David Friedman's beliefs of moral truth
mark_anth...@my-dejanews.com
...my]
[blah blah moral universe blah blah --- ah, here we go]
mark_anth...@my-dejanews.com: >> Well I read this as a statement only
that humans share the same moral >> outlook. I do not consider this
equivalent to the statement that "morality >> is objective" (as I mentioned
before, and you agreed, agreement does not >> imply correctness).
gsol...@virginia.edu: > And our agreement about physical judgments does
not /imply/ their > correctness. Many physical judgments have been agreed
to, and were wrong. No > doubt, many are agreed to today, and will be found
to be wrong. This is, I > claim, because there is a physical world to be
wrong about. You do not argue > that the physical world is not objective
because our physical judgments, > although in agreement, tell us nothing
because "agreement does not imply > correctness". Why the asymmetry?
Because, as was so aptly pointed out at the very beginning of this thread,
we have experiments to decide when a physical claim is false, and none for
moral claims.
[...] > Mark, I'm going to have to skip the rest of your post, at least for
now. I > have to go back to what I call "real work". I hope that what I
have given > has been responsive, and that what I have left out is not too
damaging to my > argument. If you disagree, I will try to return to it
later.
Well, the rest of that post was about the difference between "we can be
mistaken in our moral judgements" and "we can be mistaken about what our
moral judgements will be". Only the former is equivalent to "morality is
objective". You didn't seem clear on the distinction (but then again, it
could just be language problems between us).
...mark young
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Gordon Sollars
> And our agreement about physical judgments does
>not /imply/ their > correctness. Many physical judgments have been agreed
>to, and were wrong. No > doubt, many are agreed to today, and will be found
>to be wrong. This is, I > claim, because there is a physical world to be
>wrong about. You do not argue > that the physical world is not objective
>because our physical judgments, > although in agreement, tell us nothing
>because "agreement does not imply > correctness". Why the asymmetry?
>
> Because, as was so aptly pointed out at the very beginning of this thread,
> we have experiments to decide when a physical claim is false, and none for
> moral claims.
Physical experiments can give us good reason to accept a claim. But it
would be dogmatic to claim that experiments (of a certain kind) are the only
things that provide good reasons. In any event, we have to decide if the
experiments are good ones, and the meaning of complex experiments is often
highly contested.
> Well, the rest of that post was about the difference between "we can be
> mistaken in our moral judgements" and "we can be mistaken about what our
> moral judgements will be". Only the former is equivalent to "morality is
> objective". You didn't seem clear on the distinction (but then again, it
> could just be language problems between us).
Maybe I should go back and look, but I'm lazy today. OK. "We can be
mistaken in our moral judgments" is equivalent to "morality is objective".
We conclude that you were wrong to break your promise to give me $100. But
you point out to us something we did not know, or some error we made in
reaching our conclusion. So we see that we were mistaken. So morality is
objective.
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu
mark_anth...@my-dejanews.com
>>> You do not argue that the physical world is not objective
>>> because our physical judgments, although in agreement, tell us nothing
>>> because "agreement does not imply correctness". Why the asymmetry?
mark_anth...@my-dejanews.com:
>> Because, as was so aptly pointed out at the very beginning of this thread,
>> we have experiments to decide when a physical claim is false, and none for
>> moral claims.
Gordon Sollars <gsol...@virginia.edu>:
> Physical experiments can give us good reason to accept a claim. But it
> would be dogmatic to claim that experiments (of a certain kind) are the only
> things that provide good reasons. In any event, we have to decide if the
> experiments are good ones, and the meaning of complex experiments is often
> highly contested.
All agreed. Implication: you haven't provided sufficient good reasons of
any other type, either.
>> Well, the rest of that post was about the difference between "we can be
>> mistaken in our moral judgements" and "we can be mistaken about what our
>> moral judgements will be". Only the former is equivalent to "morality is
>> objective". You didn't seem clear on the distinction (but then again, it
>> could just be language problems between us).
> Maybe I should go back and look, but I'm lazy today. OK. "We can be
> mistaken in our moral judgments" is equivalent to "morality is objective".
> We conclude that you were wrong to break your promise to give me $100. But
> you point out to us something we did not know, or some error we made in
> reaching our conclusion. So we see that we were mistaken. So morality is
> objective.
What do you mean "we"? Once again all you are giving me is agreements and
changing minds. I do not agree that you were *mistaken* in your moral
judgement, only that you have changed your mind given new information.
gsol...@virginia.edu
mark_anth...@my-dejanews.com wrote:
> Gordon Sollars <gsol...@virginia.edu>:
> > Physical experiments can give us good reason to accept a claim. But it
> > would be dogmatic to claim that experiments (of a certain kind) are the
> > only
> > things that provide good reasons. In any event, we have to decide if the
> > experiments are good ones, and the meaning of complex experiments is often
> > highly contested.
>
> All agreed. Implication: you haven't provided sufficient good reasons of
> any other type, either.
The good reason I have given (so far) has been that a moral world is the best
explanation for the similarity in moral judgments. You apparently do not find
that a "good enough" good reason.
> > Maybe I should go back and look, but I'm lazy today. OK. "We can be
> > mistaken in our moral judgments" is equivalent to "morality is objective".
> > We conclude that you were wrong to break your promise to give me $100. But
> > you point out to us something we did not know, or some error we made in
> > reaching our conclusion. So we see that we were mistaken. So morality is
> > objective.
>
> What do you mean "we"?
What do you mean? I was taking your two phrases, I think. Substitute
"anyone" for "we" if you like.
> Once again all you are giving me is agreements
Since these play a role in morality, they seem fair game.
> and
> changing minds.
> I do not agree that you were *mistaken* in your moral
> judgement, only that you have changed your mind given new information.
In the example, I thought it was right for you to give me $100. I made the
judgment "Mark ought to give me $100, because he promised me." I "changed my
mind" as you put it, because I now see I made a mistake in thinking that you
ought to pay me $100. May be I should ask you what you mean by being
*mistaken*?
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu
mark_anth...@my-dejanews.com
>> All agreed. Implication: you haven't provided sufficient good reasons of
>> any other type, either.
> The good reason I have given (so far) has been that a moral world is the best
> explanation for the similarity in moral judgments. You apparently do not
> find
> that a "good enough" good reason.
I don't find it a "good reason" at all. And repetition doesn't make it any
better, let alone fudging between objective morality and "objective" moral
conventions.
>> I do not agree that you were *mistaken* in your moral
>> judgement, only that you have changed your mind given new information.
> In the example, I thought it was right for you to give me $100. I made the
> judgment "Mark ought to give me $100, because he promised me." I "changed my
> mind" as you put it, because I now see I made a mistake in thinking that you
> ought to pay me $100. May be I should ask you what you mean by being
> *mistaken*?
You changed your mind because you think you made a mistake---that I can agree
to. But did you actually make a mistake---come to believe something contrary
to the objective moral facts of the matter? I say there are no objective
moral facts, and so there is nothing contrary to "them", and so no way that
your moral judgements (either of them) could have been mistaken. You may
have been mistaken about physical facts---indeed, I don't see why you would
have changed your mind unless you came to believe something different about
the relevent physical facts---but that is not a mistake in moral judgement,
it is a mistake in physical judgement.
...mark young
gsol...@virginia.edu
mark_anth...@my-dejanews.com wrote:
[cut]
> I don't find it a "good reason" at all. And repetition doesn't make it any
> better,
If you see no value at all in the reason, then I am going to have a difficult
time convincing you. I don't wish to imply that I think my task will be easy.
I have said some other things it related posts that might be helpful. I will
try to improve the argument for you, if I can.
> let alone fudging between objective morality and "objective" moral
> conventions.
I am not trying to "fudge" anything. I have been clear what I mean by
"objective" and that I think there is, ultimately, one morality or "correct
moral theory".
> You changed your mind because you think you made a mistake---that I can agree
> to. But did you actually make a mistake---come to believe something contrary
> to the objective moral facts of the matter? I say there are no objective
> moral facts, and so there is nothing contrary to "them", and so no way that
> your moral judgements (either of them) could have been mistaken.
