libertarianism and anarchism
Alex
On 18 Feb 1998 19:22:10 GMT, "Chuck Reis" <re...@chipsupply.com> wrote:
>>[Alex:] WRONG -- libertarianism IS anarchism, although anarchism isn't
>> necesarily libertarianism.
>>
>> All anarchism means is "without government". Thus, one could be an
>> anarchist and still believe that it is OK to initiate force (i.e., so
>> long as a government isn't doing it).
>>
>> But, libertarianism is based on non-initiation of force, as such,
>> libertarianism unavoidably leads to anarchism.
>>
>
>I don't think so.
>
>This is from Ayn Rand's "Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal":
>
>"The chaos of the airwaves was an example, not of free enterprise, but of
>anarchy. It was caused, not by private property rights, but by their
>absence. It demonstrated why capitalism is incompatible with anarchism, why
>men do need a government and what is a government's proper function."
Ayn Rand is mistaken in both her history and her theory. I'll let
Rothbard speak to that:
"Most people believe that this is precisely the reason the airwaves
were nationalized; that before the Radio Act of 1927, stations
interfered with each other's signals and chaos ensued, and the federal
government was finally forced to step in to bring order and make a
radio industry feasible at last. But this is historical legend, not
fact. The actual history is _precisely the opposite_. For when
interference on the same channel began to occur, the injured party
took the airwave aggressors into court, and the courts were beginning
to bring order out of the chaos by very successfully applying the
common law theory of property rights -- in very many ways similar to
the libertarian theory -- to this new technological area. In short,
the courts were beginning to assign property rights in the airwaves to
their "homesteading" users. It was after the federal government saw
the likelihood of this new extension of private property that it
rushed in to nationalize the airwaves, using alleged chaos as the
excuse." -- Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty, pg. 101 (1973).
>More from the same book:
>
>"A recent variant of anarchistic theory, which is befuddling some of the
>younger advocates of freedom, is a weird absurdity called "competing
>governments." Accepting the basic premise of the modern statists - who see
>no difference between the functions of government and the functions of
>industry, between force and production, and who advocate government
>ownership of business - the proponents of "competing governments" take the
>other side of the same coin and declare that since competition is so
>beneficial to business, it should also be applied to government. Instead of
>a single, monopolistic government, they declare, there should be a number
>of different governments in the same geographical area, competing for
>allegiance of individual citizens, with every citizen free to "shop" and to
>patronize whatever government he chooses.
> Remember that forcible restraint of men is the only service a government
>has to offer. Ask yourself what a competion in forcible restraint would
>have to mean.
> One cannot call this theory a contradiction in terms, since it is
>obviously devoid of any understanding of the terms "competition" and
>"government". Nor can one call it a floating abstraction, since it it is
>devoid of any contact with or reference to reality and cannot be
>concretized at all, not even roughly or approximately. One illustration
>will be sufficient: suppose Mr. Smith, a customer of government A, suspects
>that his next-door neighbor, Mr. Jones, a customer of government B, has
>robbed him: a squad of Police A proceeds to Mr. Jones's house and is met at
>the door by a squad of Police B, who declare that they do not accept the
>validity of Mr. Smith's complaint and do not recognize the authority of
>Government A. What happens then? You take it from there."
Isn't that quote from "The Virtue of Selfishness" by Ayn Rand? (Or
both maybe.)
At any rate, Rand displays her ignorance of the theory she criticizes
by her very mischaracterization of it. No proponent of
"anarcho-capitalism" that I'm aware of refers to it as "competing
governments" (the very thought of such is oxymoronic).
And futher still, even if anarcho-capitalism could be proven
unworkable (which it hasen't; there are many good refutations of
Rand's criticism, for one of those see: The Market for Liberty, by
Linda and Morris Tannehill), it would still not take away the fact
that the non-initiation of force principle (i.e., the "nonaggression
axiom" which is central to both Objectivism and libertarianism) is
incompatible with any degree or form of government or state.
This can be demonstrably proven. Government, by definition, must
involve one or both of the folowing (historically speaking, almost
always both):
#1. Coercive tax levy.
#2. Coercive monopoly on the rule of law (i.e., courts, police etc.).
Both of which initiate force. And if it does not involve either of
those, then quite simply, it is not a government. Thus, those who hold
the nonaggression axiom (i.e., Objectivists and libertarians) and yet
who also advocate government (even "minimal" government) find
themselves in a insoluble contradiction.
Rand's suggestion of a goverment lottery does not even solve #1
either. Government would have to outlaw private lotteries in order to
make it work, for, if allowed exist, the private lotteries would
outcompeate the government lotteries, for the simple reason that the
private lotteries would not have the overhead of courts, police, etc.
etc. (Contained within this exaple is the reason the government needs
to raise the money in the first place, i.e., the coercive monopoly on
courts, defense etc. (#2), which in of itself initiates force.)
>Many libertarians consider Ayn Rand's theories to be the basis for
>libertarian theories.
>
>Libertarians have a political party, called oddly enough, the "Libertarian
>Party". This would suggest that they believe in some government.
That they call themselves "libertarians" does not make it so.
>How could
>you have the "Anarchist Party"? There would be no members by definition!
Don't you mean a libertarian party? I can conceive of a libertarian
candidate which, if elected, would refuse any salery paid from taxes
and try to dissolve government. But, of course, that's not what the
'Libertarian' Party is.
I don't think any significant change will come about by politics ("if
voting could change anything it would be illegal"). In the end, I
think it will come about by what Spencer called "the right to ignore
the state". When there becomes enough "actual" libertarians (as
opposed to people who just like the sound of "libertarian"), people
will simply stop paying taxes and will not comply with the government
edicts which initiate force.
David Friedman
"Chuck Reis" <re...@chipsupply.com> wrote:
(If I have my attributions right--I missed the first round).
>Libertarians have a political party, called oddly enough, the "Libertarian
>Party". This would suggest that they believe in some government.
>>How could
>>you have the "Anarchist Party"? There would be no members by definition!
Why?
Anarchy, in the political context, does not mean chaos or lack of
organization, it means lack of government. Anarchists can join a party
just as they can join a club or a firm, and still remain anarchists.
I don't see how having a political party suggests that one believes in
some government--if "believe in" means "be in favor of." Anarchists do
believe in government in the sense of believing that government exists,
and one must take account of its existence in one's actions. One way of
doing so might be to form a political party intended to reduce and
eventually eliminate government. The Libertarian party does not quite fit
that description, since a majority of the membership probably wants to
keep some government, but there would be no logical inconsistency if it
did.
--
David Friedman
DD...@Best.com
http://www.best.com/~ddfr/
"No man is secure in his life, liberty or property
while the legislature is in session"
Chris Cathcart
Alex wrote:
>that the non-initiation of force principle (i.e., the "nonaggression
>axiom" which is central to both Objectivism and libertarianism) is
1. It's not an "axiom."
2. It's not "central" to Objectivism, though it is one of its tenets.
You've been saying that anarchism is the logical implications of the
principle forbidding aggression. What if it turned out through some study
of the anarchism issue that a limited government was more conducive to
peace than an anarchist "setup"? Would you support it then, or would you
concede that aggression by gov't is not the only evil we want to combat?
(This is not to say that there aren't logistical problems in keeping a
limited gov't limited, but no more of a logistical problem than getting to
an anarchist society.)
---
Chris Cathcart <cathcacr at whitman dot edu>
Alex
On 20 Feb 1998 07:58:58 GMT, Chris Cathcart <cath...@spamlovers.net>
wrote:
>Alex wrote:
>
>>that the non-initiation of force principle (i.e., the "nonaggression
>>axiom" which is central to both Objectivism and libertarianism) is
>
>1. It's not an "axiom."
By my definition of "axiom" it is not an axiom. That is merly one of
the names it goes by. There are many misnomers in the English
language, stop being so literal minded about semantics. In the context
used, it has the same meaning as "principle".
>2. It's not "central" to Objectivism, though it is one of its tenets.
Very well then. My point still stands.
>You've been saying that anarchism is the logical implications of the
>principle forbidding aggression.
If by aggression you mean "initiation of force", then yes. But what I
say about it is immaterial. It is demonstrably provable independent of
what I may say or think about it.
> What if it turned out through some study
>of the anarchism issue that a limited government was more conducive to
>peace than an anarchist "setup"?
Did you not understand the thrust of my argument? Even if
anarcho-capitalism could somehow be proven unworkable, government
still could not be logically derived by those who also maintain the
nonaggression axiom. For those who maintain the nonaggression axiom
and who also advocate government, the burden is one them to show how
they can derive a government without violating the nonaggression
axiom.
> Would you support it then, or would you
>concede that aggression by gov't is not the only evil we want to combat?
>(This is not to say that there aren't logistical problems in keeping a
>limited gov't limited, but no more of a logistical problem than getting to
>an anarchist society.)
Since when did Objectivists become Utilitarians? Being that I am not a
Utilitarian, I would not then support government, even if it could
somehow be shown that the initiation of force quotient was lower under
it than for anarchism.
And if Objectivists (or libertarians) still want government, then they
should give up the nonaggression axiom as being insolubly
contradictory to their position.
Chris Cathcart
> From: Alex <n...@spam.com>
> > What if it turned out through some study
> >of the anarchism issue that a limited government was more conducive
> to
> >peace than an anarchist "setup"?
>
> Did you not understand the thrust of my argument? Even if
> anarcho-capitalism could somehow be proven unworkable, government
> still could not be logically derived by those who also maintain the
> nonaggression axiom.
I used to hold that same view when I was in my anarchist phase a few years
back (it lasted about 3 months), and that view is the main reason I quite
being an anarchist.
Could be "unworkable" yet still worthy of our support. I doubt you'd
convince any Objectivists with that line of argument. At least some like
David Friedman has enough sense to say that he wouldn't support the system
he touts if he didn't have good reason to think it wouldn't fall into gang
warfare, etc.
Chris Wolf
Alex writes:
>>This is from Ayn Rand's "Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal":
>>
>>"The chaos of the airwaves was an example, not of free enterprise, but of
>>anarchy. It was caused, not by private property rights, but by their
>>absence. It demonstrated why capitalism is incompatible with anarchism, why
>>men do need a government and what is a government's proper function."
>Ayn Rand is mistaken in both her history and her theory. I'll let
>Rothbard speak to that:
>
>"Most people believe that this is precisely the reason the airwaves
>were nationalized; that before the Radio Act of 1927, stations
>interfered with each other's signals and chaos ensued, and the federal
>government was finally forced to step in to bring order and make a
>radio industry feasible at last. But this is historical legend, not
>fact. The actual history is _precisely the opposite_. For when
>interference on the same channel began to occur, the injured party
>took the airwave aggressors into court, and the courts were beginning
>to bring order out of the chaos by very successfully applying the
>common law theory of property rights -- in very many ways similar to
>the libertarian theory -- to this new technological area. In short,
>the courts were beginning to assign property rights in the airwaves to
>their "homesteading" users. It was after the federal government saw
>the likelihood of this new extension of private property that it
>rushed in to nationalize the airwaves, using alleged chaos as the
>excuse." -- Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty, pg. 101 (1973).
I fail to see how this contradicts what Rand claimed. When anarchy
resulted in chaos on the airwaves, the government, via the courts,
stepped in and enforced property rights. Just as Rand said should be
done.
Ayn Rand never claimed that it was necessary for the government to
nationalize the airwaves; quite the contrary. As she said, "What was
needed was *legality*, not controls."
>And futher still, even if anarcho-capitalism could be proven
>unworkable (which it hasen't; there are many good refutations of
>Rand's criticism, for one of those see: The Market for Liberty, by
>Linda and Morris Tannehill), it would still not take away the fact
>that the non-initiation of force principle (i.e., the "nonaggression
>axiom" which is central to both Objectivism and libertarianism) is
>incompatible with any degree or form of government or state.
False.
>This can be demonstrably proven. Government, by definition, must
>involve one or both of the folowing (historically speaking, almost
>always both):
>
>#1. Coercive tax levy.
Not under the Objectivist theory of government.
>#2. Coercive monopoly on the rule of law (i.e., courts, police etc.).
Very true.
>Both of which initiate force.
Not the latter.
>And if it does not involve either of
>those, then quite simply, it is not a government. Thus, those who hold
>the nonaggression axiom (i.e., Objectivists and libertarians) and yet
>who also advocate government (even "minimal" government) find
>themselves in a insoluble contradiction.
Not at all. Setting up a coercive monopoly on the rule of law does
not require the initiation of force against anyone. In fact, such a
monopoly is actually a *defense* against the threat of non-objective
retaliatory force by every Tom, Dick, and Harry, seeking to be his own
justice agency.
If I tell everyone in a particular geographical area that they are not
allowed to carry around vials of anthrax germs in their pocket, I'm
not initiating force against anyone. On the contrary, I'm simply
defending myself against a very real, objective threat.
