perhaps, to resist the necessity of questioning their own
beliefs, to lie curled up comfortably in the womb of mother-Rand,
never to be born into the hard, cruel world of metaphysical
investigation.
It is far easier, for some, to study Objectivism in a vacuum. A
metaphysical vacuum. Perhaps because that's what Objectivism's
metaphysics amounts to. They take pride in their massive
epistemology, and neglect the metaphysics, declaring the whole
pursuit "dangerous," at least when taken to great pains.
But it is in metaphysics where lie the major philosophical
dilemmas, not epistemology. Logic has been taken for granted for
centuries. In the 20th century it took different forms, and Aristotle
was formally neglected in favor of such ideas as dialectics, but
the practicality of Aristotelian logic has never died out or gone
out of fashion. Our very thought is shaped by his efficient causes,
and sometimes even his teleology. Epistemology has been well-handled
down through the centuries.
But the great questions of metaphysics have been neglected or lost.
Some will claim they are not important, not now or perhaps they never
were. But your basic answers to fundamental questions shape the
rest of your thought, as well as the unspoken contradictions, as those
pointed out at the beginning of this thread and at Rob's webpage.
Swinging your arm around and declaring, "This is existence," is not
a good basis for a system of philosophic thought. It indicates
a laziness to do the hard work of developing a sound, theoretical
foundation. It holds, not existence, but common sense as a basic
axiom against which we constantly check our premises. But where
did common sense come from? Blank-out. It is just something that
has worked for centuries, so "it must be right." It is grounded in
the faith that common sense will continue to work out, and that the
world will continue to obey the dictates of our common sense. And
if some day, it doesn't happen to work out, it was an unspoken
premise of the philosophy, so nobody can be blamed (because nobody
was aware of it). And as Rand liked to say, not knowing is a better
excuse than not *wanting* to know. It is on this thin line that
she holds Reardan better than James Taggart, morally, although it
is impossible to prove whether or not somebody wanted to know something
-- unless of course you're writing a novel and write these facts
into the characterization. But the world is not a novel. While moral
blacks and whites may exist, it is not always so easy to determine
which is which. When I come across purposeful obtuseness on this
newsgroup, I can only conclude that it is a not *wanting* to know,
because it sure doesn't demonstrate to me a desire to know anything
outside the world of Rand's philosophical "womb."
snip
malenor
3.143204...@corp.supernews.com>...
>
> With that I certainly agree. In fact, I fail to understand why a
> philosopher feels competent to decide, on metaphysical grounds, what the
> characteristics of the physical world are--of which an "actual infinity"
> of extent may very possibly be one.
>
> Best wishes,
> Bert
The point is not to determine the shape or extent of the physical
world. That is a physics problem. A metaphysical question treats
of infinity alone without assuming it connects to any possible
experience. If concepts, in the objectivist view, are constantly
checked against "axioms," existence, then what accounts for the
existence and necessary concept of an infinity in thought, a
concept so vast that not even the universe itself can contain it?
"Infinity" contains nothing under it, yet it is not an empty
concept by any means. It is not a quantity, at least not in the
real sense. Then what is it, and why is it important? Important
enough that it is implied in the objectivist notion that the
universe is eternal.
malenor
E3...@hcsmail.com>...
> Cant antimony help with these problegames?
a. No regular poster here knows what an 'antinomy' is.
b. Antinomy's help clarify arguments, but do nothing
in the way or resolving them.
Robert Allen Leeper
--
Best wishes,
RAL
Reason Is Not a Perfect Guide
But There Is No Other
-
-
-
-
-
Robert Allen Leeper
confusion. Antinomies are pairs of mutually inconsistent propositions,
for each of which there appears to be a compelling reason to accept it.
Clarity is essential for resolution.
--
Chris Cathcart
>Robert Allen Leeper <ra...@hcsmail.com> wrote in message news:<3C1B7948.2308
>E3...@hcsmail.com>...
>> Cant antimony help with these problegames?
>
>a. No regular poster here knows what an 'antinomy' is.
False.
--
Chris Cathcart [email suffix: yahoo dot com]
"Beer is proof that God loves us and wants us to be happy." --Benjamin Franklin
"Baseball is only further proof." --Me
Bert Clanton
> > Cant antimony help with these problegames?
>
> a. No regular poster here knows what an 'antinomy' is.
> b. Antinomy's help clarify arguments, but do nothing
> in the way or resolving them.
No! He said *antimony*!
Sometimes I think that arsenic might be more helpful.
Best wishes,
Bert
David Tomlin
RS7.94637$li3.8...@ozemail.com.au>...
> Time is our concept of measuring motion.
Is this definition of "time" an Objectivist doctrine? Is it
Rand's or Peikoff's?
I don't agree with it. We have a concept of time. Time is not
a concept.
Time existed for billions of years (at least) before humans
came along to form concepts of measurements.
That time is a "concept", not an objective reality, is a
curiously subjectivist doctrine for "Objectivists".
> While
> 'time' the measurement is consciousness dependent, motion itself is not.
> If one says that there is no reason to claim all motion should stop at some
> point, I wouldn't equate that with claiming an "actual" infinity.
Does this apply to space? Is space defined as "our concept
of measuring distances"? Can it also be infinite?
If space can be infinite, can it contain an infinite number
of galaxies?
Btw, if "measuring motion" means measuring velocities, that
includes distance as well as time. It seems like "our concept
of measuring motion" should define "space-time", not just
"time". Why does "our concept of measuring motion" define
time alone?
George Dance
5ff...@posting.google.com>...
> Bert Clanton <eubi...@charter.net> wrote in message news:<eubiotist-61762
> 3.143204...@corp.supernews.com>...
> snip
>
> >
> > With that I certainly agree. In fact, I fail to understand why a
> > philosopher feels competent to decide, on metaphysical grounds, what the
> > characteristics of the physical world are--of which an "actual infinity"
> > of extent may very possibly be one.
> >
> > Best wishes,
> > Bert
>
> The point is not to determine the shape or extent of the physical
> world. That is a physics problem. A metaphysical question treats
> of infinity alone without assuming it connects to any possible
> experience.
That means that such questions as "Does the universe have a limit?"
and "Did time have a starting point", as they are answerable by
experience (which does not imply that anyone has the experience to
answer them), are not metaphysical ones.
> If concepts, in the objectivist view, are constantly
> checked against "axioms," existence, then what accounts for the
> existence and necessary concept of an infinity in thought, a
> concept so vast that not even the universe itself can contain it?
The tilde operator (~). To identify a real thing as finite or
bounded, requires being able to say that it is not infinite or
endless, which requires being able to imagine infinity, and (leaving
out the practical difficulties) to identify the thing as infinite if
it were.
> "Infinity" contains nothing under it, yet it is not an empty
> concept by any means. It is not a quantity, at least not in the
> real sense. Then what is it, and why is it important?
Obviously infinity is something people have an idea of. They can
discuss their varying ideas, and discover and remove inconsistencies
in them. But without referring to experience, there's not much more
they can do.
> Important
> enough that it is implied in the objectivist notion that the
> universe is eternal.
By the last, do you mean Rand's claim that "The existence of inanimate
matter is unconditional,... Matter is indestructible; it changes its
forms but it cannot cease to exist." In that instance, I thought that
she was not naking a metaphysical pronouncement, but restating a law
of physics. She simplifies the law, of course; but that's no big deal
here, as she's not making any pronouncements about matter at all, but
(to make a different point) appealing to an idea that presumably all
of her readers already have.
malenor
www.newsranger.com>...
> In article <5851837b.01121...@posting.google.com>, malenor says...
>
> >Robert Allen Leeper <ra...@hcsmail.com> wrote in message news:<3C1B7948.2308
> >E3...@hcsmail.com>...
> >> Cant antimony help with these problegames?
> >
> >a. No regular poster here knows what an 'antinomy' is.
>
> False.
Well I know that, but you weren't supposed to be watching
this thread. There's no politics here.
malenor
160655....@posting.google.com>...
> malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<5851837b.0112151834.28
> 5ff...@posting.google.com>...
> > Bert Clanton <eubi...@charter.net> wrote in message news:<eubiotist-61762
> > 3.143204...@corp.supernews.com>...
> > snip
> >
> > >
> > > With that I certainly agree. In fact, I fail to understand why a
> > > philosopher feels competent to decide, on metaphysical grounds, what the
> > > characteristics of the physical world are--of which an "actual infinity"
> > > of extent may very possibly be one.
> > >
> > > Best wishes,
> > > Bert
> >
> > The point is not to determine the shape or extent of the physical
> > world. That is a physics problem. A metaphysical question treats
> > of infinity alone without assuming it connects to any possible
> > experience.
>
> That means that such questions as "Does the universe have a limit?"
> and "Did time have a starting point", as they are answerable by
> experience (which does not imply that anyone has the experience to
> answer them), are not metaphysical ones.
That's somewhat true, as physics deals with experience, or objects
of a possible experience, while metaphysics does not. The law of
causality, for instance, is not a possible experience. Causality
is demonstrated in experience, but the law itself is nowhere
to be found there. Physics holds it to be a law so long as the world
continues to obey its dictates. But is there any reason why it
should continue to do so? Metaphysics is the key to answering
that question, and in order to do so, it cannot rely on any
experience whatsoever in its proof.
(The question "Did time have a starting point," is not answerable
by experience. Time itself is not an experience; what we experience,
as someone else on this thread noted, is motions of objects.)
> > If concepts, in the objectivist view, are constantly
> > checked against "axioms," existence, then what accounts for the
> > existence and necessary concept of an infinity in thought, a
> > concept so vast that not even the universe itself can contain it?
>
> The tilde operator (~). To identify a real thing as finite or
> bounded, requires being able to say that it is not infinite or
> endless, which requires being able to imagine infinity, and (leaving
> out the practical difficulties) to identify the thing as infinite if
> it were.
Finite and bounded are not the same thing. Modern physics holds that
the universe is finite and unbounded. This means that, in its spatial
extent, there is a finite number of reference points, but that when
traveling through the universe, no matter how far you go, you never
reach a boundary.
As for the rest: sorry, can't leave out the practical difficulties
involved in imagining an infinite anything.
> > "Infinity" contains nothing under it, yet it is not an empty
> > concept by any means. It is not a quantity, at least not in the
> > real sense. Then what is it, and why is it important?
>
> Obviously infinity is something people have an idea of. They can
> discuss their varying ideas, and discover and remove inconsistencies
> in them. But without referring to experience, there's not much more
> they can do.
Let's say the idea of 'finity' came from negating the concept of
'infinity.' Where did the latter concept come from? You seem to
be saying that 'infinity' is just an idea. It does at least have
tremendous importance for calculus, and therefore for engineering
problems and other practical applications I'm sure.
> > Important
> > enough that it is implied in the objectivist notion that the
> > universe is eternal.
>
> By the last, do you mean Rand's claim that "The existence of inanimate
> matter is unconditional,... Matter is indestructible; it changes its
> forms but it cannot cease to exist." In that instance, I thought that
> she was not naking a metaphysical pronouncement, but restating a law
> of physics. She simplifies the law, of course; but that's no big deal
> here, as she's not making any pronouncements about matter at all, but
> (to make a different point) appealing to an idea that presumably all
> of her readers already have.
It comes from the claim at the beginning of this thread,
that 'matter is eternal.' Later this person changed it
somewhat. But I think he's referring to "the universe as a whole
cannot be created or annihilated... it cannot come into or go
out of existence." The universe, therefore, is eternal, iow,
it has infinite duration.
I think "the existence of inanimate matter is unconditional" is
a similar claim. Matter I would declare a concept of metaphysics
(as well as physics). This is because it is a reference to the
substance of the universe. Unlike physics though, it incorporates
energy into its concept. Whereas physics treats matter separately
from energy in order to describe various physical laws which
treat them differently. Matter, for philosophy, is an object of
metaphysical laws, but as substance, it is subject to no other
condition other than itself. When Rand says "matter is unconditional,"
it is without doubt a metaphysical statement. Physics only deals
with things in their causal relationships. To say "matter is
unconditional" is to claim a non-causal relationship, which
is to say, it is not related to any previous concept. It is
therefore self-subsisting. It would be a mistake, therefore, to
assume that to say, "matter is indestructible, it changes its
forms but cannot cease to exist," is stating a law of physics.
The old law of physics, that the matter in a particular
experiment, such as a chemical reaction, retains its mass
throughout the change, is false. Rand is talking about matter,
which is to say in the philosophy of old, substance. This is a
notion that goes back to Aristotle's 'qua,' if not before.
That's not to be confused with things, but related more to
things-in-themselves as we know them generally, in concept.
