Is it ever right to do wrong? Part 2
Tomm Carr
intrinsic quality of the act, but was instead determined by the context
in which the act took place.
There are two elements which form this "moral context." So far, I have
mentioned the relevant circumstances surrounding the act. The second
element is "result": what did the act accomplish?
Let's revisit the situation from the previous column. A hit man asks if
we know the whereabouts of his intended victim. We know where he is --
back in our bedroom hiding in the closet. Our choice is to tell the
truth or lie.
The likely outcome of honesty would be that the hit man goes into the
bedroom, throws open the closet door and murders our neighbor. The
likely outcome of lying would be that the hit man continues his search
elsewhere and the neighbor is saved -- for the moment, at least. So in
this situation, telling the truth would be the evil, the bad, the
immoral act.
"But I didn't ask to be put in this situation. I was just sitting at
home, watching TV, minding my own business when my neighbor knocked. I
was forced into the situation so whatever happens is not my fault!"
While it is true that we became involved in the situation without your
permission, it is also irrelevant. While we can control some of the
situations that affect us -- and we work hard to exercise what control we
can -- for the most part life comes at us beyond our control and without
our permission. Moral decisions are constantly being thrust upon us.
This in no way relieves us of responsibility for our actions.
"But I played no part in the situation. I didn't hire the hit man, I
didn't ask my neighbor to seek my help. So whatever happens is not my
fault."
Again, it is true we played no part in the initial situation but now we
are in a position where our actions affect the outcome. This is our
moral involvement and we can't escape it.
But isn't "outcome" or "result" the same thing as "end"? So aren't we
just saying the same thing as "the end justifies the means"?
Not at all. The difference may be subtle but is critically important.
The end is the anticipated result of our action -- it is our goal. So
another way of saying "the end justifies the means" is "if our
intentions are good, any actions we take in pursuit of them are also good."
However, it is not the intended result but the actual result that
determines the morality of an act.
There are two important reasons for this.
1.Morality is a judgment. We can only make judgments based on objective
referents. Intentions are subjective; results are objective.
2.As we all know, there can be a huge difference between intentions and
results -- best laid plans and all that. "He meant well," is small
consolation to someone who's life lies in tatters due to the disastrous
actions of a well-meaning fool.
This brings up an important implication: *the morality of an act cannot
be ascertained with absolute certainty before the act is taken*. This is
not a big problem for most of us. We know there is never absolute
certainty anywhere in life. When we get into our car, we know there is a
small chance we will not live to reach our destination. Life happens. We
are used to spending our entire lives making small decisions and great
decisions based on probabilities. We know that, every now and then, even
very high probabilities fail us.
There are some people, however, who are more risk averse than others,
especially in the moral arena. (I mean "risk averse" as an euphemism for
"moral cowardice.") These people are the ones who insist of being judged
on what they meant to do rather on what they actually did. There are
even a few who desire to be free of all judgment altogether -- "who are
we to judge?"
The claims that intentions should be the basis of moral judgment or the
ends justify the means both move morality from the objective realm to
the subjective. This would mean that morality is nothing more than a
matter of opinion and thus plays no important role in human life.
--
Tomm Catt
In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. In
practice, there is.
Charles Bell
> In a previous column, I explained how the morality of an act is not an
> intrinsic quality of the act, but was instead determined by the context
> in which the act took place.
>
> There are two elements which form this "moral context." So far, I have
> mentioned the relevant circumstances surrounding the act. The second
> element is "result": what did the act accomplish?
>
The problem with the phrase "moral context" is that such a morality is
relativistic. As in my reply to part 1, the reality is that all human
understanding -- whether it is in science, ethics, or in forming
personal relationships - is contextual and cannot be otherwise.
Morality is not a matter of "if this is true . . then you do that" but
rather centers around the meaning of "true". The absolute -- not
relativistic -- moral code is /what is in one's best interest/ given
what one can know about the truth.
>
> However, it is not the intended result but the actual result that
> determines the morality of an act.
>
One cannot know the actual result of an action before it happens.
> There are two important reasons for this.
>
> 1.Morality is a judgment.
