Rationality and Objectivity
Ken Gardner
Has anyone, especially advanced Objectivists , thought about the
difference, if any, between rationality (in the sense described in Galt's
speech, i.e. identify and integrate the material provided by your senses)
and objectivity in the sense described in detail in Chapter 4 of OPAR?
Do they refer to the same method of thinking, i.e. are these two terms
interchangeable? If they are different, in what respect are they
different?
To get this started, I'll name one APPARENT difference -- the description
of objectivity in Chapter 4 of OPAR is much more detailed and specific
than the description of thinking in Galt's speech or in the paragraph
describing "conceptualizing" in Rand's essay The Objectivist Ethics. For
example, Peikoff spends a great deal of time in OPAR discussing
integration and reduction as volitional steps of proper thought. As far
as I know, Rand's writings barely mention either of these steps as part
of a process of thought, and certainly not in the systematic way that
Peikoff treats these subjects.
Ken
Stephen Speicher
>
> Has anyone, especially advanced Objectivists , thought about the
> difference, if any, between rationality (in the sense described in Galt's
> speech, i.e. identify and integrate the material provided by your senses)
> and objectivity in the sense described in detail in Chapter 4 of OPAR?
> Do they refer to the same method of thinking, i.e. are these two terms
> interchangeable? If they are different, in what respect are they
> different?
>
Rationality being the virtue of recognizing and accepting reason,
I assume you are really asking about the difference between
objectivity and reason.
Reason refers, in essence, to a volitional faculty of awareness,
whereas objectivity is an orientation, a relationship between
that consciousness and reality.
Stephen
s...@compbio.caltech.edu
You can always tell a pioneer by the arrows in his back.
Printed using 100% recycled electrons.
--------------------------------------------------------
Ken Gardner
> Rationality being the virtue of recognizing and accepting reason,
> I assume you are really asking about the difference between
> objectivity and reason.
> Reason refers, in essence, to a volitional faculty of awareness,
> whereas objectivity is an orientation, a relationship between
> that consciousness and reality.
I was thinking more in terms of reason being the faculty that identifies
and integrates the material provided by the senses, rationality being the
act of exercising reason (i.e. actually identifying and integrating this
material), objectivity being volitional adherence to reality by the
method of logic -- and wondering whether rationality and objectivity, as
defined here, were essentially the same or essentially different in some
respect.
In this regard, I don't see how one can be rational without also being
objective, or be objective without also being rational, so what, if
anything, is the difference between the two? What is the difference, if
any, between volitionally exercising reason and volitionally striving to
be objective?
Ken
Stephen Speicher
> Stephen Speicher says...
>
> > Rationality being the virtue of recognizing and accepting reason,
> > I assume you are really asking about the difference between
> > objectivity and reason.
>
> > Reason refers, in essence, to a volitional faculty of awareness,
> > whereas objectivity is an orientation, a relationship between
> > that consciousness and reality.
>
> I was thinking more in terms of reason being the faculty that identifies
> and integrates the material provided by the senses, rationality being the
> act of exercising reason (i.e. actually identifying and integrating this
> material), objectivity being volitional adherence to reality by the
> method of logic -- and wondering whether rationality and objectivity, as
> defined here, were essentially the same or essentially different in some
> respect.
>
It is still the same issue, just formed as an active process.
Whereas rationality is the adherence to reason, being objective
is adhering to reality by establishing the proper relationship
between consciousness and existence.
Note the full form of Peikoff's words here.
"To be 'objective' in one's conceptual activities is
volitionally to adhere to reality by following certain
rules of method, a method based on facts _and_
appropriate to man's form of cognition."
> In this regard, I don't see how one can be rational without also being
> objective, or be objective without also being rational, so what, if
> anything, is the difference between the two?
In this regard, then, let me ask: Do you think someone who holds
universals as being inherent in objects is incapable of being
rational, simply by virtue of holding an intrinsic view of
reality, as opposed to the objective view of Objectivism?
> What is the difference, if
> any, between volitionally exercising reason and volitionally striving to
> be objective?
>
It is a matter of what aspects you are foused on. Rationality
focuses on accepting reason as your sole source of knowledge,
whereas being objective focuses on that cognitive faculty _and_
its relationship to existence.
mdhjwh
Objectivity is useful , especially the distinction you make between
'active process.' and 'proper relationship'
However I have no understanding of what is implied in your quote
from Piekoff when he says ' - - appropriate to man's form of cognition."<
John H
Jim Klein
"To be 'objective' in one's conceptual activities is
volitionally to adhere to reality by following certain
rules of method, a method based on facts _and_
appropriate to man's form of cognition."
In article <3896D575...@ozemail.com.au>,
mdhjwh <mdh...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
>However I have no understanding of what is implied in your quote
>from Piekoff when he says ' - - appropriate to man's form of cognition."
Damn...that's the part of the sentence that makes sense! I believe he's
saying that among the facts of reality to which we ought to adhere, is the
nature of our cognition. I guess it could be slightly improved by saying,
"...a method based on facts, the nature of our cognition being among those
facts." The "is" is the nature of our cognition; the "ought" is acting
appropriately with regard to that.
The more important oversight--error really--is implying that somehow there's
a distinction between "adhere to reality" and "following certain rules of
method." This is a clue to the ARIan (nee Peikovian) philosophy; the clear
implication is that we have a certain process (RULES of method, yet) which
yield certain results (adherence to reality).
This is a false dichotomy, and it can be shown from either direction.
"Adhering to reality" MEANS "following certain rules of method" (though
they're not really rules). The so-called rules of method are themselves an
identification, and so arise by adherence to reality.
The point not so hidden in here--and wrong as wrong could be--is that there
are some intrinsic "rules" floating around out there, and that mere
awareness of those rules will somehow cause "adherence to reality" to
happen. That's what the preposition "by" means...do the second and the
first will happen; follow the rules of rules of method and adherence to
reality will happen.
The likely retort is that Peikoff is just trying to describe an accurate
principle. Problem is, that dodge fails. To the degree the two actions are
different, Peikoff has the causality reversed; the truth is precisely the
opposite of what he says. Principles are formed _up_ and the rules of
method are a species of principle. Adherence to reality is the action; the
"rules" are the result. You don't get adherence to reality by following the
rules of method (which is _exactly_ what he asserts); you get the rules of
method by adhering to reality.
As always...the more fundamental the point, the greater the inversion.
What's really amazing to me is how many otherwise rational folks have bought
into this. Like, "Go out and find the rules; then you'll know that you've
adhered to reality."
And notice that this is _precisely_ what the followers of that bizarro
philosophy proclaim that they've done.
jk
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Stephen Speicher wrote:
>
> On 1 Feb 2000, Ken Gardner wrote:
>
> >
> > Has anyone, especially advanced Objectivists , thought about the
> > difference, if any, between rationality (in the sense described in Galt's
> > speech, i.e. identify and integrate the material provided by your senses)
> > and objectivity in the sense described in detail in Chapter 4 of OPAR?
> > Do they refer to the same method of thinking, i.e. are these two terms
> > interchangeable? If they are different, in what respect are they
> > different?
> >
>
> Rationality being the virtue of recognizing and accepting reason,
> I assume you are really asking about the difference between
> objectivity and reason.
>
But what if one's view of what reason amounts to is itself mistaken?
Is 'being rational' as simple as deciding that is what one wants to be?
Haven't all humans in one way or another construed themselves as rational?
--
Phil Roberts, Jr.
The Psychodynamics of Genetic Indeterminism:
Why We Turned Out Like Captain Kirk Instead of Mr. Spock
http://www.fortunecity.com/victorian/dada/90/
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Stephen Speicher wrote:
>
>
> It is still the same issue, just formed as an active process.
> Whereas rationality is the adherence to reason, being objective
> is adhering to reality by establishing the proper relationship
> between consciousness and existence.
>
I have a somewhat different take on these terms and am curious as
to what would be an objectivist critique of my view.
I assume the term 'rationality' DENOTES 'the psychical
product of reasoning', including, not only the product
of one's own reasoning, but of one's culture as well.
I assume the term 'rationality' CONNOTES 'the extent to which
this psychical product serves to maximize one's mental occularity'
or the extent to which one is 'being objective', at least when it
is employed in a valuative sense to praise or impune a person's
rationality.
IOW, I assume that 'being rational' is simply a matter of 'being
able to "see" what is going on' or, less metaphorically, of
'being objective'. This seems to me to be quite similar to
what Ken is proposing in that I am supposing that the extent to
which one is 'being rational' can be said to CORRELATE with the
extent to which one is 'being objective'. Am I off the beam?
Kyle Haight
Ken Gardner <ke...@dallas.net> wrote:
>
>In this regard, I don't see how one can be rational without also being
>objective, or be objective without also being rational, so what, if
>be objective?
You might want to check out Tara Smith's lecture course on
"Rationality and Objectivity". It's been a while since I listened to
it, but I do remember there was a discussion of the above question.
It's about fifty bucks from Second Renaissance.
--
Kyle Haight
kha...@netcom.com
"Feeding on the blood of the working classes for fun and profit."
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Jim Klein wrote:
>
> The point not so hidden in here--and wrong as wrong could be--is that there
> are some intrinsic "rules" floating around out there, and that mere
> awareness of those rules will somehow cause "adherence to reality" to
> happen. That's what the preposition "by" means...do the second and the
> first will happen; follow the rules of rules of method and adherence to
> reality will happen.
>
Also, I believe that the endeavor to reduce reasoning to rules has been
proven to be impossible by Godel. Or am I mistaken?
Owl
news:MPG.130032903...@news.dallas.net...
> Has anyone, especially advanced Objectivists , thought about the
> difference, if any, between rationality (in the sense described in
Galt's
> speech, i.e. identify and integrate the material provided by your
senses)
> and objectivity in the sense described in detail in Chapter 4 of OPAR?
> Do they refer to the same method of thinking, i.e. are these two terms
> interchangeable? If they are different, in what respect are they
> different?
I think of objectivity as just one part of rationality. Examples:
1. A person encounters evidence that his favorite theory of physics is
wrong. He dismisses the evidence blithely because he refuses to believe
the physics establishment could have been wrong for 50 years. (This is a
purely hypothetical example, of course.) This is an example of not being
objective, and so also of being irrational.
2. A person is given a choice between $100 and $50, and decides to take
the 50. This is an example of being irrational, but not (or not
necessarily) of being non-objective.
Stephen Speicher
> Your explication of the significant differences between rationality and
> Objectivity is useful , especially the distinction you make between
> 'active process.' and 'proper relationship'
> However I have no understanding of what is implied in your quote
> from Piekoff when he says ' - - appropriate to man's form of cognition."<
>
Dr. Peikoff is referring to all that which is concomitant with
reason. If you read Chapter 4 of OPAR, Peikoff offers there a
full sense of the meaning of objectivity in the philosophy of
Objectivism.
Owl
news:38971CD9...@ix.netcom.com...
> Haven't all humans in one way or another construed themselves as
rational?
Not by a long shot. In fact, look at your sig:
> The Psychodynamics of Genetic Indeterminism:
> Why We Turned Out Like Captain Kirk Instead of Mr. Spock
> http://www.fortunecity.com/victorian/dada/90/
Even you don't construe humans as being generally rational, do you?
There have been plenty of confessed advocates of 'faith' or 'feeling'.
mdhjwh
Owl wrote:>He dismisses the evidence blithely because he refuses to believe
the physics establishment could have been wrong for 50 years. (This is a
purely hypothetical example, of course.) <
You may think it purely hypothetical , however , the priests in white lab
coats blithely indulge in this behavior on a consistent basis .
The thread on h.p.o ' TEW and everyone else'. refers.
Distinctions made here between rationality and the'objective'
have me wondering what , if any , the role of formal logic may have in
relation to this discussion.
Surely, for any philosophy to be proven consistently 'rational' or
"objective',
the bare minimum must be a logically consistent process?
John H
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Owl wrote:
>
> I think of objectivity as just one part of rationality. Examples:
> 1. A person encounters evidence that his favorite theory of physics is
> wrong. He dismisses the evidence blithely because he refuses to believe
> the physics establishment could have been wrong for 50 years. (This is a
> purely hypothetical example, of course.) This is an example of not being
> objective, and so also of being irrational.
But only in a qualified sense, I believe.
a. he is probably not so much irrational as less rational than
the norm or what he might be (assuming rationality can not be
formalized and therefore must always be a matter of COMPARATIVE
ASCRIPTIONS).
b. he is only less rational to the extent that his presribed objective
is the maximizing of true belief (e.g., physics) rather than
e.g., avoiding cognitive discomfort.
c. he is only less rational to the extent that you include his lack
of valuative coherence/objectivity with respect to instrumentally
valueing
the means of maximizing true belief, e.g., of not valuing methods
or evidence one "ought" to value to achieve the prescribed end.
d. and I would suppose we might include his lack of objectivity
regarding his own capacity for being rational, which I believe
is probably the most significant problem I currently have with
objectivist philosophy.
> 2. A person is given a choice between $100 and $50, and decides to take
> the 50. This is an example of being irrational, but not (or not
> necessarily) of being non-objective.
This is an interesting example. Since I am a simplicity fanatic, and
have my heart set on a simple notion in which 'being rational' is
simply a matter of 'being objective', I quess I would argue that
objectivity ENTAILS valuative coherence. Couldn't I argue that
having sex with my bosses' wife in a public restaurant in front
of the whole world entails a lack of valuative objectivity? Wouldn't
your example fall under this same heading?
--
Phil Roberts, Jr.
mdhjwh
"Phil Roberts, Jr." wrote:>(assuming rationality can not be
formalized and therefore must always be a matter of COMPARATIVE
ASCRIPTIONS).<
What is a comparative ascription ? How does one evaluate the validity of
one comparative ascription against another?
John H
>
mshiltonj
clarify some things I've been thinking about for a while but
couldn't quite get my mind around. You're insight helped bring
it into focus. Thanks.
In article <876qjl$t3g$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>, Jim Klein
<rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
<snip>
>The point not so hidden in here--and wrong as wrong could be--
is that there
>are some intrinsic "rules" floating around out there, and that
mere
>awareness of those rules will somehow cause "adherence to
reality" to
>happen. That's what the preposition "by" means...do the second
and the
>first will happen; follow the rules of rules of method and
adherence to
>reality will happen.
>
ftb
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M. Steven Hilton, Jr.
mshi...@yahoo.com
* Sent from RemarQ http://www.remarq.com The Internet's Discussion Network *
The fastest and easiest way to search and participate in Usenet - Free!
Phil Roberts, Jr.
mdhjwh wrote:
>
> "Phil Roberts, Jr." wrote:>(assuming rationality can not be
> formalized and therefore must always be a matter of COMPARATIVE
> ASCRIPTIONS).<
> What is a comparative ascription ?
One in which elief/value system X is construed as neither rational
nor irrational, but only more or less so than system Y, the
norm, etc.
BTW, I believe this lack of understanding about the nature
of rationality lies at the heart of the huge controversy surrounding
the Cohen symposium on rationality in the 1981 issue of 'The
Behavioral and Brain Science'. Its title was 'Can Human Irrationality
Be Experimentally Demonstrated', and reading the 50 or so contributors
was an absolute morass of confusion and disagreement. I believe there
is a simple explanation for this confusion, ie., that you can not
meaningfully ask the question, 'Is Human Irrationality Experimentally
Demonstrated', because it presupposes that rationality comes in
two flavors, like logic, rational and irrational, rather than more
or less rational than X. I also believe this conclusion is implicit
in Godel's theorem.
> How does one evaluate the validity of
> one comparative ascription against another?
>
Ah. If I knew the answer to that I could rule the world.
The same way it has always been evaluated, I suppose, but with
the proviso that
conclusions do not have absolute answers, but only comparative ones.
"The same way it has always been evaluated" is, of course, a bit
of a sticky wicket, and I don't have any crystal ball. I'm only
arguing that there are epistemic advantages to questioning our common
sense ascriptions that X is rational or irrational, and assuming that
such common sense ascriptions are either in err, or should be taken
as short hand for X is more or less rational than the norm.
Stephen Speicher
>
> Distinctions made here between rationality and the'objective'
> have me wondering what , if any , the role of formal logic may have in
> relation to this discussion.
> Surely, for any philosophy to be proven consistently 'rational' or
> "objective',
> the bare minimum must be a logically consistent process?
>
I understand, from a number of sources, that in Objectivism logic
comes highly recommended. :)
Adrian
"Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
>
> Jim Klein wrote:
> >
>
> > The point not so hidden in here--and wrong as wrong could be--is
that there
> > are some intrinsic "rules" floating around out there, and that mere
> > awareness of those rules will somehow cause "adherence to reality"
to
> > happen. That's what the preposition "by" means...do the second and
the
> > first will happen; follow the rules of rules of method and
adherence to
> > reality will happen.
> >
>
been
> proven to be impossible by Godel. Or am I mistaken?
>
I don't think so. Actually he proved that propositional calculus is
complete if you are concerned about incompleteness. In fact, when you
combine his completeness theorem with his incompleteness theorem (that
arithmetic and so all of mathematics is incomplete) then you get that
math is not just logic plus some definitions.
> --
>
> Phil Roberts, Jr.
>
> The Psychodynamics of Genetic Indeterminism:
> Why We Turned Out Like Captain Kirk Instead of Mr. Spock
> http://www.fortunecity.com/victorian/dada/90/
>
--
Adrian
"Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in
accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of
choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a
universal law."
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Adrian
> >
>
> >
> > It is still the same issue, just formed as an active process.
> > Whereas rationality is the adherence to reason, being objective
> > is adhering to reality by establishing the proper relationship
> > between consciousness and existence.
> >
>
> I have a somewhat different take on these terms and am curious as
> to what would be an objectivist critique of my view.
>
> I assume the term 'rationality' DENOTES 'the psychical
> product of reasoning', including, not only the product
> of one's own reasoning, but of one's culture as well.
>
> I assume the term 'rationality' CONNOTES 'the extent to which
> this psychical product serves to maximize one's mental occularity'
> or the extent to which one is 'being objective', at least when it
> is employed in a valuative sense to praise or impune a person's
> rationality.
>
> able to "see" what is going on' or, less metaphorically, of
> 'being objective'. This seems to me to be quite similar to
> what Ken is proposing in that I am supposing that the extent to
> which one is 'being rational' can be said to CORRELATE with the
> extent to which one is 'being objective'. Am I off the beam?
>
I think objectivity with regard to a given subject refers to one's
ability to treat all the issues with respect to the subject as external
objects or more precisely to not internalize an issue by reacting to it
emotionally. So, for instance, one might say that you are not
objective when considering your own case if suspected of criminal
activity since instead of determining guilt or innocence and
appropriate punishment, you will react to the matter with your own
internal desires to not suffer punishment. You are not examining the
matter as you would an external object in order to understand it, but
rather you are trying to also figure out how you feel internally about
the possible conclusions you might come to (and/or disclose) about the
subject.
