Kelly Ross on universals
1Z
Rand's description of "concept formation" seems more sensible.
Qualities are "abstracted" from experience and formulated into
concepts. Rand shoots for a "conceptualist" theory of universals,
which avoids an Aristotelian "realism" of substantial essences on the
one hand and the subjectivism of "nominalism," where universals are
just words, on the other hand. However, a conceptualist theory cannot
be consistently maintained (and this is not just a problem for Rand).
Even if concepts may be conventional and arbitrary in many ways, they
can only be connected to reality if they are based on some abstract
features that are really in the objects. Thus, as soon as Rand allows
that the terms for features "abstracted" from experience refer to
features that are really there, then she has let in some form of
Aristotelian realism, whether she wants to or not. And if there are
indeed natural kinds, then there must be natural, and real, essences.
Otherwise her theory is nominalist and subjectivist
Malrassic Park
Hahaha.
You see, the writer of this article (which I read some time back)
understands what the problem of Universals is, whereas Randroids and
Jim Klein do not. And neither did Rand. The author also understands
the philosophical implications of Rand's Conceptualism in which she
tried to have her moderate Aristotelian cake and eat it too. Rand in
fact has gotten no farther with this problem than those thinkers of
the Scholastic era such as Anselm and Aquinas, and as far as that goes
she has barely touched on the problem while adding nothing new to the
conversation.
Ken Gardner
"1Z" wrote:
> Rand's description of "concept formation" seems more sensible.
> Qualities are "abstracted" from experience and formulated into
> concepts. Rand shoots for a "conceptualist" theory of universals,
> which avoids an Aristotelian "realism" of substantial essences on the
> one hand and the subjectivism of "nominalism," where universals are
> just words, on the other hand. However, a conceptualist theory cannot
> be consistently maintained (and this is not just a problem for Rand).
> Even if concepts may be conventional and arbitrary in many ways, they
> can only be connected to reality if they are based on some abstract
> features that are really in the objects.
Not abstract features that are really in the objects, but distinguishing
characteristics that are the same in the existence even if their particular
measurements are different. For example, no two animals are alike in any
feature, yet we can form the concept "animal" because all of them are living
entities that posses the attributes of consciousness and locomotion in some
respect, even if the exact form of consciousness and locomotion differs from
species to species (and even to individual members within the species) -- in
exactly the same way we can form the concept "fingerprint" even though no
two fingerprints are exactly alike.
>Thus, as soon as Rand allows
> that the terms for features "abstracted" from experience refer to
> features that are really there, then she has let in some form of
> Aristotelian realism, whether she wants to or not. And if there are
> indeed natural kinds, then there must be natural, and real, essences.
> Otherwise her theory is nominalist and subjectivist
Rand believed that Aristotle regarding essences as the same in every entity
possessing them. And I understand that in some translations (including the
one I suspect she had), this is indeed the case. But not in my translation.
In mine, his theory is very close to her theory, except that he used
different terminology.
1Z
> "1Z" wrote:
Not me, Mal
> Not abstract features that are really in the objects, but distinguishing
> characteristics that are the same in the existence even if their particular
> measurements are different. �For example, no two animals are alike in any
> feature,
Many are alike in many features. You probably
meant no two are exactly alike in all their features.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>Rand believed that Aristotle regarding essences as the same in every entity
>possessing them. And I understand that in some translations (including the
>one I suspect she had), this is indeed the case. But not in my translation.
>In mine, his theory is very close to her theory, except that he used
>different terminology.
The problem there is one of interpretation as well as translation. It
could be that Aristotle was a Conceptualist under the right
interpretation. Interpreting Kant in a ceratin light can also make his
theory appear very close to Rand's.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
> "1Z" wrote:
> > Rand's description of "concept formation" seems more sensible.
> > Qualities are "abstracted" from experience and formulated into
> > concepts. Rand shoots for a "conceptualist" theory of universals,
> > which avoids an Aristotelian "realism" of substantial essences on the
> > one hand and the subjectivism of "nominalism," where universals are
> > just words, on the other hand. However, a conceptualist theory cannot
> > be consistently maintained (and this is not just a problem for Rand).
> > Even if concepts may be conventional and arbitrary in many ways, they
> > can only be connected to reality if they are based on some abstract
> > features that are really in the objects.
>
> Not abstract features that are really in the objects, but distinguishing
> characteristics that are the same in the existence even if their particular
> measurements are different. �For example, no two animals are alike in any
> feature, yet we can form the concept "animal" because all of them are living
> entities that posses the attributes of consciousness and locomotion in some
> respect, even if the exact form of consciousness and locomotion differs from
> species to species (and even to individual members within the species) -- in
> exactly the same way we can form the concept "fingerprint" even though no
> two fingerprints are exactly alike.
What this means is that one has narrowed the details of a complex
attribute to such an extent that only a very simple attribute is left.
A very simple example of this is the attribute of number.
--Paul Wakfer
MoreLife for the rational - http://morelife.org
Reality based tools for more life in quantity and quality
The Self-Sovereign Individual Project - http://selfsip.org
Self-sovereignty, rational pursuit of optimal lifetime happiness,
individual responsibility, social preferencing & social contracting
Paul Antonik Wakfer
Although Rand described this approach well and partly convinced many
people (including me 40 years ago) that it was logically sound, she
essentially contributed nothing new to clearly place these notions on
a firm foundation. By using the terms "abstracted' and "concepts", she
merely displaced the problem of just exactly where in relationship to
reality do those "things" lie. What does solve the problem of
universals is what I have called "hierarchical realism" - where
*level-1* reality only contains matter, energy and combinations of
these, space, time, Events and Actions. These are the only things
which can be directly sensed (which means measured in some fashion).
Attributes of level-1 existents are then in level-2 reality.
For more details on this scheme see: the opening section of
definitions in: http://selfsip.org/solutions/NSC.html
Malrassic Park
<pa...@morelife.org> wrote:
>For more details on this scheme see: the opening section of
>definitions in: http://selfsip.org/solutions/NSC.html
>
>--Paul Wakfer
"An Existent is a particular (unique) Thing (or Element) in/of Reality
(also called Existence), the set of all distinguishable Things that
can InterAct."
You're assuming that all existents are distinguishable.
Charles Bell
> Although Rand described this approach well and partly convinced many
> people (including me 40 years ago) that it was logically sound, she
> essentially contributed nothing new to clearly place these notions on
> a firm foundation. By using the terms "abstracted' and "concepts", she
> merely displaced the problem of just exactly where in relationship to
> reality do those "things" lie. What does solve the problem of
> universals is what I have called "hierarchical realism" - where
> *level-1* reality only contains matter, energy and combinations of
> these, space, time, Events and Actions. These are the only things
> which can be directly sensed (which means measured in some fashion).
> Attributes of level-1 existents are then in level-2 reality.
Dunno. It seems to me you have merely re-washed Rand and added
unnecessary complexity while creating nothing of greater value.
<< The meaning of "furniture" cannot be grasped unless one has first
grasped the meaning of its constituent concepts; these are its link to
reality. (On the lower levels of an unlimited conceptual chain, this
is an illustration of the hierarchical structure of concepts.) >>
and
<< Since the definition of a concept is formulated in terms of other
concepts, it enables man, not only to identify and retain a concept,
but also to establish the relationships, the hierarchy, the
integration of all his concepts and thus the integration of his
knowledge. Definitions preserve, not the chronological order in which
a given man may have learned concepts, but the logical order of their
hierarchical interdependence. >> Rand, ITOE
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>Dunno. It seems to me you have merely re-washed Rand and added
>unnecessary complexity while creating nothing of greater value.
>
><< The meaning of "furniture" cannot be grasped unless one has first
>grasped the meaning of its constituent concepts; these are its link to
>reality. (On the lower levels of an unlimited conceptual chain, this
>is an illustration of the hierarchical structure of concepts.) >>
Irrelevant to the problem. Since no two sets of furniture are
identical in every respect, there is nothing in reality that conforms
to the concept "furniture" no matter which method you chose to form
the concept.
Charles Bell
> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 02:35:32 -0800, Charles Bell
>
> >Dunno. It seems to me you have merely re-washed Rand and added
> >unnecessary complexity while creating nothing of greater value.
>
> ><< The meaning of "furniture" cannot be grasped unless one has first
> >grasped the meaning of its constituent concepts; these are its link to
> >reality. (On the lower levels of an unlimited conceptual chain, this
> >is an illustration of the hierarchical structure of concepts.) >>
>
> Irrelevant to the problem.
To you who has no solution to the "problem" you want to create.
Wakfer said:
"By using the terms "abstracted' and "concepts", she merely displaced
the problem of just exactly where in relationship to reality do those
"things" lie.
. . . but he can only falsely claim that Rand "merely displaced
relationships."
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>On Dec 22, 10:59�am, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 02:35:32 -0800, Charles Bell
..
>> <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>> >Dunno. It seems to me you have merely re-washed Rand and added
>> >unnecessary complexity while creating nothing of greater value.
..
>> ><< The meaning of "furniture" cannot be grasped unless one has first
>> >grasped the meaning of its constituent concepts; these are its link to
>> >reality. (On the lower levels of an unlimited conceptual chain, this
>> >is an illustration of the hierarchical structure of concepts.) >>
..
>> Irrelevant to the problem.
..
>>To you who has no solution to the "problem" you want to create.
I did not create it. The Problem is 2500 years old and Rand did NOT
solve it in a half-hour. She merely asserted that concept-formation
was the solution when in fact it only bypasses the Problem.