These are the concepts that are not conditional on any
experience, because experience changes, while matter does not.
Robert Allen Leeper
relation 'earlier than'. And where do we get that? It would seem to be
inherent in memory, predating philosophical sophistication and perhaps
even self-awareness.
So does it make sense to speak of the 'existence' of time? Could time
have a beginning or end? Wouldn't we need some 'higher time' to say
that while time *now* exists, there was a time before it existed and
will be a time when it no longer does?
OK. If we admit [into our theoretical language] times as individuals
[or particulars - possible values of individual variables], we can
simply express the infinity of time by "for every time t there are times
t' and t'' such that t' is earlier than t and t'' is later than t". But
I think it would be unwarranted to draw any metaphysical conclusions
from this.
David Tomlin wrote:
>
> Arnold Broese-van-Groenou wrote:
> > Time is our concept of measuring motion.
>
> Is this definition of "time" an Objectivist doctrine? Is it
> Rand's or Peikoff's?
>
> I don't agree with it. We have a concept of time. Time is not
> a concept.
>
> Time existed for billions of years (at least) before humans
> came along to form concepts of measurements.
>
> That time is a "concept", not an objective reality, is a
> curiously subjectivist doctrine for "Objectivists".
>
[...]
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
> RS7.94637$li3.8...@ozemail.com.au>...
>
> > Time is our concept of measuring motion.
>
> Is this definition of "time" an Objectivist doctrine? Is it
> Rand's or Peikoff's?
I believe it is the view held by modern science. Einstein referred to time a
4th dimension of existence, not something apart from it.
>
> I don't agree with it. We have a concept of time. Time is not
> a concept.
OK. The one word can stand for two related things. One is 'motion', and the
other is measurement of that motion by comparing it to another motion.
The latter is the concept.
We regard the passing of events as time. Where nothing happens we speak of
'time standing still'.
> Time existed for billions of years (at least) before humans
> came along to form concepts of measurements.
Yes
> That time is a "concept", not an objective reality, is a
> curiously subjectivist doctrine for "Objectivists".
Concepts are of objective reality. The motion exists regardless of our
concept of it. The confusion arises if one is not clear about how 'time' is
used.
To 'time' something, assumes "time" exists. The latter "time" meaning refers
to motion, or events unfolding. This latter meaning, unlike the former 'to
time', is not dependent on consciousness.
> > While
> > 'time' the measurement is consciousness dependent, motion itself is not.
> > If one says that there is no reason to claim all motion should stop at
some
> > point, I wouldn't equate that with claiming an "actual" infinity.
>
> Does this apply to space? Is space defined as "our concept
> of measuring distances"? Can it also be infinite?
I don't think so, since I define space as the gaps between (seperating)
existents, and I don't agree that there are infinite existents.
> If space can be infinite, can it contain an infinite number
> of galaxies?
See above
> Btw, if "measuring motion" means measuring velocities, that
> includes distance as well as time. It seems like "our concept
> of measuring motion" should define "space-time", not just
> "time". Why does "our concept of measuring motion" define
> time alone?
Time is motion between specific entities.(change of position between them)
In that sense, time is relative to the entities involved, and there is not
an absolute time reference for the universe as a whole.
It depends on your relative motion.
--
Arnold
Eudaimonus
> The point is not to determine the shape or extent of the physical
> world. That is a physics problem. A metaphysical question treats
> of infinity alone without assuming it connects to any possible
> experience. If concepts, in the objectivist view, are constantly
> checked against "axioms," existence, then what accounts for the
> existence and necessary concept of an infinity in thought, a
> concept so vast that not even the universe itself can contain it?
> "Infinity" contains nothing under it, yet it is not an empty
> concept by any means. It is not a quantity, at least not in the
> real sense. Then what is it, and why is it important? Important
> enough that it is implied in the objectivist notion that the
> universe is eternal.
Infinity - what is it?
"Infinite" - a property of means of construction of series, such that an
internal principle that limits the ability of the means, with respect to
some system of measurement, does not exist.
My curious thought on this kind of definition - "Infinite" can not "exist"
in this sense, as it is fundamentally a lack - a lack of finiteness, ie.
limit. Fundamentally, one asks a question such as "What is the limit of 1/x
as x approaches 0?" and one answers with "There is no answer to that
question" - but to say that that means there is a limit, and that limit is
some thing called "infinity", is to call that answer (that there is no
answer), itself as an answer.
As to the emptiness of the concept "infinite" - while indeed, considered as
a concept, the referents of which are things, it is an 'empty' concept -
there are no entites to fall as instances under that concept. Yet,
considered as a conjunction of two other concepts - lack, bound, and
increase - all of these are to be found to have instances, considered
seperately. So, while "infinite" is an empty concept, it is created by a
conjunction of concepts, none of which are empty.
(Further I should like to introduce into this discussion the following :
Rand, as far as my memory serves, never says explicitly these four words
"The universe is eternal" - so is not Melanor's views that such a position
is part of her philosophy, based not so much on her philosophy as on his
interpretation of her philosophy - so that what he really holds is not that
it is part of her philosophy, but that it logically follows from her
philosophy?)
Eudaimonus
> If it exists, then it is part of the universe. That would mean that space
> and time are in the universe. There was therefore, no time 'before' the
> universe. This implies there never was a time the universe did not exist.
Strickly speaking, "If it exists, then it is part of the universe" is not
true.
There are red things, but is "red" part of the universe? The point here is
that "part/whole" doesn't work for all that exists - it works only for
things. While calling "sphericalness" a "part" of "ballness" might be a
good and usefull analogy or metaphore, it is not strickly true.
As (a supposedly serious) Aristotelian, my analysis of "If it exists, then
it is part of the universe" leads me to belief that it implies that all
substance is primary substance - for surely it is wrong to hold that
quality, quantity, place, disposition, ect (ie. properties) are _in_ or
_part of_ the universe. They are _of_ the universe and all of it's parts,
but they are not _part of_ the universe. Only things can be parts of
things. Thus, to say that 'spaciality' or 'temporality' are _part of _ the
universe (or that 'greyness' is 'part of' my computer) is, if not an analogy
or metaphor, a category error.
To say that space-time is a thing, is a contradiction, for thing-ness is
neccesarrily bound up with location in space-time, and for space-time to be
a thing, it would have to be somewhere in space-time. But a whole is never
a part of itself.
Fundamentally, the problem is that 'part' is a physical concept. Be very
carefull when using it in a metaphysical context.
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
Eudaimonus <jwsc...@home.net> wrote in message
news:RotT7.19580$Z03.9...@news1.rdc1.mi.home.com...
> To say that space-time is a thing, is a contradiction, for thing-ness is
> neccesarrily bound up with location in space-time, and for space-time to
be
> a thing, it would have to be somewhere in space-time. But a whole is
never
> a part of itself.
How else would you say such a 'thing' exists? I only use 'thing' to refer to
space-time as something which exists, not something which is physical in
form.
Love exists, injustice exists, but they are not physical things.
>
> Fundamentally, the problem is that 'part' is a physical concept. Be very
> carefull when using it in a metaphysical context.
What way would you express the existence of some 'thing' that is not the
totality of existence? I see nothing wrong with 'part'. Part, to me only
signifies less than all, not necessarily a physical piece.
If you don't care for my word use, it would help if you offered a better
suggestion.
--
Arnold
malenor
6...@news1.rdc1.mi.home.com>...
I've seen that on this thread, e.g., infinity comes from "continuous"
and "series." My viewpoint is contained earlier in this thread in
responses
to ABvG. I put a lot of energy into those posts and am wearing down on
this.
Let me kind of sum it up: I am not actually denying your point. But
the necessary existence of a concept like "infinity" implies something
about the mind and its ability to gain knowledge that is not contained
in Objectivist epistemology.
A "lack of boundaries" does not imply infinity, nor does "increasing."
It means that I can go a step farther (in whatever units are
applicable). Logically, the human mind cannot simply start with the
finite and leap forward (or backward) to infinity. Nothing in this
series implies something beyond the finite, or better, something (some
quantity) that is not finite. While the concept of an infinite seems
to follow obviously from (a conjunction of) mundane concepts, it does
not follow that any finite concepts can be synthesized, not merely
conjoined, into an infinite. Every member of a series, even if you
call it a continuous, infinite series, is finite.
Calculus examples do not help, because Rand uses 'infinity' as a tool
of metaphysics. Sure, infinites are used in limits. They are a
theoretical "point" that is never attained (and I was castigated once
here for calling it an infinite "point"). But for Objectivists, this
is its only rational usage, while at the same time, maintaining that
the universe is infinite in duration: "The universe as a whole...
cannot come into, or go out of, existence."
> (Further I should like to introduce into this discussion the following :
> Rand, as far as my memory serves, never says explicitly these four words
> "The universe is eternal" - so is not Melanor's
Contemptuous mis-spelling?
> views that such a position
> is part of her philosophy, based not so much on her philosophy as on his
> interpretation of her philosophy - so that what he really holds is not that
> it is part of her philosophy, but that it logically follows from her
> philosophy?)
It was a view implied by the originator of this thread:
- Eternity is infinite time.
-
- The proposition that matter is eternal seems to
- contradict the proposition that there can be no
- actual infinities.
-
- If it doesn't, then why not?
I kept asking what his original question meant exactly, and he
responded, 'I regret using the word "matter." It should have been
"nature" or "the universe." '
Then he said: "[T]he terms are not mine. I don't know if Rand used the
phrase, but Peikoff and other Objectivists do."
He cited this passage from Rand: "The Metaphysical Versus The
Man-Made",
"To grasp the axiom that existence exists, means to grasp the fact
that nature, i.e., the universe as a whole, cannot be created or
annihilated, that it cannot come into or go out of existence."
I don't think it's David's fault for the confusion. Rand doesn't make
herself very clear, but it's easy to draw the conclusion that her view
was: the universe, as a whole, is eternal, ie., infinite in duration.
This is part of a metaphysical argument using a term that the
Objectivists have relegated to mathematics -- infinity. Actual
infinities do not exist. And yet the whole of existence, for them,
exemplifies such a thing. The universe has the attribute of infinite
duration.
As the thread progressed, I made the assumption that an "infinity" is
a valid metaphysical concept, not merely mathematical. In my
conversation with ABvG, I staked my metaphysical territory with it,
and dared somebody to cross the line.
Lol. Nobody even understood what the line consisted of. I did not
expect anybody to actually come over to my side, but perhaps just to
get a view of it. To my knowledge, there was no mind out there capable
of grasping my viewpoint. (And, after snipping all the harder passages
I wrote, the ones that explained my side, ABvG wrote (to paraphrase),
"Then tell us, what's your answer"? Lol. I think I write with great
clarity, at least, that was part of my previous life in the Randian
fold.)
I'm going to find those passages and re-post them for interested
parties, here:
malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<5851837b.0112100857.42
d5b...@posting.google.com>...
> Arnold Broese-van-Groenou <bro...@ozemail.com.au> wrote in message news:<PM
> VQ7.89705$li3.6...@ozemail.com.au>...
snip
> > Infinity is not a place. It is just another way of saying "don't stop".
>
> In other words, time is eternal, which takes you back to the beginning
> of the original question, creating an unresolvable infinite loop.
>
> In another post on this thread we are given a choice between, a. the
> universe is in time, or b. time is in the universe. And we are advised
> to choose the latter. I think you have too when you say, time is
> motion, without motion there is no time.
>
> Then I wonder, how are you aware of motion without some previous
> concept of time? Doesn't time make your perception of motion possible?
> How do you account for the order in your perceptions before you have
> conceived of any time, or space for that matter? Why are your
> perceptions ordered and not chaotic? Many things existed before you
> conceived of them. It is therefore conceivable that the same is true
> for time, but even to a greater extent, as you could not even become
> aware of objects at all if your perceptions were in chaos. From this
> viewpoint, time must be more than just a concept abstracted from
> things in motion.
>
> Even if you accepted that (which I doubt), does that leave us with the
> first alternative: the universe is in time? This is the view of Newton
> and modern physics in general. The question then becomes, how can
> there be a something, an existent, that serves the purpose of
> containing all other existents? Assuming this, as does physics with
> its notion of a space/time containing all matter and energy, this
> still doesn't explain why we perceive an orderly universe and not a
> chaotic one. It's an answer that does a lot to explain laws of nature,
> but not our consciousness of them.