On the other hand, rationality is simply remaining faithful to a priori
rules of inference. So while you are not very objective in considering
your own criminal case, you might very well be very rational about it
when presenting an argument even if the conclusion is false. You might
also be inept at applying the rules of inference and just not be
rational even when judging someone else's case. On the other hand, in
judging someone else's case, you could very well be objective or at
least more so than in judging your own case.
"Objectivity" refers to your lack of personal bias with regard to a
matter and "rationality" refers to your application of rules of
inference to that matter. According to this criterion, a mathematician
is likely to be far more rational in approaching everything (even those
things for which he is not objective) than a professional football
player (say). Perhaps philosophers would tend to be the most
generically rational of all. On the other hand, it may be that
atheletes would have a higher tolerance for pain and be able to be more
objective at least when it comes to the possibility of physical
hardship than an academician would when faced with the same prospects.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Adrian wrote:
>
> In article <38971FAA...@ix.netcom.com>,
> "Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
> >
> > Also, I believe that the endeavor to reduce reasoning to rules has
> been
> > proven to be impossible by Godel. Or am I mistaken?
> >
>
> I don't think so.
> Actually he proved that propositional calculus is
> complete if you are concerned about incompleteness.
But only at the expense of consistency, which pretty much destroys the
system's capacity to maintain its semantic coherence as a consequence
of its obeisance to its own internal logic. (Sheesh! Either I'm really
eloquent or I don't know what I'm talking about.)
> In fact, when you
> combine his completeness theorem with his incompleteness theorem (that
> arithmetic and so all of mathematics is incomplete) then you get that
> math is not just logic plus some definitions.
>
Yes. But what is most interesting is that WE can obtain completeness
precisely by violating the logic of the system, i.e., WE (unlike the
system which mechanically proves) can "see" that the G is true, precisely
because it can't be proven in the system. IOW, WE can increase our own
semantic coherence by violating the system's logic. But this isn't just
a matter of abandoning consistency. Its knowing WHEN to abandon consistency
as an expedient to maximizing coherence. Or am I all wet? :)
"Formalism failed for reasoning, but succeeded brilliantly for
computation" (Michael Chaitin).
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Adrian wrote:
>
>
> I think objectivity with regard to a given subject refers to one's
> ability to treat all the issues with respect to the subject as external
> objects or more precisely to not internalize an issue by reacting to it
> emotionally. So, for instance, one might say that you are not
> objective when considering your own case if suspected of criminal
> activity since instead of determining guilt or innocence and
> appropriate punishment, you will react to the matter with your own
> internal desires to not suffer punishment. You are not examining the
> matter as you would an external object in order to understand it, but
> rather you are trying to also figure out how you feel internally about
> the possible conclusions you might come to (and/or disclose) about the
> subject.
>
Agreed. But I also think it terribly important to understand that there
are two kinds of objectivity, epistemic and valuative, with the former
probably a matter of the correspondence and coherence of one's beliefs
and the latter a matter of valuative impartiality. Your paragraph
above is focused on the valuative aspect of objectivity I believe.
> On the other hand, rationality is simply remaining faithful to a priori
> rules of inference. So while you are not very objective in considering
> your own criminal case, you might very well be very rational about it
> when presenting an argument even if the conclusion is false.
The "a priori rules of inference" refers to the epistemic component of
your rationality, while your bias regarding your own virtue would be
the valuative component. There is considerable disagreement, however,
with regard to the reduction of the epistemic component to obeisance
to 'a priori rules' however. For example, Hume's basic thesis was
that 'All reasoining is simply comparing'. If so, then reasoning
would turn out to be ANAlogical, rather than logical. Perhaps
I'm getting ahead of myself though, eh?
> You might
> also be inept at applying the rules of inference and just not be
> rational even when judging someone else's case. On the other hand, in
> judging someone else's case, you could very well be objective or at
> least more so than in judging your own case.
>
Yes. But keep in mind my distinction between the epistemic and valuative
components of rationality, and my own belief that 'being rational' is
simply a matter of 'being objective' BOTH epistemically and valuatively,
and with the supposition that this can NEVER be accomplished in any
but a relative (comparative) sense in which X is more or less rational
than Y, the norm, etc.
> "Objectivity" refers to your lack of personal bias with regard to a
> matter and "rationality" refers to your application of rules of
> inference to that matter.
You seem to be reserving 'rationality' to the epistemic component
and 'objectivity' to the valuative component. I can't say right off
the top of my head that this is "wrong", but I also can't see where
its necessarily "right" either, although I can appreciate the allure
of having a nice simple distinction here.
> According to this criterion, a mathematician
> is likely to be far more rational in approaching everything (even those
> things for which he is not objective) than a professional football
> player (say).
Assuming 'being rational' is simply a matter of 'being logical', which
is itself open to question. I think 'being rational' is simply a
matter of 'being able to "see" what is going on' and not simply a
matter of 'being logical' (computationalism) or 'being efficient'
(the means/end theory) or 'maximizing self-interest' (egoism). Indeed,
I seriously doubt that rationality can be coherently construed as
a strategic attribute, although I'm likely to be in a very small
minority on this.
> Perhaps philosophers would tend to be the most
> generically rational of all. On the other hand, it may be that
> atheletes would have a higher tolerance for pain and be able to be more
> objective at least when it comes to the possibility of physical
> hardship than an academician would when faced with the same prospects.
>
Again, you want to make a clear distinction between the valuative
aspects of a strategy/intention and the epistemic aspects, or at
least it seems that way to me.
Owl
news:389765B0...@ix.netcom.com...
> > > Also, I believe that the endeavor to reduce reasoning to rules has
> > been
> > > proven to be impossible by Godel. Or am I mistaken?
> >
> > I don't think so.
> > Actually he proved that propositional calculus is
> > complete if you are concerned about incompleteness.
>
> But only at the expense of consistency, which pretty much destroys the
> system's capacity to maintain its semantic coherence as a consequence
> of its obeisance to its own internal logic. (Sheesh! Either I'm really
> eloquent or I don't know what I'm talking about.)
Well, let's just say your eloquence is coming into question.
Adrian's remark is correct, but not entirely relevant. The propositional
calculus is 'complete' (and consistent), but that does not mean it can
represent all kinds of reasoning. On the other hand, any system adequate
to representing arithmetic (as the propositional calculus is not) is
either incomplete or inconsistent.
Does this prove that reasoning is not just rule-following? Lucas argues
yes, although a great many critics have argued against him. Among other
things, it's been argued that G's theorem would only show that, if human
reasoning is just rule-following, a human cannot identify the whole set of
rules he is using. Or that perhaps our reasoning procedures are
inconsistent (hey, people sometimes contradict themselves, don't they?)
> > In fact, when you
> > combine his completeness theorem with his incompleteness theorem (that
> > arithmetic and so all of mathematics is incomplete) then you get that
> > math is not just logic plus some definitions.
Yep, mathematics is synthetic, a priori knowledge, like so many other
things.
> Yes. But what is most interesting is that WE can obtain completeness
> precisely by violating the logic of the system, i.e., WE (unlike the
> system which mechanically proves) can "see" that the G is true,
precisely
> because it can't be proven in the system. IOW, WE can increase our own
> semantic coherence by violating the system's logic. But this isn't just
> a matter of abandoning consistency. Its knowing WHEN to abandon
consistency
> as an expedient to maximizing coherence. Or am I all wet? :)
You seem to be confusing 'consistent with the rules of a given formal
system' with 'consistent.' There's no time when abandoning consistency
tout court is expedient.
> "Formalism failed for reasoning, but succeeded brilliantly for
> computation" (Michael Chaitin).
Yep.
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
Stephen Speicher <s...@atlantis.compbio.caltech.edu> wrote in message
news:Pine.LNX.4.21.000201...@atlantis.compbio.caltech
..edu...
>
> I understand, from a number of sources, that in Objectivism logic
> comes highly recommended. :)
Yes, especially the non-contradictory identification sort. ;-)
--
A.Broese-van-Groenou.
Ken Gardner
> You might want to check out Tara Smith's lecture course on
> "Rationality and Objectivity". It's been a while since I listened to
> it, but I do remember there was a discussion of the above question.
> It's about fifty bucks from Second Renaissance.
Actually, I recently purchased it (the tapes are terrific, BTW, and I
would highly recommend them to anyone). I wasn't entirely sure that I
correctly understood or agreed with her answers (in Tape 4) to these
questions, so I figured that I would repeat the questions here and see
what happens.
My own view -- as of right now, anyway <G>, and I have thought about
these issues some more since posting the original note -- is that
rationality and objectivity are indeed interchangeable and essentially
refer to the same volitional cognitive processes. As a practical guide,
objectivity's major contribution is its focus on the role of logic (i.e.
avoiding contradictions) in identifying and integrating the material
provided by the senses.
Ken
Ken Gardner
> I think of objectivity as just one part of rationality.
You are suggesting that one can be rational without also being objective.
How so? Presumably, you are also suggesting that one can be objective
without being rational. How so?
> Examples:
> 1. A person encounters evidence that his favorite theory of physics is
> wrong. He dismisses the evidence blithely because he refuses to believe
> the physics establishment could have been wrong for 50 years. (This is a
> purely hypothetical example, of course.) This is an example of not being
> objective, and so also of being irrational.
I agree, but your example tends to support the conclusion that
rationality and objectivity are interchangeable, which is contrary to
saying that one is merely part of the other.
> 2. A person is given a choice between $100 and $50, and decides to take
> the 50. This is an example of being irrational, but not (or not
> necessarily) of being non-objective.
I don't necessarily agree that his decision is irrational. Before
drawing that conclusion, I would need to know his reasons for picking the
smaller number.
More generally, if he is being objective, and if we are using that term
in the sense that I intended it when posing the question in the first
place, then what you are essentially saying is that he chose to adhere to
reality by following the method of logic, but he was nevertheless being
irrational. The converse is the possibility that he could reject
objectivity (reason and logic) while being rational. Both conclusions
make no sense to me -- which, again, tends to support my tentative view
that the two terms are, in fact, interchangeable.
Ken
Ken Gardner
> > Your explication of the significant differences between rationality and
> > Objectivity is useful , especially the distinction you make between
> > 'active process.' and 'proper relationship'
> > However I have no understanding of what is implied in your quote
> > from Piekoff when he says ' - - appropriate to man's form of cognition."<
> Dr. Peikoff is referring to all that which is concomitant with
> reason. If you read Chapter 4 of OPAR, Peikoff offers there a
> full sense of the meaning of objectivity in the philosophy of
> Objectivism.
I agree, but I would add that he was also referring to two additional
facts about man's form of cognition: (1) conceptual processes are neither
automatic nor infallible and (2) the mind is an integrating faculty, in
the sense that we integrate sensations into percepts, percepts into
concepts, concepts into higher level concepts and propositions, and those
concepts and propositions into even higher level concepts and
propositions, etc. Logic is the appropriate method for man's form
of cognition because it provides man with a means of validating his
conclusions as well as a method for getting from one step to the next in
the course of reaching and proving a higher level concept or conclusion.
Ken
mdhjwh
"Phil Roberts, Jr." wrote:> (Sheesh! Either I'm really
eloquent or I don't know what I'm talking about.)<
Maybe not EITHER/OR but both?
John H
mdhjwh
Ken Gardner wrote:> Logic is the appropriate method for man's form
of cognition because it provides man with a means of validating his
conclusions as well as a method for getting from one step to the next in
the course of reaching and proving a higher level concept or conclusion.<
Yes.
John H
Adrian
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
<snip>
>
> Adrian's remark is correct, but not entirely relevant. The
propositional
> calculus is 'complete' (and consistent), but that does not mean it can
> represent all kinds of reasoning.
Well, you know how dogmatic I am... ;-)
<snip>
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Owl wrote:
>
> phil wrote:
> > "Formalism failed for reasoning, but succeeded brilliantly for
> > computation" (Michael Chaitin).
>
> Yep.
My point exactly.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Adrian wrote:
>
> In article <8782b3$iuo$1...@nntp3.atl.mindspring.net>,
> Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
> >
> > Adrian's remark is correct, but not entirely relevant. The
> propositional
> > calculus is 'complete' (and consistent), but that does not mean it can
> > represent all kinds of reasoning.
>
I wasn't aware that Godel had proven the propositional calculus is
both complete and consistent. Can you elaborate on this a bit?
mdhjwh
"Phil Roberts, Jr." wrote:>I wasn't aware that Godel had proven the
propositional calculus is both complete and consistent. Can you elaborate on
this a bit?
Excese me jumping in but it pays to be very careful in assessing Godel.
It is not as if Godel discovered an arithmetical truth, which presented itself
as such, that was not provable from Peano's axioms. What happened was
that the whole formalism was re-interpreted as being about syntax, including
such notions as "provability", and then showing that there was a proposition
knowable as true under the new interpretation that cannot be provable in
the formalisation of the original interpretation as dealing with
numbers. Sure, it was a very clever move on Godel's part, but I do not
think it demonstrates some mystical insight into numbers unattainable by
machines. The syntactical, "unprovable" proposition Godel formulated was
then back-interpreted into arithmetic.
John H
Adrian
Actually, I had trouble understanding what you said exactly, but I
think it is in the same vein as what I am about to say. What Godel
showed was that mathematics is not logic nor is it logic plus a few
rules. It makes a whole lot more sense in the context of what was
going on in philosophy at the turn of the century -- in the context of
Wittgenstein, Russell, and the logical positivists. There was this
idea that perhaps there was really no need for academic philosophy --
that philosophy was really just evolving into science and math and that
academic philosophy was really sort of this archaic vestigial organ
left over from when we were a bunch of superstitious savages (to put it
colorfully). So whereas you might have epistemology and metaphysics in
philosophy, you have mathematics and physics more generally.
Mathematics is just epistemology times 10 and done well and physics has
the same relationship to metaphysics. This particular view is further
strengthened by the fact that mathematicians can often do philosophy
but philosophers usually cannot do mathematics and similarly for
physics.
Well anyway, there was a big drive to put mathematics on a formal
foundation (that actually started before all this with Hilbert in
1900). The drive became all the more crucial now in this broader
phislophical context. Godel was even a member of the school of logical
positivism in Vienna. However, possibly the major decisive blow to
this view that philosophy was evolving into a formal calculus for
understanding a priori concepts and a formal method for gathering an a
posteriori fact (e.g. mathematics combined with the scientific method)
was Godel's incompleteness theorem. It really just shows that
mathematics is a field of study separate from philosophy -- no more, no
less (as far as we are all probably concerned). Not only is arithmetic
not just logic plus some definitions (as Russell was hoping to
eventually prove), but it isn't even an extension of logic to a broader
context (as Hilbert was trying to make it by setting it on a foundation
of a finite set of consistent axioms from which one can formally prove
every theorem). It is actually just another object to be studied by
the use of logic just like physics, for instance. We don't need
completeness if we look at it this way and in fact that is the way we
must look at it since we cannot have completeness.
In conclusion, many years ago mathematics was not done formally the way
you might experience it now with formulas and equations and what not.
I remember I was reading something in some magazine once (I believe it
was in the Notices of the American Mathematical Society) about Andrew
Wiles who proved Fermat's Last Theorem not long ago. What was striking
was that it showed some of the original text (perhaps it was even
commenting on this), and the text was text. It wasn't a bunch of
symbols garnished with some explanation. Euclid was a philosopher and
did Euclidean Geometry philosophically. He probably wouldn't even
recognize it in the formal form you would see it in an introduction to
advanced math class, say, today. We have always started out informally
and eventually been able to formally write down some things we can all
agree on. That is how mathematics as we know it came to be. From this
perspective, philosophy always precedes math. Well, just recently we
tried to instead of going from informal to formal this way, to push out
the boundaries of what we can formally construct sort of from the
inside pushing out, and found that we cannot encompass all of
philosophy into it. There will always be this informal starting point -
- not just as how the business got started in the first place with an
imperfect attempt made long ago at understanding some problems, but as
a fundamental part of inquiry in general that will always be there.
Just like a movie star will always have to wade through a line of
paporazzi to get to a public event, we will always have to put up with
some crack-pot philosophers before we can get down to business.
mdhjwh
Adrian wrote:>Actually, I had trouble understanding what you said exactly,
but I
think it is in the same vein as what I am about to say. What Godel
showed was that mathematics is not logic nor is it logic plus a few
rules. etc. etc. etc.< (big snip)
YES !
Have a look at.http://www.umcs.maine.edu/~chaitin/
John H
Jim Klein
Kyle Haight <kha...@netcom.com> wrote:
>>When I say objectivity is a part of rationality, I mean that to be
>>rational is to be objective AND other things. Thus, if you are not
>>objective, then you are not rational. But if you are objective, you could
>>still be irrational, by failing in the 'other things.'
>
>I don't think this is right.
I think it's exactly right, even if we use your (or my, or Ken's) definition
of "objective" which is quite a bit broader than Owl's "unbiased."
>Being objective requires following a particular method of thinking.
A _particular_ method of thinking? I wonder what you mean by that. I agree
that it has essential attributes and all of that--the most essential being
the recognition of the primacy of existence versus consciousness--but
otherwise I don't know what "particular" method you have in mind.
Could you clarify a bit?
>That method is obviously not self-evident,
Parts are, but overall I'd agree that it's not.
>and thus had to be discovered by some person or persons.
You're not offering that Rand "discovered" that particular method you call
"objectivity," are you? Or worse, Peikoff? Say it ain't so.
>Are you saying that all the people who lived before that discovery, or
>who lived after it but never learned of the issue, were necessarily
>not rational?
He's clearly saying that objectivity is necessary but not sufficient for
rationality. And in general terms I'd say he's right, though I think Ken's
approach is pretty unobjectionable too.
You can understand the approach of objectivity--even the very refined sort
Objectivists like to pretend they use--and still not be rational. For
instance, you could _choose_ not to use an objective method on various
occassions just like so many Objectivists so choose. Such a person is still
objective but not rational; at the very least rationality demands choosing
objectivity. The reason Ken's approach is okay is because he could say that
likewise objectivity demands being rational. That's alright I suppose, but
it's a less common usage than Owl's.
>I might agree that, once one knows the proper thinking methods
>required to be objective, rejecting them would be irrational. But if
>one has never heard of them at all?
Again, I wonder what in the world you imagine this to mean. If one chooses
to pay attention and integrates percepts and concepts into a hierarchical
structure of knowledge, with an implicit PofE approach, would you say that
he's not being objective because he never read OPAR or something?
