Kant Is Your Friend
anth...@hotmail.com
me that Rand and objectivists have, not surprisingly, things pretty
much ass backwards when it comes to knowing who their historical
friends and enemies are. A case in point is Kant versus utiltarianism.
While objectivists, of course, are anti-utilitarian, they reserve their
special enmity for "the most evil man in the world."
But for people who find altruism and sacrifice morally bad,
utilitarianism is certainly worse than Kantianism. Kant made a
distinction between perfect duties and imperfect duties. Perfect duties
are things like keeping promises, not telling lies, not stealing, and so
on. These duties are really all that you are obligated, in the strict
sense, to do, and considered simply as rules of conduct, are not any
different from objectivist rules of conduct (though of course their
theoretical foundation is different). In addition to perfect
duties there are imperfect duties, among which is the duty of
"beneficience."
Beneficience is helping your fellow man achieve his own ends without
regard to yours and it is not morally required in the strict sense, but
it is good if you do it. Not being beneficient or charitable does not
make you a morally bad person according to Kant, and is not required of
you as such. But being beneficient on occasion makes you a better
person.
On the other hand, utilitarianism morally requires you to make
sacrifices for your fellow man in the sense that it demands the
democratization of pleasure and pain. If there are millions of people
starving in some famine-stricken region, and you can help them without
bringing about some comparable evil (like allowing your own family to
starve), then you are morally required to help them by sending aid.
According to utilitarianism you and your family should not buy the
latest fashions, or that new car, or filet mignon, or fine wine, but
wear your old clothes, drive a clunker, and dine at MacDonalds, if by
doing so you can help someone in dire need. On utilitarian grounds,
doing so would not be "charity" something that would be nice to do;
it is morally required, and not to do so is a moral failure.
It is fairly obvious that utilitarianism demands more sacrifice from
people than Kantianism. If Rand knew philosophy, she would have said,
J.S. Mill and Bentham were "the most evil men in the world."
Wrathbone
--
Wrathbone
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
Andrew Jones
anth...@hotmail.com wrote in message <7jjd1j$nu6$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>...
> As I sit enjoying a nice filet mignon and hearty Merlot, it occurs to
>me that Rand and objectivists have, not surprisingly, things pretty
>much ass backwards when it comes to knowing who their historical
>friends and enemies are. A case in point is Kant versus utiltarianism.
>While objectivists, of course, are anti-utilitarian, they reserve their
>special enmity for "the most evil man in the world."
[..]
>It is fairly obvious that utilitarianism demands more sacrifice from
>people than Kantianism. If Rand knew philosophy, she would have said,
>J.S. Mill and Bentham were "the most evil men in the world."
Utilitarianism though, is a joke. Philosophers have often love to show how
silly the theory is, even in introductory courses. So, I assume that for
Rand, Utilitarianism was never a possible threat to Objectivism.
Kantianism, on the otherhand, was a real threat. It might be that John
Stewart Mills was indeed more Evil than Kant - but it was a Mickey Mouse
kind of Evil by comparison. Evil for Rand may have also encompassed
"Dangerous" as well. In short, I take that Rand bestowed the said title on
the most worthy and dangerous advesary to Objectivism she came across.
Take care,
Andy.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Can you provide a quick run down of why utilitarianism is silly.
--
Phil Roberts, Jr.
The Mechanics of Indeterminism:
Why We Turned Out Like Captain Kirk Instead of Mr. Spock
http://www.fortunecity.com/victorian/dada/90/
--
Andrew Jones
Phil Roberts, Jr. wrote in message <375D4BA2...@ix.netcom.com>...
>
>Andrew Jones wrote:
>> Utilitarianism though, is a joke. Philosophers have often love to show
how
>> silly the theory is, even in introductory courses. So, I assume that for
>> Rand, Utilitarianism was never a possible threat to Objectivism.
>> Kantianism, on the otherhand, was a real threat. It might be that John
>> Stewart Mills was indeed more Evil than Kant - but it was a Mickey Mouse
>> kind of Evil by comparison. Evil for Rand may have also encompassed
>> "Dangerous" as well. In short, I take that Rand bestowed the said title
on
>> the most worthy and dangerous advesary to Objectivism she came across.
>>
>
>Can you provide a quick run down of why utilitarianism is silly.
We generally have a good intuitive feel about what is right and wrong. What
we look for in a theory of ethics is something that adequately supports
those notions. But utilitarianism, being a consequentialist theory, often
times goes so completely against our intutions that it becomes "silly" as I
put it. If we look merely at the consequences, we might be forced to decide
something is morally right when it is prima facie wrong. For instance,
suppose that the greatest happiness would be derived by enslaving a minority
group. Under (act) utilitarianism, we should take the action of enslaving
the minority group *because* it lead to the greater happiness (larger
majority) - and it would be morally right. There are many such problems
with utilitarianim. This was only a quick take, but hope that helps.
Take care,
Andy.
David Friedman
<andydjones...@mindspring.com> wrote:
>Utilitarianism though, is a joke. Philosophers have often love to show how
>silly the theory is, even in introductory courses.
I gather that most professional philosophers regard Objectivism as even
sillier--do you find that fact convincing?
Utilitarianism is out of fashion at the moment, but there have been lots
of serious academic philosophers who considered themselves utilitarians,
and I believe still are some. Showing how silly something is when there is
nobody arguing on the other side and your audience consists of people who
know much less about the subject than you do and are going to write exams
that you are going to grade isn't terribly hard.
--
David Friedman
DD...@Best.com
http://www.best.com/~ddfr/
Andrew Jones
David Friedman wrote in message ...
>In article <7jjg4j$9lg$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net>, Andrew Jones
><andydjones...@mindspring.com> wrote:
>
>>Utilitarianism though, is a joke. Philosophers have often love to show
how
>>silly the theory is, even in introductory courses.
>
>I gather that most professional philosophers regard Objectivism as even
>sillier--do you find that fact convincing?
Actually, I've gathered that most professional philosophers don't regard
Objectivism at all. Convincing? Of what? In any case, I was merely making
a statement about Utilitarianism and not presenting an argument of why it
was silly. My comment was in relation to why Rand may not have given
Utiltarianism the time of day.
>Utilitarianism is out of fashion at the moment, but there have been lots
>of serious academic philosophers who considered themselves utilitarians,
>and I believe still are some.
I don't know that there are "lots" of serious academic philosophers who
consider themselves utilitarians - I mean, do you know many? I should point
out that something that seems silly now might only seem so because we've
adequately explored the implications of the philosophy. Back in the late
1800's or early 1900's (whatever) when philosophers may have been more
inclined to believe in the merits of utilitarianism, it was only because
the theory was so new and so unthought out in it's implications, that it may
have been accepted.
>Showing how silly something is when there is
>nobody arguing on the other side and your audience consists of people who
>know much less about the subject than you do and are going to write exams
>that you are going to grade isn't terribly hard.
Showing how to do arithmetic when there is nobody arguing with you and when
your audience consists of people who know very little about arithmetic isn't
that terribly hard either....(especially when you write the exams that you
grade).
Anyways, I should stress, I wasn't attempting to show that utilitarinism was
silly - I was asserting it.
-Andy.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Andrew Jones wrote:
>
> Phil Roberts, Jr. wrote in message <375D4BA2...@ix.netcom.com>...
> >
> >
> >Can you provide a quick run down of why utilitarianism is silly.
>
> We generally have a good intuitive feel about what is right and wrong. What
> we look for in a theory of ethics is something that adequately supports
> those notions. But utilitarianism, being a consequentialist theory, often
> times goes so completely against our intutions that it becomes "silly" as I
> put it. If we look merely at the consequences, we might be forced to decide
> something is morally right when it is prima facie wrong. For instance,
> suppose that the greatest happiness would be derived by enslaving a minority
> group. Under (act) utilitarianism, we should take the action of enslaving
> the minority group *because* it lead to the greater happiness (larger
> majority) - and it would be morally right. There are many such problems
> with utilitarianim. This was only a quick take, but hope that helps.
>
Thanks Andy. Yes. I think I can see your point. Is there such a thing
as a quick fix for these counter examples? IOW, do you have
an alternative theory in mind that can survive or "explain"
such examples?
My own theory
is simply to abandon the assumption that 'being rational' is a matter
of 'maximizing self-interest' or 'being efficient' and replacing it
with the assumption that
'being rational' is simply a matter of 'being objective' both
epistemically AND VALUATIVELY. In this fashion, to the extent a
more moral being is more objective, he would automatically become
more rational and the justification of morality would come under the
heading of bringing the mountain to Mohammed, i.e., morality = rationality.
The fact that this would constitute a standard of both morality and
rationality no human could possibly live up to would not constitute
a valid criticism, IMO, since we were designed, not to be
rational, but to perpetuate our DNA. And so it should come as no
surprise that homo sapiens fall a little short in the rationality
department.
But I'm not sure if my 'being objective' standard of morality can survive
your counter-examples any better than utilitarianism. Any insights you
can offer would be most appreciated.
--
Phil Roberts, Jr.
The Mechanics of Genetic Indeterminism
http://www.fortunecity.com/victorian/dada/90/
Feelings of Worthlessness from the Perspective of
So-Called Cognitive Science
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/5476
Gordon G. Sollars
andydjones...@mindspring.com writes...
...
> For instance,
> suppose that the greatest happiness would be derived by enslaving a minority
> group. Under (act) utilitarianism, we should take the action of enslaving
> the minority group *because* it lead to the greater happiness (larger
> majority) - and it would be morally right.
Whereas, with a deontological theory, we would never lie, even to prevent
a mass murder, since lying is wrong.
An interesting defense of utilitarianism (although I would call it
consequentialism) is given by Russell Hardin in /Morality within the
Limits of Reason/.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu
Tony Shrapnel
> As I sit enjoying a nice filet mignon and hearty Merlot, it occurs to
>me that Rand and objectivists have, not surprisingly, things pretty
>much ass backwards when it comes to knowing who their historical
>friends and enemies are. A case in point is Kant versus utiltarianism.
>While objectivists, of course, are anti-utilitarian, they reserve their
>special enmity for "the most evil man in the world."
>
>utilitarianism is certainly worse than Kantianism. Kant made a
>distinction between perfect duties and imperfect duties. Perfect duties
>are things like keeping promises, not telling lies, not stealing, and so
>on. These duties are really all that you are obligated, in the strict
>sense, to do, and considered simply as rules of conduct, are not any
>different from objectivist rules of conduct (though of course their
>theoretical foundation is different). In addition to perfect
>duties there are imperfect duties, among which is the duty of
>"beneficience."
>[...]
I have not read much Kant, so you have the advantage of me in this matter
Sir Anthanson. But in what I have read, I've found nothing too objectionable
from the Objectivist perspective. I understand that Rand's main objection to
Kant was his notion that things are ultimately "unknowable", whereas in
order to function as an Objectivist, the first requirement is a need to
"know", or at least confidence that true knowledge about the world is
possible. Is this right, or am I barking up the wrong tree?
From what you've written above, I also perceive a major Objectivist
objection to the concept of "duty" whether perfect or imperfect. This
implies that someone or something is telling you what you *should* do
whereas I (even as a half-cooked pseudo-Objectivist with a penchant for
rational economics and modern art) would prefer to decide for myself what is
my duty (and then do it faithfully). I agree with your comments on
Utilitarianism.
A brief PS: I've read that Heumer critique you posted and truly believe, old
Wrathbone, that it is nothing more than tripe *dressed up* as filet mignon.
I've not had time to respond to it in detail (where does one begin?) but it
is full of false premises. The key problem is the notion that in deciding
that our ethics should be based on self-interest, *we* must necessarily
believe that others should act in our best interests as well. This is
bulldust.
Regards
Tony Shrapnel
Chris Cathcart
When interpreting Rand's writings, be as charitable as possible.
When intpereting Kant's writings, be as uncharitable as possible.
To get secondary interpretation of Rand in print, read Peikoff.
To get secondary interpretation of Kant in print, read Peikoff.
When criticizing Rand's arguments, you must prove that you've read her
writings to be taken seriously (e.g., by quoting her writing).
When criticizing Kant's arguments, no such proof is needed (e.g., no
quoting of original source needed). One need only "summarize in terms
of essentials," or advise others to "read Peikoff."
Now you have an idea as to why some Objectivists here object so
strenuously to many unfavorable interperations of Rand as unfair
misinterpretations, but apparently don't even consider that the problem
might be quite similar going in the other direction.
--
Chris Cathcart
anth...@hotmail.com
Andrew Jones <andydjones...@mindspring.com> wrote:
>
>
> Utilitarianism though, is a joke. Philosophers have often love to
show how silly the theory is, even in introductory courses. So, I
assume that for Rand, Utilitarianism was never a possible threat to
Objectivism.Kantianism, on the otherhand, was a real threat. It might
be that John Stewart Mills was indeed more Evil than Kant - but it was
a Mickey Mouse kind of Evil by comparison. Evil for Rand may have also
encompassed "Dangerous" as well. In short, I take that Rand bestowed
the said title on the most worthy and dangerous advesary to Objectivism
she came across.
Andy, you cannot even spell Mill's name and you expect people to
believe you have something intelligent to say about utilitarianism?
The philosophers you speak of were probably attacking a very simplistic
version of utilitarianism. It is a more serious doctrine than you are
giving it credit for. Democratic liberalism has its intellectual
foundation in utlitarianism, so it is certainly a "worthy adversary".
Wrathbone
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
>
> Take care,
> Andy.
>
--
Wrathbone
anth...@hotmail.com
Andrew Jones <andydjones...@mindspring.com> wrote:
>
> Phil Roberts, Jr. wrote in message <375D4BA2...@ix.netcom.com>...
> >
> >> Utilitarianism though, is a joke. Philosophers have often love to
show
> how
> >> silly the theory is, even in introductory courses. So, I assume
that for
> >> Rand, Utilitarianism was never a possible threat to Objectivism.
> >> Kantianism, on the otherhand, was a real threat. It might be that
John
> >> Stewart Mills was indeed more Evil than Kant - but it was a Mickey
Mouse
> >> kind of Evil by comparison. Evil for Rand may have also
encompassed
> >> "Dangerous" as well. In short, I take that Rand bestowed the said
title
> on
> >> the most worthy and dangerous advesary to Objectivism she came
across.
> >>
> >
>
> We generally have a good intuitive feel about what is right and
wrong. What we look for in a theory of ethics is something that
consequentialist theory, often times goes so completely against our
intutions that it becomes "silly" as I
> put it. If we look merely at the consequences, we might be forced to
decide something is morally right when it is prima facie wrong. For
enslaving a minority group. Under (act) utilitarianism, we should take
the action of enslaving the minority group *because* it lead to the
There are many such problems
> with utilitarianim. This was only a quick take, but hope that helps.
Well, you've gone from mispelling "Mill" to making a distinction between
act and rule utilitarianism - that's quite an improvement, Andy.
BTW, you are an objectivist, right? If so, I don't think your reliance
on "intuition" is going to sit too well with the gaurdians of your
particular dogma.
Also, consequentialism, does capture many of our intuitions about what
is right. For example what if keeping a promise or returning property
would lead to the death of an innocent person? Say you promised to hold
a gun for your friend until he asked for it. He comes to your door has
been drinking and is in a jealous rage at his girlfriend who he thinks
is having an affair, but you know otherwise. Wouldn't it be wrong to
give him the gun, uphold his property rights, and keep your promise in
this case? Thinking it to be so, is giving due consideration to
consequences.
anth...@hotmail.com
"Phil Roberts, Jr." <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
>
> Andrew Jones wrote:
> >
> > Phil Roberts, Jr. wrote in message
<375D4BA2...@ix.netcom.com>...
> > >
>
> > >
> >
> > We generally have a good intuitive feel about what is right and
wrong. What
> > we look for in a theory of ethics is something that adequately
supports
> > those notions. But utilitarianism, being a consequentialist
theory, often
> > times goes so completely against our intutions that it becomes
"silly" as I
> > put it. If we look merely at the consequences, we might be forced
to decide
> > something is morally right when it is prima facie wrong. For
instance,
> > suppose that the greatest happiness would be derived by enslaving a
minority
> > group. Under (act) utilitarianism, we should take the action of
enslaving
> > the minority group *because* it lead to the greater happiness
(larger
> > majority) - and it would be morally right. There are many such
problems
> > with utilitarianim. This was only a quick take, but hope that
helps.
> >
>
thing
> as a quick fix for these counter examples? IOW, do you have
> an alternative theory in mind that can survive or "explain"
> such examples?
I do. Try W.D. Ross, _The Right and the Good_, Clarendon Press (1930).
This is a classic synthesis of utilitarian and deontological theory,
and where modern ethics really begins.
Andrew Jones
anth...@hotmail.com wrote in message <7jm1t9$ms5$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>...
>Andy, you cannot even spell Mill's name and you expect people to
>believe you have something intelligent to say about utilitarianism?
No. I would only expect _intelligent_ people to believe that I might have
something intelligent to say about utilitarianism. You see, intelligent
people would realize that the misspelling of a name has little to do with
the merits of the points presented. Do you realize this?
>The philosophers you speak of were probably attacking a very simplistic
>version of utilitarianism.
They were attacking Utilitarianism as presented by John Stuart Mill.
Whoo-hoo!!! Check out the spelling, Tony!
>It is a more serious doctrine than you are
>giving it credit for. Democratic liberalism has its intellectual
>foundation in utlitarianism, so it is certainly a "worthy adversary".