>
> Ayn Rand showed that we derive our concepts from percepts. But how do
> percepts derive from sensations? These are quite different species of
> event. Sensation is physical, perception is mental. How does a
> physical event become a mental event? Ayn Rand was primarily concerned
> with concepts and abstraction, but seemed to leave other important
> questions taken for granted. For example, Peikoff merely waves his arm
> in a circle and asserts, "This is existence." But then he finds it
> impossible (understandably) to derive truth inductively.
>
> I think if you can answer these problems with relative confidence,
> then the question posed by the starter of this thread becomes a little
> clearer (although he didn't explain what he means by 'matter is
> eternal').
malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<5851837b.0112121324.59
c1f...@posting.google.com>...
> Arnold Broese-van-Groenou <bro...@ozemail.com.au> wrote in message news:<ms
> BR7.91663$li3.7...@ozemail.com.au>...
>snip
> As it turns out, the implication I was drawing there is that a
> certain order of perceptions is necessary for our perception of
> time. But time is not the percept, this order is. Time is an empirical
> concept derived from orderly events. But I asked 3 posts ago, what
> makes this order possible, as a mental phenomenon? We can discuss
> brain imprints all day, but nothing will have been gained in answer
> the question of how mental events are possible, how they happen
> to coincide with physicsal events...
snip
> > All proof requires a standard. A standard that was beyond humans ability is
> > of no consequence for humans.
>
> NOW you're getting closer to my view. Good going! To determine these
> boundaries is a major step in answering the question primarily posed
> on this thread. Do humans have the ability to determine actual
> infinities? No. All we can do is say, no matter where you arbitrarily
> stop, you may potentially go a step farther (in time). We can't say if
> there is or is not an actual boundary. Infinity is beyond our ability
> to perceive, although we can conceive of it as a sort of marker for
> that point we cannot attain. So to claim that the universe is eternal,
> infinite through time, goes beyond human reckoning. By Objectivist
> standards, the person stating this is claiming omniscience in this
> regard.
>
> You have stated that "infinity" has an epistemological importance,
> although for Objectivists it is only mathematical. But I think
> mathematics touches on the epistemological, as Rand showed in
> ITOE. So what does the mathematical concept of infinity have to say
> about our cognitive abilities in general? I think you put it very
> well when you stated, whatever is beyond that point is of no
> consequence to humans (human understanding). It says that we can
> know almost up to the point of infinity, approaching it
> geometrically without ever touching it. This is as far as our
> reckoning can go, and whatever cannot be understood by man's mind,
> does not need to be understood.
>
> Infinity is a point just out of reach of our understanding. How, then,
> can we conceive of it? We certainly can't perceive it, we can't even
> find it on any number line of reals. We can only symbolize it as a
> sideways 8 or whatever such concrete you choose. Then where does
> infinity as a concept come from? It is not arbitrary, yet it is not
> capable of being understood. Could there be more to the human mind
> than our simple ability to understand things and build theories
> inductively? The concept of infinity was surely not attained
> inductively, for there is no evidence to support it. The scientific
> mind (the understanding) only works from evidence. I have shown
> that it brings no necessity to its theories, only probable truth.
> Yet we hold our truths as being necessary and absolute for all time.
> I think that at least the notion of an infinity is a pointer to
> guide us to understanding our minds, our abilities, our limits, and
> our capacities (which are necessarily finite).
> The notion of an infinity did not come to us from the world, it came
> from our own minds, our ability to conceive of a non-existent,
> non-actual quantity that is yet not arbitrarily held by whim or
> imagination. In other words, we are not limited in our conceptions
> to the world of our understanding. We are simply not limited by
> the world.
>
> What grounds our concepts and theories about the universe is not
> the universe, but ideas such as infinity. The ultimate context
> of our knowledge is not outside us, but conceived within us, not
> from the evidence of the senses (which only brings contingent
> knowledge), but from concepts alone. Because it is mere concepts
> by themselves that make such notions as an "infinite" possible
> at all, and this is just one example of a standard that grounds
> our knowledge in the necessary.
>
snip
> > Right, but that is not the so called infinity of existence that is some
> > times
> > meant.
> > There is a difference between saying the universe is infinite in size, and
> > infinite in duration. The former is in conflict with the law of identity,
> > which says everything being what it is, has a limit. The latter says that
> > changes going on in the universe don't stop with a finite number, since
> > another change will follow regardless of how large the number reached.
> > Regardless, every change will have a number.
>
> The question involved eternity, infinite time, not infinite space.
> Eternity of matter means infinite duration of matter in this case.
> And yet Objectivists claim the notion of an infinite is limited
> to the mathematical realm. They can't have it both ways. So either
> the notion of an infinite is an actual quantity, or the universe
> is not eternal, but finite in duration.
>
> As for the infinity of the universe, that's for another thread, but
> physics has it that the universe is finite and unbounded, like a
> 4-dimensional ball. There are a finite number of points on the ball,
> but you can walk on it, theoretically like on the earth, forever
> without reaching any end-point.
>
> That is the physics answer. A metaphysical answer would state that
> the universe is indeterminately finite and determinately bounded, but
> the boundaries mean nothing to us (as you implied above). So of
> course they also mean nothing to science, which then declares that
> the universe is, in effect, unbounded.
>
> The exciting thing about all this is that, although science can reach
> to the stars and galaxies, it can analyze down to the tiniest
> quantities, our minds are capable of even more! In thought alone
> we can contemplate the vastness beyond the universe (as if there
> is such a vastness, but its actual existence or non-existence is
> irrelevant to the task), and in this investigation, thoroughly ground
> the universe, or really our knowledge of it, in the absolutes sought
> by Rand.
What else can I say?
Eudaimonus
>
> Eudaimonus <jwsc...@home.net> wrote in message
> news:RotT7.19580$Z03.9...@news1.rdc1.mi.home.com...
> > To say that space-time is a thing, is a contradiction, for thing-ness is
> > neccesarrily bound up with location in space-time, and for space-time to
> be
> > a thing, it would have to be somewhere in space-time. But a whole is
> never
> > a part of itself.
>
> How else would you say such a 'thing' exists? I only use 'thing' to refer
to
> space-time as something which exists, not something which is physical in
> form.
> Love exists, injustice exists, but they are not physical things.
There are many senses to the word 'exist' - but one is primary, and that is
that of substance (which, I must add, doesn't neccessarily imply
physicality).
However, to say that "injustice exists", for example, is just to use
shorthand to say "there is something such that it is unjust". Normally,
that isn't much of a problem. However, when trying to do philosophy, and
metaphysics in particular, metaphors and forshortentings of this kind only
lead to confusion - for example, Plato's theory of forms.
Similarly, to say that "space-time exists" is just to say that "there are
things that have spacio-temporality" - which is true enough, but I am
asking - which is more accurate, that there is some substantial (though not
neccessarily physical) thing which we call space-time, or that there is some
type of properties, namely length, duration, ect, that there are things that
are such? The answer to that question, in my mind, is that as the latter
conception must exist even if the former does, and that it explains all that
the former does as well, the former conception (of space-time as substance)
adds nothing of value to the latter conception (of spacio-temporality as a
property).
> > Fundamentally, the problem is that 'part' is a physical concept. Be
very
> > carefull when using it in a metaphysical context.
>
> What way would you express the existence of some 'thing' that is not the
> totality of existence? I see nothing wrong with 'part'. Part, to me only
> signifies less than all, not necessarily a physical piece.
> If you don't care for my word use, it would help if you offered a better
> suggestion.
You start off with - "what way would you express the existence of some
'thing' .." and proceed to "I see nothing wrong with 'part'". That is all
fine insofar as it goes, but you are allready presupposing that you are
talking about a 'thing' when you are talking about a 'part' - which is just
my point. But just as I wouldn't call 'red' a 'part' of my shirt, nor would
I call 'length' a 'part' of my shirt - nor the conjuction of all such
lengths would I call a 'part' of the universe. The difference is between
whole and part, and universal and particular. To call "space-time" a "part"
of the universe, is to confuse those two.
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
>
> There are many senses to the word 'exist' - but one is primary, and that
is
> that of substance (which, I must add, doesn't neccessarily imply
> physicality).
>
> However, to say that "injustice exists", for example, is just to use
> shorthand to say "there is something such that it is unjust". Normally,
> that isn't much of a problem. However, when trying to do philosophy, and
> metaphysics in particular, metaphors and forshortentings of this kind only
> lead to confusion - for example, Plato's theory of forms.
So is your main point to do with the words I use, or the ideas themselves?
I agree that confusion can arise from what I say if no attempt is made to
keep the whole context in mind, but the alternative is a belaboured style
that can obscure rather than clarify.
> Similarly, to say that "space-time exists" is just to say that "there are
> things that have spacio-temporality" - which is true enough, but I am
> asking - which is more accurate, that there is some substantial (though
not
> neccessarily physical) thing which we call space-time, or that there is
some
> type of properties, namely length, duration, ect, that there are things
that
> are such? The answer to that question, in my mind, is that as the latter
> conception must exist even if the former does, and that it explains all
that
> the former does as well, the former conception (of space-time as
substance)
> adds nothing of value to the latter conception (of spacio-temporality as a
> property).
Well yes, as I have made clear, it is motion that gives meaning to time, and
existence that gives it to space. IOW, time and space are dependent on
(relate to) existence, and not things in themselves.
> > > Fundamentally, the problem is that 'part' is a physical concept. Be
> very
> > > carefull when using it in a metaphysical context.
> >
> > What way would you express the existence of some 'thing' that is not the
> > totality of existence? I see nothing wrong with 'part'. Part, to me only
> > signifies less than all, not necessarily a physical piece.
> > If you don't care for my word use, it would help if you offered a better
> > suggestion.
>
> You start off with - "what way would you express the existence of some
> 'thing' .." and proceed to "I see nothing wrong with 'part'". That is all
> fine insofar as it goes, but you are allready presupposing that you are
> talking about a 'thing' when you are talking about a 'part' - which is
just
> my point. But just as I wouldn't call 'red' a 'part' of my shirt, nor
would
> I call 'length' a 'part' of my shirt - nor the conjuction of all such
> lengths would I call a 'part' of the universe. The difference is between
> whole and part, and universal and particular. To call "space-time" a
"part"
> of the universe, is to confuse those two.
Agreed, a universal isn't a part. I just assumed this was understood as an
'aspect' of. Obviously I assumed wrongly.
How about an "aspect" of then? Is that better? Red is an aspect of your
shirt.
While you are correct, I don't think the average person would have trouble
understanding "Red is part of what your shirt is", means: "Red is an aspect
of your shirt".
--
Arnold
Rob
>> Take a look at "An Inconsistent Triad" at
>> http://personal.bgsu.edu/~roberth/triad.html
>>
>> I point out that there are three beliefs that Rand almost certainly held
>> (that
>> time is not cyclical, that every event has prior causal conditions, and that
>> there are no actual infinities) that are not mutually consistent. At leas
>> t one
>> must be false.
>>
>>
>Wow, excellent page, I got a lot out of it.
Thank you. Did you, by any chance, look at any of the neighboring pages
(starting from http://personal.bgsu.edu/~roberth/oism.html)?
>You said, at the end,
>
>"For my money, the one I'd be most reluctant to give up is the
>non-cyclicity of time. I don't have any rock-ribbed proof that time is
>not cyclical..."
>
>and then:
>
>"As far as I can see, no very strong argument has been offered either
>for the truth of the denial of actual infinities or for the
>affirmation of the causal conditioning of every event."
>
>So there's no proof or disproof of any of the three propositions. Then
>by what real standard do you choose one to falsify?
Well, let's see. Suppose that by "proof" you mean support of such quality that
any alternative conclusion is impossible (in light of that support). ("Disp
roof"
correspondingly would be proof that some conclusion is not correct.) Suppose
also that by "no proof or disproof of any of the three propositions" you me
an to
be talking about the absence of proof (or disproof) for each one taken
individually.
Then, I'd agree. I don't have a proof for or against any one of them. That
doesn't mean that no reasons can be given for favoring some over others, just
that whatever reason can be given does not rise to the level of proof. And I
think I did give a reason in favor of accepting the non-cyclicity of time,
namely that giving it up would upset a great deal else that most of us take to
be well-founded, like beliefs that the past is settled in a way that the future
is not. One of the ways that is important is the connection it has to
conceptions of free will and responsibility.
For reasons of that sort, which admittedly fall short of proof, I'd acept the
non-cyclicity of time. Having accepted it, I cannot consistently hold both that
there are no actual infinities and that every event has causal conditions. But
actually I don't believe either of them -- which is not equivalent to saying
that I _disbelieve_ them. I'm confident they're not both true, but as far as I
can tell, they could both be false.
>"In my post, I pointed out that if two other premises that many
>Objectivists accept are true, then there must be an actual infinity of
>events extending into the past."