Sorry to put it so bluntly, but that seems to me the direction you're
heading. If not, what is the "particular method of thinking" that "had to
be discovered" and that an objective person must have "heard of"?
I mean, if it's so particular then surely you can indicate what it is.
jk
Ken Gardner
> For instance, you could _choose_ not to use an objective method on various
> occassions just like so many Objectivists so choose. Such a person is still
> objective but not rational;
This makes no sense. Leaving aside dumb luck, how can a person not
choose to use an objective method and still be objective? Objectivity is
a volitional process. If you choose not to be objective on a particular
occassion (as opposed to making a mistake in applying an objective
method), you are non-objective and irrational even if, on some
occassions, you are objective. Just as you would be a killer if you
respected human life most of the time and killed only occassionally.
> at the very least rationality demands choosing
> objectivity. The reason Ken's approach is okay is because he could say that
> likewise objectivity demands being rational.
I'm saying that you cannot be rational without being objective, or
objective without being rational, and that both concepts essentially
refer to the same cognitive processes (perhaps with emphasis on different
aspects of these processes). Rationality refers to the choice to
identify and integrate the facts of reality; objectivity emphasizes the
role of logic (the art of non-contradiction) in identifying and
integrating the facts correctly and in establishing that one has done so.
Ken
Ken Gardner
> >Being objective requires following a particular method of thinking.
> A _particular_ method of thinking? I wonder what you mean by that. I agree
> that it has essential attributes and all of that--the most essential being
> the recognition of the primacy of existence versus consciousness--but
> otherwise I don't know what "particular" method you have in mind.
> Could you clarify a bit?
I can, although Kyle can certainly speak for himself. He is talking
about logic, "the art of non-contradictory identification." Peikoff
covers this topic in detail in Chapter 4 of OPAR. Yes, part of the
method is recognizing the primacy of existence. Also, the method
of logic recognizes that human beings have free will (they can choose
whether or not to be objective) and are not infallible (which is why they
need a method in the first place). The essentials of the method, as
Peikoff describes it, is basing one's conclusions on the facts (i.e.
reducing all concepts and propositions to observed facts) and integrating
each concept and conclusion without contradiction into the total sum of
your knowledge.
Ken
Jim Klein
Ken Gardner <ke...@dallas.net> wrote:
>Jim Klein says...
>
>>>Being objective requires following a particular method of thinking.
>
>>A _particular_ method of thinking? I wonder what you mean by that. I
>>agree that it has essential attributes and all of that--the most essential
>>being the recognition of the primacy of existence versus consciousness-
>>but otherwise I don't know what "particular" method you have in mind.
>
>>Could you clarify a bit?
>
>I can, although Kyle can certainly speak for himself. He is talking
>about logic, "the art of non-contradictory identification." Peikoff
>covers this topic in detail in Chapter 4 of OPAR. Yes, part of the
>method is recognizing the primacy of existence. Also, the method
>of logic recognizes that human beings have free will (they can choose
>whether or not to be objective) and are not infallible (which is why they
>need a method in the first place). The essentials of the method, as
>Peikoff describes it, is basing one's conclusions on the facts (i.e.
>reducing all concepts and propositions to observed facts) and integrating
>each concept and conclusion without contradiction into the total sum of
>your knowledge.
Okay, but you write as if this were news. I think both the idea of
noncontradictory identification (built with an implicit primacy of existence
outlook and other objective considerations, as well as a respect for formal
validity) together with the idea that humans have free will, have been
accepted by reasonable people for a very, very long time. Also, I don't
think the facts that humans aren't omniscient and that even a few of them
are fallible, are really recent discoveries.
It just doesn't sound very "particular" to me, that's all. Indeed...to the
degree Peikoff offers something particularly different in this oft-quoted
Chapter 4, it seems to be wrong. I say "seems" because I don't know first
hand and can only judge based on the affect it has upon those who view it as
some sort of brilliant discovery. From what I can tell, it ought to be
subtitled "Becoming a Prisoner of Your Mind" or something like that; but
again that's based on hearing the faithful, not the words themselves.
Well...some of them I've heard, and some of those are wrong.
jk
Jim Klein
Ken Gardner <ke...@dallas.net> wrote:
>This makes no sense. Leaving aside dumb luck, how can a person not
>choose to use an objective method and still be objective?
The same way a swimmer comes out of the pool and is still a swimmer.
>Objectivity is a volitional process. If you choose not to be objective on
>a particular occassion (as opposed to making a mistake in applying an
>objective method), you are non-objective and irrational even if, on some
>occassions, you are objective. Just as you would be a killer if you
>respected human life most of the time and killed only occassionally.
Okay; I really wasn't trying to make some grand point. But if I wanted to
pursue it, I could point out that you're doing the same thing with "non
objective" that I was doing with "objective."
>I'm saying that you cannot be rational without being objective, or
>objective without being rational, and that both concepts essentially
>refer to the same cognitive processes
And I'm saying, as I said, that this is unobjectionable IMO.
>(perhaps with emphasis on different aspects of these processes).
Right, and I'd say that rationality tends to encompass a wider range of
processes than objectivity. For instance, I'd personally be inclined to say
that just looking at something is part of the process of rationality; I'd
be a bit less likely to say that it's part of objectivity. But I'd neither
care to defend that usage as perfect, nor offer that it's very important.
>Rationality refers to the choice to identify and integrate the facts of
>reality; objectivity emphasizes the role of logic (the art of non
>contradiction) in identifying and integrating the facts correctly and in
>establishing that one has done so.
And I don't think there's anything wrong with making "objectivity"
synonymous with that. I also don't think there's anything wrong with Owl
taking rationality as a wider concept than objectivity. As a question of
identification, I think I'd side with you; as a question of descriptive
linguistics, I'd likely side with him. Trivial in any event, as I see it.
jk
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Adrian wrote:
>
> Actually, I had trouble understanding what you said exactly, but I
> think it is in the same vein as what I am about to say. What Godel
> showed was that mathematics is not logic nor is it logic plus a few
> rules.
More specifically, that mathematical REASONING is not simply a matter
of logic plus a few rules. This is what is at the heart of the
this particular thread, IMHO, and the digression on Godel has led
to a certain amount of obfiscation of what to me has been a most
intriguing question raised by Ken, i.e., is 'being rational' simply
a matter of 'being objective' and visa versa?.
> It makes a whole lot more sense in the context of what was
> going on in philosophy at the turn of the century -- in the context of
> Wittgenstein, Russell, and the logical positivists. There was this
> idea that perhaps there was really no need for academic philosophy --
> that philosophy was really just evolving into science and math and that
> academic philosophy was really sort of this archaic vestigial organ
> left over from when we were a bunch of superstitious savages (to put it
> colorfully).
Yes. As I recall, the logical positivists were much enamored with
Wittgenstein, and his proposal that philosophy should restrict itself
to clarifying language, or some such rot. I suspect this also included
a rather extreme version of empiricism, which eventually led
all but inevitably to behaviorism. Ultimately, I suspect that
logical positivism was actually just materialist metaphysics
masquerading as epistemological puritanism. But that's just my
personal opinion.
> So whereas you might have epistemology and metaphysics in
> philosophy, you have mathematics and physics more generally.
> Mathematics is just epistemology times 10 and done well and physics has
> the same relationship to metaphysics. This particular view is further
> strengthened by the fact that mathematicians can often do philosophy
> but philosophers usually cannot do mathematics and similarly for
> physics.
>
> Well anyway, there was a big drive to put mathematics on a formal
> foundation (that actually started before all this with Hilbert in
> 1900). The drive became all the more crucial now in this broader
> phislophical context. Godel was even a member of the school of logical
> positivism in Vienna. However, possibly the major decisive blow to
> this view that philosophy was evolving into a formal calculus for
> understanding a priori concepts and a formal method for gathering an a
> posteriori fact (e.g. mathematics combined with the scientific method)
> was Godel's incompleteness theorem. It really just shows that
> mathematics is a field of study separate from philosophy -- no more, no
> less (as far as we are all probably concerned).
You've lost me here. I've always been under the impression that it
showed that mathematical reasoning can not be reduced to logic.
> Not only is arithmetic
> not just logic plus some definitions (as Russell was hoping to
> eventually prove), but it isn't even an extension of logic to a broader
> context (as Hilbert was trying to make it by setting it on a foundation
> of a finite set of consistent axioms from which one can formally prove
> every theorem). It is actually just another object to be studied by
> the use of logic just like physics, for instance. We don't need
> completeness if we look at it this way and in fact that is the way we
> must look at it since we cannot have completeness.
>
I think I've also heard it said that Godel demonstrated that knowledge
outruns provability.
> In conclusion, many years ago mathematics was not done formally the way
> you might experience it now with formulas and equations and what not.
> I remember I was reading something in some magazine once (I believe it
> was in the Notices of the American Mathematical Society) about Andrew
> Wiles who proved Fermat's Last Theorem not long ago. What was striking
> was that it showed some of the original text (perhaps it was even
> commenting on this), and the text was text. It wasn't a bunch of
> symbols garnished with some explanation.
Interesting. I found similar sentiments in 'The Mathematical Way of
Thinking'. Can't remember the author off hand.
> Euclid was a philosopher and
> did Euclidean Geometry philosophically. He probably wouldn't even
> recognize it in the formal form you would see it in an introduction to
> advanced math class, say, today. We have always started out informally
> and eventually been able to formally write down some things we can all
> agree on.
I would say that its probably because our formalisms are simply abstractions
of our intuitions and of certain regularities our intuitions have discerned
in nature. Logic, in particular, seems to me to arise out of a discernment
of the order in which we cognize order.
> --
> Adrian
>
> "Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in
> accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of
> choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a
> universal law."
>
> Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals
>
My problem here is that there is still a self-interest assumption hidden
in Kant's maxim. Its buried, but its still a version of 'Do unto others
as you would have them do unto you'. By simply abandoning the self
interest assumption, you can get to the equivalent of the categorical
imperative without having to read 50,000 pages of dense philosophy,
IMHO.
IOW, assume that 'being rational' is simply a matter of 'being able
to "see" what is going on', and that we are moral BOTH because we
can project ourselves into other sentient beings via inference and
because we can view matters from a more global perspective, and
therefore it is rational to be moral because moral beings "see"
more than immoral one's, or some such rot.
IOW, rationality = objectivity = morality. You justify morality
by bringing the mountain to Mohammed so to speak.
Enjoyed your remarks. In fact, I've found this entire thread
immensely fascinating. Thanks again to Ken for initiating it.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
mdhjwh wrote:
>
> Adrian wrote:>Actually, I had trouble understanding what you said exactly,
> but I
> think it is in the same vein as what I am about to say. What Godel
> showed was that mathematics is not logic nor is it logic plus a few
> rules. etc. etc. etc.< (big snip)
>
> YES !
> Have a look at.http://www.umcs.maine.edu/~chaitin/
> John H
That's where I got my quote from:
'Formalism failed for reasoning but succeeded brilliantly for
computaton.'
It cuts right to the quick, which is important when you get into the
verbal mine fields in discussing logic and rationality.
Only I attributed it to Michael Chaitin. Should have been G.J. Chaitin.
At my age, its a wonder I didn't attribute it to Michael Jackson. :)
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Owl wrote:
>
> Phil Roberts, Jr. <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
> news:3897ACDA...@ix.netcom.com...
> > I wasn't aware that Godel had proven the propositional calculus is
> > both complete and consistent. Can you elaborate on this a bit?
>
> Well, I can't reproduce the proof, but I'll tell you what the conclusion
> means (I don't know if G proved the prop calc to be consistent, but it
> obviously is):
>
Because it was designed that way, I suppose. But even so, the prop calculus
falls apart in certain syllogisms if I recall, e.g., Russell had a number
of logical paradoxes. I quess, to me, this would constitute a reason to
suspect that the prop calculus is itself either consistent or complete,
but not both, similar to Godel's proof.
> Note that "complete" doesn't mean anything along the lines of "adequate
> for all forms of reasoning" -- in the latter sense, the prop calc. would
> obviously be incomplete. "Complete" in formal logic just means that if a
> sentence is true in every model of the system, then the sentence can also
> be derived according to the set of rules in question (the ones that are
> being said to be complete). "Consistent" means you can't derive a
> contradiction according to the rules.
>
I suspect that it is possible to come up with well formed sentences in
the prop calculus which lead to semantically incoherent results, although
I'm not sure I'm using the proper language to express myself. I'm thinking
particularly about a syllogism mentioned by L.J. Cohen in 'Can Human
Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated', which I assume could be
translated into prop calc.
> If you take a typical set of rules that will be stated in any intro formal
> logic book for the propositional calculus, I think you will find it no
> surprise that they are complete and consistent. Typically, the rules will
> include the likes of:
>
> Addition: From P, deduce (P v Q).
> Modus Ponens: From P, P -> Q; deduce Q.
> Simplification: From (P & Q), deduce P.
> Reductio ad absurdum: You're allowed to 'assume' P, and if it leads to (Q
> & ~Q), thence conclude ~P.
> and so on.
>
Consistent by design, incomplete in that they will lead, on certain rare
occasions, to semantically incoherent conclusions.
> Your logic book will give you more rules than you strictly need, just to
> make proofs easier (I don't know what the minimum # of rules is). As I
> say, it's no surprise that you can't use the sort of rules above (I mean,
> the above plus the other ones that appear in a standard logic text) to
> derive (P & ~P).
>
> What about completeness? For the propositional calculus, that means that
> if a statement is true under every normal truth assignment (in other
> words: a truth-table analysis would show it to be true on every line of
> the truth table), then it can be derived according to the aforementioned
> rules. Proving that for a given set of rules takes a little time (a logic
> prof. of mine once went over it), but there's nothing profound about it.
But I don't think any of this has all that much to do with Godel's proof,
do you?
BTW, you also mentioned a distinction between formal/logical consistency
and consistency toute court. I'm not quite certain I understand the
relevance of this distinction, although I do recall Penrose making
a distinction between consistency and w consistency (w was some sort
of Greek letter, as I recall).
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Ken Gardner wrote:
>
> Jim Klein says...
>
> > >Being objective requires following a particular method of thinking.
>
> > A _particular_ method of thinking? I wonder what you mean by that. I
> > agree
> > that it has essential attributes and all of that--the most essential being
> > the recognition of the primacy of existence versus consciousness--but
> > otherwise I don't know what "particular" method you have in mind.
>
> > Could you clarify a bit?
>
> I can, although Kyle can certainly speak for himself. He is talking
> about logic, "the art of non-contradictory identification." Peikoff
> covers this topic in detail in Chapter 4 of OPAR. Yes, part of the
> method is recognizing the primacy of existence. Also, the method
> of logic recognizes that human beings have free will (they can choose
> whether or not to be objective) and are not infallible (which is why they
> need a method in the first place). The essentials of the method, as
> Peikoff describes it, is basing one's conclusions on the facts (i.e.
> reducing all concepts and propositions to observed facts) and integrating
> each concept and conclusion without contradiction into the total sum of
> your knowledge.
You say this as though it were as simple as deciding that that is what
one chooses to do. Isn't that a lack of objectivity regarding our own
capacity for objectivity?
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Jim Klein wrote:
>
> In article <87av16$bfk$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net>,
> Kyle Haight <kha...@netcom.com> wrote:
>
> >>When I say objectivity is a part of rationality, I mean that to be
> >>rational is to be objective AND other things. Thus, if you are not
> >>objective, then you are not rational. But if you are objective, you could
> >>still be irrational, by failing in the 'other things.'
> >
> >I don't think this is right.
>
> I think it's exactly right, even if we use your (or my, or Ken's) definition
> of "objective" which is quite a bit broader than Owl's "unbiased."
>
Isn't objectivity simply a matter of the correspondence and coherence of
one's beliefs and the impartiality of one's values? Or is there more
to it.
> >Being objective requires following a particular method of thinking.
>
I would say that that method is not a particular one, but merely a
method X which is hopefully better than method Y. Otherwise, I suspect
we might be in danger of having a lack of objectivity with respect to
our capacity to be objective.
> A _particular_ method of thinking? I wonder what you mean by that. I agree
> that it has essential attributes and all of that--the most essential being
> the recognition of the primacy of existence versus consciousness--but
> otherwise I don't know what "particular" method you have in mind.
>
> Could you clarify a bit?
>
> >That method is obviously not self-evident,
>
> Parts are, but overall I'd agree that it's not.
>
Aren't we continuously in the act of discovering this method, with its
final version always beyond our reach?
mdhjwh
"Phil Roberts, Jr." wrote:>At my age, its a wonder I didn't attribute it to
Michael Jackson. :)
Speculating, about the probable form of a logical system invented by
Michael Jackson, boggles the mind :-0
John H
Owl
news:MPG.1302ce7d5...@news.dallas.net...
> What other things?
I haven't got a complete list. Here's a few examples: you don't believe
contradictions. When you want X and you believe Y will lead to X, then
(ceteris paribus) you want Y. When you seem to perceive X, then you
believe X is present. And so on. These are examples of what it is to be
rational, though I don't think they're examples of objectivity (in the
sense of lack of bias).
> In what sense is my usage any different from your usage, other than that
> mine is broader than yours, i.e. my usage captures bias and many other
> things?
Well, exactly that. Your "objectivity" seems to be the same as your
"rationality", whereas my "objectivity" is a part of rationality.
Owl
news:87av16$bfk$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net...
> I don't think this is right. Being objective requires following a
> particular method of thinking. That method is obviously not
> self-evident, and thus had to be discovered by some person or persons.
> Are you saying that all the people who lived before that discovery, or
> who lived after it but never learned of the issue, were necessarily
> not rational?
No, I think that the capacity for logical thinking is innate in the human
species, or any intelligent species. It cannot be taught. (If you had an
illogical being, how would you propose to *teach* it anything?)
'Objectivity', however, as it is usually used, just means the opposite of
bias. I don't think you have to be taught how to be objective either.
You say it is "obviously not self-evident," but this is not obvious to me.
Ken Gardner
> > The essentials of the method, as
> > Peikoff describes it, is basing one's conclusions on the facts (i.e.
> > reducing all concepts and propositions to observed facts) and integrating
> > each concept and conclusion without contradiction into the total sum of
> > your knowledge.
> You say this as though it were as simple as deciding that that is what
> one chooses to do. Isn't that a lack of objectivity regarding our own
> capacity for objectivity?
No.
Ken
Ken Gardner
> I haven't got a complete list. Here's a few examples: you don't believe
> contradictions. When you want X and you believe Y will lead to X, then
> (ceteris paribus) you want Y. When you seem to perceive X, then you
> believe X is present. And so on. These are examples of what it is to be
> rational, though I don't think they're examples of objectivity (in the
> sense of lack of bias).
