Definition of art
Acar
the artist's metaphysical value judgements". A proper definition stands of
its own. It is not proper for a definition to be contingent on further
clarifications and exceptions. If the definition says "metaphysical value
judgements", that's what it says. So let's forget The Romantic Manifesto and
the "sense of life" and all the other alleged qualifications and exceptions
which are not contained in the definition.
Whatever power Objectivism seeks to have on transforming people's lives is
based on _internalizing_ an Objectivist outlook toward metaphysical value
judgements. You must truly _accept_ new conclusions from an old set of
axioms in order to experience the benefits of "rational thinking". Thus your
metaphysical value judgements are a sensitive gauge of your rationality.
There are correct metaphysical value judgements and there are incorrect
metaphysical value judgements. From the definition it follows that there is
good art and bad art. Good art is a selective recreation of reality
according to correct value judgements, that is - value judgements based on
the Objectivist definition of rationality. Bad art is a selective recreation
of reality based on subjectivist and other irrational kinds of value
judgements. Beauty is not a criterion, much less *the* criterion.
I bet that the reader is expecting that the balance of the article will
attack the criteria for good art which emerge from the definition. That is
important but is already implicit in the above.
No, the point of the article is as follows.
The traditional view is that art is about subjectivity and beauty,
regardless of message or underlying mindset. The O definition proposes a
different foundation for art consistent with the Objectivist view of the
world. _I suggest that the Objectivist definition has been created to fit
Objectivist doctrine._ I further suggest that the traditional view is based
on experience and observation. All would be fine if the newly discovered
foundation of art affirmed and expanded the induction-based traditional
concepts, much like Relativity builds on the truths of Newtonian physics.
Sadly that is not the case. In an amazing fiat of incredible hubris, the
Objectivist definition sets out to purge and purify the products of
induction.
A definition which is tailored to a preconceived conclusion but contrary to
observation is what Objectivists call a classic example of a "rationalistic"
definition, and that is the point of this article.
Carmichael
Acar
Ken Gardner
> Rand's definition of art is "A selective recreation of reality according to
> the artist's metaphysical value judgements".
[...]
> A definition which is tailored to a preconceived conclusion but contrary to
> observation is what Objectivists call a classic example of a "rationalistic"
> definition, and that is the point of this article.
> Carmichael
I think it is an excellent definition, and not one unique to Objectivism
at all, and certainly not "rationalistic." It appears to encompass every
type of art that I know. Can you give me any example of "art" that does
not fit this definition?
Ken
Acar
I built an argument, layer by layer, to support the proposition that the
Objectivist definition of art is rationalistic. To make sure that the point
is not missed I state: "that is the point of this article". Then an argumert
comes back which says: "No, it is not" to which I hereby reply: "It is too."
Carmichael
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Bert Clanton
<kesga...@home.com> wrote:
I think that the definition, as stated above, excludes too many works
that seem to me to be works of art (e.g., Jackson Pollock's "spatters",
which I respond to favorably in a way that I'd label "esthetic"); and
includes too many works that do not seem to me to be works of art
(e.g., Soviet Socialist Realism).
I don't think that the term "abominable works of art" is an oxymoron.
Best wishes,
Bert
Rob Bass
>Rand's definition of art is "A selective recreation of reality according to
>its own. It is not proper for a definition to be contingent on further
>clarifications and exceptions. If the definition says "metaphysical value
>judgements", that's what it says. So let's forget The Romantic Manifesto and
>the "sense of life" and all the other alleged qualifications and exceptions
>which are not contained in the definition.
>
>There are correct metaphysical value judgements and there are incorrect
>metaphysical value judgements. From the definition it follows that there is
>good art and bad art. Good art is a selective recreation of reality
>according to correct value judgements, that is - value judgements based on
>the Objectivist definition of rationality. Bad art is a selective recreation
>of reality based on subjectivist and other irrational kinds of value
>judgements.
This does _not_ follow from the definition, and, so far as I know, Rand
never
suggested anything like this. If anything, her view is that there can be
good
art based on incorrect metaphysical value judgments (e.g., according to her,
Dostoevsky). Saying that there _are_ correct metaphysical value judgments
and
that art is based upon (correct or incorrect) metaphysical value judgments
does not imply that the correctness of the value judgments is the right
dimension for evaluating works of art. A work of art might be good or bad in
some other way.
Rob
P.S. I don't think much of Rand's aesthetics, but you're criticizing it, it
appears, for something she neither said nor implied about art.
____
Rob Bass
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Rob Bass" <log...@MailAndNews.com>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
> Rob Bass
Aha. If the correctness or incorrectness of the value judgements is not the
right dimension for evaluating works of art, this definition does not guide
us to what is. Then any such "recreation" is art. That would make the
definition so broad as to be useless IMO. If a work of art might be good or
bad in some other way, but those criteria do not follow from the definition,
then the definition does not address the soul of the matter.
An argument can be made and probably has been made that bad art is an
oxymoron. That bad art is not art but an attempt at art. By the traditional
definition this would be something lacking in emotion and beauty. Other than
metaphysical value judgements, there is nothing in this definition that can
be used to legitimize a good work of art.
By the way, what are those ways in which a work of art can be good or bad?
We need to know this in order to know what art is, don't you think?
Carmichael
Fred Weiss
good vs. bad art and your are now doing precisely what you were criticizing
someone else for, simply reasserting your position.
This definition does exclude things from the category of art, for example
commercial illustration or painting "by the numbers" or "hack" work or the
photographic or ultra-realist or stuff done merely for the purpose of
propaganda, or the merely decorative, etc.
What constitutes good or bad art is an entirely different - and
complicated - issue and is, by the way, distinct from what you may like or
not like.
Fred Weiss
"Acar" <acar...@mail.com> wrote in message
news:007b01c0d103$7c500560$d618...@cinci.rr.com...
Dean Sandin
> Rand's definition of art is "A selective recreation of reality according to
> the artist's metaphysical value judgements". A proper definition stands of
> its own. It is not proper for a definition to be contingent on further
> clarifications and exceptions. If the definition says "metaphysical value
> judgements", that's what it says. So let's forget The Romantic Manifesto and
> the "sense of life" and all the other alleged qualifications and exceptions
> which are not contained in the definition.
This is bull. A proper definition places its concept in
hierarchical relation to all other concepts. It names the wider
class of existents that its referents fall under and it
differentiates the concept from other concepts in that class.
This role is obviously played by Ayn Rand's definition of art.
Definitions are stand-alone for _dis_integrated thinking.
> There are correct metaphysical value judgements and there are incorrect
> metaphysical value judgements. From the definition it follows that there is
> good art and bad art.
There is of course good art and bad art. But you've uttered a
gross non-sequitur by conflating standards of evaluation in one
context with standards of evaluation in another. The evaluation
"good" or "bad" in the context of art reflects how well the artist
did his job of selectively recreating reality according to his
value judgments. It does _not_, nor does Ayn Rand say or imply
that is _does_, reflect the _content_ of the value judgments. She
abstracts that particular measurement out of consideration. This
is not tough to see if you have a decent notion of the principles
of concept-formation, such that you can actually recognize them
in action when shown an example such as "art".
And sure enough, Ayn Rand rejected the sense of life and
metaphysical value judgments of many an artist whom she admired as
a good artist. If you'd paid the material serious attention you'd
have noticed that.
--Dean
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Fred Weiss" <pape...@ix.netcom.com>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Sent: Sunday, April 29, 2001 7:57 PM
Subject: Re: Definition of art
> You were just told that this definition does not tell you how to evaluate
> good vs. bad art and your are now doing precisely what you were
criticizing
> someone else for, simply reasserting your position.
>
> This definition does exclude things from the category of art, for example
> commercial illustration or painting "by the numbers" or "hack" work or the
> photographic or ultra-realist or stuff done merely for the purpose of
> propaganda, or the merely decorative, etc.