OK. Then my example needs more. My judgment was I you ought to give me $100,
because you promised me you would do so. My belief was that your promise
created an obligation. When I tell you why are wrong, you reply, "Yes, a
promise creates an obligation. But there can be conflicting obligations or
other values. When obligations conflict, it is not clear that the one created
by a particular promise made to you is the one that must be met." I now see
that my reasoning was incorrect. I could not legitimately conclude that you
were wrong because you failed to meet one obligation without knowing more.
Hence I was wrong about a moral judgment.
> You may
> have been mistaken about physical facts---indeed, I don't see why you would
> have changed your mind unless you came to believe something different about
> the relevent physical facts
I hope that this provides some answer.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu
mark_anth...@my-dejanews.com
>> I don't find it a "good reason" at all. And repetition doesn't make it any
>> better,
> If you see no value at all in the reason, then I am going to have a difficult
> time convincing you. I don't wish to imply that I think my task will be
> easy.
> I have said some other things it related posts that might be helpful. I will
> try to improve the argument for you, if I can.
I have been folloowing your debate with Matt. I sometimes think I'll break
in on it, but then I think about how much time I can afford to devote to
Net debates, and restrict myself to the one. Let it suffice to say that I
haven't seen anything over there that would change my mind.
>> let alone fudging between objective morality and "objective" moral
>> conventions.
> I am not trying to "fudge" anything. I have been clear what I mean by
> "objective" and that I think there is, ultimately, one morality or "correct
> moral theory".
You have been clear that you think there is one correct moral theory, and
that you base this conclusion on what you perceive as wide agreement in
basic moral intuitions. But when we (Matt and I) raise objections, your
arguments seem to presuppose that it is the wide agreement *in itself*
that is objective---we can be mistaken about what the moral conventions are
(as Matt and I agree), so that means that morality is objective (where
Matt and I disagree). Your claims that language and etiquette are also
objective make me feel all the more sure that when you claim that morality
is objective you are making a different claim than I would be making if I
said that morality were objective.
Now I would not say that you were fudging if you kept the two issues
clearly separate. But your examples don't make the distinction.
>> You changed your mind because you think you made a mistake---that I can
>> agree to. But did you actually make a mistake---come to believe something
>> contrary to the objective moral facts of the matter? I say there are no
>> objective moral facts, and so there is nothing contrary to "them", and so
>> no way that your moral judgements (either of them) could have been
>> mistaken.
> OK. Then my example needs more.
No, no, no. Pay attention to the counter-claim. I said there are no
objective moral facts, and so no way that your moral judgements can be
*wrong* in any interesting sense. It doesn't matter how much you
elaborate your example, because it doesn't demonstrate the existence of
moral facts, it presupposes it.
> My judgment was I you ought to give me $100,
> because you promised me you would do so. My belief was that your promise
> created an obligation.
This is perfectly conventional: I make a promise, I create a (defeasible)
obligation on myself. How do you *prove* that someone who violates the
convention is anything other than unconventional?
> When I tell you why are wrong, you reply, "Yes, a
> promise creates an obligation. But there can be conflicting obligations or
> other values. When obligations conflict, it is not clear that the one cr
> eated
> by a particular promise made to you is the one that must be met." I now see
> that my reasoning was incorrect. I could not legitimately conclude that you
> were wrong because you failed to meet one obligation without knowing more.
Your initial judgement was that I had violated a moral convention. Your
later judgement was that you had insufficient data to determine whether I
had violated that moral convention. At no point have you shown that the
moral convention is "correct". You haven't even said what it would mean
for that convention to be incorrect.
> Hence I was wrong about a moral judgment.
Actually, your moral judgement was hasty---made without all the physical
facts known.
Note: the statement "This person has violated the prevailing moral
conventions" can be objectively true without "This person has acted
immorally" also being objectively true. If you disagree, then you are a
moral relativist---the prevailing moral conventions determine what is or
is not immoral; changing conventions ==> changing morality, and neither
one more correct than the other.
Have you checked out Mike Huemer's Web site?
http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~owl/
...mark young
Matt Ruff / Lisa Gold
>
> Have you checked out Mike Huemer's Web site?
>
> http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~owl/
I just took a peek at his paper on "The Subjectivist's Dilemma." He's
obviously a bright guy, but I see he makes the common error of
concluding that if morality is not objective (in the sense that Gordon
seems to mean that it is objective), it is meaningless. For myself, I
see no contradiction in (a) believing that "moral truth" is a
socially-created convention while (b) continuing to pass moral
judgments. I believe that English vocabulary and grammar are social
conventions, too, but that doesn't mean I'm a hypocrite to go on writing
and speaking.
-- M. Ruff
Gerardo
It is the difference between:
"I'll stick with this because it works."
and
"This should work because it's right."
The latter call the former unprincipled.
Whatever.
Gerardo
mark_anth...@my-dejanews.com
Matt Ruff / Lisa Gold <Storyt...@worldnet.att.net>:
> I just took a peek at his paper on "The Subjectivist's Dilemma." He's
> obviously a bright guy, but I see he makes the common error of
> concluding that if morality is not objective (in the sense that Gordon
> seems to mean that it is objective), it is meaningless.
Yes, I agree that he is in error. I recommended it because it explains
pretty clearly some stuff that Gordon seems (to me) to be confused about,
and he does it in a way that Gordon wouldn't have to find fault with (since
Michael agrees with him that morality is objective).
> For myself, I
> see no contradiction in (a) believing that "moral truth" is a
> socially-created convention while (b) continuing to pass moral
> judgments. I believe that English vocabulary and grammar are social
> conventions, too, but that doesn't mean I'm a hypocrite to go on writing
> and speaking.
Quite right. Not that Michael sees this as a problem---no one says "'Jim
goed to the store' is *false*" to indicate that it's an ungrammatical
statement. But people do say that "'Hitler was a great man' is false" to
indicate that it's an immoral statement. And, according to Michael,
you can't rationally disagree with someone unless there are objective
facts that would make one of you incorrect. The subjectivist's dilemma
is that he either has to give up his subjectivism or his normal mode of
speech.
What Michael seems to be missing is that subjectivists typically do give
up the modes of speech that imply objective moral facts---or they give up
the beliefs that these modes of speech imply objectivity. What they don't
give up are the normal modes of moral speech ("Hitler was an evil man").
People who believe that there are objective facts will naturally take
these to be statements about objective moral facts, even tho the speaker
means them only as an expression of a valuation.
gsol...@virginia.edu
mark_anth...@my-dejanews.com wrote:
> You have been clear that you think there is one correct moral theory, and
> that you base this conclusion on what you perceive as wide agreement in
> basic moral intuitions. But when we (Matt and I) raise objections, your
> arguments seem to presuppose that it is the wide agreement *in itself*
> that is objective
I take the agreement on moral judgments as /evidence/ that there is a real
moral world with a certain structure, just as I take agreement on physical
judgments as /evidence/ that there is a real physical world with a certain
structure.
Careful analysis of moral judgments may reveal several seemingly incompatible
structures. This situtation is no different from the situation in physics,
where careful analysis has put forward two incompatible and yet highly
confirmed theories, quantum mechanics and general relativity. I do not take
this latter fact as establishing that there are two different physical
universes; similarly, I do not take the former fact as establishing that
there are multiple moral universes. Of course, it may nonetheless be true
that there /are/ multiple universes of /both/ sorts.
> Your claims that language and etiquette are also
> objective make me feel all the more sure that when you claim that morality
> is objective you are making a different claim than I would be making if I
> said that morality were objective.
Perhaps so.
> No, no, no. Pay attention to the counter-claim. I said there are no
> objective moral facts, and so no way that your moral judgements can be
> *wrong* in any interesting sense. It doesn't matter how much you
> elaborate your example, because it doesn't demonstrate the existence of
> moral facts, it presupposes it.
And you are simply presupposing that there are no "moral facts", or moral
judgments that are true. If we are to make any progress we need to put
forward arguments. My example was one such attempt.