*********************************************
Chris Wolf
cwo...@nwlink.com
Check out the World's Fastest Keyboard!
http://www.jeffcomp.com/jcp/
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http://www.jeffcomp.com/jcp/faq/
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http://www.jeffcomp.com/jcp/faq/murder.html
*********************************************
Alex
On 20 Feb 1998 21:01:21 GMT, Chris Cathcart <cath...@spamlovers.net>
wrote:
>> From: Alex <n...@spam.com>
>
>> > What if it turned out through some study
>> >of the anarchism issue that a limited government was more conducive
>> to
>> >peace than an anarchist "setup"?
>>
>> Did you not understand the thrust of my argument? Even if
>> anarcho-capitalism could somehow be proven unworkable, government
>> still could not be logically derived by those who also maintain the
>> nonaggression axiom.
>
>I used to hold that same view when I was in my anarchist phase a few years
>back (it lasted about 3 months), and that view is the main reason I quite
>being an anarchist.
>
>Could be "unworkable" yet still worthy of our support.
So indeed you did not, and apparently can not, understand what my
argument was. Never did I claim anarcho-capitalism was worthy of
anyone's support. I was not advancing -- or indeed so much as
defending -- what MY position is; instead, I was critiquing the
position of those who advocate government while also holding the
nonaggression axiom.
> I doubt you'd
>convince any Objectivists with that line of argument.
I was not trying to convince anyone of a positive theory of my own
(certainly not as it is presented by you). Instead, my argument was
that government and the nonaggression axiom are insolubly
contradictory; and that if one advocates government then they should
abandon the nonaggression axiom as being contradictory to their
position; likewise, if it is the nonaggression axiom that one
supports, then they should abandon government as being contradictory
to their position. My argument was that government and the
nonaggression axiom are mutually exclusive. One can support either,
but one can not support both without contradicting themselves.
> At least some like
>David Friedman has enough sense to say that he wouldn't support the system
>he touts if he didn't have good reason to think it wouldn't fall into gang
>warfare, etc.
I can not pressume to speak for David Friedmen as you have. But, I
certainly would not want my name invoked in defence of your confused
rebut.
David Friedman
In article <Pine.SOL.3.96.980220...@marcus.whitman.edu>,
Chris Cathcart <cath...@spamlovers.net> wrote:
>> Did you not understand the thrust of my argument? Even if
>> anarcho-capitalism could somehow be proven unworkable, government
>> still could not be logically derived by those who also maintain the
>> nonaggression axiom.
>
>I used to hold that same view when I was in my anarchist phase a few years
>back (it lasted about 3 months), and that view is the main reason I quite
>being an anarchist.
>
>Could be "unworkable" yet still worthy of our support. I doubt you'd
>convince any Objectivists with that line of argument. At least some like
>David Friedman has enough sense to say that he wouldn't support the system
>he touts if he didn't have good reason to think it wouldn't fall into gang
>warfare, etc.
He isn't saying that if anarcho-capitalism was proven unworkable he would
still support it. He is saying that governments is inconsistent with the
nonaggression axiom. If you accept the Roy Child argument, that statement
is true--whether or not there are any workable alternatives. Presumably,
if there are no workable alternatives that are consistent with
nonaggression, Objectivists should scrap the nonaggression axiom. Some of
the more thoughtful ones seem to agree with that--although they may prefer
to redefine aggression. Thus Jimbo concedes, if I understand him
correctly, that under some possible circumstances he would be in favor of
taxation, although he doesn't think such circumstances currently exist.
Alex
On 21 Feb 1998 03:12:54 GMT, Chris Wolf <cwo...@nwlink.com> wrote:
>
>I fail to see how this contradicts what Rand claimed. When anarchy
>resulted in chaos on the airwaves, the government, via the courts,
>stepped in and enforced property rights. Just as Rand said should be
>done.
First of all, there was never "anarchy" which "resulted in chaos on
the airwaves". You're using anarchy as a synonym for "chaos", as such,
your sentence doesn't even make sense (i.e., "When chaos
resulted in chaos on the airwaves...").
It was the government which nationalized the airwaves. That the
government monopolized courts were upholding property rights does not
mean that this function could not be performed as well or indeed beter
by privately run courts.
>Ayn Rand never claimed that it was necessary for the government to
>nationalize the airwaves; quite the contrary. As she said, "What was
>needed was *legality*, not controls."
Fine, but it does not then follow that it is only government courts
which can uphold the law.
>>And futher still, even if anarcho-capitalism could be proven
>>unworkable (which it hasen't; there are many good refutations of
>>Rand's criticism, for one of those see: The Market for Liberty, by
>>Linda and Morris Tannehill), it would still not take away the fact
>>that the non-initiation of force principle (i.e., the "nonaggression
>>axiom" which is central to both Objectivism and libertarianism) is
>>incompatible with any degree or form of government or state.
>
>False.
It is not false. It is correct.
>>This can be demonstrably proven. Government, by definition, must
>>involve one or both of the folowing (historically speaking, almost
>>always both):
>>
>>#1. Coercive tax levy.
>
>Not under the Objectivist theory of government.
Assuming that people will just give their money to government, but
this requires a utopian faith of which I lack.
>>#2. Coercive monopoly on the rule of law (i.e., courts, police etc.).
>
>Very true.
Yes, thank you.
>>Both of which initiate force.
>
>Not the latter.
Yet, you just admited such was the case. In my dictionary, "coerce"
means "to bring about by force", and in the context used, it is clear
that "initiatory" force is meant. (It was a discusion about the
initiation of force, after all.)
>>And if it does not involve either of
>>those, then quite simply, it is not a government. Thus, those who hold
>>the nonaggression axiom (i.e., Objectivists and libertarians) and yet
>>who also advocate government (even "minimal" government) find
>>themselves in a insoluble contradiction.
>
>Not at all. Setting up a coercive monopoly on the rule of law does
>not require the initiation of force against anyone.
Your idea of initiation of force is very confused, as futher
demonstrated below.
> In fact, such a
>monopoly is actually a *defense* against the threat of non-objective
>retaliatory force by every Tom, Dick, and Harry, seeking to be his own
>justice agency.
Fine, rather than argue with you as to what is meant by "non-objective
retaliatory force", I'll just assume that Tom, Dick, and Harry only
use "objective" retaliatory force: in which case -- by your own
standards -- if one tried to stop them, they would be initiating
force.
>If I tell everyone in a particular geographical area that they are not
>allowed to carry around vials of anthrax germs in their pocket, I'm
>not initiating force against anyone.
If you own that geographical area and mandate that noone is to come on
your property "carrying around vials of anthrax germs in their pocket"
and someone does, then that someone would be trespassing and thus
initiating force against you as the owner of that property. If, when
asked to leave your property, this person refused, then you could use
retaliatory force to literally "kick them off" your property.
If however, you were to mandate that noone "carry around vials of
anthrax germs in their pocket" on properties which you do not own, and
tried to enforce this mandate, then you would be initiating force
against the property owners and the people on their property.
> On the contrary, I'm simply
>defending myself against a very real, objective threat.
Maybe it is a "very real, objective threat"; but if you did not own
that property, and tried to enforce that mandate, then you would be
initiating force. If you did own that property, then you could mandate
anything of the people that come on your property; if they did not
comply, then they would be trespassing, and thus initiating force
against you as the property owner; and, if required, you could then
escort them off your property.
Chris Wolf
Alex writes:
>On 21 Feb 1998 03:12:54 GMT, Chris Wolf <cwo...@nwlink.com> wrote:
>>I fail to see how this contradicts what Rand claimed. When anarchy
>>resulted in chaos on the airwaves, the government, via the courts,
>>stepped in and enforced property rights. Just as Rand said should be
>>done.
>First of all, there was never "anarchy" which "resulted in chaos on
>the airwaves". You're using anarchy as a synonym for "chaos", as such,
>your sentence doesn't even make sense (i.e., "When chaos
>resulted in chaos on the airwaves...").
Nonsense. Learn some English. Property rights had not been
established for the airwaves. Anarchy prevailed, resulting in chaos
when one broadcaster interfered with another.
Anarchy is the cause. Chaos is the result.
>It was the government which nationalized the airwaves. That the
>government monopolized courts were upholding property rights does not
>mean that this function could not be performed as well or indeed beter
>by privately run courts.
Total non-sequitor. The argument is about what Rand said; not who can
better enforce property rights.
>>Ayn Rand never claimed that it was necessary for the government to
>>nationalize the airwaves; quite the contrary. As she said, "What was
>>needed was *legality*, not controls."
>Fine, but it does not then follow that it is only government courts
>which can uphold the law.
That's a completely different argument.
>>>This can be demonstrably proven. Government, by definition, must
>>>involve one or both of the folowing (historically speaking, almost
>>>always both):
>>>
>>>#1. Coercive tax levy.
>>Not under the Objectivist theory of government.
>Assuming that people will just give their money to government, but
>this requires a utopian faith of which I lack.
I give my money, voluntarily, to various insurance agencies. I would
have no problem giving my money, voluntarily, to a government that
existed to protect my rights.
>>>#2. Coercive monopoly on the rule of law (i.e., courts, police etc.).
>>Very true.
>Yes, thank you.
>>>Both of which initiate force.
>>Not the latter.
>Yet, you just admited such was the case. In my dictionary, "coerce"
>means "to bring about by force", and in the context used, it is clear
>that "initiatory" force is meant. (It was a discusion about the
>initiation of force, after all.)
Once a government monopoly on law has been set up, the government is
perfectly justified in using force to prevent any "competing"
governments in its territory. But this is not initiating force; it is
RESPONDING to the threat of force by the competing government.
>>>And if it does not involve either of
>>>those, then quite simply, it is not a government. Thus, those who hold
>>>the nonaggression axiom (i.e., Objectivists and libertarians) and yet
>>>who also advocate government (even "minimal" government) find
>>>themselves in a insoluble contradiction.
>>Not at all. Setting up a coercive monopoly on the rule of law does
>>not require the initiation of force against anyone.
>Your idea of initiation of force is very confused, as futher
>demonstrated below.
No, you are simply confusing the FIRST USE of force with the
INITIATION of force. They are not equivalent. The first use of force
can actually be self-defense against the threat of force.
If you seriously threaten me with the use of force, then you have
initiated force against me. If I then respond with the use of force
to neutralize your threat, I have acted in self-defense. I have not
initiated force, even though I was the first to actually use force.
>> In fact, such a
>>monopoly is actually a *defense* against the threat of non-objective
>>retaliatory force by every Tom, Dick, and Harry, seeking to be his own
>>justice agency.
>Fine, rather than argue with you as to what is meant by "non-objective
>retaliatory force", I'll just assume that Tom, Dick, and Harry only
>use "objective" retaliatory force: in which case -- by your own
>standards -- if one tried to stop them, they would be initiating
>force.
No, it is Tom, Dick, and Harry who are initiating force. By stopping
them, I'm acting in self-defense. Once a system of government has
been set up to protect the rights of everyone, the right to privately
use ANY sort of retaliatory force, objective or subjective, ceases.
>>If I tell everyone in a particular geographical area that they are not
>>allowed to carry around vials of anthrax germs in their pocket, I'm
>>not initiating force against anyone.
>If you own that geographical area and mandate that noone is to come on
>your property "carrying around vials of anthrax germs in their pocket"
>and someone does, then that someone would be trespassing and thus
>initiating force against you as the owner of that property. If, when
>asked to leave your property, this person refused, then you could use
>retaliatory force to literally "kick them off" your property.
>
>If however, you were to mandate that noone "carry around vials of
>anthrax germs in their pocket" on properties which you do not own, and
>tried to enforce this mandate, then you would be initiating force
>against the property owners and the people on their property.
Nonsense. If my neighbor elects to carry around a vial of anthrax
germs in his pocket, on his property, he is still threatening my life,
and I have every right to use force to stop him. My neighbor has
initiated force, against me, by endangering my life, by carrying
around a vial of anthrax germs, in his pocket, on his property.
Property rights do not give a man the right to endanger my life.
>> On the contrary, I'm simply
>>defending myself against a very real, objective threat.
>Maybe it is a "very real, objective threat"; but if you did not own
>that property, and tried to enforce that mandate, then you would be
>initiating force.
Nonsense. I would simply be defending myself from a deadly threat.
Property rights have nothing to do with it.
Where in the world did you get this ridiculous idea that a man can
endanger the life the others, so long as he remains on his own
property, and that it would be "initiating force" to stop him?
Eric Knauer
Chris Cathcart wrote in message ...
>> From: Alex <n...@spam.com>
>
>> > What if it turned out through some study
>> >of the anarchism issue that a limited government was more conducive
>> to
>> >peace than an anarchist "setup"?
>>
>> anarcho-capitalism could somehow be proven unworkable, government
>> still could not be logically derived by those who also maintain the
>> nonaggression axiom.
>
>I used to hold that same view when I was in my anarchist phase a few years
>back (it lasted about 3 months), and that view is the main reason I quite
>being an anarchist.
>
What was the reason you quit your anarchist phase? If, as Rand said, the
moral is the practical, then I assume you reject anarcho-capitalism on
ethical grounds. What arguments by Childs, and more recently George Smith,
do you reject?