>
> What constitutes good or bad art is an entirely different - and
> complicated - issue and is, by the way, distinct from what you may like or
> not like.
> Fred Weiss
Relativity is complicated and Einstein was able to expalin it to laymen in
cocktail parties. Maybe you can take a shot at telling us what makes a
selective recreation of reality good, and what makes a bad recreation.
Everybody is telling me that the judgement of what is good art or bad art
(or which human constructions are art art and which are not) does not need
to follow from the definition. Let us consider oranges. Do the criteria of a
good *orange* vs a bad *orange* follow from the definition? Yes they do
because we are talking about criteria that have to do with the "orangeness"
of the orange. It is a bad *orange* if it is a tangerine or a watermelon.
What makes a table a bad *table* is not that it is too tall or that it is of
an ugly color or that the legs are too skinny. Those attributes do not
follow from the definition and do not affect the tableness of the table. An
example of a bad *table* is a table in which one leg is slightly too short.
It is a bad table not because it is annoying and uncomfortable. Those
objections do not follow from the definition. It is a bad *table* because
intermittently the surface is not parallel to the floor. That objection
follows from the definition.
Now let us take the example of an accountant's financial audit of a
corporation. An audit by definition must be conducted according to
(whatever) standards. There are standards that are generally accepted and
there are standards that will lead to misleading results. So there are good
standards and bad standards. Since an audit is conducted to determine the
financial health of an institution (part of the definition) the criterion
for judging a bad audit follow from the definition - the "bad" audit is bad
because the standards (part of the definition) are bad; and the audit is
misleading about the financial health of the corporation.
Quality and legitimacy go hand in hand in the standard definition of art.
Are we to say then that the definition in question defines art without
implications of legitimacy? That it is a definition that does not separate
art from other human constructions? What kind of a definition is that? Any
and every human construction is a selective recreation of reality according
to the individual's metaphysical value judgements. Maybe we are all artists.
How nice.
I am writing on the fly and these examples are tricky. If there are logical
traps above we'll deal with them as they surface.
Carmichael
Fred Weiss
"Acar" <acar...@mail.com> wrote in message
news:004e01c0d115$4b868780$d618...@cinci.rr.com...
> Everybody is telling me that the judgement of what is good art or bad art
> (or which human constructions are art art and which are not) does not need
> to follow from the definition. Let us consider oranges. Do the criteria of
a
> good *orange* vs a bad *orange* follow from the definition? Yes they do
> because we are talking about criteria that have to do with the
"orangeness"
> of the orange. It is a bad *orange* if it is a tangerine or a watermelon.
Oh, but you are seriously mistaken. I gather you have never bought any bad
oranges. I did recently. They were bad, but they were still oranges.
You can't tell the difference between a good or a bad car, you'd pay the
same amount for any old car, it doesn't matter?
You've never had a bad steak or you see no difference between filet mignon
and chuck?
You're certainly cognisant of the difference between a good and a bad
argument, but that doesn't pertain to the definition of an argument.
Fred Weiss
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Dean Sandin" <dsa...@bellsouth.net>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Sent: Sunday, April 29, 2001 8:21 PM
Subject: Re: Definition of art
> Acar wrote:
>
> > Rand's definition of art is "A selective recreation of reality according
to
> > the artist's metaphysical value judgements". A proper definition stands
of
> > its own. It is not proper for a definition to be contingent on further
> > clarifications and exceptions. If the definition says "metaphysical
value
> > judgements", that's what it says. So let's forget The Romantic Manifesto
and
> > the "sense of life" and all the other alleged qualifications and
exceptions
> > which are not contained in the definition.
In the first place let me tell you what I understand about the allegations
that have been made in respect to the definition.
(1) That any selective representation of MVJ (metaphysical value judgements)
is art.
(2) That the quality of art is judged by the reponse of the of the observer
to certain criteria of skill (not further specified).
(3) That those criteria ("how well the artist does his job") are independent
of the MVJ of the artist and the MVJ of the observer.
In art it has traditionally been understood that quality is considered in
terms technical skills, emotional impact and considerations ultimately
reducible to beauty (a layman's representation) independent of the message
if any that is embodied by the work of art. It has been explained that this
is no different for Objectivists. What no one has told me is how the
Objectivist approach to Reality changes all this, if it changes it at all. I
hear a lot about O esthetics. How does Objective principle impact a
person's concept of esthetics. I need specific differences traced back to
principle, if such differences exist. Or a statement to the fact that the
Objectivist perspective on reality does not influence an artist's output or
an observer's response to art, and why not.
(4) Mrs. Speicher has explained that those criteria (how well the artist
does his job?) are not contingent on the beaurty of the art object. (This is
puzzling.)
Let me tell you why in my opinion this is bull.
There is an esthetic response on the part of the observer but it has nothing
to do with beauty or the elements of beauty? In what way has the artist done
his job so well that it moves you? My point is that if the reponse _is_ to
perceived beauty then the standard criteria are still in place and the
definition has done nothing but elevate every human construction to the
category of art. (Good art, bad art). Now that is a perfectly legitimate
position to adopt, but if otherwise the traditional esthetics is still in
place then someone should articulate it and then we would not be having
these arguments.
> This is bull. A proper definition places its concept in
> hierarchical relation to all other concepts. It names the wider
> class of existents that its referents fall under and it
> differentiates the concept from other concepts in that class.
Well that is one of my problems. After having placed art in the category of
representation of MVJ, how does it separate it from other representations of
MVP. Is it by excluding abstract art as non-metaphysical? Can I find an
instance of a human construction that is not a selective represenation of
his MVJ? (I take 'selective' to mean selection of a subject.)
> This role is obviously played by Ayn Rand's definition of art.
> Definitions are stand-alone for _dis_integrated thinking.
Stand alone in this context means that it is a complete definition, that it
does not need to be qualified or clarified with additional contingencies not
present in the definition.
> > There are correct metaphysical value judgements and there are incorrect
> > metaphysical value judgements. From the definition it follows that there
is
> > good art and bad art.
>
> There is of course good art and bad art. But you've uttered a
> gross non-sequitur by conflating standards of evaluation in one
> context with standards of evaluation in another. The evaluation
> "good" or "bad" in the context of art reflects how well the artist
> did his job of selectively recreating reality according to his
> value judgments.
The reason that we need to know those criteria (how well the artist has done
his job) is because we are talking about O esthetics and how it is a
revolutionary concept that follows from O doctrine. So we absolutely need to
know how Objectivist doctrine impacts (changes?) our concept of esthetics.
> It does _not_, nor does Ayn Rand say or imply
> that is _does_, reflect the _content_ of the value judgments. She
> abstracts that particular measurement out of consideration. This
> is not tough to see if you have a decent notion of the principles
> of concept-formation, such that you can actually recognize them
> in action when shown an example such as "art".
>
> And sure enough, Ayn Rand rejected the sense of life and
> metaphysical value judgments of many an artist whom she admired as
> a good artist. If you'd paid the material serious attention you'd
> have noticed that.
> --Dean
I was told that early in the game and kept in mind. I have been questioning
how it all ties together without contradiction and sensing unintended
implications.
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Fred Weiss" <pape...@ix.netcom.com>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Sent: Sunday, April 29, 2001 11:05 PM
Subject: Re: Definition of art
>
>
You have not considered the difference bewteen your oranges and my
*oranges*. In terms of the standard definition, bad art is not art. In terms
of the definition of an orange as an orange, a *bad* orange is not an
orange, a bad table is not a table when its surface is not parallel to the
floor, an audit that uses incorrect accounting standards is not an audit.
For someone committed to certain value judgements, the products of incorrect
value judgements should not be art, unless traditional values are still
operative.