Grammatically, this has no meaning. Rephrase. Perhaps, "morality
requires individual judgment."
> We can only make judgments based on objective
> referents. Intentions are subjective; results are objective.
What you mean to say is that "we *should* make judgments based on
objective (real) referents" which begs the question "why?" If one
intends to make a judgment based in reality (rather than according to
one's inner daemons) that intention is "objective". Results are real,
not "objective"
>
> 2.As we all know, there can be a huge difference between intentions and
> results -- best laid plans and all that. "He meant well," is small
> consolation to someone who's life lies in tatters due to the disastrous
> actions of a well-meaning fool.
The difference is that judgment prior to an act can be based in
reality (objective) or in emotion (subjective). Your statement:
"Intentions are subjective" is simply wrong for sane people. It is
exactly the difference in intentions based in reality or alternatively
in emotional fantasy that determines the result, setting aside a real
value in intuition as an underpinning working of the brain based in
reality and not fantasy (the difference between a mother's intuition
and the hallucinations of a schizophrenic)..
>
> This brings up an important implication: *the morality of an act cannot
> be ascertained with absolute certainty before the act is taken*. This is
> not a big problem for most of us.
You are only right in the sense that. traditional (deontological)
morality ignores certainty altogether. This means that . . .
> The claims that intentions should be the basis of moral judgment or the
> ends justify the means both move morality from the objective realm to
> the subjective.
. . . moral "duty" does not involve individual assessments of the
certainty of outcomes at all. In contrast, utilitarianism and
relativistic morality put *all* the value in certainties of outcomes.
The greatest good for the greatest number assumes a determined outcome
given a certain action. Therefore, is utilitarianism really in
contrast to moral duty or merely a different form of duty? Objectivism
holds that in reality as in Objectivist ethics there is no such thing
as duty.
I once was a very bad boy in vandalizing my school's motto on a plaque
in the chapel "Quaesivi bona tibi" to "Quaesivi bona mihi" Had I
been clever, skilled and more versed in Latin, I would have made my
own plaque with a motto in Latin: "To the best of my ability, to the
capacity of my knowledge, and in the light of my own conscience, I
seek good."
"Do not let the hero in your soul perish, in lonely frustration for
the life you deserved, but have never been able to reach. Check your
road and the nature of your battle. The world you desired can be won,
it exists, it is real, it is possible, it's yours." -- John Galt in
Atlas Shrugged
Tomm Carr
>
> The problem with the phrase "moral context" is that such a morality is
> relativistic. As in my reply to part 1, the reality is that all human
> understanding -- whether it is in science, ethics, or in forming
> personal relationships - is contextual and cannot be otherwise.
First you claim that "moral context" makes morality relativistic. Then
you claim that many things, including ethics, /must/ be contextual. Your
second sentence contradicts your first.
> Morality is not a matter of "if this is true . . then you do that" but
> rather centers around the meaning of "true".
I have know idea what you are trying to say here. You are attacking
words I did not say.
> The absolute -- not
> relativistic -- moral code is /what is in one's best interest/ given
> what one can know about the truth.
I am writing to a general audience, not Objectivists or anyone who might
even know anything about Objectivism.
>> 1.Morality is a judgment.
>
> Grammatically, this has no meaning. Rephrase. Perhaps, "morality
> requires individual judgment."
Yes, you're right. "Morality requires judgment" is what I meant to say.
The word "individual" is redundant.
>> We can only make judgments based on objective
>> referents. Intentions are subjective; results are objective.
>
> What you mean to say is that "we *should* make judgments based on
> objective (real) referents" ...
No. This is exactly what I meant. There is no "should" -- we cannot do
otherwise.
>> 2.As we all know, there can be a huge difference between intentions and
>> results -- best laid plans and all that. "He meant well," is small
>> consolation to someone who's life lies in tatters due to the disastrous
>> actions of a well-meaning fool.
>
> The difference is that judgment prior to an act can be based in
> reality (objective) or in emotion (subjective).