>
> > My judgment was I you ought to give me $100,
> > because you promised me you would do so. My belief was that your promise
> > created an obligation.
>
> This is perfectly conventional: I make a promise, I create a (defeasible)
> obligation on myself.
The point of my example was that I had misunderstood this fact about
promising, i.e., that the obligations are defeasible. I came to see that I
had made a mistake.
> How do you *prove* that someone who violates the
> convention is anything other than unconventional?
You seem to mean "mere convention" when you say "convention". Of course he
is being "unconventional" when he violates the convention. The question is
whether he has a well-worked out promising convention that is very different
from ours. I don't think he does. In my example, I made an incorrect
judgment because I was wrong about promising.
> Your initial judgement was that I had violated a moral convention. Your
> later judgement was that you had insufficient data to determine whether I
> had violated that moral convention.
When I first stated the example I left it open whether I had changed my
judgment because of some new "data" or some new understanding about promising.
You challenged the example on the ground that I had only received new
"information", I believe. You seem to make a hard distinction between "fact"
statements and "value" statements. I do not. It seems to me that my moral
judgment can turn out to be wrong for a variety of reasons. When I restated
the example I tried to make it clear that I was mistaken about promising
itself. Of course this is new information to me.
> At no point have you shown that the
> moral convention is "correct".
I came to agree that promises create defeasible obligations. That agreement
is evidence that there are "facts" about promising. What sense of "correct"
are you using?
> > Hence I was wrong about a moral judgment.
>
> Actually, your moral judgement was hasty---made without all the physical
> facts known.
Then /all/ judgments, including judgments about the "real" world, are "hasty"
since /all/ the physical facts are never known. If there is no objective
structure about such judgments, exactly what am I being "hasty" with regard
to?
> If you disagree, then you are a
> moral relativist---the prevailing moral conventions determine what is or
> is not immoral; changing conventions ==> changing morality, and neither
> one more correct than the other.
The issue is whether we have different moral conventions, as opposed to, say,
disagreements because of differences in knowledge.
> Have you checked out Mike Huemer's Web site?
>
Thanks, but I have not. Does he discuss moral realism? If I were seeking a
better worked out set of views than my own, I would read Brink and Sturgeon.
I have explicitly decided /not/ to do this. I am well aware that I may be
reinventing philosophical wheels here, and wheels not as good, but I am doing
this to work out my own views. As such, I am grateful for your comments.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu
Matt Ruff / Lisa Gold
>
> I take the agreement on moral judgments as /evidence/ that there is a real
> moral world with a certain structure, just as I take agreement on physical
> judgments as /evidence/ that there is a real physical world with a certain
> structure.
Do you take the belief of a majority of human beings in some form of
Supreme Being as evidence that God exists? What about widespread beliefs
in an afterlife, astrology, and psychic phenomena? Do those count as
evidence?
-- M. Ruff
mark_anth...@my-dejanews.com
>> You have been clear that you think there is one correct moral theory, and
>> that you base this conclusion on what you perceive as wide agreement in
>> basic moral intuitions. But when we (Matt and I) raise objections, your
>> arguments seem to presuppose that it is the wide agreement *in itself*
>> that is objective
> I take the agreement on moral judgments as /evidence/ that there is a real
> moral world with a certain structure, just as I take agreement on physical
> judgments as /evidence/ that there is a real physical world with a certain
> structure.
Just as I said in my first sentence above: one correct moral theory;
agreements on moral judgements. But below you persist in offering arguments
that assume that the agreement itself is what's at issue.
> Careful analysis of moral judgments may reveal several seemingly incompatible
> structures. This situtation is no different from the situation in physics,
> where careful analysis has put forward two incompatible and yet highly
> confirmed theories, quantum mechanics and general relativity[....]
Fine. I have not disagreed with this, nor, so far as I know, has Matt.
>> Your claims that language and etiquette are also
>> objective make me feel all the more sure that when you claim that morality
>> is objective you are making a different claim than I would be making if I
>> said that morality were objective.
> Perhaps so.
But you're not interested in finding out whether this is the case?
(In case you're wondering, this is a tentative inference from observation
(very short response to one issue versus long responses to other issues) to
explanation (not interested in this issue).)
>> No, no, no. Pay attention to the counter-claim. I said there are no
>> objective moral facts, and so no way that your moral judgements can be
>> *wrong* in any interesting sense. It doesn't matter how much you
>> elaborate your example, because it doesn't demonstrate the existence of
>> moral facts, it presupposes it.
> And you are simply presupposing that there are no "moral facts", or moral
> judgments that are true.
No, I'm not. I am stating it without giving supporting arguments, but that
is not nearly the same thing.
> If we are to make any progress we need to put
> forward arguments. My example was one such attempt.
And I was informing you (again) why it was the wrong sort of argument. If
you still think it's the right sort of argument, then you have to explain
why I'm wrong to say that it presupposes what it is meant to show.
>> This is perfectly conventional: I make a promise, I create a (defeasible)
>> obligation on myself.
> The point of my example was that I had misunderstood this fact about
> promising, i.e., that the obligations are defeasible. I came to see that I
> had made a mistake.
You made a mistake about the moral conventions in force, yes. But this in
no way demonstrates that the moral conventions in force are the "correct"
ones (whatever *that* means---you haven't even explained what it would
mean for them to be correct or incorrect).
>> How do you *prove* that someone who violates the
>> convention is anything other than unconventional?
> You seem to mean "mere convention" when you say "convention". Of course he
> is being "unconventional" when he violates the convention. The question is
> whether he has a well-worked out promising convention that is very different
> from ours.
Is that the question? If that is really the question, then I take it that
if he *did* have "a well-worked out promising convention that is very
different from ours" then we would know that morality is non-objective.
In other words, a moral convention is "correct" if and only if it is "well-
worked out".
Is this what you mean to say?
> I don't think he does. In my example, I made an incorrect
> judgment because I was wrong about promising.
Wrong about the conventions in force regarding promises.
>> Your initial judgement was that I had violated a moral convention. Your
>> later judgement was that you had insufficient data to determine whether I
>> had violated that moral convention.
> When I first stated the example I left it open whether I had changed my
> judgment because of some new "data" or some new understanding about promi
> sing.
I mean initial/later in terms of story time, not discussion time. In the
story, you first did X, then you did Y.
[...]
>> At no point have you shown that the
>> moral convention is "correct".
> I came to agree that promises create defeasible obligations. That agreement
> is evidence that there are "facts" about promising. What sense of "correct"
> are you using?
Objectively correct. Correct regardless of what people believe about it.
You have claimed that morality is objective, and made your arguments. I
complain that your arguments only show that moral conventions are
objective---and that your argument only works if you identify morality
with moral conventions. And if you do so, you are what I would call a
moral relativist.
[...]
>> If you disagree, then you are a
>> moral relativist---the prevailing moral conventions determine what is or
>> is not immoral; changing conventions ==> changing morality, and neither
>> one more correct than the other.
> The issue is whether we have different moral conventions, as opposed to, say,
> disagreements because of differences in knowledge.
No, that is not the issue. People can have different moral conventions
even if morality is objective---it's just that (at least) one of those
conventions would be wrong. And people can have identical moral conventions
even if morality is non-objective---it's just that they have nothing more
than an agreement of taste. The issue is something else entirely.
>> Have you checked out Mike Huemer's Web site?
> Thanks, but I have not. Does he discuss moral realism? If I were seeking a
> better worked out set of views than my own, I would read Brink and Sturgeon.
He does discuss moral realism, but he does not explain what his views are.
He explains what all the various possible alternatives are---moral realism,
and the various forms of moral anti-realism. He also explains why he thinks
none of the anti-realist positions can work. You claim to be a moral realist,
but all the arguments you have presented are arguments for a form of moral
relativism.
> I have explicitly decided /not/ to do this. I am well aware that I may be
> reinventing philosophical wheels here, and wheels not as good, but I am doing
> this to work out my own views. As such, I am grateful for your comments.
But you aren't "working out" your views---you are trying to undermine mine.