-Eric
Chris Cathcart
>From: DD...@best.com (David Friedman )
>
>He isn't saying that if anarcho-capitalism was proven unworkable he would
>still support it. He is saying that governments is inconsistent with the
>nonaggression axiom.
Okay, I guess I misunderstood his argument (though I'm still skeptical of
the idea that if you oppose aggression, you must logically oppose
government, but that's an argument I'll have to beef up before I lay it
open for debate).
But Alex DID say the following, which I snipped from his earlier response:
>Since when did Objectivists become Utilitarians? Being that I am not a
>Utilitarian, I would not then support government, even if it could
>somehow be shown that the initiation of force quotient was lower under
>it than for anarchism.
He is saying that he'd still not support government even if anarcho-
capitalism proved to be unworkable. (If "workable" is taken to mean that
you'd have a more peaceful society under a limited government than under
anarchy.) So I inferred from that that he still considered a-c worthy of
our support even if it turned out to be unworkable. Unless he is going to
support something that he doesn't think worthy of our support, which would
then be nonsensical.
Chris Cathcart
>From: ekn...@worldnet.att.net (Eric Knauer )
>Chris Cathcart wrote in message ...
>I used to hold that same view when I was in my anarchist phase a few
years
>back (it lasted about 3 months), and that view is the main reason I quite
>being an anarchist.
>
>What was the reason you quit your anarchist phase? If, as Rand said, the
>moral is the practical, then I assume you reject anarcho-capitalism on
>ethical grounds. What arguments by Childs, and more recently George
>Smith, do you reject?
Eric, this is really not something I'm prepared to debate at this point.
I've got many other things that have been of more pressing philosophical
importance to me that I haven't given enough thought to this subject in
quite some time to adequately provide an argument for either side of the
debate.
I was just pointing out that supporting anarchism even if it turned out to
be unworkable looks like a position I wouldn't ever want to hold.
Alex
On 21 Feb 1998 03:12:54 GMT, Chris Wolf <cwo...@nwlink.com> wrote:
>Alex writes:
>
>>>This is from Ayn Rand's "Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal":
>>>
>>>"The chaos of the airwaves was an example, not of free enterprise, but of
>>>anarchy. It was caused, not by private property rights, but by their
>>>absence. It demonstrated why capitalism is incompatible with anarchism, why
>>>men do need a government and what is a government's proper function."
>
>>Ayn Rand is mistaken in both her history and her theory. I'll let
>>Rothbard speak to that:
>>
>>"Most people believe that this is precisely the reason the airwaves
>>were nationalized; that before the Radio Act of 1927, stations
>>interfered with each other's signals and chaos ensued, and the federal
>>government was finally forced to step in to bring order and make a
>>radio industry feasible at last. But this is historical legend, not
>>fact. The actual history is _precisely the opposite_. For when
>>interference on the same channel began to occur, the injured party
>>took the airwave aggressors into court, and the courts were beginning
>>to bring order out of the chaos by very successfully applying the
>>common law theory of property rights -- in very many ways similar to
>>the libertarian theory -- to this new technological area. In short,
>>the courts were beginning to assign property rights in the airwaves to
>>their "homesteading" users. It was after the federal government saw
>>the likelihood of this new extension of private property that it
>>rushed in to nationalize the airwaves, using alleged chaos as the
>>excuse." -- Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty, pg. 101 (1973).
>
>I fail to see how this contradicts what Rand claimed. When anarchy
>resulted in chaos on the airwaves, the government, via the courts,
>stepped in and enforced property rights. Just as Rand said should be
>done.
First of all, there was never "anarchy" which "resulted in chaos on
the airwaves". You're using anarchy as a synonym for "chaos", as such,
your sentence doesn't even make sense (i.e., "When chaos
resulted in chaos on the airwaves...").
It was the government which nationalized the airwaves. That the
government monopolized courts were upholding property rights does not
mean that this function could not be performed as well or indeed beter
by privately run courts.
>Ayn Rand never claimed that it was necessary for the government to
>nationalize the airwaves; quite the contrary. As she said, "What was
>needed was *legality*, not controls."
Fine, but it does not then follow that it is only government courts
which can uphold the law.
>>And futher still, even if anarcho-capitalism could be proven
>>unworkable (which it hasen't; there are many good refutations of
>>Rand's criticism, for one of those see: The Market for Liberty, by
>>Linda and Morris Tannehill), it would still not take away the fact
>>that the non-initiation of force principle (i.e., the "nonaggression
>>axiom" which is central to both Objectivism and libertarianism) is
>>incompatible with any degree or form of government or state.
>
>False.
It is not false. It is correct.
>>This can be demonstrably proven. Government, by definition, must
>>involve one or both of the folowing (historically speaking, almost
>>always both):
>>
>>#1. Coercive tax levy.
>
>Not under the Objectivist theory of government.
Assuming that people will just give their money to government, but
this requires a utopian faith of which I lack.
>>#2. Coercive monopoly on the rule of law (i.e., courts, police etc.).
>
>Very true.
Yes, thank you.
>>Both of which initiate force.
>
>Not the latter.
Yet, you just admited such was the case. In my dictionary, "coerce"
means "to bring about by force", and in the context used, it is clear
that "initiatory" force is meant. (It was a discusion about the
initiation of force, after all.)
>>And if it does not involve either of
>>those, then quite simply, it is not a government. Thus, those who hold
>>the nonaggression axiom (i.e., Objectivists and libertarians) and yet
>>who also advocate government (even "minimal" government) find
>>themselves in a insoluble contradiction.
>
>Not at all. Setting up a coercive monopoly on the rule of law does
>not require the initiation of force against anyone.
Your idea of initiation of force is very confused, as futher
demonstrated below.
> In fact, such a
>monopoly is actually a *defense* against the threat of non-objective
>retaliatory force by every Tom, Dick, and Harry, seeking to be his own
>justice agency.
Fine, rather than argue with you as to what is meant by "non-objective
retaliatory force", I'll just assume that Tom, Dick, and Harry only
use "objective" retaliatory force: in which case -- by your own
standards -- if one tried to stop them, they would be initiating
force.
>If I tell everyone in a particular geographical area that they are not
>allowed to carry around vials of anthrax germs in their pocket, I'm
>not initiating force against anyone.
If you own that geographical area and mandate that noone is to come on
your property "carrying around vials of anthrax germs in their pocket"
and someone does, then that someone would be trespassing and thus
initiating force against you as the owner of that property. If, when
asked to leave your property, this person refused, then you could use
retaliatory force to literally "kick them off" your property.
If however, you were to mandate that noone "carry around vials of
anthrax germs in their pocket" on properties which you do not own, and
tried to enforce this mandate, then you would be initiating force
against the property owners and the people on their property.
> On the contrary, I'm simply
>defending myself against a very real, objective threat.
Maybe it is a "very real, objective threat"; but if you did not own
that property, and tried to enforce that mandate, then you would be
Eric Knauer
Chris Cathcart wrote in message ...
>> From: Alex <n...@spam.com>
>
>> > What if it turned out through some study
>> >of the anarchism issue that a limited government was more conducive
>> to
>> >peace than an anarchist "setup"?
>>
>> Did you not understand the thrust of my argument? Even if
>> anarcho-capitalism could somehow be proven unworkable, government
>> still could not be logically derived by those who also maintain the
>> nonaggression axiom.
>
>I used to hold that same view when I was in my anarchist phase a few years
>back (it lasted about 3 months), and that view is the main reason I quite
>being an anarchist.
>
What was the reason you quit your anarchist phase? If, as Rand said, the
moral is the practical, then I assume you reject anarcho-capitalism on
ethical grounds. What arguments by Childs, and more recently George Smith,
do you reject?
-Eric
Alex
On 21 Feb 1998 03:12:54 GMT, Chris Wolf <cwo...@nwlink.com> wrote:
>Alex writes:
>
>>>This is from Ayn Rand's "Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal":
>>>
>>>"The chaos of the airwaves was an example, not of free enterprise, but of
>>>anarchy. It was caused, not by private property rights, but by their
>>>absence. It demonstrated why capitalism is incompatible with anarchism, why
>>>men do need a government and what is a government's proper function."
>
>>Ayn Rand is mistaken in both her history and her theory. I'll let
>>Rothbard speak to that:
>>
>>"Most people believe that this is precisely the reason the airwaves
>>were nationalized; that before the Radio Act of 1927, stations
>>interfered with each other's signals and chaos ensued, and the federal
>>government was finally forced to step in to bring order and make a
>>radio industry feasible at last. But this is historical legend, not
>>fact. The actual history is _precisely the opposite_. For when
>>interference on the same channel began to occur, the injured party
>>took the airwave aggressors into court, and the courts were beginning
>>to bring order out of the chaos by very successfully applying the
>>common law theory of property rights -- in very many ways similar to
>>the libertarian theory -- to this new technological area. In short,
>>the courts were beginning to assign property rights in the airwaves to
>>their "homesteading" users. It was after the federal government saw
>>the likelihood of this new extension of private property that it
>>rushed in to nationalize the airwaves, using alleged chaos as the
>>excuse." -- Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty, pg. 101 (1973).
>
>I fail to see how this contradicts what Rand claimed. When anarchy
>resulted in chaos on the airwaves, the government, via the courts,
>stepped in and enforced property rights. Just as Rand said should be
>done.
First of all, there was never "anarchy" which "resulted in chaos on
the airwaves". You're using anarchy as a synonym for "chaos", as such,
your sentence doesn't even make sense (i.e., "When chaos
resulted in chaos on the airwaves...").
It was the government which nationalized the airwaves. That the
government monopolized courts were upholding property rights does not
mean that this function could not be performed as well or indeed beter
by privately run courts.
>Ayn Rand never claimed that it was necessary for the government to
>nationalize the airwaves; quite the contrary. As she said, "What was
>needed was *legality*, not controls."
Fine, but it does not then follow that it is only government courts
which can uphold the law.
>>And futher still, even if anarcho-capitalism could be proven
>>unworkable (which it hasen't; there are many good refutations of
>>Rand's criticism, for one of those see: The Market for Liberty, by
>>Linda and Morris Tannehill), it would still not take away the fact
>>that the non-initiation of force principle (i.e., the "nonaggression
>>axiom" which is central to both Objectivism and libertarianism) is
>>incompatible with any degree or form of government or state.
>
>False.
It is not false. It is correct.
>>This can be demonstrably proven. Government, by definition, must
>>involve one or both of the folowing (historically speaking, almost
>>always both):
>>
>>#1. Coercive tax levy.
>
>Not under the Objectivist theory of government.
Assuming that people will just give their money to government, but
this requires a utopian faith of which I lack.
>>#2. Coercive monopoly on the rule of law (i.e., courts, police etc.).
>
>Very true.
Yes, thank you.
>>Both of which initiate force.
>
>Not the latter.
Yet, you just admited such was the case. In my dictionary, "coerce"
means "to bring about by force", and in the context used, it is clear
that "initiatory" force is meant. (It was a discusion about the
initiation of force, after all.)
>>And if it does not involve either of
>>those, then quite simply, it is not a government. Thus, those who hold
>>the nonaggression axiom (i.e., Objectivists and libertarians) and yet
>>who also advocate government (even "minimal" government) find
>>themselves in a insoluble contradiction.
>
hex...@hotmail.com
In article <34ee464...@news.supernews.com>,
Chris Wolf <cwo...@nwlink.com> wrote:
>Alex writes:
>
>>>This is from Ayn Rand's "Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal":
>>>
>>>"The chaos of the airwaves was an example, not of free enterprise, but of
>>>anarchy. It was caused, not by private property rights, but by their
>>>absence. It demonstrated why capitalism is incompatible with anarchism, why
>>>men do need a government and what is a government's proper function."
>
>>Ayn Rand is mistaken in both her history and her theory. I'll let
>>Rothbard speak to that:
>>
>>"Most people believe that this is precisely the reason the airwaves
>>were nationalized; that before the Radio Act of 1927, stations
>>interfered with each other's signals and chaos ensued, and the federal
>>government was finally forced to step in to bring order and make a
>>radio industry feasible at last. But this is historical legend, not
>>fact. The actual history is _precisely the opposite_. For when
>>interference on the same channel began to occur, the injured party
>>took the airwave aggressors into court, and the courts were beginning
>>to bring order out of the chaos by very successfully applying the
>>common law theory of property rights -- in very many ways similar to
>>the libertarian theory -- to this new technological area. In short,
>>the courts were beginning to assign property rights in the airwaves to
>>their "homesteading" users. It was after the federal government saw
>>the likelihood of this new extension of private property that it
>>rushed in to nationalize the airwaves, using alleged chaos as the
>>excuse." -- Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty, pg. 101 (1973).
>
>I fail to see how this contradicts what Rand claimed. When anarchy
>resulted in chaos on the airwaves, the government, via the courts,
>stepped in and enforced property rights. Just as Rand said should be
>done.
First of all, there was never "anarchy" which "resulted in chaos on the
airwaves". You're using anarchy as a synonym for "chaos", as such, your
sentence doesn't even make sense (i.e., "When chaos resulted in chaos on the
airwaves...").