>
>So are you acknowledging their truth without proof, simply on the
>grounds that it opens up the possibility of an actual infinity? (And
>the fact that nobody has disproved the actuality of infinity.)
No, I'm pointing out that people (many Objectivists, if no one else) are
committed to a pair of beliefs which entail that there is an actual infinity of
events extending into the past. Since many of those same people deny that there
are any actual infinities, their position is inconsistent. Whatever the real
facts are about the three propositions, combining all three of them can't b
e the
truth. For anyone so tempted, it's time for some intellectual house-cleaning.
malenor
WT7.96298$li3.9...@ozemail.com.au>...
snip
>
> Well yes, as I have made clear, it is motion that gives meaning to time, and
> existence that gives it to space. IOW, time and space are dependent on
> (relate to) existence, and not things in themselves.
>
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
Eudaimonus
> While you are correct, I don't think the average person would have trouble
> understanding "Red is part of what your shirt is", means: "Red is an
aspect
> of your shirt".
My basic point is that even the some of the "greatest" minds in philosophy
don't know the difference.
Loose language leads to loose thinking, as we take our patterns of speach
for granted. Even "Red is an aspect of your shirt" is wrong, for it puts the
word "red" in the place of a noun - but red isn't a noun, it's an adjective.
I agree that, normally, one isn't lead towards much error by mistakes of
that kind - but that's only because most people doesn't do metaphysics all
the time.
My point is that it is that it is little things like this that lead to
errors such as the Platonist's theory of forms, the Existentialist's chatter
about nothingness, ect. All are examples of taking litteral, a pattern of
speach which should have been taken only metaphorically.
Dealing with issues such as the one taken on in this thread, require the
clearest and most exacting taking apart, analysing, and putting back
together of very specific concepts - there is no room for approximations and
"well, you know what I mean" - such are the stuff from which errors are
made.
Eudaimonus
> Let me kind of sum it up: I am not actually denying your point. But
> the necessary existence of a concept like "infinity" implies something
> about the mind and its ability to gain knowledge that is not contained
> in Objectivist epistemology.
First off, what is so "necessary" about the existence of the "concept" of
infinity? It may be 'inevitable', but hardly would one call it
'neccessary'. For long periods of time, people have lived and died, without
having thought of that concept.
> A "lack of boundaries" does not imply infinity, nor does "increasing."
> It means that I can go a step farther (in whatever units are
> applicable). Logically, the human mind cannot simply start with the
> finite and leap forward (or backward) to infinity. Nothing in this
> series implies something beyond the finite, or better, something (some
> quantity) that is not finite. While the concept of an infinite seems
> to follow obviously from (a conjunction of) mundane concepts, it does
> not follow that any finite concepts can be synthesized, not merely
> conjoined, into an infinite. Every member of a series, even if you
> call it a continuous, infinite series, is finite.
Uhm, if this is an arguement, then you are simply assuming the consequent
(or, it's just a bald assertion). You say that one can't simply start with
the finite and leap forward to infinity. First of all, that is all fancy
phrases and stretched out metaphors. Second of all, nobody things that one
'leaps forward' into infinity. The idea is that one reaches the concept of
negation, not by 'leaping forward' from finiteness, but by _negating_ it -
infinity just means "not finite" such that "infinite" can be defined as
~x'finite' <-> x'infinite'
> Calculus examples do not help, because Rand uses 'infinity' as a tool
> of metaphysics. Sure, infinites are used in limits. They are a
> theoretical "point" that is never attained (and I was castigated once
> here for calling it an infinite "point"). But for Objectivists, this
> is its only rational usage, while at the same time, maintaining that
> the universe is infinite in duration: "The universe as a whole...
> cannot come into, or go out of, existence."
I don't see an infinity in there. Obviously you do. However, it is clear
that if you see it there, you see it not there, but IMPLIED there.
In truth, that statement is clear - there is no bound to time. That, as you
correctly point out above, doesn't mean it's infinite. So you are wrong to
bring up that statement, as evidence that Rand held that there was an actual
infinite duration in time (either forwards or backwards). But that is not
what she said there - she said that time has no bound, not that it is
infinite.
> > (Further I should like to introduce into this discussion the following :
> > Rand, as far as my memory serves, never says explicitly these four words
> > "The universe is eternal" - so is not Melanor's
>
> Contemptuous mis-spelling?
And "one can't simply start" instead of "one can't start" (above) isn't
contemptuous?
> > views that such a position
> > is part of her philosophy, based not so much on her philosophy as on his
> > interpretation of her philosophy - so that what he really holds is not
that
> > it is part of her philosophy, but that it logically follows from her
> > philosophy?)
>
> It was a view implied by the originator of this thread:
>
> - Eternity is infinite time.
Actually this is the sticking point here, I think - one meaning of eternity
is 'infinite time' - but another is 'time without bound' - and the two are
not the same thing. Confuse the two, and you will get, well, this whole
problem.
> - The proposition that matter is eternal seems to
> - contradict the proposition that there can be no
> - actual infinities.
> -
> - If it doesn't, then why not?
>
> I kept asking what his original question meant exactly, and he
> responded, 'I regret using the word "matter." It should have been
> "nature" or "the universe." '
>
> Then he said: "[T]he terms are not mine. I don't know if Rand used the
> phrase, but Peikoff and other Objectivists do."
>
> He cited this passage from Rand: "The Metaphysical Versus The
> Man-Made",
>
> "To grasp the axiom that existence exists, means to grasp the fact
> that nature, i.e., the universe as a whole, cannot be created or
> annihilated, that it cannot come into or go out of existence."
>
> I don't think it's David's fault for the confusion. Rand doesn't make
> herself very clear, but it's easy to draw the conclusion that her view
> was: the universe, as a whole, is eternal, ie., infinite in duration.
To do that would be to make an error in inference - to equivocate between
boundless and infinite.
> This is part of a metaphysical argument using a term that the
> Objectivists have relegated to mathematics -- infinity. Actual
> infinities do not exist. And yet the whole of existence, for them,
> exemplifies such a thing. The universe has the attribute of infinite
> duration.
You keep saying they say that, but they keep saying they don't - so
something has to give somewhere!
Eudaimonus
> Is time really so difficult? All we need for a theory of time is the
> relation 'earlier than'. And where do we get that? It would seem to be
> inherent in memory, predating philosophical sophistication and perhaps
> even self-awareness.
>
> So does it make sense to speak of the 'existence' of time? Could time
> have a beginning or end? Wouldn't we need some 'higher time' to say
> that while time *now* exists, there was a time before it existed and
> will be a time when it no longer does?
>
> OK. If we admit [into our theoretical language] times as individuals
> [or particulars - possible values of individual variables], we can
> simply express the infinity of time by "for every time t there are times
> t' and t'' such that t' is earlier than t and t'' is later than t". But
> I think it would be unwarranted to draw any metaphysical conclusions
> from this.
I couldn't have said it better myself!
Prehaps I will try however.
In order to view time as infinite, we must view it as a value of a
variable - to do that would require a view in which there existed distinct
times, each ordered one after the other, such as that they could be
numbered. The error here is that such is a reification of a relation into
an entity - if, that is, one takes the relational view of time and space.
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
>
> Loose language leads to loose thinking, as we take our patterns of speach
> for granted. Even "Red is an aspect of your shirt" is wrong, for it puts
the
> word "red" in the place of a noun - but red isn't a noun, it's an
adjective.
> I agree that, normally, one isn't lead towards much error by mistakes of
> that kind - but that's only because most people doesn't do metaphysics all
> the time.
Point taken. I agree that loose language and sloppy definitions lead to bad
thinking.
--
Arnold
malenor
w.newsranger.com>...
> In article <5851837b.01121...@posting.google.com>, malenor says...
> >
> >Rob <log...@mailandnews.com> wrote
>
> >Wow, excellent page, I got a lot out of it.
>
> Thank you. Did you, by any chance, look at any of the neighboring pages
> (starting from http://personal.bgsu.edu/~roberth/oism.html)?
No, but I will. The reason I was so impressed was because I had tried
this very tactic before, with regard to metaphysical issues, but never
considered the issue of time as non-looping. That is really the key
which opens the door to the contradiction.
> >You said, at the end,
> >
> >"For my money, the one I'd be most reluctant to give up is the
> >non-cyclicity of time. I don't have any rock-ribbed proof that time is
> >not cyclical..."
> >
> >and then:
> >
> >"As far as I can see, no very strong argument has been offered either
> >for the truth of the denial of actual infinities or for the
> >affirmation of the causal conditioning of every event."
> >
> >So there's no proof or disproof of any of the three propositions. Then
> >by what real standard do you choose one to falsify?
>
> Well, let's see. Suppose that by "proof" you mean support of such quality
> that any alternative conclusion is impossible (in light of that support).
> ("Disproof" correspondingly would be proof that some conclusion is not
> correct.) Suppose
> also that by "no proof or disproof of any of the three propositions" you
> mean to be talking about the absence of proof (or disproof) for each one
> taken individually.
That type of proof seems to be unknown here, but it is what you use at
your webpage. Modus pollens? Something like that.
> Then, I'd agree. I don't have a proof for or against any one of them. That
> doesn't mean that no reasons can be given for favoring some over others, just
> that whatever reason can be given does not rise to the level of proof. And I
> think I did give a reason in favor of accepting the non-cyclicity of time,
> namely that giving it up would upset a great deal else that most of us ta
> ke > to be well-founded, like beliefs that the past is settled in a way t
> hat the > future is not. One of the ways that is important is the connect
> ion it has to
> conceptions of free will and responsibility.
>
> For reasons of that sort, which admittedly fall short of proof, I'd acept the
> non-cyclicity of time. Having accepted it, I cannot consistently hold both
> that there are no actual infinities and that every event has causal
> conditions. But actually I don't believe either of them -- which is not
> equivalent to saying that I _disbelieve_ them. I'm confident they're not
> both true, but as far as I can tell, they could both be false.
>
It is a difficult question, and all I have really done on this thread
is point in the general direction of an answer. I think the answer,
though, will be long and arduous. I asked the question, "What makes
the concept of infinity possible?" I got a couple answers that really
boil down to the same thing: the concept is derived from empirical
concepts. For instance, it comes from the idea of a continuous series.
But I asked, if every member of this (continuous) series is finite,
which it is by definition, then how can one derive an infinite
(whatever) from that? I got no response.
The Objectivists believe that all knowledge originates in the
empirical. But the concept of an infinite cannot possible originate
there: 1. it is nowhere to be found, 2. it is nowhere even possibly to
be found.
So I still ask, where does the idea of an Infinite quantity come from?
One of my respondents almost had the answer which I think is right,
but when he found me agreeing with his point, he found something to
nitpick at lol. It proves that sometimes you can trick them into
thinking "laterally" in regards to their own beliefs, but just don't
point out that fact! He said, to paraphrase, "That which is beyond
man's power to grasp is irrelevant." This appears to be putting off my
concept of an infinite as irrelevant. But implied in this statement is
the notion that man has powers of cognition, that there are things
lying out of reach of those powers; and so I must ask, what cognition
makes it possible for us to even conceive of things beyond our ability
to grasp? Things that are necessary for certain cognitions, and by no
means arbitrary inventions.
I found it highly relevant that the focus was, at least for a moment,
on the human capacity for knowledge, rather than on metaphysical
issues into which we try to jump headfirst without even knowing
beforehand if we will sink or drown!
Some people may learn to swim that way for real, but with regards to
metaphysics, you will drown, I guarantee it. Objectivism has already
sunk, and only the steadfast capacity for belief of its proponents
keeps it afloat at all.
The same could be said for any religion.
> >"In my post, I pointed out that if two other premises that many
> >Objectivists accept are true, then there must be an actual infinity of
> >events extending into the past."
> >
> >So are you acknowledging their truth without proof, simply on the
> >grounds that it opens up the possibility of an actual infinity? (And
> >the fact that nobody has disproved the actuality of infinity.)
>
> No, I'm pointing out that people (many Objectivists, if no one else) are
> committed to a pair of beliefs which entail that there is an actual infin
> ity > of events extending into the past.
>
> Since many of those same people deny that there
> are any actual infinities, their position is inconsistent. Whatever the real
> facts are about the three propositions, combining all three of them can't
> be > the truth. For anyone so tempted, it's time for some intellectual h
> ouse-
> cleaning.