Agent Cooper
<acar...@mail.com> wrote:
> Aha. If the correctness or incorrectness of the value judgements is not the
> right dimension for evaluating works of art, this definition does not guide
> us to what is. Then any such "recreation" is art. That would make the
> definition so broad as to be useless IMO.
It doesn't seem that way to me--wiggle room doesn't necessarily get a
hippo in the door. In addition to evaluating the implicit value judgments
the art work expresses which might involve "internal" aesthetic criteria
as well as "external" (I'm not sure if they should be regarded as
aesthetic or not) criteria, there would be the question of the
effectiveness with which the artistic media are deployed in expressing
that judgment and recreating in the spectator the experience of so
judging. Thus Rand insists that Dostoevski is very good at expressing
views which, when judged by non-aesthetic (in the end, moral) criteria,
would not stand up to scrutiny. But she is able to give him enormous
credit where due. I don't see anything in her critical practice which is
in tension with the theoretical stance here.
What is problematic with Rand as a critic is that, having introduced the
possibility of moral appraisal as a dimension of aesthetic appraisal, she
tends to overdo it (much as, for example, Tolstoy does, though in
Tolstoy's case, his theory and practice dovetail perfectly). We want more
about how *successful* Dostoevski is and less about what a wicked thing he
is successful at. Well, that's one thing. The other is that some of her
judgments of taste seem rather arbitrary, not well defended, etc. But I
don't think that's decisive. One must separate the research programme from
a poor execution of it. Rand's biggest shortcoming as a critic was a lack
of patience, lack of historical sense and (arguably) a streak of
prissiness. Still, we can't be or do everything. I think an interesting
blend of Rand, somethings in Hegel and Northrop Frye might very well give
you a very sophisticated "Objectivist" aesthetics. But who would do it?
Alas, all the interesting further developments of Objectivism that have
crossed my mind over the years seem to lie around like so many rusting
engines. I can't be or do everything either...
I think that one could do a better job of doing Objectivist art criticism
than Rand did, and still be doing Objectivist art criticism.
Agent Cooper
<acar...@mail.com> wrote:
> Relativity is complicated and Einstein was able to expalin it to laymen in
> cocktail parties. Maybe you can take a shot at telling us what makes a
> selective recreation of reality good, and what makes a bad recreation.
>
> Everybody is telling me that the judgement of what is good art or bad art
> (or which human constructions are art art and which are not) does not need
> to follow from the definition. Let us consider oranges. Do the criteria of a
> good *orange* vs a bad *orange* follow from the definition? Yes they do
> because we are talking about criteria that have to do with the "orangeness"
> of the orange. It is a bad *orange* if it is a tangerine or a watermelon.
I can't tell if this is sophistry or a misunderstanding--I think the
latter. Playing out the analogy, you are saying that something that
doesn't meet the criteria for being good art isn't art at all, or that
something which barely meets criteria for being art is thereby good art? I
get the sense that this is not your *view* but a view that you think
Objectivism is unfortunately committed to, but I completely miss where you
get that from.
First we have the value judgment, which could be expressed ineptly with
statements like "life sucks" or "life is grand" or "the world is the kind
of place where the following sort of situation is typical, or especially
etlling or somesuch [insert situation]." Obviously, getting really good at
making such staements would require one to be something of a poet, but
leave that aside.
Second, we represent some aspect of reality in such a way that the
representation, if adequate to the world, would in some sense conform or
support to the value judgment.
Third, there's the question of how successful the representation is qua
representation, and how successfully it conveys the judgment. For example,
a Shakespearean tragedy with a happy ending tacked on would be less
effective than one without it. Since the means that a work utilizes will
be *tremendously* complicated, the discussion of why a work was effective
or not would tend to be pretty complicated too. Most good criticism is
like that.
Where Rand is at her weakest is on the third thing, because the devil's in
the details.
Agent Cooper
<acar...@mail.com> wrote:
> You have not considered the difference bewteen your oranges and my
> *oranges*. In terms of the standard definition, bad art is not art. In terms
> of the definition of an orange as an orange, a *bad* orange is not an
> orange, a bad table is not a table when its surface is not parallel to the
> floor, an audit that uses incorrect accounting standards is not an audit.
> For someone committed to certain value judgements, the products of incorrect
> value judgements should not be art, unless traditional values are still
> operative.
> Carmichael
Car:
I think I get what you're getting at--the notion of a concept in terms of
class-inclusion/class-exclusion vs. the notion of concept as prototype,
where instancehood is something that admits of degree. But I'm not at all
clear how you are using this distinction or what you are driving at. Can
you try again? (Couldn't we have the class of artworks, the class of
artworks of degree of quality X, X=1, etc. etc.? So that the quality
issues pertained to subsets instead of to degrees of membership in one
set? I'm tempted to say that for all the interet of claims to the effect
that concepts psychologically don't work as classes with intensions and
extensions, that this doesn't really touch the claim that this is what
they are metaphysically, or logically, or somesuch). If this seems murky
and of questionable relevance, it's because I'm not sure I'm following
*you*. Is everyone else?
This interests me because I've always though Objectivist aesthetics was
what was most in need of further development.
K
Fred Weiss
manage.
On the subject of art criticism, there is in fact relatively little. Very
little on art, just about nothing on music (which she admitted stumped her),
but quite a bit more on literature (though nothing comprehensive).
You might want to get hold of the tapes of her seminars on fiction.
Fred Weiss
"Agent Cooper" <rkh...@lulu.acns.nwu.edu> wrote in message
news:rkh229-3004...@hill.phil.nwu.edu...
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Agent Cooper" <rkh...@lulu.acns.nwu.edu>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Sent: Monday, April 30, 2001 8:42 PM
Subject: Re: Definition of art
Aha again.
(At this point I feel that, given the stubborn reluctance of participants to
elaborate on this subject, it would be appropriate for me to read the
Romantic Manifesto, but since I am not going to send for it and it can not
be sent to me because I wont give out my address, I'll have do without it.)
I have not the foggiest notion of what you mean by Objectivist art
criticism. I have been asking but nobody answers. Is there a mystery here?
We have agreed that the definition is meant to be generic, that it is not
intended to be an appropriate basis for criticism. Help me. On what criteria
of _Objectivist esthetics_ is Dostoevski successful or Dali a good artist?
How can these criteria be traced back to Objectivist doctrine, so that it
can be considered _Objectivist_ esthetics?
Carmichael
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Agent Cooper" <rkh...@lulu.acns.nwu.edu>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Definition of art
> In article <004e01c0d115$4b868780$d618...@cinci.rr.com>, Acar
> <acar...@mail.com> wrote:
>
> > Relativity is complicated and Einstein was able to expalin it to laymen
in
> > cocktail parties. Maybe you can take a shot at telling us what makes a
> > selective recreation of reality good, and what makes a bad recreation.
> >
> > Everybody is telling me that the judgement of what is good art or bad
art
> > (or which human constructions are art art and which are not) does not
need
> > to follow from the definition. Let us consider oranges. Do the criteria
of a
> > good *orange* vs a bad *orange* follow from the definition? Yes they do
> > because we are talking about criteria that have to do with the
"orangeness"
> > of the orange. It is a bad *orange* if it is a tangerine or a
watermelon.
>
> I can't tell if this is sophistry or a misunderstanding--I think the
> latter.
One point of the analogies is that a proper definition excludes from a
larger class items that do not belong in the category. Is the larger class
here "a recreation of reality" and the qualifying clause "according to MVJ
(metaphysical value judgements)"? But there are no recreations of reality
that are not done according to MVJ.
>Playing out the analogy, you are saying that something that
> doesn't meet the criteria for being good art isn't art at all, or that
> something which barely meets criteria for being art is thereby good art? I
> get the sense that this is not your *view* but a view that you think
> Objectivism is unfortunately committed to, but I completely miss where you
> get that from.
At this point it is appropriate that I try to make clearer what it is that
am whining about.
In my view the definition has unintended consequences.