Oh my God!!! What is this "utlitarianism" you are speaking of? Oh. I guess
you are just having trouble spelling the name of the very philosophy we are
discussing. Don't worry, I won't discredit you for it. ;-) Anyway, I
agree, that Utilitarianism has had some influence. People do think about
the common good when making policy. Still, the way they think about it is
is very different than the Utilitarianism as presented by it's modern
father. One of the nice things about Utilitarianism is that it IS a
simplistic theory and easily analyzed (and discredited). Not so with
Kantanism or Objectivism.
Take care,
Andy.
Ps - If you have a more complicated Utilitarianism you wish to discuss, by
all means, present it. I am familiar mostly with the version presented by
J.S. Mill, and his predicessor on utility - Jeremy Bentham. I am also aware
of a Rule-base Utilitarianism that I think you might have been referring to
in regards to democratic liberalism. But I suspect they don't actually
follow Rule-base Utilitarianism either.
Pss - I hope this ends your silly mispelling criticisms, because I'm bound
to make them again.
anth...@hotmail.com
Tony Shrapnel <shra...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
>
> I have not read much Kant, so you have the advantage of me in this
matter
> Sir Anthanson. But in what I have read, I've found nothing too
objectionable
> from the Objectivist perspective. I understand that Rand's main
objection to
> Kant was his notion that things are ultimately "unknowable", whereas
in
> order to function as an Objectivist, the first requirement is a need
to
> "know", or at least confidence that true knowledge about the world is
> possible. Is this right, or am I barking up the wrong tree?
Wrong tree. Kant's "thing-in-itself" is unkowable but it has no
implications or practical consequences. The transcendental categories
of the understanding are hard-wired, so experience will always be
consistent and ordered according to them. If the lenses of your eyes
and everyone else's were rose-colored, the world is going to appear
rose colored, you can count on it, rely on it, and make plans that
account for it - you could even be a good, rational, self-interested,
objectivist.
>
> From what you've written above, I also perceive a major Objectivist
> objection to the concept of "duty" whether perfect or imperfect. This
> implies that someone or something is telling you what you *should* do
> whereas I (even as a half-cooked pseudo-Objectivist with a penchant
for
> rational economics and modern art) would prefer to decide for myself
what is
> my duty (and then do it faithfully).
What if you decide for yourself that you should kidnap and torture
people? Is saying that it is really your duty not to do this
"someone or something telling you what you should do?" Isn't kidnapping
and torturing going against "something" whether you believe it is or
not?
I agree with your comments on
> Utilitarianism.
>
> A brief PS: I've read that Heumer critique you posted and truly
believe, old
> Wrathbone, that it is nothing more than tripe *dressed up* as filet
mignon.
> I've not had time to respond to it in detail (where does one begin?)
but it
> is full of false premises.
I don't think so.
The key problem is the notion that in deciding
> that our ethics should be based on self-interest, *we* must
necessarily
> believe that others should act in our best interests as well. This is
> bulldust.
You cannot have it both ways. If you are an egoist, when you call
something "good" you mean it serves your interest. Having people serve
your interests, then is better for you, than if they did not. But
Rand's conception of people as rights possessing ends in themselves,
contradicts her egoism, since on this (very Kantian view) the moral
agent cannot regard others as mere means to their own interests and
good.
anth...@hotmail.com
Chris Cathcart <cath...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> Some basic unstated rules for debating in this newsgroup:
>
> When interpreting Rand's writings, be as charitable as possible.
My charity and beneficience only go sa far. Rand's philosophical
writing requires infinite charity.
> >
> To get secondary interpretation of Rand in print, read Peikoff.
>
> To get secondary interpretation of Kant in print, read Peikoff.
Peikoff would not know a philosophical argument if it bit him in the
ankle.
>
snip>
> Now you have an idea as to why some Objectivists here object so
> strenuously to many unfavorable interperations of Rand as unfair
> misinterpretations,
They can object all they want. When you ask them to show you what
the problem with your interpretation is, they cannot do it.
Tony Shrapnel
anth...@hotmail.com wrote in message <7jm5gn$oi5$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>...
>In article <pOi73.88$N02...@ozemail.com.au>,
> Tony Shrapnel <shra...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
>>
>> From what you've written above, I also perceive a major Objectivist
>> objection to the concept of "duty" whether perfect or imperfect. This
>> implies that someone or something is telling you what you *should* do
>> whereas I (even as a half-cooked pseudo-Objectivist with a penchant
>for
>> rational economics and modern art) would prefer to decide for myself
>what is
>> my duty (and then do it faithfully).
>
>What if you decide for yourself that you should kidnap and torture
>people? Is saying that it is really your duty not to do this
>"someone or something telling you what you should do?" Isn't kidnapping
>and torturing going against "something" whether you believe it is or
>not?
I don't accept this line of argument. With kidnapping, torture etc you are
talking about fundamental laws of conduct - well established in all
societies to protect individual rights and enable the societies to function.
I believe that "duty" as referred to in this discussion means obligations
outside the more basic realm of acceptable laws. There may not be a law that
determines that I must care for my fellow man, but some will say I have a
"duty" to do so. In this realm the Objectivist would say that caring for
another is his (the Objectivists) personal choice.
>> A brief PS: I've read that Heumer critique you posted and truly
>believe, old
>> Wrathbone, that it is nothing more than tripe *dressed up* as filet
>mignon.
>> I've not had time to respond to it in detail (where does one begin?)
>but it
>> is full of false premises.
>
>I don't think so.
>
> The key problem is the notion that in deciding
>> that our ethics should be based on self-interest, *we* must
>necessarily
>> believe that others should act in our best interests as well. This is
>> bulldust.
>
>You cannot have it both ways. If you are an egoist, when you call
>something "good" you mean it serves your interest. Having people serve
>your interests, then is better for you, than if they did not. But
>Rand's conception of people as rights possessing ends in themselves,
>contradicts her egoism, since on this (very Kantian view) the moral
>agent cannot regard others as mere means to their own interests and
>good.
There is something wrong here; I can't quite put my finger on it, but I'll
have a go. I think the problem is in the value judgement "good". Things
can't just be "good" in isolation. They can only be good to some evaluating
agent. Therefore, when the egoist says something is good, he is saying it is
good *for him*. Were I an egoist, I could readily accept that 'A' is good
for me, and 'B' is good for the other fellow. Here is where the recogition
of a basic right comes to bear. It is my clear understanding that a
fundamental tenet of the Objectivist ethics is a *recognition of the right*
of the other fellow to concern himself with 'B' and not 'A' if that is his
choice. So the Objectivist ethics *qualifies* what appears to be a more
basic conception (egoism) through recognition of a right.
To me it is Heumer's narrow focus that leads to these incorrect assertions
about Objectivism. A glaring case is his trite example of the shop keepers.
Only at a superficial level are they in conflict as asserted by Heumer. At a
more fundamental level, they are not in conflict at all. As a clearer
example of this principle, lets examine sport. I recently saw the Andre's
Agassi and Medvedev battle it out for the French Open. At the superficial
level, they were in conflict - battling it out on the tennis court for a
major prize. This is the level of Heumer's shop keepers. At a deeper level,
however, (a far more important level) the Andre's were both benefitting in a
major way from "Tennis" itself - its rules, its traditions, its economics,
its excitement. Both men accept the constraints imposed by the action arena,
and they have a mutual interest in the whole system. So do Heumer's shop
keepers.
Tony Shrapnel
anth...@hotmail.com
Tony Shrapnel <shra...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
>
> anth...@hotmail.com wrote in message <7jm5gn$oi5
If you believe that individuals have rights, then you are not "deciding
for yourself" what duties you have. You have a duty to respect them
regardless of what "you decide".
> I believe that "duty" as referred to in this discussion means
obligations
> outside the more basic realm of acceptable laws.
Why do you believe that? "Acceptable" laws are made to protect rights
aren't they? Acceptable laws mirror morality.
There may not be a law that
> determines that I must care for my fellow man, but some will say I
have a
> "duty" to do so. In this realm the Objectivist would say that caring
for
> another is his (the Objectivists) personal choice.
Kant would say this too.
Other people are evaluating agents. Not just you.
Therefore, when the egoist says something is good, he is saying it is
> good *for him*.
For an egoist something is only good if it benefits you in some way.
Hence, for example, the honesty, intelligence, and integrity of your
kids is good only because they benefit you.
However, if you believe that people are ends in themselves, then you
are committed to the view that these virtues are good for your kids,
regardless of whether you benefit, and you would want your kids to
possess them, regardless of their benefit to you.
Were I an egoist, I could readily accept that 'A' is good
> for me, and 'B' is good for the other fellow.
Is your fulfillment of your good as important as his fulfillment of his
good?
If you say your fulfillment is more important "to you", he, of course
will say his fulfillment his more important to him. An egoist as an
egoist has to say that his fulfillment is more important than the other
guy's, but has no good reason to offer why.
Here is where the recogition
> of a basic right comes to bear. It is my clear understanding that a
> fundamental tenet of the Objectivist ethics is a *recognition of the
right*
> of the other fellow to concern himself with 'B' and not 'A' if that
is his
> choice.
What if they both want 'A' and have an equal right to it. An egoist has
to say he should get it. Can you provide a reason why?
They both benefited. But who benefited more? - the winner or the loser?
They had a common interest - playing in the French Open. But they also
had a conflict - winning or losing. Same with the shop keeper example.
Or, if you were playing, would you rather have lost (-:?
anth...@hotmail.com
Andrew Jones <andydjones...@mindspring.com> wrote:
>
> anth...@hotmail.com wrote in message <7jm1t9$ms5
$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>...
> >Andy, you cannot even spell Mill's name and you expect people to
> >believe you have something intelligent to say about utilitarianism?
>
> No. I would only expect _intelligent_ people to believe that I might
have
> something intelligent to say about utilitarianism. You see,
intelligent
> people would realize that the misspelling of a name has little to do
with
> the merits of the points presented. Do you realize this?
A typo is one thing. But you spelled his name J. Stewart Mills.
His middle name is spelled 'Stuart' and his last name 'Mill', as you
are now spelling it. It does not _necessarily_ mean you have nothing
intelligent to say, but it is pretty good evidence that you have not
been exposed to his name much, at least in writing. It leaves the
impression that you have not done your homework, that's all.
> >The philosophers you speak of were probably attacking a very
simplistic
> >version of utilitarianism.
>
> They were attacking Utilitarianism as presented by John Stuart Mill.
> Whoo-hoo!!! Check out the spelling, Tony!
Since you have not presented the attacks there is no way to assess them.
And Mill answered a lot of the "standard" attacks. Also, there are
other modern versions of utlitarianism. (See below)
>
> >It is a more serious doctrine than you are
> >giving it credit for. Democratic liberalism has its intellectual
> >foundation in utlitarianism, so it is certainly a "worthy adversary".
>
> Oh my God!!! What is this "utlitarianism" you are speaking of? Oh.
I guess
> you are just having trouble spelling the name of the very philosophy
we are
> discussing. Don't worry, I won't discredit you for it. ;-) Anyway, I
> agree, that Utilitarianism has had some influence.
You should read a history of the last half of the 19th century in
Britain - particularly the philosophical motivation behind the Reform
Acts.
Also, think about the relationship of democracy (one man one vote) and
the Greatest Happiness Principle.
People do think about
> the common good when making policy. Still, the way they think about
it is
> is very different than the Utilitarianism as presented by it's modern
> father. One of the nice things about Utilitarianism is that it IS a
> simplistic theory and easily analyzed (and discredited). Not so with
> Kantanism or Objectivism.
So are you a Kantian Objectivist (-:?
>
> Ps - If you have a more complicated Utilitarianism you wish to
discuss, by
> all means, present it.
Book IV of Henry Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics, 7th edition
(Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981),
J. B. Schneewind, Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
Richard Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice
Hall, 1959).
A. C. Ewing, "What Would Happen if Everyone Acted Like Me?",
Philosophy, Vol. 28 (1953), pp. 16-29 and A
I believe Gordon Sollars also mentioned a modern defense in this thread.
Steve Davis
> I understand that Rand's main objection to Kant was his notion that
> things are ultimately "unknowable", whereas in order to function as
> an Objectivist, the first requirement is a need to "know", or at least
> confidence that true knowledge about the world is possible. Is this
> right, or am I barking up the wrong tree?
Actually Kant began with the presuppositions that one must believe in God
and the immortality of his soul in order to be moral. He viewed scientific
progress and reasoning from experience as anathema to this end. So, Kant
constructed an epistemological system which "[denies] knowledge in order to
make room for faith." This was the expressly stated purpose of his
philosophy.
> From what you've written above, I also perceive a major Objectivist
> objection to the concept of "duty" whether perfect or imperfect. This
> implies that someone or something is telling you what you *should* do
> whereas I [...] would prefer to decide for myself what is my duty [...].
I don't have cites handy because my notes are at home, but a few months ago
I unearthed comparative passages of Rand and Kant opining about the meaning
of their ethics. Specifically, each passage was about whether a man should
be considered more or less moral when he commits a moral act because he
Wants to, rather than because his morality dictates that he do it. Of
course Rand and Kant had diametrically opposite viewpoints, but I found the
passages to be especially telling of their respective attitudes and
metaphysical views toward man.
Russell Hanneken
Andrew Jones <andydjones...@mindspring.com> wrote:
>
> We generally have a good intuitive feel about what is right and
> wrong. What we look for in a theory of ethics is something that
> adequately supports those notions.
Andy,
I have two questions:
1) You said intuition "generally" tells us what is right and wrong.
Generally, but not always? When an intuition is incorrect, how do we
know it? Apparently not by ethical theory; you said ethical theories
are good or bad according to how well they support our intuitions.
2) Why bother with ethical theory, if all it does is tell us what we
already know by intuition?
Regards,
Russell
hann...@best.com
Chris Cathcart
Steve Davis <st...@pobox.com> wrote:
> Actually Kant began with the presuppositions that one must believe in
God
> and the immortality of his soul in order to be moral. He viewed
scientific
> progress and reasoning from experience as anathema to this end. So,
Kant
> constructed an epistemological system which "[denies] knowledge in
order to
> make room for faith." This was the expressly stated purpose of his
> philosophy.
Am I to take it that you would consider this a fair interpretation of
Kant's words and what it implies about his system? It would seem that
with such a sentence like this, the meaning might not be so apparent,
and upon reading this I'd be inclined to try to think what the heck he
might mean by something like this. After all, one chief virtue that
Rand has that Kant definitely lacks is clarity of exposition, and the
meaning of what Kant says in that sentence is hardly clear without
further investigation.
> > From what you've written above, I also perceive a major Objectivist
> > objection to the concept of "duty" whether perfect or imperfect.
This
> > implies that someone or something is telling you what you *should*
do
> > whereas I [...] would prefer to decide for myself what is my duty
[...].
>
> I don't have cites handy because my notes are at home, but a few
months ago
> I unearthed comparative passages of Rand and Kant opining about the
meaning
> of their ethics. Specifically, each passage was about whether a man
should
> be considered more or less moral when he commits a moral act because
he
> Wants to, rather than because his morality dictates that he do it. Of
> course Rand and Kant had diametrically opposite viewpoints, but I
found the
> passages to be especially telling of their respective attitudes and
> metaphysical views toward man.
You did indeed provide some quotes, and another poster here whose
knowledge of Kant I have considerably more reason to trust than yours,
thought you were *very* selective in your quotations of Kant.
Regarding the differences between Rand and Kant on this, you probably
are well aware that according to Rand, doing an act that is right is
not right *in virtue of* one's wanting to do it. One's wanting to
perform an action is not thereby going to make the action moral.
Consider someone like, say, a Peter Keating who designs great buildings
out of the desire to impress others (I'm not saying that Keating
himself designed great buildings; I am focusing on the motivation of
the act). His outward actions would be just like the actions of a
Howard Roark, and he did it because he wanted to, just like Roark did
it because he wanted to, but Keating would not deserve the same kind of
moral appraisal that Roark did because their intentions for doing so
were different. Likewise for Kant, intention has some role to play in
judging the moral worth of an action. Not that I'm saying that no
differences remain between the two, but whether desire confers moral
worth on an otherwise right action is in itself not anything that
highlights a fundamental difference between Rand and Kant.
As to whether Kant thought that an action *only* has moral worth when
it is one's duty and it is down solely for the sake of duty, there
might be some plausibility to that claim but I'm not in a position to
say for sure. There are some here with considerably better knowledge
in Kant's ethics that might tell us whether this is a fair
interpretation of Kant's writing. Whether it is a fatal blow to his
system assuming this is a fair intpretation is another issue that I
really don't think I'm prepared to argue about at this point one way or
the other.
--
Chris Cathcart
Tony Shrapnel
But clearly I am making a distinction between rights as established at law
and "duty" in the sense of one's moral code within the domain of personal
choice. I believe it is not only a valid distinction, but an obvious one.
>> I believe that "duty" as referred to in this discussion means
>obligations
>> outside the more basic realm of acceptable laws.
>
>Why do you believe that? "Acceptable" laws are made to protect rights
>aren't they? Acceptable laws mirror morality.
Yes, but they do not mirror it in its entirety.
[...]
>> >You cannot have it both ways. If you are an egoist, when you call
>> >something "good" you mean it serves your interest. Having people
>serve
>> >your interests, then is better for you, than if they did not. But
>> >Rand's conception of people as rights possessing ends in themselves,
>> >contradicts her egoism, since on this (very Kantian view) the moral
>> >agent cannot regard others as mere means to their own interests and
>> >good.