I have no problem with that, but it's not what you said you were doing.
...mark young
gsol...@virginia.edu
Matt Ruff / Lisa Gold <Storyt...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
> gsol...@virginia.edu wrote:
> >
> > I take the agreement on moral judgments as /evidence/ that there is a real
> > moral world with a certain structure, just as I take agreement on physical
> > judgments as /evidence/ that there is a real physical world with a certain
> > structure.
>
> Do you take the belief of a majority of human beings in some form of
> Supreme Being as evidence that God exists? What about widespread beliefs
> in an afterlife, astrology, and psychic phenomena? Do those count as
> evidence?
Yes, I consider each of these widespread beliefs as /some/ evidence in favor.
How good it is depends on how well it stands up to criticism and other
evidence, the same as for the existence of a moral or physical world. Some
people stipulate that belief in God is a matter of faith, and so can not be
evaluated in a reasonable way. I believe, however, that it is still the
doctrine of the Catholic church that the existence of God can be known "by the
clear light of reason alone", so at least they are theoretically open to
criticism.
I don't think that claims of psychic phenomena have stood up very well to
criticism, e.g., The Amazing Randi has volunteered to duplicate /any/ psychic
feat performed by Uri Geller by "non-psychic" means. On the other hand,
Robert A. Wilson rightly points out that a fake demonstration of Ohm's Law
would not be proof that Ohm's Law was false. I think that Wilson is right to
warn us about possible CSICOP "fascism", but, at the end of the day, my money
is on Randi.
With regard to astrology, I understand that one test has actually provided
some confirmation. This is the so-called "Mars Effect". According to
"standard" astrology, persons born with "Aries rising" should be good
athletes. A study of Olympic athletes revealed that more of them were born
with Aries rising than chance would suggest. I understand that even this
example is disputed, however.
I think that the moral world is in better shape than this.
gsol...@virginia.edu
mark_anth...@my-dejanews.com wrote:
> Just as I said in my first sentence above: one correct moral theory;
> agreements on moral judgements. But below you persist in offering arguments
> that assume that the agreement itself is what's at issue.
I'm not sure what you are referring to; maybe it will be clear when I get to
your later comments. I have been using an analogy with agreement language in
making my argument; perhaps that has been confusing (to me, as well as you).
> > Careful analysis of moral judgments may reveal several seemingly
incompatible
> > structures. This situtation is no different from the situation in physics,
> > where careful analysis has put forward two incompatible and yet highly
> > confirmed theories, quantum mechanics and general relativity[....]
>
> Fine. I have not disagreed with this, nor, so far as I know, has Matt.
Yet the existence of various physical theories, as yet un-unified, is not
taken by you or Matt, I presume, as evidence of multiple physical worlds.
>
> >> Your claims that language and etiquette are also
> >> objective make me feel all the more sure that when you claim that morality
> >> is objective you are making a different claim than I would be making if I
> >> said that morality were objective.
>
> > Perhaps so.
>
> But you're not interested in finding out whether this is the case?
Sorry, I was busy frying my own fish. If you would like to state your
position on what it means for morality to be objective, I would be happy to
provide some feedback. My apologies if I missed an earlier attempt on your
part. I tried in the beginning to be very careful about what I meant by
objective, however, just to avoid problems later on. My overall claim was
that something was objective if I could be wrong about it. Another way to
say this is that I can not have something be just whatever I believe it to
be, simply because I believe it. Perhaps this notion of objectivity is not
interesting to you.
> >> No, no, no. Pay attention to the counter-claim. I said there are no
> >> objective moral facts, and so no way that your moral judgements can be
> >> *wrong* in any interesting sense. It doesn't matter how much you
> >> elaborate your example, because it doesn't demonstrate the existence of
> >> moral facts, it presupposes it.
>
> > And you are simply presupposing that there are no "moral facts", or moral
> > judgments that are true.
>
> No, I'm not. I am stating it without giving supporting arguments, but that
> is not nearly the same thing.
Sorry. Let's back up, then. Why do you say that there are no objective moral
facts, or, as I prefer to say, no moral judgments that are true.
> > If we are to make any progress we need to put
> > forward arguments. My example was one such attempt.
>
> And I was informing you (again) why it was the wrong sort of argument. If
> you still think it's the right sort of argument, then you have to explain
> why I'm wrong to say that it presupposes what it is meant to show.
It does not simply presuppose what it is meant to show, because, in the
example, I come to see that I was wrong. You point out to me that the best
way to understand promises is not, as I had thought, to view them as creating
non- defeasible obligations. If I had not been wrong about it, that would
have been evidence that there was nothing objective about promising.
Let me try this another way. I am not trying to /prove/ that there is a
moral world, any more that I would try to /prove/ that there is a physical
world. Proofs proceed from axioms (or other theorems) as starting points. I
don't see what axioms are of any help in proving the existence of a physical
or a moral world. We can make conjectures and test them; that's the best I
think that we can do.
> > The point of my example was that I had misunderstood this fact about
> > promising, i.e., that the obligations are defeasible. I came to see that I
> > had made a mistake.
>
> You made a mistake about the moral conventions in force, yes.
I would describe it as saying that I made a mistake about the convention of
promising. You apparently take my mistaken view of promising as being another
promising convention. But it was not; it was a misunderstanding of promising.
> But this in
> no way demonstrates that the moral conventions in force are the "correct"
> ones (whatever *that* means---you haven't even explained what it would
> mean for them to be correct or incorrect).
But my view is that there is one promising convention, so I don't know what it
would mean for it to be "incorrect". People may differ over the details of
promising, of course, but it seems to me that these differences reflect
different knowledge bases, and are, in principle, amenable to settlement by
reasons.
> > You seem to mean "mere convention" when you say "convention". Of course he
> > is being "unconventional" when he violates the convention. The question is
> > whether he has a well-worked out promising convention that is very diff
> > erent
> > from ours.
>
> Is that the question? If that is really the question, then I take it that
> if he *did* have "a well-worked out promising convention that is very
> different from ours" then we would know that morality is non-objective.
Yes. But I am not simply interested in what he says or claims about "his"
convention.
> > I don't think he does. In my example, I made an incorrect
> > judgment because I was wrong about promising.
>
> Wrong about the conventions in force regarding promises.
Wrong about the correct way to think about promises, i.e., as creating
defeasible obligations.
> >> At no point have you shown that the
> >> moral convention is "correct".
>
> > I came to agree that promises create defeasible obligations. That agre
> > ement
> > is evidence that there are "facts" about promising. What sense of "cor
> > rect"
> > are you using?
>
> Objectively correct. Correct regardless of what people believe about it.
But that is exactly what happened. I believed that the obligations were not
defeasible, but, in fact, they are. My belief about promising was wrong, and
I came to see that.
> You have claimed that morality is objective, and made your arguments. I
> complain that your arguments only show that moral conventions are
> objective---and that your argument only works if you identify morality
> with moral conventions. And if you do so, you are what I would call a
> moral relativist.
Perhaps, then, I am an objective moral relativist. I don't mind being called
a relativist, as long as you don't think that that commits me to the view
that I can have any sort of moral conventions that I want, because I don't
believe that. Or that you can either.
> [...]
> >> If you disagree, then you are a
> >> moral relativist---the prevailing moral conventions determine what is or
> >> is not immoral; changing conventions ==> changing morality, and neither
> >> one more correct than the other.
What have been the major changes in the convention of promising?
>
> > The issue is whether we have different moral conventions, as opposed to,
say,
> > disagreements because of differences in knowledge.
>
> No, that is not the issue. People can have different moral conventions
> even if morality is objective---it's just that (at least) one of those
> conventions would be wrong. And people can have identical moral conventions
> even if morality is non-objective---it's just that they have nothing more
> than an agreement of taste. The issue is something else entirely.
You are assuming that the only reason for the agreement is taste. This is why
I used the broccoli/cauliflower example with Matt. If you say "I like
broccoli" that is a matter (I will assume) you can not be wrong about. It is
not objective in the sense I have been using. But if you say "I like
broccoli, because I like the taste", you may be wrong (since it may, in fact,
be the chewing texture of broccoli that you enjoy) about that. It is
objective.