It was the government which nationalized the airwaves. That the government
monopolized courts were upholding property rights does not mean that this
function could not be performed as well or indeed beter by privately run
courts.
>Ayn Rand never claimed that it was necessary for the government to
>nationalize the airwaves; quite the contrary. As she said, "What was
>needed was *legality*, not controls."
Fine, but it does not then follow that it is only government courts which can
uphold the law.
>>And futher still, even if anarcho-capitalism could be proven
>>unworkable (which it hasen't; there are many good refutations of
>>Rand's criticism, for one of those see: The Market for Liberty, by
>>Linda and Morris Tannehill), it would still not take away the fact
>>that the non-initiation of force principle (i.e., the "nonaggression
>>axiom" which is central to both Objectivism and libertarianism) is
>>incompatible with any degree or form of government or state.
>
>False.
It is not false. It is correct.
>>This can be demonstrably proven. Government, by definition, must
>>involve one or both of the folowing (historically speaking, almost
>>always both):
>>
>>#1. Coercive tax levy.
>
>Not under the Objectivist theory of government.
Assuming that people will just give their money to government, but this
requires a utopian faith of which I lack.
>>#2. Coercive monopoly on the rule of law (i.e., courts, police etc.).
>
>Very true.
Yes, thank you.
>>Both of which initiate force.
>
>Not the latter.
Yet, you just admited such was the case. In my dictionary, "coerce" means "to
bring about by force", and in the context used, it is clear that "initiatory"
force is meant. (It was a discusion about the initiation of force, after
all.)
>>And if it does not involve either of
>>those, then quite simply, it is not a government. Thus, those who hold
>>the nonaggression axiom (i.e., Objectivists and libertarians) and yet
>>who also advocate government (even "minimal" government) find
>>themselves in a insoluble contradiction.
>
-----== Posted via Deja News, The Leader in Internet Discussion ==-----
http://www.dejanews.com/ Now offering spam-free web-based newsreading
Charles Bell
Eric Knauer wrote:
>EK> What was the reason you quit your anarchist phase? If, as Rand said,
>EK> the moral is the practical,
Rand did not say: "the moral is the practical".
-----------------------------
Charles Bell
What's REALLY right with Objectivism?
http://www.netcom.com/~cbell58/aynrand.htm/#best
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ The College Board * Boynton Beach FL * 561.364.9249 * Interent Gateway
+
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David Friedman
In article <Pine.SOL.3.96.980221...@marcus.whitman.edu>,
Chris Cathcart <cath...@spamlovers.net> wrote:
>But Alex DID say the following, which I snipped from his earlier response:
>
>>Since when did Objectivists become Utilitarians? Being that I am not a
>>Utilitarian, I would not then support government, even if it could
>>somehow be shown that the initiation of force quotient was lower under
>>it than for anarchism.
>
>He is saying that he'd still not support government even if anarcho-
>capitalism proved to be unworkable. (If "workable" is taken to mean that
>you'd have a more peaceful society under a limited government than under
>anarchy.) So I inferred from that that he still considered a-c worthy of
>our support even if it turned out to be unworkable. Unless he is going to
>support something that he doesn't think worthy of our support, which would
>then be nonsensical.
Alex can parse his arguments better than I can, but I think this does
raise an interesting issue.
Suppose I believe in rights--specifically, I believe that I ought never
initiate force against anyone. Suppose I also believed that
anarcho-capitalism did not work--that the best one could manage was some
sort of minimal state, some of whose activities I classified as initiating
rights. Those activities might consist in suppressing competing agents of
retaliatory force, they might consist of collecting taxes--for my current
purposes it doesn't matter. What do I do?
Surely the answer is that I neither support the minimal state, since doing
so would be helping it to initiate force, nor oppose it, since doing so
would result in a worse outcome--perhaps including lots more initiation of
force by other people. That seems consistent with what Alex said.
It is not consistent, of course, with the Objectivist belief that the
moral is always the practical. But I think it has been demonstrated
repeatedly here--although not to the satisfaction of many of the
Objectivists--that that belief can only be logically maintained if you are
willing to stretch "moral" to cover lots of things, such as murdering
innocent people, that most of us (with the possible exception of Chris
Wolf) don't believe are moral. The attempt to evade that conclusion has
occupied lots of bandwidth, on topics such as eskimos and prudent
predators, but seems to me, at least, a total failure.
Charles Bell
David Friedman wrote:
>DF> It is not consistent, of course, with the Objectivist belief that the
>DF> moral is always the practical.
This has shown up twice in as many days. Where does Rand or any
Objectivist claim "the moral is the practical"? Or even words to that effect?
And what does
>DF> that anarcho-capitalism did not work--that the best one could manage
>DF> was some sort of minimal state, some of whose activities I classified
>DF> as initiating rights.
a state "initiating rights" mean?
Charles Bell
Eric Knauer wrote:
>EK> What was the reason you quit your anarchist phase? If, as Rand said,
>EK> the moral is the practical,
Rand did not say: "the moral is the practical".
mau...@mail.com
Chris Wolf <cwo...@nwlink.com> wrote:
>
> Alex writes:
>
> >On 21 Feb 1998 03:12:54 GMT, Chris Wolf <cwo...@nwlink.com> wrote:
>
> >First of all, there was never "anarchy" which "resulted in chaos on
> >the airwaves". You're using anarchy as a synonym for "chaos", as such,
> >your sentence doesn't even make sense (i.e., "When chaos
> >resulted in chaos on the airwaves...").
>
> Nonsense. Learn some English. Property rights had not been
> established for the airwaves. Anarchy prevailed, resulting in chaos
> when one broadcaster interfered with another.
>
> Anarchy is the cause. Chaos is the result.
It seems you are using "anarchy" to mean "the absence of property rights" --
which is not the same thing as "the absence of government." I can quite
easily imagine both (a) a world with property rights but without government,
and (b) a world with government but without an extensive system of property
rights.
I think most people would agree that several stations simultaneously
broadcasting on the same frequency would be a bad thing, and that a sensible
way to prevent that from happening is to establish property rights in
airwaves.
The relevant question is whether the entity (or entities) who establish and
enforce such property rights should be granted a monopoly to do those things,
or whether they should compete with such entities.
> If my neighbor elects to carry around a vial of anthrax
> germs in his pocket, on his property, he is still threatening my life,
> and I have every right to use force to stop him. My neighbor has
> initiated force, against me, by endangering my life, by carrying
> around a vial of anthrax germs, in his pocket, on his property.
What if, instead of carrying a vial of anthrax, he is operating an old bakery
that constantly gives off smoke, some of which drifts onto your property and
increases your chance of getting lung cancer later in life? Also, there is a
small chance that the bakery will catch fire, immediately threatening your
house and the lives of everyone in it.
Has he initiated force against you in a way that entitles you to forcibly
stop him? Would it make a difference if the bread he bakes feeds several
hundred thousand people? What if he had been operating his bakery for
several decades before you decided to build your house next door?
Property rights are not simple to create and enforce intelligently. Do you
really want to leave the job to an entity that can't even deliver the mail
very well?
Maurile
Eric Knauer
Charles Bell wrote in message <0000...@noname.ix.netcom.com>...
>
> Eric Knauer wrote:
>
>>EK> What was the reason you quit your anarchist phase? If, as Rand said,
>>EK> the moral is the practical,
>
> Rand did not say: "the moral is the practical".
>
I should have said "believed" instead of "said" because I meant to
paraphrase. There's a passage in Galt's speech (I'm qouting from the
Lexicon, pg. 311) where Rand says, "Your impractical creed...{inculcates a}
lethal tenet: the belief that the moral and the practical are opposites",
and then she goes on to explain the moral-practical dichotomy.
Matt Ruff / Lisa Gold
Charles Bell wrote:
>
> David Friedman wrote:
>
> >DF> It is not consistent, of course, with the Objectivist belief that the
> >DF> moral is always the practical.
>
> This has shown up twice in as many days. Where does Rand or any
> Objectivist claim "the moral is the practical"? Or even words to that effect?
Try Galt's speech, for starts: "Your impracticable creed..." says Galt
to the world, "[inculcates a] lethal tenet: the belief that the moral
and the practical are opposites...If the *practical,* whatever you must
practice to exist, whatever works, succeeds, achieves your purpose,
whatever brings you food and joy, whatever profits you, is evil--and if
the good, the moral, is the *impractical,* whatever fails, destroys,
frustrates, whatever injures you and brings you loss or pain--then your
choice is to be moral or to live."
> And what does
>
> >DF> that anarcho-capitalism did not work--that the best one could manage
> >DF> was some sort of minimal state, some of whose activities I classified
> >DF> as initiating rights.
>
> a state "initiating rights" mean?
Instituting legal recognition and support for rights, I imagine.
-- Matt Ruff
Charles Bell
Eric Knauer wrote:
>> Rand did not say: "the moral is the practical".
>>
>EK> I should have said "believed" instead of "said" because I meant to
>EK> paraphrase. There's a passage in Galt's speech (I'm qouting from the
>EK> Lexicon, pg. 311) where Rand says, "Your impractical
>EK> creed...{inculcates a} lethal tenet: the belief that the moral and
>EK> the practical are opposites", and then she goes on to explain the
>EK> moral-practical dichotomy.
To say she believed the moral is the practical is still incorrect. The
moral-practical dicotomy in Galt's speech was getting at the wrong conceptions
of what is "practical" as much as wrong conceptions of what is "moral" by
saying that "actual evils are the practical means of existence" is simply
wrong. Rand is condemning moral codes that force those who wish to live and to
live in happiness to live as though morality were inessential: pragmatism. She
is actually condeming morality as the merely practical as much as she is
condemning morality as the impractical because "when you are happy your joy is
diluted by guilt ... and pleasure, to you, is a liquor-soggy brain, a mindless
slut .. since pleasure cannot be moral." She is condeming the obliteration of
all virtue from that which does give happiness while at the same time
condemning those activites which are ~actually~ immoral (drugging, promiscuity,
gambling) because she is declaring that the (religion-based) old moral codes
have declared that ALL acts of pleasure are immoral regardless of what they
are. Because the old moral codes have removed the connection of morality to
life it is impossbile thereby to live any life as though living is
important. This is NOT to say that a new moral code ought to be exactly
equivalent to the practical means of survival but that morality is connected to
the means of survival. Rand expostulates on this in For the New
Intellectual: for a morality to be "practical" is to reduce it to a system
that is not a system of absolute principles and standards.
William H. Stoddard
In article <34ed466d...@news.infi.net>, Alex <n...@spam.com> wrote:
>
> Did you not understand the thrust of my argument? Even if
> anarcho-capitalism could somehow be proven unworkable, government
> still could not be logically derived by those who also maintain the
> and who also advocate government, the burden is one them to show how
> they can derive a government without violating the nonaggression
> axiom.
>
which have different scales of penalties for acts of aggression. For
example, without loss of generality, suppose one penalizes theft by
requiring return of the stolen goods, the other by cutting off the thief's
right hand a la Muslim law.
The agency that only requires return of the stolen goods will clearly
consider that the other agency's penalty is excessive and out of all
proportion to the offense. Excessive purported retaliation can be
considered a new initiation of force. Therefore, this agency can
legitimately offer protection to those of its clients who face having
their hands cut off, and perhaps to anyone who faces this penalty; and if
it stops the other agency from cutting off hands, or even closes it down
for repeated excessive penalties, it can claim by its rules to be engaged
in retaliation and thus not to be aggressive.
Conversely, the penalty of returning the stolen goods won't be much of a
deterrent; all it says is that sometimes the thief gets away and sometimes
they don't. So thieves will multiply under those rules. The agency that
cuts off hands can legitimately claim that the other agency is fostering
theft by protecting thieves from retaliation, and that it is thus aiding
and abetting theft. If it administers harsher penalties, or forces the
milder agency to do so, or closes the milder agency down, it can claim to
be acting in retaliation and thus not to be aggressive.
How can this source of conflict be resolved? If the two agencies are to
go on operating in the same domain, then one method is for them to
negotiate a common scale of penalties, one that either agency will apply
at least when dealing with the other agency's clients. At this point you
have a force that leads to a single network of enforcement agencies with a
single legal code, and with agencies that don't subscribe to this legal
code being subject to forcible interference or even to being shut down.
This is a large step toward at least an ultraminimal form of government.
Bill Stoddard
--
William H. Stoddard whs...@primenet.net
You'll be sure to find him resting, or a-licking of his thumbs,
Or engaged in doing complicated long division sums.
(T. S. Eliot, "Old Possum's Book of Practical Cats")
David Friedman
Charles Bell wrote:
> And what does
> >DF> that anarcho-capitalism did not work--that the best one could manage
> >DF> was some sort of minimal state, some of whose activities I classified
> >DF> as initiating rights.
>
> a state "initiating rights" mean?
A typo for "initiating force" or "violating rights." Sorry.