I think they ARE examples of objectivity in the sense that I was using
the term (i.e. the OPAR sense) when I started this thread.
Ken
Adrian
"Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
>
> Adrian wrote:
<snip>
> > "Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in
> > accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of
> > choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance
with a
> > universal law."
> >
> > Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals
> >
>
> My problem here is that there is still a self-interest assumption
hidden
> in Kant's maxim. Its buried, but its still a version of 'Do unto
others
> as you would have them do unto you'.
On the contrary, he specifically rejects at least the negative version
in a foot note in the Groundwork as being susceptible to spurious
reasoning to among other things defend criminals from retributive
justice (which he derives from the above principle). The point is that
you can just take a party slogan and construe it to mean something that
takes 50,000 words to say definitively. But if you want the definitive
statement you have to read the 50,000 words. Kant bends over backwards
to make sure that you don't walk away with a collectivist idea of what
he means. It takes a real creative effort to get that out of what he
says in the Metaphysics of Morals and he labors long and hard to split
the hairs just so, so that those that come behind him might be able to
lie about what he says but they won't be able to split hairs to make
imply something he never intended.
> By simply abandoning the self
> interest assumption, you can get to the equivalent of the categorical
> imperative without having to read 50,000 pages of dense philosophy,
> IMHO.
>
But we all do, in fact, act out of our self-interest and are ultimately
interested in our self-interest. You may dispose of it as you please
in moral philosophy, but as a fact of reality it will always be there.
> IOW, assume that 'being rational' is simply a matter of 'being able
> to "see" what is going on', and that we are moral BOTH because we
> can project ourselves into other sentient beings via inference and
> because we can view matters from a more global perspective, and
> therefore it is rational to be moral because moral beings "see"
> more than immoral one's, or some such rot.
>
As you say... some such rot.... :p
> IOW, rationality = objectivity = morality. You justify morality
> by bringing the mountain to Mohammed so to speak.
I don't think so. So Kant thinks that a perfectly rational being would
act perfectly morally. In fact, a perfectly rational being is nto even
tempted to act immorally, according to Kant. The only reason moral
philosophy exists, I suppose, is because we are imperfect. I disagree
completely.
I think a "perfectly rational being" (for starters I think it is an
oxymoron, but...) will act perfectly in their best self-interests. The
moral issues arise when our self-interests conflict between beings not
within a given being. We do not always act out of our true rational
self-interest because we are imperfect, but we tend to and we
definitely act out of our perceived self-interest. And, that self-
interest is in principle completely independent of any other's self
interest or any idea of justice. That is why half the time it is in
our self-interest to act unjustly. Moral evaluations occur
independently of self-interest and what a rational person will do out
of prudential considerations. I contend that if it were not possible
to construct examples of it being rational to act unjustly, then
morality would be a pretty academic and irrelevent subject.
--
Adrian
"Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in
accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of
choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a
universal law."
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals
Phil Roberts, Jr.
You sound just a wee bit dogmatic on this point. Or is it just my
imagination. :)
p.r.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
imagination? :)
p.r.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Owl wrote:
>
> Ken Gardner <ke...@dallas.net> wrote in message
> news:MPG.1302ce7d5...@news.dallas.net...
> > What other things?
>
> I haven't got a complete list. Here's a few examples: you don't believe
> contradictions. When you want X and you believe Y will lead to X, then
> (ceteris paribus) you want Y. When you seem to perceive X, then you
> believe X is present. And so on. These are examples of what it is to be
> rational, though I don't think they're examples of objectivity (in the
> sense of lack of bias).
>
I suspect these could be gerrymandered into objectivity criteria, particularly
if simplicity were something of a passion. 1. could be construed as a
consequence of 'being able to "see" what is going on' with respect to
the wanting of X and 2 could be construed as a consequence of 'being
able to "see" what is going on' with respect to the maximizing of
true belief.
The maximizing of true belief and of wanting X could themselves also
be assessed for their rationality using this criteria. For example,
Dr Frankenstein's obsession for knowledge could be construed as
less rational than a value system in which knowledge was only one
aspect of a more comprehensive view of reality, and thereby account
for our collective feeling that Dr. Frankenstein was not quite
rational.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Adrian wrote:
>
> > My problem here is that there is still a self-interest assumption
> hidden
> > in Kant's maxim. Its buried, but its still a version of 'Do unto
> others
> > as you would have them do unto you'.
>
> On the contrary, he specifically rejects at least the negative version
> in a foot note in the Groundwork as being susceptible to spurious
> reasoning to among other things defend criminals from retributive
> justice (which he derives from the above principle).
Yes, yes, I'm well aware of Kant's endeavor to establish the categorical
imperative on grounds other than self-interest. But when you look at
the categorical imperative itself,
it definitely has do unto others overtones. And when you are dealing
with texts this complex, voluminous, and written over long periods of
time, well.... , you get into somewhat the same sort of situation
you run into with arguing about the Bible, if you know what I mean.
I'm just saying there is a much faster way to arrive at a conclusion
which is very similar to the categorical imperative, i.e., simply
abandon the self-interest assumption altogether, indeed, abandon
the assumption that morality is a matter of what you do and more
a matter of what you are, i.e., someone who 'loves his neighbor as
he loves himself', and with what you do simply constituting a
manifestation of that.
> The point is that
> you can just take a party slogan and construe it to mean something that
> takes 50,000 words to say definitively. But if you want the definitive
> statement you have to read the 50,000 words.
And even then, you might end up in a debate which might last a few
hundred years, which is pretty much my point. BTW, I am not
a Kant hater, and actually have high regard for some of his writings,
but am only trying to point out a much more expedient way of getting
to his desired conclusion, i.e., that it is rational to be moral.
> Kant bends over backwards
> to make sure that you don't walk away with a collectivist idea of what
> he means. It takes a real creative effort to get that out of what he
> says in the Metaphysics of Morals and he labors long and hard to split
> the hairs just so, so that those that come behind him might be able to
> lie about what he says but they won't be able to split hairs to make
> imply something he never intended.
>
Yes, but he still ends up with a STRATEGIC notion of rationality, and
50,000 pages of very obscure text about which there is rarely any final
agreement between interpreters. And the imperative itself still has
self-interest overtones, in spite of all the argumentation.
> > By simply abandoning the self
> > interest assumption, you can get to the equivalent of the categorical
> > imperative without having to read 50,000 pages of dense philosophy,
> > IMHO.
> >
>
> But we all do, in fact, act out of our self-interest and are ultimately
> interested in our self-interest. You may dispose of it as you please
> in moral philosophy, but as a fact of reality it will always be there.
>
But how does that constitute an argument that it is rational?
Special concern for one's own future would be selected by
evolution: Animals without such concern would be more likely
to die before passing on their genes. Such concern would
remain, as a natural fact, even if we decided that it was not
justified. By thinking hard about the arguments, we might
be able briefly to stun this natural concern. But it would
soon revive... The fact that we have this attitude cannot
therefore be a reason for thinking it justified. Whether
it is justified [i.e. rational] is an open question, waiting
to be answered (Derek Parfit, 'Reasons and Persons').
> > IOW, assume that 'being rational' is simply a matter of 'being able
> > to "see" what is going on', and that we are moral BOTH because we
> > can project ourselves into other sentient beings via inference and
> > because we can view matters from a more global perspective, and
> > therefore it is rational to be moral because moral beings "see"
> > more than immoral one's, or some such rot.
> >
>
> As you say... some such rot.... :p
>
But on what grounds. That's kind of important, don't you think?
> > IOW, rationality = objectivity = morality. You justify morality
> > by bringing the mountain to Mohammed so to speak.
>
> I don't think so. So Kant thinks that a perfectly rational being would
> act perfectly morally. In fact, a perfectly rational being is nto even
> tempted to act immorally, according to Kant. The only reason moral
> philosophy exists, I suppose, is because we are imperfect. I disagree
> completely.
>
A perfectly rational being would not so much do something as be something,
i.e., a being who 'loves his neighbor as he loves himself'. That's because
being rational is simply a matter of 'being able to "see" what is going
on', i.e., of being objective, both epistemically AND valuatively, IMHO.
You can't get any simpler than that. Bring the mountain to Mohammed, get it?
> I think a "perfectly rational being" (for starters I think it is an
> oxymoron, but...) will act perfectly in their best self-interests.
That's because, as a naturally selected organism, you have more than
a little difficulty with abandoning the self-interest assumption.
Understandable. But it leads to a theory of ratioanlity which is
demonstrably self-defeating, sanctions all sorts of paradoxes, and
tells us virtually nothing about the world that we didn't already
know.
> The
> moral issues arise when our self-interests conflict between beings not
> within a given being.
> We do not always act out of our true rational
> self-interest
an oxymoron, IMHO, like Christian militia or jumbo shrimp. :)
> because we are imperfect, but we tend to and we
> definitely act out of our perceived self-interest. And, that self-
> interest is in principle completely independent of any other's self
> interest or any idea of justice. That is why half the time it is in
> our self-interest to act unjustly. Moral evaluations occur
> independently of self-interest and what a rational person will do out
> of prudential considerations. I contend that if it were not possible
> to construct examples of it being rational to act unjustly, then
> morality would be a pretty academic and irrelevent subject.
>
Maybe. But if you want a profoundly simple justification of morality,
simply abandon the self-interest assumption, i.e., the assumption that
morality is a matter of 'doing unto others as you would have them do
unto you', and replace it with the assumption that 'being rational'
is a matter of 'being able to "see" what is going on'. Because moral
beings "see" more, they are more rational, i.e., more objective, both
epistemically and valuatively. Get it?
> --
> Adrian
>
> "Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in
> accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of
> choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a
> universal law."
>
Everyone's freedom? Sounds like a good dose of self-interest to me.
Adrian
Well, this is all looking at it from the standpoint of "What is the
Good?" He starts here with a good will in the Groundwork. But, I
really think that his real agenda is to get away from something like
that.
> > The point is that
> > you can just take a party slogan and construe it to mean something
that
> > takes 50,000 words to say definitively. But if you want the
definitive
> > statement you have to read the 50,000 words.
>
> And even then, you might end up in a debate which might last a few
> hundred years, which is pretty much my point. BTW, I am not
> a Kant hater, and actually have high regard for some of his writings,
> but am only trying to point out a much more expedient way of getting
> to his desired conclusion, i.e., that it is rational to be moral.
>
That is not his desired conclusion. He concludes that but what he
seems to be mainly interested in is a careful development of what is
only casually disclosed as something like the golden rule. Really what
he seems to be the most interested in is concluding that ethics is
deontological. Ethics has been discussed for millenia -- no one is
going to settle it in less than 50,000 words.
Besides that, *the* conclusion that he gave mankind is an explicit
articulation of the principle of universality.
> > Kant bends over backwards
> > to make sure that you don't walk away with a collectivist idea of
what
> > he means. It takes a real creative effort to get that out of what
he
> > says in the Metaphysics of Morals and he labors long and hard to
split
> > the hairs just so, so that those that come behind him might be able
to
> > lie about what he says but they won't be able to split hairs to make
> > imply something he never intended.
> >
>
> Yes, but he still ends up with a STRATEGIC notion of rationality, and
> 50,000 pages of very obscure text about which there is rarely any
final
> agreement between interpreters. And the imperative itself still has
> self-interest overtones, in spite of all the argumentation.
>
You take one of the most if not the most influential philosopher of all
time in the matter and you are going to get dispute over what he really
meant. Social democrats call Locke a socialist -- you aren't going to
get around the fact that people are going to twist what you say.
Besides that, I have Mary Gregor's translation of the Metaphysics of
Morals. Perhaps you would find that more readable. I cannot imagine
considering Kant to be obscure and hard to read compared to Hobbes
which is in Elizabethan English. Or, for that matter, don't let those
fundies put you to shame! They read the KJV bible which makes Kant
look like a children's book when it comes to readability.
*wonders what Kant's Flesch score would be*
> > > By simply abandoning the self
> > > interest assumption, you can get to the equivalent of the
categorical
> > > imperative without having to read 50,000 pages of dense
philosophy,
> > > IMHO.
> > >
> >
> > But we all do, in fact, act out of our self-interest and are
ultimately
> > interested in our self-interest. You may dispose of it as you
please
> > in moral philosophy, but as a fact of reality it will always be
there.
> >
>
> But how does that constitute an argument that it is rational?
>
It doesn't. We act out of self-interest. Desire is by definiton
irrational. The only rational part of it is that we might be able to
assess our true interest better rationally at times (delay of
gratification). This, however, only presents us with a situation to
evaluate morally. It does not present us with the moral evaluation.
> Special concern for one's own future would be selected by
> evolution: Animals without such concern would be more likely
> to die before passing on their genes. Such concern would
> remain, as a natural fact, even if we decided that it was not
> justified. By thinking hard about the arguments, we might
> be able briefly to stun this natural concern. But it would
> soon revive... The fact that we have this attitude cannot
> therefore be a reason for thinking it justified. Whether
> it is justified [i.e. rational] is an open question, waiting
> to be answered (Derek Parfit, 'Reasons and Persons').
>
I do not think that one should act contrary to their self-interest. I
just think it is wrong to. In other words, I think we should make a
government that makes it in our self-interest to act contrary to the
way we should otherwise act, namely to make it in our self-interest to
act morally.
<snip>
>
> > I think a "perfectly rational being" (for starters I think it is an
> > oxymoron, but...) will act perfectly in their best self-interests.
>
> That's because, as a naturally selected organism, you have more than
> a little difficulty with abandoning the self-interest assumption.
> Understandable. But it leads to a theory of ratioanlity which is
> demonstrably self-defeating, sanctions all sorts of paradoxes, and
> tells us virtually nothing about the world that we didn't already
> know.
>
Right. But, to quote an old saying: "If you ask a stupid
question...." In other words, we are already erring in bringing up the
idea of a perfectly rational being. But, to say that it is rational to
act morally, I think, is fundamentally mistaken about the nature of
morality. I suppose I agree with Rand in that I think we should
neither expect from oursleves nor anyone else other than that we act in
our best self-interest. However, where Rand fails to add much is how
such a philosophy gets us to any sense of justice. It doesn't -- that
is a completely separate issue. And that is where Kant comes in.
> > The
> > moral issues arise when our self-interests conflict between beings
not
> > within a given being.
> > We do not always act out of our true rational
> > self-interest
>
> an oxymoron, IMHO, like Christian militia or jumbo shrimp. :)
All this talk of Christians and Shrimp is making me and the rest of the
lions hungry >;^}
>
> > because we are imperfect, but we tend to and we
> > definitely act out of our perceived self-interest. And, that self-
> > interest is in principle completely independent of any other's self
> > interest or any idea of justice. That is why half the time it is in
> > our self-interest to act unjustly. Moral evaluations occur
> > independently of self-interest and what a rational person will do
out
> > of prudential considerations. I contend that if it were not
possible
> > to construct examples of it being rational to act unjustly, then
> > morality would be a pretty academic and irrelevent subject.
> >
>
> Maybe. But if you want a profoundly simple justification of morality,
> simply abandon the self-interest assumption, i.e., the assumption that
> morality is a matter of 'doing unto others as you would have them do
> unto you', and replace it with the assumption that 'being rational'
> is a matter of 'being able to "see" what is going on'. Because moral
> beings "see" more, they are more rational, i.e., more objective, both
> epistemically and valuatively. Get it?
>
I understand what you are saying, but I disagree with it. I do not
think that a moral person is necessarily rational. If that were the
case, then we would not see nearly so much evil in the world. We would
not have to make special consideration of it. It really would not be
that interesting to talk about morality. It would just be a matter of
personal economics. By the way, this view is definitely not Kant. I
think it might be something Samuel Clarke would have said, but it might
be purely my own machination to emphasize it.
<snip>
--
Adrian
"Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in
accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of
choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a
universal law."
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals
Ken Gardner
> > > You say this as though it were as simple as deciding that that is what
> > > one chooses to do. Isn't that a lack of objectivity regarding our own
> > > capacity for objectivity?
> > No.
> You sound just a wee bit dogmatic on this point. Or is it just my
> imagination. :)
You decide.
Ken
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Adrian wrote:
>
>
> Well, this is all looking at it from the standpoint of "What is the
> Good?" He starts here with a good will in the Groundwork. But, I
> really think that his real agenda is to get away from something like
> that.
>
Which, on the surface, certainly appears to make sense. But in the
light of modern developments, it probably makes more sense to start
with a scientific anomaly, such as the intersubjectively reproducible
feature of nature indexed by the linguistic expression, 'feelings of
worthlessness'. Of course, this does not mean that one can treat
our semantic ecology with indifference. It just means that there may
be a better place to start than with the examination of the meanings
of words, given the relative rates of "success of the two approaches.
> > to his desired conclusion, i.e., that it is rational to be moral.
> >
>
> That is not his desired conclusion.
Here we disagree. I believe Kant was electrified by Hume's skepticism,
or at least that is what I take to be the commonly recieved opinion
on Kant, and wanted deperately to re-establish a number of beliefs
and values on a rational foundation. But perhaps I don't quite
understand where you are coming from on this. Kant is obviously
a very complex criter to encapsulate in a single phrase.
> Ethics has been discussed for millenia -- no one is
> going to settle it in less than 50,000 words.
>
Certainly, a profound skepticism on this point would be entirely
reasonable. But even so, it is not entirely unreasonable to suppose
that, should someone actually make a bit of headway on these matters,
the answers might be so simple that everyone would ask themselves
how could it have taken so long to figure it out. I'm thinking
here along the lines of Copernicus and Darwin. And also, don't
forget that the huge benefits of the advances in knowledge since
Kant, e.g., evolutionary theory, advances in the both the scientific
method and the philosophy of science (e.g., Kuhn, Bhaskar, Hansen,
etc.), may have rendered some of these ancient problems more
amenable to resolution.
>
> >
> > But how does that constitute an argument that it is rational?
> >
>
> It doesn't. We act out of self-interest. Desire is by definiton
> irrational. The only rational part of it is that we might be able to
> assess our true interest better rationally at times (delay of
> gratification). This, however, only presents us with a situation to
> evaluate morally. It does not present us with the moral evaluation.
Not quite clear on the distinction.
>
> I do not think that one should act contrary to their self-interest. I
> just think it is wrong to. In other words, I think we should make a
> government that makes it in our self-interest to act contrary to the
> way we should otherwise act, namely to make it in our self-interest to
> act morally.
>
I think it would be rational for a government to be designed to appeal
to self-interested constituents. But I don't think any of this constitutes
an argument that self-interest is itself an inherent aspect of rationality.