There is more than taste involved in at least some moral judgments, even if
your assessment of the value of broccoli /is/ purely subjective. This is what
I was trying to point out with the promising example.
> >> Have you checked out Mike Huemer's Web site?
>
> > Thanks, but I have not. Does he discuss moral realism? If I were seek
> > ing a
> > better worked out set of views than my own, I would read Brink and Stur
> > geon.
>
> He does discuss moral realism, but he does not explain what his views are.
Ah, then he is being a good philosopher. ;-)
> He explains what all the various possible alternatives are---moral realism,
> and the various forms of moral anti-realism. He also explains why he thinks
> none of the anti-realist positions can work. You claim to be a moral rea
> list,
> but all the arguments you have presented are arguments for a form of moral
> relativism.
Probably because I have been influenced by reading Gilbert Harman, who
considers himself a moral relativist. He might be wrong, however. ;-)
> > I have explicitly decided /not/ to do this. I am well aware that I may be
> > reinventing philosophical wheels here, and wheels not as good, but I am
doing
> > this to work out my own views. As such, I am grateful for your comments.
>
> But you aren't "working out" your views---you are trying to undermine mine.
> I have no problem with that, but it's not what you said you were doing.
I'm not clear on exactly what your views are, so I am not intentionally
campaigning against them. I suppose that any time we put forward one view, we
"undermine" another. The question is whether we have good reasons for what we
believe. Perhaps neither of us do.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu
mark_anth...@my-dejanews.com
>>>> Your claims that language and etiquette are also
>>>> objective make me feel all the more sure that when you claim that
>>>> morality is objective you are making a different claim than I would
>>>> be making if I said that morality were objective.
gsol...@virginia.edu:
>>> Perhaps so.
>> But you're not interested in finding out whether this is the case?
> Sorry, I was busy frying my own fish. If you would like to state your
> position on what it means for morality to be objective, I would be happy to
> provide some feedback. My apologies if I missed an earlier attempt on
> your part. I tried in the beginning to be very careful about what I meant
> by objective, however, just to avoid problems later on. My overall claim
> was that something was objective if I could be wrong about it. Another way
> to say this is that I can not have something be just whatever I believe it
> to be, simply because I believe it. Perhaps this notion of objectivity is
> not interesting to you.
You can be wrong about what the conventions are. You can be wrong about
which conventions apply. Conventions are objective. If you identify
moral conventions with morality, then you are a moral relativist.
Do you identify moral conventions with morality?
>> No, I'm not. I am stating it without giving supporting arguments, but that
>> is not nearly the same thing.
> Sorry. Let's back up, then. Why do you say that there are no objective
> moral
> facts, or, as I prefer to say, no moral judgments that are true.
I would only agree to "there are ... no moral judgements that are true" if
you stipulate that truth for moral judgements is not *simply* conformity
with prevailing moral norms. Given that, the reason I don't believe that
there are moral facts is that no one has been able to adequately explain
what it would mean for a moral claim to be false.
On the other hand, if the truth of moral claims is to be determined
relative to prevailing moral norms, then I would accept that there are
moral facts.
>> And I was informing you (again) why it was the wrong sort of argument. If
>> you still think it's the right sort of argument, then you have to explain
>> why I'm wrong to say that it presupposes what it is meant to show.
> It does not simply presuppose what it is meant to show, because, in the
> example, I come to see that I was wrong.
You came to change your mind---you accepted that the social norm was not
what you thought it was. This only counts as an error of moral judgement
if morality is the prevailing set of norms.
> You point out to me that the best
> way to understand promises is not, as I had thought, to view them as creating
> non- defeasible obligations. If I had not been wrong about it, that would
> have been evidence that there was nothing objective about promising.
Something objective about the norms surrounding promises.
> Let me try this another way. I am not trying to /prove/ that there is a
> moral world, any more that I would try to /prove/ that there is a physical
> world. Proofs proceed from axioms (or other theorems) as starting points. I
> don't see what axioms are of any help in proving the existence of a physical
> or a moral world. We can make conjectures and test them; that's the best I
> think that we can do.
Excellent. That, of course, is what we were looking for when this thread
started: *tests* of moral conjectures. So, explain again how it is you
test the moral conjecture "torturing children for fun is wrong"? As I
recall, the only test you offered so far was a popularity contest: do
people agree with it or not? That is inadequate for reasons that have been
explained many times.
>> You made a mistake about the moral conventions in force, yes.
> I would describe it as saying that I made a mistake about the convention of
> promising. You apparently take my mistaken view of promising as being an
> other
> promising convention. But it was not; it was a misunderstanding of promi
> sing.
No, it's not another promising convention---conventions must be shared.
You made a mistake about what the convention was. The only way you can
deduce a moral mistake from this is if you identify morality with the
prevailing moral conventions.
>> But this in
>> no way demonstrates that the moral conventions in force are the "correct"
>> ones (whatever *that* means---you haven't even explained what it would
>> mean for them to be correct or incorrect).
> But my view is that there is one promising convention, so I don't know wh
> at it
> would mean for it to be "incorrect". People may differ over the details of
> promising, of course, but it seems to me that these differences reflect
> different knowledge bases, and are, in principle, amenable to settlement by
> reasons.
There may only be one promising convention here and now, but there may be
others in other times and places. If two conventions differ, how do we
tell which one is correct?
>>> You seem to mean "mere convention" when you say "convention". Of course
>>> he is being "unconventional" when he violates the convention. The
>>> question is whether he has a well-worked out promising convention that
>>> is very different from ours.
>> Is that the question? If that is really the question, then I take it that
>> if he *did* have "a well-worked out promising convention that is very
>> different from ours" then we would know that morality is non-objective.
> Yes. But I am not simply interested in what he says or claims about "his"
> convention.
So you are saying that there are no, and there have never been, *any* well-
worked out moral conventions that differ from our own???
>>> I came to agree that promises create defeasible obligations. That
>>> agreement is evidence that there are "facts" about promising. What
>>> sense of "correct" are you using?
>> Objectively correct. Correct regardless of what people believe about it.
> But that is exactly what happened. I believed that the obligations were not
> defeasible, but, in fact, they are. My belief about promising was wrong, and
> I came to see that.
The belief was wrong because it was at odds with your neighbours' beliefs.
Thus the belief is not wrong "regardless of what people believe about it."
>> You have claimed that morality is objective, and made your arguments. I
>> complain that your arguments only show that moral conventions are
>> objective---and that your argument only works if you identify morality
>> with moral conventions. And if you do so, you are what I would call a
>> moral relativist.
> Perhaps, then, I am an objective moral relativist. I don't mind being called
> a relativist, as long as you don't think that that commits me to the view
> that I can have any sort of moral conventions that I want, because I don't
> believe that. Or that you can either.
Well *you* can't have any moral conventions you want, and *I* can't have
any moral conventions I want, but *we* could have any moral conventions
we want, between ourselves, if we were on a desert island together. Just
as we could have any conventions of etiquette and language we liked.
>>>> If you disagree, then you are a
>>>> moral relativist---the prevailing moral conventions determine what is or
>>>> is not immoral; changing conventions ==> changing morality, and neither
>>>> one more correct than the other.
> What have been the major changes in the convention of promising?
You'd need an historian to answer that question, but I can give some ideas
about what has changed. Consider the defeasibility of promises that we
discussed above. Round about 1064, so they say, Harold Godwinson was
tricked into making an oath to William the Bastard. The details are
vague, and possibly a later Norman invention, but still instructive.
Harold said something along the lines that he'd speak up in favour of
William when it came time for the Witan to pick a new king for England.
This was (and would be) taken as a promise. But what was special was
that William had hidden some holy relics beneath the table that they
were sitting at. After Harold made his promise, William had the table
cloth torn away, and the relics shown to Harold. This changed the promise
to a holy oath, as William had intended and Harold would immediately have
recognized. It remains an oath even if Harold had made his original
"promise" under duress (as he may well have).