David Friedman
In article <whswhs-2202...@ip-104-205.san.primenet.com>, William
H. Stoddard <whs...@primenet.com> wrote:
>Suppose there are two enforcement agencies operating in the same area,
>which have different scales of penalties for acts of aggression. For
>example, without loss of generality, suppose one penalizes theft by
>requiring return of the stolen goods, the other by cutting off the thief's
>right hand a la Muslim law.
This assumes that each agency has its own system of courts and laws, like
a government. A more plausible scenario has the enforcement by the
agencies, and the lawmaking and adjudicating by private courts. Each pair
of agencies then agree on what court will settle disputes between their
customers, thus eliminating the problem you describe. They make such
agreements because fighting over every dispute is much more costly than
accepting preselected arbitration--and no more likely, on average, to give
the preferred outcome.
>How can this source of conflict be resolved? If the two agencies are to
>go on operating in the same domain, then one method is for them to
>negotiate a common scale of penalties, one that either agency will apply
>at least when dealing with the other agency's clients. At this point you
>have a force that leads to a single network of enforcement agencies with a
>single legal code, and with agencies that don't subscribe to this legal
>code being subject to forcible interference or even to being shut down.
Nothing in the logic implies a single legal code. Each pair of agencies
must agree on a court and thus a code, but there is no reason why the law
applying between agency A and B must be the same as between C and D, or A
and C, or B and D.
Suppose we were talking about the U.S. computer industry, and someone
asserted that the appearance of multiple competing firms was an illusion,
since they were all part of a single network of production. After all,
almost all of those desktops get their operating systems from either
Microsoft or Apple, and Microsoft and Apple have a variety of contractual
relations with each other. The desktops get their cpu's from one or
another of half a dozen chip producers, some of which, probably all of
which, have contractual relations with each other--patent licensing
agreements and the like. Similarly for any industry--all firms are linked
if you count "having a contractual relation with someone who has a ...
with someone who has a ..." as a linkage.
I think, in other words, you are confusing a marketplace--albeit a
somewhat unusual marketplace--with an organization. It isn't that someone
shuts you down if you don't agree to "the legal code." If you cannot
negotiate acceptable agreements with all the firms you come into frequent
contact with, the result is that both you and they have higher costs than
if you had negotiated such agreements--come conflicts don't get resolved,
or get resolved by ad hoc negotiations, or lead to interfirm violence.
If the reason you can't negotiate acceptable agreements with a particular
firm is that you are being unreasonable, then you have this problem with
lots of firms, he has it only with you, so you are the one who goes broke.
You might want to look at my reply to Tyler Cowan, on my web page; he made
an argument along the lines of the one you are making in _Economics and
Philosophy_, and I rebutted in the same journal.
Bill Riggins
> David Friedman <DD...@best.com> writes:
> It is not consistent, of course, with the Objectivist belief that the
> repeatedly here--although not to the satisfaction of many of the
> Objectivists--that that belief can only be logically maintained if you are
> willing to stretch "moral" to cover lots of things, such as murdering
> innocent people, that most of us (with the possible exception of Chris
> Wolf) don't believe are moral.
I agree David, though I approach this gap from a little different angle
than you do. I also think it is important to understand this dichotomy,
as it illuminates the essence of the schism between the tolerant &
intolerant.
The moral ~is~ the practical, as long as you stipulate all parties act
in a rational manner. It is when one has to deal with the irrationality
of his fellows (like being force to pay taxes or else) that the moral
and the practical go their separate ways.
Lots of things we do just to function in daily life--what we
tolerate--is not objectively moral but is accepted (and was even by
Rand, so as not to become a martyr). These actions sanction
irrationality, no two ways about it. The more irrational nonsense one
decides they must tolerate in order to adapt to their culture, family
situation, etc. the larger the moral/practical gap gets--and where one
draws that line determines whether they fall closer to the Peikoff or
the Kelly camp.
Rand agreed with the maxim "Morality ends where the gun begins". Given
that she had no interest in becoming the protomartyr, it should have
went more like:
"Morality evaporates at the same rate that you tolerate
coercion--coercion that is of course both irrational and evil, but you
are incapable of withholding sanction from without becoming a martyr."
Guess it just didn't have the same "ring" to it--or maybe it would have
revealed her to be too much of a tolerationist ;>)
wbr
William H. Stoddard
In article <DDFr-22029...@ddfr.vip.best.com>, David Friedman
<DD...@best.com> wrote:
> In article <whswhs-2202...@ip-104-205.san.primenet.com>, William
> H. Stoddard <whs...@primenet.com> wrote:
>
> >Suppose there are two enforcement agencies operating in the same area,
> >which have different scales of penalties for acts of aggression. For
> >example, without loss of generality, suppose one penalizes theft by
> >requiring return of the stolen goods, the other by cutting off the thief's
> >right hand a la Muslim law.
>
> This assumes that each agency has its own system of courts and laws, like
> a government. A more plausible scenario has the enforcement by the
> agencies, and the lawmaking and adjudicating by private courts. Each pair
> of agencies then agree on what court will settle disputes between their
> customers, thus eliminating the problem you describe. They make such
> agreements because fighting over every dispute is much more costly than
> accepting preselected arbitration--and no more likely, on average, to give
> the preferred outcome.
>
At a certain level, we may actually be agreeing on this. I have read
comments of yours to the effect that if two clients both have the same
enforcement agency, then cases between them will be decided by its rules;
this seems to imply that each agency will have its own system of laws, at
least for its own clients. Now, when two people are clients of different
agencies, I argue that there is a potential for conflict, and suggest that
it will normally be resolved by the adoption of agreed upon legal
procedures by the two agencies; you seem to make a similar argument in
saying that fighting over every dispute is excessively costly.
>
> >How can this source of conflict be resolved? If the two agencies are to
> >go on operating in the same domain, then one method is for them to
> >negotiate a common scale of penalties, one that either agency will apply
> >at least when dealing with the other agency's clients. At this point you
> >have a force that leads to a single network of enforcement agencies with a
> >single legal code, and with agencies that don't subscribe to this legal
> >code being subject to forcible interference or even to being shut down.
>
> Nothing in the logic implies a single legal code. Each pair of agencies
> must agree on a court and thus a code, but there is no reason why the law
> applying between agency A and B must be the same as between C and D, or A
> and C, or B and D.
>
Here we get to a point of disagreement. And here I would like to ask a
question: In the historical cases I am familiar with in which there was a
legal system, but there was no monopoly on the use of force--early Iceland
and premonarchic Israel come to mind--the evidence seems very strong that
there was a single legal code in each case. This seems to match my
scenario better than it does yours. Do you have (a) an explanation for
why things worked this way in past near-anarchist societies and (b) a
reason to suppose that things would work differently now?
>
> I think, in other words, you are confusing a marketplace--albeit a
> somewhat unusual marketplace--with an organization. It isn't that someone
> shuts you down if you don't agree to "the legal code." If you cannot
> negotiate acceptable agreements with all the firms you come into frequent
> contact with, the result is that both you and they have higher costs than
> if you had negotiated such agreements--come conflicts don't get resolved,
> or get resolved by ad hoc negotiations, or lead to interfirm violence.
>
For there to be a marketplace, in general, there need to be certain basic
rights: individual freedom of choice, property rights, contract, agency.
Specifically, for there to be a marketplace in the service of protecting
individual rights, there needs to be agreement on such matters as who
counts as an individual; how agreement is to be reached between an
individual and the enforcement agency they deal with, and between two
enforcement agencies wishing to select an arbitration agency; and what
area of land an individual is entitled to have protected by a particular
enforcement agency. If these matters are not clearly resolved, then there
is endless potential for conflict over which enforcement agency should be
protecting a given person or a given extent of land. But if you already
have general agreement on such matters, you have the skeleton of a uniform
legal code; and you also have just made it possible for enforcement
agencies to lower their costs significantly by adopting that same legal
code to settle other points at issue.
Consider, for example, the potential conflicts when enforcement agency A
says that fetuses are human beings and that if the women carrying them do
not wish to complete the pregnancies, they have abandoned trusteeship over
those fetuses by no longer giving priority to their interests, entitling
the agency to assume trusteeship and protect the fetuses against murder by
abortion; and enforcement agency B says that fetuses aren't human beings
at all and the pregnant woman has the same right to control them as she
does to control her vermiform appendix....
Charles Bell
>> This has shown up twice in as many days. Where does Rand or any
>> Objectivist claim "the moral is the practical"? Or even words to
>> that effect?
Matt Ruff / Lisa Gold wrote:
>MG> Try Galt's speech, for starts: "
This is why I fear for the success of an _Atlas Shrugged_ movie. Objectivism
cannot be summed up in glitzy soundbites. Galt/Rand did not mean to equate
morality with practicality, but to condemn the prevailing moral code that
separates off the means of man's survival as evil. I admit the ambiguity, and
Rand clarifies the moral-practical dichotomy in _For the New Intellectual_.
When you take the "sense-of-life" meaning out of Galt's speech you take much
more than mere poetical expression. Galt says in that same passage: "When you
are happy, your joy is diluted by guilt" because of the old moral code which
removes living with happiness from virtue. "Living with happiness" also does
not mean hedonism, but it also does not mean living a "practical" existence.
David Friedman
In article <whswhs-2202...@ip-104-210.san.primenet.com>, William
H. Stoddard <whs...@primenet.com> wrote:
>In article <DDFr-22029...@ddfr.vip.best.com>, David Friedman
><DD...@best.com> wrote:
>> Nothing in the logic implies a single legal code. Each pair of agencies
>> must agree on a court and thus a code, but there is no reason why the law
>> applying between agency A and B must be the same as between C and D, or A
>> and C, or B and D.
>>
>Here we get to a point of disagreement. And here I would like to ask a
>question: In the historical cases I am familiar with in which there was a
>legal system, but there was no monopoly on the use of force--early Iceland
>and premonarchic Israel come to mind--the evidence seems very strong that
>there was a single legal code in each case. This seems to match my
>scenario better than it does yours. Do you have (a) an explanation for
>why things worked this way in past near-anarchist societies and (b) a
>reason to suppose that things would work differently now?
Interesting questions. Iceland had one law code, on the other hand the
court that got to decide the law code depended to some extent on the
"protection agencies" (godord) that the parties were customers of. I don't
know enough about Israel.
On the other hand, I believe modern arbitration agreements have a
structure more like what I am describing. There may be a single industry
code or arbitrator, but there doesn't have to be. Two parties who contract
with each other specify the arbitrator. And my rather vague impression of
medieval law merchant is that parties could agree to have a dispute
settled according to the rules of the X fair.
The reasons I would expect more legal diversity now are that we are
dealing with a larger population and much better information and
communication technology. But that is only a guess. You could end up with
an equivalent of the American Law Institute--an organization that produced
model law codes which very many arbitration agencies adopted.
>For there to be a marketplace, in general, there need to be certain basic
>rights: individual freedom of choice, property rights, contract, agency.
I don't think so. Those may be requirements for a free market. But there
are lots of situations that have the logical structure of a
marketplace--no hierarchical rule, multiple objectives, individuals
independently maximizing against an environment consisting of other
individuals, contract, exchange, etc. without a background of externally
enforced rights. The present system of multiple states is an example, as
is the criminal marketplace--even if you include the victims. I bear costs
to make it harder for someone to steal from me, he bears costs to steal
from me, if he succeeds we may mutually agree that I will buy the loot
back from him (not common at the moment, but common enough in the past).
The point I was making was not that the structure I described would
produce good outcomes, although I think it would, but that it was not
equivalent to a single government--was a market rather than a hierarchy.
>Specifically, for there to be a marketplace in the service of protecting
>individual rights, there needs to be agreement on such matters as who
>counts as an individual; how agreement is to be reached between an
>individual and the enforcement agency they deal with, and between two
>enforcement agencies wishing to select an arbitration agency; and what
>area of land an individual is entitled to have protected by a particular
>enforcement agency. If these matters are not clearly resolved, then there
>is endless potential for conflict over which enforcement agency should be
>protecting a given person or a given extent of land. But if you already
>have general agreement on such matters, you have the skeleton of a uniform
>legal code; and you also have just made it possible for enforcement
>agencies to lower their costs significantly by adopting that same legal
>code to settle other points at issue.
A lot of the agreement gets hammered out as the system develops. We start
with a sort of underlying natural property--the fact that it is easier for
some people to control some objects than for others to. I, for example,
can control my hand more easily than you can control my hand. Out of that
we bargain up to mutually acceptable rules to keep down conflict, permit
trade, etc. I discuss this in my "Positive Account of Property Rights"
article on my web page.
Obviously there is lots of room for possible disagreements. But the
parties have an incentive to settle them. The obligations of the agency to
its customer are determined by contract, enforced by reputation. You don't
need a background legal code as long as, as a practical matter, I can take
my business elsewhere if not satisfied. And you don't need rules for how
agreement is to be reached between two agencies--all that is enforcing
them is reputation. If agencies A and B agree to an arbitration agency and
B renegs, the punishment is that everyone in the business knows B reneged.