Emotion can sway us to act one way rather than another, but almost
inevitably, it is /against/ our judgment. We can make no judgments based
on emotion. That is why, when faced with life-or-death decisions, we
have to remain calm and hold our emotions at bay.
> Your statement:
> "Intentions are subjective" is simply wrong for sane people. It is
> exactly the difference in intentions based in reality or alternatively
> in emotional fantasy that determines the result, setting aside a real
> value in intuition as an underpinning working of the brain based in
> reality and not fantasy (the difference between a mother's intuition
> and the hallucinations of a schizophrenic)..
Again, I get no meaning from this. But intentions, like dreams, take
place only in one's mind. There is no way to objectively prove a dream
or a desire.
>> This brings up an important implication: *the morality of an act cannot
>> be ascertained with absolute certainty before the act is taken*. This is
>> not a big problem for most of us.
>
> You are only right in the sense that. traditional (deontological)
> morality ignores certainty altogether. This means that . . .
>
>> The claims that intentions should be the basis of moral judgment or the
>> ends justify the means both move morality from the objective realm to
>> the subjective.
>
> . . . moral "duty" does not involve individual assessments of the
> certainty of outcomes at all. In contrast, utilitarianism and
> relativistic morality put *all* the value in certainties of outcomes.
Duty? Certainties of outcome? Where are you getting this? I have said
nothing about duty (if you are referring to the Kantian concept of moral
duty, I might mention it in part 3 -- but only to undermine it). I had
just got through saying there was /no/ certainty of outcome.
> The greatest good for the greatest number assumes a determined outcome
> given a certain action. Therefore, is utilitarianism really in
> contrast to moral duty or merely a different form of duty?
It not described as a duty at all. "The greatest good for the greatest
number" is a statement of a moral goal -- one so vaguely worded that it
could be used to justify almost any act. The word "good" used here can
be defined to mean anything a determined person would like it to mean.
> Objectivism
> holds that in reality as in Objectivist ethics there is no such thing
> as duty.
True. However, Objectivism does recognize /obligation/. Unlike duty, an
obligation is freely undertaken, but once accepted, becomes as much a
moral imperative as any duty.
But I'm not sure how any of this relates to what I wrote.
Charles Bell
> Charles Bell wrote:
>
> > The problem with the phrase "moral context" is that such a morality is
> > relativistic. �As in my reply to part 1, the reality is that all human
> > understanding -- whether it is in science, ethics, or in forming
> > personal relationships - is contextual and cannot be otherwise.
>
> First you claim that "moral context" makes morality relativistic.
Anyone who has no familiarity with Objectivism would think that is
what you meant. In Objectivism there is no such working phrase "moral
context", but then perhaps I am mistaken in thinking that your beliefs
are related to Objectivism.
> Then
> you claim that many things, including ethics, /must/ be contextual. Your
> second sentence contradicts your first.
You put the cart before the horse. Let me repeat what I said: All
human understanding is contextual. Did you say that anywhere in your
essay? Why not?
Jim Klein
> True. However, Objectivism does recognize /obligation/. Unlike duty, an
> obligation is freely undertaken, but once accepted, becomes as much a
> moral imperative as any duty.
I'd say that's a little ambiguous in modern lingo.
It passes technically in the sense that the only
sort of "moral imperative" that even COULD exist,
is an obligation freely taken. In that sense, the
two phrases are perfectly synonymous---they
have exactly the same referent.
But if "moral imperative" is supposed to mean
something--anything--more than "obligation
freely chosen," then the sentence is misleading.
I'm guessin' that what you're saying is, "The only
sort of moral imperative that exists is one that
arises in virtue of being an obligation freely
chosen, not from somebody yapping 'duty'."
Or something like that, anyway. Of course, in
that verbiage it's necessary to point out that
there's no way for an obligation to exist
EXCEPT by being freely chosen. IMO this is
the key to understanding morality.
And we never have to worry about forgetting it,
as long as Charles is around!
jk
Tomm Carr
> On Nov 12, 3:18 am, Tomm Carr <TommC...@Gmail.com> wrote:
>> First you claim that "moral context" makes morality relativistic.