>>
>> There is something wrong here; I can't quite put my finger on it, but
>I'll
>> have a go. I think the problem is in the value judgement "good".
>Things
>> can't just be "good" in isolation. They can only be good to some
>evaluating
>> agent.
>
>Other people are evaluating agents. Not just you.
Sure, but what is "good" to one may not be "good" to another
>Therefore, when the egoist says something is good, he is saying it is
>> good *for him*.
>
>For an egoist something is only good if it benefits you in some way.
>Hence, for example, the honesty, intelligence, and integrity of your
>kids is good only because they benefit you.
But I also think the planet Jupiter is good; how does it benefit me?
>However, if you believe that people are ends in themselves, then you
>are committed to the view that these virtues are good for your kids,
>regardless of whether you benefit, and you would want your kids to
>possess them, regardless of their benefit to you.
I would expect that any sensible person (Objectivist or otherwise) would
agree.
> Were I an egoist, I could readily accept that 'A' is good
>> for me, and 'B' is good for the other fellow.
>
>Is your fulfillment of your good as important as his fulfillment of his
>good?
Important? to whom. To me, my good is more important. To him, his is. That's
OK. To the Objectivist (as opposed to the more generic "rational egotist"
that you are talking about) this is a basic starting point.
>If you say your fulfillment is more important "to you", he, of course
>will say his fulfillment his more important to him. An egoist as an
>egoist has to say that his fulfillment is more important than the other
>guy's, but has no good reason to offer why.
But the reason is contained within the basic principle. That is that
"importance" is not "out there"; it is a perceived value. An Objectivist
would not translate his own personal view of importance into some cosmic law
of importance.
>Here is where the recogition
>> of a basic right comes to bear. It is my clear understanding that a
>> fundamental tenet of the Objectivist ethics is a *recognition of the
>right*
>> of the other fellow to concern himself with 'B' and not 'A' if that
>is his
>> choice.
>
>What if they both want 'A' and have an equal right to it. An egoist has
>to say he should get it. Can you provide a reason why?
I said "concern himself with", not "want". I had in mind possible duties
(the original topic). For example, if someone was interested in helping the
intellectually gifted achieve more as distinct from helping the urban poor,
he has the right to do so. Whereas someone else might choose to help the
urban poor (or for that matter, to help nobody); that is his right.
However, to take up your specific question: if the 'A' was intangible (such
as, for example, music appreciation) then each can pursue and achieve it
without cost to the other. If the 'A' is tangible public property (such as a
park) then both can simply share it. If the 'A' is tangible private property
then by definition both cannot have an equal right to it. Your defined
egoist might look at a new car and say "I want it and I should have it". The
Objectivist on the other hand would, if he wanted the car badly enough, take
the appropriate moral and legal steps to acquire it. But he would recognise
the right of another to do the same, and compete if necessary.
No, I would rather have won, and perhaps I will next time I play. The point
is, however, that such day-to-day "conflicts" are merely the natural
consequences of living. They are not systemic conflicts such as, for
example, between Communism and Capitalism, or between Objectivism and
Utilitarianism. Now *you*, old Wrathbone, are on the public record as having
said Heumer's critique is "very good". If this represents the best of the
arguments against Objectivist ethics, then I believe Objectivists may take
heart.
Tony Shrapnel
Andrew Jones
Russell Hanneken wrote in message <7jpej2$v52$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>...
>Andy,
>
>I have two questions:
>
>1) You said intuition "generally" tells us what is right and wrong.
>Generally, but not always? When an intuition is incorrect, how do we
>know it? Apparently not by ethical theory; you said ethical theories
>are good or bad according to how well they support our intuitions.
Suppose some philosopher came up with an ethical theory that rendered it
moral that one can cheat, rob, steal, murder, etc. and be morally good.
Supposing that the theory was consistent and soundly based (on whatever
premises), what objections would we have toward it? The objections to the
theory would be, no doubt, that it doesn't conform to our general intuitions
of what is moral and what is not. And indeed, it is precisely objections of
these sorts which ultimately discredits an ethical theory.
Now to answer your questions. It is true that iIntuition is generally
correct but not always. And when an intuition is incorrect, we *can* resort
to an ethical theory if we believe it is sound and presents the truth. Let
me say that a little better. Intutively, just about everyone will agree
that murder is wrong. But consider this situation. You are held up at gun
point and told to kill someone otherwise the guy holding you up will kill 9
other people. Now intution isn't so good and people will start to disagree.
This might be a point where you would get help from the ethical theory
(which has worked so well with your general intutions) to decide what to do.
>2) Why bother with ethical theory, if all it does is tell us what we
>already know by intuition?
Hopefully from above, you see that the ethical theory (after being able to
hold up to general intutions of most people) can help us understand how to
make moral decisions in the more grey cases.
Take care,
Andy.
log...@my-deja.com
> Actually Kant began with the presuppositions that one must believe in
God
> and the immortality of his soul in order to be moral.
Apparently, like the Bourbon kings, you've learned nothing and
forgotten nothing. When you made this same utterly silly claim last
year I pointed out that it directly contradicted what Kant said on the
subject, to wit:
"It is well to note here that this moral necessity *is subjective*,
that is, a need, and not *objective*, that is, itself a duty; for,
there can be no duty to assume the existence of anything .... Moreover,
it is not to be understood by this that it is necessary to assume the
existence of God *as a ground of all obligation in general* (for this
rests, as has been sufficiently shown, solely on the autonomy of reason
itself)." 2nd Critique, 125-126
Get this straight: For Kant, "the ground of all obligation in
general ... rests ... solely on the autonomy of reason itself."
Not faith, not God, not immortality. If you don't understand that, you
don't understand Kant.
Apparently, you (still) don't.
SQ
Steve Davis
> You did indeed provide some quotes, and another poster here whose
> knowledge of Kant I have considerably more reason to trust than yours,
> thought you were *very* selective in your quotations of Kant.
Anybody who cares to can go to an Internet search engine and read all the
Kant they want. I find it particularly odd that you would rather get your
information from Kant from Usenet.
> Not that I'm saying that no differences remain between the two, but
> whether desire confers moral worth on an otherwise right action is
> in itself not anything that highlights a fundamental difference
> between Rand and Kant.
Actually it is a very large difference. As I said before I don't have any
cites, I will try to dig them up this weekend.
anth...@hotmail.com
Tony Shrapnel <shra...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
> anth...@hotmail.com wrote in message <7jnq0g$bu1
Many laws are made to protect rights, correct? So, isn't it the case
that rights exist prior to laws. This is the objectivist view (and many
others). If people have rights prior to the law, then you are not
"deciding for yourself" what duties you have with respect to them. You
are obligated to respect them, regardless of your wishes.
We have some obligations that are not enforced by law, of course, and
many people disagree about what these are. But some include: generally
not lying (there are of course exceptions), keeping promises, certain
obligations to one's family, and so forth. I would argue these are
obligations regardless of what you "decide for yourself."
Otherwise, it is not clear what you mean by a "moral code within the
domain of personal choice." Do you mean you should be able to decide
for yourself what hairstyle you want? (-:
Snip
>
> >> >You cannot have it both ways. If you are an egoist, when you call
> >> >something "good" you mean it serves your interest. Having people
> >serve
> >> >your interests, then is better for you, than if they did not. But
> >> >Rand's conception of people as rights possessing ends in
themselves,
> >> >contradicts her egoism, since on this (very Kantian view) the
moral
> >> >agent cannot regard others as mere means to their own interests
and
> >> >good.
> >>
> >> There is something wrong here; I can't quite put my finger on it,
but
> >I'll
> >> have a go. I think the problem is in the value judgement "good".
> >Things
> >> can't just be "good" in isolation. They can only be good to some
> >evaluating
> >> agent.
> >
> >Other people are evaluating agents. Not just you.
>
> Sure, but what is "good" to one may not be "good" to another
Obviously so. However, the official objectivist position is that this
is not true since we have certain goods as "man qua man", and since
rational people's interests do not conflict. Are you sure you are
even a "half baked" objectivist? (-:
>
> >Therefore, when the egoist says something is good, he is saying it is
> >> good *for him*.
> >
> >For an egoist something is only good if it benefits you in some way.
> >Hence, for example, the honesty, intelligence, and integrity of your
> >kids is good only because they benefit you.
>
> But I also think the planet Jupiter is good; how does it benefit me?
If you are an egoist and you say that Jupiter is good, and it has no
benefit to you in any way, then you would be contradicting yourself.
You apparently want to refute your own philosophical position.
>
> >However, if you believe that people are ends in themselves, then you
> >are committed to the view that these virtues are good for your kids,
> >regardless of whether you benefit, and you would want your kids to
> >possess them, regardless of their benefit to you.
>
> I would expect that any sensible person (Objectivist or otherwise)
would
> agree.
But an objectivist cannot agree, since for him it does not make sense
to say that something is good, without any benefit to him. Maybe you
should turn off the oven on this philosophy and find another.
>
> > Were I an egoist, I could readily accept that 'A' is good
> >> for me, and 'B' is good for the other fellow.
> >
> >Is your fulfillment of your good as important as his fulfillment of
his
> >good?
>
> Important? to whom. To me, my good is more important. To him, his is.
That's
> OK. To the Objectivist (as opposed to the more generic "rational
egotist"
> that you are talking about) this is a basic starting point.
It is also trivially true. When you say "My good is more important to
me" and "his good is more important to him" what you are really saying
is "what is more important to me is more important to me" or "what is
good for me is good for me". The nice thing about tautologies is that
they are always true. The drawback is that they don't say anything.
>
> >If you say your fulfillment is more important "to you", he, of course
> >will say his fulfillment his more important to him. An egoist as an
> >egoist has to say that his fulfillment is more important than the
other
> >guy's, but has no good reason to offer why.
>
> But the reason is contained within the basic principle. That is that
> "importance" is not "out there"; it is a perceived value. An
Objectivist
> would not translate his own personal view of importance into some
cosmic law
> of importance.
But he does define the good only in terms of his self- interest. So
nothing in the cosmos is good unless it benefits him in some way.
>
snip
>
> However, to take up your specific question: if the 'A' was intangible
(such
> as, for example, music appreciation) then each can pursue and achieve
it
> without cost to the other. If the 'A' is tangible public property
(such as a
> park) then both can simply share it. If the 'A' is tangible private
property
> then by definition both cannot have an equal right to it. Your defined
> egoist might look at a new car and say "I want it and I should have
it". The
> Objectivist on the other hand would, if he wanted the car badly
enough, take
> the appropriate moral and legal steps to acquire it. But he would
recognise
> the right of another to do the same, and compete if necessary.
If you recognize the right of another as equal to your own, then egoism
as a basic moral theory falls out of the picture entirely (except in
the sense of being trivially true as I pointed out above)
>
snip
> >
> >They both benefited. But who benefited more? - the winner or the
loser?
> >They had a common interest - playing in the French Open. But they
also
> >had a conflict - winning or losing. Same with the shop keeper
example.
> >Or, if you were playing, would you rather have lost (-:?
>
> No, I would rather have won, and perhaps I will next time I play.
So they both wanted to win. At the level of the game itself their
interests were opposed.
The point
> is, however, that such day-to-day "conflicts" are merely the natural
> consequences of living. They are not systemic conflicts such as, for
> example, between Communism and Capitalism, or between Objectivism and
> Utilitarianism.
That's fine. But you are missing the point. Playing in the French Open
is "good" or in the interest of each and winning the game is "good" or
in the interest of each. Here is a rational conflict of interest. To
say winning the game is not in their interests is patently false. And
this is precisely Heumer's point.
Now *you*, old Wrathbone, are on the public record as having
> said Heumer's critique is "very good". If this represents the best of
the
> arguments against Objectivist ethics, then I believe Objectivists may
take
> heart.
Let me proclaim to the public at large, and have it duly recorded in the
annals of history that Heumer's critique is excellent, and that you have
said nothing that challenges it.
--
Stephen Grossman
> In article <7jjm4f$pus$1...@nntp1.atl.mindspring.net>,
> Andrew Jones <andydjones...@mindspring.com> wrote:
> >
> > We generally have a good intuitive feel about what is right and
> > wrong. What we look for in a theory of ethics is something that
> > adequately supports those notions.
I intuit that youre wrong. Can you help me look for a theory of ethics
which adequately supports this notion?
--
Reason is man's basic means of survival. AYN RAND
Elegant and prosperous Californians. DAVID GULBRAA
This here thing comes from this here seed. ARISTOTLE
------------------------------------------------------
Tracking Marxist dialectical revolution: ZigZag
Radically systematic radical metaphysics: Existence 2
http://home.att.net/~sdgross
-------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Grossman Fairhaven, MA, USA sdg...@att.net
Stephen Grossman
> Actually Kant began with the presuppositions that one must believe in God
> and the immortality of his soul in order to be moral.
Is this a logical beginning or a chronological beginning? Ie, in the
beginning of the first preface to his CPR, Kant says we are "troubled by
questions that cannot be ignored.. and which cannot be answered." And
"reason...begins w/principles" [and not concretes]. In his Introduction,
he says that understanding causes experience which causes sensation. In
the first sentence of the book's last paragraph he offers "criticism" as
the proper intellectual view, ie, criticism as a principled negativism,
ie, nihilism. Note well that reality is evaded for consciousness. Do you
regard these preuppositions as applications of the principle of the
primacy of consciousness?
Kant's concerns here were God, immortality and freedom.
Stephen Grossman
<cath...@my-deja.com> wrote:
you were *very* selective in your quotations of Kant.
Please provide some unselective quotes...
Andrew Jones
Stephen Grossman wrote in message ...
>
>> In article <7jjm4f$pus$1...@nntp1.atl.mindspring.net>,
>> Andrew Jones <andydjones...@mindspring.com> wrote:
>> >
>> > We generally have a good intuitive feel about what is right and
>> > wrong. What we look for in a theory of ethics is something that
>> > adequately supports those notions.
>
>I intuit that youre wrong.
That must be very paradoxal for you then. If you do not generally have a
good intuitive feel about what is right and wrong - you ought not (in
general) trust yourself.
>Can you help me look for a theory of ethics
>which adequately supports this notion?
A theory of ethics that supports your intuition about my assertion? Since
my being wrong or right and your believing my being wrong or right doesn't
follow under any ethical consideration - no theory of ethics will support
this notion... but you were being silly, right? ;-) Now, so am I.
Take care,
Andy.
Chris Cathcart
access.att.net>,
Stephen Grossman <sdg...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
> In article <7jp5ek$q...@usenet.pa.dec.com>, Steve Davis
<st...@pobox.com> wrote:
>
> > Actually Kant began with the presuppositions that one must believe
in God
> > and the immortality of his soul in order to be moral.
>
> Is this a logical beginning or a chronological beginning? Ie, in the
> beginning of the first preface to his CPR, Kant says we are "troubled
by
> questions that cannot be ignored.. and which cannot be answered." And
> "reason...begins w/principles" [and not concretes].
Yeah, I bet the "w/" appears in the original text rather than the
word "with," too.
[snip the rest of this fucking idiot's mindless gibberish]
--
Chris Cathcart
b
o
t
food
anth...@hotmail.com
Russell Hanneken <hann...@best.com> wrote:
> In article <7jjm4f$pus$1...@nntp1.atl.mindspring.net>,
> Andrew Jones <andydjones...@mindspring.com> wrote:
> >
> > We generally have a good intuitive feel about what is right and
> > wrong. What we look for in a theory of ethics is something that
> > adequately supports those notions.
>
>
> I have two questions:
>
> 1) You said intuition "generally" tells us what is right and wrong.
> Generally, but not always? When an intuition is incorrect, how do we
> know it? Apparently not by ethical theory; you said ethical theories
> are good or bad according to how well they support our intuitions.
>
> already know by intuition?
There has come to be known in Ethics, the idea of "reflective
equilibrium." I am not a specialist in ethics, so I don't know
the person who came up with the term. You need to check an ethical
theory with your basic moral intuitions. If a theory leads to
consequences that contradict basic intuitions about what is right
then you should reject the theory (I believe objectivism does this).
If the theory is derived from rational principles and matches our basic
intuitions, then there is a good reason to think it might be the right
theory, or at least a good theory to live by. Sometimes in ethical
dilemmas our intuitions are not clear or decisive. In these cases the
theory might guide us to find a solution. In other words our intuitions
must guide our theory making, and once we have a sound theory this
theory can aid us in clarifying our intuitions, or guide us when our
intuitions don't help. This process is called "reflective equilibrium."
Wrathbone
anth...@hotmail.com
access.att.net>,
Stephen Grossman <sdg...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
> In article <7jp5ek$q...@usenet.pa.dec.com>, Steve Davis
<st...@pobox.com> wrote:
>
> > Actually Kant began with the presuppositions that one must believe
in God
> > and the immortality of his soul in order to be moral.
>
> Is this a logical beginning or a chronological beginning? Ie, in the
> beginning of the first preface to his CPR, Kant says we are "troubled
by
> questions that cannot be ignored.. and which cannot be answered." And
Introduction,
> he says that understanding causes experience which causes sensation.
In
> the first sentence of the book's last paragraph he offers "criticism"
as
> the proper intellectual view, ie, criticism as a principled
negativism,
> ie, nihilism. Note well that reality is evaded for consciousness. Do
you
> regard these preuppositions as applications of the principle of the
> primacy of consciousness?