>Consider, for example, the potential conflicts when enforcement agency A
>says that fetuses are human beings and that if the women carrying them do
>not wish to complete the pregnancies, they have abandoned trusteeship over
>those fetuses by no longer giving priority to their interests, entitling
>the agency to assume trusteeship and protect the fetuses against murder by
>abortion; and enforcement agency B says that fetuses aren't human beings
>at all and the pregnant woman has the same right to control them as she
>does to control her vermiform appendix....
Who is paying A to try to enforce that particular view of rights? How much
is he paying them? How much is it worth it to the women customers of B not
to have that right enforced against them? My conjecture is that B will
lose much more if it fails to maintain its view against A than vice versa,
so B gets its preferred law.
David Friedman
In article <1998022218...@host-32-96-34-145.atl.bellsouth.net>,
Bill Riggins <rig...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>The moral ~is~ the practical, as long as you stipulate all parties act
>in a rational manner. It is when one has to deal with the irrationality
>of his fellows (like being force to pay taxes or else) that the moral
>and the practical go their separate ways.
Do you identify "act in a rational manner" with "always respect rights?"
If so, why? Obvious possible answers:
1. Rand proved it with the argument that starts with life as the purpose
of ethics and ends with MQM and non-initiation of force.
I discuss why I believe that argument is full of holes on my web
page--follow the libertarian branch.
2. Because A can never rationally believe that he will be better off as a
result of violating B's rights.
We have been through all that at great length. Lots of people offer
reasons why violating rights sometimes has bad consequences for the
violator. But the only way of getting from "sometimes" to "always" is by
making very strong assumptions about human psychology, which do not fit
what we seem to observe around us.
It may be true that prudent predation via the political system would be
much harder if everyone was rational--but there is still the possibility
of private prudent predation (PPP). After all, in a world where almost
everyone respects rights, it isn't worth taking much care to protect
yourself against the very rare exceptions.
Chris Wolf
mau...@mail.com writes:
>> Chris Wolf <cwo...@nwlink.com> wrote:
>> If my neighbor elects to carry around a vial of anthrax
>> germs in his pocket, on his property, he is still threatening my life,
>> and I have every right to use force to stop him. My neighbor has
>> initiated force, against me, by endangering my life, by carrying
>> around a vial of anthrax germs, in his pocket, on his property.
>What if, instead of carrying a vial of anthrax, he is operating an old bakery
>that constantly gives off smoke, some of which drifts onto your property and
>increases your chance of getting lung cancer later in life?
If I can objectively demonstrate that the smoke is harmful to me, then
I have every right to use the government to force him to clean up the
smoke, or else shut down the bakery.
>Also, there is a
>small chance that the bakery will catch fire, immediately threatening your
>house and the lives of everyone in it.
There's also a small chance that my house will catch fire, and
immediately threaten the bakery. That's what fire departments are
for. Nothing more can be done for such a risk, given our current
state of technology, so that comes under the heading of voluntary
assumption of risk.
>Has he initiated force against you in a way that entitles you to forcibly
>stop him?
In the case of the smoke, he probably has.
>Would it make a difference if the bread he bakes feeds several
>hundred thousand people?
No.
>What if he had been operating his bakery for
>several decades before you decided to build your house next door?
Doesn't matter. He never purchased the right to pollute the property
next door.
>Property rights are not simple to create and enforce intelligently. Do you
>really want to leave the job to an entity that can't even deliver the mail
>very well?
Yes, I do. Delivering the mail is a job for private industry.
Enforcing rights, is not.
Eric Knauer
Charles Bell wrote in message <0000...@noname.ix.netcom.com>...
>
> Eric Knauer wrote:
>
>>> Rand did not say: "the moral is the practical".
>>>
>>EK> I should have said "believed" instead of "said" because I meant to
>>EK> paraphrase. There's a passage in Galt's speech (I'm qouting from the
>>EK> Lexicon, pg. 311) where Rand says, "Your impractical
>>EK> creed...{inculcates a} lethal tenet: the belief that the moral and
>>EK> the practical are opposites", and then she goes on to explain the
>>EK> moral-practical dichotomy.
>
> To say she believed the moral is the practical is still incorrect. The
>moral-practical dicotomy in Galt's speech was getting at the wrong
conceptions
>of what is "practical" as much as wrong conceptions of what is "moral" by
>saying that "actual evils are the practical means of existence" is simply
>wrong.
Let me quote another passage from one of her essays that seems to support
the idea that there is no conflict between the moral and the practical:
{Consider the catch phrase:} "This may be good in theory, but it doesn't
work in
practice." What is a theory? It is a set of abstract principles
purporting to be
either a correct description of reality or a set of guidelines for man's
actions.
Correspondence to reality is the standard of value by which one
estimates
a theory. If a theory is inapplicable to reality, by what standard can
it be estimated
a "good"?
So basically, I'm asking whether it's compatible to accept the moral
legitimacy of anarcho-capitalism but still maintain that AC is impractical.
If I remember correctly, you're not sympathetic to AC even though you see
problems with Rand's concept of voluntary taxation. I could be
rong. -Eric
Eric Knauer
Bill Riggins
David Friedman <DD...@best.com> writes:
> > Bill Riggins <rig...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> >The moral ~is~ the practical, as long as you stipulate all parties act
> >in a rational manner. It is when one has to deal with the irrationality
> >of his fellows (like being forced to pay taxes or else) that the moral
> >and the practical go their separate ways.
>
> Do you identify "act in a rational manner" with "always respect rights?"
> If so, why?
Easy to snub that stipulation, isn't it? Remember asking Jaffo the same
question over and over again? We tried to tell ya it was wrong to ask
him to accept your premise without questioning it--simply on faith.
Remember your response?
>DDfr: No. I am asking that he answer a simple question:
> What would he conclude if he accepted the premise?
That was all I was asking here David. Even pointed out the premise
needed to be assumed. I locate it somewhere near the apex of mount
irony that you couldn't breeze on past and consider "what you would
conclude if".
wbr
Chris Wolf
David Friedman writes:
>In article <whswhs-2202...@ip-104-205.san.primenet.com>, William
>H. Stoddard <whs...@primenet.com> wrote:
>
>>Suppose there are two enforcement agencies operating in the same area,
>>which have different scales of penalties for acts of aggression. For
>>example, without loss of generality, suppose one penalizes theft by
>>requiring return of the stolen goods, the other by cutting off the thief's
>>right hand a la Muslim law.
>This assumes that each agency has its own system of courts and laws, like
>a government. A more plausible scenario has the enforcement by the
>agencies, and the lawmaking and adjudicating by private courts. Each pair
>of agencies then agree on what court will settle disputes between their
>customers, thus eliminating the problem you describe. They make such
>agreements because fighting over every dispute is much more costly than
>accepting preselected arbitration--and no more likely, on average, to give
>the preferred outcome.
Apparently someone forgot to tell the warring factions in Mogadishu.
They seem to be quite willing to fight over every dispute.
Perhaps we could buy David a plane ticket, to enlighten them?
Tim Starr
In article <Pine.SOL.3.96.980219...@marcus.whitman.edu>,
Chris Cathcart <cath...@spamlovers.net> wrote:
>Alex wrote:
>
>>that the non-initiation of force principle (i.e., the "nonaggression
>>axiom" which is central to both Objectivism and libertarianism) is
>
>
>2. It's not "central" to Objectivism, though it is one of its tenets.
>
>You've been saying that anarchism is the logical implications of the
>principle forbidding aggression. What if it turned out through some study
>of the anarchism issue that a limited government was more conducive to
>peace than an anarchist "setup"?
"What if it turned out through some study of the genocide issue that a
limited genocide policy carried out by the State was less conducive to
genocide than abolishing genocide completely?"
"If guns are outlawed, only the government will have guns. Only the police,
the secret police, the military, the hired servants of our rulers. Only the
government--and a few outlaws. I intend to be among the outlaws."
--Edward Abbey (1927-1989), _Abbey's Road,_ p.39_(Plume, 1979)
Tim Starr - Renaissance Now! Think Universally, Act Selfishly
Assistant Editor: Freedom Network News, the newsletter of The International
Society for Individual Liberty (ISIL), http://www.isil.org/
Personal home page: http://www.creative.net/~star/timstarr.htm
Liberty is the Best Policy - tims...@netcom.com
Bob Renninger
>2. Because A can never rationally believe that he will be better off as a
>result of violating B's rights.
>
>We have been through all that at great length. Lots of people offer
>reasons why violating rights sometimes has bad consequences for the
>violator. But the only way of getting from "sometimes" to "always" is by
>making very strong assumptions about human psychology, which do not fit
>what we seem to observe around us.
Then it seems you should tell your children the following:
"I don't think it would be moral for you to be prudent predators, but if
you intend to act in your own best interests, that's what you should
do."
Bob Renninger
"Just Say No: To Slogans."
Chris Cathcart
>From: tims...@netcom.com (Tim Starr )
>Chris Cathcart <cath...@spamlovers.net> wrote:
>>You've been saying that anarchism is the logical implications of the
>>principle forbidding aggression. What if it turned out through some
study
>>of the anarchism issue that a limited government was more conducive to
>>peace than an anarchist "setup"?
>
>"What if it turned out through some study of the genocide issue that a
>limited genocide policy carried out by the State was less conducive to
>genocide than abolishing genocide completely?"
Huh? How would some genocide be less conducive to genocide than no
genocide?
If I take your analogy literally, you would then be saying that an
anarchist setup would end up completely abolishing all rights-violations,
which is obviously false. This is not to say that I am in any way
convinced that an anarchist society would not have _less_ rights
violations than a limited government, but your analogous question
_assumes_ not only that, but that it could get rid of rights-violations
completely.
---
Chris Cathcart <cathcacr at whitman dot edu>
mau...@mail.com
Chris Wolf <cwo...@nwlink.com> wrote:
>
> mau...@mail.com writes:
>
> >> Chris Wolf <cwo...@nwlink.com> wrote:
>>What if, instead of carrying a vial of anthrax, [your neighbor] is
>>operating an old bakery that constantly gives off smoke,
>>some of which drifts onto your property and increases
>>your chance of getting lung cancer later in life?
>
> If I can objectively demonstrate that the smoke is harmful to me, then
> I have every right to use the government to force him to clean up the
> smoke, or else shut down the bakery.
>
>>Also, there is a small chance that the bakery will catch
>>fire, immediately threatening your house and the lives of
>>everyone in it.
>
> There's also a small chance that my house will catch fire, and
> immediately threaten the bakery. That's what fire departments are
> for. Nothing more can be done for such a risk, given our current
> state of technology, so that comes under the heading of voluntary
> assumption of risk.
I don't see a difference in principle between the smoke and the threat of
fire. Both are objectively harmful to you. Both may be avoided. (Your
neighbor doesn't have to use his property to operate a bakery -- he could
just build a big swimming pool on it.) In each case, your neighbor is
subjecting you to harm (and let's say for the sake of argument that he is
doing so without your permission).
There may be a difference in degree. Perhaps the threat of fire will cause
you less harm (on average) than the smoke. Or perhaps it will cost the baker
less to clean up the smoke than to eliminate the risk of fire. But these
considerations, while useful to a utilitarian analysis of the relevant laws,
seem out of place in a rights-based analysis deriving from a principle of
non-aggression.
Matt Ruff / Lisa Gold
Just curious -- and forgive me if you've already answered this on your
web site -- what becomes of the power-mongers in this scenario? Won't
these competing enforcement agencies feel a natural impulse to attempt
to establish a monopoly, perhaps by allying themselves with a
monopolistic company?
To pull a random name out of a hat, let's say Microsoft adds a new
clause to its contracts saying that in order to get Windows 2095,
computer dealers have to agree to accept enforcement agency A as their
official enforcement agency for all business matters...
-- Matt Ruff
David Friedman
In article <6ct7gj$h...@bgtnsc02.worldnet.att.net>, Bob Renninger
<Renn...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>Then it seems you should tell your children the following:
>"I don't think it would be moral for you to be prudent predators, but if
>you intend to act in your own best interests, that's what you should
>do."
I expect my elder son (20) has figured it out for himself--certainly if he
wanted to discuss such issues I would tell him that I do not believe a
policy of always respecting rights follows from rational self interest.
Of course, for some people in some circumstances, such a policy may best
serve their interests, so what advice I gave my son on what action was in
his interest would depend on him and his circumstances.
My younger children have not yet expressed an interest in moral
philosophy, but I expect such questions will arise at some point.
David Friedman
In article <1998022314...@host-32-96-34-3.atl.bellsouth.net>, Bill
Riggins <rig...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
That is not correct. You made an assertion "The moral ~is~ the practical."
Your stipulation was that all parties act in a rational manner. I am happy
to assume that stipulation, for the sake of argument. My question is how
you get from that stipulation to the conclusion that the moral is the
practical--a question you have not answered.
To make it equivalent to my exchange with Jaffo, I would have to be
refusing to accept, for purposes of discussion, the premise that all
parties act in a rational manner. I wasn't.
Bill Riggins
> That is not correct. You made an assertion "The moral ~is~ the practical."