>
> Anyone who has no familiarity with Objectivism would think that is
> what you meant. In Objectivism there is no such working phrase "moral
> context", but then perhaps I am mistaken in thinking that your beliefs
> are related to Objectivism.
You're right, "moral context" is not in the Objectivist lexicon. And
that means what, exactly?
Do you see Objectivism as some sort of inspired revelation? Do you think
every word spoken by Ayn Rand is inerrant Gospel, not subject to
analysis, expansion and, possibly, improvement?
>> Then
>> you claim that many things, including ethics, /must/ be contextual. Your
>> second sentence contradicts your first.
>
>
> You put the cart before the horse. Let me repeat what I said: All
> human understanding is contextual. Did you say that anywhere in your
> essay?
No.
> Why not?
My subject was morality, not all human understanding. One of my goals
was to show that morality is not a unique, semi-mystical chant of
mumbo-jumbo, but a quite ordinary concept perfectly capable of being
comprehended by any rational person.
You may be proving me wrong.
OK, gratuitous jibe aside, you seem to demand that everything fit into
existing Objectivist terminology. If you can do that with what I wrote
without changing the meaning, by all means, be my guest. If, however,
you are using that as a basis of accuracy or truth, don't expect me to
give it any credence. I have no interest in adhering to any orthodoxy,
even Objectivist.
Even if I should write something that flatly contradicts something Rand
said (which I will do in the next month or so), I fully expect it to be
judged solely on how closely it measures up against reality, not
official Objectivist dogma.
Charles Bell
> Charles Bell wrote:
> > On Nov 12, 3:18 am, Tomm Carr <TommC...@Gmail.com> wrote:
> >> First you claim that "moral context" makes morality relativistic.
>
> > Anyone who has no familiarity with Objectivism would think that is
> > what you meant. In Objectivism there is no such working phrase "moral
> > context", but then perhaps I am mistaken in thinking that your beliefs
> > are related to Objectivism.
>
> You're right, "moral context" is not in the Objectivist lexicon. And
> that means what, exactly?
>
> Do you see Objectivism as some sort of inspired revelation? Do you think
> every word spoken by Ayn Rand is inerrant Gospel, not subject to
> analysis, expansion and, possibly, improvement?
>
Whatever it is that you are saying, it is not honest to make
Objectivism appear to claim to a kind of situational ethics that
"moral context" implies. What is moral is moral in an absolute sense,
not relative to a situation, and if it is the intention of the actor
to make a moral choice, his intention is good and therefore he is
right to act on that intention contrary to the general thesis of your
essay.
> >> Then
> >> you claim that many things, including ethics, /must/ be contextual. Your
> >> second sentence contradicts your first.
>
> > You put the cart before the horse. �Let me repeat what I said: �All
> > human understanding is contextual. �Did you say that anywhere in your
> > essay?
>
> No.
>
> > Why not?
>
> My subject was morality, not all human understanding.
Let me repeat: All human understanding, including that necessary to
make a moral choice, is contextual.
By taking a moral choice outside of human understanding, or
considering epistemology as unimportant to a discussion on morality,
you advocate moral imperatives.
> Even if I should write something that flatly contradicts something Rand
> said (which I will do in the next month or so), I fully expect it to be
> judged solely on how closely it measures up against reality, not
> official Objectivist dogma.
>
Oh well, at least you are bringing yourself up to some level of
intellectual honesty.
Charles Bell
> Or something like that, anyway. �Of course, in
> that verbiage it's necessary to point out that
> there's no way for an obligation to exist
> EXCEPT by being freely chosen. �IMO this is
> the key to understanding morality.
>
> And we never have to worry about forgetting it,
> as long as Charles is around!
>
That is my duty!
x.
xx.
xxx.
xx.
x.
Tomm Carr
>
> Whatever it is that you are saying, it is not honest to make
> Objectivism appear to claim to a kind of situational ethics that
> "moral context" implies.
Where did I mention Objectivism? Where did I make such a claim? I did
discuss situational ethics and showed how moral context could not be
considered situational ethics. Did you read that part? Did I make an
error anywhere?
You keep arguing with points I did not make and leave unremarked what I
/did/ say.