You simply do not have a clue about what "criticism" means when Kant
uses it in this passage. A common error is also thinking that "critique"
(Kritik) in the _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ means that Kant is
criticizing reason. Kant, in fact, shows the limitations of _pure_
(reinen) reason, or rationalist metaphysics, by arguing that for real
knowledge you need sense experience. Hence his famous statement that a
concept without sense experience is empty, and sense experience without
a concept is blind. Byut this does not mean that you cannot have
rational knowledge. In fact Kant thinks he has put it on a firmer
foundation than rationalism and empiricism. You, in short, don't know
what you are talking about.
--
Gordon G. Sollars
...
> There has come to be known in Ethics, the idea of "reflective
> equilibrium." I am not a specialist in ethics, so I don't know
> the person who came up with the term.
John Rawls, /A Theory of Justice/, p20. Rawls notes that the idea is not
peculiar to moral philosophy, but he refers to it as "reflective
equilibrium". I am morally certain that he would have provided a
reference if the term had been used before him. ;-)
Of course, the fact that the term originates with Rawls gives
Objectivists a reason to treat it with suspicion.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu
Jim Klein
>If you recognize the right of another as equal to your own, then
>egoism as a basic moral theory falls out of the picture entirely
>(except in the sense of being trivially true as I pointed out above)
..unless one can show that treating other humans as they are--humans--
is in the interest of the ego. IOW, what if I choose to recognize the
rights of others not because of what it does for them, but rather what
it does for me?
>So they both wanted to win. At the level of the game itself their
>interests were opposed.
Bullshit. "At the level of the game itself," only one will win.
Your argument subtly makes "winning the game" an intrinsic value, but
there are no intrinsic values without a valuer. [See, you're closer to
Peikoff than you thought!] Acing every par three is also "in the
golfer's interest;" this doesn't imply that every time he doesn't, he
has acted against his interest.
>That's fine. But you are missing the point. Playing in the French Open
>is "good" or in the interest of each and winning the game is "good" or
>in the interest of each. Here is a rational conflict of interest. To
>say winning the game is not in their interests is patently false.
It can be in the interests of A to play in the French Open and it can
be in the interests of B to play. In fact, if nobody else played, it
probably wouldn't be in either of their interests. Well, when you play
in the French Open, you know that only one person will win...you may
call that the "context" if you wish. Hence, the fact that only one
will win doesn't mean that fact is against the interest of any of the
players. Again, if that _weren't_ the case, then it might be against a
player's interest to play in it. [Besides, facts themselves are
_never_ against a person's interest, in this usage.]
>Let me proclaim to the public at large, and have it duly recorded in
>the annals of history that Heumer's critique is excellent, and that
>you have said nothing that challenges it.
IMO, Huemer's critique is remarkably weak especially considering the
various _actual_ objections one might have to the less-than-fully-
developed Objectivist theories. Essentially, it's just typical
philo-babble using word play and bait-and-switch tactics to pretend
that something is "proven" when the only things proven are the
magnificent feats one can accomplish with words.
Though as you for yourself have made accomplishing such feats a very
high value, I can understand why you'd think it's excellent!
Objectivists should be so lucky that Huemer's piece would be the best
critique of their positions.
jk
Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes.
"But who will guard the guards themselves?"--Juvenal
Andrew Jones
anth...@hotmail.com wrote in message <7jnrpe$cd8$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>...
> Book IV of Henry Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics, 7th edition
>(Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981),
>
>J. B. Schneewind, Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy
>(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
>
>Richard Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice
>Hall, 1959).
>
>A. C. Ewing, "What Would Happen if Everyone Acted Like Me?",
>Philosophy, Vol. 28 (1953), pp. 16-29 and A
Thanks for the reference list, Tony. I haven't had a chance to find these
yet - but hope to read at least one soon. I am a bit skeptical, though. I
have read a fair share of Utilitarianism literature - abeit not in several
years. I've found that nearly all versions have the same common problems.
And it seems to me that, any flavor of Utilitarianism will ultimately rest
on the same premise, that is, that we should look at the consequences of an
action to determine its moral rightness or wrongness. To escape the
criticism that Utilitarianism has under gone, I would think that
Utilitarianism would have to drop this notion... but then, it wouldn't be
Utilitarianism anymore...
Take care,
Andy.
Andrew Jones
anth...@hotmail.com wrote in message <7jm2u5$nc7$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>...
>In article <7jjm4f$pus$1...@nntp1.atl.mindspring.net>,
>
>Also, consequentialism, does capture many of our intuitions about what
>is right. For example what if keeping a promise or returning property
>would lead to the death of an innocent person? Say you promised to hold
>a gun for your friend until he asked for it. He comes to your door has
>been drinking and is in a jealous rage at his girlfriend who he thinks
>is having an affair, but you know otherwise.
Lets consider this more. Suppose that after you've decided to not give your
raging friend the gun, he immediatly goes back home, picks up a bat, and
brutally kills 3 passer-bys in the frustration of not having the gun to kill
his one girl-friend.
Under consequentialism, your action may be deemed as morally wrong. Again,
this does not capture our intuitions about what is right/wrong.
>Wouldn't it be wrong to
>give him the gun, uphold his property rights, and keep your promise in
>this case?
It very well might.
>Thinking it to be so, is giving due consideration to consequences.
That is only one way of looking at it. I would say that you are giving due
consideration only to the present situation. It might be that you gave your
raging friend the gun and he goes home and does nothing. Maybe, though, we
would like to say it was *still* wrong to give the friend the gun given the
circumstances (and regardless of the consequences).
Take care,
Andy.
Stephen Grossman
<andydjones...@mindspring.com> wrote:
> Stephen Grossman wrote in message ...
> >
> >> In article <7jjm4f$pus$1...@nntp1.atl.mindspring.net>,
> >> Andrew Jones <andydjones...@mindspring.com> wrote:
> >> >
> >> > We generally have a good intuitive feel about what is right and
> >> > wrong. What we look for in a theory of ethics is something that
> >> > adequately supports those notions.
> >
> >I intuit that youre wrong.
>
> That must be very paradoxal for you then. If you do not generally have a
> good intuitive feel about what is right and wrong - you ought not (in
> general) trust yourself.
It has ben revealed to me that this also wrong and that Im right.
Stephen Grossman
>In the first sentence of the book's last paragraph he offers "criticism"
> as the proper intellectual view, ie, criticism as a principled
> negativism, ie, nihilism. Note well that reality is evaded for
consciousness. Do
> you regard these preuppositions as applications of the principle of the
> > primacy of consciousness?
>
> You simply do not have a clue about what "criticism" means when Kant
> uses it in this passage. A common error is also thinking that "critique"
> (Kritik) in the _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ means that Kant is
> criticizing reason. Kant, in fact, shows the limitations of _pure_
> (reinen) reason, or rationalist metaphysics, by arguing that for real
> knowledge you need sense experience. Hence his famous statement that a
> concept without sense experience is empty, and sense experience without
> a concept is blind. Byut this does not mean that you cannot have
> rational knowledge. In fact Kant thinks he has put it on a firmer
> foundation than rationalism and empiricism. You, in short, don't know
> what you are talking about.
Perhaps you missed that part of Kant in which knowledge of reality is
denied, a claim which invaliates his philosophy. Aristotle had a
sense-based reason in the context of knowledge of reality. But, if you
hate focusing your mind, Manny is the guy!
Stephen Grossman
<andydjones...@mindspring.com> wrote:
Utilitarianism will ultimately rest
> on the same premise, that is, that we should look at the consequences of an
> action to determine its moral rightness or wrongness.
Its a type of collectivism
anth...@hotmail.com
Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> In <7ju5c1$dr8$1...@nnrp1.deja.com> anth...@hotmail.com writes:
>
> >If you recognize the right of another as equal to your own, then
> >egoism as a basic moral theory falls out of the picture entirely
> >(except in the sense of being trivially true as I pointed out above)
>
> is in the interest of the ego.
But this is contrary to the view that every person is an end in
himself. If a person is an end in himself then he has a right to
pursue his interests, in spite of its effect on you. Letting him
do so unhindered may have good consequences for you, but he should be
left to do so whether it does or not. For an ethical egoist something
is only good if it benefits him. This is true by definition. An egoist
must affirm, then, that leaving people to pursue their rightful goals
is good only because it benefits the egoist, which, of course, is false.
IOW, what if I choose to recognize the
> rights of others not because of what it does for them, but rather what
> it does for me?
I could choose to obey the law of gravity because I admire Newton,
or choose never to murder anybody because I can't stand the sight of
blood. The reason you choose to respect people's rights has nothing to
do with why they have those rights.
>
> >So they both wanted to win. At the level of the game itself their
> >interests were opposed.
>
> Bullshit. "At the level of the game itself," only one will win.
Maybe you should look at what I wrote again.
>
> Your argument subtly makes "winning the game" an intrinsic value, but
> there are no intrinsic values without a valuer. [See, you're closer
to
> Peikoff than you thought!]
It's pretty clear that winning the game is a good thing for the winner.
Whether winning is an intrinsic good in contrast to an instrumental good
is an interesting question. I think many people find winning to be an
intrinsic good, and at that level of competition sacrifice nearly
everything to do it.
As far as needing a valuer to have values, I don't see what that has to
do with anything.
Acing every par three is also "in the
> golfer's interest;" this doesn't imply that every time he doesn't, he
> has acted against his interest.
It's interesting that you changed the example in this way. You quietly
made the competitor (who has a conflicting interest) disappear.
>
> >That's fine. But you are missing the point. Playing in the French
Open
> >is "good" or in the interest of each and winning the game is "good"
or
> >in the interest of each. Here is a rational conflict of interest. To
> >say winning the game is not in their interests is patently false.
>
> It can be in the interests of A to play in the French Open and it can
> be in the interests of B to play.
They have this interest in common.
In fact, if nobody else played, it
> probably wouldn't be in either of their interests. Well, when you
play
> in the French Open, you know that only one person will win...you may
> call that the "context" if you wish. Hence, the fact that only one
> will win doesn't mean that fact is against the interest of any of the
> players.
Sure it does. It is in the interest of both players to win. Only one
can win. He is happy. The loser is unhappy. Or to be more precise, the
winner is happier than the loser.
Again, if that _weren't_ the case, then it might be against a
> player's interest to play in it.
No it wouldn't, because he has a chance to win, and it's good for him
to play in such a prestigious contest.
>
> >Let me proclaim to the public at large, and have it duly recorded in
> >the annals of history that Heumer's critique is excellent, and that
> >you have said nothing that challenges it.
>
> IMO, Huemer's critique is remarkably weak especially considering the
> various _actual_ objections one might have to the less-than-fully-
> developed Objectivist theories. Essentially, it's just typical
> philo-babble using word play and bait-and-switch tactics to pretend
> that something is "proven" when the only things proven are the
> magnificent feats one can accomplish with words.
Maybe. But _you_ certainly have not shown anything he has said to be
wrong.
>
> Though as you for yourself have made accomplishing such feats a very
> high value, I can understand why you'd think it's excellent!
Thank you.
Steve Davis
> When you made this same utterly silly claim last year I pointed
> out that it directly contradicted what Kant said on the subject, to wit:
People accuse ME of selective quoting!
The (incomplete) sentence which you quoted is in a section titled "The
Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason." The "reason"
which Kant referrs to in that section does not denote the same concept as
"reason" as used by anybody else. He's talking about "Practical Reason,"
which is simply a term which stands for one's faith in divine moral law.
It is precisely "faith" that Kant is promoting. Faith in moral law which is
practical only insofar as it allows the promulgation of the "summum bonum,"
which Kant believes is necessarily predicated on the existence of God. The
point he was driving at in the sentence which you incompletely quoted and
the surrounding context was that someone could choose to follow the moral
law even if they didn't necessarily assume the existence of God, so long as
they still had faith in the promotion of the "summum bonum." Kant goes on
to say (I'm quoting from a different translation):
What belongs to duty here is only the endeavour to realize and promote
the summum bonum in the world, the possibility of which can
therefore be postulated; and as our reason finds it not conceivable
except on the supposition of a supreme intelligence, the admission
of this existence is therefore connected with the consciousness of our
duty, although the admission itself belongs to the domain of
speculative reason.
So in other words, even though one need not believe in God the "admission of
this existence" is presupposed by one's faith in the moral law. In other
words, in order to be moral in Kant's eye you must believe in God, even if
you don't believe that you believe in God.
Kant's works are full of these sorts of dirty tricks.
Tony Shrapnel
[mega-snip]
> Now *you*, old Wrathbone, are on the public record as having
> > said Heumer's critique is "very good". If this represents the best of
> the
> > arguments against Objectivist ethics, then I believe Objectivists may
> take
> > heart.
>
> Let me proclaim to the public at large, and have it duly recorded in the
> annals of history that Heumer's critique is excellent [...].
> --
> Wrathbone
Thank you, Sir Wrathbone. I repair for now, content. I shall return.
Regards
TS
anth...@hotmail.com
Tony Shrapnel <shra...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
> <anth...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:7ju5c1$dr8
$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> [mega-snip]
>
> >
> > Let me proclaim to the public at large, and have it duly recorded
in the
> > annals of history that Heumer's critique is excellent [...].
> > --
> > Wrathbone
>
> Thank you, Sir Wrathbone. I repair for now, content. I shall return.
>
On a personal note, I would find it difficult to be content if someone
has shown me to be so misguided (see material that was "mega-snipped").
But some people, I suppose, have a high tolerance for such experiences
(-:
Take care,
anth...@hotmail.com
Gordon G. Sollars <gsol...@virginia.edu> wrote:
> In article <7jvkb5$q70$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, anth...@hotmail.com
writes...
> ...
> > There has come to be known in Ethics, the idea of "reflective
> > equilibrium." I am not a specialist in ethics, so I don't know
> > the person who came up with the term.
>
> John Rawls, /A Theory of Justice/, p20
Thanks.
Wrathbone
xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx
Stephen Grossman
>[Kant's] "Practical Reason,"...faith in divine moral law.
>
> [Kant] What belongs to duty here is only the endeavour to realize and p
> romote
> the summum bonum in the world, the possibility of which can
> therefore be postulated; and as our reason finds it not conceivable
> except on the supposition of a supreme intelligence, the admission
> of this existence is therefore connected with the consciousness of our
> duty, although the admission itself belongs to the domain of
> speculative reason.
>
> So in other words, even though one need not believe in God the "admission of
> this existence" is presupposed by one's faith in the moral law. In other
> words, in order to be moral in Kant's eye you must believe in God, even if
> you don't believe that you believe in God.
Basically, Kant doesnt discuss concrete reality but instead a
subjectivity split from it.
--
====================================================
Reason is man's basic means of survival. AYN RAND
This here thing comes from this here seed. ARISTOTLE
I reckon so! JOANN SVENDSEN
----------------------------------------------------
Tracking Marxist dialectical revolution: ZigZag
Radically systematic radical metaphysics: Existence 2
http://home.att.net/~sdgross
----------------------------------------------------
Stephen Grossman Fairhaven, MA, USA sdg...@att.net
====================================================
Stephen Grossman
> leaving people to pursue their rightful goals
> is good only because it benefits the egoist, which, of course, is false.
. In Obj, its true since other people may and often do produce values,
inc/knowledge,that may benefit the egoist. Surely you respect your
doctor's ability such that forcing him to obey your non-expert knowledge
of medicine will destroy you. Also, respecting other's rights encourages
them to respect yours. Also, the most important benefits ae long-range,
thus an essential concern w/short-range benefits (from force) is
destructive in the long-run.
Gordon G. Sollars
> In article <MPG.11cd79b07...@news.compuserve.com>,
> Gordon G. Sollars <gsol...@virginia.edu> wrote:
> > John Rawls, /A Theory of Justice/, p20
>
> Thanks.
>
> Wrathbone
You're quite welcome. Like my "motorist helper", I cruise the
information super highway, looking for my chances to do good.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu
Tony Shrapnel
> In article <OXh93.1886$fR5....@ozemail.com.au>,
> Tony Shrapnel <shra...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
> > <anth...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:7ju5c1$dr8
> $1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> > [mega-snip]
> > >
> > > Let me proclaim to the public at large, and have it duly recorded
> in the
> > > --
> > > Wrathbone
> >
> > Thank you, Sir Wrathbone. I repair for now, content. I shall return.
>
> On a personal note, I would find it difficult to be content if someone
> has shown me to be so misguided (see material that was "mega-snipped").
> But some people, I suppose, have a high tolerance for such experiences
> (-:
>
excellent - I know excellent when I see it. As to being misguided, well,
I've been misguided for years. I would say *anyone* who sits at a computer
terminal sparring pop-philosophy back-chat around the planet in random
snatched moments might be considered somewhat misguided. Don't you? (-:
TS
anth...@hotmail.com
Tony Shrapnel <shra...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
>
> I am content in the knowledge that Heumer's critique is definitely
*not*
> excellent - I know excellent when I see it.
But none of your claims to show that it is not excellent stand up to
scrutiny. If you had responded in a convincing way to my criticisms of
your criticisms (what you "mega -snipped") you would have _shown_ that
it is not excellent. As it is you are simply saying that it is not
excellent without giving any reasons. This, of course, in the context
of a debate, is equivalent to throwing in the towel.
You say that you know what is excellent when you see it. But you have
given nobody any reason to believe that you can distinguish the
excellent from the non-excellent.