>Wakfer said:
>
>"By using the terms "abstracted' and "concepts", she merely displaced
>the problem of just exactly where in relationship to reality do those
>"things" lie.
>
>. . . but he can only falsely claim that Rand "merely displaced
>relationships."
Wakfer is just re-stating the Problem. If Universals are not found in
(or above) particulars, then they are in the mind. The issue becomes
one of relating this mental content back to particulars. The issue is
not one of how this content is formed.
Wakfer mentioned the example of numbers. In this context, it might be
asked, Where is the 2-ness in two men?
Or for another example: Man is a rational animal. Are all men
therefore rational animals? Not necessarily.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
> On Sun, 20 Dec 2009 20:52:25 -0800, Paul Antonik Wakfer
>
> >For more details on this scheme see: the opening section of
> >definitions in:http://selfsip.org/solutions/NSC.html
>
> >--Paul Wakfer
>
> "An Existent is a particular (unique) Thing (or Element) in/of Reality
> (also called Existence), the set of all distinguishable Things that
> can InterAct."
>
> You're assuming that all existents are distinguishable.
I choose not to see it as an assumption, but rather a fact of reality.
All existents *are* distinguishable, if only because each one is in a
unique point in space-time. You can call this an assumption about, or
better still, axiom of the reality of space-time and matter if you
like.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
> On Dec 20, 11:52�pm, Paul Antonik Wakfer <p...@morelife.org> wrote:
>
> > Although Rand described this approach well and partly convinced many
> > people (including me 40 years ago) that it was logically sound, she
> > essentially contributed nothing new to clearly place these notions on
> > a firm foundation. By using the terms "abstracted' and "concepts", she
> > merely displaced the problem of just exactly where in relationship to
> > reality do those "things" lie. What does solve the problem of
> > universals is what I have called "hierarchical realism" - where
> > *level-1* reality only contains matter, energy and combinations of
> > these, space, time, Events and Actions. These are the only things
> > which can be directly sensed (which means measured in some fashion).
> > Attributes of level-1 existents are then in level-2 reality.
Correction:
its been a while since I read my own stuff and I actually placed
existents in level-0 and attributes of existents in level-1. All
numbers for example would be level-1 and attributes of numbers would
be in level-2 and so on. (All levels greater than 0 are call meta-
realities.) This kind of hierarchical arrangements circumvents the
types of paradoxes generated by such things as sets being able to
contain themselves.
> Dunno.
> It seems to me you have merely re-washed Rand and added
> unnecessary complexity while creating nothing of greater value.
That is only because you have not yet read enough (or any? - beyond my
post) of my system to understand the significant differences.
By your very admission, you are still in the state of "dunno".
> << The meaning of "furniture" cannot be grasped unless one has first
> grasped the meaning of its constituent concepts; these are its link to
> reality. (On the lower levels of an unlimited conceptual chain, this
> is an illustration of the hierarchical structure of concepts.) >>
>
> and
>
> << Since the definition of a concept is formulated in terms of other
> concepts, it enables man, not only to identify and retain a concept,
> but also to establish the relationships, the hierarchy, the
> integration of all his concepts and thus the integration of his
> knowledge. Definitions preserve, not the chronological order in which
> a given man may have learned concepts, but the logical order of their
> hierarchical interdependence. >> �Rand, ITOE
Thanks for the quotes. But I think that my metaphysical system makes
those ideas more precise, clearer and formalized. Rand had no
mathematical background as I do and therefore no idea of an axiomatic
system and the necessary complex and involved "circularity" of all
definitions. (One can think of a dictionary - correctly written - as
an axiomatic system wherein all the words are primitives and all the
definitions are either axioms or implications of them.)
As I stated before, my work is a synthesis of Objectivism (and I
certainly owe much to Rand for starting me off), and other
philosophical approaches. (However, that is not what I set out to do.
I only realized that after I my thinking from the ground up had led me
to formulate what I did.) Where I more greatly differ from Rand is
further on, if you are interested in reading my work.
Malrassic Park
<pa...@morelife.org> wrote:
>On 21 Dec, 22:19, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On Sun, 20 Dec 2009 20:52:25 -0800, Paul Antonik Wakfer
>>
>> <p...@morelife.org> wrote:
>> >For more details on this scheme see: the opening section of
>> >definitions in:http://selfsip.org/solutions/NSC.html
..
>> >--Paul Wakfer
..
>> "An Existent is a particular (unique) Thing (or Element) in/of Reality
>> (also called Existence), the set of all distinguishable Things that
>> can InterAct."
..
>> You're assuming that all existents are distinguishable.
..
>I choose not to see it as an assumption, but rather a fact of reality.
>All existents *are* distinguishable, if only because each one is in a
>unique point in space-time. You can call this an assumption about, or
>better still, axiom of the reality of space-time and matter if you
>like.
You have a deeper "axiom" at work here: that all points in space/time
are unique. But it does not necessarily follow that all existents are
distinguishable. Calling it an "axiom" does not render it true,
axioms, indeed, are often considered arbitrary points from which to
begin a coherent system of thought.
My axiom is that all existents are *not* *necessariliy*
distinguishable, their being in unique points in space-time is
irrelevant.
You see the problem with merely asserting one's axioms as self-evident
withour grounds or evidence - someone else can come along and
reasonably assert the opposite, that is, equally with no reason at
all.
Malrassic Park
<pa...@morelife.org> wrote:
>Correction:
>its been a while since I read my own stuff and I actually placed
>existents in level-0 and attributes of existents in level-1.
Are those points in space/time you mentioned at level negative-1?
Paul Antonik Wakfer
> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 02:35:32 -0800, Charles Bell
>
> >Dunno. It seems to me you have merely re-washed Rand and added
> >unnecessary complexity while creating nothing of greater value.
>
> ><< The meaning of "furniture" cannot be grasped unless one has first
> >grasped the meaning of its constituent concepts; these are its link to
> >reality. (On the lower levels of an unlimited conceptual chain, this
> >is an illustration of the hierarchical structure of concepts.) >>
>
> Irrelevant to the problem. Since no two sets of furniture are
> identical in every respect,
I think that in a straw man, since few are trying to maintain that.
> there is nothing in reality that conforms
> to the concept "furniture"
Correct, there *is* nothing in reality (level-0).
> no matter which method you chose to form the concept.
If one formulates a well-defined measurable attribute of some
existents named "furniture", then that is a useful level-1 meta-
reality human construct. Note that my system eschews the word
"concept" because I think it is far to vague and ambiguous, and
therefore not well-definable.
Ray
news:7c90c62f-59ed-4479...@y10g2000prg.googlegroups.com...
> On 22 Dec, 08:59, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 02:35:32 -0800, Charles Bell
>
> "concept" because I think it is far to vague and ambiguous, and
> therefore not well-definable.
>
Then what do use in place of the word "concept"?
Tell me first, then I'll read you stuff.
Ray
Paul Antonik Wakfer
You will have to explain this more before I can understand your point
enough to respond.
However, I wish to point out that my hierarchy of meta-realities is
not at all the same as Rand's notion of hierarchy of concepts as
described in your two quotes. In my system all the various attributes
(which she calls "constituent concepts") are still in level-1.
"Furnitureness" is not abstracted from these "constituent
concepts" (simpler and logically prior attributes in my terminology)
but rather is a kind of merging and combination of them into a more
complex attribute requiring more complex measurement to affirm its
validity for any existent.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
As much as I understand what you have just stated, I agree with that
approach.
> Wakfer mentioned the example of numbers. In this context, it might be
> asked, Where is the 2-ness in two men?
It certainly is not in reality. There is nothing that one can directly
sense as "2-ness". However, as a very simple attribute of some
collections of existents, 2-ness is clearly in level-1 meta-reality.
> Or for another example: Man is a rational animal. Are all men
> therefore rational animals? Not necessarily.
No this is a far, far more difficult problem because of the complexity
(and enormous social/cultural ambiguity) of the attribute "rational".
I wrestled with that attribute for decades before I came up with what
I think is the only well-defined meaning of the word. You might be
interested to read my work to see what I arrived at.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
I think that is does, since I cannot logically see any consistent
meaning of the term "distinguishable) such that two existents at
different space-time points are still not distinguishable.
> Calling it an "axiom" does not render it true,
I never said or thought that it did.
> axioms, indeed, are often considered arbitrary points from which to
> begin a coherent system of thought.
Yes, such is the nature of an axiomatic system. One starts with
primitives (undefined terms), then one makes statements about them
which connect and relate them to one another. If these statements are
mutually consistent then they are a start at in essence, defining the
terms. Only if the system of statements is complete does one have a
full definition of the primitives. Eucild's geometry is an early
example of an (non-complete) axiomatic system.
> My axiom is that all existents are *not* *necessariliy*
> distinguishable, their being in unique points in space-time is
> irrelevant.
The only answer that I can think of right now is that such an axiom
has no practical function - does not help to understand and make use
of reality. In any case, before we can go any further on it you will
need to well-define "distinguishable", which I expect is at the root
of our difference (if you really think the above).
> You see the problem with merely asserting one's axioms as self-evident
> withour grounds or evidence
One has to begin somewhere, and that somewhere must necessarily be
"without grounds or evidence". Such is the nature of the notion of an
axiomatic system.
> - someone else can come along and
> reasonably assert the opposite, that is, equally with no reason at
> all.
Quite true. So in the end the important test (beyond consistency) is
*usefulness* in dealing with reality for the purpose of optimizing
one's Lifetime Happiness. (See my work for more details on why
Lifetime Happiness - appropriately defined - must necessarily be the
end purpose of any human, whether or not s/he knows it.)