> Your stipulation was that all parties act in a rational manner. I am happy
> to assume that stipulation, for the sake of argument. My question is how
> you get from that stipulation to the conclusion that the moral is the
> practical--a question you have not answered.
That is not correct.
You contested the stipulation David,
with this question:
>> DDfr:
>> Do you identify "act in a rational manner" with
>> "always respect rights?" If so, why?
And if you insist on playing this shell game, I'll be glad to answer
your question: Yes, I do.
And now that you know I do, and you claim to have accepted the
stipulation (of which this answer is a clarification), you don't get to
ask "why".
wbr
Charles Bell
>>>> Rand did not say: "the moral is the practical".
>>>>
Eric Knauer wrote:
>EK> Let me quote another passage from one of her essays that seems to
>EK> support the idea that there is no conflict between the moral and the
>EK> practical:
Rand knew how to use Ockham's razor. If she had meant to set an equivalency
of morality and practicality she would have said, "The moral is the practical"
and not "your impracticable creed [teaches] that the moral and the practical
are opposites" ... and then go on for a very long paragraph about what morality
is not. "The electron is not the opposite of the proton" does not mean "the
electron is the proton." By saying in her later work {For the New
Intellectual): "Pragmatists declared that philosophy must be practical and that
practicality consists of dispensing with all absolute principles and standards
-- that the truth is that which works, [they say that] whatever one wishes to
be true, is true, whatever one wishes to exist, does exist, provided it works
or make one feels better" Rand differentiates what she meant in Galt's Speech
from the truism that "the moral is the practical"
>EK> Correspondence to reality is the standard of value by which one
>EK> estimates a theory. If a theory is inapplicable to reality, by what
>EK> standard can it be estimated a "good"?
Correspondence is a long way from the practical. It may be practical at
certain moment to seek sexual pleasure from a sluttish woman, but a moral
principle that corresponds with reality teaches the long-term efficacy of
courtship and marriage and the dangers of promiscuous and anonymous sex; the
same is also true as guide against predation and criminality. Rand's emphasis
is to teach that no moral code which holds anti-life values as virtuous is
practical for a man's happiness.
>EK> So basically, I'm asking whether it's compatible to accept the moral
>EK> legitimacy of anarcho-capitalism but still maintain that AC is
>EK> impractical. If I remember correctly, you're not sympathetic to AC
>EK> even though you see problems with Rand's concept of voluntary
>EK> taxation.
Rand teaches that there is a lesson in perceiving something as impractical; a
moral code that does teach the impractical as moral is anti-life. It is not so
much that anarchism is to be rejected because it is perceived as impractical,
it is that it needs to be examined for the reasons that it is impractical -- it
is in the nature of man as social being. I think Rand forgets her own advice
when discussing anarchism -- I think she just takes it for granted that anyone
accepting her positive argument for the need for government will necessarily
reject anarchism. Moreover, her argument on taxation is a complete rejection
of her own advice. She accepts mandatory taxation in to-day's moral climate
presumably for practical reasons, rather than examining why voluntary taxation
is impractical. The moral legitimacy of AC and voluntary taxation ought to
be looked at from a different perspective than whether they are practical. It
is that they are impractical that gives one the impetus to examiine them in a
moral perspective to determine why they may be immoral. Likewise, one must also
examine for evidence that a theoretical model for an ideal system is
indeed practical and determine why it is there is no correspondence to reality
when such an ideal system does not appear to be practical. Rand gives us the
constitutional government of the U.S. as evidence for the practical existence
of her ideal government (with exceptions, obviously) and Friedman gives us a
100-year period in medieval Iceland. One has to ask: why do even the Icelanders
not consider anarchism practical?
David Friedman
In article <6ctnnv$6...@bgtnsc02.worldnet.att.net>, Matt Ruff / Lisa Gold
<Storyt...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>Just curious -- and forgive me if you've already answered this on your
>web site -- what becomes of the power-mongers in this scenario? Won't
>these competing enforcement agencies feel a natural impulse to attempt
>to establish a monopoly, perhaps by allying themselves with a
>monopolistic company?
Establishing a monopoly is very hard to do if the efficient size for
production is much smaller than the size of the market.
>To pull a random name out of a hat, let's say Microsoft adds a new
>clause to its contracts saying that in order to get Windows 2095,
>computer dealers have to agree to accept enforcement agency A as their
>official enforcement agency for all business matters...
That is equivalent to a price increase for their product equal to the
difference between the value of A's services (at their price) and of the
dealer's preferred agency's services. Why does MS take its monopoly
profits in that form instead of cash? Note that as A gets bigger and worse
(I am assuming that efficient scalse is substantially smaller than the
size of the market--otherwise we have a natural monopoly problem even
without MS, as I pointed out in _Machinery of Freedom_), the cost of using
it gets larger.
How is this scenario different from a wealthy entrepreneur who simply
subsidizes an enforcement agency to get it bigger? Do we observe
monopolies happening this way in more familiar markets? I think the answer
is no.
David Friedman
In article <1998022403...@host-32-96-38-6.atl.bellsouth.net>, Bill
Riggins <rig...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>> That is not correct. You made an assertion "The moral ~is~ the practical."
>> Your stipulation was that all parties act in a rational manner. I am happy
>> to assume that stipulation, for the sake of argument. My question is how
>> you get from that stipulation to the conclusion that the moral is the
>> practical--a question you have not answered.
>
>That is not correct.
>You contested the stipulation David,
>with this question:
>
>>> DDfr:
>>> Do you identify "act in a rational manner" with
>>> "always respect rights?" If so, why?
Your stipulation was "act in a rational manner." I didn't contest that.
Are you now complaining that I contested a stipualtion you didn't
make--namely that acting in a rational manner implies always respecting
rights?
>And if you insist on playing this shell game, I'll be glad to answer
>your question: Yes, I do.
So your assertion now is "If all parties are rational, and if it is always
rational to respect rights, then the moral is the practical."
It only remains for you to show--or stipulate--that respecting rights is
equivalent to being moral--not only that it is always immoral to violate
rights, but that as long as you respect rights you are acting morally. If
you want to stipulate that too, I have no disagreement with your
claim--but isn't a very interesting one.
Now what point were you trying to make?
Chris Wolf
mau...@mail.com writes:
>> Chris Wolf <cwo...@nwlink.com> wrote:
>> There's also a small chance that my house will catch fire, and
>> immediately threaten the bakery. That's what fire departments are
>> for. Nothing more can be done for such a risk, given our current
>> state of technology, so that comes under the heading of voluntary
>> assumption of risk.
>I don't see a difference in principle between the smoke and the threat of
>fire. Both are objectively harmful to you. Both may be avoided. (Your
>neighbor doesn't have to use his property to operate a bakery -- he could
>just build a big swimming pool on it.) In each case, your neighbor is
>subjecting you to harm (and let's say for the sake of argument that he is
>doing so without your permission).
The smoke actually exists, and is causing real, objective damage. The
threat of fire is merely a potential. I can no more demand that my
neighbor remove his bakery, simply because it might someday catch
fire, than I can demand that airplanes never fly near my house,
because one of them might crash into my house someday.
>There may be a difference in degree.
The difference is potential vs. actual.
Bill Riggins
> >> David Friedman <DD...@best.com>
> >> Your stipulation was that all parties act in a rational manner. I am happy
> >> to assume that stipulation, for the sake of argument. My question is how
> >> you get from that stipulation to the conclusion that the moral is the
> >> practical--a question you have not answered.
> >Bill Riggins <rig...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> >That is not correct.
> >You contested the stipulation David,
> >with this question:
> >
> >>> DDfr:
> >>> Do you identify "act in a rational manner" with
> >>> "always respect rights?" If so, why?
>
> Your stipulation was "act in a rational manner." I didn't contest that.
Yes, you did.
You directly contested the meaning of it.
> Are you now complaining...
Was I complaining??? I must have missed that part. I thought all I was
doing was pointing out the lack of reasoning regarding your response.
> that I contested a stipualtion you didn't
> make--namely that acting in a rational manner implies always respecting
> rights?
You just don't like how I define "rational", which *was* part of the
stipulation. Not my problem.
wbr
Bob Renninger
In article <DDFr-23029...@ddfr.vip.best.com>,
>In article <6ct7gj$h...@bgtnsc02.worldnet.att.net>, Bob Renninger
><Renn...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>
>>Then it seems you should tell your children the following:
>>"I don't think it would be moral for you to be prudent predators, but if
>>you intend to act in your own best interests, that's what you should
>>do."
>
>I expect my elder son (20) has figured it out for himself--certainly if he
>wanted to discuss such issues I would tell him that I do not believe a
>policy of always respecting rights follows from rational self interest.
I didn't really want to bring out too many specifics about your family
in this forum. It would be more fun to compare notes on that subject
the next time we get together face-to-face.
My purpose is to focus the discussion on a situation where one
wants to make very sure that the recommended course of action will
really be in the person's best interest.
>Of course, for some people in some circumstances, such a policy may best
>serve their interests, so what advice I gave my son on what action was in
>his interest would depend on him and his circumstances.
As for my children, I would certainly never tell them to be on the
lookout for situations where they might benefit by harming an innocent
victim. I can't imagine any circumstances where they would be better
off trying to do so. If you can illustrate your point of view with a
specific example, that might advance the discussion. At this level of
abstraction, I don't find it persuasive.
If I may put words in your mouth again, you claim "it cannot be ruled
out that in some specific case prudent predation may give one a net
benefit." This is not a guide for action, and thus is not a moral
principle. To get to a moral principle, you would need something like
"be on the lookout for such cases." But to give someone this advice
clearly negates the values of productivity and benevolence we want to
instill in those we love.
I agree completely that no moral code is going to persuade everybody to
give up violating rights. That's beside the point. We might imagine
some human creature who exists on such a miserable level that he is
incapable of productive activities, and can conceive of no better career
than to be a criminal. But if it were someone close to us, we would be
more likely to banish all such thoughts, and go to any end to instill in
him some flicker of productive humanity to forestall the inevitable
disaster.
mau...@mail.com
Explaining why he is entitled to use force to prevent his neighbor from
blowing carcinogenic smoke onto his property, but not to prevent his neighbor
from subjecting him to the risk of an accidental fire,
Chris Wolf <cwo...@nwlink.com> wrote:
> The smoke actually exists, and is causing real, objective damage. The
> threat of fire is merely a potential. <snip>
> The difference is potential vs. actual.
There's got to be more to it than that. Surely you would be justified in
using force to prevent some harms that are merely potential.
For instance, let's say that instead of operating a bakery, your neighbor
decided to carry around a vial of anthrax in his pocket. The bacteria impose
on you no actual harm as long as the lid stays on. Would you be justified in
using force to prevent him from carrying around a lidded vial? (The vial in
the previous posts was not explicitly lidded, but I got the impression you
were not talking about an open container.)
By the same token, there are many actual harms people should not have the
right to forcibly prevent. Because of all the automobile exhaust I inhale as
I sit on my front porch, I sometimes cough -- and it hurts a little. Should I
have the right to prevent everyone from driving anywhere near my house?
Jim Klein
In <6d07d8$7ir$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com> mau...@mail.com writes:
>Explaining why he is entitled to use force to prevent his neighbor
>from blowing carcinogenic smoke onto his property, but not to prevent
>his neighbor from subjecting him to the risk of an accidental fire,
>
> Chris Wolf <cwo...@nwlink.com> wrote:
>
>>The smoke actually exists, and is causing real, objective damage.
>>The threat of fire is merely a potential. <snip>
>>The difference is potential vs. actual.
>
>There's got to be more to it than that. Surely you would be justified
>in using force to prevent some harms that are merely potential.
You misunderstand. Chris is a man of principle, and ALL principles are
inviolate. Specifically, the principle Chris holds to ethically is,
"That which Chris finds proper and non-threatening is objectively
moral; that which he doesn't is not."
It's the same way he defines words like "emergency" and "militia." A
"militia" is a group of people who don't like the government he does,
and are armed. An "emergency" is a situation where he can't figure out
how to act morally.
>By the same token, there are many actual harms people should not have
>the right to forcibly prevent. Because of all the automobile exhaust
>I inhale as I sit on my front porch, I sometimes cough -- and it hurts
>a little. Should I have the right to prevent everyone from driving
>anywhere near my house?
Obviously, it depends on how close Chris lives to that road!
jk
David Friedman
In article <6cvrrh$4...@bgtnsc01.worldnet.att.net>, Bob Renninger
<Renn...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>As for my children, I would certainly never tell them to be on the
>lookout for situations where they might benefit by harming an innocent
>victim.
1. I wouldn't tell my son that it is in his interest to be "on the look
out for" such situations because I doubt that, in the environment he
currently lives in, they would be common enough for that to be worth
doing.
2. I wouldn't tell him that he *should* be on the lookout for ... because
I don't think rational self interest implies should.