To do so, to me, seems to be a case of conflating the rationality of the
means with the rationality of the end. Self-interested is what we ARE.
Whether what we ARE is rational in this regard is "an open question
waiting to be answered" (Parfit).
> > That's because, as a naturally selected organism, you have more than
> > a little difficulty with abandoning the self-interest assumption.
> > Understandable. But it leads to a theory of ratioanlity which is
> > demonstrably self-defeating, sanctions all sorts of paradoxes, and
> > tells us virtually nothing about the world that we didn't already
> > know.
> >
>
> Right. But, to quote an old saying: "If you ask a stupid
> question...." In other words, we are already erring in bringing up the
> idea of a perfectly rational being.
I TOTALLY AGREE WITH YOU ON THIS POINT. Now just extend it a bit, to
the conclusion that there is no such thing as an ideally rational
belief, objective, value, method (objectivism's mistake), theory,
definition, etc., and you will
arrive at precisely my own theory of rationality. You will also
begin to understand why I have defined 'being rational' in metaphorical
terms, i.e., as a matter of 'being able to "see" what is going on"
and why I insist that all rationality ascriptions must be in
comparative terms, e.g., belief/value system X is more or less
rational than belief/value system Y, the norm, etc.. You will
also begin to understand why it is that the particular theory
of rationality I am proposing here is one which PREDICTS ITS
OWN DEMISE.
Not only that, but even more importantly, you will begin to understand
why there is a species of naturally selected organism expending most
of its effort and energy on the survivalistically bizarre non-physical
objective of maximizing self-worth rather than maximizing their
PHYSICAL best interests, as implied by our current understanding
of natural selection (e.g., the kin calculus developed by Hamilton,
Smith, etc.).
>
> I understand what you are saying, but I disagree with it. I do not
> think that a moral person is necessarily rational. If that were the
> case, then we would not see nearly so much evil in the world.
This argument won't hold. The fact that persons strive to accomplish
moral objectives in a fallible and immoral fashion doesn't really
impune the contention that 'being rational' is a matter of 'loving
your neighbor as your love yourself'. It just suggests that our
moral endeavors are usually as much if not more a matter of
emotional self-interest than of true love for others (e.g.,
Mother Teresa).
> We would
> not have to make special consideration of it. It really would not be
> that interesting to talk about morality. It would just be a matter of
> personal economics. By the way, this view is definitely not Kant.
Kant wants to capture it all in terms of one's duty. Understandable
considering his cultural heritage. But he still has an underlying
thesis that we should do our duty because, all things considered, it
will work out for the best for the world at large, and as such entails
an implicit appeal to self-interest at large. My proposal is that
it is "rational" to love your neighbor as yourself, simply because
'being rational' is a matter of 'being objective'. As to why one
"ought" to be rational, I have no idea, but to the extent one wishes
to be so, then the moral imperative ensues simply because that is
what 'being rational' "is".
Adrian
"Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
<snip>
> > > to his desired conclusion, i.e., that it is rational to be moral.
> > >
> >
> > That is not his desired conclusion.
>
> Here we disagree. I believe Kant was electrified by Hume's
skepticism,
> or at least that is what I take to be the commonly recieved opinion
> on Kant, and wanted deperately to re-establish a number of beliefs
> and values on a rational foundation. But perhaps I don't quite
> understand where you are coming from on this. Kant is obviously
> a very complex criter to encapsulate in a single phrase.
>
Indeed, he did speak out against skepticism. However, that theme is a
lot more appropriately applied to Critique of Pure Reason and kind of
in general. In his groundwork he specifically goes out of his way to
refute utilitarianism. So in his moral and political philosophy, there
is a much more direct goal he seeks.
But, you do have a point that if anything, his purpose in philosophy
was to refute subjectivity and skepticism. He several times makes
mention of the fact that the dialectic and antinomies are nto
acceptable and that any contradictions are only apparent and that
reason (good ole fashioned Aristotelean logic) can resolve them.
Notwithstanding this issue that seems to be particularly dwelt upon in
this group (probably because the major proponents of Kant being a
subjectivist haven't bothered to give him even the most superficial of
considerations), the real issue Kant seems to take in his moral
philosophy is against ends based ethics.
<snip>
> >
> > I understand what you are saying, but I disagree with it. I do not
> > think that a moral person is necessarily rational. If that were the
> > case, then we would not see nearly so much evil in the world.
>
> This argument won't hold. The fact that persons strive to accomplish
> moral objectives in a fallible and immoral fashion doesn't really
> impune the contention that 'being rational' is a matter of 'loving
> your neighbor as your love yourself'. It just suggests that our
> moral endeavors are usually as much if not more a matter of
> emotional self-interest than of true love for others (e.g.,
> Mother Teresa).
>
I don't think you understand what I am trying to say. Kant happened to
think that morality might be characterized as the way that a perfectly
rational agent would select their ends or that the most morally
valuable ends are those that a perfectly rational agent would select
for themselves. I think this view is mistaken. However, his moral
philosophy does not rest on it, so I do not reject his moral philosophy.
> > We would
> > not have to make special consideration of it. It really would not
be
> > that interesting to talk about morality. It would just be a matter
of
> > personal economics. By the way, this view is definitely not Kant.
>
> Kant wants to capture it all in terms of one's duty. Understandable
> considering his cultural heritage. But he still has an underlying
> thesis that we should do our duty because, all things considered, it
> will work out for the best for the world at large, and as such entails
> an implicit appeal to self-interest at large.
No way. Kant does not say that. His moral philosophy is desinged to
have nothing to do with something like what is best for us all
collectively or that it will work out for the best or some such *ends
based* thing. That is, in fact, what the utilitarians say which Kant
specifically rejected. His duties are all supposed to be based on the
principle of universality aplpied to different contexts. After Kant,
almost no one disputes the priniciple of universality, so we have been
making some headway over the centuries, incidentally. :)
> My proposal is that
> it is "rational" to love your neighbor as yourself, simply because
> 'being rational' is a matter of 'being objective'. As to why one
> "ought" to be rational, I have no idea, but to the extent one wishes
> to be so, then the moral imperative ensues simply because that is
> what 'being rational' "is".
>
Now this is precisely what *I* am taking issue with. The more rational
an agent is the more he will tend *not* to take others into
consideration in the final analysis. Much of the time, the wants or
needs of others is not directly relevant if not irrelevant, anyway,
such as if I want to go use the bathroom at the moment or if I want a
drink of water or take a breath or.... On the other hand, if I can
force someone to get me a glass of water or to procure all my food for
me to eat whenever I feel like it, then the desires of others becomes
an issue. For, if they do not want to go to all the trouble to get my
food and water for me, then what happens is we have one being desiring
one end to which another being desires an opposing end. They cannot
both have their way as a matter of logic.
Now this is where the classic Kantian development of the categorical
imperative or the principle of universality comes in. Moral philosophy
is that endeavor that seeks to understand what ends that it is merely
*possible* that we can all consitently have. In other words, moral
philosophy is the intellectual pursuit of finding out what ends are co-
possible. The most basic mistake one can make in approaching morality
this way is that they do not consider the matter thoroughly enough. I
want the ten dollars in my wallet, and you want the ten dollars in my
wallet. We cannot both have it, so perhaps it would be construed that
I would suggest here that neither of us can have it since that is what
is apparently co-possible.
Obviously, there is a lot more to consider than just that. There is
the whole history of the ten dollars. Perhaps if the ten dollars were
lying in the middle of the street half way between us, then the above
reasoning is all that we would have to go on. But what about the idea
of being able to labor for some benefit that may not be alienated from
me? Could such things (such as ownership of property under certain
conditions) be co-possible? (Apparently, Marx thought so.) Anyway,
the point is that this development of morality is independent of the
valuation of ends. Such a development is along the lines of natural
rights or the categorical imperative and is generally classified as
"deontological" or "means-based" or "duty-based" and is in strict
opposition to "teleological" or "ends-based" ethics. The world could
come to an end tomorrow, and it could be a perfectly *morally* neutral
event, no matter how horrible it might be.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Adrian wrote:
>
> In article <389DC013...@ix.netcom.com>,
> "Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
> Indeed, he did speak out against skepticism. However, that theme is a
> lot more appropriately applied to Critique of Pure Reason and kind of
> in general. In his groundwork he specifically goes out of his way to
> refute utilitarianism. So in his moral and political philosophy, there
> is a much more direct goal he seeks.
>
> But, you do have a point that if anything, his purpose in philosophy
> was to refute subjectivity and skepticism. He several times makes
> mention of the fact that the dialectic and antinomies are nto
> acceptable and that any contradictions are only apparent and that
> reason (good ole fashioned Aristotelean logic) can resolve them.
> Notwithstanding this issue that seems to be particularly dwelt upon in
> this group (probably because the major proponents of Kant being a
> subjectivist haven't bothered to give him even the most superficial of
> considerations), the real issue Kant seems to take in his moral
> philosophy is against ends based ethics.
>
I think he was right on on this point, but probably for different reasons,
i.e., that rationality can not be reduced to rules, algorhythms,
programs, etc., and a fixed objective is simply a program (a formalism)
in the most abstract sense of the term. Or is this something you also
disagree with?
> >
> > Kant wants to capture it all in terms of one's duty. Understandable
> > considering his cultural heritage. But he still has an underlying
> > thesis that we should do our duty because, all things considered, it
> > will work out for the best for the world at large, and as such entails
> > an implicit appeal to self-interest at large.
>
> No way. Kant does not say that. His moral philosophy is desinged to
> have nothing to do with something like what is best for us all
> collectively or that it will work out for the best or some such *ends
> based* thing. That is, in fact, what the utilitarians say which Kant
> specifically rejected. His duties are all supposed to be based on the
> principle of universality aplpied to different contexts. After Kant,
> almost no one disputes the priniciple of universality, so we have been
> making some headway over the centuries, incidentally. :)
>
Doesn't an argument based on a univerality criterion constitute an
ends based criterion? I'm a little confused here.
> > My proposal is that
> > it is "rational" to love your neighbor as yourself, simply because
> > 'being rational' is a matter of 'being objective'. As to why one
> > "ought" to be rational, I have no idea, but to the extent one wishes
> > to be so, then the moral imperative ensues simply because that is
> > what 'being rational' "is".
> >
>
> Now this is precisely what *I* am taking issue with. The more rational
> an agent is the more he will tend *not* to take others into
> consideration in the final analysis.
But your contention is countered by observable evidence on this matter,
i.e., that the most rational species is also the most altruistic, i.e.,
the one most plagued with moral concerns. Doesn't this suggest a
causal relationship which is the reverse of the one you are maintaining,
i.e., that as rationality goes up other-interestedness goes up rather
down as you maintain?
> Much of the time, the wants or
> needs of others is not directly relevant if not irrelevant, anyway,
> such as if I want to go use the bathroom at the moment or if I want a
> drink of water or take a breath or.... On the other hand, if I can
> force someone to get me a glass of water or to procure all my food for
> me to eat whenever I feel like it, then the desires of others becomes
> an issue. For, if they do not want to go to all the trouble to get my
> food and water for me, then what happens is we have one being desiring
> one end to which another being desires an opposing end. They cannot
> both have their way as a matter of logic.
>
You have taken issue with me on this point, and stated your own position,
as well as working out some of the details, but you have not as yet
offered much in the way of an argument to corroborate your position.
Where's the beef, as they say. :)
> Now this is where the classic Kantian development of the categorical
> imperative or the principle of universality comes in. Moral philosophy
> is that endeavor that seeks to understand what ends that it is merely
> *possible* that we can all consitently have.
> In other words, moral
> philosophy is the intellectual pursuit of finding out what ends are co-
> possible. The most basic mistake one can make in approaching morality
> this way is that they do not consider the matter thoroughly enough. I
> want the ten dollars in my wallet, and you want the ten dollars in my
> wallet. We cannot both have it, so perhaps it would be construed that
> I would suggest here that neither of us can have it since that is what
> is apparently co-possible.
>
But all this sounds like ends based reasoning, unlike my own theory
which TRULY IS NOT ends based, i.e., in which 'being rational' is
simply a matter of 'being able to "see" what is going on'.
> Obviously, there is a lot more to consider than just that. There is
> the whole history of the ten dollars. Perhaps if the ten dollars were
> lying in the middle of the street half way between us, then the above
> reasoning is all that we would have to go on. But what about the idea
> of being able to labor for some benefit that may not be alienated from
> me? Could such things (such as ownership of property under certain
> conditions) be co-possible? (Apparently, Marx thought so.) Anyway,
> the point is that this development of morality is independent of the
> valuation of ends.
This is where you've lost me. Are you saying that because Kant contemplates
CO-POSSIBLE ends that he has escaped the ends based type of theory which
he criticizes?
> Such a development is along the lines of natural
> rights or the categorical imperative and is generally classified as
> "deontological" or "means-based" or "duty-based" and is in strict
> opposition to "teleological" or "ends-based" ethics.
Previously you disagreed with my contention that Kant relied heavily on
the notion of duty, or did I misunderstand. Also, I'm still having
a little trouble with the distinction. Its seems to me that it is
still a matter of desirable ends which drives Kants machinations.
I guess I'm going to have to get out my Cambridge Companion to Kant,
eh? Its been a while. :)
Adrian
"Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
<snip>
>
> Doesn't an argument based on a univerality criterion constitute an
> ends based criterion? I'm a little confused here.
>
Not really -- not based purely from the principle of universality. The
priniciple of universal simply puts a constraint on what could be
permissible. The utilitarian priciple, for instance, actually requires
a criterion to place worth on the consequences of actions. The
universality principle does not really look at the particualr ends a
person has so much as the way in which they go about achieving those
ends.
> > > My proposal is that
> > > it is "rational" to love your neighbor as yourself, simply because
> > > 'being rational' is a matter of 'being objective'. As to why one
> > > "ought" to be rational, I have no idea, but to the extent one
wishes
> > > to be so, then the moral imperative ensues simply because that is
> > > what 'being rational' "is".
> > >
> >
> > Now this is precisely what *I* am taking issue with. The more
rational
> > an agent is the more he will tend *not* to take others into
> > consideration in the final analysis.
>
> But your contention is countered by observable evidence on this
matter,
> i.e., that the most rational species is also the most altruistic,
i.e.,
> the one most plagued with moral concerns. Doesn't this suggest a
> causal relationship which is the reverse of the one you are
maintaining,
> i.e., that as rationality goes up other-interestedness goes up rather
> down as you maintain?
>
I don't think that is true. Not only are most animals at least as
alturistic as humans are -- bees for instance -- but I think that the
only reason we are plagued by moral concerns is because the subject of
morality is a rational issue. That is to say, you have to be rational
to engage in moral philosophy, but being moral is not particularly a
rational thing to do.
I don't think so. Kant is almost the definition of "means-based"
reasoning.
> > Obviously, there is a lot more to consider than just that. There is
> > the whole history of the ten dollars. Perhaps if the ten dollars
were
> > lying in the middle of the street half way between us, then the
above
> > reasoning is all that we would have to go on. But what about the
idea
> > of being able to labor for some benefit that may not be alienated
from
> > me? Could such things (such as ownership of property under certain
> > conditions) be co-possible? (Apparently, Marx thought so.) Anyway,
> > the point is that this development of morality is independent of the
> > valuation of ends.
>
> This is where you've lost me. Are you saying that because Kant
contemplates
> CO-POSSIBLE ends that he has escaped the ends based type of theory
which
> he criticizes?
>
Yes -- since he contemplates *only* the co-possibility of the ends
(i.e. their fitness as universal principles) in making a moral
evaluation, his moral evaluation is completely independent of something
like the value of the ends themselves. In other words, he does not
look to the consequences of the action but rather the internal
consistency of the maxim of the action if considered as a universal law.
For instance, consider stealing. A thief wishes to possess an object
as his own property that some other man owns. So, the thief violates
that man's property rights only to be able to have the same rights
himself over the object in question. This act of stealing contradicts
itself as a universal principle of action since if everyone stole, the
thief could not possess the object he originally desired as his own
property. Basically from the perspective of universality, we can
either have property or we can authorize stealing (though in such a
case it would not be called "stealing"), but we cannot have both. That
means that for the thief, stealing can only be acceptable *for him*
(i.e. is not universalizable).
Okay, so Kant would reject stealing as immoral since it violates the
principle of universality. Notice there is no consideration of society
being better off in the long run if we stamp out theft. There is no
questioning about the consequence of the act of stealing -- whether or
not (all thigns being equal) the thief should have the object rather
than its present owner. The end result is not evaluated here -- just
the act itself. The ends are not even brought up.
> > Such a development is along the lines of natural
> > rights or the categorical imperative and is generally classified as
> > "deontological" or "means-based" or "duty-based" and is in strict
> > opposition to "teleological" or "ends-based" ethics.
>
> Previously you disagreed with my contention that Kant relied heavily
on
> the notion of duty, or did I misunderstand.
Definitely if you thought that!
> Also, I'm still having
> a little trouble with the distinction. Its seems to me that it is
> still a matter of desirable ends which drives Kants machinations.
"Whenever, an object of the will has to be put down as the basis for
prescribing a rule to determine the will, there the rule is heteronom;
the imperative is conditioned, as follows: "*If*, or *because*, you
will this object, you ought to act thus or thus'; consequently it can
never give moral -- that is, a categorical -- command."
-- Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals
> I guess I'm going to have to get out my Cambridge Companion to Kant,
> eh? Its been a while. :)
I think you should get out Kant, himself. ;-)
mdhjwh
Newsgroups:
humanities.philosophy.objectivism
References:
1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15
, 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 ,
20 , 21 , 22
Adrian wrote:>He several times makes
mention of the fact that the dialectic and antinomies are not
acceptable and that any contradictions are only apparent and that
reason (good ole fashioned Aristotelian logic) can resolve them.<
Are you saying that Kant acknowledged a debt to Aristotle or that
his view of dialectic and antinomies only implies such ?
John H
mdhjwh
"Phil Roberts, Jr." wrote:>I guess I'm going to have to get out my Cambridge
Companion to Kant, eh? Its been a while. :)<
Does such a animal exist and if so could you let us know of the publisher?.
Cambridge Uni' Press ? ? ? ?
John H
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Adrian wrote:
>
> In article <389E5543...@ix.netcom.com>,
> "Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
> >
> > Doesn't an argument based on a univerality criterion constitute an
> > ends based criterion? I'm a little confused here.
> >
>
> Not really -- not based purely from the principle of universality. The
> priniciple of universal simply puts a constraint on what could be
> permissible. The utilitarian priciple, for instance, actually requires
> a criterion to place worth on the consequences of actions. The
> universality principle does not really look at the particualr ends a
> person has so much as the way in which they go about achieving those
> ends.