But they do have a formidable psychological defense to such
contradictions, and that is what I have come to call: purposeful
obtuseness. Anything you may point out to them that seems disagreeable
lands with a dull thud. How does one convince intellectually-dishonest
people such as these that ideas are important? IT would appear that
ideas as such are not important to them, and furthermore, that *this*
particular set of doctrines, which they call Objectivist, is more
important than facts or reality, such as the fact that their views are
inconsistent within themselves. Is it possible to break down this
cult-mentality with mere logic?
malenor
3...@news1.rdc1.mi.home.com>...
> "malenor" <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:5851837b.01121...@posting.google.com...
>
> > Let me kind of sum it up: I am not actually denying your point. But
> > the necessary existence of a concept like "infinity" implies something
> > about the mind and its ability to gain knowledge that is not contained
> > in Objectivist epistemology.
>
> First off, what is so "necessary" about the existence of the "concept" of
> infinity? It may be 'inevitable', but hardly would one call it
> 'neccessary'. For long periods of time, people have lived and died, without
> having thought of that concept.
It is necessary for one thing to make calculus problems work out, and
then to their applications in reality. But beyond that, it is a
necessary product of our natural thought-processes, yet not integrated
by any real components or abstractions from them.
> > A "lack of boundaries" does not imply infinity, nor does "increasing."
> > It means that I can go a step farther (in whatever units are
> > applicable). Logically, the human mind cannot simply start with the
> > finite and leap forward (or backward) to infinity. Nothing in this
> > series implies something beyond the finite, or better, something (some
> > quantity) that is not finite. While the concept of an infinite seems
> > to follow obviously from (a conjunction of) mundane concepts, it does
> > not follow that any finite concepts can be synthesized, not merely
> > conjoined, into an infinite. Every member of a series, even if you
> > call it a continuous, infinite series, is finite.
>
> Uhm, if this is an arguement, then you are simply assuming the consequent
> (or, it's just a bald assertion).
I see. I didn't realize I had applied for a doctorate here.
> You say that one can't simply start with
> the finite and leap forward to infinity. First of all, that is all fancy
> phrases and stretched out metaphors. Second of all, nobody things that one
> 'leaps forward' into infinity. The idea is that one reaches the concept of
> negation, not by 'leaping forward' from finiteness, but by _negating_ it -
> infinity just means "not finite" such that "infinite" can be defined as
> ~x'finite' <-> x'infinite'
Given any series, every point on that series must be finite. There is
no point on the series that you can call infinite, it is a theoretical
potential. There is nothing in the universe that allows us to conceive
of an infinity.
Nitpick all you want. But attaching the "in-" to "finite" doesn't make
it a valid concept.
> > Calculus examples do not help, because Rand uses 'infinity' as a tool
> > of metaphysics. Sure, infinites are used in limits. They are a
> > theoretical "point" that is never attained (and I was castigated once
> > here for calling it an infinite "point"). But for Objectivists, this
> > is its only rational usage, while at the same time, maintaining that
> > the universe is infinite in duration: "The universe as a whole...
> > cannot come into, or go out of, existence."
>
> I don't see an infinity in there. Obviously you do. However, it is clear
> that if you see it there, you see it not there, but IMPLIED there.
You're picking on me for something I didn't say.
> In truth, that statement is clear - there is no bound to time. That, as you
> correctly point out above, doesn't mean it's infinite. So you are wrong to
> bring up that statement, as evidence that Rand held that there was an actual
> infinite duration in time (either forwards or backwards). But that is not
> what she said there - she said that time has no bound, not that it is
> infinite.
> Actually this is the sticking point here, I think - one meaning of eternity
> is 'infinite time' - but another is 'time without bound' - and the two are
> not the same thing. Confuse the two, and you will get, well, this whole
> problem.
>
snip
For time, boundless and infinite mean the same thing. For space, they
are different. But it depends on the space, the dimensions. So really
we're conceiving this based on geometrical figures constructed in
imaginary space: a line, a plane, a cube or sphere, a hyper-cube, etc.
*Time* is represented as a line of one dimension. Three-dimensional
space, as a sphere usually, when drawing an analogy with the real
universe.
A line, a one-dimensional object, that which represents time, is
theoretically boundless and infinite. There is no boundary, and it
(the series of points from which it is constructed) goes on forever. A
plane is also boundless and infinite. But the space of our universe is
not 2-dimensional like a plane. It is apparently some kind of space
that wraps around on itself. (Hyper-boloid?) This space is predicated
as being finite, yet boundless. It is finite because the number of
points on it are finite, boundless because, no matter how far you
travel through this space, you never reach an absolute boundary beyond
which you can no longer move. It has the same metaphysical properties
as a sphere, finite and boundless, and for practical purposes, a
spherical shape is used when attempting to describe the physical
dimensions of the universe. It is far easier to imagine.
Time is infinite and boundless, but the space of our universe is not.
> > > (Further I should like to introduce into this discussion the following :
> > > Rand, as far as my memory serves, never says explicitly these four words
> > > "The universe is eternal" - so is not Melanor's
> >
> > Contemptuous mis-spelling?
>
> And "one can't simply start" instead of "one can't start" (above) isn't
> contemptuous?
I take that to be a "yes."
snip
> > This is part of a metaphysical argument using a term that the
> > Objectivists have relegated to mathematics -- infinity. Actual
> > infinities do not exist. And yet the whole of existence, for them,
> > exemplifies such a thing. The universe has the attribute of infinite
> > duration.
>
> You keep saying they say that, but they keep saying they don't - so
> something has to give somewhere!
I hope this response will clarify your concerns regarding "boundless"
vs. "infinite." Your entire argument this time hinged upon it.
BTW, thank you for snipping all that material I had taken the time to
re-post -- and without even giving it a "snip" of recognition.
malenor
43...@posting.google.com>...
You know, reading your statement again, I wish you had said it a long
time ago on this thread. You hinted at it when you said that that
which is beyond man's power to conceive is irrelevant. I agreed with
that, and tried to take it a step further and apply it to the notion
of infinity. I wonder if you can proceed in that manner, from where
you left off here?
Bert Clanton
malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> A line, a one-dimensional object, that which represents time, is
> theoretically boundless and infinite. There is no boundary, and it
> (the series of points from which it is constructed) goes on forever.
> A plane is also boundless and infinite. But the space of our universe is
> not 2-dimensional like a plane. It is apparently some kind of space
> that wraps around on itself. (Hyper-boloid?)
The "latest model" of the spacial component of space-time is *not* that
it is a closed and unbounded hypersphere. If I understand correctly,
that would have been the case if there were enough space-curving matter
to "cause" closure. But the latest surveys seem to show that the amount
of matter is not sufficient to "cause" closure. If this is indeed the
case, then space is either a "flat" euclidean manifold (zero curvature)
or a hyper-hyperboloid (negative curvature). If it is indeed a
hyper-hyperboloid, then the appropriate 3-D analogue is not a sphere,
but a hyperboloid, a *saddle-shaped* surface which extends without limit
(i.e., infinitely) in every direction. Which would give us a shape that
is *infinite* and unbounded. Which would contradict the Objectivist
dictum that "there are no actual infinities". Hmm.
Doubtless there will be folks here who will tell us that this model
*can't* be correct, because "there are no actual infinities". I
personally wouldn't find such reasoning persuasive. Arguing from
physical theory to philosophical theory makes sense to me, but arguing
from philosophical theory to physical theory doesn't.
> This space is predicated
> as being finite, yet boundless. It is finite because the number of
> points on it are finite,
Not so: the number of points in it is uncountably infinite. But I'm
willing to grant that "points" are "epistemologically" rather than
"metaphysically" based.
> boundless because, no matter how far you
> travel through this space, you never reach an absolute boundary beyond
> which you can no longer move.
Right.
> It has the same metaphysical properties
> as a sphere, finite and boundless, and for practical purposes, a
> spherical shape is used when attempting to describe the physical
> dimensions of the universe. It is far easier to imagine.
>
That metaphor now seems to be outmoded. But things may be different in a
few years.
Best wishes,
Bert
Brian Holly
374b...@posting.google.com>...
> Eternity is infinite time.
>
> The proposition that matter is eternal seems to
> If it doesn't, then why not?
And just what is wrong with actual infinities? Hegel originated this
notion, but he doesn't seem to have been based on much of anything. -
Brian
malenor
7.102402...@corp.supernews.com>...snip
>
> > It has the same metaphysical properties
> > as a sphere, finite and boundless, and for practical purposes, a
> > spherical shape is used when attempting to describe the physical
> > dimensions of the universe. It is far easier to imagine.
> >
>
> That metaphor now seems to be outmoded. But things may be different in a
> few years.
>
> Best wishes,
> Bert
What's important is that boundless and infinite are not the same
thing. The outside of a sphere is boundless, but it has a definite,
finite area -- and this is what I mean when I say it has a finite
number of points.
But you're right, and my readings on this cosmology are not
up-to-date. I was only trying to make the point about infinity vs.
boundlessness.
George Dance
335...@posting.google.com>...
> George Dance <georg...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<6312c50b.0112
> 160655....@posting.google.com>...
> > malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<5851837b.0112151834.28
> > 5ff...@posting.google.com>...
> > > world. That is a physics problem. A metaphysical question treats
> > > of infinity alone without assuming it connects to any possible
> > > experience.
> >
> > That means that such questions as "Does the universe have a limit?"
> > and "Did time have a starting point", as they are answerable by
> > experience (which does not imply that anyone has the experience to
> > answer them), are not metaphysical ones.
>
> That's somewhat true, as physics deals with experience, or objects
> of a possible experience, while metaphysics does not. The law of
> causality, for instance, is not a possible experience. Causality
> is demonstrated in experience, but the law itself is nowhere
> to be found there.
I think the only law that physics actually gives is that the 'cause'
must precede the 'effect' in time. All the rest is simply explanation
of actual (or, in deference to your Kantianism, actually experienced)
relations:
If ~(A&~B), then either: A is a sufficient cause of B (if A is
earlier) or B is a necessary cause of A (if B is earlier).
> Physics holds it to be a law so long as the world
> continues to obey its dictates. But is there any reason why it
> should continue to do so?
Only a logical (or analytic) one: to say that effects happen without
their causes, would be to say that two events A and B were related
(because they are cause-and-effect) and simultaneously were not
related (because they happen independently of each other); which is
self-contradictory.
> Metaphysics is the key to answering
> that question, and in order to do so, it cannot rely on any
> experience whatsoever in its proof.
So, as I show, it relies on logic alone. To allow for logic, of
course, it must have a principle similar to: "Existence exists in a
particular way (reality), and not in other particular ways." I see
that as having to originate as a generalization from experience (and a
pretty obvious one), but that as no bar to its being a metaphysical
principle: as it can justify the principle without reference to
experience, but merely by reference to hypothetical or possible
experience.
> (The question "Did time have a starting point," is not answerable
> by experience. Time itself is not an experience; what we experience,
> as someone else on this thread noted, is motions of objects.)
So we make up the word 'time' to refer to a ratio between two motions,
making 'time' no more metaphysical than 'causality;' both apparently
no more than convenient labels to talk about things we do experience.
> > > If concepts, in the objectivist view, are constantly
> > > checked against "axioms," existence, then what accounts for the
> > > existence and necessary concept of an infinity in thought, a
> > > concept so vast that not even the universe itself can contain it?
> >
> > The tilde operator (~). To identify a real thing as finite or
> > bounded, requires being able to say that it is not infinite or
> > endless, which requires being able to imagine infinity, and (leaving
> > out the practical difficulties) to identify the thing as infinite if
> > it were.
>
> Finite and bounded are not the same thing. Modern physics holds that
> the universe is finite and unbounded. This means that, in its spatial
> extent, there is a finite number of reference points, but that when
> traveling through the universe, no matter how far you go, you never
> reach a boundary.
As for the physics, I'd have to see a cite from an authority saying
that and why. As for the concepts being different, I agree: bounded
is having a limited extension in space, and finite having a limited
extension of any kind. I would say that 'bounded' implies 'finite',
and 'unbounded' implies 'infinite' (as concepts, not claims) and vice
versa.
> As for the rest: sorry, can't leave out the practical difficulties
> involved in imagining an infinite anything.
No? When you claim that the universe is 'finite and bounded', are you
also saying you have no idea what it would mean for either part of
that claim to be false? Then how can you say it sensibly?
> > > "Infinity" contains nothing under it, yet it is not an empty
> > > concept by any means. It is not a quantity, at least not in the
> > > real sense. Then what is it, and why is it important?
> >
> > Obviously infinity is something people have an idea of. They can
> > discuss their varying ideas, and discover and remove inconsistencies
> > in them. But without referring to experience, there's not much more
> > they can do.
>
> Let's say the idea of 'finity' came from negating the concept of
> 'infinity.' Where did the latter concept come from? You seem to
> be saying that 'infinity' is just an idea.