As to being misguided, well,
> I've been misguided for years. I would say *anyone* who sits at a
computer
> terminal sparring pop-philosophy back-chat around the planet in random
> snatched moments might be considered somewhat misguided. Don't you?
(-:
Not at all. Is collecting stamps "misguided" - or playing tennis, or
poker? knitting? bowling? sky-diving? Are you imposing a narrow and
"half-baked" objectivist conception of rationality on yourself? - and
me?(-:
anth...@hotmail.com
sdg...@worldnet.att.net wrote:
> anth...@hotmail.com wrote:
>
> > leaving people to pursue their rightful goals
> > is good only because it benefits the egoist, which, of course, is
false.
>
> . In Obj, its true since other people may and often do produce values,
> inc/knowledge,that may benefit the egoist.
Irrelevant. Read my sentence. I said the view that leaving people to
pursue their rightful goals is good _only_ because it benefits you, is
false. The doctor pursuing his goals may benefit you, but his results
are good for him and other people too, regardless of their benefit to
you. Your good ain't no better than anybody else's.
Surely you respect your
> doctor's ability such that forcing him to obey your non-expert
knowledge
> of medicine will destroy you.
The knowledge of a doctor or the rights of another person should be
valued whether they benefit you or not.
Also, respecting other's rights encourages
> them to respect yours.
Irrelevant. You should respect someone's rights even if you never see
them again and they have no opportunity to reciprocate.
Also, the most important benefits ae long-range,
> thus an essential concern w/short-range benefits (from force) is
> destructive in the long-run.
False. A series of short range benefits is necessary to gain long term
benefits. So it is essential to be concerned about short term benefits.
Using forse is destructive only if you are retaliated against. There
are cases where there is very little, if any, chance of retaliation.
If there are negative psychological effects, these are very difficult
for an egoist to explain, without contrdicting himself.
Chris Cathcart
sdg...@worldnet.att.net wrote:
> anth...@hotmail.com wrote:
>
> > leaving people to pursue their rightful goals
> > is good only because it benefits the egoist, which, of course, is
false.
>
> . In Obj, its true since other people may and often do produce values,
> doctor's ability such that forcing him to obey your non-expert
knowledge
encourages
> them to respect yours. Also, the most important benefits ae long-
range,
> thus an essential concern w/short-range benefits (from force) is
> destructive in the long-run.
A perfect example of how Grossman is such a Genius. His reading
comprehension abilities apparently cannot parse the sentence that says
that according to an egoist respecting others' rights is good only
because it benefits the rights-respecter, which Wrathbone then says is
a false position to hold.
On the other hand, Wrathbone has a confusion of his own which I'll
address in my next post.
--
Chris Cathcart
Chris Cathcart
anth...@hotmail.com wrote:
> In article <376681...@worldnet.att.net>,
> sdg...@worldnet.att.net wrote:
> > anth...@hotmail.com wrote:
> >
> > > leaving people to pursue their rightful goals
> > > is good only because it benefits the egoist, which, of course, is
> false.
> >
> > . In Obj, its true since other people may and often do produce
values,
> > inc/knowledge,that may benefit the egoist.
>
> pursue their rightful goals is good _only_ because it benefits you, is
> false. The doctor pursuing his goals may benefit you, but his results
> are good for him and other people too, regardless of their benefit to
> you. Your good ain't no better than anybody else's.
Okay, let's accept your paragraph up until the last sentence. Pretty
uncontroversial that a doctor pursuing his goals and achieving their
results are good for him and other people, regardless of their benefit
to you. That's a reasonable rendering of the thesis that values are
agent-relative -- that goods are goods-for-some-person without
necessarily being goods-for-other-persons. Which makes your last
sentence confused at best, a non sequitur at worst, for it might
plausibly be construed as a denial of agent-relativity of value.
But let's say it's not taken to be construed as a denial of agent-
relativity. Then what the heck are we supposed to take it to mean? I
really don't know; I suppose I have to leave it to you to clarify what
it means, since as it stands it seems rather confused. Going back to
the first post of your thread, in which you sit and eat your fine meal
while people starve over in Africa, in what sense are you going to say
that your interests "are no better than anyone else's"? To you, the
fine meal is a good-for-you, and in this sense your interests
are "better" than theirs: you stand in a certain relation to your own
interests that others do not stand in, that gives you reason to prefer
your own interests to theirs, that wouldn't necessarily give anyone
else a reason to prefer to *their* own.
The Objectivist view of the nature of values, which is a version of
agent-relativity, denies that there is some interpersonal (I'd call it
impersonal) summum bonum, which might very well support the thesis that
no one's interests are "better" than others', and it plausibly supports
and even demands impartiality between my interests and your own. Which
is one way of reasoning to support the kind of utilitarianism that you
seem to be arguing against in your first post, unless you just want to
say that Kant is really *Objectivists'* friend.
But if, as an academic, you're interested in some "academic-quality"
defenses of agent-relativity of value, I'll be willing to provide
references (or search Deja under "Mack" and you might readily come
across references I've already given in this forum before).
mattbe...@hotmail.com
anth...@hotmail.com wrote:
> As I sit enjoying a nice filet mignon and hearty Merlot
You sound like my kind of person, who knows what's important in life!
> ...But for people who find altruism and sacrifice morally bad,
> utilitarianism is certainly worse than Kantianism. Kant made a
> distinction between perfect duties and imperfect duties...
> On the other hand, utilitarianism morally requires you to make
> sacrifices for your fellow man...
Your post is an excellent exposition of these contrasting moral
philosophies. Thank-you for the informative post.
mattbe...@hotmail.com
> Andy, you cannot even spell Mill's name and you expect people to
> believe you have something intelligent to say about utilitarianism?
Wow, I just finished complimenting this idiot. I wish DejaNews had kill
filter capability.
Tony Shrapnel
> In article <LmC93.85$lc5...@ozemail.com.au>,
> Tony Shrapnel <shra...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
> >
> > I am content in the knowledge that Heumer's critique is definitely
> *not*
> > excellent - I know excellent when I see it.
>
> But none of your claims to show that it is not excellent stand up to
> scrutiny.
I don't think so.
> If you had responded in a convincing way to my criticisms of
> your criticisms (what you "mega -snipped") you would have _shown_ that
> it is not excellent. As it is you are simply saying that it is not
> excellent without giving any reasons. This, of course, in the context
> of a debate, is equivalent to throwing in the towel.
One can only reasonably state, then re-state the obvious so many times. If
it is then not comprehended by the person with whom one is debating, there
is absolutely no point in continuing. Under such trying circumstances, the
mega-snip is the only sensible solution - a definitive strike to the Gordian
knot!
> You say that you know what is excellent when you see it. But you have
> given nobody any reason to believe that you can distinguish the
> excellent from the non-excellent.
Example of excellence in philosophical appraisal: Bertrand Russell's
"History of Western Philosophy"
Example of third-rate philosophical appraisal: Heumer's critique of
Objectivism
> As to being misguided, well,
> > I've been misguided for years. I would say *anyone* who sits at a
> computer
> > terminal sparring pop-philosophy back-chat around the planet in random
> > snatched moments might be considered somewhat misguided. Don't you?
>
> Not at all. Is collecting stamps "misguided" - or playing tennis, or
> poker? knitting? bowling? sky-diving? Are you imposing a narrow and
> "half-baked" objectivist conception of rationality on yourself? - and
> me?(-:
Knitting may be misguided under certain circumstances. I may be half-baked,
but to my credit I am still in the oven and rising nicely. This is in stark
contrast to some other notable knights of the realm who are fully baked -
nay, over-done; in some cases completely encased in impenetrable charcoal!
Never permit yourself to reach such a state Wrathbone.
Regards
Tony Shrapnel
Stephen Grossman
> In article <376681...@worldnet.att.net>,
> sdg...@worldnet.att.net wrote:
> > anth...@hotmail.com wrote:
> >
> > > leaving people to pursue their rightful goals is good only because
>>>it benefits the egoist, which, of course, is false.
> >
> > . In Obj, its true since other people may and often do produce values,
> > inc/knowledge,that may benefit the egoist.
>
> Irrelevant. Read my sentence. I said the view that leaving people to
> pursue their rightful goals is good _only_ because it benefits you, is
> false. The doctor pursuing his goals may benefit you, but his results
> are good for him and other people too, regardless of their benefit to
> you. Your good ain't no better than anybody else's.
Egoistically, only oneself is the purpose of ethics. One' good is better
FOR ONE, than anybody else's.
>
> Surely you respect your doctor's ability such that forcing him to obey
your non-expert knowledge of medicine will destroy you.
>
> The knowledge of a doctor or the rights of another person should be
> valued whether they benefit you or not.
No. Since you have participated in hpo for long enough to know that
justification is needed, and you provide none, you have none.
>
> Also, respecting other's rights encourages
> > them to respect yours.
>
> Irrelevant. You should respect someone's rights even if you never see
> them again and they have no opportunity to reciprocate.
justification?
>
>> Also, the most important benefits ae long-range, thus an essential
concern >>w/short-range benefits (from force) is destructive in the
long-run.
>
> False. A series of short range benefits is necessary to gain long term
> benefits. So it is essential to be concerned about short term benefits.
I said "essential" concern, not only concern
> Using forse is destructive only if you are retaliated against. There
> are cases where there is very little, if any, chance of retaliation.
Potential retaliation and encouraging retaliation are destructive
> If there are negative psychological effects, these are very difficult
> for an egoist to explain, without contrdicting himself.
?
--
Reason is man's basic means of survival. AYN RAND
Elegant and prosperous Californians. DAVID GULBRAA
This here thing comes from this here seed. ARISTOTLE
------------------------------------------------------
Tracking Marxist dialectical revolution: ZigZag
Radically systematic radical metaphysics: Existence 2
http://home.att.net/~sdgross
-------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Grossman
> In article <7jjd1j$nu6$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>,
> anth...@hotmail.com wrote:
>
> > As I sit enjoying a nice filet mignon and hearty Merlot
is there a blond and a Ferrari nearby?
>
> You sound like my kind of person, who knows what's important in life!
>
> > ...But for people who find altruism and sacrifice morally bad,
> > utilitarianism is certainly worse than Kantianism. Kant made a
> > distinction between perfect duties and imperfect duties...
Now that your a scholar of differences, go from the Many to the One and
recognize that all types of duty are duty, ie, sacrifice for the sake of
sacrifice.
>
> > On the other hand, utilitarianism morally requires you to make
> > sacrifices for your fellow man...
Thats semi-human compared to sacrifice as end.
Stephen Grossman
<shra...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
> Example of excellence in philosophical appraisal: Bertrand Russell's
> "History of Western Philosophy"
Russell is famous for his Math. Princ, a work rejected, shortly after
publication, by his fellow subjectivists. Russell is infamous for changing
philosophies from book to book.
Stephen Grossman
<cath...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> In article <376681...@worldnet.att.net>,
> sdg...@worldnet.att.net wrote:
> > anth...@hotmail.com wrote:
> >
> > > leaving people to pursue their rightful goals
> > > is good only because it benefits the egoist, which, of course, is false.
> >
> > . In Obj, its true since other people may and often do produce values,
> > inc/knowledge,that may benefit the egoist. Surely you respect your
> > doctor's ability such that forcing him to obey your non-expert
> knowledge of medicine will destroy you. Also, respecting other's rights
> encourages them to respect yours. Also, the most important benefits ae long-
> range, thus an essential concern w/short-range benefits (from force) is
> > destructive in the long-run.
>
> A perfect example of how Grossman is such a Genius.
One can rationally discuss my genius as there is evidence judge. One could
not rationally discuss you in this context.
>according to an egoist respecting others' rights is good only
> because it benefits the rights-respecter
correct. It benefits others as well but that doesnt make it good, merely a
means to the egoists goodness
Tony Shrapnel
news:sdgross-1706...@194.cambridge-23-24rs.ma.dial-access.att.net..
..
> In article <7vX93.1121$lc5....@ozemail.com.au>, Tony Shrapnel
> <shra...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
>
> > Example of excellence in philosophical appraisal: Bertrand Russell's
> > "History of Western Philosophy"
>
> Russell is famous for his Math. Princ, a work rejected, shortly after
> publication, by his fellow subjectivists. Russell is infamous for changing
> philosophies from book to book.
> --
I'm sure there is much to criticise in Russell, however, his summaries and
appraisals of various philosophers and their ideas in The History may, I
believe, be considered excellent.
TS
anth...@hotmail.com
Chris Cathcart <cath...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> In article <7k7beu$avo$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>,
> anth...@hotmail.com wrote:
> > In article <376681...@worldnet.att.net>,
> > sdg...@worldnet.att.net wrote:
> > > anth...@hotmail.com wrote:
> > >
> > > > leaving people to pursue their rightful goals
> > > > is good only because it benefits the egoist, which, of course,
is
> > false.
> > >
> > > . In Obj, its true since other people may and often do produce
> values,
> > > inc/knowledge,that may benefit the egoist.
> >
> > pursue their rightful goals is good _only_ because it benefits you,
is
> > false. The doctor pursuing his goals may benefit you, but his
results
> > are good for him and other people too, regardless of their benefit
to
> > you. Your good ain't no better than anybody else's.
>
> uncontroversial that a doctor pursuing his goals and achieving their
> results are good for him and other people, regardless of their benefit
> to you. That's a reasonable rendering of the thesis that values are
> agent-relative -- that goods are goods-for-some-person without
> necessarily being goods-for-other-persons. Which makes your last
> sentence confused at best, a non sequitur at worst, for it might
> plausibly be construed as a denial of agent-relativity of value.
My last sentence is a non-sequitor or confused because it "might" be
construed as a denial of agent relativity?
The denial of agent relativity does not follow from what I said.
Other people are agents, and the good is relative to them.
>
> But let's say it's not taken to be construed as a denial of agent-
> relativity. Then what the heck are we supposed to take it to mean? I
> really don't know; I suppose I have to leave it to you to clarify what
> it means, since as it stands it seems rather confused. Going back to
> the first post of your thread, in which you sit and eat your fine meal
> while people starve over in Africa, in what sense are you going to say
> that your interests "are no better than anyone else's"? To you, the
> fine meal is a good-for-you, and in this sense your interests
> are "better" than theirs:
Of course, "to me" my meal is good for me. That is a tautology. But it
does not follow from this that my eating my meal is any better than
another eating his meal. The goods are equivalent, and in a conflict
must be negotiated as such. To simply insist, "but I should get the meal
because I'm me and my goods are better for me than his goods are" is a
prtetty laugable argument, don't you think?
you stand in a certain relation to your own
> interests that others do not stand in, that gives you reason to prefer
> your own interests to theirs, \
Obviously so, but it does not follow from this that you should _only_
pursue your interests, which is the point of contention in the bebate
about ethical egoism.
>
> The Objectivist view of the nature of values, which is a version of
> agent-relativity, denies that there is some interpersonal (I'd call it
> impersonal) summum bonum, which might very well support the thesis
that
> no one's interests are "better" than others', and it plausibly
supports
> and even demands impartiality between my interests and your own.
Which
> is one way of reasoning to support the kind of utilitarianism that you
> seem to be arguing against in your first post, unless you just want to
> say that Kant is really *Objectivists'* friend.
I don't think my argument depnds on denying agent relativity.
>
> But if, as an academic, you're interested in some "academic-quality"
> defenses of agent-relativity of value, I'll be willing to provide
> references (or search Deja under "Mack" and you might readily come
> across references I've already given in this forum before).
Thanks. But, as I said I am pretty much convinced that agent relativity
is true. But ethical egoism does not follow from it.
>
Wrathbone
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
V
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
log...@my-deja.com
Steve Davis <st...@pobox.com> wrote:
> The (incomplete) sentence which you quoted is in a section titled "The
> Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason." The
"reason"
> which Kant referrs to in that section does not denote the same concept
as
> "reason" as used by anybody else. He's talking about "Practical
Reason,"
> which is simply a term which stands for one's faith in divine moral
law.
Nonsense. (Once again, this is a re-run. You made the same [false] claim
the last time we discussed it.) Kant's term, practical reason, just
refers to reason considered as guiding or governing choice and action.
Apparently, you think Kant is writing in some kind of code to foist
dirty tricks upon us. (How lucky we are to have you to translate and
tell us he didn't mean what he said, not really!)
If anybody treated Rand with the lack of attention to what she actually
said, the shoddy attributions of absurdities on the flimsiest of bases,
with which Objectivists have often treated Kant, Objectivists would be
(have been!) up in arms about the egregious unfairness of the treatment.
It is no more fair when Kant is treated that way.
SQ
T.J.
<andydjones...@mindspring.com> wrote:
>anth...@hotmail.com wrote in message <7jjd1j$nu6$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>...
>[..]
>>It is fairly obvious that utilitarianism demands more sacrifice from
>>people than Kantianism. If Rand knew philosophy, she would have said,
>>J.S. Mill and Bentham were "the most evil men in the world."
>
>Utilitarianism though, is a joke. Philosophers have often love to show how
>silly the theory is, even in introductory courses. So, I assume that for
>Rand, Utilitarianism was never a possible threat to Objectivism.
>Kantianism, on the otherhand, was a real threat. It might be that John
>Stewart Mills was indeed more Evil than Kant - but it was a Mickey Mouse
>kind of Evil by comparison. Evil for Rand may have also encompassed
>"Dangerous" as well. In short, I take that Rand bestowed the said title on
>the most worthy and dangerous advesary to Objectivism she came across.