Paul Antonik Wakfer
> "Paul Antonik Wakfer" <p...@morelife.org> wrote in
In formulating my system I never even thought about the word "concept"
- it never came to mind as being needed. However looking at Rand's and
other's use of the word, I would say the my term Attribute
(synonymously also Characteristic and Parameter - to clearly denote
the measurability) is what replaces "concept". Note that in my system
I capitalize all my primitives, just so that they are distinguished
from the ever-so-ambiguous similar vernacular words.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 21:17:28 -0800, Paul Antonik Wakfer
>
> >Correction:
> >its been a while since I read my own stuff and I actually placed
> >existents in level-0 and attributes of existents in level-1.
>
> Are those points in space/time you mentioned at level negative-1?
Good question!
No, in my system as it stands, they are part of existence - level-0 or
simply just reality. Level-0 contains all things that are measurable
and from the simplest viewpoint space-time is also measurable. BTW,
when I referred to an existent at some point in space-time, I
obviously meant occupying some unique volume of space at same
particular time (and yes, I know that relatively theory predicts that
such time is not uniquely definable, but can we please ignore that for
the current discussion).
However, your question (and I think that can see a point to it) has
started me on some thinking that may change that.
I only seek to perfect my work, having no vested interest in its being
already perfect. I have had this system in place essentially as it is
for over 5 years now, but have been unable to attract sufficient
foundational thinkers to give it a thorough vetting.
Charles Bell
> On 22 Dec, 08:59, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > there is nothing in reality that conforms
> > to the concept "furniture"
>
> Correct, there *is* nothing in reality (level-0).
>
> > no matter which method you chose to form the concept.
>
> If one formulates a well-defined measurable attribute of some
> existents named "furniture", then that is a useful level-1 meta-
> reality human construct. Note that my system eschews the word
> "concept" because I think it is far to vague and ambiguous, and
> therefore not well-definable.
Just another sophist spook peddling his mysticism.
x.
xx.
xxx.
xx.
x.
Charles Bell
> On 22 Dec, 14:25, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> > Wakfer said:
>
> > "By using the terms "abstracted' and "concepts", she merely displaced
> > the problem of just exactly where in relationship to reality do those
> > "things" lie.
>
> > . . . �but he can only falsely claim that Rand "merely displaced
> > relationships."
>
> You will have to explain this more before I can understand your point
> enough to respond.
>
You are a liar if you claim to have studied Objectivism enough to have
rejected it on the basis of some allegation of inadequacy to explain
placing things in relationship to other things.
> However, I wish to point out that my hierarchy of meta-realities is
> not at all the same as Rand's notion of hierarchy of concepts as
> described in your two quotes.
No, it isn't. Now, go away.
Jim Klein
> Irrelevant to the problem. Since no two sets of furniture are
> identical in every respect, there is nothing in reality that conforms
> to the concept "furniture" no matter which method you chose to form
> the concept.
Y'know, you've really become the King of the Non-Sequitor
lately. I can see how that might be necessary, considering
what you're defending!
No, no two sets of furniture are identical in every
respect. No two anything are that, though acar
might want to notice that any two everythings are,
since they reference exactly the same set.
But no matter that. What in the world would it mean to
say that "there is nothing in reality that conforms to the
concept 'furniture'"???
In what manner does that chair over there not "conform
to the concept 'furniture'"?
Maybe start simple. Is it furniture, yes or no?
Also, you might want to keep in mind that the claim
isn't that the referent "conforms" to the concept, but
that the concept "conforms," in the sense of "is
reflective of" or "is representational of," the
referent.
Or you might not, depending on how committed
you are to taking this bullshit to the grave.
jk
Malrassic Park
<pa...@morelife.org> wrote:
>On 22 Dec, 22:29, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 21:17:28 -0800, Paul Antonik Wakfer
>>
>> <p...@morelife.org> wrote:
>> >Correction:
>> >its been a while since I read my own stuff and I actually placed
>> >existents in level-0 and attributes of existents in level-1.
>>
>> Are those points in space/time you mentioned at level negative-1?
>
>Good question!
>No, in my system as it stands, they are part of existence - level-0 or
>simply just reality. Level-0 contains all things that are measurable
>and from the simplest viewpoint space-time is also measurable. BTW,
>when I referred to an existent at some point in space-time, I
>obviously meant occupying some unique volume of space at same
>particular time (and yes, I know that relatively theory predicts that
>such time is not uniquely definable, but can we please ignore that for
>the current discussion).
>
>However, your question (and I think that can see a point to it) has
>started me on some thinking that may change that.
>
>I only seek to perfect my work, having no vested interest in its being
>already perfect. I have had this system in place essentially as it is
>for over 5 years now, but have been unable to attract sufficient
>foundational thinkers to give it a thorough vetting.
I agree that it really isn't necessary to involve Relativity here.
Philosophy has been asking questions about space and time long before
Einstein, long before even Kant. The main question in this context
involves distinguishability as a criterion for reality. If your
limitation involves distinguishing everything, including space and
time, then it need only be pointed out that points in space/time are
completely indistinguishable in the absence of objects, that is,
outside of all possibility of relationships. And it is only objects in
space/time that make distinguishability possible. It is not, as would
be the case in a universe where space/time is real, space/time that
makes distinguishability possible, but only objects in space/time that
make it possible to distinguish points in space/time.
This is where Leibniz's Identity of Indistinguishables may actually
bear fruit, in that ideally, in the absence of objects, points in
space/time cannot be related and thus are not only considered
indistinguishable, but indeed identical, such that every point in
space/time is precisely the same point so it is no longer necessary to
refer to points, thus there is nothing left, outside of all
relationships, to distinguish.
It is only objective reality that makes space/time possible,
space/time is therefore not objective reality.
Malrassic Park
<pa...@morelife.org> wrote:
>On 22 Dec, 14:55, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 13:25:32 -0800, Charles Bell
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>> >On Dec 22, 10:59�am, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> >> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 02:35:32 -0800, Charles Bell
>> ..
>>
>> >. . . �but he can only falsely claim that Rand "merely displaced
>> >relationships."
>>
>> Wakfer is just re-stating the Problem. If Universals are not found in
>> (or above) particulars, then they are in the mind. The issue becomes
>> one of relating this mental content back to particulars. The issue is
>> not one of how this content is formed.
>
>As much as I understand what you have just stated, I agree with that
>approach.
>
>> Wakfer mentioned the example of numbers. In this context, it might be
>> asked, Where is the 2-ness in two men?
>
>It certainly is not in reality. There is nothing that one can directly
>sense as "2-ness". However, as a very simple attribute of some
>collections of existents, 2-ness is clearly in level-1 meta-reality.
It is a mental act to generate contexts, reality does not generate
context for you. It is only in the context of the idea of 2-ness that
one can mentally isolate 2 entities on the basis of similarities
(even, on the most general level, two entities).
So it is not to say that there are some entities out there that one
can identify as having the simple attribute of 2-ness, but in fact
there are an infinite number of such collections based simply on our
ability to mentally isolate them at will.
Remember, it is only in accordance with percepts that concepts can
function at all, where percepts are mental objects generated by the
brain of a conscious organism. But it is only in the form of percepts
that we are able to isolate a certain mental content in perception
that could be granted the attribute of 2-ness.
>> Or for another example: Man is a rational animal. Are all men
>> therefore rational animals? Not necessarily.
>
>No this is a far, far more difficult problem because of the complexity
>(and enormous social/cultural ambiguity) of the attribute "rational".
>I wrestled with that attribute for decades before I came up with what
>I think is the only well-defined meaning of the word. You might be
>interested to read my work to see what I arrived at.
Reasoning is however easy to distinguish from non-reasoning, anybody
on Usenet can tell you that.
Malrassic Park
<pa...@morelife.org> wrote:
>On 22 Dec, 08:59, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 02:35:32 -0800, Charles Bell
>>
>> <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>> >Dunno. It seems to me you have merely re-washed Rand and added
>> >unnecessary complexity while creating nothing of greater value.
>>
>> ><< The meaning of "furniture" cannot be grasped unless one has first
>> >grasped the meaning of its constituent concepts; these are its link to
>> >reality. (On the lower levels of an unlimited conceptual chain, this
>> >is an illustration of the hierarchical structure of concepts.) >>
>>
>> Irrelevant to the problem. Since no two sets of furniture are
>> identical in every respect,
>
>I think that in a straw man, since few are trying to maintain that.
I am trying to bring them around to the main problem here which does
not involve concept-formation but whether or not Universals are found
in particulars. No two entities can be identical in every way, yet the
same Universal can apply to them equally, in this case, 2-ness. That
is the problem of Universals. But nobody wants to discuss the reality
of the problem of Universals, Rand's word is gospel and if she didn't
note it somewhere in writing then it doesn't exist.
>> there is nothing in reality that conforms to the concept "furniture"
>
>Correct, there *is* nothing in reality (level-0).
>
>> no matter which method you chose to form the concept.
>
>If one formulates a well-defined measurable attribute of some
>existents named "furniture", then that is a useful level-1 meta-
>reality human construct. Note that my system eschews the word
>"concept" because I think it is far to vague and ambiguous, and
>therefore not well-definable.
Rand might agree with you, and then proceed to set forth her own
well-defined definition of it. I'm not certain where you've really
diverged from her view but have only invented new terminology.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>
>In what manner does that chair over there not "conform
>to the concept 'furniture'"?
>
>Maybe start simple. Is it furniture, yes or no?
No, it is an article of furniture. As Wakfer pointed out, "furniture"
is on a higher level of abstraction than "chair."