These *were* the conventions. You and I would laugh at such a thing. If
the promise was made under duress, then it is no promise. And the presence
of holy relics is entirely irrelevent (or *is* it?). But at the time it
bound Harold to pursuing the course come Hell or high water.
So, how do you prove that our conventions are correct and theirs were wrong?
>> No, that is not the issue. People can have different moral conventions
>> even if morality is objective---it's just that (at least) one of those
>> conventions would be wrong. And people can have identical moral conventions
>> even if morality is non-objective---it's just that they have nothing more
>> than an agreement of taste. The issue is something else entirely.
> You are assuming that the only reason for the agreement is taste.
No, I'm not---it follows from the hypothesis---if there is no objective
basis for the agreement, then the agreement is one of taste (as opposed
to an agreement of fact, which would be the case if your theory is true).
> This is why
> I used the broccoli/cauliflower example with Matt. If you say "I like
> broccoli" that is a matter (I will assume) you can not be wrong about.
But you can be mistaken about that. I have a four year old son, so I know.
What's not objective is "Broccoli tastes good." *That* is subjective.
> It is
> not objective in the sense I have been using. But if you say "I like
> broccoli, because I like the taste", you may be wrong (since it may, in fact,
> be the chewing texture of broccoli that you enjoy) about that. It is
> objective.
> There is more than taste involved in at least some moral judgments,
This is an assertion, not an argument.
> even if
> your assessment of the value of broccoli /is/ purely subjective.
There are objective facts about people's tastes, but that does not make
taste non-subjective. There are objective facts about people's moral
judgements, but that does not make morality non-relative.
> This is what
> I was trying to point out with the promising example.
And I will once again point out that your example does not speak to my
objections. The mere fact that you can find something objective to say
about moral judgements does not imply that the judgements themselves are
objective.
[...]
> The question is whether we have good reasons for what we
> believe.
The question of whether we have good reasons for our beliefs is the
question of justification. The question of truth is separate unless you
hold a justificationist theory of truth ("something is true if we are
justified in saying it", as opposed to a correspondence theory of truth
("what's true is what's real")).
And by the way "That's a good reason" is not objective, it's subjective,
just like "That's a good pie" and, yes, "That's a good man."
...mark young
Gordon G. Sollars
is intruding again, and this topic has the unfortunate property that when
I am thinking about it, I can't get my other work done. I'll try to post
again in a week or so.
In article <73dfjd$vm8$1...@nnrp1.dejanews.com>, writes...
> You can be wrong about what the conventions are. You can be wrong about
> which conventions apply. Conventions are objective. If you identify
> moral conventions with morality, then you are a moral relativist.
It seems possible to me that you are somewhat more interested in labeling
my position than in understanding it. That is not necessarily
unreasonable, because labeling it might /be/ one way of understanding it,
but I'm not sure what the full significance of the label is.
My position is that there is one Big Moral Convention with which various
moral conventions fit more or less well. I attribute the examples of
poor fit to mistakes in reasoning and differences in knowledge, although
it is not uncommon for people to adapt their view of the Big Moral
Convention to match their motivations rather than the other way around.
But I think it is a mistake to believe that the Big Moral Convention
/must/ successfully motivate everyone. Morality gives is a reason for
doing something, but, sadly, not always a reason that actually provides
motivation.
Since there is one such convention, I do not see what, exactly, it is
relative to. I have already granted that if aliens were to arrive who
seemed to make moral judgments that didn't make any sense, I might have
to revise my view. Or I might have a better reason for thinking that the
aliens were talking nonsense. It remains to be seen.
> I would only agree to "there are ... no moral judgements that are true" if
> you stipulate that truth for moral judgements is not *simply* conformity
> with prevailing moral norms.
I think the truth of moral judgments can depend on many things, and
even easily stated moral judgments can depend for their truth on a vast
number of things.
[cut - sorry]
> Excellent. That, of course, is what we were looking for when this thread
> started: *tests* of moral conjectures. So, explain again how it is you
> test the moral conjecture "torturing children for fun is wrong"? As I
> recall, the only test you offered so far was a popularity contest: do
> people agree with it or not? That is inadequate for reasons that have been
> explained many times.
"Torturing small children is wrong" is a judgment, and it is tested by
asking if we have good reason to think it is true or not. It is like
testing the truth of "It is warm outside". Do I have good reasons for
making that judgment? We might have different reasons for thinking the
judgment is correct, and we may disagree over it until we clarify what we
mean by "warm". It is not simply the fact that people might agree that
it is true; it is that they can give reasons why and that these reasons
make a difference.
[cut]
> > But my view is that there is one promising convention, so I don't know wh
> > at it
> > would mean for it to be "incorrect". People may differ over the details of
> > promising, of course, but it seems to me that these differences reflect
> > different knowledge bases, and are, in principle, amenable to settlement by
> > reasons.
>
> There may only be one promising convention here and now, but there may be
> others in other times and places. If two conventions differ, how do we
> tell which one is correct?
We ask which convention is supported by the better reasons. Now it might
be the case that one convention is better in some respect that another,
although not clearly better overall. This happens too with physical
theories such as relativity and quantum mechanics. It is then an
interesting question whether we take this sort of thing as evidence for
distinct "domains" or "worlds". As I have pointed out, you and Matt do
not seem to take this as evidence when the theories are physical, but
you do seem to when they are moral.
However, there is still the /possibility/ that there are better reasons
for one than the other, but we have yet to discover what they are.
> So you are saying that there are no, and there have never been, *any* well-
> worked out moral conventions that differ from our own???
Some moral conventions differ in details, of course. I attribute this,
as I said, to errors in reasoning and differences in knowledge. But
there is an overlap to the conventions that supports judgments like "It
is wrong to harm the innocent".
You apparently attribute the differences to something else. What?
> > But that is exactly what happened. I believed that the obligations wer
> > e not
> > defeasible, but, in fact, they are. My belief about promising was wron
> > g, and
> > I came to see that.
>
> The belief was wrong because it was at odds with your neighbours' beliefs.
> Thus the belief is not wrong "regardless of what people believe about it."
No, in fact, my neighbors, save you, might have all agreed with me about
promising. We all had the wrong idea about it. Aren't we surprised!
But a "non-defeasible obligation" promise convention is not as good as
the promising convention we actually have. It can not be reconciled with
the proper effects of other obligations, once we think about it.
> Well *you* can't have any moral conventions you want, and *I* can't have
> any moral conventions I want, but *we* could have any moral conventions
> we want, between ourselves, if we were on a desert island together. Just
> as we could have any conventions of etiquette and language we liked.
First, we don't actually have /any/ conventions of etiquette and language
we like - we have what we inherited. Note that if conditions during the
first femto-second of the Big Bang had been slightly different, we
wouldn't have the physical laws and constants that we have now.
Second, I don't think that our choices, going forward, are as
unconstrained as you seem to think. I predict, for example, that we
will not have a convention on your desert island that supports the
judgment "Torturing small children is wrong". I predict we won't even
have a convention supporting non-defeasible promises. Now, of course,
you can /claim/ that you are "free" to do otherwise, than no one can stop
you, etc. But that is, I think, irrelevant to what will actually happen.
Third, do you think that on your island we could agree to have any set
of prices for goods that we "wanted"? Or would we face constraints
apart from our beliefs?
{Interesting example about holy oaths and promises cut.]
> These *were* the conventions. You and I would laugh at such a thing.
Perhaps. No more so than I laugh at Aristotle's physics.
> If
> the promise was made under duress, then it is no promise.
Yes. Just one more thing we know about promising. But your example
involved a trick rather than "duress" as I understand it. Of course, a
convention that gives force to promises we are tricked into is defective.
Promises serve to coordinate our future actions. Trickery plays no
useful role in that.
> And the presence
> of holy relics is entirely irrelevent (or *is* it?).