Absolute tripe. Utilitarianism a joke? You have got to be kidding.
As it stands, utilitarianism is the only mode of ethics (that you have
discussed) which offers the potential of considering the long-term
consequences of one's actions--as opposed to the rigid or simplistic
forms of thinking offered by neo-Aristotelian (qua "Objectivist" &/or
Virtue theory) or neo-Kantian/nonconsequentialist ethics.
If one has bothered to read Singer or Rachel, one quickly realizes that
utilitarianism is not a joke and is quite capable of countering many of
the ridiculous connundrums that have been aimed at Bentham's rigid
system in Philosophy 101--the least of which is Mill's adapting the
system to allow for qualitative valuations. In many ways, if one allows
for a hybrid between act and rule utilitarianisms, then one can develop
a system which is easily superior to Rand's/Rosenbaum's psychological
egoism or Kantian nonconsequentialism in providing a rationalization for
ethics (i.e., if in fact one can objectify ethics). Utilitarianism has
gone a long way from Bentham's early hedonistic calculus.
Correction#1: The name is John Stuart Mill, not "John Stewart Mills".
If you are going to bash a real philosopher, at least try to get his
name right.
Correction#2: As for either Kant or Mill being evil, I would recommend
that you re-read a history of either philosopher before starting to
slander their good and established names.
As for the "Randian" allegations of evil, I would submit that she saw
Kant as evil merely because he offered an ethical system that competed
with her rigid philosophy head-on. Further, she did not like the fact
that his philosophy treated men as being ends-in-themselves; capitalism
by its nature treats fellow men as means-towards-an-end. This was of
course the consequence of her taking on her neo-Hegelian master-slave
dialectic (with her pro-master slant, naturally).
Cheers,
Tom Asquith
=======================================
To reply by e-mail:
Delete "7" and make sure it is sent to:
3-1-5-9-1-0-5-4 at 3web*dot*com or
tasquith at hotmail dot com
=======================================
Calvin Bruce Ostrum
T.J. <7315...@3web.com> wrote:
| Absolute tripe. Utilitarianism a joke? You have got to be kidding.
Rawls (and others) pegged it: "Utilitarianism does not
take seriously the distinction between persons". You are
correct that this is not funny though.
| As it stands, utilitarianism is the only mode of ethics (that you have
| discussed) which offers the potential of considering the long-term
| consequences of one's actions--as opposed to the rigid or simplistic
| forms of thinking offered by neo-Aristotelian (qua "Objectivist" &/or
| Virtue theory) or neo-Kantian/nonconsequentialist ethics.
There are many forms of consequentialism besides
utilitarianism.
| If one has bothered to read Singer or Rachel, one quickly realizes that
Singer? Not very well-liked by that moral exemplar,
Dr Laura. I copied down some of her comments about
his recent appointment at Princeton while listening
to her April 20th show:
http://www.broadcast.com/premrad/shows/drlaura/9904/laura0420.ram
They may not be exact quotes,
but they are very close:
"I'm scared out of my mind. If you arent scared out of
your mind you must be in a coma or asleep... I'm frankly
horrified that this guy's a Jew, espousing things that Nazis
stood for... Princeton university has a problem in human
values... Peter Singer and a Center for Human Values,
doesn't match... i wouldnt dream of appearing at
any kind of presentation at princeton university. I
am terrified about what they are going to breed there"
Not only that, but both Republican and Democrat
US presidential candidates are trying to get him
canned already, before he has actually arrived,
I think. Both Steve Forbes and Bill Bradley have
spoken out against his appointment.
| utilitarianism is not a joke and is quite capable of countering many of
| the ridiculous connundrums that have been aimed at Bentham's rigid
| system in Philosophy 101--the least of which is Mill's adapting the
| system to allow for qualitative valuations. In many ways, if one allows
| for a hybrid between act and rule utilitarianisms, then one can develop
| a system which is easily superior to Rand's/Rosenbaum's psychological
| egoism or Kantian nonconsequentialism in providing a rationalization for
| ethics (i.e., if in fact one can objectify ethics).
That's highly debatable, provided that you allow for a similar
advance in non-consequentialist ethical systems as well (such
as for example Thomas Scanlon's "contractualism" as developed
in "What we owe to each other".
| Correction#1: The name is John Stuart Mill, not "John Stewart Mills".
| If you are going to bash a real philosopher, at least try to get his
| name right.
And the name is "Rachels", not "Rachel"... (at least it's
possible to claim that's a typo).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calvin Ostrum c...@interlog.com
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To say that altruism and morality are possible in virtue of something
basic to human nature is not to say that men are basically good. Men
are basically complicated; how good they are depends on whether certain
conceptions and ways thinking have achieved dominance, a dominance which
is precarious in any case. The manner in which human beings have conducted
themselves so far does not encourage optimism about the moral future of
the species. -- Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Calvin Bruce Ostrum wrote:
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> To say that altruism and morality are possible in virtue of something
> basic to human nature is not to say that men are basically good. Men
> are basically complicated; how good they are depends on whether certain
> conceptions and ways thinking have achieved dominance, a dominance which
> is precarious in any case. The manner in which human beings have conducted
> themselves so far does not encourage optimism about the moral future of
> the species. -- Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the other hand, given that natural selection seems to predict animate
organisms which are "ruthlessly selfish" (Dawkins), the fact that we are
considerably more "good" than predicted is both a biological enigma as
well as a reason to be optimistic about the future, IMHO. Here is my
own humble attempt to "explain" how we managed to transcend our selfish
nature's. Just a sketch of course. I'd be delighted to elaborate further
should someone wish clarification here or there, or perhaps wish to
criticize:
The Mechanics of Genetic Indeterminism:
Why We Turned Out Like Captain Kirk Instead of Mr. Spock
"Can the cultural evolution of cultural values gain a
direction and momentum of its own and completely replace
genetic evolution? I think not. The genes hold culture
on a leash. The leash is very long, but inevitably values
will be constrained in accordance with their effects on
the human gene pool" (E. O. Wilson, 1978, p. 167).
(Abstract)
Diagrams A and B (below) represent someone's understanding, with
Diagram A representing an understanding which is relatively correct
and complete and Diagram B representing an understanding which is
less correct (slanted line) and less complete (missing line).
Diagram C is comprised of a number of A-like configurations which
have been conjoined to one another with asterisks which represent
associations. The configuration in the middle of the diagram,
labeled with an 'X', represents an individual's relatively correct
and complete understanding of her own interests (and taken to
include those of immediate kin). The conjoined surrounding
configurations represent this same individual's relatively correct
and complete understanding of the interests of others. As such,
Diagram C can be construed as a rough representation of the
cognitive profile we find in ourselves in that, where human beings
are concerned, it appears nature has been selecting for organisms
that are relatively cognitively objective (i.e., smart).
By representing value in terms of the darkness of lines, it is also
possible to employ Diagram C to represent our species' predicted
valuative profile. This could be accomplished simply by making the
X configuration as dark as possible and the other configurations as
light as possible. That's because, at least according to most
sociobiologists, we should expect animate organisms to place
paramount importance on their own interests and, with the exception
of immediate kin, none whatsoever on the interests of others
(Hamilton, Dawkins, Campbell, etc.)
| | | | |
- z - * - z - * - z - * - z - * - z -
| | | | | |
- X - * * * * *
| | | | | |
- z - * - y - * - y - * - y - * - z -
Diagram A | | | | |
* * * * *
| | | | |
- z - * - y - * - X - * - y - * - z -
| | | | |
/ * * * * *
- X - | | | | |
- z - * - y - * - y - * - y - * - z -
| | | | |
Diagram B * * * * *
| | | | |
- z - * - z - * - z - * - z - * - z -
| | | | |
Diagram C
While other species conform quite nicely, the valuative profile
in man has been a source of consternation, in that we are
considerably more other-interested than expected (Albert
Schweitzer, self-endangering Greenpeacers, etc.). This could be
represented in Diagram C by making the lines in the peripheral
configurations a bit darker, but still quite light.
Although egregiously underappreciated by natural scientists,
most of whom are still mesmerized by "an extrinsic philosophy
of science which is [fourty] years out of date" (Manicas
and Secord), our species is also afflicted with a disturbing
volatility in self-worth. Not infrequently, this volatility
manifests itself in a life threatening deficiency in self-interest
(apathy, recklessness, suicide, etc.) represented by making
configuration X a bit lighter, but still quite dark.
Since the proposed adjustments to Diagram C would result in
configurations which are more equal in darkness compared to
the configurations in the predicted profile, it suggests that
other-interestedness and emotional instability are just different
manifestations of an "unwanted" (maladaptive from a "gene's"
perspective) increase in valuative objectivity. And, since I am
supposing that this "red shift" toward valuative objectivity is
indeed "unwanted" (e.g., no group selection), I have postulated
A LEAKAGE BETWEEN THE COGNITIVE AND VALUATIVE COMPONENTS OF
OUR STRATEGIC PROFILE to account for it, i.e., a leakage of
value from regions of high concentration to regions of low
concentration via the conduits of the associative junctures.
This amounts to the supposition that the explosive increase in
cognitive objectivity (knowledge) emanating from the snowball
effect of cultural evolution (language, printing, scientific
method, etc.) has begun to have an objectifying influence on our
values. Combined with the fact that these influenced values
become culturally transmitted and the influence further
amplified over time, the cumulative effect has become SUFFICIENT
TO OVERWHELM NATURE'S INCESSANT CULLING OF THE VALUATIVELY UNFIT
(other-interested and emotionally unstable members of the
species) causing the species to become LESS DETERMINED by
natural selection. Or, if you prefer, the reason we turned out like
Captain Kirk instead of Mr. Spock or more like Mother Teresa
than Joseph Stalin has been more a matter of psychodynamic
necessity than of survivalistic expediency.
In the remainder of the paper I elaborate on the mechanism presumed
responsible for the leakage (the moralization mechanism), suggest
some disturbing implications (e.g., homo sapiens are becoming too
rational) and, by incorporating representations for Hume's three
types of association, conclude by employing Diagram C to represent
several predictions of the theory.
---------- References ----------
1.E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature, 1978.
2.W. D. Hamilton, The Genetic Evolution of Social Behavior, Journal
of Theoretical Biology, 7, 1964.
3.Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 1976.
4.Donald Campbell, On the Conflicts Between Biological and Social
Evolution and Between Psychology and Moral Tradition, American
Psychologist, Dec. 1975.
5.Peter Manicas and Paul F. Secord, Implications of the New
Philosophy of Science: A Topology for Psychology, presented at
the seventh annual meeting of the 'Society for Philosophy and
Psychology' at the University of Chicago, 1981. Available at:
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/5476/N_T_abs.htm
6.David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 1739.
--
Phil Roberts, Jr.
The Mechanics of Genetic Indeterminism
http://www.fortunecity.com/victorian/dada/90/
Feelings of Worthlessness from the Perspective of
So-Called Cognitive Science
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/5476
anth...@hotmail.com
Chris Cathcart <cath...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>
> On the other hand, Wrathbone has a confusion of his own which I'll
> address in my next post.
Please do. I'll be waiting with baited breath (-:
>
--
Wrathbone
anth...@hotmail.com
access.att.net>,
Stephen Grossman <sdg...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
> In article <7k7beu$avo$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, anth...@hotmail.com wrote:
>
> >
> > Irrelevant. Read my sentence. I said the view that leaving people to
> > pursue their rightful goals is good _only_ because it benefits you,
is false. The doctor pursuing his goals may benefit you, but his results
> > are good for him and other people too, regardless of their benefit
to you. Your good ain't no better than anybody else's.
Egoistically, only oneself is the purpose of ethics. One's good is
better FOR ONE, than anybody else's.
This is a pure tautology and means absolutely nothing. All it says is
what is good for me is good for me. What is good for the other guy is
good for the other guy too. Your good ain't no better [in an objective
sense], than anybody else's. And the ethical egoist is committed to the
view that his good is better than everybody else's in an objective
sense. To assert what is good for me is better "for me" is trivial and
uninformative, and does no work guiding action (ethical theory).
> >
> > Surely you respect your doctor's ability such that forcing him to
obey
> your non-expert knowledge of medicine will destroy you.
> >
> > The knowledge of a doctor or the rights of another person should be
> > valued whether they benefit you or not.
>
> No. Since you have participated in hpo for long enough to know that
> justification is needed, and you provide none, you have none.
This follows from Rand's conception of every person as an end in
himself. The only way one can conceive of a person as an end in himself
is to see him as having a right to pursue his own goals. Your existence
has nothing to do with this right. My justification is understanding
what a person as an end in himself means. The fact that you do not
understand it, does not mean that my claim is not justified. It is my
view that Rand's ethical egoism and her conception of individuals as
rights possessing ends in themselves is a contradiction, and nobody in
this newsgroup, including you, have shown me otherwise.
> >
> > Also, respecting other's rights encourages
> > > them to respect yours.
> >
> > Irrelevant. You should respect someone's rights even if you never
see
> > them again and they have no opportunity to reciprocate.
>
> justification?
So you would violate their rights if you were certain it had no future
repurcussions on you? This goes against Rand's conception of a person
as an end in himself.
anth...@hotmail.com
>
> One can only reasonably state, then re-state the obvious so many
times. If
> it is then not comprehended by the person with whom one is debating,
there
> is absolutely no point in continuing. Under such trying
circumstances, the
> mega-snip is the only sensible solution - a definitive strike to the
Gordian
> knot!
It is avoiding the knot. You made some common errors in understanding
Heumer's critique. I pointed them out to you and you did not respond.
The fact that you "re-state" your errors makes them no less errors.
>
> > You say that you know what is excellent when you see it. But you
have
> > given nobody any reason to believe that you can distinguish the
> > excellent from the non-excellent.
>
> Example of excellence in philosophical appraisal: Bertrand Russell's
> "History of Western Philosophy"
> Example of third-rate philosophical appraisal: Heumer's critique of
> Objectivism
Most philosophers generally regard Russell's History to be entertaining
and fun to read, but in many areas wildly inaccurate. So this is your
model of "excellent appraisal"? If you want a particular example read
his treatment of Nietzsche. (This, of course, presumes you know enough
about Nietszche to appraise his appraisal) (-:
>
> > As to being misguided, well,
> > > I've been misguided for years. I would say *anyone* who sits at a
> > computer
> > > terminal sparring pop-philosophy back-chat around the planet in
random
> > > snatched moments might be considered somewhat misguided. Don't
you?
> >
> > Not at all. Is collecting stamps "misguided" - or playing tennis, or
> > poker? knitting? bowling? sky-diving? Are you imposing a narrow and
> > "half-baked" objectivist conception of rationality on yourself? -
and
> > me?(-:
>
> Knitting may be misguided under certain circumstances. I may be half-
baked,
But in some circumstances not. After all you might need a new pair of
booties (-:
> but to my credit I am still in the oven and rising nicely. This is in
stark
> contrast to some other notable knights of the realm who are fully
baked -
> nay, over-done; in some cases completely encased in impenetrable
charcoal!
> Never permit yourself to reach such a state Wrathbone.
I am not sure if baking is quite the appropriate metaphor for learning
philosophy. Something that is baking just sits passively and absorbs
heat. Learning philosophy requires some semblance of active thought.
Perhaps, at some point you will distinguish yourself from most of the
others in hpo in this regard. Perhaps not.
>
--
Stephen Grossman
<shra...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
> Stephen Grossman <sdg...@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> news:sdgross-1706...@194.cambridge-23-24rs.ma.dial-access.att.net..
> ..
> > In article <7vX93.1121$lc5....@ozemail.com.au>, Tony Shrapnel
> > <shra...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
> >
> > > Example of excellence in philosophical appraisal: Bertrand Russell's
> > > "History of Western Philosophy"
> >
> > Russell is famous for his Math. Princ, a work rejected, shortly after
> > publication, by his fellow subjectivists. Russell is infamous for changing
> > philosophies from book to book.
> > --
> I'm sure there is much to criticise in Russell, however, his summaries and
> appraisals of various philosophers and their ideas in The History may, I
> believe, be considered excellent.
Is this a rational "may"? Even if so, he's then reduced to a mere
historian of phil.
Stephen Grossman
>agent relativity is true. But ethical egoism does not follow from it.
Both ethical egoism and ethical subjectivism follow.
Stephen Grossman
utilitarianism is the only mode of ethics (that you have
> discussed) which offers the potential of considering the long-term
> consequences of one's actions--as opposed to the rigid or simplistic
> forms of thinking offered by neo-Aristotelian (qua "Objectivist" &/or
> Virtue theory) or neo-Kantian/nonconsequentialist ethics.
long-term is opposed to short-term, not rigidity or simplistic
> > If one has bothered to read Singer or Rachel, one quickly realizes that
> utilitarianism is not a joke and is quite capable of countering many of
> the ridiculous connundrums that have been aimed at Bentham's rigid
> system in Philosophy 101--
but not all
the least of which is Mill's adapting the
> system to allow for qualitative valuations. In many ways, if one allows
> for a hybrid between act and rule utilitarianisms, then one can develop
> a system which is easily superior to Rand's/Rosenbaum's psychological
> egoism or Kantian nonconsequentialism in providing a rationalization for
> ethics (i.e., if in fact one can objectify ethics). Utilitarianism has
> gone a long way from Bentham's early hedonistic calculus.
Util. is a mere variation on altruistic collectivism, both never proven.
> her [Rand] taking on her neo-Hegelian master-slave
> dialectic (with her pro-master slant, naturally).