ONLY when viewed in the light of a certain context; that is, the
judgment "the chair is an article of furniture" makes use of the idea
of sets of percepts that we deem to have certain well-defined
commonalities.
Jim Klein
> >In what manner does that chair over there not "conform
> >to the concept 'furniture'"?
>
> >Maybe start simple. Is it furniture, yes or no?
>
> No, it is an article of furniture.
You mean, "Yes, it's an article of furniture."
The referent of <furniture> is the set of all
instances of furniture. That chair is one of
those instances.
> As Wakfer pointed out, "furniture"
> is on a higher level of abstraction than "chair."
Even pretending this actually means something, so what?
> ONLY when viewed in the light of a certain context; that is, the
> judgment "the chair is an article of furniture" makes use of the idea
> of sets of percepts that we deem to have certain well-defined
> commonalities.
That's about making use of the idea...
The chair is still an instance of furniture.
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>> ONLY when viewed in the light of a certain context; that is, the
>> judgment "the chair is an article of furniture" makes use of the idea
>> of sets of percepts that we deem to have certain well-defined
>> commonalities.
>
>That's about making use of the idea...
>
>The chair is still an instance of furniture.
Nice try, but even Rand, who was wrong about most of these issues, is
right on this one. Because a chair is not an instance of furniture. It
Malrassic Park
<pa...@morelife.org> wrote:
>> - someone else can come along and
>> reasonably assert the opposite, that is, equally with no reason at
>> all.
..
>Quite true. So in the end the important test (beyond consistency) is
>*usefulness* in dealing with reality for the purpose of optimizing
>one's Lifetime Happiness. (See my work for more details on why
>Lifetime Happiness - appropriately defined - must necessarily be the
>end purpose of any human, whether or not s/he knows it.)
My theory, which is opposed to yours, also leads to happiness.
Jim Klein
> Nice try, but even Rand, who was wrong about most of these issues, is
> right on this one. Because a chair is not an instance of furniture. It
> is an article of furniture.
Sorry, I must've forgotten you're the Word guy.
You should be glad I'm not involved in the
educational system, because you'd be my
poster child for what's wrong with look-say.
I doubt soaking the brain in hydrochloric acid
could create any bigger harm. Sorry.
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>On Dec 24, 7:31 pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
I don't care about look-say. Children learn to read naturally, they
don't need to be trained like monkeys. Only those with disabilities
need to be taught and usually encouraged to read.
But for your benefit (and as you are a product and victim of the fonix
munke method), I looked up the word "article" in the context of
"article of furniture."
Article: "A member of a group or class." In this case the group or
class is "Furniture."
"Furniture" is a mass noun, a noun that never takes the indefinite
article (and no plural form but for one exception I can think of), so
there is no such construction as "a furniture." Therefore, there is no
referent for "a furniture," and no such thing as "a furniture."
"Furniture" refers to a plurality without actually being one. It can
refer to pluralities of chairs, as in your example, but never to a
single chair.
Jim Klein
> >Sorry, I must've forgotten you're the Word guy.
>
> >You should be glad I'm not involved in the
> >educational system, because you'd be my
> >poster child for what's wrong with look-say.
>
> >I doubt soaking the brain in hydrochloric acid
> >could create any bigger harm. Sorry.
>
> I don't care about look-say. Children learn to read naturally, they
> don't need to be trained like monkeys. Only those with disabilities
> need to be taught and usually encouraged to read.
>
> But for your benefit (and as you are a product and victim of the fonix
> munke method), I looked up the word "article" in the context of
> "article of furniture."
>
> Article: "A member of a group or class." In this case the group or
> class is "Furniture."
>
> "Furniture" is a mass noun, a noun that never takes the indefinite
> article (and no plural form but for one exception I can think of), so
> there is no such construction as "a furniture." Therefore, there is no
> referent for "a furniture," and no such thing as "a furniture."
> "Furniture" refers to a plurality without actually being one. It can
> refer to pluralities of chairs, as in your example, but never to a
> single chair.
Q.E.D.
--------------------------------
This was you: "Because a chair is not an instance of furniture."
I don't know what you want, since I've said to you
time and time again, that I'm sorry. Beyond that, I
don't know what to say to someone who believes
that that chair is not an instance of furniture.
The really funny part (to me, I mean) is that you go
to a DICTIONARY to try to find the answer. You don't
understand that a dictionary is a compliation of usages;
you think it literally makes the referent of a concept
what it says it is.
And if you really wanted to know about the usages,
then you could walk up to people, point to a chair
and ask them if that chair (as in my original usage)
is an instance of furniture.
Tell you what. Why don't you go do that and come
back to us when you hit the first person who says,
"No, it is not." We could use the break.
And no fair askin' any mirrors!
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>And if you really wanted to know about the usages,
>then you could walk up to people, point to a chair
>and ask them if that chair (as in my original usage)
>is an instance of furniture.
I don't care what random people think. An "instance" is not the same
concept as an "item," an "article," or a "member" of a set. The set
(in this case, furniture) is the instance taken as a collective of
items or articles.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 21:40:31 -0800, Paul Antonik Wakfer
>
>
>
> <p...@morelife.org> wrote:
> >On 22 Dec, 08:59, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> >> On Tue, 22 Dec 2009 02:35:32 -0800, Charles Bell
>
> >> <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> >> >Dunno. It seems to me you have merely re-washed Rand and added
> >> >unnecessary complexity while creating nothing of greater value.
>
> >> ><< The meaning of "furniture" cannot be grasped unless one has first
> >> >grasped the meaning of its constituent concepts; these are its link to
> >> >reality. (On the lower levels of an unlimited conceptual chain, this
> >> >is an illustration of the hierarchical structure of concepts.) >>
>
> >> Irrelevant to the problem. Since no two sets of furniture are
> >> identical in every respect,
>
> >I think that in a straw man, since few are trying to maintain that.
>
> I am trying to bring them around to the main problem here which does
> not involve concept-formation but whether or not Universals are found
> in particulars. No two entities can be identical in every way, yet the
> same Universal can apply to them equally, in this case, 2-ness. That
> is the problem of Universals.
Certainly no two existents can be identical in *all* attributes, but
they can be identical with respect to some particular attributed - for
example 2-ness. The universal is simply the attribute that they have
in common. However, it is not an existent of reality (level-0), but
rather a construction of the mind created in level-1 reality in order
to aid understanding and practical operations with actual reality. I
don't see what the problem is with this notion of common attributes
(if that is what you mean be "universals".
> But nobody wants to discuss the reality
> of the problem of Universals, Rand's word is gospel and if she didn't
> note it somewhere in writing then it doesn't exist.
I agree that there are far, far to many Rand fans that think that way.
> >> there is nothing in reality that conforms to the concept "furniture"
>
> >Correct, there *is* nothing in reality (level-0).
>
> >> no matter which method you chose to form the concept.
>
> >If one formulates a well-defined measurable attribute of some
> >existents named "furniture", then that is a useful level-1 meta-
> >reality human construct. Note that my system eschews the word
> >"concept" because I think it is far to vague and ambiguous, and
> >therefore not well-definable.
>
> Rand might agree with you, and then proceed to set forth her own
> well-defined definition of it.
That would be no problem since then is would no longer be ambiguous,
but rather would be a well-defined technical term of her system,
which I could then relate to mine.
> I'm not certain where you've really
> diverged from her view but have only invented new terminology.
I should make it clear that my work's purpose was not solidly founding
metaphysics and epistemology, but rather founding what Aristotle
classified as ethics and politics. The societies of the world are in
an enormous mess and finding a self-ordered social system of total
liberty and maximum possible freedom based on the fundamental nature
of humans is by far the more important quest at this time. It is in my
ethics and politics that I have diverged from and, I think, extended
Rand's ideas.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
If you provide a link to an elucidation of "[your] theory", I will
take a look at it and perhaps comment.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
I don't understand your point. Of course, all thinking about reality,
including noticing attributes and characteristics, requires mental
acts, whether of humans or some other animals who can clearly
distinguish such simple attributes as 2-ness. There is not need to
even imagine reality somehow implanting such an idea into one's mind.
> So it is not to say that there are some entities out there that one
> can identify as having the simple attribute of 2-ness,
It certainly is. Every collection of two existents has that attrubute.
> but in fact
> there are an infinite number of such collections based simply on our
> ability to mentally isolate them at will.
Technically your use of the word "infinite" is incorrect. Nothing that
one deals with can be truly infinite, but rather be merely of
unbounded number or size. "Infinite" cannot be an attribute of
anything, since all attributes must necessarily be measurable or they
would not be able be sensed (detected by the body and that detection
recorded in the mind).
> Remember, it is only in accordance with percepts that concepts can
> function at all, where percepts are mental objects generated by the
> brain of a conscious organism. But it is only in the form of percepts
> that we are able to isolate a certain mental content in perception
> that could be granted the attribute of 2-ness.
So what is your point? I don't use these terms "percepts" and
"concepts" because I see no place for them in describing and thinking
about mental process from the background of modern mathematics,
physics and animal neuroscience (which I have and Rand did not, BTW).
> >> Or for another example: Man is a rational animal. Are all men
> >> therefore rational animals? Not necessarily.
>
> >No this is a far, far more difficult problem because of the complexity
> >(and enormous social/cultural ambiguity) of the attribute "rational".
> >I wrestled with that attribute for decades before I came up with what
> >I think is the only well-defined meaning of the word. You might be
> >interested to read my work to see what I arrived at.
>
> Reasoning is however easy to distinguish from non-reasoning, anybody
> on Usenet can tell you that.