>If I may put words in your mouth again, you claim "it cannot be ruled
>out that in some specific case prudent predation may give one a net
>benefit." This is not a guide for action, and thus is not a moral
>principle. To get to a moral principle, you would need something like
>"be on the lookout for such cases." But to give someone this advice
>clearly negates the values of productivity and benevolence we want to
>instill in those we love.
But I also want to instill rationality in those I love--indeed, a good
deal of my childrearing practice is aimed at doing so. So I feel obliged
to tell them the truth--including the truth about the implications of
different actions.
"It cannot be ruled out that ..." is a true statement. The reason it is
not a guide for action is not that, in my environment, it represents a
possibility but not a terribly likely one, but that action ought not be
guided only by self interest--that, at least, is my view. And have been
lots of environments--the U.S. south in 1840, for example--where it is
quite likely that a policy of selective willingness to violate rights was
in the interest of lots of people. Do you believe that if you were in such
an environment it would be moral to own slaves, or tell your neighbors
when you saw their slaves escaping?
Tim Starr
In article <Pine.SOL.3.96.980223...@marcus.whitman.edu>,
Chris Cathcart <cath...@spamlovers.net> wrote:
>>From: tims...@netcom.com (Tim Starr )
>
>>Chris Cathcart <cath...@spamlovers.net> wrote:
>>>You've been saying that anarchism is the logical implications of the
>>>principle forbidding aggression. What if it turned out through some
>study
>>>of the anarchism issue that a limited government was more conducive to
>>>peace than an anarchist "setup"?
>>
>>"What if it turned out through some study of the genocide issue that a
>>limited genocide policy carried out by the State was less conducive to
>>genocide than abolishing genocide completely?"
>
>Huh? How would some genocide be less conducive to genocide than no
>genocide?
Exactly.
>If I take your analogy literally, you would then be saying that an
>anarchist setup would end up completely abolishing all rights-violations,
>which is obviously false. This is not to say that I am in any way
>convinced that an anarchist society would not have _less_ rights
>violations than a limited government, but your analogous question
>_assumes_ not only that, but that it could get rid of rights-violations
>completely.
The problem is with the presumption that there could be equal or less
rights-violations with a State than without, all else being equal. This is
made clearer by realizing that the State is the institutionalized monopoliza-
tion of aggression.
To say that there could be just as many, or more, rights violations without
any institutionalized monopolization of aggression, is like saying that
there could be just as much genocide without any organized campaign to
exterminate people based upon their race.
Charles Bell
David Friedman wrote:
>DF> "It cannot be ruled out that ..." is a true statement. The reason it
>DF> is not a guide for action is not that, in my environment, it
>DF> represents a possibility but not a terribly likely one, but that
>DF> action ought not be guided only by self interest--that, at least, is
>DF> my view. And have been lots of environments--the U.S. south in 1840,
>DF> for example--where it is quite likely that a policy of selective
>DF> willingness to violate rights was in the interest of lots of people.
You assume a lot when you assume that a rational man in 1840 would know that
negroes had rights as another humans. Negroes were property and the U.S.
government was attempting to degrade property rights by restricting the right
of ownership, just as it did when it has passed civil-rights legislation a
hundred years later. There are still libertarian capitalists who believe in
the primacy of property rights and also that such legislation is a violation of
property rights. What is the difference between the property-rights advocate
of 1840 and the property-rights advocate in 1940 with respect to the black man?
It is perceived by both that it is government and not anything else that has
determined what is or is not a right. A black man is or is not a slave only
because the government says so. A restaurateur must serve a black man only
because the government says so. So says the anarcho-libertarian.
Matt Ruff / Lisa Gold
David Friedman wrote:
>
> In article <6ctnnv$6...@bgtnsc02.worldnet.att.net>, Matt Ruff / Lisa Gold
> <Storyt...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>
> >Just curious -- and forgive me if you've already answered this on your
> >web site -- what becomes of the power-mongers in this scenario? Won't
> >these competing enforcement agencies feel a natural impulse to attempt
> >to establish a monopoly, perhaps by allying themselves with a
> >monopolistic company?
>
> Establishing a monopoly is very hard to do if the efficient size for
> production is much smaller than the size of the market.
I'd imagine establishing a government is very hard, too. But there are
an awful lot of governments around.
> >To pull a random name out of a hat, let's say Microsoft adds a new
> >clause to its contracts saying that in order to get Windows 2095,
> >computer dealers have to agree to accept enforcement agency A as their
> >official enforcement agency for all business matters...
>
> That is equivalent to a price increase for their product equal to the
> difference between the value of A's services (at their price) and of the
> dealer's preferred agency's services. Why does MS take its monopoly
> profits in that form instead of cash?
Because a big enough enforcement agency becomes a de facto government --
in this case, a de facto government that is in bed with Microsoft.
Wouldn't that be worth a lot?
> Note that as A gets bigger and worse
> (I am assuming that efficient scalse is substantially smaller than the
> size of the market--otherwise we have a natural monopoly problem even
> without MS, as I pointed out in _Machinery of Freedom_), the cost of using
> it gets larger.
>
> How is this scenario different from a wealthy entrepreneur who simply
> subsidizes an enforcement agency to get it bigger?
Don't corporations spend enormous sums of money on lobbyists and
campaign contributions? I expect all that bribe money going to
Washington does indeed make the government -- the "enforcement agency"
-- bigger, but that doesn't stop the flow of cash. Even those
entrepreneurs who would rather not engage in corruption have little
choice, for fear that their rivals will be less scrupulous and gain an
unfair advantage over them.
> Do we observe
> monopolies happening this way in more familiar markets?
I guess my own feeling is that the "enforcement" market is not like
other markets, because the advantages that come from dominating it are
so much greater. Control of the law translates into control of *every*
market.
-- Matt Ruff
Chris Wolf
mau...@mail.com writes:
>Explaining why he is entitled to use force to prevent his neighbor from
>blowing carcinogenic smoke onto his property, but not to prevent his neighbor
>from subjecting him to the risk of an accidental fire,
>
> Chris Wolf <cwo...@nwlink.com> wrote:
>
>> The smoke actually exists, and is causing real, objective damage. The
>> threat of fire is merely a potential. <snip>
>> The difference is potential vs. actual.
>There's got to be more to it than that. Surely you would be justified in
>using force to prevent some harms that are merely potential.
True.
>For instance, let's say that instead of operating a bakery, your neighbor
>decided to carry around a vial of anthrax in his pocket. The bacteria impose
>on you no actual harm as long as the lid stays on. Would you be justified in
>using force to prevent him from carrying around a lidded vial?
Yes.
>By the same token, there are many actual harms people should not have the
>right to forcibly prevent. Because of all the automobile exhaust I inhale as
>I sit on my front porch, I sometimes cough -- and it hurts a little. Should I
>have the right to prevent everyone from driving anywhere near my house?
No. All risks, both real and potential, must be subjected to a
cost/benefit analysis. By building homes close to one another, we can
provide housing for many more people. This also increases the risk of
fire, but the benefit far outweighs the risk, so we allow it. By
contrast, carrying around a vial of anthrax poses tremendous risk, for
no benefit. Therefore we prohibit it.
If the only way to have factories was to endure some damaging smoke,
then we would do so, since factories are essential to life. However
we can easily prevent factory smoke, and so we require that it be
done.
Chris Wolf
Jim Klein writes:
>In <6d07d8$7ir$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com> mau...@mail.com writes:
>
>>Explaining why he is entitled to use force to prevent his neighbor
>>from blowing carcinogenic smoke onto his property, but not to prevent
>>his neighbor from subjecting him to the risk of an accidental fire,
>>
>> Chris Wolf <cwo...@nwlink.com> wrote:
>>
>>>The smoke actually exists, and is causing real, objective damage.
>>>The threat of fire is merely a potential. <snip>
>>>The difference is potential vs. actual.
>>There's got to be more to it than that. Surely you would be justified
>>in using force to prevent some harms that are merely potential.
>You misunderstand. Chris is a man of principle, and ALL principles are
>inviolate. Specifically, the principle Chris holds to ethically is,
>"That which Chris finds proper and non-threatening is objectively
>moral; that which he doesn't is not."
See what happens when cousins marry?
Bob Renninger
In article <DDFr-24029...@ddfr.vip.best.com>,
>In article <6cvrrh$4...@bgtnsc01.worldnet.att.net>, Bob Renninger
><Renn...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>
>>As for my children, I would certainly never tell them to be on the
>>lookout for situations where they might benefit by harming an innocent
>>victim.
>
>I don't think rational self interest implies should.
Do you want him to act in his rational self-interest? What other
considerations should he have?
>>If I may put words in your mouth again, you claim "it cannot be ruled
>>out that in some specific case prudent predation may give one a net
>>benefit." This is not a guide for action, and thus is not a moral
>>principle. To get to a moral principle, you would need something like
>>"be on the lookout for such cases." But to give someone this advice
>>clearly negates the values of productivity and benevolence we want to
>>instill in those we love.
>
>But I also want to instill rationality in those I love--indeed, a good
>deal of my childrearing practice is aimed at doing so. So I feel obliged
>to tell them the truth--including the truth about the implications of
>different actions.
I certainly agree.
>"It cannot be ruled out that in some specific case prudent predation may
>give one a net benefit." is a true statement.
It all depends on how you define "net benefit."
> The reason it is
>not a guide for action is not that, in my environment, it represents a
>possibility but not a terribly likely one, but that action ought not be
>guided only by self interest--that, at least, is my view.
What other things do you think should guide action? (I'm surprised that
by now I don't know the answer to this; but there you have it.) You
apparently believe in some form of morality. Your web page even has
some nice arguments about how self-interest leads to virtue.
>And there have been
>lots of environments--the U.S. south in 1840, for example--where it is
>quite likely that a policy of selective willingness to violate rights was
>in the interest of lots of people. Do you believe that if you were in such
>an environment it would be moral to own slaves, or tell your neighbors
>when you saw their slaves escaping?
I am leery about jumping to conclusions about such far-off times. The
institution of slavery was not the responsibility of the individual
slave owners. They should certainly have done whatever they could to
free the slaves they owned, and to speak out against the institution.
I can't unequivocally condemn them for not defying the laws supporting
slavery, and for not wanting to reduce their families to penury by
freeing everyone at once.
Keeping quiet when your neighbor's slaves escaped would be good,
as well as would be keeping quiet when your own escaped.
Jefferson is a case in point, and I can't help feeling that he comes up
a little short in this area, not even arranging to free all his slaves
at the time of his death.
In our time the analogous case would be "working for the government."
Objectivists seem to be able to justify this without blushing too much.
mau...@mail.com
In article <3527a7e4...@news.supernews.com>,
Chris Wolf <cwo...@nwlink.com> wrote:
> All risks, both real and potential, must be subjected to a
> cost/benefit analysis. By building homes close to one another, we can
> provide housing for many more people. This also increases the risk of
> fire, but the benefit far outweighs the risk, so we allow it. By
> contrast, carrying around a vial of anthrax poses tremendous risk, for
> no benefit. Therefore we prohibit it.
Cool: we're getting somewhere. So as I understand you, one is justified in
forcibly preventing others from engaging in activities only if the costs
associated with those activities are greater than the benefits.
I suppose you also want to keep these principles: (1) one ought not initiate
force against others; and (2) one may use retaliatory force in response to
another's initiation of force.
So to reconcile all of the above, we must define "initiation of force" to (a)
include engaging in any activity whose costs exceed its benefits; (b) exclude
engaging in any activity whose benefits exceed its costs; (c) include
forcibly preventing another from engaging in any activity whose benefits
exceed its costs; and (d) exclude forcibly preventing another from engaging
in any activity whose costs exceed its benefits.
Is that correct?
Chris Wolf
mau...@mail.com writes:
>In article <3527a7e4...@news.supernews.com>,
> Chris Wolf <cwo...@nwlink.com> wrote:
>
>> All risks, both real and potential, must be subjected to a
>> cost/benefit analysis. By building homes close to one another, we can
>> provide housing for many more people. This also increases the risk of
>> fire, but the benefit far outweighs the risk, so we allow it. By
>> contrast, carrying around a vial of anthrax poses tremendous risk, for
>> no benefit. Therefore we prohibit it.
>Cool: we're getting somewhere. So as I understand you, one is justified in
>forcibly preventing others from engaging in activities only if the costs
>associated with those activities are greater than the benefits.
>
>I suppose you also want to keep these principles: (1) one ought not initiate
>force against others; and (2) one may use retaliatory force in response to
>another's initiation of force.
Given those qualifications, I would agree. Also, you must insert the
word "risky" in front of the word "activities."
>So to reconcile all of the above, we must define "initiation of force" to (a)
>include engaging in any activity whose costs exceed its benefits; (b) exclude
>engaging in any activity whose benefits exceed its costs; (c) include
>forcibly preventing another from engaging in any activity whose benefits
>exceed its costs; and (d) exclude forcibly preventing another from engaging
>in any activity whose costs exceed its benefits.
>
>Is that correct?
That's getting kinda complicated, and I reserve the right to withdraw
my blessing at any time, but assuming you're talking about risky
activities, I think I could agree to possibly consider that you might
be right under certain selected conditions.