One is that every human construction including this message and ordinary
conversations are art. If your definition of "recreation of reality" is
narrower then it would help to know that. Regardless of how basic this
definition intends to be it seems to be broader than intended. Note that I
can accept this "definition" as an insightful non-exlusive comment about
the fundamental nature of all art, but in my opinion it is defective as a
definition. I would settle for "a characterization".
Second - (and this also applies to the statement as a definition): It has
the unitended consequence of defining art in terms of morality. Perhaps
some have noticed that I jump from swearing that I understand that the
definition intends to be generic at a fundamental level and then I start
excoriating
it because it carries implications of quality or legitimacy. This is because
I see the latter as an unintended consequence.
IMO Objectivits should not step out of their paradigm, out of the real
world so to speak, in order to judge art. I see this as a contradiction.
99.9+%
of humans live in a world of distortions and misconceptions about values.
Objectivists live in the real world. In the real world (if the statement
is a definition of art) a pear tree yields pears. Quality can not follow
from
fundamental errors. If it can, then Objectivists have, principle-wise, one
leg on each world. However, if skill, beauty and emotional impact are the
criteria - that is traditional esthetics. Even Objectivists are allowed to
embrace traditional esthetics :-) Do you see why I keep asking
what is Objectivist esthetics and how it is extracted from Objectivist
doctrine? If it is in the Romantic Manifesto, surely someone can get to the
gist of
it and articulate it.
Anyone?
The oranges analogy is the simplest. The table analogy gets closer. They
lead to the audit analogy in which the standards used for the audit are
analogous to the metaphysical value judgements. Good standards=good (real)
audit. Bad standards = bad (no) audit. It is such with any proper
definition because proper definitions have an exclusive clause.
To repeat I think that the proposition in question can stand as a
non-exclusive statement about the fundamental nature of art but I think
that it fails as a definition, even as a generic definition of any art.
I still want to know what is Objectivist esthetics.
Carmichael
Dean Sandin
> > > Rand's definition of art is "A selective recreation of reality according
> to
> > > the artist's metaphysical value judgements". A proper definition stands
> of
> > > its own. It is not proper for a definition to be contingent on further
> > > clarifications and exceptions. If the definition says "metaphysical
> value
> > > judgements", that's what it says. So let's forget The Romantic Manifesto
> and
> > > the "sense of life" and all the other alleged qualifications and
> exceptions
> > > which are not contained in the definition.
>
> In the first place let me tell you what I understand about the allegations
> that have been made in respect to the definition.
>
> (1) That any selective representation of MVJ (metaphysical value judgements)
> is art.
No. This is no place to introduce your own loose and incorrect
paraphrase. The actual definition is at hand, while you have
stated something entirely wrong and vague. Note that your
statement conflates the genus and the differentia, leaves out an
essential element (reality), alters an essential relation (from
"according to" to "of"), and alters "re-creation" to
"representation". Step by step you've manufactured something far
removed from the meaning of art, and impossible to concretize
cogently anyhow.
> (2) That the quality of art is judged by the reponse of the observer
> to certain criteria of skill (not further specified).
No. The quality of art, as art, isn't in the "response"
(emotional reaction) of the observer. This is another form of
confusing sense of life with artistic standards.
[ snip (3) and (4), which evanesce without (1) and (2) ]
> > A proper definition places its concept in
> > hierarchical relation to all other concepts. It names the wider
> > class of existents that its referents fall under and it
> > differentiates the concept from other concepts in that class.
>
> Well that is one of my problems. After having placed art in the category of
> representation of MVJ, how does it separate it from other representations of
> MVP.
Your prior problem is in not working with the definition, and
instead substituting a confused straw man line of thought for it.
> Is it by excluding abstract art as non-metaphysical?
No use chasing a straw man.
Even so, in abstract "art" note that there's no reality being
re-created in the first place.
> Can I find an
> instance of a human construction that is not a selective represenation of
> his MVJ?
How about a computer program? A movie review? A logic textbook?
The official rulebook of baseball? The U.S. Constitution? The
Hypocratic Oath? The Voyager plaque? Ayn Rand's Apollo 11 essay?
My grocery list? On and on.
> > This role is obviously played by Ayn Rand's definition of art.
> > Definitions are stand-alone for _dis_integrated thinking.
>
> Stand alone in this context means that it is a complete definition, that it
> does not need to be qualified or clarified with additional contingencies not
> present in the definition.
If you can just repeat yourself, so can I. Ayn Rand's definition
of art is a valid definition. Definitions are not understood in
isolation. They are contextual as part of a hierarchy of
knowledge. Their function is to delimit the material of reality
being organized by the concept and to relate that concept to the
rest of our knowledge of reality. I.e., to let us to know what
we're talking about. Obviously, to fully understand "selective
recreation of reality according to the artist's metaphysical value
judgments", we also must understand such things as "metaphysical
significance", "psycho-epistemology", and "sense of life".
Meanwhile, what part of Ayn Rand's definition (NOT of your
misstatements of it) is not "complete"? Apply the standards for
any definition: What putative non-art does it include? What
putative art does it exclude?
> > > There are correct metaphysical value judgements and there are incorrect
> > > metaphysical value judgements. From the definition it follows that there
> is
> > > good art and bad art.
> >
> > There is of course good art and bad art. But you've uttered a
> > gross non-sequitur by conflating standards of evaluation in one
> > context with standards of evaluation in another. The evaluation
> > "good" or "bad" in the context of art reflects how well the artist
> > did his job of selectively recreating reality according to his
> > value judgments.
>
> The reason that we need to know those criteria (how well the artist has done
> his job) is because we are talking about O esthetics and how it is a
> revolutionary concept that follows from O doctrine. So we absolutely need to
> know how Objectivist doctrine impacts (changes?) our concept of esthetics.
Invalid approach. Ayn Rand's concept of art is not a deduction
from a doctrine. Seeing features of Objectivism that way is a
basic error. Her concept of art is an application of her
inductive/integrative method.
And her definition doesn't change "our" concept. (Maybe yours.)
I'm not so sure there ever _was_ a clear concept of art before
now. Maybe Aristotle's? I'm not well informed of his. But the
fixation on beauty as central is a sterile, superficial approach.
It leads to the false alternative of art as intrinsic, Platonic,
and revealed vs. art as subjective, relative, and uncaused.
--Dean
Fred Weiss
"Acar" <acar...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:039801c0d265$9ae4f540$d618...@cinci.rr.com...
> One point of the analogies is that a proper definition excludes from a
> larger class items that do not belong in the category. Is the larger class
> here "a recreation of reality" and the qualifying clause "according to MVJ
> (metaphysical value judgements)"? But there are no recreations of reality
> that are not done according to MVJ.
Building a model ship, which is not art. For that matter reproducing a work
of art.
> Second - (and this also applies to the statement as a definition): It has
> the unitended consequence of defining art in terms of morality. Perhaps
> some have noticed that I jump from swearing that I understand that the
> definition intends to be generic at a fundamental level and then I start
> excoriating
> it because it carries implications of quality or legitimacy. This is
because
> I see the latter as an unintended consequence.
Well, if you want to include painting by the numbers as art, then you are
going to have trouble with Ayn Rand's definition.
> However, if skill, beauty and emotional impact are the
> criteria - that is traditional esthetics. Even Objectivists are allowed to
> embrace traditional esthetics :-) Do you see why I keep asking
> what is Objectivist esthetics and how it is extracted from Objectivist
> doctrine? If it is in the Romantic Manifesto, surely someone can get to
the
> gist of
> it and articulate it.
> Anyone?
But it's still not clear what you are asking. You alternate between
attacking the Objectivist definition of art with demanding that we give you
an art appreciation or literary criticism course. What do you want?
Fred Weiss
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Dean Sandin" <dsa...@bellsouth.net>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2001 3:36 PM
Subject: Re: Definition of art
You are correct. I paraphrased loosely and inaccurately. My fault.