Then such people are both naive and wrong. Perhaps the use of logic or
illogic is easily distinguishable, but "reason" is far more than that.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
Good
> Philosophy has been asking questions about space and time long before
> Einstein, long before even Kant. The main question in this context
> involves distinguishability as a criterion for reality.
Actually I had never before thought about whether or not is was a
criterion (in the sense of being true for all existents, but had only
considered it for material objects - which was the context in which I
originally responded to you.
> If your
> limitation involves distinguishing everything, including space and
> time, then it need only be pointed out that points in space/time are
> completely indistinguishable in the absence of objects, that is,
> outside of all possibility of relationships. And it is only objects in
> space/time that make distinguishability possible. It is not, as would
> be the case in a universe where space/time is real, space/time that
> makes distinguishability possible, but only objects in space/time that
> make it possible to distinguish points in space/time.
I don't agree with this. Even ignoring that space-time does not exist
without the presence of energy/matter (since it isnot amenable to
human detection). (The only things which exist are what humans can, in
principle, detect - I even go further the only things which exist for
me are what I can detect - that which can in some manner affect me).
The only need for objects is to enable the measurement of space-time
by which two points can be distinguished by their different coordinate
measurements.
> This is where Leibniz's Identity of Indistinguishables may actually
> bear fruit, in that ideally, in the absence of objects, points in
> space/time cannot be related and thus are not only considered
> indistinguishable, but indeed identical, such that every point in
> space/time is precisely the same point so it is no longer necessary to
> refer to points, thus there is nothing left, outside of all
> relationships, to distinguish.
Since space-time without objects is not a part of human reality, why
do care what properties it has? For that matter any non-existent is
effectively like a contradiction - it can have any properties you
wish.
> It is only objective reality that makes space/time possible,
> space/time is therefore not objective reality.
Space-time is an inseparable part of objective reality, just as energy/
matter are inseparable.
And the amount of space between me and the monitor is pretty objective
to me right now.
Malrassic Park
I don't know that level-0 reality refers to material objects in that I
don't know what all you consider distinguishable.
>> If your
>> limitation involves distinguishing everything, including space and
>> time, then it need only be pointed out that points in space/time are
>> completely indistinguishable in the absence of objects, that is,
>> outside of all possibility of relationships. And it is only objects in
>> space/time that make distinguishability possible. It is not, as would
>> be the case in a universe where space/time is real, space/time that
>> makes distinguishability possible, but only objects in space/time that
>> make it possible to distinguish points in space/time.
>
>I don't agree with this. Even ignoring that space-time does not exist
>without the presence of energy/matter (since it isnot amenable to
>human detection). (The only things which exist are what humans can, in
>principle, detect - I even go further the only things which exist for
>me are what I can detect - that which can in some manner affect me).
>The only need for objects is to enable the measurement of space-time
>by which two points can be distinguished by their different coordinate
>measurements.
You have no absolute frame of reference for developing a coordinate
system, so you can only appeal to utility and happiness again. But
happiness has only natural appeal, and is only vaguely definable, so
it falls under the heading of the Naturalist Fallacy or Appeal to
Nature.
>> This is where Leibniz's Identity of Indistinguishables may actually
>> bear fruit, in that ideally, in the absence of objects, points in
>> space/time cannot be related and thus are not only considered
>> indistinguishable, but indeed identical, such that every point in
>> space/time is precisely the same point so it is no longer necessary to
>> refer to points, thus there is nothing left, outside of all
>> relationships, to distinguish.
>
>Since space-time without objects is not a part of human reality, why
>do care what properties it has? For that matter any non-existent is
>effectively like a contradiction - it can have any properties you
>wish.
I never mentioned properties of space/time. My "caring" about it is
strictly logical. I'm not saying that space/time doesn't exist, I am
only pointing out that space/time doesn't exist in the absence of
objects. I would like to know the level of reality of something
considered to be real, not abstract, and yet not material, and only
comes into being in the presence of objects.
>> It is only objective reality that makes space/time possible,
>> space/time is therefore not objective reality.
>
>Space-time is an inseparable part of objective reality, just as energy/
>matter are inseparable.
>And the amount of space between me and the monitor is pretty objective
>to me right now.
Yet above you pointed out to material reality, and in another post you
mentioned space/time in the same context. All I am asking you is what
it is in your system that only comes into being in the presence of
matter (or energy), but is not abstract thus its presence is not a
level-1 reality (as with "furniture"). I asked you if space/time was
at level negative-1 in your system for a good reason. But as far as I
can tell you haven't given this strange issue any great thought,
meaning space/time hasn't yet been categorized in your system.
Jim Klein
> > So it is not to say that there are some entities out there that one
> > can identify as having the simple attribute of 2-ness,
>
> It certainly is. Every collection of two existents has that attrubute.
That's treading on thin water IMO. I agree overwhelmingly
with your post and even this as you mean it, in the sense
of "something we are able to conceptualize," which is a
very wide, and yes I'd say accurate, usage.
The reason I say thin water is because attribute (or
property or characteristic) has a narrower meaning
as well, referencing something particularly about an
object...with an implicit meaning that it's something
about that particular object and its (what we call)
physical nature. The concept "2" is rather different
than that, I'd say, referencing a particular number of
objects that are presumed to have a full set of
properties on their own.
I'd also say that has no bearing on anything you wrote,
at least in this post...just thought I'd mention.
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
> The concept "2" is rather different
>than that, I'd say, referencing a particular number of
>objects t
So circular. You can go on and on about their having characteristics,
but it won't get you anywhere nearer to answering the question of what
the characteristic of "2-ness" refers to.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
> On Dec 26, 2:41 am, Paul Antonik Wakfer <p...@morelife.org> wrote:
>
> > > So it is not to say that there are some entities out there that one
> > > can identify as having the simple attribute of 2-ness,
>
> > It certainly is. Every collection of two existents has that attrubute.
>
> That's treading on thin water IMO. �I agree overwhelmingly
> with your post and even this as you mean it, in the sense
> of "something we are able to conceptualize," which is a
> very wide, and yes I'd say accurate, usage.
>
> The reason I say thin water is because attribute (or
> property or characteristic) has a narrower meaning
> as well, referencing something particularly about an
> object...with an implicit meaning that it's something
> about that particular object and its (what we call)
> physical nature.
Agreed, and that sort of ambiguity of meaning is precisely why I use
capitalized words within my text (at selfsip.org) to signify words
that I use with uniquely specified meanings, usually one of that
word's vernacular meanings or very close to it.
> The concept "2" is rather different
> than that, I'd say, referencing a particular number of
> objects that are presumed to have a full set of
> properties on their own.
Agreed.
> I'd also say that has no bearing on anything you wrote,
> at least in this post...just thought I'd mention.
Thanks, but it does bear on my careful use of technical rather than
vernacular terms.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
I don't see your point at all, unless you are just being contrary.
The Attribute "2-ness" can be invented and defined by the mind (as
necessarily are all Attributes, since they are not Existents of
Reality - Level-0) in the following manner.
1) Imagine the hands of one human body (a normal one) as being in a
collection.
2) Consider the process of making an isomorphism (one-to-one
correspondence) of all other such collections to the collection of
your hands (the hands of one normal human body).
"2-ness" is then the one and only common Attribute of of all
collections which are isomorphic with the collection of your hands.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
> On Dec 23, 1:04�am, Paul Antonik Wakfer <p...@morelife.org> wrote:
>
> > On 22 Dec, 14:25, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> > > Wakfer said:
>
> > > "By using the terms "abstracted' and "concepts", she merely displaced
> > > the problem of just exactly where in relationship to reality do those
> > > "things" lie.
>
> > > . . . �but he can only falsely claim that Rand "merely displaced
> > > relationships."
>
> > You will have to explain this more before I can understand your point
> > enough to respond.
>
> You are a liar if you claim to have studied Objectivism enough to have
> rejected it on the basis of some allegation of �inadequacy to explain
> placing things in relationship to other things.
First, I claimed no such thing, and, moreover, to what you refer is
insignificant relative to my more substantive criticisms of
Objectivism.
Second, I have not so much rejected Objectivism as corrected,
clarified and extended it.
> > However, I wish to point out that my hierarchy of meta-realities is
> > not at all the same as Rand's notion of hierarchy of concepts as
> > described in your two quotes.
>
> No, it isn't. �
I'm glad you agree.
> Now, go away.
I have not taken orders from anyone, since I was a child.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
Read, but not worthy of any reply.
Paul Antonik Wakfer
> On Sat, 26 Dec 2009 00:04:45 -0800, Paul Antonik Wakfer
>
Understood, and that is a result of the necessary incompleteness of my
text here in comparison to what is at my selfsip.org website. All I
can hope to do here is give some very rough idea of my approach and
hope that it will entice people to read my full text and then to
comment or query me on that - either here or on my Yahoo group
MoreLife.
> >> If your
> >> limitation involves distinguishing everything, including space and
> >> time, then it need only be pointed out that points in space/time are
> >> completely indistinguishable in the absence of objects, that is,
> >> outside of all possibility of relationships. And it is only objects in
> >> space/time that make distinguishability possible. It is not, as would
> >> be the case in a universe where space/time is real, space/time that
> >> makes distinguishability possible, but only objects in space/time that
> >> make it possible to distinguish points in space/time.
>
> >I don't agree with this. Even ignoring that space-time does not exist
> >without the presence of energy/matter (since it isnot amenable to
> >human detection). (The only things which exist are what humans can, in
> >principle, detect - I even go further the only things which exist for
> >me are what I can detect - that which can in some manner affect me).