Apparently they /are/ relevant to the swearing of holy oaths, but not to
promises. I have seen many promises made and kept without seeing any
holy relics. Holy oaths, like the gods of the ancient Greeks, just don't
play the role they used to. But perhaps there is only one way to make
them, and that involves the use of holy relics. Is it your claim that
Harold made a promise or a "holy oath"? If it was a promise it was
defeasible; if it was a holy oath, I don't see the relevance of it to the
correct moral theory. Are you claiming that any correct moral theory
would have to include holy oaths?
> But at the time it
> bound Harold to pursuing the course come Hell or high water.
At the time George Washington's physicians bled him, they thought they
were helping him to get better. They were wrong about the value of
bleeding, and Harold was wrong about being bound "Hell or high water".
Both believed they were right, of course.
> So, how do you prove that our conventions are correct and theirs were wrong?
By noting that holy oaths play no role in moral theory, while promising
does. By noting that no reasonable convention of promising can be based
upon trickery or duress, since these defeat the point of promising. The
usual ways I would go about proving anything, I guess. Or by "proof" do
you mean some deductive argument? I don't have a deductive proof, any
more than I have a deductive proof that the universe exists.
> >> No, that is not the issue. People can have different moral conventions
> >> even if morality is objective---it's just that (at least) one of those
> >> conventions would be wrong. And people can have identical moral conve
> >> ntions
> >> even if morality is non-objective---it's just that they have nothing more
> >> than an agreement of taste. The issue is something else entirely.
>
> > You are assuming that the only reason for the agreement is taste.
>
> No, I'm not---it follows from the hypothesis---if there is no objective
> basis for the agreement, then the agreement is one of taste (as opposed
> to an agreement of fact, which would be the case if your theory is true).
What is "the hypothesis" here, except an assumption that you are making?
My claim, of course, is that there /is/ an objective basis for the
agreement. As an initial assumption it is perhaps no better, but
certainly no worse, than yours.
> > This is why
> > I used the broccoli/cauliflower example with Matt. If you say "I like
> > broccoli" that is a matter (I will assume) you can not be wrong about.
>
> But you can be mistaken about that. I have a four year old son, so I know.
I will defer to your greater experience. So both are objective.
>
> What's not objective is "Broccoli tastes good." *That* is subjective.
OK. So you can not be wrong about whether broccoli tastes good, but
you can be wrong about why you like broccoli (and, apparently, you - at
least if you are four years old - can be wrong even about whether you
like broccoli). So some things are subjective and others are objective.
Where does that get us?
> > There is more than taste involved in at least some moral judgments,
>
> This is an assertion, not an argument.
It was indeed an assertion. Supporting that assertion are such facts as
that people can give reasons for their moral judgments, people think that
it is meaningful to argue for these judgments, and they can be mistaken
about the import of their reasons and the validity of their arguments.
Tastes, on the other hand, are not dealt with in the same way. If you
say "Broccoli tastes good", I assume you to mean "Broccoli tastes good to
me". I probably have no reason to dispute that, and no meaningful way to
do so - except perhaps to see if you fail to eat broccoli when you have
the chance. But if you say, "No, I mean broccoli tastes good to
everyone", I think we can easily test that.
[cut]
> And I will once again point out that your example does not speak to my
> objections. The mere fact that you can find something objective to say
> about moral judgements does not imply that the judgements themselves are
> objective.
But I am saying that the /use/, not merely the /mention/, of moral
judgments has something objective about it.
> [...]
> > The question is whether we have good reasons for what we
> > believe.
>
> The question of whether we have good reasons for our beliefs is the
> question of justification. The question of truth is separate unless you
> hold a justificationist theory of truth ("something is true if we are
> justified in saying it", as opposed to a correspondence theory of truth
> ("what's true is what's real")).
I'm going to need a little more from you on what you mean by a
"correspondence theory of truth". (My ideas about correspondence
theories are pretty much based upon what I have read by Karl Popper,
btw.) My problem is that I have no idea what you mean by equating "true"
with "real". What is true (or false) are statements. I don't see what
sense it makes to say "what's true is what's real".
> And by the way "That's a good reason" is not objective, it's subjective,
> just like "That's a good pie" and, yes, "That's a good man."
What makes you think that one can not be wrong about whether a pie is
good? Or are you saying that there are no criteria for determining if a
pie is good? If so, why do people bother to follow recipes when baking?
Consider Rawls's definition of "good":
A is a good x for k means that A has, to a substantial degree, those
properties which it is rational for k to desire in an x, given his life
plans. (This is from memory, and I don't have time to check it.)
To say "A is a good x" involves abstracting in some way from the various
k's. I think we can do that in a way that would allow us to meaningfully
say that some pies are good - have the properties it is rational to
desire in a pie. Now some pies we may be unsure about. And there may be
some people, say the Three Stooges, for whom throwing a pie is much more
important than eating it, but we can understand their situation as a
special case - "That's a good pie." "Not for throwing." "Well, maybe
not. What do you want in a good throwing pie?"
Your skepticism seems extreme. If any reason for belief is acceptable,
then why bother to examine our beliefs or ever revise them?
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu
mark_anth...@my-dejanews.com
> Mark, this is going to be shorter than I would like, but the "real world"
> is intruding again, and this topic has the unfortunate property that when
> I am thinking about it, I can't get my other work done. I'll try to post
> again in a week or so.
Good Lord! How long did you *want* to make this? Unmarked chopping below.
Mark Young:
>> You can be wrong about what the conventions are. You can be wrong about
>> which conventions apply. Conventions are objective. If you identify
>> moral conventions with morality, then you are a moral relativist.
> It seems possible to me that you are somewhat more interested in labeling
> my position than in understanding it. That is not necessarily
> unreasonable, because labeling it might /be/ one way of understanding it,
> but I'm not sure what the full significance of the label is.
I am interested in understanding it. The label is subjective---it's what I
would call someone who has the beliefs I stated. The fact that I use that
label should, however, help you understand whether our problem is with the
nature of morality or with the nature of objectivity.
> My position is that there is one Big Moral Convention with which various
> moral conventions fit more or less well. I attribute the examples of
> poor fit to mistakes in reasoning and differences in knowledge, although
> it is not uncommon for people to adapt their view of the Big Moral
> Convention to match their motivations rather than the other way around.
[...]
> I think the truth of moral judgments can depend on many things, and
> even easily stated moral judgments can depend for their truth on a vast
> number of things.
So the Big Moral Convention is what? Is it a set of rules that can be
applied to real-world situations to generate true moral judgments? Is
it simply the set of true moral judgements? Do you have any idea what
*kind* of a thing it is?
>> Excellent. That, of course, is what we were looking for when this thread
>> started: *tests* of moral conjectures. So, explain again how it is you
>> test the moral conjecture "torturing children for fun is wrong"? As I
>> recall, the only test you offered so far was a popularity contest[....]
> "Torturing small children is wrong" is a judgment, and it is tested by
> asking if we have good reason to think it is true or not. It is like
> testing the truth of "It is warm outside". Do I have good reasons for
> making that judgment?
All very well and good, but what constitutes a "good reason to think it
is true"? In other words, how do we tell a good reason to believe a
moral judgement from a bad one?
> We might have different reasons for thinking the
> judgment is correct, and we may disagree over it until we clarify what we
> mean by "warm". It is not simply the fact that people might agree that
> it is true; it is that they can give reasons why and that these reasons
> make a difference.
The reasons for believing it's warm make a difference as to whether it
*is* warm?
My explanation is that "warm" is a subjective term. There's something
objective underlying it (temperature), but no way to decide in the event
of disagreement who is *wrong*. And it's not a case of us meaning
different things by "warm"---we both mean "having a slightly elevated
temperature".
>> There may only be one promising convention here and now, but there may be
>> others in other times and places. If two conventions differ, how do we
>> tell which one is correct?
> We ask which convention is supported by the better reasons.
But that's not a test of correctness, it's a test of reasonableness.
Consider the question "Did OJ Simpson kill his ex-wife?" Can we really
say that the correct answer to that question depends on what reasons we
have for believing it? Are you trying to say that if we have no reason
at all to believe something, then it is false?
>> So you are saying that there are no, and there have never been, *any* well-
>> worked out moral conventions that differ from our own???