Precisely, and for precisely that reason. Infinity had to come from
finity, as finity can be generalized from experience (of actually
counting and measuring things), while infinity cannot be generalized
from any possible experience.
> It does at least have
> tremendous importance for calculus, and therefore for engineering
> problems and other practical applications I'm sure.
Agreed. Ideas have consequences.
> > > Important
> > > enough that it is implied in the objectivist notion that the
> > > universe is eternal.
> >
> > By the last, do you mean Rand's claim that "The existence of inanimate
> > matter is unconditional,... Matter is indestructible; it changes its
> > forms but it cannot cease to exist." In that instance, I thought that
> > she was not naking a metaphysical pronouncement, but restating a law
> > of physics. She simplifies the law, of course; but that's no big deal
> > here, as she's not making any pronouncements about matter at all, but
> > (to make a different point) appealing to an idea that presumably all
> > of her readers already have.
>
> It comes from the claim at the beginning of this thread,
> that 'matter is eternal.' Later this person changed it
> somewhat. But I think he's referring to "the universe as a whole
> cannot be created or annihilated... it cannot come into or go
> out of existence." The universe, therefore, is eternal, iow,
> it has infinite duration.
I don't think so. I think the poster was just paraphrasing Rand's
claim above, which is just the Law of Conservation (simplified).
> I think "the existence of inanimate matter is unconditional" is
> a similar claim. Matter I would declare a concept of metaphysics
> (as well as physics). This is because it is a reference to the
> substance of the universe. Unlike physics though, it incorporates
> energy into its concept.
So does the correct Law of Conservation - but you're right, physics
states the law that way because it makes the distinction. I also
think you're right that Rand had a notion of 'substance'
(matter/energy, as in the correct law, and that she meant that by
'matter' above.
> Whereas physics treats matter separately
> from energy in order to describe various physical laws which
> treat them differently. Matter, for philosophy, is an object of
> metaphysical laws, but as substance, it is subject to no other
> condition other than itself. When Rand says "matter is unconditional,"
> it is without doubt a metaphysical statement. Physics only deals
> with things in their causal relationships. To say "matter is
> unconditional" is to claim a non-causal relationship, which
> is to say, it is not related to any previous concept. It is
> therefore self-subsisting. It would be a mistake, therefore, to
> assume that to say, "matter is indestructible, it changes its
> forms but cannot cease to exist," is stating a law of physics.
> The old law of physics, that the matter in a particular
> experiment, such as a chemical reaction, retains its mass
> throughout the change, is false.
I think you're reading way too much into the claim. I would say that
Rand actually says 'matter' (rather than 'energy (with matter as a
special case of energy)' because it serves the distinction she's
trying to make, between the animate and the inanimate - 'matter' as
vs. life has a clear meaning, while 'energy' as vs. life is just
confusing. Otherwise, all she is doing is giving the Law of
Conservation.
> Rand is talking about matter,
> which is to say in the philosophy of old, substance. This is a
> notion that goes back to Aristotle's 'qua,' if not before.
> That's not to be confused with things, but related more to
> things-in-themselves as we know them generally, in concept.
> These are the concepts that are not conditional on any
> experience, because experience changes, while matter does not.
I think Rand explicitly rejected even the possibility of there being
'things-in-themselves' in this sense; IIRC, she declared explicitly
that "There is no 'noumenal world'." As for the rest, I think it's
perfectly reasonable to distinguish between using 'analytic' language
(eg, to discuss what a concept or a belief entails) and 'synthetic'
language (eg, to discuss what something really is); and I don't see
Rand's remarks on the analytic/synthetic dichotomy as having anything
to do with making such a distinction.
George Dance
28.60...@posting.google.com>...
Apparently, the proposition that "There can be no actual infinities"
is one that some Objectivists have concluded (apparently by using
Kant's 'method of reason' on the concept, rather than by any empirical
investigation of reality). It is interesting to discover that Hegel
apparently did the same thing.
Robert J. Kolker
George Dance wrote:
>
>
> As for the physics, I'd have to see a cite from an authority saying
> that and why. As for the concepts being different, I agree: bounded
> is having a limited extension in space, and finite having a limited
> extension of any kind. I would say that 'bounded' implies 'finite',
> and 'unbounded' implies 'infinite' (as concepts, not claims) and vice
> versa.
Not so. The question of boundedness is topological. Let T be
a topological space (a set of points and a topology defined on
that set). Let S be a subset of T. p is a boundry point of S
if and only if every neighborhood of p contains points not
in S and points in S (other than p itself).
Such points are necessarily limit points of
S and must be in the closure of S.
A closed unbounded set S in T is a set whose closure contains no limit points.
For example the space T itself is such a set.
Examples of finite unbounded sets. Let S be the surface of a sphere. The
open set of S are the union of S patches. An S patch is a set of points
which is less than or equal to some great circle distance from some
point p in S. They correspond to open cirlces about points on a plane.
A union of patches is an open set of S. This gives the topology
of S. One can show that S (the surface of a sphere with this
topology) is unbounded, but the maximum distance between any
two points on S is PI*r where r is the radius of the sphere whose
surface is S. So S is finite in the sense of having a finite diameter.
Bob Kolker
malenor
Apparently the modbot bounced it? I don't know why it would do
that.
Eudaimonus <jwsc...@home.net> wrote in message news:<WduS7.13882$Z03.68239
4...@news1.rdc1.mi.home.com>...
> "malenor" <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:5851837b.01121...@posting.google.com...
>
> > From what I've seen, even Peikoff has rejected Rand here.
> > (Look up his definition of "context.") She is stating that the
> > proper context is existents within one's field of awareness.
> > The validity of mathematics refutes her claim. It is a purely ideal
> > system, valid for all time, and applicable to real things. But
> > it's context is not existents, it is the wider field of the
> > integration
> > of our ideas.
>
> You are ignoring the whole field of concepts of concepts. Starting with the
> concepts of unity, division and addition - all able to be found "out there",
Unity, division and addition are not objects of perception. Let's say
you divide a piece of pie in two and place the pieces apart from each
other.
In one time, you have a whole pie; in another time, you have two
halves of a pie. But what makes it two halves of a single pie? ("The
facts of reality, hehe.") No, not your memory, because your memory
only tells you that there was at one time a whole pie. It is your
*ability* to imagine the process by which a *whole* becomes a *half*.
You can imagine division, you can conceive of wholes becoming halves.
This is reflected conceptually in the words you use: The pie is still
a pie, whether it is whole or in halves, you don't give separate name
to the whole and the half. You call the latter "half a pie," not a
"grotunk" or whatever. Now you will bring up Rand's Razor. But it is
only a practical invention of her mind, not an explanation of why it
is a necessary element in cognition. Re-read on her Razor, she says
that it is practical; but she never explains the meta-theory behind
it.
It is our own minds that says something is divided, not the "out
there," because you could conceivably call the divided half a
"grotunk," an object unrelated to what we know as the whole pie in
genesis. Reality does not give us the necessary connection between the
two; we create it in our minds, not arbitrarily, but in accordance
with rules we invent -- just as Rand invented Rand's Razor, but for
more than merely practical reasons. We invented "division," as a
concept, because we need to understand reality. As Rand herself says,
our minds are constantly asking such questions as: "What is it?" And
more than that, creating the concepts that enable us to understand
exactly what it is.
It is the fact that we create the concepts we use, that they are not
found "out there," that explains the necessity of a concept such as
"infinity," which is not found "out there" and never will be. On the
epistemological level, it is just a concept like division, responsible
for the coherence of our concepts, that which is our most basic
context.
> indeed, starting, technically, with little more than abstraction and
> subsumption as axioms (which are the very basis of the human conceptual
> level of thought), one can build up all of mathematics. Mathematics, to
> Objectivism, is not "about reality" though it is tied to reality - because
> it is considered to not be built by means of concepts of concepts, and
> concepts of concepts that are themselves concepts of concepts ... ect ect.
> And yet it is valid, because the first-level concepts in this chain of
> concepts-of-concepts are all tied to reality - ie. the ones I mentions -
> unity (as in the perception of individual objects) and division and
> addition -
I agree with Arnold, that it is reality that gives them meaning.
Unfortunately, it is not reality that gives them reality -- we do.
> consider a young child learning to add and subtract by means of
> moving groups of little blocks together - then consider that child turning
> his awareness inward to observe his own mental functioning (and thus
> becoming able to do multiplication) and then consider yet a second looking
> inward (and thus, he becomes able to understand exponents) ... and so on and
> so forth. What matters is that the process "unfolds" back out into
> reality - that it isn't some sort of circular loop that remains inside the
> mind with no contact with reality.
I agree, but the coherence of our knowledge is not found in reality.
Reality constantly gives us new things to explore, especially as young
children. If we kept looking to reality to maintain the coherence of
our knowledge, we would soon fail to maintain it. We need some
pre-conceived form into which to integrate the new material.
> In short, the mind is in the world - and thus your field of self-awareness
> is part of your field of awareness.
The mind is in the world -- but not *of* the world. Your mind is the
ultimate context. The "looping" you mentioned is dependent on the
meaning your own mind gives to the reality, even to the extent of
granting it reality. The object is not reality *for you* until you
grant it reality.
> > It's not confusing language, I defined a potential as a possible
> > existent.
> > I didn't mention quantities at all, or anything about what the
> > existent
> > will be. That would be to assume I know what it is in the universe
> > that
> > changes when the infinite point is reached (as if there were such a
> > point.)
> > www.m-w.com has this definition of "potential": 1 : existing in
> > possibility : capable of development into actuality. Even definition 2
> > says 2 : expressing possibility.
> >
> > If matter is eternal, then it has the potential to attain infinity,
> > implying "capable of development into actuality." Which is only to
> > say the infinite duration of the universe is a possible reality.
>
> Beware using a dictionary to define philosophical terms. Better to use the
> definition given by the person who introduced the term.
Aristotle did not introduce the term. He introduced a metaphysical
analysis of the term based on the way his contemporaries used it. But
that is not necessary to the way we use it today.
Sigh, I hate having to reformulate my answers all over again. The
internet really really sucks sometimes.
Imagine if you had to write the following all over again:
> "Potency" means: (a) the source of motion or change which is in something
> other than the thing changed, or in it qua other. E.g., the science of
> building is a potency which is not present in the thing built; but the
> science of medicine, which is a potency, may be present in the patient,
> although not qua patient.Thus "potency" means the source in general of
> change or motion in another thing, or in the same thing qua other; [20] or
> the source of a thing's being moved or changed by another thing, or by
> itself qua other (for in virtue of that principle by which the passive thing
> is affected in any way we call it capable of being affected; sometimes if it
> is affected at all, and sometimes not in respect of every affection, but
> only if it is changed for the better).(b) The power of performing this well
> or according to intention; because sometimes we say that those who can
> merely take a walk, or speak, without doing it as well as they intended,
> cannot speak or walk. And similarly in the case of passivity.(c) All states
> in virtue of which things are unaffected generally, or are unchangeable, or
> cannot readily deteriorate, are called "potencies." For things are broken
> and worn out and bent and in general destroyed not through potency but
> through impotence and deficiency of some sort; and things are unaffected by
> such processes which are scarcely or slightly affected because they have a
> potency and are potent and are in a definite state.
Rand was skeptical of using new dictionaries to define terms, but not
skeptical of dictionaries per se. She found that the older
dictionaries were better. You can see this in her attempts to define
"selfist" as either "egotist" or "egoist." She complained that her
newer dictionary did not sufficiently distinguish the two.
But your definition of "potency" is not only old, it's positively
ancient. Isn't this Aristotle you are quoting here? Beware of using
sources that are extremely antiquated. You are working with not only
an interpretation of ancient Greek, you are not actually sure if what
we mean by these terms is what the ancient Greeks meant by them.
The first thing I notice about Aristotle's definition is that it is
dependent on a dichotomy between a patient and a "patient qua
patient." While I appreciate the history lesson, it is an outdated
philosophical mode. An etymological analysis of terms is ok, but
really, such an analysis cannot depend merely on one person's thought.
The origins of terms is not necessarily their meaning, anymore.