> What is moral is moral in an absolute sense,
So you claim that morality is an intrinsic quality of the action. Could
you please support that?
> Let me repeat: All human understanding, including that necessary to
> make a moral choice, is contextual.
Yes, I agree. That was my point. But morality was my subject matter so
that is what I mentioned, not all human understanding. Just because I
didn't mention it doesn't mean I don't it applies. I didn't mention it
because I'm trying to be a good writer and a good writer has to *focus*.
> By taking a moral choice outside of human understanding, or
> considering epistemology as unimportant to a discussion on morality,
> you advocate moral imperatives.
Yet again, after complaining about "a kind of situational ethics that
'moral context' implies" just a few paragraphs above, you again state
"all human understanding, including that necessary to make a moral
choice, is contextual," yet, (and you neglect to explain how) when /I/
claim that morality is contextual it is to take "moral choice outside of
human understanding," but when /you/ claim that morality is contextual,
it is morality "in an absolute sense."
> Oh well, at least you are bringing yourself up to some level of
> intellectual honesty.
Oh...yes...Intellectual honesty...Kindly tell me all about it.
--
Tomm Catt
http://www.examiner.com/x-26551-Phoenix-Freethought-Examiner
Charles Bell
> Charles Bell wrote:
>
> > Whatever it is that you are saying, it is not honest to make
> > Objectivism appear to claim to a kind of situational ethics that
> > "moral context" implies.
>
> Where did I mention Objectivism? Where did I make such a claim? I did
> discuss situational ethics and showed how moral context could not be
> considered situational ethics. Did you read that part? Did I make an
> error anywhere?
>
> You keep arguing with points I did not make and leave unremarked what I
> /did/ say.
>
> > What is moral is moral in an absolute sense,
>
> So you claim that morality is an intrinsic quality of the action.
No, I am not making that claim. I am saying that all actions have
moral consequences. If one does not act in his best interests, he
cannot later complain that the outcome was bad for him (and probably
others) even though he thought he did the moral thing, but rather
because he did not do the moral thing (act in his interests), he
suffrered a bad outcome. The altruist doing his selfless thing leads
to bad consequences not because of some good intentions gone wrong,
but that his intentions were not good.
> Could
> you please support that?
>
> > � Let me repeat: �All human understanding, including that necessary to
> > make a moral choice, is contextual.
>
> Yes, I agree. That was my point. But morality was my subject matter so
> that is what I mentioned, not all human understanding. Just because I
> didn't mention it doesn't mean I don't it applies. I didn't mention it
> because I'm trying to be a good writer and a good writer has to *focus*.
>
You blew it by introducing an absurd situation around which to
*focus*.
> > By taking a moral choice outside of human understanding, or
> > considering epistemology as unimportant to a discussion on morality,
> > you advocate moral imperatives.
>
> Yet again, after complaining about "a kind of situational ethics that
> 'moral context' implies" just a few paragraphs above, you again state
> "all human understanding, including that necessary to make a moral
> choice, is contextual," yet, (and you neglect to explain how)
Objectivist contextual epistemology.
> when /I/
> claim that morality is contextual
You claimed that there is a "moral context" -- a meaningless phrase
because morality is absolute, not contextual, and "context" is not
properly modifiable by an adjective.
> it is to take "moral choice outside of
> human understanding,"
. . . By, for example, your claim "that moral decisions are thrust
upon us".
> but when /you/ claim that morality is contextual,
I did not claim that "morality is contextual".
> it is morality "in an absolute sense."
Morality is absolute, and there is not a "context" to it except only
as a man comes to understand it. This is true about any concept (in
that A is A), especially a metaphysical concept. It is human
understanding of what is or is not moral that is contextual. This
Objectivtist statement alone makes a hash of your thesis that good
intentions are not good enough.
>
> > Oh well, at least you are bringing yourself up to some level of
> > intellectual honesty.
>
> Oh...yes...Intellectual honesty...Kindly tell me all about it.