> >The only need for objects is to enable the measurement of space-time
> >by which two points can be distinguished by their different coordinate
> >measurements.
>
> You have no absolute frame of reference for developing a coordinate
> system,
Yes, but that is irrelevant to any actual analysis the one performs
about reality.
Since one simply cannot deal with all of reality at the same time, one
simply uses local frame of reference that is convenient for the
portion of reality that one wants to deal with at the moment. As and
when the portion needs to be enlarged, then another frame of reference
can be chosen which fits better the larger analysis.
> so you can only appeal to utility and happiness again.
Exactly! Just as I did above.
> But
> happiness has only natural appeal,
Not merely "only", but rather universal appeal as based on the most
fundamental nature of man, being the only reasonable purpose for any
human life. (Although more correctly - and an extension of Objectivism
- that is only true for the accumulated total of happiness over a
lifetime, which I call "Lifetime Happiness".)
> and is only vaguely definable,
I maintain that is not so vague at all. For details I refer you to my
website: selfsip.org
> so
> it falls under the heading of the Naturalist Fallacy or Appeal to
> Nature.
There is no necessary fallacy in the investigation of the nature of
any collection of existents if it is done logically and
scientifically.
> >> This is where Leibniz's Identity of Indistinguishables may actually
> >> bear fruit, in that ideally, in the absence of objects, points in
> >> space/time cannot be related and thus are not only considered
> >> indistinguishable, but indeed identical, such that every point in
> >> space/time is precisely the same point so it is no longer necessary to
> >> refer to points, thus there is nothing left, outside of all
> >> relationships, to distinguish.
>
> >Since space-time without objects is not a part of human reality, why
> >do care what properties it has? For that matter any non-existent is
> >effectively like a contradiction - it can have any properties you
> >wish.
>
> I never mentioned properties of space/time. My "caring" about it is
> strictly logical. I'm not saying that space/time doesn't exist, I am
> only pointing out that space/time doesn't exist in the absence of
> objects. I would like to know the level of reality of something
> considered to be real, not abstract, and yet not material, and only
> comes into being in the presence of objects.
I still think that level-0 is the proper place for space. After all.
one could just as well say that objects cannot exist without space for
them to occupy (time is a little more complex and there is good reason
to think it is actually an Attribute). So as I said before (below)
matter/energy and space are inseparable. It just occurred to me that
perhaps space should also be an Attribute in Level-1 - that would make
sense wrt General Relativity also.
> >> It is only objective reality that makes space/time possible,
> >> space/time is therefore not objective reality.
>
> >Space-time is an inseparable part of objective reality, just as energy/
> >matter are inseparable.
> >And the amount of space between me and the monitor is pretty objective
> >to me right now.
>
> Yet above you pointed out to material reality, and in another post you
> mentioned space/time in the same context. All I am asking you is what
> it is in your system that only comes into being in the presence of
> matter (or energy), but is not abstract thus its presence is not a
> level-1 reality (as with "furniture"). I asked you if space/time was
> at level negative-1 in your system for a good reason. But as far as I
> can tell you haven't given this strange issue any great thought,
> meaning space/time hasn't yet been categorized in your system.
The last is correct. First, I did not need to fully work out my
metaphysics because the heart of my system involves "ethics" and
"politics" (placed in quotes because I never actually use such
vernacularly ambiguous words). And second, because no one has given me
any critique of any part of my metaphysics since it was written down
on my website about 5 years ago. At some future point, I had planned
to get back the metaphysics and epistemology, particularly with
respect to how it relates to modern physics. However, that was not
what I saw (or still see) as the most currently urgent requirement of
human society.
I will now do some more thinking about it (as a result of these
discussions - thank you), particularly with respect to the level
placement of space and time (at the moment I am leaning toward them
both being Level-1 Attributes - properties of matter/energy).
Charles Bell
news:3a3677a4-5924-49f6...@k32g2000prb.googlegroups.com...
> On 23 Dec, 04:00, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>> On Dec 23, 1:04 am, Paul Antonik Wakfer <p...@morelife.org> wrote:
>>
>> > On 22 Dec, 14:25, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>> > > Wakfer said:
>>
>> > > "By using the terms "abstracted' and "concepts", she merely displaced
>> > > the problem of just exactly where in relationship to reality do those
>> > > "things" lie.
>>
>> > > . . . but he can only falsely claim that Rand "merely displaced
>> > > relationships."
>>
>> > You will have to explain this more before I can understand your point
>> > enough to respond.
>>
>> You are a liar if you claim to have studied Objectivism enough to have
>> rejected it on the basis of some allegation of inadequacy to explain
>> placing things in relationship to other things.
>
> First, I claimed no such thing,
You said . . .
>> > > "By using the terms "abstracted' and "concepts", she merely displaced
>> > > the problem of just exactly where in relationship to reality do those
>> > > "things" lie.
You are a liar if you claim to both have studied Objectivism and to "know"
that Rand inadequately explained relationships of things. The fact of the
matter is you are wishing to inject mystical metaphysics into the discussion
where none belongs.
> and, moreover, to what you refer is
> insignificant relative to my more substantive criticisms of
> Objectivism.
> Second, I have not so much rejected Objectivism as corrected,
> clarified and extended it.
Prima facie, your crap smells like shit.
Charles Bell
> On 23 Dec, 03:53, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>> Just another sophist spook peddling his mysticism.
>
> Read, but not worthy of any reply.
>
Good. Go back to your tent, Witch Doctor.
Scam.
Malrassic Park
<pa...@morelife.org> wrote:
>On 26 Dec, 12:41, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On Sat, 26 Dec 2009 09:58:52 -0800, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> > The concept "2" is rather different
>> >than that, I'd say, referencing a particular number of
>> >objects t
>>
>> So circular. You can go on and on about their having characteristics,
>> but it won't get you anywhere nearer to answering the question of what
>> the characteristic of "2-ness" refers to.
>
>I don't see your point at all, unless you are just being contrary.
>The Attribute "2-ness" can be invented and defined by the mind (as
>necessarily are all Attributes, since they are not Existents of
>Reality - Level-0) in the following manner.
>
>1) Imagine the hands of one human body (a normal one) as being in a
>collection.
>2) Consider the process of making an isomorphism (one-to-one
>correspondence) of all other such collections to the collection of
>your hands (the hands of one normal human body).
>
>"2-ness" is then the one and only common Attribute of of all
>collections which are isomorphic with the collection of your hands.
Jim Klein is absorbed in trying to keep me in touch with external
reality. He thinks that any concern with consciousness (apart from
Rand's self-referential, narcissistic analysis of her own mental life
in ITOE) needs his reality guidance.
I am pointing out to Jim Klein that the answer to the problem of
Universals is not in external reality. This was made clear enough in a
webpage I cited here some time back.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/universals-medieval/
At this page is the common example of a triangle inscribed in a
circle. That is certainly real enough to the Klein's senses. However,
the article's authur points out that, upon closer examination, it is
not actually a triangle at all in that it is actually a figure
composed of numerous jagged lines. Whereas the definition of a
Euclidean triangle requires that it be composed of straight lines.
This is an introduction to a much larger problem, and all it really
says at this point is that if that is not a triangle, and if straight
lines do not exist in reality, then what the hell is a triangle, and
where do they reside? In imagination.
A deeper problem arises: how did this imaginary triangle come to be in
imagination in the first place?
If you observe this forum's posts a little more closely, you will find
that any reference to the imagination is greeted with the accusation
of being arbitrary. However, if a triangle, along with its definition,
is partially a product of imagination, then one can hardly conclude
that it is arbitrary. And that if these Randroids insist on labeling
every product of the imagination as arbitrary, then they may as well
toss out all of Ayn Rand's works of fiction as arbitrary.
Malrassic Park
<pa...@morelife.org> wrote:
>I still think that level-0 is the proper place for space. After all.
>one could just as well say that objects cannot exist without space for
>them to occupy (time is a little more complex and there is good reason
>to think it is actually an Attribute). So as I said before (below)
>matter/energy and space are inseparable. It just occurred to me that
>perhaps space should also be an Attribute in Level-1 - that would make
>sense wrt General Relativity also.
As it is getting late here, I'll just deal with this for now. You have
not properly defined what it means for an object to be IN space, or
what it means for there to exist some kind of metaphysical container
called space for things to be in.
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
>>Rand believed that Aristotle regarding essences as the same in every
>>entity
>>possessing them. And I understand that in some translations (including
>>the
>>one I suspect she had), this is indeed the case. But not in my
>>translation.
>>In mine, his theory is very close to her theory, except that he used
>>different terminology.
> The problem there is one of interpretation as well as translation. It
> could be that Aristotle was a Conceptualist under the right
> interpretation. Interpreting Kant in a ceratin light can also make his
> theory appear very close to Rand's.
I am very confident that there is a translation problem, and of course this
leads directly to the interpretation problems that I think exist when Rand
or Peikoff discuss Aristotle's theory of concepts in places like ITOE or
OPAR. I should note that the Aristotelian scholar in the group (Allan
Gotthelf) seems to disagree with their reading of Aristotle, as I do. At
least that's my distinct recollection, although unfortunately I don't
remember from where I got that recollection.
In any event, my understanding is that Aristotle's theory is essentially
Rand's theory with different terminology. Indeed, Rand's rules for
definitions essentially come straight from Aristotle. For that matter, so
does their respective views on the nature of proof and the hierarchical
structure of human knowledge. Again with different terminology of course
(e.g. "first principles" for Aristotle, "irreducible primaries" for Rand).