> Some moral conventions differ in details, of course. I attribute this,
> as I said, to errors in reasoning and differences in knowledge. But
> there is an overlap to the conventions that supports judgments like "It
> is wrong to harm the innocent".
> You apparently attribute the differences to something else. What?
Culture.
> But a "non-defeasible obligation" promise convention is not as good as
> the promising convention we actually have. It can not be reconciled with
> the proper effects of other obligations, once we think about it.
Yes it can. Consider this: you cannot have any obligation that conflicts
with a prior obligation. If you appear to take on an obligation that
conflicts with an earlier one, then it is a mere appearance---the only
obligation you have is the prior one.
Now there is no need for defeasible obligations.
>> Well *you* can't have any moral conventions you want, and *I* can't have
>> any moral conventions I want, but *we* could have any moral conventions
>> we want, between ourselves, if we were on a desert island together. Just
>> as we could have any conventions of etiquette and language we liked.
> First, we don't actually have /any/ conventions of etiquette and language
> we like - we have what we inherited.
Bloody red herring. I wasn't talking about the conventions we *do* have.
> Second, I don't think that our choices, going forward, are as
> unconstrained as you seem to think. I predict, for example, that we
> will not have a convention on your desert island that supports the
> judgment "Torturing small children is wrong". I predict we won't even
> have a convention supporting non-defeasible promises. Now, of course,
> you can /claim/ that you are "free" to do otherwise, than no one can stop
> you, etc. But that is, I think, irrelevant to what will actually happen.
"what will actually happen" is irrelevent to what could happen because
"it is a mistake to believe that the Big Moral Convention
/must/ successfully motivate everyone."
> Third, do you think that on your island we could agree to have any set
> of prices for goods that we "wanted"? Or would we face constraints
> apart from our beliefs?
I can't think of any constraints on prices in a two-person model---there
aren't enough people for market forces to take over.
[on promises and oaths]
> Is it your claim that
> Harold made a promise or a "holy oath"?
It is my claim that promises and holy oaths are entirely conventional
things---they are what the conventions say they are. Thus, Harold did
make a holy oath (per the story) by the conventions of the time. It is
also my claim that Harold did *not* make a holy oath by the norms of
our time.
> If it was a promise it was
> defeasible; if it was a holy oath, I don't see the relevance of it to the
> correct moral theory. Are you claiming that any correct moral theory
> would have to include holy oaths?
I'm saying that if there is only one correct moral theory, then it either
includes holy oaths or not. You seem to be claiming here that the BMC
does not include holy oaths. I'd like to know how you came to that
conclusion.
>> So, how do you prove that our conventions are correct and theirs were
>> wrong?
> By noting that holy oaths play no role in moral theory, while promising
> does.
Holy oaths did play a role in the moral theories of late tenth century
Europe, and so play a role in moral theory in general. I assume that
you mean "play no role in CORRECT moral theory".
> By noting that no reasonable convention of promising can be based
> upon trickery or duress, since these defeat the point of promising.
The "point" of promising? They can play a role in the "point of being
promised", which is, after all, to get someone else to do something
you'd like them to do.
> The usual ways I would go about proving anything, I guess.
You'd prove that OJ did not kill Nicole Brown Simpson by noting that
killing can play no role in proper marital relations, perhaps?
> Or by "proof" do
> you mean some deductive argument? I don't have a deductive proof, any
> more than I have a deductive proof that the universe exists.
You've asserted dozens of things about the BMC, and not one of them has
been supported by anything other than your "notes". I want to know how
you got your notes.
>>>> No, that is not the issue. People can have different moral conventions
>>>> even if morality is objective---it's just that (at least) one of those
>>>> conventions would be wrong. And people can have identical moral
>>>> conventions even if morality is non-objective---it's just that they
>>>> have nothing more than an agreement of taste. The issue is something
>>>> else entirely.
>>> You are assuming that the only reason for the agreement is taste.
>> No, I'm not---it follows from the hypothesis---if there is no objective
>> basis for the agreement, then the agreement is one of taste (as opposed
>> to an agreement of fact, which would be the case if your theory is true).
> What is "the hypothesis" here, except an assumption that you are making?
It's the antecedent of a conditional statement.
I said that people can agree even if there is no objective basis for the
agreement---and that that is an example of an agreement of taste. You said
I was assuming that the only reason for the agreement is taste. I wasn't.
I was saying that if there is no objective reason for the agreement, then
it is an agreement of taste. Got it?
>>> There is more than taste involved in at least some moral judgments,
>> This is an assertion, not an argument.
> It was indeed an assertion. Supporting that assertion are such facts as
> that people can give reasons for their moral judgments,
Yup.
> people think that it is meaningful to argue for these judgments,
Many of them do.
> and they can be mistaken about the import of their reasons
> and the validity of their arguments.
Yup, but only relative to a shared moral scheme.
> Tastes, on the other hand, are not dealt with in the same way. If you
> say "Broccoli tastes good", I assume you to mean "Broccoli tastes good to
> me".
And if you say "Torturing innocents is wrong", *I* assume that you mean
that you disapprove of torturing innocents, and that you further
disapprove of people who do not disapprove of torturing innocents.
> I probably have no reason to dispute that, and no meaningful way to
> do so - except perhaps to see if you fail to eat broccoli when you have
> the chance.
Which might lead you to believe that I was mistaken. What evidence can we
bring up to tell whether you were mistaken when you said "Torturing
innocents is wrong".
>> And I will once again point out that your example does not speak to my
>> objections. The mere fact that you can find something objective to say
>> about moral judgements does not imply that the judgements themselves are
>> objective.
> But I am saying that the /use/, not merely the /mention/, of moral
> judgments has something objective about it.
I have no idea what that means.
>> The question of whether we have good reasons for our beliefs is the
>> question of justification. The question of truth is separate unless you
>> hold a justificationist theory of truth ("something is true if we are
>> justified in saying it", as opposed to a correspondence theory of truth
>> ("what's true is what's real")).
> I'm going to need a little more from you on what you mean by a
> "correspondence theory of truth". (My ideas about correspondence
> theories are pretty much based upon what I have read by Karl Popper,
> btw.) My problem is that I have no idea what you mean by equating "true"
> with "real". What is true (or false) are statements. I don't see what
> sense it makes to say "what's true is what's real".
Fair enough. Try "What's true is what accurately describes what's real."
>> And by the way "That's a good reason" is not objective, it's subjective,
>> just like "That's a good pie" and, yes, "That's a good man."
> What makes you think that one can not be wrong about whether a pie is
> good? Or are you saying that there are no criteria for determining if a
> pie is good? If so, why do people bother to follow recipes when baking?
The follow the recipe in the hope that it will result in them having
something they'd like to eat (or that others will pay to eat, or
whatever). The criteria for deciding whether a pie is good (in the sense
"tasty", as I intended it above) is purely subjective---does the person
tasting it enjoy the taste?
The "That's a good man" was meant as a moral evaluation of a person.
The "That's a good reason" was meant in what I take you to have been
meaning it: the reason is such that we are justified in taking on the
belief it is for.
> Consider Rawls's definition of "good":
> A is a good x for k means that A has, to a substantial degree, those
> properties which it is rational for k to desire in an x, given his life
> plans. (This is from memory, and I don't have time to check it.)
> To say "A is a good x" involves abstracting in some way from the various
> k's. I think we can do that in a way that would allow us to meaningfully
> say that some pies are good - have the properties it is rational to
> desire in a pie. Now some pies we may be unsure about. And there may be
> some people, say the Three Stooges, for whom throwing a pie is much more
> important than eating it, but we can understand their situation as a
> special case - "That's a good pie." "Not for throwing." "Well, maybe
> not. What do you want in a good throwing pie?"
And thus we can tell that goodness is relative to purpose. The mere fact
that there is a convention saying what purpose an unspecified good is
relative to (indexed by the object being described as good) in no way makes
the goodness objective.
> Your skepticism seems extreme. If any reason for belief is acceptable,
> then why bother to examine our beliefs or ever revise them?
Acceptable to WHOM??? That's the question.