>
But it presupposes the value of those ends in order to sanction the
value on the means to the ends. I don't see how basing a principle on
ends in the abstract gets around a criticism that it is an ends based
criterion.
> > i.e., that as rationality goes up other-interestedness goes up rather
> > down as you maintain?
> >
>
> I don't think that is true. Not only are most animals at least as
> alturistic as humans are -- bees for instance --
Not according to the most eminent sociobiologist of the twentieth
century:
It is ironic that Ashley Montagu should criticize Lorentz as
'a direct descendent of the "nature red in tooth and claw" thinkers
of the nineteenth century....' As I understand Lorentz' view of
evolution, he would be very much at one with Montagu in rejecting
the implications of Tennyson's phrase. Unlike both of them, I
think 'nature red in tooth and claw' sums up our modern understanding
of natural selection admirably. (Dawkins).
Worker bees don't reproduce, so their sacrificing of themselves to
protect the group is not the least bit anomalous with respect to
the theory of natural selection. Here are a few quotes from the
folks who have had varying degrees of influence on my thinking
in this domain:
The identification of individuals as the unit of
selection is a central theme in Darwin's thought.
This idea underliees his most radical claim: that
evolution is purposeless and without inherent
direction. ... Evolution does not recognize the 'good'
of the ecosystem' or even the 'good of the species.'
Any harmony or stability is only an indirect result of
individuals relentlessly pursuing their own self-interest
-- in modern parlance, getting more of their genes into
future generations by greater reproductive success.
Individuals are the unit of selection; the "struggle
for existence" is a matter among individuals (Stephen
Gould).
Clearly from a gene's point of view it is worthwhile
to deprive a large number of distant relatives in order
to extract a small reproductive advantage. (W. D. Hamilton)
Like Chicago gangsters, our genes have survived, in some cases for
millions of years, in a highly competitive world. This entitles us to
expect
certain qualities in our genes. I shall argue that a predominent quality
to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless selfishness. This gene
selfishness will usually give rise to selfishness in individual behavior.
However, as we shall see, there are special circumstances in which a
gene can achieve its own selfish goals best by fostering a limited form
of altruism. 'Special' and 'limited' are important words in the last
sentence. Much as we might wish to believe otherwise, universal love
and the welfare of the species as a whole are concepts which simply
do not make evolutionary sense (Dawkins).
Even with qualifications regarding the possibility
of group selection, the portrait of the biologically
based social personality that emerges is one of
predominantly self-serving opportunism _even_for_
_the_most_social_species_, for all species in which
there is genetic competition among the social co-
operators, that is, where all members have the chance
of parenthood (Donald Campbell).
> but I think that the
> only reason we are plagued by moral concerns is because the subject of
> morality is a rational issue. That is to say, you have to be rational
> to engage in moral philosophy, but being moral is not particularly a
> rational thing to do.
>
Certainly not from the perspective of a naturally selected self-interested
organism. But you have not offered me much of a reason to assume that
self-interest is an inherent aspect of rationality to date, other than
pointing out that that is what we are. As I said previoulsy, 'Where's
the beef?' :)
> But all this sounds like ends based reasoning, unlike my own theory
> > which TRULY IS NOT ends based, i.e., in which 'being rational' is
> > simply a matter of 'being able to "see" what is going on'.
> >
>
> I don't think so. Kant is almost the definition of "means-based"
> reasoning.
>
I think you are confusing concrete ends based with abstract ends based
reasoning. From my perspective, BOTH are in error because rational
behavior is not something determined and dictated by an end, but rather
is simply the manifestation of a "good will", i.e., one which is 'able
to "see" what is going on", and has subsequently become a little too
objective for its own good.
> > This is where you've lost me. Are you saying that because Kant
> contemplates
> > CO-POSSIBLE ends that he has escaped the ends based type of theory
> which
> > he criticizes?
> >
>
> Yes -- since he contemplates *only* the co-possibility of the ends
> (i.e. their fitness as universal principles) in making a moral
> evaluation, his moral evaluation is completely independent of something
> like the value of the ends themselves.
But he presupposes a principle in which the value on the means is a
function of the value of the end. So there may be no no in his
words, but there's yes yes in his thinking, isn't there.
> In other words, he does not
> look to the consequences of the action but rather the internal
> consistency of the maxim of the action if considered as a universal law.
>
This helps a bit, but it still seems to be a case of wanting to have
his cake and eat it too.
> For instance, consider stealing. A thief wishes to possess an object
> as his own property that some other man owns. So, the thief violates
> that man's property rights only to be able to have the same rights
> himself over the object in question. This act of stealing contradicts
> itself as a universal principle of action since if everyone stole, the
> thief could not possess the object he originally desired as his own
> property. Basically from the perspective of universality, we can
> either have property or we can authorize stealing (though in such a
> case it would not be called "stealing"), but we cannot have both. That
> means that for the thief, stealing can only be acceptable *for him*
> (i.e. is not universalizable).
>
But all of this presupposes self-interested motivation. On what grounds
should I suppose that rationality ENTAILS self-interest.
> Okay, so Kant would reject stealing as immoral since it violates the
> principle of universality. Notice there is no consideration of society
> being better off in the long run if we stamp out theft. There is no
> questioning about the consequence of the act of stealing -- whether or
> not (all thigns being equal) the thief should have the object rather
> than its present owner. The end result is not evaluated here -- just
> the act itself. The ends are not even brought up.
>
Actually, they are implicit in the valuing of the means. See what I
mean when you start to talk about Kant.
> > Also, I'm still having
> > a little trouble with the distinction. Its seems to me that it is
> > still a matter of desirable ends which drives Kants machinations.
>
> "Whenever, an object of the will has to be put down as the basis for
> prescribing a rule to determine the will, there the rule is heteronom;
> the imperative is conditioned, as follows: "*If*, or *because*, you
> will this object, you ought to act thus or thus'; consequently it can
> never give moral -- that is, a categorical -- command."
>
Interesting. But what motivates the categorical imperative. Pure
form, duty, I sustpect? Not very motivational is it? An ideally
rational being simply follows a different detemination, I quess.
My own take on this is similar to that of Schopenhaurer, that an ideally
rational will becomes no will at all, i.e., that there is an inverse
correlation between consciousness and will. ALL desire is IRRATIONAL,
including the desire to obey the moral imperative, because it requires
a fixating of one's mental focus on 'being rational', much like
Dr. Frankenstein. So, unlike Kant, I do not view 'being rational'
as a matter of following rules, of being DETERMINED by different
principles, but rather that the good will is the result of becoming
completely indetermined by all the rules. Once "sees" what is
going on. That's why philosophical is defined as passive in
the dictionary, etc. Another way of saying this is that, as implied
by Godel, 'being rational' is not a matter of following a program,
but rather a matter of COGNIZING a program with the option to TRANSCEND
the program (e.g., nature's program that one maximize one's overall
best interest). I'm sure this would be a bit of an anathema to
objectivists however. In fact, I suspect most folks would find it
sufficiently emotionally repulsive to not even want to consider it.
Rationality theory is a dirty business, but some body's got to do
it. :)
Phil Roberts, Jr.
mdhjwh wrote:
>
> "Phil Roberts, Jr." wrote:>I guess I'm going to have to get out my Cambridge
> Companion to Kant, eh? Its been a while. :)<
> Does such a animal exist and if so could you let us know of the publisher?.
> Cambridge Uni' Press ? ? ? ?
Its a stock item at Barne's and Noble, B. Dalton, Amazon, etc. Very popoular
stuff, and easy to read for bone heads like myself who don't have the patience
to sort through the chaff to get to the wheat.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Adrian wrote:
>
> For instance, consider stealing. A thief wishes to possess an object
> as his own property that some other man owns. So, the thief violates
> that man's property rights only to be able to have the same rights
> himself over the object in question. This act of stealing contradicts
> itself as a universal principle of action since if everyone stole, the
> thief could not possess the object he originally desired as his own
> property. Basically from the perspective of universality, we can
> either have property or we can authorize stealing (though in such a
> case it would not be called "stealing"), but we cannot have both. That
> means that for the thief, stealing can only be acceptable *for him*
> (i.e. is not universalizable).
>
As I said previously, this all presupposes self-interested agents, and you
have not offered much in the way of an argument for why someone should
suppose that. But more importantly, I don't believe you've offered
much in the way of a reason for rejecting my own proposal
that 'being rational' is simply a matter of 'being able to "see" what
is going on'. Do you have a reason?
Adrian
> >
>
> > For instance, consider stealing. A thief wishes to possess an
object
> > as his own property that some other man owns. So, the thief
violates
> > that man's property rights only to be able to have the same rights
> > himself over the object in question. This act of stealing
contradicts
> > itself as a universal principle of action since if everyone stole,
the
> > thief could not possess the object he originally desired as his own
> > property. Basically from the perspective of universality, we can
> > either have property or we can authorize stealing (though in such a
> > case it would not be called "stealing"), but we cannot have both.
That
> > means that for the thief, stealing can only be acceptable *for him*
> > (i.e. is not universalizable).
> >
>
and you
> have not offered much in the way of an argument for why someone should
> suppose that.
You do not think that people are all self-interested agents? This is a
simple question of fact. Do people act ultimately in their self-
interest? It is a tautology that they do -- it is the definition
of "self-interest". There is not more presupposition than this in
anything that Kant said, if that. Everything that I am saying says
just that "if there is a conflict of self-interest, then...." If there
is no conflict with in self-interests between agents, then what is the
issue?
> But more importantly, I don't believe you've offered
> much in the way of a reason for rejecting my own proposal
> that 'being rational' is simply a matter of 'being able to "see" what
> is going on'. Do you have a reason?
>
Well, your definition of "rational" I do disagree with in that I think
rational more specifically means adherence to a set of rules of
inference (specifically the laws of logic). Being "objective" with
respect to a particular issue means not having an emotional
(irrational) bias toward any particular answer to the questions
entailed in the issue. Both of these are relevant according to me in
that they are required to some extent in order to apprehend moral
philosophy. However, as far as I am concerned, one can act morally
without ever realizing it (or immorally out of ignorance, for that
matter). We needn't identify with the other person in order to
ultimately act within the constraints of justice. And, being
enlightened may just mean we are better able to thwart justice
depending on the context. (That is, the more capable of "being able
to 'see' what is going on" we are, the more we will be able to actually
pull off actions that would logically mean our own preferential
treatment in the end -- such as stealing where we get to have property
but no one else does.)
Adrian
"Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
>
> Adrian wrote:
> >
> > In article <389E5543...@ix.netcom.com>,
> > "Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> >
> > <snip>
> >
> > >
> > > Doesn't an argument based on a univerality criterion constitute an
> > > ends based criterion? I'm a little confused here.
> > >
> >
> > Not really -- not based purely from the principle of universality.
The
> > priniciple of universal simply puts a constraint on what could be
> > permissible. The utilitarian priciple, for instance, actually
requires
> > a criterion to place worth on the consequences of actions. The
> > universality principle does not really look at the particualr ends a
> > person has so much as the way in which they go about achieving those
> > ends.
> >
>
> But it presupposes the value of those ends in order to sanction the
> value on the means to the ends. I don't see how basing a principle on
> ends in the abstract gets around a criticism that it is an ends based
> criterion.
>
That someone has ends is certainly the case. If there was no will,
then there would be no need for moral philosophy. The point is that
the objects of the will are not used to evaluate the actions. BAck to
the thief: the object of the will is that the thief and not the victim
own the object. This situation -- this end -- is not ever -- not even
indirectly -- involved in evaluating the thief's action of stealing the
object. That is why this moral philosophy is not called "ends-based".
Really, that is what the terms mean.
<snipping citations concerning evolution and selfishness>
I am not sure if those quotes are supposed to support the idea that we
are altruistic or not. In any case, the ultimate point is going to be
something like that we will seem to see individuals sacrifice
themselves when in fact it is in their best interests evolutionarily
speaking. In any case, the point is that apparent altruism is actually
in their self-interest -- it is a matter of selfishness that they act
that way. The punchline is that we all act in our self-interest.
I agree with this.
>
> > but I think that the
> > only reason we are plagued by moral concerns is because the subject
of
> > morality is a rational issue. That is to say, you have to be
rational
> > to engage in moral philosophy, but being moral is not particularly a
> > rational thing to do.
> >
>
> Certainly not from the perspective of a naturally selected self-
interested
> organism. But you have not offered me much of a reason to assume that
> self-interest is an inherent aspect of rationality to date, other than
> pointing out that that is what we are. As I said previoulsy, 'Where's
> the beef?' :)
>
But you don't disagree that we are self-interested by nature. So we
are through with this point then -- we agree. All that matters is that
we are in fact selfish, not that we have to think to be that way or
that it would be rational to be that way or anything of the sort.
So, I do not think that rationality is an inherent aspect of self-
interest. That's the Objectivists. I am saying, in fact, that
rationality is only important if you want to engage in philosophy
(incl. science, math, etc.). Beyond that it has no use. So, in
particular there is no particular connnection between rationality and
morality -- just between rationality and our *knowledge of* morality.
In as much as our knowing what is moral may affect our actually acting
moral, then, we see a correlation between morality and rationality.
<snip>
>
> I think you are confusing concrete ends based with abstract ends based
> reasoning. From my perspective, BOTH are in error because rational
> behavior is not something determined and dictated by an end, but
rather
> is simply the manifestation of a "good will", i.e., one which is 'able
> to "see" what is going on", and has subsequently become a little too
> objective for its own good.
>
Well, that is pretty close to what I might say. If objectivity refers
to a lack of irrational bias, then a totally rational agent will not be
self-interested. On the other hand, it will also lack volition
altogether (and so lack a will and not be an "agent" of any sort). So
there is no such thing as a purely rational agent. the very idea of
being a too objective for your own good is fundamentally flawed.
Kant's philosophy does not rest on this, though he seems to think this
is one way to approach moral philosophy.
And now I am explicitly rejecting that idea that a will can desire
something that it does not value. It is a tautology that a will must
be self-interested.
<snip>
>
> But he presupposes a principle in which the value on the means is a
> function of the value of the end. So there may be no no in his
> words, but there's yes yes in his thinking, isn't there.
>
(You weren't a frat boy were you? :-P)
I don't think so. He is not placing "value" on anything. I just got
through discussing this with Agent Cooper. You are choosing to look at
his philosophy through the lense of value theory. So, it should be no
surprise that his moral philosophy appears to be ultimately ends-based
since everything through the lense of value theory must be so. Kant
actually never really talks like that: "The only actions that have
moral value, ...." He sort of talks this way in introducing the idea
that only a will can be truly good, but in the formation of the
categorical imperative and in really developing his moral philosophy,
he drops this perspective altogether. That is, he does not
consider "the Good", but rather only considers universality. He gets
back into ends in the Doctrine of Virtue, but there again, he
specifically renounces any idea that such a doctrine could form an
objective basis of external constraint and bases it all on making
Justice your end. So even when he has the trappings of considering
ends (which is rare) he still isn't really doing that.
<snip>
> > For instance, consider stealing. A thief wishes to possess an
object
> > as his own property that some other man owns. So, the thief
violates
> > that man's property rights only to be able to have the same rights
> > himself over the object in question. This act of stealing
contradicts
> > itself as a universal principle of action since if everyone stole,
the
> > thief could not possess the object he originally desired as his own
> > property. Basically from the perspective of universality, we can
> > either have property or we can authorize stealing (though in such a
> > case it would not be called "stealing"), but we cannot have both.
That
> > means that for the thief, stealing can only be acceptable *for him*
> > (i.e. is not universalizable).
> >
>
> But all of this presupposes self-interested motivation. On what
grounds
> should I suppose that rationality ENTAILS self-interest.
>
Don't suppose it. It doesn't. Self-interest is about a purely
irrational desire. The *fact* is that we are self-interested
(irrationally so). That is enough to make for dilemmas to arise in a
disinterested third party observer (a judge or a juror, say). It is
there that morality comes up in the first place. As far as each of us
are concerned we should (prudentially speaking) always act in our best
self-interets even if it conflicts with justice.
> > Okay, so Kant would reject stealing as immoral since it violates the
> > principle of universality. Notice there is no consideration of
society
> > being better off in the long run if we stamp out theft. There is no
> > questioning about the consequence of the act of stealing -- whether
or
> > not (all thigns being equal) the thief should have the object rather
> > than its present owner. The end result is not evaluated here --
just
> > the act itself. The ends are not even brought up.
> >
>
> Actually, they are implicit in the valuing of the means. See what I
> mean when you start to talk about Kant.
>
The lense of value theory, again. We do not "value the means" in a
means based theory.
> > > Also, I'm still having
> > > a little trouble with the distinction. Its seems to me that it is
> > > still a matter of desirable ends which drives Kants machinations.
> >
> > "Whenever, an object of the will has to be put down as the basis
for
> > prescribing a rule to determine the will, there the rule is
heteronom;
> > the imperative is conditioned, as follows: "*If*, or *because*, you
> > will this object, you ought to act thus or thus'; consequently it
can
> > never give moral -- that is, a categorical -- command."
> >
>
> Interesting. But what motivates the categorical imperative. Pure
> form, duty, I sustpect? Not very motivational is it? An ideally
> rational being simply follows a different detemination, I quess.
>
EXACTLY!! That is what I say. That is not what Kant said. But, all
that matters is that duty -- morality -- is a purely rational
construct. It is like Clarke would say, for instance. Just as a
statement about two numbers might be "fit" or "proportioned" to the
idea of "less than", a moral statement is similarly evaluated. I am
not trying to actually say here, that there is a spirit world of moral
facts anymore than there is such a world of mathematical facts.
Now we are through with the moral consideration. It can never answer
the question "What shall I do?" That is a purely prudential question.
Sometimes (if you are an impartial observe with authority over some
matter perhaps even given such authority *because* you are impartial)
the answer to the question "What shall I do," is "I shall see that the
outcome is just." In this case, you are now presented with a new
question: "What is just?" And so, we enter the realm of moral
philosophy.
<snip>
Adrian
> >
> > "Phil Roberts, Jr." wrote:>I guess I'm going to have to get out my
Cambridge
> > Companion to Kant, eh? Its been a while. :)<
publisher?.
> > Cambridge Uni' Press ? ? ? ?
>
> Its a stock item at Barne's and Noble, B. Dalton, Amazon, etc. Very
popoular
> stuff, and easy to read for bone heads like myself who don't have the
patience
> to sort through the chaff to get to the wheat.