> > (2) That the quality of art is judged by the reponse of the observer
> > to certain criteria of skill (not further specified).
>
> No. The quality of art, as art, isn't in the "response"
> (emotional reaction) of the observer. This is another form of
> confusing sense of life with artistic standards.
Now there we have a real misunderstanding (on my part) of what had been
alleged. For some reason that I can not fathom, although Objectivists are
willing to engage, it is proving extremely difficult to extract straight
answers from them - thus the misunderstandings. Witness your statement above
which fails to elaborate on why the quality of art is not contingent on the
reaction of the observer to the piece of art. What objective criterion is it
contingent on? Dr. Peikoff's verdict? Is it possible for one Objecivist to
validly admire a piece of art that another Objectivist validly dismisses? Or
do all proper Objectivists have similar tastes? Can you elaborate on
artistic standards?
> [ snip (3) and (4), which evanesce without (1) and (2) ]
I quote again # 3
(3) That those criteria ("how well the artist does his job") are independent
of the MVJ of the artist and the MVJ of the observer
When I suggested that the definition implies correlation between MVJ
(metaphysical value judgements) and quality, the notion was rejected in no
uncertain terms. Thus my framing of #3.
> > > A proper definition places its concept in
> > > hierarchical relation to all other concepts. It names the wider
> > > class of existents that its referents fall under and it
> > > differentiates the concept from other concepts in that class.
> >
> > Well that is one of my problems. After having placed art in the category
of
> > representation of MVJ, how does it separate it from other
representations of
> > MVP.
>
> Your prior problem is in not working with the definition, and
> instead substituting a confused straw man line of thought for it.
In that paraphrase my problem was not of substance but sloppy paraphrase.
How would it be diffrenet if I had written: "After having placed art in the
category of selective recreations of reality according to the artist's
metahysical value judgements, how does it (the definition) separate art from
other selective recreations of reality?" All recreations of reality are done
according to the individual's metaphysical value judgements. It would be
impossible to do otherwise.
> > Is it by excluding abstract art as non-metaphysical?
>
> No use chasing a straw man.
If the answer is yes, we have an esthetics anchored in reality which would
censor out by doctrinal dictum some categories of expression that are
inductively recognizable as subjective statements made for no other purpose
than the communication of emotion in a manner that wants to appeal in some
way to the sense of beauty (traditional concept of art). Then my statement
that the definition contains implied criteria would be correct. Part of the
problem of communication is based on people jumping on me when I make that
suggestion. If I say "Humans are white people" it will not do to say that it
is simply a basic fundamental definition of humans without prescriptive
implications. It is loaded with implications about other races.
> Even so, in abstract "art" note that there's no reality being
> re-created in the first place.
Thus it is legislated as bad art or non-art?
> > Can I find an
> > instance of a human construction that is not a selective represenation
of
> > his MVJ?
Failing to say "of reality" and "according to" still conveys the sense of
the question
> How about a computer program? A movie review? A logic textbook?
> The official rulebook of baseball? The U.S. Constitution? The
> Hypocratic Oath? The Voyager plaque? Ayn Rand's Apollo 11 essay?
> My grocery list? On and on.
Absolutely. My point precisely. Each one of those symbol-based entities are
selective reprentations of reality according to the individual's
metaphysical value judgements, as are Frank Lloyd Wright's buildings and
Rachmaninoff's symphonies. A logic textbook, for example is no less a
selective reprentation of reality than a Shakespeare sonnet. Rand's Apollo
11 essay and Atlas Shrugged are both selective representation of reality
according to her metaphysical value judgements.
> > > This role is obviously played by Ayn Rand's definition of art.
> > > Definitions are stand-alone for _dis_integrated thinking.
> >
> > Stand alone in this context means that it is a complete definition, that
it
> > does not need to be qualified or clarified with additional contingencies
not
> > present in the definition.
>
> If you can just repeat yourself, so can I. Ayn Rand's definition
> of art is a valid definition. Definitions are not understood in
> isolation. They are contextual as part of a hierarchy of
> knowledge. Their function is to delimit the material of reality
> being organized by the concept and to relate that concept to the
> rest of our knowledge of reality. I.e., to let us to know what
> we're talking about. Obviously, to fully understand "selective
> recreation of reality according to the artist's metaphysical value
> judgments", we also must understand such things as "metaphysical
> significance", "psycho-epistemology", and "sense of life".
No. We only need to understand what she means by reality and what she means
by metaphysical value judgements. If it is contingent on some unmentioned
concept such as sense of life or Nibelungan mythology, then it is not a
proper definition. When we run into the definition we would not know what to
reasearch.
> Meanwhile, what part of Ayn Rand's definition (NOT of your
> misstatements of it) is not "complete"? Apply the standards for
> any definition: What putative non-art does it include? What
> putative art does it exclude?
You appear to have excluded abstract art, for one thing. It includes the
entities that you mentioned above.
> > > > There are correct metaphysical value judgements and there are
incorrect
> > > > metaphysical value judgements. From the definition it follows that
there
> > is
> > > > good art and bad art.
> > >
> > > There is of course good art and bad art. But you've uttered a
> > > gross non-sequitur by conflating standards of evaluation in one
> > > context with standards of evaluation in another. The evaluation
> > > "good" or "bad" in the context of art reflects how well the artist
> > > did his job of selectively recreating reality according to his
> > > value judgments.
> >
> > The reason that we need to know those criteria (how well the artist has
done
> > his job) is because we are talking about O esthetics and how it is a
> > revolutionary concept that follows from O doctrine. So we absolutely
need to
> > know how Objectivist doctrine impacts (changes?) our concept of
esthetics.
>
> Invalid approach. Ayn Rand's concept of art is not a deduction
> from a doctrine. Seeing features of Objectivism that way is a
> basic error. Her concept of art is an application of her
> inductive/integrative method.
I believe that you belive that; and that you believe that it is sound. I
still don't know how the definition impacts on abstract art, science
fiction, etc. If it does, then I believe that it is more like a deduction
from a doctrine; and anti-inductive. I have been unable to raise guiding
ingormation about this.
> And her definition doesn't change "our" concept. (Maybe yours.)
> I'm not so sure there ever _was_ a clear concept of art before
> now. Maybe Aristotle's? I'm not well informed of his. But the
> fixation on beauty as central is a sterile, superficial approach.
> It leads to the false alternative of art as intrinsic, Platonic,
> and revealed vs. art as subjective, relative, and uncaused.
>
> --Dean
The concept is by its nature imprecise because it is immersed in
subjectivity. But everybody knows what art is.
Carmichael
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Fred Weiss" <pape...@ix.netcom.com>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Definition of art
>
>
> "Acar" <acar...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
> news:039801c0d265$9ae4f540$d618...@cinci.rr.com...
>
> > But there are no recreations of reality
> > that are not done according to MVJ.
>
> Building a model ship, which is not art. For that matter reproducing a
work
> of art.
Everything that we build construct or deliberately create is built or
constructed or created according to our metaphysical value judgements. Only
a robot has no metaphysical value judgements to guide his recreations of
reality.
Carmichael.
Fred Weiss
"Acar" <acar...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:002101c0d28d$2bbe7e20$d618...@cinci.rr.com...
Ayn Rand obviously meant something deeper by "metaphysical" in this context,
and for that matter "value". You do whine a lot and stamp your feet, but
sometimes you raise some very good, valid questions and make some
interesting points. But in this instance you are just being difficult - or
dense - for its own sake.
Fred Weiss
Agent Cooper
out there, I really fail to see how scholasticism about Rand's definition
of art advances our understanding of art or our understanding of Rand's
understanding of art. I suspect that it would be more useful to start from
a shared assumption about what is on list L that counts as art and then
discuss Rand's necessary (not necessary and sufficient) conditions for
being art, which for her will exclude some things others would include.