>
It is important to establish from the beginning that you are bumbling
around this subject on your own without benefit of anything Rand said
or might have said,
Tomm Carr
>
> It is important to establish from the beginning that you are bumbling
> around this subject on your own without benefit of anything Rand said
> or might have said,
I have not once invoked Rand or Objectivism. I have referenced either
only in answer to posts that bring them up first. I am aware that I am
not parroting Rand's words. Most of the people here (hpo) are already
intimately aware of what Rand said, and most of the people in the
general audience don't really care. So why would I want to?
I'm curious though. There are thousands of posts here on hpo. Some
mention Rand and some don't. The subject matter of these posts are
extremely varied and the contents range from the profound to the
profoundly silly. Not once have you found it necessary to remind anyone
that it was important to establish from the beginning that the author
was not repeating something that Rand said. Only I, who never made such
a claim, get this admonishment. Why?
I have found that when someone accuses you of something you quite
obviously did not do, it's more than likely a case of projection. But
what could you possibly be projecting onto me?
Ah, well. It doesn't really matter, I suppose. This has already turned
into one of those TOUS's (Threads Of Unusual Size) and, like day-old
chewing gum, is rapidly loosing its appeal. Let's start afresh with a
new post.
And just take it for granted that I will already be aware of the fact
that the words I write may not be anything that Rand has said.
Charles Bell
> Charles Bell wrote:
>
> > It is important to establish from the beginning that you are bumbling
> > around this subject on your own without benefit of anything Rand said
> > or might have said,
>
> I have not once invoked Rand or Objectivism.
In part 1 you entered into an Objectivist handling of moral conundrums
(inadvertantly, I suppose now) , but then in part 2 you went astray.
I did specifically ask you in my second reply here if it was your
intention to handle this discussion along Objectivist lines:
<< In Objectivism there is no such working phrase "moral context", but
then perhaps I am mistaken in thinking that your beliefs are related
to Objectivism. >>
To which you replied:
<< You're right, "moral context" is not in the Objectivist lexicon.
And that means what, exactly?
Do you see Objectivism as some sort of inspired revelation? Do you
think every word spoken by Ayn Rand is inerrant Gospel, not subject to
analysis, expansion and, possibly, improvement?>>
That was a snotty response.
>I have referenced either
> only in answer to posts that bring them up first. I am aware that I am
> not parroting Rand's words. Most of the people here (hpo) are already
> intimately aware of what Rand said, and most of the people in the
> general audience don't really care. So why would I want to?
>
You are posting in an Objectivist forum.
> I'm curious though. There are thousands of posts here on hpo. Some
> mention Rand and some don't. The subject matter of these posts are
> extremely varied and the contents range from the profound to the
> profoundly silly. Not once have you found it necessary to remind anyone
> that it was important to establish from the beginning that the author
> was not repeating something that Rand said.
On a moral-philosophical topic, something which interests me, I am
establishing the degree to which the OP -- you -- holds Objectivism as
valuable. I do not think it unreasonable in an Objectivist forum to
establish that fact, but it is unreasonable for the OP to adopt a
snotty, belligerent attitude when pressed about his POV on
Objectivism. Secondarily, I would like to point out, from an
Objectivist POV, or at least from my amateur understanding of
Objectivism, how the OP is wrong.
I should wait for part 3 to formulate an opinion, but what I see now
is a whole lot of words expended on something Objectivism dispatches
easily: if telling the truth establishes security for oneself, then do
just that. [*] There is not even a moral conundrum here. The problem
with your approach is that you do, in fact, believe in moral
imperatives but also feel the need to justify from time to time
violating those imperatives. Objectivism does not deal with
imperatives by putting them into context; Objectivism denies the
existence of imperatives while also not denying the existence of an
absolute morality. There is not one thing about Objectivism that can
be understood -- namely, how its morality seems to the ignorant at
once both absolutist and relativistic -- without learning its
principles of epistemology: existence exists, A is A, whether or not
man exists, but man's mind operates at an epistemological and never
metaphysical level.
[*] "Yeah, but what if . . . " the imbecile continues, ". . . the
neighbor who is about to be killed based on the information you gave
the hit man is a woman who is carrying your baby! Huh? What about
that?!"