Malrassic Park
wrote:
As I stated to Charles, there was no difference for Aristotle between
the formal cause of the bust of Socrates found inside a granite block,
and the formal cause of the oak tree found inside the acorn.
This is not a terminological distinction between Aristotle and Rand,
it is a philosophical distinction.
However, Rand DID grant causes beyond what Aristotle called efficient
cause, she also accepted the Aristotelian idea of formal cause:
"Epistemologically, the process of determining a defining
characteristic will proceed by means of the question: which
characteristic explains the others? Metaphysically, this means: which
characteristic makes the others possible? Which is the cause?" [ITOE2,
231]
Rand asked, which is the metaphysical CAUSE?
Jim Klein
> Jim Klein is absorbed in trying to keep me in touch with external
> reality.
That's right. Begin at the beginning, I say.
Alas, you might as well add, "to no avail."
> He thinks that any concern with consciousness (apart from
> Rand's self-referential, narcissistic analysis of her own mental life
> in ITOE) needs his reality guidance.
See, now THAT'S an ad hominem...not against me,
but against Rand. The clear implication is that
because she is "self-referential," whatever the hell
that's supposed to mean, and "narcissistic," then
therefore her analysis is mistaken.
Luckily, none of that matters to me since I hardly
need Rand or ITOE to show that you've gone well
off the deep end in overthinking this stuff, and have
sacrificed any recognition of reality at all.
> I am pointing out to Jim Klein that the answer to the problem of
> Universals is not in external reality.
That'd be alright if you were just saying, "It's in
internal reality" instead, in view of the fact that
it concerns epistemological existents.
But that's not good enough for you. You've got
to challenge the very existence and nature of
reality because of some huge fanciful dichotomy
you've created between reality and consciousness.
Consciousness is a part of reality, that does as much
as it can--or in your case, as much as you wish,
which ain't much at all--at identifying reality.
Yes, that would mean including itself, if one so
desires. Like I said, philosophy can be a wonderful
thing, but not at the sacrifice of what the whole
underlying point is...identifying reality.
You and most of those other great minds you admire
so much, actually think you can identify the fact
that you can't identify. The only thing I can't figure
out, is why you all don't suffer more from vertigo.
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>On Dec 28, 1:35 am, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Jim Klein is absorbed in trying to keep me in touch with external
>> reality.
>
>That's right. Begin at the beginning, I say.
>
>Alas, you might as well add, "to no avail."
>
>
>> He thinks that any concern with consciousness (apart from
>> Rand's self-referential, narcissistic analysis of her own mental life
>> in ITOE) needs his reality guidance.
>
>See, now THAT'S an ad hominem...not against me,
>but against Rand. The clear implication is that
>because she is "self-referential," whatever the hell
>that's supposed to mean, and "narcissistic," then
>therefore her analysis is mistaken.
I did not conclude that she was mistaken from that. But you're
evidently drawing from Rand's article on psychologizing.
>Luckily, none of that matters to me since I hardly
>need Rand or ITOE to show that you've gone well
>off the deep end in overthinking this stuff, and have
>sacrificed any recognition of reality at all.
Ad hom? Psychologizing? Not when it comes from a Randroid, only when
it comes from non-Randroids.
>> I am pointing out to Jim Klein that the answer to the problem of
>> Universals is not in external reality.
>
>That'd be alright if you were just saying, "It's in
>internal reality" instead, in view of the fact that
>it concerns epistemological existents.
Maybe, although the phrasing "epistemological existents" is too vague
to be useful.
>But that's not good enough for you. You've got
>to challenge the very existence and nature of
>reality because of some huge fanciful dichotomy
>you've created between reality and consciousness.
I haven't challenged the nature of existence or reality.
>Consciousness is a part of reality, that does as much
>as it can--or in your case, as much as you wish,
>which ain't much at all--at identifying reality.
>
>Yes, that would mean including itself, if one so
>desires. Like I said, philosophy can be a wonderful
>thing, but not at the sacrifice of what the whole
>underlying point is...identifying reality.
>
>You and most of those other great minds you admire
>so much, actually think you can identify the fact
>that you can't identify. The only thing I can't figure
>out, is why you all don't suffer more from vertigo.
I haven't "identified" any such thing. Where do you get these ideas?
Not from reality, obviously.
I have however, in the past here, questioned Rand's apparent view that
perception is like a movie screen in the mind.
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
> As I stated to Charles, there was no difference for Aristotle between
> the formal cause of the bust of Socrates found inside a granite block,
> and the formal cause of the oak tree found inside the acorn.
> This is not a terminological distinction between Aristotle and Rand,
> it is a philosophical distinction.
What Aristotle is really saying here, and with which no reasonable person
can disagree even today, is that we can use a block of granite to create a
bust of Socrates, or that a planted acorn can grow into an oak tree.
Aristotelian formal causation, as I understand, is simply that into which
something is made or becomes.
> However, Rand DID grant causes beyond what Aristotle called efficient
> cause, she also accepted the Aristotelian idea of formal cause:
> "Epistemologically, the process of determining a defining
> characteristic will proceed by means of the question: which
> characteristic explains the others? Metaphysically, this means: which
> characteristic makes the others possible? Which is the cause?" [ITOE2,
> 231]
> Rand asked, which is the metaphysical CAUSE?
But she isn't talking here about formal causation in the Aristotelian sense.
She is asking here what distinguishing characteristic makes more other
distinguishing characteristics possible. For example, both possession of a
rational faculty and the capacity to laugh at a joke are unique to human
beings, but the first characteristic makes far more other unique human
characteristics possible than the second. This is actually much closer to
Aristotelian efficient causation, in other words that by which something is
made or becomes. By possessing and using one's rational capacity, one
becomes capable of understanding and laughing at a joke.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>
>
>"Malrassic Park" wrote:
>
>> As I stated to Charles, there was no difference for Aristotle between
>> the formal cause of the bust of Socrates found inside a granite block,
>> and the formal cause of the oak tree found inside the acorn.
>
>> This is not a terminological distinction between Aristotle and Rand,
>> it is a philosophical distinction.
>
>What Aristotle is really saying here, and with which no reasonable person
>can disagree even today, is that we can use a block of granite to create a
>bust of Socrates, or that a planted acorn can grow into an oak tree.
>Aristotelian formal causation, as I understand, is simply that into which
>something is made or becomes.
That is only more revisionism, i.e., you have pulled Aristotle out of
historical and social context and made the mistake of confusing
Aristotle with a modern thinker:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_cause#Formal_cause
"Formal cause is a concept used by Aristotle, and originates from
Plato's theory of forms.
The formal cause according to which a statue is made is the idea
existing in the first place as exemplar in the mind of the sculptor,
and in the second place as intrinsic, determining cause, embodied in
the matter. Formal cause could only refer to the essential quality of
causation. A deeper contemplation reveals a formal cause as the
ever-existing truth of capacity. Thus, the capacity of the human
genome to accompany the existence of a human being presumes that the
capacity to be a human being pre-exists the human being. That
pre-existence consists of the essential capacity of the specific
genome to co-exist with the human in a very significant and specific
way. The dog genome does not cause a human though elements of dog
genome may coexist with the human genome."
The key to understanding this issue is to realize that Aristotle was
not a modern reasonable person, he was an ancient Greek student of
Plato who simply relocated his original theory of Forms on secular,
less supernatural, grounds. That is what Arisotle is really saying
here.
Aristotle brought the Platonic gods or forms down to earth and planted
them inside of things, but they are still 'gods'. Or at least, they
are part of the gods' intent to establish their Final Causes or ends
(Arete, virtue, excellence) here on earth, namely, through the
excellence inside of all men which comes out in the form of virtue.
The highest good is the mere contemplation of these philosophical
issues as an end-in-itself acquired through active reasoning which
seeks God as that final end toward which rational thought is
compelled.
>> However, Rand DID grant causes beyond what Aristotle called efficient
>> cause, she also accepted the Aristotelian idea of formal cause:
>> "Epistemologically, the process of determining a defining
>> characteristic will proceed by means of the question: which
>> characteristic explains the others? Metaphysically, this means: which
>> characteristic makes the others possible? Which is the cause?" [ITOE2,
>> 231]
>
>> Rand asked, which is the metaphysical CAUSE?
>
>But she isn't talking here about formal causation in the Aristotelian sense.
>She is asking here what distinguishing characteristic makes more other
>distinguishing characteristics possible. For example, both possession of a
>rational faculty and the capacity to laugh at a joke are unique to human
>beings, but the first characteristic makes far more other unique human
>characteristics possible than the second. This is actually much closer to
>Aristotelian efficient causation, in other words that by which something is
>made or becomes. By possessing and using one's rational capacity, one
>becomes capable of understanding and laughing at a joke.
What you are seeing in that Rand quote is Aristotle's powerful
influence on her thinking. Efficient causation is an external cause,
as in the common example of the Greek sculptor chiseling away at the
granite future bust of Socrates. Formal causation, on the other hand,
is an "internal cause," that "inside" the object which causes it to
be, as in the example of the future bust of Socrates. The rational
faculty inside of man is that which causes him to be a man in the
formal, not efficient, sense. Reason is not an efficient cause outside
of man that causes him to be a man.
Jim Klein
> A deeper contemplation reveals a formal cause as the
> ever-existing truth of capacity. Thus, the capacity of the human
> genome to accompany the existence of a human being presumes that the
> capacity to be a human being pre-exists the human being.
See, this is what I mean. You write crazy shit like this, as
if "capacity to be a human being" is an existent in the
same fashion that a human being is.