Rand rejects contradictions as real. Sciaberra is a fool who lost a debate
w/me on this here some time ago. I have a copy.
Stephen Grossman
<phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> natural selection seems to predict animate
> organisms which are "ruthlessly selfish" (Dawkins)
only people, w/volition, have moral attributes.
Stephen Grossman
>I'll be waiting with baited breath (-:
youre going to put a worm in your mouth?
Stephen Grossman
> In article <sdgross-1706...@194.cambridge-23-24rs.ma.dial-
> access.att.net>,
> Stephen Grossman <sdg...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
> > In article <7k7beu$avo$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, anth...@hotmail.com wrote:
> >
> > > Irrelevant. Read my sentence. I said the view that leaving people to
> > > pursue their rightful goals is good _only_ because it benefits you,
> is false. The doctor pursuing his goals may benefit you, but his results
> > > are good for him and other people too, regardless of their benefit
> to you. Your good ain't no better than anybody else's.
>
> Egoistically, only oneself is the purpose of ethics. One's good is
> better FOR ONE, than anybody else's.
>
> This is a pure tautology and means absolutely nothing. All it says is
> what is good for me is good for me.
so it does mean something, ie, that you (by some standard) are the purpose
of your morality. It means that society or other people are not the moral
purpose
What is good for the other guy is
> good for the other guy too. Your good ain't no better [in an objective
> sense], than anybody else's.
conventional objectivity (intrinsic, mystical) or Rand's obj (reality as
rationally evluated)?
>And the ethical egoist is committed to the
> view that his good is better than everybody else's in an objective
> sense. To assert what is good for me is better "for me" is trivial and
> uninformative, and does no work guiding action (ethical theory).
agreed, thats why Rand includes a standard
> This follows from Rand's conception of every person as an end in
> himself. The only way one can conceive of a person as an end in himself
> is to see him as having a right to pursue his own goals. Your existence
> has nothing to do with this right.
The fact that humans exist, as living, volitional, rational means they
need a guide to life.
Rand's ethical egoism and her conception of individuals as
> rights possessing ends in themselves is a contradiction, and nobody in
> this newsgroup, including you, have shown me otherwise.
Rand's clear, consistent ethics has been clearly stated here often. Youre
an intellectual fraud
> > > Also, respecting other's rights encourages
> > > > them to respect yours.
> > >
> > > Irrelevant. You should respect someone's rights even if you never
> see
> > > them again and they have no opportunity to reciprocate.
> >
> > justification?
>
> So you would violate their rights if you were certain it had no future
> repurcussions on you? This goes against Rand's conception of a person
> as an end in himself.
This is an irrational if.
Stephen Grossman
Learning philosophy requires some semblance of active thought.
You have that semblance
anth...@hotmail.com
Calvin Bruce Ostrum <c...@interlog.delete-this.com> wrote:
> Singer? Not very well-liked by that moral exemplar,
> Dr Laura. I copied down some of her comments about
> his recent appointment at Princeton while listening
> to her April 20th show:
>
> http://www.broadcast.com/premrad/shows/drlaura/9904/laura0420.ram
>
> They may not be exact quotes,
> but they are very close:
snip quotes
Is this a joke? One is supposed to care about what "Dr" Laura says about
Peter Singer as a moral philosopher? If it is, what is the point?
Wrathbone
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
xXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXx
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Stephen Grossman wrote:
>
> In article <376C0BB9...@ix.netcom.com>, "Phil Roberts, Jr."
> <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
> > natural selection seems to predict animate
> > organisms which are "ruthlessly selfish" (Dawkins)
>
> only people, w/volition, have moral attributes.
Sorry. I forget that not everyone is familiar with the
sociobiological literature. "genes", "ruthless selfishness", etc.]
are metaphors for fairly precise mathematical predictions. The
metaphors become so commonplace that I usually forget to clarify.
But, more often than not, ruthless "selfishness" in a "gene" SHOULD
translate to ruthless selfishness at the personal level, although
with special and limited exceptions.
Chris Cathcart
<7315...@3web.com> wrote:
> > her [Rand] taking on her neo-Hegelian master-slave
> > dialectic (with her pro-master slant, naturally).
>
> Rand rejects contradictions as real. Sciaberra is a fool who lost a
debate
> w/me on this here some time ago. I have a copy.
It's SciabArra. For once spell it right, you fucking jackass. And
most likely your responses were so idiotic and nonsensical just like
the rest of your posts are, that Sciabarra gave up. He probably also
got tired of your excruciatingly offensive homophobic remarks
intertwined in with your "arguments."
Stephen Grossman: a fucking screwball.
--
Chris Cathcart
Chris Cathcart
access.att.net>,
Stephen Grossman <sdg...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>
> > So you would violate their rights if you were certain it had no
future
> > repurcussions on you? This goes against Rand's conception of a
person
> > as an end in himself.
>
> This is an irrational if.
You mean, like: If Stephen Grossman weren't such an irrational,
imbecilic twit, . . .
--
Chris Cathcart
b
o
t
food
Bert Clanton
<sdgross-2006...@137.cambridge-23-24rs.ma.dial-access.att.net>,
Stephen Grossman <sdg...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
> In article <7kdhg7$h9g$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, anth...@hotmail.com wrote:
>
> >agent relativity is true. But ethical egoism does not follow from it.
>
> Both ethical egoism and ethical subjectivism follow.
If I too may indulge in a bit of unsupported assertion: agent relativity
is *false*, and thus materially implies anything you like.
Best wishes,
Bert
anth...@hotmail.com
mattbe...@hotmail.com wrote:
> anth...@hotmail.com wrote:
>
> > Andy, you cannot even spell Mill's name and you expect people to
> > believe you have something intelligent to say about utilitarianism?
>
> Wow, I just finished complimenting this idiot. I wish DejaNews had
kill
> filter capability.
I am an idiot because I think that someone who spells "John Stuart
Mill," "John Stewart Mills" probably does not have anything particularly
illuminating to say about utilitarianism?
BTW, thanks for the compliment.
Also, you can kill posts in the Deja archive, but you will have to wait
for this thread to die before your compliment disappears into oblivion
(-:
Wrathbone
Andrew Jones
T.J. <7315...@3web.com> wrote in message
[..]
>Absolute tripe. Utilitarianism a joke? You have got to be kidding.
I'm not kidding. Are you kidding?
>As it stands, utilitarianism is the only mode of ethics (that you have
>discussed)
I haven't discussed any other mode of ethics. Must be easy...
>which offers the potential of considering the long-term
>consequences of one's actions--as opposed to the rigid or simplistic
>forms of thinking offered by neo-Aristotelian (qua "Objectivist" &/or
>Virtue theory) or neo-Kantian/nonconsequentialist ethics.
The ends justify the means, eh?
>If one has bothered to read Singer or Rachel, one quickly realizes that
>utilitarianism is not a joke and is quite capable of countering many of
>the ridiculous connundrums that have been aimed at Bentham's rigid
>system in Philosophy 101--the least of which is Mill's adapting the
>system to allow for qualitative valuations.
I seriously doubt it. But I will try to take a look (Utilitarianism is such
a joke - I feel I'm wasting valuable time). I have some references from
another post.
>In many ways, if one allows
>for a hybrid between act and rule utilitarianisms, then one can develop
>a system which is easily superior to Rand's/Rosenbaum's psychological
>egoism or Kantian nonconsequentialism in providing a rationalization for
>ethics (i.e., if in fact one can objectify ethics). Utilitarianism has
>gone a long way from Bentham's early hedonistic calculus.
A hybrid between act and rule utilitarianism? Sounds pretty weak...
>Correction#1: The name is John Stuart Mill, not "John Stewart Mills".
>If you are going to bash a real philosopher, at least try to get his
>name right.
Thank you. It's nothing personal. Don't get upset that I spelled his name
wrong - I'm just bad with names (and spelling in general). Utilitarianism
as presented by John Stuart Mill is a joke. Better?
>Correction#2: As for either Kant or Mill being evil, I would recommend
>that you re-read a history of either philosopher before starting to
>slander their good and established names.
Dude. I was speaking in relation to Rand and in her terms of evil. Do you
doubt she considers both as evil?
>As for the "Randian" allegations of evil, I would submit that she saw
>Kant as evil merely because he offered an ethical system that competed
>with her rigid philosophy head-on. Further, she did not like the fact
>that his philosophy treated men as being ends-in-themselves; capitalism
>by its nature treats fellow men as means-towards-an-end. This was of
>course the consequence of her taking on her neo-Hegelian master-slave
>dialectic (with her pro-master slant, naturally).
And none of this answers the original question... which was concerned with
why Rand did not consider J.S. Mill Utilitarianism as the most evil...
My answer is she didn't consider it at all (because it was a...)
Take care,
Andy.
Steve Davis
> Kant's term, practical reason, just refers to reason considered
> as guiding or governing choice and action.
This is not an explanation. Practical reason is reasoning about practice,
that is reasoning about principles of action.
Kant mentions three things: God, immortality, and free-will as the three
things he wanted to rescue from scientific falsifiability and Hume's
skepticism. All of these things are central, in his view, to morality.
Kant began with the mystical belief that without God, immortality, and
free-will, morality is impossible. Within the context of Kant's
philosophical system, these principles are derived from and justified solely
by means of faith. Thus, Kant's "practical reason" is synonomous with
"faith."
> Apparently, you think Kant is writing in some kind of code to foist
> dirty tricks upon us.
I don't think Kant is writing in any kind of code at all. I simply take it
as self-evident that when an author spends hundreds of pages (yes, literally
hundreds) talking about the relationship between God, faith, the eternal
nature of man's soul, divine moral law, obedience to duty, and the like that
this is ought to be taken into consideration when assessing the meaning of
his claims.
I have sat through hour-long lectures about Kant where the word "God" is not
even mentioned. It is as though he never uttered the word and that the
notion had no place in his philosophy. I do not fully understand the reason
for such deliberate evasion. I suppose that modern Kantians and
semi-Kantians can not bear to face the fact that Kant's entire ethical
theory was based on old fashioned Judeo-Christian mysticism.
I do not view Kant's writing through secularism-colored glasses. Nor would
I accuse Kant of being a religious dogmatist. Dogma was not his aim. Kant
was not out to prove the validity of a particular sect of Christianity or to
justify his faith over that of any other. Kant's goal was to save faith in
general. His goal was to to prevent certain articles of faith from from
being obviated by scientific knowledge or cast into doubt from Humean
skepticism.
> If anybody treated Rand with the lack of attention to what she actually
> said, the shoddy attributions of absurdities on the flimsiest of bases,
Happens every day.
Tony Shrapnel
> times. If
> > it is then not comprehended by the person with whom one is debating,
> there
> > is absolutely no point in continuing. Under such trying
> circumstances, the
> > mega-snip is the only sensible solution - a definitive strike to the
> Gordian
> > knot!
>
> It is avoiding the knot. You made some common errors in understanding
> Heumer's critique. I pointed them out to you and you did not respond.
> The fact that you "re-state" your errors makes them no less errors.
In my opinion, this response rests on two false premises:
1. When you disagree with someone, they are definitely in error;
2. You never make errors yourself.
> > > You say that you know what is excellent when you see it. But you
> have
> > > given nobody any reason to believe that you can distinguish the
> > > excellent from the non-excellent.
> >
> > Example of excellence in philosophical appraisal: Bertrand Russell's
> > "History of Western Philosophy"
> > Example of third-rate philosophical appraisal: Heumer's critique of
> > Objectivism
>
> Most philosophers generally regard Russell's History to be entertaining
> and fun to read,
....as distinct from Heumer...
> but in many areas wildly inaccurate. So this is your
> model of "excellent appraisal"? If you want a particular example read
> his treatment of Nietzsche. (This, of course, presumes you know enough
> about Nietszche to appraise his appraisal) (-:
Very well. But now, Sir Anthonson, you may go on the record as confirming
that it is your opinion that Heumer's critique of Objectivism is of equal or
better quality as philosophic appraisal to Russell's "History of Western
Philosophy"
> > > As to being misguided, well,
> > > > I've been misguided for years. I would say *anyone* who sits at a
> > > computer
> > > > terminal sparring pop-philosophy back-chat around the planet in
> random
> > > > snatched moments might be considered somewhat misguided. Don't
> you?
> > >
> > > Not at all. Is collecting stamps "misguided" - or playing tennis, or
> > > poker? knitting? bowling? sky-diving? Are you imposing a narrow and
> > > "half-baked" objectivist conception of rationality on yourself? -
> and
> > > me?(-:
> >
> > Knitting may be misguided under certain circumstances. I may be half-
> baked,
>
> But in some circumstances not. After all you might need a new pair of
> booties (-:
And you a tummy warmer (for your mum) (-:
> > but to my credit I am still in the oven and rising nicely. This is in
> stark
> > contrast to some other notable knights of the realm who are fully
> baked -
> > nay, over-done; in some cases completely encased in impenetrable
> charcoal!
> > Never permit yourself to reach such a state Wrathbone.
>
> I am not sure if baking is quite the appropriate metaphor for learning
> philosophy. Something that is baking just sits passively and absorbs
> heat. Learning philosophy requires some semblance of active thought.
My souffle's are pro-active.
> Perhaps, at some point you will distinguish yourself from most of the
> others in hpo in this regard. Perhaps not.
Don't be so snobbie. Many of the posters to hpo are almost as effulgently
wise as yourself. As for the others, well at least they care enough about
philosophy to have a go. There should be more good ideas put out at the
common level. If you're so clever, why don't you or your collegues write
some alternative philosophy that is as user-friendly as Rand or Russell? Now
*that* would be useful.
Regards
Tony Shrapnel
Stephen Grossman
> Is this a joke? One is supposed to care about what "Dr" Laura says about
> Peter Singer as a moral philosopher? If it is, what is the point?
Id follow her sooner than the nihilist garbage in the universities. May
their rotten Nazi souls rot in Hell!
Stephen Grossman
<phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> Stephen Grossman wrote:
> >
> > In article <376C0BB9...@ix.netcom.com>, "Phil Roberts, Jr."
> > <phi...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> >
> > > natural selection seems to predict animate
> > > organisms which are "ruthlessly selfish" (Dawkins)
> >
> > only people, w/volition, have moral attributes.
>
> Sorry. I forget that not everyone is familiar with the
> sociobiological literature. "genes", "ruthless selfishness", etc.]
> are metaphors for fairly precise mathematical predictions. The
> metaphors become so commonplace that I usually forget to clarify.
Metaphors are not scientific. Your claim of fairly precise mathematical
predictions is arbitrary. See the shamefully incompetent crap spewed out
by psychologists, etc over the school murders.
> But, more often than not, ruthless "selfishness" in a "gene" SHOULD
> translate to ruthless selfishness at the personal level, although
> with special and limited exceptions.
Youre a quack. This has never been proven. And cant, since the free will
choice to focus or evade is the basic cause of ideas, action, emotions,
etc. Ideas are states of consciousness, not physical thingies (altho a
brain generates consciousness). How tall is your memory of yesterday? And
there are no innate ideas, regardless of Plato and Kant. And, you suggest
that selfishness is psy motivation, an absurdity. Selfishness is
furthering one's life by a rational standard, _basically_ independently of
motive.
> The Mechanics of Genetic Indeterminism
here you say its not understood
> http://www.fortunecity.com/victorian/dada/90/
>
> Feelings of Worthlessness from the Perspective of
> So-Called Cognitive Science
yes, cog sci is not yet fully focused on reason but on perception.
As for humility, its from a lack of selfish action and morality.
Stephen Grossman
<cath...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> In article <sdgross-2006...@137.cambridge-23-24rs.ma.dial-
> access.att.net>,
> Stephen Grossman <sdg...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
> > In article <37649c8b...@news.3web.net>, T.J.
> <7315...@3web.com> wrote:
> > > her [Rand] taking on her neo-Hegelian master-slave
> > > dialectic (with her pro-master slant, naturally).
> >
> > Rand rejects contradictions as real. Sciaberra is a fool who lost a
> debate
> > w/me on this here some time ago. I have a copy.
>
> It's SciabArra. For once spell it right, you fucking jackass.
you win on this trivial point.
And
> most likely your responses were so idiotic and nonsensical just like
> the rest of your posts are, that Sciabarra gave up.
and the basis of this alleged "most likely?"
He probably also
> got tired of your excruciatingly offensive homophobic remarks
> intertwined in with your "arguments."
I didnt discuss homosexuality w/him. Do you mean that he was concerned
w/my discussions of that w/others? My claim that homosexuals are insane is
cognitive, not psychological, thus needing judgement, not therapy. I could
claim that your rejection of Objectivism means that you suffer from
Objectivistphobia. Then I wouldnt need to judge your knowledge claims.
Stephen Grossman
<cath...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> In article <sdgross-2006...@137.cambridge-23-24rs.ma.dial-
> access.att.net>,
> Stephen Grossman <sdg...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
> > In article <7kfjcf$n35$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, anth...@hotmail.com wrote:
> >
> > > So you would violate their rights if you were certain it had no
> future repurcussions on you? This goes against Rand's conception of a
> person as an end in himself.
> >
> > This is an irrational if.
>
> You mean, like: If Stephen Grossman weren't such an irrational,
> imbecilic twit, . .
ie, you cant rationally validate your hypothesis
log...@my-deja.com
Steve Davis <st...@pobox.com> wrote:
> <log...@my-deja.com> :
>
> > Kant's term, practical reason, just refers to reason considered
> > as guiding or governing choice and action.