Then we can argue the cogency of those necessary conditions. Part of the
oddity of the foregoing discussion has hinged on the alleged impossibility
of delimiting a class of items which are artworks. Since the function of
the definition is to exclude certain things rather than to figure out what
to include, perhaps we should view it in light of its function and not
some other.
Rand's primary agenda in art theory as I understand it is to argue that
there is a role to be played in assessing a work of art by looking at the
values it is "pushing" in addition to how well it does what it is trying
to do. I don't think this is so controversial now, for better or
worse--the days of formalism are over. Since values for Rand can
themselves be evaluated, this gives her a means of making judgments
reminiscent of Nietzsche's, to wit, certain artworks are "decadent" (his
word, not hers or mine) and that that is relevant to their assessment, if
not decisive. We can argue about whether or not this is helpful,
warranted, etc. but we should focus on that, rather than the definition
and what it accomplishes or fails to accomplish. Her contrasting
assessments of naturalistic novels like Steinbeck's and her (I think
overenthusiastic) assessments of romantic/realistic works like Victor
Hugo's belongs here. By contrast, her judgment that Dostoevski is good at
what he is trying to do, though she doesn't agree with what that is, is,
minus the disagreement, not fundamentally different from anybody else's
Dostoevski criticism. Consequently, I see little point in saying anything
about it, unless the topic is Dostoevski, which it isn't.
[However, it might interest you all to read what Nabokov says about
Dostoevski--his objections are very like the sorts of objections one hears
about Rand's fiction. What's interesting is that Nabokov on Dostoevski is
considered shocking, whereas damn near everyone against Rand is considered
obvious. Sounds like a double-standard worth looking into.]
Furthermore, Rand's definition is designed to exclude certain kinds of
works which she did not regard as "genuine art". Now while I sometimes
feel that she is also rather prissy in these sorts of judgments, I find it
interesting that so much of what she rejects as non-art seems to succeed
precisely because it is in some sense deliberately subverting some tacit
understanding we start with about what is art. Dada and performance art
cannot quite function as art other than by subverting expectations--a
world in which there had never been a Michaelangelo's _David_ is a world
that *cannot* produce Duchamp's urinal-as-sculpture. Now while typically
critics, especially those on the Blessed Isle, will use terms like
"transgressive" to characterize what is important about such works, a less
sympathetic characterization, though perhaps meaning essentially the same
thing, is "parasitic" or, if you will, "biting the hand that feeds you" (I
do *not* mean by giving independent offense on non-aesthetic grounds, a la
the "Sensation" show, but by giving "offense" to *aesthetic*
expectations). Rand's way with this sort of thing was to say that it isn't
art at all. I'm not sure that that is right; but it may be more
illuminating, and just as good in terms of an Objectivist agenda, to call
it "parasitic" art. This is more illuminating, I think, than the
Danto-esque "institutional theory of art" which says that it's art because
it is in a museum. For the next question is, what is it about this place
that makes it museum-y? My suggestion, would be, "the spectacle of
artworks under a narrower characterization". So a hybrid
Objectivist-institutional theory could allow the other kinds of works in
under the expanded account, but only parasitically.
Also, I find it a little bit frustrating that we are engaged in a
discussion that is premised on Carmichael's not having read the relevant
essays. It is difficult to illustrate the distinction between the MVJ and
the technique by reference to the Dostoevski discussion in RM only to find
Carmichael hasn't/won't look at it and query *it*. To be fair, there is a
limit to this--at some point such appeals devolve into cultism, as in "if
you haven't *been* a Scientologist for x # of yrs, I can't possibly
explain it to you--and all your criticisms are based on
misunderstandings." Then again, I'm not sure it would be a mistake to say
"it is too complicated to explain what thinking like a lawyer involves,
and until you know how to do that, I can't successfully explain why your
questions about, say, federal powers, are misguided." Is there some way of
teasing out the scope and limits of this sort of move? After all, there is
expertise in the world as well as obfustication.
Acar
"Obviously meant something" is not very helpful. You speak like you are
chasing a ghost, or something with a mystical meaning. Let's stick to what
is written. The whining and the stamping of feet is about non-informative
replies like you have just given. Rand said or implied that thinking is
about making metaphysical value judgements. Are we now supposed to give her
a pass and say that it means something else? I already said that it is an
acceptable statement about art from the O perspective. Just the fact that it
says something important (from the O perspective) about art does not make it
a complete definition.
The fact that no one answers succint and direct questions makes me sound
more argumentative than I would prefer, and makes me sound more pessimistic
about the existence of good replies than when I started asking. Forget the
definition. In Objectivist esthetics, by what criteria do we judge and
critique art? How do those criteria derive from Objectivist principle? Is
this a problematic question that makes me a whiner and stamper of feet?
Carmichael
Anthony Argyriou
> On what criteria
>of _Objectivist esthetics_ is Dostoevski successful or Dali a good artist?
Dostoyevski is able to communicate his metaphysical value judgements and
sense of life" far more effectively than most novelists with a similar sense
of life and similar MVJs. He does so not by writing polemics, but placing
characters that can be believed in believable situations, which, as an
integrated whole, impart to the reader the emotional state which Dostoyevski
wants the reader to reach.
Dali does similarly, though his medium is different.
Anthony Argyriou
Unix _is_ user-friendly. It's just selective about its friends.
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Anthony Argyriou" <ant...@alphageo.com>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Definition of art
Thank you.
So let us put MVJ (metaphysical value judgements) aside. (That is said to be
the definition, not the yardstick.) Concentrating on the yardstick (which
was the question) I do not see innovation here or anything that I may call
Objectivist esthetics. Their work is good because they do it superbly. It
has always been this way. (It is also what Mr. Sandin said) The Objectivist
angle appears to reside in the definition with the reference to "reality".
(I am getting the impression that the "sense of life" is also a connection
to reality.)
But the entire story of this wretched discussion is that I started out by
saying that, and I was jumped on and called an ignorant, evil, wretched,
disgraceful, disgusting, annoying, ugly, fat, bald, gynecomastic,
elephantiasic, acne ridden bum; after which I was insulted. Of course I am
not any of those things.
If that is the case I again propose, coming full circle, that the
"definition" is put together to satisfy the premises of the philosophy and
is therefore deductive. Because reality (...such and such...) then art must
be (...such and such...).
If your representation is on target then this discussion is a bizarre comedy
of errors and I am the victim. :-)
Carmichael
Fred Weiss
"Acar" <acar...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:004501c0d2a9$2704b5e0$d618...@cinci.rr.com...
>Forget the
> definition. In Objectivist esthetics, by what criteria do we judge and
> critique art? How do those criteria derive from Objectivist principle? Is
> this a problematic question that makes me a whiner and stamper of feet?
No, it's actually a very good question. But in the right context. I'm not
sure hpo is the right one because I don't think anyone here can answer it
for you, or not in any depth. I sure can't, or not much anyway. There are
people who could (in Objectivism) but I've not thought enough about
aesthetics. I can probably say a little more about literature because of all
the branches of art, it interests me the most. But I'm very far from being
especially knowledgeable about that either.
That's probably why you haven't gotten very far with your questions.
But I can tell you that you are drawing all kinds of erroneous conclusions
about the definition.
Fred Weiss
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Agent Cooper" <rkh...@lulu.acns.nwu.edu>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2001 7:45 PM
Subject: Re: Definition of art
Thank you. That is very helpful. I can assure you that (now) if I had ready
access to the RM I would read it. More frustrating is the fact that its
students seem to be unable to articulate the message. (Someone should tell
Mr. Peikoff to put it on the web. That's where I found Fact and Value.)