> Since "potency" has all these meanings, "potent" (or "capable") will mean
> (a) that which contains a source of motion or change (for even what is
> static is "potent" in a sense) which takes place in another thing, or in
> itself qua other. (b) That over which something else has a potency of this
> kind. (c) That which has the potency of changing things, either for the
> worse or for the better (for it seems that even that which perishes is
> "capable" of perishing; otherwise, if it had been incapable, it would not
> have perished. As it is, it has a kind of disposition or cause or principle
> which induces such an affection.Sometimes it seems to be such as it is
> because it has something, and sometimes because it is deprived of something;
> but if privation is in a sense a state or "habit," everything will be
> "potent" through having something; and so a thing is "potent" in virtue of
> having a certain "habit" or principle, and also in virtue of having the
> privation of that "habit," if it can have privation; and if privation is not
> in a sense "habit," the term "potent" is equivocal).(d) A thing is "potent"
> if neither any other thing nor itself qua other contains a potency or
> principle destructive of it. (e) All these things are "potent" either
> because they merely might chance to happen or not to happen, or because they
> might do so well . Even in inanimate things this kind of potency is found;
> e.g. in instruments; for they say that one lyre "can" be played, and another
> not at all, if it has not a good tone.
A lyre, eh. I don't think lyres, like old ideas, have any potency
anymore.
> "Impotence" is a privation of potency--a kind of abolition of the principle
> which has been described--either in general or in something which would
> naturally possess that principle, or even at a time when it would naturally
> already possess it (for we should not use "impotence"--in respect of
> begetting--in the same sense of a boy, a man and a eunuch). [20] Again,
> there is an "impotence" corresponding to each kind of potency; both to the
> kinetic and to the successfully kinetic.
Impotence merely means "not potent," which means "something other than
potent," or "not potent." But that doesn't necessarily imply
"impotence" as a privation. You have to demonstrate that potency
versus impotency is your only alternative within a context. What
context? That's not up to me. Aristotle is only telling us how words
were used back then, he is not giving any meta-reason why they must be
used in that way.
> Some things are said to be "impotent" in accordance with this meaning of
> "impotence," but others in a different sense, namely "possible" and
> "impossible." "Impossible" means: (a) that whose contrary is necessarily
> true; e.g., it is impossible that the diagonal of a square should be
> commensurable with the sides, because such a thing is a lie, whose contrary
> is not only true but inevitable. Hence that it is commensurable is not only
> a lie but necessarily a lie.And the contrary of the impossible, i.e. the
> possible, is when the contrary is not necessarily a lie; e.g., it is
> possible that a man should be seated, for it is not necessarily a lie that
> he should not be seated. "Possible," then, means in one sense, as we have
> said, that which is not necessarily a lie; in another, that which is true;
> and in another, that which may be true.
>
> (The "power" in geometry is so called by an extension of meaning.)
>
> These are the senses of "potent" which do not correspond to "potency." Those
> which do correspond to it all refer to the first meaning, i.e. "a source of
> change which exists in something other than that in which the change takes
> place, or in the same thing qua other."Other things are said to be "potent"
> because something else has such a potency over them; others because it does
> not possess it; others because it possesses it in a particular way. The term
> "impotent" is similarly used. Thus the authoritative definition of "potency"
> in the primary sense will be "a principle producing change, which is in
> something other than that in which the change takes place, or in the same
> thing qua other." (Arist. Meta. V.xii)
>
> The point here is that potency is something other than possiblity - possible
> mearly means "not impossible", ir. "not neccessarily untrue", whereas
> potentiality means something more as well as something distinct - rather
> than being a lack of something (namely, lack of impossiblity), it is a
> precessence of something.
Now if I look up "precessence" in an online dictionary, can I trust
that definition? Since it was your term, not mine, apparently it is
absolutely trustworthy, whereas anything I say is labeled "doubtful"
*because* I said it.
That is, of course, the nature of high school debate tactics.
> When you are potentially x, it is because you
> have some property y, such that y is relatable as part of cause of being x -
> either as an active power of yours, or as a receptivity to the power of
> something else.
>
> In short, the dictionary is wrong to equate "existing in possibility" with
> "capable of developement into actuality".
That comes from Aristotle's metaphysical analysis of potency, which is
based on the way his contemporaries used it. The same goes for the
dictionary definition today. It has come to mean a certain thing, and
it is the sense in which our contemporaries use it, including Leonard
Peikoff.
What Peikoff is afraid to do is say that an infinite is a
*theoretical* potential. He is afraid, because his belief system does
not allow a distinction between theory and reality. And by avoiding
this necessity, he is creating another problem: since theories are
attached to reality, so must be the concept of an infinite, which is
to say that a potential infinite is potentially actual in reality.
This is evidenced in their belief that the universe cannot come into
or go out of existence.
> For instance, it is possible for
> me to do architecture, however, I am not capable of doing architecture.
This is entirely based on Aristotle's dichotomy between a person and a
person qua person, which comes down to a dichotomy between substance
and accident.
> This is because it would not be a contradiction for me to go to architecture
> school, graduate, get a job, and a build a building - yet I have not gone to
> architecture school, and thus do not have architectural skills - it would be
> wrong to say that I am potentially house-designing (ie. potentially
> architecting - an architect) but it would be right to say of me that I am
> potentially potentially house-designing (ie. potentially an architect). It
> confuses being able, with being able to become able.
The whole paragraph is confusing. Weren't you the one who started this
sub-thread by calling me confusing?
> > You can't look at the whole of the universe without getting outside of
> > it.
> > You can say "the universe exists" from the inside, but not much else.
> > You can't say if the universe itself has a cause or not. You can't say
> > if
> > it is eternal, or not, or if its eternality is impossible or possible.
> >
> > At least, not with normal logic.
>
> I would agree with all of that (to a point - I would prefer to say those
> questions are invalid as questions, rather than that they are unanswerable)
> However, that is not what I was proposing - I was not making a pronouncement
> as to the nature of 'existence as a whole'
And yet you were the one who made reference to the whole universe,
thus my response.
> - but as to some one part of it,
> as determined by the whole of it. My logic is this - IF the normal
> conception of determinism is true THEN all that is, 'had to be', based on
> the previous states of the universe, and THUS IF it must be possible-for-x
> in order to be potentially-x, THEN if x, then ~possible(~x), and thus
> ~potentially(~x) and THUS WOULD Ax(x->~potentially(~x)) and so there would
> not only be no unactualizable potentialities, but no unactualiz_ed_
> potentialities - which would render the concept of potentiality itself
> impotent. Therefor, if you wish to hold to determinism, even if just for
> inanimate mater, you would have to get rid of the concept of potentiality
> (at least in respect to that of which you hold determinism to hold for) -
> that, or you would need to adjust your concept of the relation between
> potentiatlity and possibility.
In the post that didn't appear, I had analyzed this in some such way
as:
Let's put your argument in terms of your actual example of becoming a
doctor.
X is a man, possible-for-x (potentially-for-x) is a doctor. Given a
man, then not a possible not-doctor, in other words, it is impossible
for him to be anything other than a doctor. And so he has no
potentiality for anything other than a doctor.
It seems fairly obvious that this example depends on a conflation
between absolute necessity in logic and the various possibilities that
lie in reality. While some things are impossible to man qua man, you
are limiting him here, in logic, to the mere possibility of being a
doctor (or lawyer or whatever).
Brian Holly
Thanks George. I guess I should have suspected something like this.
When you can murmur things like, "there can be no actual infinities,"
I guess it makes you sound smart, at least to yourself. And I'm no
enemy of a priori reasoning, I'm just a little old fashioned and would
like to actually see the reasoning. I really don't know why Hegel was
antsy about it, but I suspect it might have had something to do with
the medieval argument that if the past were infinite, we'd never have
gotten to now. Of course, since Cantor, that sort of stuff doesn't cut
it. So I was kind of surprised to see this idea taken seriously here,
sort of like seeing a phrenology chart in your doctors waiting room.
Best - Brian
David Tomlin
0f0...@posting.google.com>...
> malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<5851837b.0112191418.9b
> 43...@posting.google.com>...
> You know, reading your statement again, I wish you had said it a long
> time ago on this thread. You hinted at it when you said that that
> which is beyond man's power to conceive is irrelevant.
Does "irrelevant" imply "not actual"? If so, why?
I'm not sure I agree that we cannot "conceive" infinity.
We can't visualize it. But if we can't conceive it, how
can we talk about it?
David Tomlin
28.60...@posting.google.com>...
> 374b...@posting.google.com>...
> > The proposition that matter is eternal seems to
> > contradict the proposition that there can be no
> > actual infinities.
> And just what is wrong with actual infinities?
You're asking the wrong person. I'm not an Objectivist.
David Tomlin
ea...@posting.google.com>...
> The outside of a sphere is boundless, but it has a definite,
> finite area -- and this is what I mean when I say it has a finite
> number of points.
"Point" is a mathematical abstraction. A point has no
dimensions. A finite line segment, area, or volume has
an infinite number of points.
malenor
An authority did answer to that question very recently. Actually he
wanted to inform me of the contemporary cosmological theory of the
shape of the universe, it is a hyper-hyperboloid. I would give you an
actual citation, but it was something that I read long ago in material
probably dealing with Einstein. The author characterized the universe
as a sphere, but he didn't mean to imply that it is spherical. It was
just an easily imagined example of an object whose external dimensions
are finite and unbounded. In fact, that's really all I need in order
to show here that there is a distinction. I don't have to say anything
about the universe at all, and that's all just speculative anyway. The
claim was that infinite and unbounded are the same thing. I proved
otherwise, no matter what the shape of the universe may be.
It is irrelevant.
I never thought of it as per your explanation, that bounded implies
finite; but
you neglected to really consider your idea of the vice versa; and in
fact, finite does not imply bounded. The proof is getting a bit more
complex, but you are implying, with your "vice versa," that bounded
and finite are the same thing, whereas previously you denied that they
are. If finite implies bounded, and bounded implies finite, then how
are they really different? You say bounded is a concept of space,
while finity is a concept of any extension -- but the only two basic
extensions are of or in space and time. But when you deal with time,
you must represent its extension in space, as a line of one dimension.
So really you are dealing with extension in space with either concept,
the bounded or the finite. There is no other kind of extension that we
can imagine.
That is why I started my analysis with a one-dimensional object, a
line, representing time. It is theoretically unbounded and infinite. A
plane, one consisting of two parallel straight lines in two
dimensions, is bounded and
infinite, like two railroad tracks stretching into a seeming infinity.
Most three-dimensional objects, at least the ones that I can conceive
of, are finite and unbounded.
I would not, therefore, conclude that one implies the other, until I
had analyzed the forms of actual geometrical figures. In the railroad
tracks example, you have boundaries on two sides, so the extent of
your travels in their direction are finite; you must stay within the
boundaries. But you are not limited in the direction of your travels,
except to the two dimensions.
The number of points that you can traverse in your journey is
theoretically infinite.
> > As for the rest: sorry, can't leave out the practical difficulties
> > involved in imagining an infinite anything.
>
> No? When you claim that the universe is 'finite and bounded', are you
> also saying you have no idea what it would mean for either part of
> that claim to be false? Then how can you say it sensibly?
I said that the universe is finite and unbounded. Start over again
from there.
Practically speaking though, saying that something is "infinite is,"
from the empirical view, nothing more than to say it is "not finite."
You seem to be handing me an alternative between finite and infinite
before demonstrating the actuality of any infinity.
> > > > "Infinity" contains nothing under it, yet it is not an empty
> > > > concept by any means. It is not a quantity, at least not in the
> > > > real sense. Then what is it, and why is it important?
> > >
> > > Obviously infinity is something people have an idea of. They can
> > > discuss their varying ideas, and discover and remove inconsistencies
> > > in them. But without referring to experience, there's not much more
> > > they can do.
> >
> > Let's say the idea of 'finity' came from negating the concept of
> > 'infinity.' Where did the latter concept come from? You seem to
> > be saying that 'infinity' is just an idea.
>
> Precisely, and for precisely that reason. Infinity had to come from
> finity, as finity can be generalized from experience (of actually
> counting and measuring things), while infinity cannot be generalized
> from any possible experience.
>
> > It does at least have
> > tremendous importance for calculus, and therefore for engineering
> > problems and other practical applications I'm sure.
>
> Agreed. Ideas have consequences.
My goal on this thread is to show that it has metaphysical
consequences too.
snip
> > It comes from the claim at the beginning of this thread,
> > that 'matter is eternal.' Later this person changed it
> > somewhat. But I think he's referring to "the universe as a whole
> > cannot be created or annihilated... it cannot come into or go
> > out of existence." The universe, therefore, is eternal, iow,
> > it has infinite duration.
>
> I don't think so. I think the poster was just paraphrasing Rand's
> claim above, which is just the Law of Conservation (simplified).
No, Rand's claim was a metaphysical one, not physics. She is dealing
with matter, as unconditional, which in old philosophical terms means
"substance." But physics does not deal with the unconditional, only
with the conditional in experience. The substance of a thing is that
which cannot go into or out of existence, whereas states of matter do;
but then Rand expanded this concept to encompass the universe as a
whole -- a tragic error on her part.