>
If you're reading Kant, it's all wheat. That is why, I suspect, many
find him "so hard to read". You must try to keep focussed on what it
is he is saying at every point in the book while you are reading him --
you cannot get distracted or else you will likely miss something
important. That just means you read only a few pages a day instead of
a novel a day like one might be used to doing. Sometimes you should
look up and think at length about what he just said and see if you
really agree with it. And when you are done reading his book, come and
post on it some and get into arguments and cite a lot from it as
appropriate.
This forces you to understand what he really said and really produces
quite a level of mastery, I think, that you just wouldn't get otherwise
(no matter who you are discussing it with). I read his books and
gleaned most of the basic idea and argument. But, I really did not
have the kind of through detailed knowledge just of what he said --
whether he was conservative or liberal, if he was for a consitutional
republic or a direct democracy, what exactly his idea of property
rights were, three branches of government or two or what, and so on --
until I came in here and started citing him and rereading parts of his
books and finding the relevant citations and so on.
I much prefer this to taking a course any day! And, judging from what
absurdities I have seen in a serious academic context, I am all the
more satisfied with this approach to philosophy.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Adrian.
I dusted off my Groundwork and quess what? You're right. Its not all
that impenetrable after all. I must have been in a blur after trying
to wade through the critique. And so short. Good suggestion.
Adrian wrote:
>
> In article <389F0245...@ix.netcom.com>,
> "Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> > As I said previously, this all presupposes self-interested agents,
> > and you
> > have not offered much in the way of an argument for why someone should
> > suppose that.
>
> You do not think that people are all self-interested agents? This is a
> simple question of fact. Do people act ultimately in their self-
> interest? It is a tautology that they do -- it is the definition
> of "self-interest". There is not more presupposition than this in
> anything that Kant said, if that. Everything that I am saying says
> just that "if there is a conflict of self-interest, then...." If there
> is no conflict with in self-interests between agents, then what is the
> issue?
>
tou che
Let me try a different tack. Alligators are self-interested, but few of
us would consider them as rational. Obviously, self-interest may be
necessary for rationality, but it is hardly sufficient (leaving aside
the issue that, according to my view, they are only LESS rational
rather than irrational).
What seems to distinguish valuatively irrational creatures from
valuatively rational ones appears to me to be a matter of the
amount of objectivity they exhibit in their values, e.g., the
valuative objectivity necessary for suspending immediate urges
for long range benefits. Since the difference between rational
and irrational in this example is a difference in valuative
objectivity rather than a difference in the degree or amount
of self-interest, is it not at least reasonable to suppose
that 'being rational' might be a matter of 'being valuatively
objective' rather than a matter of 'being self-interested',
that self-interest is not only not sufficient, it isn't even
necessary?
> > But more importantly, I don't believe you've offered
> > much in the way of a reason for rejecting my own proposal
> > that 'being rational' is simply a matter of 'being able to "see" what
> > is going on'. Do you have a reason?
> >
>
> Well, your definition of "rational" I do disagree with in that I think
> rational more specifically means adherence to a set of rules of
> inference (specifically the laws of logic).
There are tons, and I do mean TONS, of reasons for questioning that
assumption, ranging from Godel's theorem to the presence of
anomalous altruism and emotional instability (an increase in
valuative objectivity) in nature's most rational species.
Of course, there has been a long standing tradition of assuming
that 'being rational' is simply a matter of 'being logical'. But
not many modern day theoreticians hold to this view:
(from one of my papers)
!The Logic Assumption! In a similar fashion, in some
academic circles there is at least the implied acceptance of the
assumption that 'being rational' is simply a matter of 'being
logical', or that the latter is a prerequisite for the former.
This probably harks back to Aristotle, in his view of logic as
the laws of thought, and was certainly not diminished by the
practice of referring to philosophers who emphasize the role of
deductive and demonstrative operations as rationalists.
Nowadays the logic assumption continues alive and well as
the implied foundation of the various computational models of
mind which are currently all the rage, as well as being at least
tacitly adopted by many of those working in strategic logic
(e.g., normative decision theory, game theory, etc.) who
frequently construe themselves as engaged in the study of
paradoxes in rationality (Newcomb's problem, prisoner's dilemma,
etc.). However, to the extent that ordinary intuitions do,
indeed, convey relevant information, there is reason to assume
that the endeavor to reduce rationality to logic will not
succeed. This is because, in everyday usage, we seem to employ
rationality terminology and logic terminology in somewhat
different contexts. Although these notions do appear to be
related in some manner, they by no means appear to be
interchangeable or synonymous.
Nor is ordinary intuition the only basis for skepticism on
the issue, at least not to the extent you assume that 'being
rational' has something to do with reasoning. Among the various
specialists expressing reservations about any strong linkage
between logic and reasoning we find Russell, Schiller, M. R.
Cohen, Nagel, Henle, Harman, and Brown, to name a few. There is
also clinical data suggestive of a similar conclusion (e.g.,
Kahneman & Tversky, Nisbett & Borgida, Slovic, Fischhoff &
Lichtenstein, etc.) in which ordinary test subjects have
repeatedly demonstrated an appalling obliviousness to established
rules of inference when engaged in problem solving experiments.
Interestingly enough, the clinicians conducting these experiments
have reported the results as having bleak implications for human
rationality (as reported by L. J. Cohen) rather than for
computational models of mind, which gives you some idea of just
how deeply entrenched the computational hysteria has become. In
any event, it seems to me that the tendency to construe 'being
rational' as just another way of talking about 'being logical' is
another one of those assumptions that a rationologist !need not
take very seriously!.
(end quote)
> Being "objective" with
> respect to a particular issue means not having an emotional
> (irrational) bias toward any particular answer to the questions
> entailed in the issue.
1. Being rational is a matter of following an ideally rational
methodology, perhaps one already discovered
2. Being objective is being valuatively impartial with respect
toward any answer, in much the manner a juror should be impartial
with respect to the value he places on the well-being and words
of the defendent.
Got it. (I think)
> Both of these are relevant according to me in
> that they are required to some extent in order to apprehend moral
> philosophy. However, as far as I am concerned, one can act morally
> without ever realizing it (or immorally out of ignorance, for that
> matter).
This seems to me to constitute a radical departure from our ordinary
intuitions about moral acts. Or have I misread you?
> We needn't identify with the other person in order to
> ultimately act within the constraints of justice.
True, but justice is a bit of a different breed of animal compared
to morality, don't you agree?
> And, being
> enlightened may just mean we are better able to thwart justice
> depending on the context. (That is, the more capable of "being able
> to 'see' what is going on" we are, the more we will be able to actually
> pull off actions that would logically mean our own preferential
> treatment in the end -- such as stealing where we get to have property
> but no one else does.)
>
Absolutely. But you want to careful which component of the strategy,
the epistemic or the valuative, the "seeing" is referring to. By
"seeing" what is going on, I might be able to toss two little kids
into the ocean when no one is looking and put myself in the last
available life boat. That's the epistemic part, the form as Kant
would refer to it I suppose.
I am supposing that the morality stems from the valuative "seeing",
that in much the manner you might be prudent because of your ability
to empathize with your future self, so too, you come to empathize
with the plight of others, you project yourselves into them via
inference, and this causes you to actually "see" a little too much
for your own good. Its also epistemic, I quess, but it has valuative
consequences. Another way of saying it is that there is a contagion
between the epistemic component and the valuative component. I
refer to this as the moralization mechanism, in one of my papers,
to account for the valuative anomality in our species valuative
profile:
This amounts to the supposition that the explosive increase in
cognitive objectivity (knowledge) emanating from the snowball
effect of cultural evolution (language, printing, scientific
method, etc.) has begun to have an objectifying influence on our
values. Combined with the fact that these influenced values
become culturally transmitted and the influence further
amplified over time, the cumulative effect has become SUFFICIENT
TO OVERWHELM NATURE'S INCESSANT CULLING OF THE VALUATIVELY UNFIT
(other-interested and emotionally unstable members of the
species) causing the species to become LESS DETERMINED by
natural selection. Or, if you prefer, the reason we turned out like
Captain Kirk instead of Mr. Spock or more like Mother Teresa
than Joseph Stalin has been more a matter of psychodynamic
necessity than of survivalistic expediency.
Back to the Groundwork. I'm actually finding it interesting. :)
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Adrian wrote:
>
>
> If you're reading Kant, it's all wheat.
I think you're a little over the top on this one. I find him
fascinating, but almost certainly wrong on fundamental issues,
e.g., the a priori origin of the concept of causation, the
algorhithmic nature of reasoning, etc. On the other hand,
I find his assertions and argumentation concerning the
a priori nature of space and time still have me reeling. And
I'm almost certain that the concept of existence is itself
a priori, and necessary to think period, rather than a nice
little drawer into which pieces of reality will
ultimately fit.
> That is why, I suspect, many
> find him "so hard to read". You must try to keep focussed on what it
> is he is saying at every point in the book while you are reading him --
> you cannot get distracted or else you will likely miss something
> important.
I was riveted to him, not so much by what he was saying, which at
times I found very difficult to follow, but with the earnestness
and sincerity with which he seemed to be trying to communicate
revelations which seemed to him to be of phenomenal significance.
I quess I could feel a little of his evangelical zeal for his
philosophy, since I have some of this same evangelical zeal
where my own philosophical views are concerned. It was as if
he was cursing the limitations of language for making it so
difficult for him to share these truly wonderous discoveries
which at heart were very simple and fit all together into
a seamless whole. But, in the end, after a lot of reading
and thinking, I'm afraid I eventually came to the conclusion
that his edifice has some rather fundamental flaws in its
foundation. But, still, all and all, it was a most interesting
experience, not unlike John Lennon's eventual disaffection with
the Maharishi, "Nice trip. Thank you very much."
> That just means you read only a few pages a day instead of
> a novel a day like one might be used to doing. Sometimes you should
> look up and think at length about what he just said and see if you
> really agree with it. And when you are done reading his book, come and
> post on it some and get into arguments and cite a lot from it as
> appropriate.
>
I understand this feeling and zeal quite well. Its a wonderous
experience, and at one time I felt some it for Kant myself. I
don't think I will be able to rekindle this zeal, but
it was certainly fun while it lasted. But still......
never say never, as they say.
> This forces you to understand what he really said and really produces
> quite a level of mastery, I think, that you just wouldn't get otherwise
> (no matter who you are discussing it with). I read his books and
> gleaned most of the basic idea and argument. But, I really did not
> have the kind of through detailed knowledge just of what he said --
> whether he was conservative or liberal, if he was for a consitutional
> republic or a direct democracy, what exactly his idea of property
> rights were, three branches of government or two or what, and so on --
> until I came in here and started citing him and rereading parts of his
> books and finding the relevant citations and so on.
>
I assume you mean this newsgroup, or the net, with "til I came in here".
I totally concur. In fact, I have for a number of decades been of the
opinion that the only fruitful way to do or even PRESENT philosophy is
via dialogue. If ever we end up with a full blown science of the mind,
I suspect it will not be done in the old fashioned way of a single
author doing a monoologue, but rather of a thinker of interest presenting
his views and being challenged every step of the way by other thinkers.
This is why I love 'The Behavioral and Brain Sciences', because it
tries to do science via dialogue. If I had my way, all scientific
journals would follow this format. Socrates had it right right from
the start, as far as I'm concerned.
> I much prefer this to taking a course any day! And, judging from what
> absurdities I have seen in a serious academic context, I am all the
> more satisfied with this approach to philosophy.
>
Wow! You're preaching to the choir. I was engaged in a three year
debate with the executive commitee of 'The Society for Philosophy
and Psychology', including such heavy weights as Dan Dennett, Bill
Lycan, Georges Rey, Fred Dretske, and others. At the end of this
debate, I was quite literally stunned with the encyclopedic
ignorance I had encountered. I still haven't quite figured this
out, how these folks can appear so brilliant in monologue and so
foolish in back and forth conversation, but I kept thinking of Kant's
phrase about "learned men, who in handling
their learning, betray an original deficiency which can never be
mended". :)
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Adrian wrote:
>
>
> Well, your definition of "rational" I do disagree with in that I think
> rational more specifically means adherence to a set of rules of
> inference (specifically the laws of logic). Being "objective" with
> respect to a particular issue means not having an emotional
> (irrational) bias toward any particular answer to the questions
> entailed in the issue.
I think I may have found a bug in your ointment. If being objective
with respect to a particular issue ONLY means not having an emotional
bias toward any particular answer, then it has little if anything
to do with the correspondence and coherence of one's conclusion.
That constitutes a serious departure from our common sense
intuitions about objectivity, which entail a notion of epistemic
objectivity which correlates with the correspondence
of one's beliefs AS WELL AS the impartiality of one's values.
If I am right, then the rationality of one's beliefs could also
be translated into objectivity talk, in that the rationality
of one's beliefs correlates with the extent to which one is
'able to "see" what is going on" with respect to the fixed
objective of maximizing true belief. In other words, the
method of acquiring beliefs is just an encapsulated variant
on the theme of 'being able to "see" what is going on'.
mdhjwh
"Phil Roberts, Jr." wrote:>Socrates had it right right from
the start, as far as I'm concerned.<
Plato will always be at the top of my reading for pleasure list,
but I submit that platonic dialogue is sometimes nothing more than
group debate in which_all_ the participants are talking irrational gibberish.
Dialogue is a useful tool but provides no guarantee of success.
Can anyone say with certainty what Plato was on about in the
sunlight shining into the cave analogy? (The Republic)
John H
Adrian
"Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
<snip>
>
> Back to the Groundwork. I'm actually finding it interesting. :)
>
Hey, you will never find so much profundity packed into such a small
amount of text anywhere else (except for my posts, of course ;p). I
tell you what though, there are a lot of things you will walk away
possibly thinking about Kant that is inappropriate only focussing on
the Groundwork -- especially how "altruistic" he is. In the
Groundwork, pay particular attention to where he rejects the negative
golden rule (in a foot note) and consider the examples he gives of the
application of the categorical imperative.
It seems like his conclusions are going to be very much leaning in the
direction of altruism. But he does not make a distinction in the
groundwork that he does in a major way in theMetaphysics of Morals
between justice and virtue. The altruism is basically all a matter of
virtue (which is a lot more like saying one ought to give to charity
than requiring the creation of a welfare state) which is crucial in
interpretting him from the stand point of political philosophy.
Just thought I should mention it...
<snip>
Adrian
> >
> >
> > Well, your definition of "rational" I do disagree with in that I
think
> > rational more specifically means adherence to a set of rules of
> > inference (specifically the laws of logic). Being "objective" with
> > respect to a particular issue means not having an emotional
> > (irrational) bias toward any particular answer to the questions
> > entailed in the issue.
>
> I think I may have found a bug in your ointment. If being objective
> with respect to a particular issue ONLY means not having an emotional
> bias toward any particular answer, then it has little if anything
> to do with the correspondence and coherence of one's conclusion.
> That constitutes a serious departure from our common sense
> intuitions about objectivity, which entail a notion of epistemic
> objectivity which correlates with the correspondence
> of one's beliefs AS WELL AS the impartiality of one's values.
>
But it does have a correlation to the correspondence of one's beliefs
to reality because of its correspondence to rationality. I think the
clencher is that one could be perfectly objective and still just be
stupid. Objectivity is not naturally supposed to imply intelligence.
So, objectivity cannot be directly connected to being right or having
true beliefs like that.
> If I am right, then the rationality of one's beliefs could also
> be translated into objectivity talk, in that the rationality
> of one's beliefs correlates with the extent to which one is
> 'able to "see" what is going on" with respect to the fixed
> objective of maximizing true belief. In other words, the
> method of acquiring beliefs is just an encapsulated variant
> on the theme of 'being able to "see" what is going on'.
>
Objectivity is one's propensity to not be irrational, and rationality
is one's propebnsity to adhere to logic. Under the assumption that a
particular person is actively thinking about a given issue and capable
of drawing rational inferences about that issue, then their objectivity
is going to generally translate into true beliefs about the issue.
But, they may be generally rational but very unobjective and just
building a spurious argument for a position they happen to have a
strong emotional attachment to. Or they may be thoroughly objective
but just incapable of making logical deductions about the issue
(perhaps out of an ineptitude in applying logic in general or out of
sheer ignorance of the facts surrounding the issue).
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Adrian wrote:
>
> In article <389F820F...@ix.netcom.com>,
> "Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
> > I think I may have found a bug in your ointment. If being objective
> > with respect to a particular issue ONLY means not having an emotional
> > bias toward any particular answer, then it has little if anything
> > to do with the correspondence and coherence of one's conclusion.
> > That constitutes a serious departure from our common sense
> > intuitions about objectivity, which entail a notion of epistemic
> > objectivity which correlates with the correspondence
> > of one's beliefs AS WELL AS the impartiality of one's values.
> >
>
> But it does have a correlation to the correspondence of one's beliefs
> to reality because of its correspondence to rationality.
In general parliance, one's objectivity refers to the extent to which
one has gotten outside of one's skin to get at the way things really
"are".
In this respect, the objectivity of one's beliefs refers to their
veracity, whereas the
rationality of one's beliefs refers to the manner in which they
were acquired or their justification. I don't really think this
point is debatable, is it? Or are you suggesting that I have been
using these terms incorrectly for the past fifty years?
Adrian
mdh...@ozemail.com.au wrote:
>
>
> "Phil Roberts, Jr." wrote:>Socrates had it right right from
> the start, as far as I'm concerned.<
> but I submit that platonic dialogue is sometimes nothing more than
> group debate in which_all_ the participants are talking irrational
gibberish.
>
> Dialogue is a useful tool but provides no guarantee of success.
>
> Can anyone say with certainty what Plato was on about in the
> sunlight shining into the cave analogy? (The Republic)
>
> John H
>
>
But what DOES guaranty success? Really, journals are just a slow
dialogue anyway, as far as I am concerned. I just think that whether
you go to all the trouble to get published in a journal or just write
down your thoughts precisely in news group fashion, taking as long as
you need to to do it, you are getting as much out of it, personally.
So that means that anyone can go and pick up a philosophy book and read
it and start posting on it and, I think, walk away quite well informed
about the author and his philosophy. Then, what separates the
professionals from the neophytes? They can get published in a
professional journal just because they have "qualifications"? Not much.
Of course,you have to go and read all these guys: Plato, Aristotle,
Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, etc., but that is just par for the course.
And,I will tell you one thing that will separate the neophyte from the
professional is that the neophyte is genuinely interested in the
subject!
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Adrian wrote:
>
> In article <389EFDE3...@ix.netcom.com>,
> "Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
>
> <snipping citations concerning evolution and selfishness>
>
> I am not sure if those quotes are supposed to support the idea that we
> are altruistic or not. In any case, the ultimate point is going to be
> something like that we will seem to see individuals sacrifice
> themselves when in fact it is in their best interests evolutionarily
> speaking. In any case, the point is that apparent altruism is actually
> in their self-interest -- it is a matter of selfishness that they act
> that way. The punchline is that we all act in our self-interest.