Surprising is also the fact that even you would tangentially suggest that it
may be too complicated or subtle to explain. It seems more like the federal
powers issue, a religious fervor based on feelings so deep in the kidneys
that they can not be successfully urinated. (he he. Sorry!). I suspect
differently. I suspect that the answer revolves around the "sense of life"
and that the sense of life is a vague concept, difficult to pin down.
Mrs. Speicher already provided an adequate explanation of what the sense of
life is but she was not clear, at least to me, on how it fits into the
theory. Perhaps she said it and it went over my head. I suspect that the
"sense of life" is what gives an Objectivist permission to like and praise
art works which are philosophically incorrect. And perhaps the definition
itself serves to exclude only extreme disconnects from reality such as Dada
and possibly abstract art and abstract music. I know nothing about how the
theory affects performance art and I have seen discussions that have to do
with photography, but I can not comment on those.
If that is the case my original suspicion about the definition having
doctrinal implications was correct. Can you imagine my confusion when I am
told by insiders that it is not exclusive of any form of art? I respected
their expertisse and proceded to frame my discussion on that basis. Put
together the fact that I don't have access to the RM, that the participants
are unable to communicate its contents and that I get questionable guidance
and you can easily see how the discussion has been erratic. To say that an
exclusionary definition covers all instances of the object is circular
reasoning.
I am not sure that the concept of "metaphysical value judgements" is
distinctly Objectivist. Using different terminologies the concept is
generic. So I am not sure that the "sense of life", although an interesting
concept, turns out to be disctinctively Objectivist. If all of that is
correct, then the connection of "Objectivist" esthetics to Objectivism
appears to be tenuous. The reality based definition has a small exclusionary
function. From there on it is everyone to what he likes, as so long as there
is a good match of "sense of life" between the artist and the observer. If
the sense of life is a new way of accounting for taste, while it connects to
value judgements about the world, a distinctive connection to the
Objectivist view of the world is questionable. So while there is an Ayn Rand
theory of esthetics, there may not be an Objectivist theory after all. That
is unless the sense of life can be tied unequivocally to
distinctiveObjectivist theory.
In closing let me say that excluding Dada and such anti-reality forms of art
is a contradiction. It is difficult to think of a stronger and better
defined statement of metaphysical value judgements than Dada.
Carmichael
Agent Cooper
<acar...@d-g-s.com> wrote:
> Thank you.
> So let us put MVJ (metaphysical value judgements) aside.
Sheesh, I kinda thought a bunch of people had done that already.
(That is said to be
> the definition, not the yardstick.) Concentrating on the yardstick (which
> was the question) I do not see innovation here or anything that I may call
> Objectivist esthetics. Their work is good because they do it superbly. It
> has always been this way. (It is also what Mr. Sandin said) The Objectivist
> angle appears to reside in the definition with the reference to "reality".
> (I am getting the impression that the "sense of life" is also a connection
> to reality.)
The reason why Objectivist aesthetics has this inescapable connection to
reality business is twofold. First, because the rational egoist/objective
theory of value ethics, morality boils down to effective connection to
reality, independent of opinion. The MVJ is explained, but not justified,
by a kind of global sense of how one is faring in the inevitable task.
This is why Rand, like Nietzsche, is so hard on certain kinds of art--they
inadvertently disclose the "weakness" or "disease" of the artist; more,
they help the similarly diseased spectator feel in some sense vindicated,
as in, "it's not you, it's the cosmos."
The seond "connection to reality" aspect is that for Rand at least the
arts which have, in the grand old days, had a predominantly
representational element are viewed as representational by norm--thus
abstract art fails to be good art, since painting is *supposed* to
represent. I'm not clear what Rand does with whole types of art which no
one thinks can or should be representational, but for painting, sculpture,
literature, etc. non-representationalism, however the artist or critic
justifies it, for Rand just doesn't pass muster.
Now I suspect that the reason why she thinks this has something to do with
the idea that the senses in their normal uses have a normal function
linked to representing, and that healthy art stimulates them in a healthy
way. But one must be careful with a line like that (or cagy, I'm not sure
which) since the "selectivity" aspect means that art is always, in a
sense, distortive.
But in all, it is, I think, a remarkably *cognitive* conception of art,
and the best art, in a qualified sense, will "tell the truth." I think
that the reason why Rand liked D. is because she felt that he was
essentially right about wicked people but had no clue what a good person
would be like, so that his vision is, not erroneous in the deepest sense,
but incomplete. I'm inclined to agree.
Agent Cooper
<pape...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
I think Fred is right. I notice that there is precious little in "Logical
Structure of Objectivism" about the aesthetics, and that most Objectivists
tend to pay far less attention to it than to the epistemological, moral or
political views. I hear very good things about the new bok on Rand's
aesthetics, _What Art Is_ and think Car ought to look there first. Since
the book isn't dogmatic, and takes issue with Rand on some things, it
would probably be less aggravating for him than it might otherwise be.
Agent Cooper
<acar...@d-g-s.com> wrote:
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Agent Cooper" <rkh...@lulu.acns.nwu.edu>
> Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
> Sent: Tuesday, May 01, 2001 7:45 PM
> Subject: Re: Definition of art
This is off-topic but any diehard Objectivists (i.e. people who really
love the novels) who don't know Frederick Hart's sculpture don't know what
they're missing. Especially check out "Daughters of Odessa." Pity the
repros are so damn expensive and the book is out of print. I think jpgs
can be found through www.frederickhart.com
Enjoy.
Agent Cooper
> I am not sure that the concept of "metaphysical value judgements" is
> distinctly Objectivist. Using different terminologies the concept is
> generic. So I am not sure that the "sense of life", although an interesting
> concept, turns out to be disctinctively Objectivist. If all of that is
> correct, then the connection of "Objectivist" esthetics to Objectivism
> appears to be tenuous. The reality based definition has a small exclusionary
> function. From there on it is everyone to what he likes, as so long as there
> is a good match of "sense of life" between the artist and the observer. If
> the sense of life is a new way of accounting for taste, while it connects to
> value judgements about the world, a distinctive connection to the
> Objectivist view of the world is questionable. So while there is an Ayn Rand
> theory of esthetics, there may not be an Objectivist theory after all. That
> is unless the sense of life can be tied unequivocally to
> distinctiveObjectivist theory.
I think that her style of aesthetic argument is reminiscent of (surprise!)
Marxist and feminist art criticism, which also open the door to what a
formalist would call non-aesthetic normative considerations. However,
would I be overstating things to say that Rand is pushing a slightly
different set of values?
Betsy Speicher
> This is off-topic but any diehard Objectivists (i.e. people who really
> love the novels) who don't know Frederick Hart's sculpture don't know what
> they're missing.
I AGREE!
Frederick Hart is my favorite sculptor beating out my second-favorite,
Michaelangelo, by a wide margin. At the Second Renaissance Conference in
Washington, DC, I led a group on a trip to the National Cathedral to see
his "Birth of Adam" and "Ex Nihilo."
> Especially check out "Daughters of Odessa." Pity the repros are so
> damn expensive and the book is out of print.
Try museum book shops and used book services on the net for a copy of Tom
Wolfe's wonderful _Frederick Hart: Sculptor_.
> I think jpgs can be found
> through www.frederickhart.com
That's a good start.
Betsy Speicher
You'll know Objectivism is winning when ... you read the CyberNet -- the
most complete and comprehensive e-mail news source about Objectivists,
their activities, and their victories. Request a sample issue at
cybe...@speicher.com or visit http://www.stauffercom.com/cybernet/
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Agent Cooper" <rkh...@lulu.acns.nwu.edu>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Definition of art
So we have come full circle to the notion that the definition in question is
born out of an Objectivist agenda and is indeed prescriptive. This was
obvious to me from the fact that it is anchored in "reality", but to my
confusion I was emphatically instructed otherwise. After your very helpful
analyses I can no longer entertain allegations that it does not implicitly
legitimize and delegitimize certain forms of art with the obvious as
consequence: that there is indeed an Objectivist esthetics.