> > I think "the existence of inanimate matter is unconditional" is
> > a similar claim. Matter I would declare a concept of metaphysics
> > (as well as physics). This is because it is a reference to the
> > substance of the universe. Unlike physics though, it incorporates
> > energy into its concept.
>
> So does the correct Law of Conservation - but you're right, physics
> states the law that way because it makes the distinction. I also
> think you're right that Rand had a notion of 'substance'
> (matter/energy, as in the correct law, and that she meant that by
> 'matter' above.
It was not a statement about physical objects at all, much less
energy. These are conditioned, conditional on previous states. The
matter she referred to never alters, is not physical, and is
theoretically eternal. This is not the matter constituted by atoms,
nor any field of force, nor stream of electrons or photons. In her
quote, Rand is dealing with a fundamental problem of metaphysics, how
it is possible to have, for example, a river that constantly changes,
yet remain the same river. The physical "river" constantly changes,
but the substance of what it means to be a river does not. Physics
studies the river that changes, but this same physics relies on a
priori metaphysical theories about the eternal and unchanging
substance of the universe. This is not something that can be proven
through trial-and-error experimentation. It is a metaphysical problem
based in concepts alone, and believe it or not, these are important;
if you neglect these problems, then the rest of your knowledge will be
based on a foundation of sand.
Rand was fond of saying that our culture is riding on the momentum of
the past. This momentum is caused by the fact that nobody has noticed
yet that the foundation of our culture is rotten -- like the character
in Roadrunner cartoons who doesn't fall off the cliff until he happens
to look down and notice that he is no longer supported by solid
ground.
> > Whereas physics treats matter separately
> > from energy in order to describe various physical laws which
> > treat them differently. Matter, for philosophy, is an object of
> > metaphysical laws, but as substance, it is subject to no other
> > condition other than itself. When Rand says "matter is unconditional,"
> > it is without doubt a metaphysical statement. Physics only deals
> > with things in their causal relationships. To say "matter is
> > unconditional" is to claim a non-causal relationship, which
> > is to say, it is not related to any previous concept. It is
> > therefore self-subsisting. It would be a mistake, therefore, to
> > assume that to say, "matter is indestructible, it changes its
> > forms but cannot cease to exist," is stating a law of physics.
> > The old law of physics, that the matter in a particular
> > experiment, such as a chemical reaction, retains its mass
> > throughout the change, is false.
>
> I think you're reading way too much into the claim. I would say that
> Rand actually says 'matter' (rather than 'energy (with matter as a
> special case of energy)' because it serves the distinction she's
> trying to make, between the animate and the inanimate - 'matter' as
> vs. life has a clear meaning, while 'energy' as vs. life is just
> confusing. Otherwise, all she is doing is giving the Law of
> Conservation.
Then she's giving the old, false version of it. And it deals with
mass, not matter.
She's saying more than what you think she is; metaphysics always does.
It is a difficult subject because, unlike one person on this thread
suggested, it is not possible when dealing with metaphysics to loop
back into reality. The metaphysical building-blocks of the universe
are in no way, shape or form comparable to the building-blocks of
children.
Can you repeat the Rand quote about "inanimate" matter? It's in Galt's
speech somewhere, right.
> > Rand is talking about matter,
> > which is to say in the philosophy of old, substance. This is a
> > notion that goes back to Aristotle's 'qua,' if not before.
> > That's not to be confused with things, but related more to
> > things-in-themselves as we know them generally, in concept.
> > These are the concepts that are not conditional on any
> > experience, because experience changes, while matter does not.
>
> I think Rand explicitly rejected even the possibility of there being
> 'things-in-themselves' in this sense; IIRC, she declared explicitly
> that "There is no 'noumenal world'." As for the rest, I think it's
> perfectly reasonable to distinguish between using 'analytic' language
> (eg, to discuss what a concept or a belief entails) and 'synthetic'
> language (eg, to discuss what something really is); and I don't see
> Rand's remarks on the analytic/synthetic dichotomy as having anything
> to do with making such a distinction.
Don't be concerned over my use of the term "things-in-themselves." It
is only my way of saying that metaphysical matters are dealt with in
concept alone, with no reference to the conditional in reality. The
unconditional in reality is not an object of experience, therefore it
is a "thing-in-itself." Since Rand's brief exposition is on the
unconditional -- etc.
The next obvious question is -- By what right? By what standard?
What gives Ayn Rand the right to treat a thing-in-itself as an object
of experience? How does she justify the connection between substance,
the unconditional, and existence, the universe as a whole?
At least Kant attempted to justify his findings. Rand did not.
I'm not sure what connects the topic to the analytic/synthetic
distinction. There appears to be some connection for you anyway. I'm
curious to know what that is. Kant never said there was a "noumenal
world." If he did, it was either in pre-Critical writings, or a
momentary lapse into his pre-Critical style of thinking. Kant
emphasized that his meaning of "noumenal" was negative only. A
"noumenal world" would be a thoroughly positive conception.
To put it into empiricist terms, it is only to say: you cannot go
there. He doesn't say where that "there" is. But in theory, you cannot
know what things are without reference to sensibility. This is a
theory that limits the Understanding to the senses, a "possible
experience."
Exploring the substantial, the noumenal, the unconditional, on the
other hand requires a theory of what constitutes knowledge for man. It
is necessary to show that we can know things through concepts alone
without reference to the senses. Knowledge is not therefore limited to
the Understanding. If it was, the concept of "infinity" would be
meaningless to us, because it is a concept that thoroughly goes beyond
empirical reckoning. Rand has no such theory, and thus finds herself
in a metaphysical quandary, a sea of contradictions.
malenor
28.60...@posting.google.com>...
> 374b...@posting.google.com>...
> > Eternity is infinite time.
> >
> > The proposition that matter is eternal seems to
> > contradict the proposition that there can be no
> > actual infinities.
> >
> > If it doesn't, then why not?
>
> And just what is wrong with actual infinities?
I don't know, what matters is that Objectivists relegate
the notion of an "infinity" to the mathematical sphere,
as a potential quantity. (They don't even say potential
"quantity," just "potential." But it amounts to the same
thing. Far be it for Objectivists to use floating
abstractions.)
But if the notion of "infinity" is merely mathematical,
then why does it serve the implicit and very real purpose
of declaring matter eternal (infinite in duration)?
How do the Objectivists justify their use of "infinity"
in metaphysics when they have previously limited its
usage to the mathematical?
malenor
28eb...@posting.google.com>...
There's that word again...
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
malenor
9bf...@posting.google.com>...
snip
> > The point here is that potency is something other than possiblity -
> > possible
> > mearly means "not impossible", ir. "not neccessarily untrue", whereas
> > potentiality means something more as well as something distinct - rather
> > than being a lack of something (namely, lack of impossiblity), it is a
> > precessence of something.
>
I finally looked up "precessence." There is no such word, although it might
be related to "precess."
snip
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
Adam
s.uswest.net>...> news:m6WQ7.89714$li3.6...@ozemail.com.au...
> > >
> > > I don't know what you mean by 'matter is eternal.'
> >
> > My answer to that, is that there never was a time without matter.
> > Time is a 'dimension's of matter.
>
> Or as one scribe put it, "Time exists in the universe, the universe does not
> exist in time".
>
> Tom
This is easy enough to conceive of if we simply modify our view of
time. It is like an additional dimension (of the universe) used simply
to distinguish between before and after - therefore, if before is the
same as after (ie nothing has moved), then time has not passed.
Bert Clanton
>
> A line, a one-dimensional object, that which represents time, is
> theoretically boundless and infinite. There is no boundary, and it
> (the series of points from which it is constructed) goes on forever.
> A plane is also boundless and infinite. But the space of our universe is
> not 2-dimensional like a plane. It is apparently some kind of space
> that wraps around on itself. (Hyper-boloid?)
The "latest model" of the spacial component of space-time is not that it
is a closed and unbounded hypersphere. If I understand correctly, that
would have been the case if there were enough space-curving matter to
cause (?) closure. But the latest surveys seem to show that the amount
of matter is not sufficient to cause closure. If this is indeed the
case, then space is either a "flat" euclidean manifold (zero curvature)
or a hyper-hyperboloid (negative curvature). If it is indeed a
hyper-hyperboloid, then the appropriate analogue is not a sphere, but a
hyperboloid, a *saddle-shaped* surface which extends without limit
(i.e., infinitely) in every direction. Which would give us a shape that
is *infinite* and unbounded. Which would contradict the Objectivist
dictum that "there are no actual infinities".
> This space is predicated
> as being finite, yet boundless. It is finite because the number of
> points on it are finite,
Not so: the number of points in it is uncountably infinite.
Best wishes,
Bert
Brian Holly
337...@posting.google.com>...
> I don't know, what matters is that Objectivists relegate
> the notion of an "infinity" to the mathematical sphere,
> as a potential quantity. (They don't even say potential
> "quantity," just "potential." But it amounts to the same
> thing. Far be it for Objectivists to use floating
> abstractions.)
>
> But if the notion of "infinity" is merely mathematical,
> then why does it serve the implicit and very real purpose
> of declaring matter eternal (infinite in duration)?
>
> How do the Objectivists justify their use of "infinity"
> in metaphysics when they have previously limited its
> usage to the mathematical?
I don't even know why objectivists such bother with such a technical
issue. Usually they avoid mathematical and quasi-mathematical topics
like the plague - doubtless due to Rand's immense ignorance of math.
In any case, do you know where this comes from? I don't recall Rand
ever discussing it, but I may have missed something. - Brian
malenor
1a40...@posting.google.com>...
> malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<5851837b.0112200040.4a
> 0f0...@posting.google.com>...
> > malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<5851837b.0112191418.9b
> > 43...@posting.google.com>...
>
> > You know, reading your statement again, I wish you had said it a long
> > time ago on this thread. You hinted at it when you said that that
> > which is beyond man's power to conceive is irrelevant.
>
> Does "irrelevant" imply "not actual"? If so, why?
I don't think so, but then I'm not the one who said it. People
write a lot of things here without explaining themselves.
> I'm not sure I agree that we cannot "conceive" infinity.
> We can't visualize it. But if we can't conceive it, how
> can we talk about it?
That's exactly what I've been asking. I've had two basic
answers to that question: 1. The infinite derives from a
conjunction of empirical concepts, such as 'continuous'
and 'series'; 2. it is the opposite of finite.
The error these two answers make is context-dropping. The context
of 'infinite' is transcendental to the universe of finite things;
how is it possible to derive a transcendental notion simply from an
empirical one? It points in that direction, but does not lead one
there. An infinity subsumes the notion of a continuous series,
but each point on the series itself is finite.
It has also been demonstrated that 'infinity' is useful for
calculus. That's a demonstration, not a proof.
I've tried to give clues in the direction of deriving this
concept, but for some reason nobody responds -- they just
snip it without even giving it the benefit of a 'snip.'
Apparently, my attempts are so destructive to Objectivism,
its adherents feel massively threatened by my suggestions
and have to blank them out, evade them.
But if destroying Objectivism is what it takes to solve the
problem, I have no qualms about it. Objectivists anyway, are
like the coyote in the Roadrunner cartoons, who runs off a cliff
but doesn't fall until he happens to look down and notice the
abyss beneath him. They'll do anything to avoid looking down.
chance
c80...@posting.google.com>...
>
> Physicists don't know what to believe. Sometimes they claim, along with
> Newton (and no amount of purposeful obtuseness is going to convince
> me otherwise, after all my studies), that the universe exists or is
> held in place by some kind of manifold or continuum. Other times, they
> will claim space and time are products of thought. Or do they? Not that
> I've ever seen. But a purposefully obtuse individual on this thread
> claimed that this was the modern physics view.
>
> Considering the responses I get sometimes, I must be some kind of
> nut magnet here.
>
While I have not read the posts from the "purposely obtuse
individual", I would like to point out that many modern physicists do
suscribe to primacy of conciousness thought process. Although Einstien
was a materialist, almost all of the founding fathers of quantum
mechanics were at least mild Neoplatonists. Maybe you have never heard
of Niels Bohr whose own discussions on the matter while in Denmark has
lead to modern quantum idealism being dubbed Copenhagenism. Sir
Arthur Eddington has been quoted as saying God is Mathematics. Erwin
Shroedinger, Max Plank, Werner Heisenburg et al cetainly took a light
Copenhagen stance to say the least. Modern physicists such as Paul
Davies, and Robert Penrose have taken up the cause.