>
> I agree with this.
>
They amount to authoritative argumentation that, given that natural
selection is "true", then we"ought" to be RUTHLESSLY SELFISH (Dawkins)
and, most particularly, that we "ought" to be ruthlessly selfish in terms
of the PHYSICAL cost benefit
equations related to reproductive success. And, by and large, nature
pretty much conforms to this scientific prediction. Of course, there
are apparent exceptions, such as worker bees, but as it turns out,
these are only APPARENT deviations from the ruthless selfishness
predicted by natural selection, and can be explained simply by
remembering that nature is not concerned with individuals, per say,
but with the REPRODUCTIVE SUCCESS of individuals (actually of "genes").
When I say there are only apparent deviations, I am not quite correct.
It turns out that there are significant deviations from the valuative
profile of ruthless selfishness (physical cost benefits) in man in
the extreme (e.g., self-endangering Greenpeacers who ride in the
little rubber rafts between the whales and the harpoons) and to
a considerably lesser extent in species phylogenically proximal
to man (e.g., the great apes). As such, nature conforms remarkably
well to our scientific predictions with the exception of the most
rational species, where the exceptions are truly off the map. IOW,
the other-interestedness/compassion we find in man is a scientific
anomaly, "something which needs explaining", to quote Dawkins.
Well, given that the most rational species is the most altruistic,
it just seems reasonable to postulate a causal relationship between
rationality and altruism/compassion etc., don't you agree?
Human and baboon have evolved by natural selection. If you
look at the way natural selection works, it seems to follow
that anything that has evolved by natural selction should be
selfish. Therefore we must expect when we go and look at the
behavior of baboons, humans, and all other living creatures,
we will find it to be selfish. If we find that our expectation
is wrong, if we observe that human behavior is truly altruistic,
then we will be faced with something puzzling, SOMETHING THAT
NEEDS EXPLAINING.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Adrian wrote:
>
> In article <389EFDE3...@ix.netcom.com>,
> "Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> >
> > Certainly not from the perspective of a naturally selected self-
> > interested
> > organism. But you have not offered me much of a reason to assume that
> > self-interest is an inherent aspect of rationality to date, other than
> > pointing out that that is what we are. As I said previoulsy, 'Where's
> > the beef?' :)
> >
>
> But you don't disagree that we are self-interested by nature. So we
> are through with this point then -- we agree. All that matters is that
> we are in fact selfish, not that we have to think to be that way or
> that it would be rational to be that way or anything of the sort.
>
Actually, I don't quite agree and, particualarly, I don't agree
where the PHYSICAL cost benefit equations are concerned (e.g.,
self-endangering Greenpeacers). As such, I believe, like Dawkins,
that we are need of an explanation as to why the most rational
species is the most altruistic. But I do agree we act out of
emotional self-interest, which is another matter, since it
merely defers the issue, since the real problem is trying to
figure out why we are physically altruistic.
> So, I do not think that rationality is an inherent aspect of self-
> interest. That's the Objectivists. I am saying, in fact, that
> rationality is only important if you want to engage in philosophy
> (incl. science, math, etc.).
No. Rationality is our chief adaptation for suviving. Here it is
I who agree with the objectivist. I just don't agree that this
adaptation is a STRATEGIC atribute, that its a matter of doing
things, but rather a HOLISTIC attribute, a matter of "seeing"
things, which can be EMPLOYED to achieve strategic ends (e.g.
maximizing self-interrest). But because it is not inherently
strategic, it is also possible for one to become too rational
for one's own good, to actually get to a point where one
"sees" too much to maintain the sort of rationally inordinate
conception of one's own importance necessary to survive
effectively (e.g., depression, suicide, recklessness,
apathy, other-interestedness, etc.).
> >
> > I think you are confusing concrete ends based with abstract ends based
> > reasoning. From my perspective, BOTH are in error because rational
> > behavior is not something determined and dictated by an end, but
> rather
> > is simply the manifestation of a "good will", i.e., one which is 'able
> > to "see" what is going on", and has subsequently become a little too
> > objective for its own good.
> >
>
> Well, that is pretty close to what I might say. If objectivity refers
> to a lack of irrational bias, then a totally rational agent will not be
> self-interested. On the other hand, it will also lack volition
> altogether (and so lack a will and not be an "agent" of any sort). So
> there is no such thing as a purely rational agent.
Here we seem to agree, but then you seem to be saying the exact
opposite in what follows.
> the very idea of
> being a too objective for your own good is fundamentally flawed.
> Kant's philosophy does not rest on this, though he seems to think this
> is one way to approach moral philosophy.
>
--
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Adrian wrote:
>
> In article <389EFDE3...@ix.netcom.com>,
> "Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
> And now I am explicitly rejecting that idea that a will can desire
> something that it does not value. It is a tautology that a will must
> be self-interested.
>
Agreed. A value requires both that which is valued and a valuer.
However, if we use prudence as an example, the difference between
a less rational will (the will to satisfy immediate urges) and
a more rational will (the will to achieve what is in one's overall
best interets), it can be found in the COMPREHENSIVENESS of the
valuative considerations involved, i.e., the the degree of objectivity
in the value system of that which is doing the valueing.
Relating this all back to my "seeing" thesis, I assume that a
immediate urge causes one to fixate on a very small part of
one's reality, and causes one to "see" less than when values
are spread out. Also, I am supposing that an immediate urge
is countered by one's "seeing" the predicament one's future
self will be in if this urge is allowed to dictate behavior.
And finally, I suppose our rationality allows us to adopt a
more global perspective in which the valuative significance
of the immediate moment is placed in a more rational perspective,
more "seeing", so to speak.
Excellent. And, actually, prudence can probably govern everything.
Morality, in the non-self-interested sense, is an unnecessary add
on, at least from an evolutionary perspective, it seems. So that
is really the big question to a natural scientist. It might be
prudent for me to treat others with respect, but it is FAR from
prudent to ride in a little rubber raft between a whale and a
pissed off whaler with a 10 ton harpoon. And yet some of us do.
Its here where the rubber really meets the road, IMHO. What
in heavens name does this sort of behavior have to do with
perpetuating DNA?
Adrian
"Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
<snip>
> When I say there are only apparent deviations, I am not quite correct.
> It turns out that there are significant deviations from the valuative
> profile of ruthless selfishness (physical cost benefits) in man in
> the extreme (e.g., self-endangering Greenpeacers who ride in the
> little rubber rafts between the whales and the harpoons) and to
> a considerably lesser extent in species phylogenically proximal
> to man (e.g., the great apes). As such, nature conforms remarkably
> well to our scientific predictions with the exception of the most
> rational species, where the exceptions are truly off the map. IOW,
> the other-interestedness/compassion we find in man is a scientific
> anomaly, "something which needs explaining", to quote Dawkins.
>
Well, this just means that unnatural acts are more likely among more
rational beings than among less rational beings. The Greanpeace
activists are exceptions rather than the rule. I don't think this even
shows a fundamental difference in the nature of humans as opposed to
apes -- they are both self-interested. The only difference is the
Greanpeace activists have in some pathological way gotten their self-
interest convoluted into trying to save the whales. This phenomenon is
more in need of a good therapist than anything else. ;-P
They are stil acting out of self-interest -- possibly even rational
self-interest for them (in which case they might not need a therapist
and are just eccentric)!
> Well, given that the most rational species is the most altruistic,
> it just seems reasonable to postulate a causal relationship between
> rationality and altruism/compassion etc., don't you agree?
>
Yes! By a psychologist -- not a philosopher.
Adrian
"Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
<snip>
>
> Excellent. And, actually, prudence can probably govern everything.
> Morality, in the non-self-interested sense, is an unnecessary add
> on, at least from an evolutionary perspective, it seems. So that
> is really the big question to a natural scientist. It might be
> prudent for me to treat others with respect, but it is FAR from
> prudent to ride in a little rubber raft between a whale and a
> pissed off whaler with a 10 ton harpoon. And yet some of us do.
> Its here where the rubber really meets the road, IMHO. What
> in heavens name does this sort of behavior have to do with
> perpetuating DNA?
>
Well, it doesn't have very much to do with perpetuating the activist's
DNA but a lot to do with perpetuating the whaler's! heh heh heh
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Adrian wrote:
>
> In article <38A0B109...@ix.netcom.com>,
> "Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
> >
> > Excellent. And, actually, prudence can probably govern everything.
> > Morality, in the non-self-interested sense, is an unnecessary add
> > on, at least from an evolutionary perspective, it seems. So that
> > is really the big question to a natural scientist. It might be
> > prudent for me to treat others with respect, but it is FAR from
> > prudent to ride in a little rubber raft between a whale and a
> > pissed off whaler with a 10 ton harpoon. And yet some of us do.
> > Its here where the rubber really meets the road, IMHO. What
> > in heavens name does this sort of behavior have to do with
> > perpetuating DNA?
> >
>
> Well, it doesn't have very much to do with perpetuating the activist's
> DNA but a lot to do with perpetuating the whaler's! heh heh heh
>
It sounds like you are a little underwhelmed with this issue.
Bummer. Oh well. Different strokes for different folks as they
say.
Cheers!
Adrian
everything.
> > > Morality, in the non-self-interested sense, is an unnecessary add
> > > on, at least from an evolutionary perspective, it seems. So that
> > > is really the big question to a natural scientist. It might be
> > > prudent for me to treat others with respect, but it is FAR from
> > > prudent to ride in a little rubber raft between a whale and a
> > > pissed off whaler with a 10 ton harpoon. And yet some of us do.
> > > Its here where the rubber really meets the road, IMHO. What
> > > in heavens name does this sort of behavior have to do with
> > > perpetuating DNA?
> > >
> >
> > Well, it doesn't have very much to do with perpetuating the
activist's
> > DNA but a lot to do with perpetuating the whaler's! heh heh heh
> >
>
> It sounds like you are a little underwhelmed with this issue.
> Bummer. Oh well. Different strokes for different folks as they
> say.
>
Underwhelmed?? What, am I wrong? ;-)
But, I do think that it is at least as mucha matter of psychology as it
is philosophy if not more so. I am supposing the argument might be
that their behavior is genetically predestined to some extent. I think
though that the kind of behavior that they exhibit in what seems to be
a non-evolutionarily advantageous act is possibly very advantageous in
different contexts, and this is how it gets selected for. Granted,
under thse circumstances it leads potentially to a dead end, but under
different circumstances it may not.
Plus, aside from genes, there are ideas which propagate and evolve. A
great deal of what we identify as me (my personality) could be
transmitted and perpetuated accross generations without me ever
physically reproducing (my genes). Part of those ideas might be the
very thing that causes Greenpeace activists to sacrifice themselves for
whales, and their act of so doing when communicated to others may well
inspire similar acts. All you need is for there to be enough
reproduction in general to replace those that sacrifice themselves and
support a society (an environment for these ideas to inhabit). The
ideas, themselves, are not reproduced and perpetuated physically --
they are transmitted in a completely different way.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Adrian wrote:
>
> In article <38A1D58E...@ix.netcom.com>,
> "Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> > It sounds like you are a little underwhelmed with this issue.
> > Bummer. Oh well. Different strokes for different folks as they
> > say.
> >
>
> Underwhelmed?? What, am I wrong? ;-)
>
Well, yes, actually. Altruism is homo saps is a MAJOR scientific
issue. Check out the sociobiology
section in your nearest bookstore. Anomalous altruism is a cottage
industry, with literally thousands of natural scientists trying to
figure it out.
> But, I do think that it is at least as mucha matter of psychology as it
> is philosophy if not more so. I am supposing the argument might be
> that their behavior is genetically predestined to some extent. I think
> though that the kind of behavior that they exhibit in what seems to be
> a non-evolutionarily advantageous act is possibly very advantageous in
> different contexts, and this is how it gets selected for. Granted,
> under thse circumstances it leads potentially to a dead end, but under
> different circumstances it may not.
>
This is just one of myriads of possible solutions which have been
proposed by sociobiologists. But NONE has achieved victory in the
market place of ideas as of yet. A few of the books I am familiar
with are 'The Selfish Gene', the 'Sociobiology Debate', but there
are millions of them.
> Plus, aside from genes, there are ideas which propagate and evolve. A
> great deal of what we identify as me (my personality) could be
> transmitted and perpetuated accross generations without me ever
> physically reproducing (my genes).
Again, there is an entire cottage industry devoted to precisely this
idea. Its referred to as memetics, and was inspired by a passage
by Richard Dawkins, when in sheer desperation he eventually came
to realize that our current understanding of evolutionary theory
simply can not account for human altruism:
Here is a repeat of Dawkin's justification on the matter:
As an enthusiastic Darwinian, I have been dissatisfied with
explanations which my fellow-enthusiasts have offered for
human behaviour. They have tried to look for 'biological
advantages' in various attributes of human civilization. For
instance, tribla religion has been seen as a mechanisms for
solidifying group identity, valuable for a pack-hunting
species whose individuals rely on cooperation to catch large
and fast prey. Frequetnly the evolutionary preconception in
terms of which such theories are framed is implicitly group-
selectionist, but it is possible to rephrase the theories
in terms of orthodox gene selection. Man may well have
spent large portions of the last sseveral million years
living in small kin groups. Kin selectio and selection in
favour of reciprocal altruism may have acted on human genes
to produce many of our basic psychological attributes and
tendencies. These ideas are plausible as far as they go,
but I find they do not begin to square up to the formidable
challenge of explaining culture, cultural evolution, and the
immense differences between human cultures around the world,
from the utter selfishness of the Ik of Uganda, as described
by Colin Turnbull, to the gental altruism of Margaret Mead's
Arapesh. I think we have got to start again and go right
back to first principles. The argument I shall advance,
surprising as it may seem coming from the author of the
earlier chapters, is that, for an understanding of the
evolution of modern man, we must begin by throwing out the
gene as the sole basis of our ideas on evolution. I am an
enthusiastic Darwinian, but I think Darwinism is too big a
theory to be donfined to the narrow context of the gene. The
gene will enter my thesis as an analogy, nothing more.
(Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, p. 205).
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Adrian wrote:
>
> Plus, aside from genes, there are ideas which propagate and evolve. A
> great deal of what we identify as me (my personality) could be
> transmitted and perpetuated accross generations without me ever
> physically reproducing (my genes).
This is pretty much where I am coming from, only I believe the
"gene" for altruism, and far more importantly, THE GENE FOR EMOTIONAL
INSTABILITY (needs for love, acceptance, purpose, meaning, moral
integrity, attention) IS SIMPLY THE "GENE" FOR RATIONALITY, but
that the effects of this "gene" have gotten out of hand as a
result of the explosive influence of cultural/memetic evolution
on the pscyical product produced by this "gene". Its resulted
in the species becoming a little too valuativel objective ("seeing"
a little to much) to be able to maintain a rationally inordinate
conception of their own importance (self-worth needs and disorders)
without REASONS. Another way of saying it, is we are a species
which is beginning to become somewhat LESS DETERMINED by natural
selection.
Sorry. My language center isn't quite up to par today. :)
> Part of those ideas might be the
> very thing that causes Greenpeace activists to sacrifice themselves for
> whales, and their act of so doing when communicated to others may well
> inspire similar acts. All you need is for there to be enough
> reproduction in general to replace those that sacrifice themselves and
> support a society (an environment for these ideas to inhabit). The
> ideas, themselves, are not reproduced and perpetuated physically --
> they are transmitted in a completely different way.
>
Agreed. They reproduce memetically. But since they are counter-productive
to natural selection, there should also be powerful factors acting to
eliminate whatever genetic factors are necessary to sustain this
particular sort of idea (e.g., self-incinerating Buddhist monks).
Charles W. Johnson
>
>
> "Phil Roberts, Jr." wrote:>Socrates had it right right from
> the start, as far as I'm concerned.<
> but I submit that platonic dialogue is sometimes nothing more than
> group debate in which_all_ the participants are talking irrational gibberish.
> Dialogue is a useful tool but provides no guarantee of success.
John,
While this is often true, f the Platonic dialogue, I think it betrays
a deeper problem than the mass irrationality of the
participants. Examine some time the half of the "dialogue" that
belongs to speakers other than Socrates; it consists of next to
nothing other than an original statement of the position, followed by
several affirmations of the statements of Socrates. Certainly, if one
participant is granted a monopoly on framing the questions to ask then
we will be reduced to the position of Crito: "I have nothing to say,
Socrates."
If, however, a true dialogue is to occur, then all must be given the
chance to speak and to -question-. Socrates's priveleged position as
interrogator and critic allows him to ask many highly QUESTIONABLE
questions, without having anyone to oppose the rigged rules that he
sets up. One of the most notorious examples of this that springs
immediately to mind is his bowling over of Thrasymachus in THE
REPUBLIC on the basis of justice being a matter of ruling; of ruling
being a techne; and of a techne in turn being defined only by virtue
of its benefit on the subject of it. All of these are highly
questionable premises, but because Thrasymachus allows Socrates to
question unquestionably, he is left without any ground to stand on.
I would argue that this is primarily due to the fact that Plato's
"dialogues," despite their form, are not in fact premised on a model
of actual human intellectual dialogue. Rather, they are meant to be
quasi-allegorical demonstrations of the role of Reason - as critic and
interrogator - in the human psyche, thus giving it an authoritarian
stance over the other elements (accepted opinion, cynical bias, what
have you). Of course, as we find in THE REPUBLIC, this is in turn tied
back to Plato's view of the proper role of the philosopher in human
communities. It is insofar as this authoritarianism is practiced that
Plato's texts are not dialogues, but rather one-sided lectures.
As a side note, there is in fact a very nice passage of THE REPUBLIC
in which Socrates himself undermines such a stance in dialogue in
responding to Thrasymachus's indignance at the opening of the
book. Socrates himself, of course, dares not actually practice what he
preaches:
***
You are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, I replied, and well know that if
you ask a person what numbers make up twelve, [337b] taking care to
prohibit him whom you ask from answering twice six, or three times
four, or six times two, or four times three, "for this sort of
nonsense will not do for me," -- then obviously, that is your way of
putting the question, no one can answer you. But suppose that he were
to retort, "Thrasymachus, what do you mean? If one of these numbers
which you interdict be the true answer to the question, am I falsely
to say some other number which is not the right one? -- [337c] is that
your meaning?" -- How would you answer him?
***
(REPUBLIC 337a-337c)
-C
--
[Charles W. Johnson <cw...@eskimo.com> - http://www.eskimo.com/~cwj2]
| Heathen@Undernet (there is a Heathen@Dalnet. I am not he.) |
|<BriceW:#atheism> Is this where you gfo instaed of Church?! |
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