>
> This is not an explanation. Practical reason is reasoning about
practice,
> that is reasoning about principles of action.
Why you say it's not an explanation, I'm not sure (and you don't
explain!). In any case, I don't think your replacement is quite right.
It is of course true, for Kant, that there can be reasoning about
practice and principles of actions. But this is, in a certain sense,
derivative. The primary sense of practical reason is the one I gave --
reason considered as actually guiding or governing choice. Kant's first
concern in this area is to ask how it is possible for reason to govern
action, then, secondarily, reasoning about the governance of action.
>
> Kant mentions three things: God, immortality, and free-will as the
three
> things he wanted to rescue from scientific falsifiability and Hume's
> skepticism. All of these things are central, in his view, to
morality.
> Kant began with the mystical belief that without God, immortality, and
> free-will, morality is impossible. Within the context of Kant's
> philosophical system, these principles are derived from and justified
solely
> by means of faith. Thus, Kant's "practical reason" is synonomous with
> "faith."
I see a series of sentences, followed by one beginning with "thus" and
apparently stating a conclusion. But I don't see anything that could be
called a respectable argument for the conclusion.
Even if all your premises were true, they do not in any way support your
conclusion. Compare this:
"Euclid mentions three things: the five postulates, irrational numbers,
and axiomatic method in geometry that he wanted to preserve from Sophist
skepticism. All of these things are central, in his view, to the
Pythagorean Theorem. He began with the mystical belief that without the
five postulates, irrational numbers, and axiomatic method, it would be
impossible to prove the Pythagorean Theorem. Within the context of
Euclid's geometrical system, the Pythagorean Theorem is derived from and
justified solely by reliance on the postulates, irrational numbers, and
axiomatic method. Thus, Euclid's "Pythagorean Theorem" is synonomous
with the postulates (etc.)."
That's obvious garbage, but it's every bit as good as your "proof" that
Kant's practical reason is synonymous with faith. The right conclusion
to draw is that your proof is obvious garbage, too.
In addition, one of your premises (I won't comment on the others, but
I'm not necessarily endorsing them), "Kant began with the mystical
belief that without God, immortality, and free-will, morality is
impossible," is just false. It misunderstands his argument -- in fact,
gets it backward. (Perhaps, Kant "started from" these convictions in a
different sense: they may have motivated him in developing his theory --
but that does not directly tell us anything about the quality of his
arguments. One can have bad motivations for working out good arguments,
and vice versa.) Kant started with morality, which, as he said, he
regarded as founded "solely on the autonomy of reason." Then, he argued
*from* that to conclusions about God, freedom and immortality. I've
explained this in discussion with you before, together with saying why I
don't think his argument works, so I'll just quote what I said then:
"He says, very plainly, that the "moral necessity" [of believing in God,
etc.] he's talking about is subjective, not objective. The structure of
the argument he is presenting goes like this: (1) We first reach the
moral conclusions, including (2) the claim that it is our duty to
promote the summum bonum. Then (3) we ask how it is possible for it to
be our duty to promote the summum bonum. We conclude, he says, that it
couldn't be our duty to promote it unless it were possible for it to be
achieved. It's not possible, as far as we can see, for it to be achieved
unless we also assume God and immortality. Therefore, we're entitled to
assume God and immortality. The first stage of the argument could stand
-- and Kant clearly thinks that it does -- whether or not the second and
third stages are right. And there are at least two ways that the second
or third stages could go wrong without undermining the first. One is
that it might be possible in some other way than any that we can see
that the summum bonum can possibly be achieved. (I think, though I can't
lay my hand on the reference, that he actually considered the
possibility of some natural law connecting virtue and happiness -- a law
of Karma, maybe. If that were true, and his argument were otherwise
correct, that would mean that it supported immortality but not the
existence of God.) The other possible loophole is that he has
misdescribed the duty to promote the summum bonum. It might be a duty,
not to actually bring it about, but literally to *promote* it -- to
bring it about so far as it is in our power to do so. That,
definitionally, is something in our power to do, even if there is no God
to guarantee that our efforts in that direction will succeed. (Compare
this: It is [suppose] your "automotive duty" to become a perfect driver.
But, in a finite lifespan, it is not possible for you to become a
perfect driver. Therefore, it is a postulate of "automotive reason" that
you are immortal and will have an unending chance to improve your
driving. Surely, the weakness of this is patent. You could understand
the "automotive duty" to set a goal to be approached rather than to be
achieved. Then, no conclusions about the immortality of drivers would
follow. And the fact that you cannot actually become a perfect driver
would not in any way show that it could not be your "automotive duty" to
work on improving your driving, that is, approaching the goal of being a
perfect driver.)"
> I don't think Kant is writing in any kind of code at all. I simply
take it
> as self-evident that when an author spends hundreds of pages (yes,
literally
> hundreds) talking about the relationship between God, faith, the
eternal
> nature of man's soul, divine moral law, obedience to duty, and the
like that
> this is ought to be taken into consideration when assessing the
meaning of
> his claims.
You can also find hundreds of pages in Kant that don't talk about God.
Where he does use religious terms and concepts, he frequently recasts
them very substantially. He speaks, as you say, of God as a moral
law-giver, but understanding that has to be qualified by the recognition
that, for Kant, God is no more *the* law-giver than any other rational
being. The moral law is law that we give to ourselves as free and
rational beings, not something that comes from any kind of authority,
not even God.
Moreover, he is quite clear that none of these notions of God or the
soul are either things that he thinks can be proved by reason or things
that we are morally required to believe in.
That Kant was a religious man -- in some, very undogmatic, sense -- and
that his religion affected his philosophical work is not in question.
But there is much more than just the repetition of religious doctrine
there, and it may be -- I think that it is -- that there is much of
philosophical importance that remains if you detach the religious
claims. (Not to mention that there is much of philosophical interest in
his religious claims and arguments.)
>
> I have sat through hour-long lectures about Kant where the word "God"
is not
> even mentioned. It is as though he never uttered the word and that
the
> notion had no place in his philosophy. I do not fully understand the
reason
> for such deliberate evasion. I suppose that modern Kantians and
> semi-Kantians can not bear to face the fact that Kant's entire ethical
> theory was based on old fashioned Judeo-Christian mysticism.
It's not obvious to me that there's any evasion at all. I'd only accuse
them of deliberate evasion if, for example, they *denied* that he
believed in God. Modern Kantians, however, no more have to agree with
everything Kant said than modern Aristotelians have to believe in
slavery.
To say that Kant's entire theory is "based on old fashioned
Judeo-Christian mysticism" is just not taking seriously either what Kant
said or the arguments he gave.
> Kant's goal was to save faith in
> general. His goal was to to prevent certain articles of faith from
from
> being obviated by scientific knowledge or cast into doubt from Humean
> skepticism.
Wrong, wrong. (Well, he certainly wanted to avoid Humean skepticism, but
so does practically everyone else.) What he thought he had shown was
that theoretical and scientific knowledge could not conflict with
(certain) items of faith, when those were given a certain
interpretation. In fact, he claimed something stronger than that -- that
theoretical knowledge could not count either way on those issues.
*Because* theoretical knowledge couldn't count either way, we were free
to have faith (or lack it) on the basis of other motivations -- if, for
example, it helps us to understand and make sense of morality. In doing
so, we are not failing to respect truth or attend to evidence.
If he succeeded in making that argument ... well, then he succeeded.
There is no conflict between science or theoretical knowledge and the
rarified things that he allows as objects of religious faith.
But if he failed, what then? He's actually pretty clear, if you look at
the condiions that he imposes on the items to be admitted as objects of
faith. Among them are the conditions that they be conceptually coherent
and not contradict any theoretically (including scientifically)
established conclusions. If they do -- that is, if they are such that
they are "obviated by scientific knowledge" -- then Kant would throw
them out. If his grand-scale argument that there can be no conflict
fails, then consistency would commit him to waiting on the evidence and
argument and rejecting any articles of faith that failed to pass the
test of theoretical and scientific investigation.
>
> > If anybody treated Rand with the lack of attention to what she
actually
> > said, the shoddy attributions of absurdities on the flimsiest of
bases,
>
> Happens every day.
>
True, but Rand's a pretty easy target. You don't have to distort or
misrepresent her views to show they're defective. Kant is a much deeper
and richer thinker.
SQ
anth...@hotmail.com
Tony Shrapnel <shra...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
> >
> > Most philosophers generally regard Russell's History to be
entertaining
> > and fun to read,
>
> ....as distinct from Heumer...
I found Heumer's arguments very entertaining since they showed the
truth abuout the silliness of objectivism.
>
> > but in many areas wildly inaccurate. So this is your
> > model of "excellent appraisal"? If you want a particular example
read
> > his treatment of Nietzsche. (This, of course, presumes you know
enough
> > about Nietszche to appraise his appraisal) (-:
>
> Very well. But now, Sir Anthonson, you may go on the record as
confirming
> that it is your opinion that Heumer's critique of Objectivism is of
equal or
> better quality as philosophic appraisal to Russell's "History of
Western
> Philosophy"
It doesn't make sense to refer to Russell's "philosophic appraisal" in
his History in the singular since he describes and critiques the views
of many philosophers, some more fairly than others, and many of his
"criticisms are superficial. The book is a History, huckleberry; it is
not meant to be a sustained "appraisal" of a philosophic view. If you
want to see Russell at his best in "appraising" you should read his
paper "On Definite Descriptions" or his work in mathematical logic, or
epistemology.
Snip
> Don't be so snobbie. Many of the posters to hpo are almost as
effulgently
> wise as yourself. As for the others, well at least they care enough
about
> philosophy to have a go. There should be more good ideas put out at
the
> common level. If you're so clever, why don't you or your collegues
write
> some alternative philosophy that is as user-friendly as Rand or
Russell? Now
> *that* would be useful.
There are many such books written by academic philosophers. I just saw a
_Philosophy For Dummies_ at Barnes and Noble the other day. However, if
I were you I would wait for _Philosophy For Idiots_ which usually
follows on the heels of the former publication. (I guess once the dummie
demographic is saturated, publishers figure they can cater to ever
increasing heights of imbecility)
Just kidding, big guy.
A writer by the name of Donald Palmer writes philosophy books with
cartoons in them. One, I believe, is called _Looking at Philosophy_
Another is, _Does the Center Hold?_ The first is very basic, while the
second is a bit more involved and argues a thesis. The cartoons in both
are very good.
But I am not sure what you mean by "alternative philosophy." Do you
want something alternative, or good? If you have a more specific idea
of something you are looking for, I or some of the other effulgently
wise posters here might be able to recommend something.
Wrathbone
Tom Runnacles
Stephen Grossman wrote:
>
> In article <7vX93.1121$lc5....@ozemail.com.au>, Tony Shrapnel
> <shra...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
>
> > Example of excellence in philosophical appraisal: Bertrand Russell's
> > "History of Western Philosophy"
>
> Russell is famous for his Math. Princ, a work rejected, shortly after
> publication, by his fellow subjectivists. Russell is infamous for changing
> philosophies from book to book.
Really? Perhaps it would help if you could describe precisely what is
subjectivist about Russell's account of mathematical logic in the
Principia, or even give an example of the supposed 'subjectivists' who
rejected it. The Principia continues to be studied as probably THE most
important work in the subject this century, and no logician could get
away with not having a thorough grasp of it.
It's true that Russell's later, non-technical work in non-logical areas
is less important than the books he produced before WW1, but he still
has an extremely, and deservedly high reputation for clarity and
precision of a kind which Rand can only have envied.
Tony Shrapnel
> In article <hCAb3.199$D57....@ozemail.com.au>,
> Tony Shrapnel <shra...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
>
[snip...]
> A writer by the name of Donald Palmer writes philosophy books with
> cartoons in them. One, I believe, is called _Looking at Philosophy_
> Another is, _Does the Center Hold?_ The first is very basic, while the
> second is a bit more involved and argues a thesis. The cartoons in both
> are very good.
>
> But I am not sure what you mean by "alternative philosophy." Do you
> want something alternative, or good? If you have a more specific idea
> of something you are looking for, I or some of the other effulgently
> wise posters here might be able to recommend something.
Rand has been successful where many academic philosophers have failed in
that she *has* popularised a philosophy and has a world wide following
accross the spectrum from professionals to ordinary folk. The influence of
Objectivism is clearly evident in many current government policies and
personal attitudes. Yet, academic philosophers claim that Objectivism is a
very poor, low rank philosophy, and have nothing but contempt for it. What I
meant in the above paragraph was: if Objectivism is so bad, why isn't
"high-quality" philosophy also popularised by those who purport to be
experts in it? Academics whinge ineffectively about Rand's poor scholarship,
yet do not respond adequately to the obvious fact that Objectivism rules and
they don't. It must be possible to popularise quality philosophy, and thus
serve mankind better. Get to it.
TS
anth...@hotmail.com
I can't imagine what you mean by "Objectivism rules." I don't see it
"ruling" in terms of popular culture at all. There are many popular
philosophical ideologies that are much more common than "Objectivism".
Most of them are religious, both Eastern and Western, and various forms
of "New Age" pseudo-science and "metaphysics." "Objectivism" belongs in
this category of mental fluff, and it is a loser, in terms of popularity
even with respect to them.
Also, when you say "Objectivism rules and they don't" you are revealing
a somewhat simplistic view of how ideas influence society and culture.
Intellectual products of academia filter their way down into popular
culture in varieties of ways. They also influence people in positions
of political power that effect many people's lives. If you really can't
imagine any examples I will provide some for you on request.
Finally, the fact that a philosophy "rules" does not imply anything
about whether it is a good philosophy, or whether it should rule.
Christianity "rules" as a dominant ideology, and communism once "ruled".
Popularity itself is no great virtue.
Dean M. Sandin
<377123E2...@elec.qmw.ac.uk>
>It's true that Russell's later, non-technical work in non-logical areas
>is less important than the books he produced before WW1, but he still
>has an extremely, and deservedly high reputation for clarity and
>precision of a kind which Rand can only have envied.
Envy? Of the malevolent kind, the wishing that someone had
not achieved a value? Or of the wistful kind, the wishing that
oneself had done as well? If you genuinely think that Rand could
have envied Russell in either sense, you are seriously ignorant
of Rand the person and the thinker.
--- Dean
--- Dean
Christopher Roberson
How about "would have envied, if she had had any capacity for accurate
self-assessment and comparison to her intellectual superiors"?
--
Christopher Robers
Stephen Grossman
<be...@sonic.net> wrote:
> In article
> <sdgross-2006...@137.cambridge-23-24rs.ma.dial-access.att.net>,
> Stephen Grossman <sdg...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>
> > In article <7kdhg7$h9g$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, anth...@hotmail.com wrote:
> >
> > >agent relativity is true. But ethical egoism does not follow from it.
> >
> > Both ethical egoism and ethical subjectivism follow.
>
> If I too may indulge in a bit of unsupported assertion: agent relativity
> is *false*, and thus materially implies anything you like.
no you may not indulge in unsupported assertion.
also, one perversion of modern "logic" (ie, symbol manipulation) is the
claim that falsity logically implies everything. Falsity is outside of
logic and implies nothing. Logic is the method of identifying reality w/o
contradictions.
--
Stephen Grossman
> > A writer by the name of Donald Palmer writes philosophy books with
> > cartoons in them. One, I believe, is called _Looking at Philosophy_
> > Another is, _Does the Center Hold?_ The first is very basic, while the
> > second is a bit more involved and argues a thesis. The cartoons in both
> > are very good.
Are they funny or merely illustrative?
> >
>if Objectivism is so bad, why isn't "high-quality" philosophy also
popularised by those who purport to be experts in it?
Contemporary philosophy is so comprehensively subjective that its most
consistent advocates dont care about reality, merely technical problems
for other specialists.
Stephen Grossman
<th...@elec.qmw.ac.uk> wrote:
> Stephen Grossman wrote:
> >
> > In article <7vX93.1121$lc5....@ozemail.com.au>, Tony Shrapnel
> > <shra...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
> >
> > > Example of excellence in philosophical appraisal: Bertrand Russell's
> > > "History of Western Philosophy"
> >
> > Russell is famous for his Math. Princ, a work rejected, shortly after
> > publication, by his fellow subjectivists. Russell is infamous for changing
> > philosophies from book to book.
>
> Really? Perhaps it would help if you could describe precisely what is
> subjectivist about Russell's account of mathematical logic in the
> Principia,
Russell, fully in the philosophical mainstream, is thus Kantian, ie,
subjective. My recall of the book is that it opens with symbols or comment
on symbols, and not a discussion of reality. This is Kantian subjectivism.
>or even give an example of the supposed 'subjectivists' who
> rejected it. The Principia continues to be studied as probably THE most
> important work in the subject this century, and no logician could get
> away with not having a thorough grasp of it.
Russell, being a trivial modernist, is not someone whose ideas I know
well. I merely recall a few items from my university studies. Russell is
not a logician but a symbol manipulator.
>
> It's true that Russell's later, non-technical work in non-logical areas
> is less important than the books he produced before WW1, but he still
> has an extremely, and deservedly high reputation for clarity and
> precision of a kind which Rand can only have envied.
Russell,a philoophical skeptic, produced pop books in which he claimed he
was right about social issues, eg, marriage, nuclear war. As for clarity,
Rand is extraordinarily clear. Id be surprised if the profoundly
incompetent Russell was clear.