No wonder I don't read most of your wild meanderings;
you've got nothing to say. And instead of graciously
accepting my attempts to help you think straight, you
come out with wild "Randroid" charges.
You'll never own a business with that sort of attitude;
I can tell you that.
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>On Dec 29, 5:27 pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>> A deeper contemplation reveals a formal cause as the
>> ever-existing truth of capacity. Thus, the capacity of the human
>> genome to accompany the existence of a human being presumes that the
>> capacity to be a human being pre-exists the human being.
..
>See, this is what I mean. You write crazy shit like this, as
>if "capacity to be a human being" is an existent in the
>same fashion that a human being is.
You're lost in a fantasy world of your own invention, Jim. That was as
quote from Wikipedia, the link was posted, the quotation marks are
there. And no, I didn't write the Wiki article.
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_cause#Formal_cause
> "Formal cause is a concept used by Aristotle, and originates from
> Plato's theory of forms.
The Wiki article is confused. Formal causation has nothing to do with
Plato's theory of forms. I don't even remember Aristotle covering the two
in the same book (causation is covered in his Physics), whereas Plato's
theory of forms is covered in the Metaphysics). Formal causation refers to
the potentiality of matter to take on a certain form, such as granite taking
on the form of a statute when combined with other causes (e.g. efficient
cause, final cause).
[...]
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>
>
You just don't know your philosophy.
Take a look at this reference, particularly the second paragraph.
Others like this one can be found all over the place, the knowledge is
out there for you, and if wikipedia is confused then so are a lot of
other sources. A LOT.
http://books.google.com/books?id=u8Wp0C7adGoC&pg=PA99&dq=Forms+as+Causes:+Pl
ato+and+Aristotle&ei=NBM9S9-EL4qQlQTKj9TOAQ&cd=2#v=onepage&q=Forms%20as%20Ca
uses%3A%20Plato%20and%20Aristotle&f=false
http://snurl.com/txlra
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
> Take a look at this reference, particularly the second paragraph.
> Others like this one can be found all over the place, the knowledge is
> out there for you, and if wikipedia is confused then so are a lot of
> other sources. A LOT.
I have read the original Aristotle works themselves. I always prefer to go
straight to the original source whenever I can.
Jim Klein
> >> A deeper contemplation reveals a formal cause as the
> >> ever-existing truth of capacity. Thus, the capacity of the human
> >> genome to accompany the existence of a human being presumes that the
> >> capacity to be a human being pre-exists the human being.
> ..
> >See, this is what I mean. You write crazy shit like this, as
> >if "capacity to be a human being" is an existent in the
> >same fashion that a human being is.
>
> You're lost in a fantasy world of your own invention, Jim. That was as
> quote from Wikipedia, the link was posted, the quotation marks are
> there. And no, I didn't write the Wiki article.
You keep doing this, and it doesn't matter a whit to me.
I don't care WHO wrote it; it's crazy shit. I use "you"
because I'm reading it in a post of yours expressing
a POV that I believe you are posting because you
agree with it.
If I'm wrong about that, then please make it clear that
you DON'T agree with the crazy shit you post up.
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>
Then you know that the metaphysics is only the groundwork for the
physics, and that a theory of formal causation cannot exist without a
theory of forms or essences.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
....
>> >> A deeper contemplation reveals a formal cause as the
>> >> ever-existing truth of capacity. Thus, the capacity of the human
>> >> genome to accompany the existence of a human being presumes that the
>> >> capacity to be a human being pre-exists the human being.
..
>> >See, this is what I mean. You write crazy shit like this, as
>> >if "capacity to be a human being" is an existent in the
>> >same fashion that a human being is.
>> You're lost in a fantasy world of your own invention, Jim. That was as
>> quote from Wikipedia, the link was posted, the quotation marks are
>> there. And no, I didn't write the Wiki article.
>You keep doing this, and it doesn't matter a whit to me.
That's because you're out of touch with reality, Jim.
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
>>I have read the original Aristotle works themselves. I always prefer to
>>go
>>straight to the original source whenever I can.
> Then you know that the metaphysics is only the groundwork for the
> physics, and that a theory of formal causation cannot exist without a
> theory of forms or essences.
Actually, Aristotle wrote the Physics before he wrote the Metaphysics
(which, as I understand it, is how the second book got its name -- it came
"after" physics. Boy, did those Greeks have a sense of humor, or what!)
I have read both books, and on that basis I can state that Aristotle's "four
causes" have nothing to do with Plato's theory of the forms (which Aristotle
thoroughly rejected in, I believe, Book I or II of the Metaphysics).
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>
>
I see the source of your concern. You thought someone was claiming
that Aristotle used Plato's theory of forms rather than rejecting it.
But without Plato's theory of forms there would have been no
Aristotelian theory of forms.
Imagine Ayn Rand writing The Fountainhead without first reading
Nietzsche. You will respond by saying that her book wasn't Nietzschean
in the slightest. But it is not necessary for her book to be
Nietzschean, only that Rand had to read Nietzsche before writing it.
The same is true of Aristotle. If Aristotle did not have Plato for a
teacher, there would have been no Aristotelian theory of forms despite
the fact that it is not Platonic.
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
> I see the source of your concern. You thought someone was claiming
> that Aristotle used Plato's theory of forms rather than rejecting it.
> But without Plato's theory of forms there would have been no
> Aristotelian theory of forms.
This is getting dangerously close to that conflicting translations issue
that we have been discussing. Whether there was an Aristotelian theory of
forms may depend on which translation of his works you subscribe to. He
certainly held that all matter takes a certain form and that this fact, in
turn, enables us to form concepts or ideas. The big question is whether he
regarded these forms as metaphysical (albeit in the objects rather than in a
separate dimension) or epistemological.
Either way, his "formal causation" stands separate and apart from any such
theory of "essences" or concepts. It is simply the notion that one type of
causation is that "into which" something is made or becomes (e.g. a block of
granite becoming a statue of Socrates, after a sculptor imagines, plans, and
executes transforming the granite into such a statue).
[....]
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>
>
>"Malrassic Park" wrote:
>
>> I see the source of your concern. You thought someone was claiming
>> that Aristotle used Plato's theory of forms rather than rejecting it.
>> But without Plato's theory of forms there would have been no
>> Aristotelian theory of forms.
>
>This is getting dangerously close to that conflicting translations issue
>that we have been discussing.
That's not EVEN what I'm talking about. My analogy with The
Fountainhead, which you snipped, should have made that clear enough.
> Whether there was an Aristotelian theory of
>forms may depend on which translation of his works you subscribe to. He
>certainly held that all matter takes a certain form and that this fact, in
>turn, enables us to form concepts or ideas. The big question is whether he
>regarded these forms as metaphysical (albeit in the objects rather than in a
>separate dimension) or epistemological.
"From what has been said, then, it is plain that nature in the primary
and strict sense is the essence of things which have in themselves, as
such, a source of movement; for the matter is called the nature
because it is qualified to receive this, and processes of becoming and
growing are called nature because they are movements proceeding from
this. And nature in this sense is the source of the movement of
natural objects, being present in them somehow, either potentially or
in complete reality." (Metaphysics, 5 [4])
In that quote you have Aristotle giving essence as an intrinsic cause.
The essence of a thing is that which moves it in a process of becoming
and growing.
>Either way, his "formal causation" stands separate and apart from any such
>theory of "essences" or concepts. It is simply the notion that one type of
>causation is that "into which" something is made or becomes (e.g. a block of
>granite becoming a statue of Socrates, after a sculptor imagines, plans, and
>executes transforming the granite into such a statue).
I hope my quote above proves otherwise to you, whatever translation it
happens to be from.
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
> "From what has been said, then, it is plain that nature in the primary
> and strict sense is the essence of things which have in themselves, as
> such, a source of movement; for the matter is called the nature
> because it is qualified to receive this, and processes of becoming and
> growing are called nature because they are movements proceeding from
> this. And nature in this sense is the source of the movement of
> natural objects, being present in them somehow, either potentially or
> in complete reality." (Metaphysics, 5 [4])
> In that quote you have Aristotle giving essence as an intrinsic cause.
> The essence of a thing is that which moves it in a process of becoming
> and growing.
Or, it could be simply another way of saying that what an entity is
determines what it may or will do under a certain set of circumstances. If
so, this is a purely metaphysical point that has nothing to do with
epistemology, much less any theory of concepts.
[....]
Malrassic Park
wrote:
..
>"Malrassic Park" wrote:
..
>> "From what has been said, then, it is plain that nature in the primary
>> and strict sense is the essence of things which have in themselves, as
>> such, a source of movement; for the matter is called the nature
>> because it is qualified to receive this, and processes of becoming and
>> growing are called nature because they are movements proceeding from
>> this. And nature in this sense is the source of the movement of
>> natural objects, being present in them somehow, either potentially or
>> in complete reality." (Metaphysics, 5 [4])
..
>> In that quote you have Aristotle giving essence as an intrinsic cause.
>> The essence of a thing is that which moves it in a process of becoming
>> and growing.
..
>Or, it could be simply another way of saying that what an entity is
>determines what it may or will do under a certain set of circumstances. If
>so, this is a purely metaphysical point that has nothing to do with
>epistemology, much less any theory of concepts.
Or it could be Aristotle saying: "it is plain that nature in the
primary and strict sense is the essence of things which have in
themselves, as such, a source of movement; for the matter is called
the nature because it is qualified to receive this, and processes of
becoming and growing are called nature because they are movements
proceeding from this."
Of course it's metaphysics, the title of the books is Metaphysics.
Metaphysics is an a priori investigation into the nature or essences
of things.