In (hopefully) closing this discssion from my side let me summarize what I
have gleaned from it:
That the Objectivist definition of art ( A selective recreation of reality
according to the artist's metaphysical value judgements.) is indeed
prescriptive, attempting to deligitimize certain nihilistic anti-reality
styles and implicitly legitimizing realism and optimism.
That based on the proposed criteria the exclusionary attempt is not entirely
successful in view of the fact that anti-reality art styles are indeed a
reflection of metaphysical value judgements. For example, an empty canvas on
a frame could be described as such a re-creation.
That all modes of human expression are symbolic and thus all human
constructions are recreations of reality according to the individual's
metaphysical value judgements.
Therefore an argument can be make that the definition is vulnerable in both
its exclusionary an inclusionary functions.
I further believe that the above objections are significant.
Carmichael
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Fred Weiss
"Acar" <acar...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:00d301c0d3f5$83db27c0$d618...@cinci.rr.com...
> That the Objectivist definition of art ( A selective recreation of reality
> according to the artist's metaphysical value judgements.) is indeed
> prescriptive, attempting to deligitimize certain nihilistic anti-reality
> styles and implicitly legitimizing realism and optimism.
No, sorry, you still have it wrong. You are still ignoring other more
obvious issues. And furthermore it is not intended to "delegitimatize"
non-realism or non-optimism, per se. The distorted images of primitive art
are...art. Medieval art is...art. Some of it might even be good art.
> That based on the proposed criteria the exclusionary attempt is not
entirely
> successful in view of the fact that anti-reality art styles are indeed a
> reflection of metaphysical value judgements. For example, an empty canvas
on
> a frame could be described as such a re-creation.
Maybe it's a re-creation of the contents of the artist's brain. That is
*not* art, it's pretentious proponents views on the subject notwithstanding.
Most of this so-called "modern" art is, even in the words of its
practitioners, *anti-art*. It's a statement about art, not art itself. The
statement is: to spit on art. If you elevate crap like this into the realm
of art what are you doing to the stuff hanging in the Louvre?
The best you can say about some of it is that it is decorative; it might
make for an interesting pattern for a rug, if your tastes run in that
direction.
I'll allow for some of the more egregious examples - the more horrible
messes - conveying "the sense of life" of a psychotic, but that puts it at
best at the borderline. And I think over the line. Unless you want to say
that when an autistic bangs his head on the wall, he's making music. But
then you are destroying the purpose of a definition (which I think is the
purpose here).
>
> That all modes of human expression are symbolic and thus all human
> constructions are recreations of reality according to the individual's
> metaphysical value judgements.
But that's not true. None of the many counter-examples seem to have
registered with you.
> I further believe that the above objections are significant.
They aren't, but I don't suppose we'll ever be able to get you to stop
trying to make them significant because you are determined to prove a point
that isn't there.
Fred Weiss
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
Fred Weiss <pape...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
news:9cscb0$al0$1...@slb0.atl.mindspring.net...
>
> The best you can say about some of it is that it is decorative; it might
> make for an interesting pattern for a rug, if your tastes run in that
> direction.
You forgot 'wrapping paper".
--
Arnold
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Dean Sandin" <dsa...@bellsouth.net>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Definition of art
> But the
> fixation on beauty as central is a sterile, superficial approach.
> It leads to the false alternative of art as intrinsic, Platonic,
> and revealed vs. art as subjective, relative, and uncaused.
> --Dean
Unless beauty is an attribute of reality. That is unless the human sense of
what is beautiful is traceable back to attributes of reality itself. As
everyone knows the classic elements of beauty have long been considered to
be symmetry, balance and such. Objectivists must not forget that the
artist's search for beauty in the other aspect of reality, namely turmoil
and chaos, has been referred to as realism. So IMO Objectivists do not need
to disrespect beauty based on the knee-jerk ideological phobia for so called
mysticism - a "rationalistic" stance.
Paradoxical to me is also the fact that you should endeavor to divorce
esthetics from beauty as a perceived attribute of reality and choose to
emphasize entirely subjective, floating criteria as yardsticks for
evaluating the quality of human re-creations of reality.
Carmichael
Robert J. Kolker
Acar wrote:
>
> Paradoxical to me is also the fact that you should endeavor to divorce
> esthetics from beauty as a perceived attribute of reality and choose to
> emphasize entirely subjective, floating criteria as yardsticks for
> evaluating the quality of human re-creations of reality.
Let us presume arguendo that perceived attributes of an external
object are indeed rooted in the object ( a troublesome matter
when we get down to matters of taste [literally] and smell).
But let that pass. O.K. So you and I perceive some attribute
A of object X. Why should either of us regard that attribute as
either ugly or beautiful except as shorthand to say I like it or
I like it not, which which to say I wish to perceive this attribute
further (or not perceive it further).
So when you get right down to it, beautify is not only in the
eye of the beholder (or skin or ear or nose) but in his
attitude or feeling about that which is perceived. In short, it
is totally subjective even if there is an objective basis for
the perception. Aesthetic is response to perception, not
the perception itself.
Bob Kolker
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Fred Weiss" <pape...@ix.netcom.com>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Sent: Thursday, May 03, 2001 3:43 PM
Subject: Re: Definition of art
> "Acar" <acar...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
> news:00d301c0d3f5$83db27c0$d618...@cinci.rr.com...
>
> > That the Objectivist definition of art ( A selective recreation of
reality
> > according to the artist's metaphysical value judgements.) is indeed
> > prescriptive, attempting to deligitimize certain nihilistic anti-reality
> > styles and implicitly legitimizing realism and optimism.
After resting a while, :-) I have a few remarks.
> No, sorry, you still have it wrong. You are still ignoring other more
> obvious issues. And furthermore it is not intended to "delegitimatize"
> non-realism or non-optimism, per se.
I agree that it is not intended to deligitimize non-realism and non optimism
per se. Now how about addressing what I said above?
>The distorted images of primitive art
> are...art. Medieval art is...art. Some of it might even be good art.
Indeed. Nice sense of life in those. Because the deligitimization is so
selective it is reflective of an agenda.
> > That based on the proposed criteria the exclusionary attempt is not
> entirely
> > successful in view of the fact that anti-reality art styles are indeed a
> > reflection of metaphysical value judgements. For example, an empty
canvas
> on
> > a frame could be described as such a re-creation.
>
> Maybe it's a re-creation of the contents of the artist's brain.
>That is
> *not* art,
Why do you have to attack Rand this way? If the artist is nihilistic, those
are his metaphysical value judgements. An empty canvas is a selective
re-creation of "reality" according to those value judgements. You said it
yourself. Empty brain, empty canvas. Or do you disagree with Rand's
definition? Are you saying that it is defective?
> it's pretentious proponents views on the subject notwithstanding.
> Most of this so-called "modern" art is, even in the words of its
> practitioners, *anti-art*. It's a statement about art, not art itself.
The
> statement is: to spit on art. If you elevate crap like this into the realm
> of art what are you doing to the stuff hanging in the Louvre?
>
> The best you can say about some of it is that it is decorative; it might
> make for an interesting pattern for a rug, if your tastes run in that
> direction.
But you spoke earlier about commercial art (such as rug patterns and
wrapping paper). Before it was art, now it's not art. Are your
contradictions indicative of an agenda?
> I'll allow for some of the more egregious examples - the more horrible
> messes - conveying "the sense of life" of a psychotic, but that puts it at
> best at the borderline. And I think over the line. Unless you want to say
> that when an autistic bangs his head on the wall, he's making music. But
> then you are destroying the purpose of a definition (which I think is the
> purpose here).
If Rand were alive you could argue with her as to whether she should revise
her definition so as to exclude re-creations of reality according to
nihilistic metaphysical value judgements or whatever other metaphysical
value judgements are intolerable to Objectivists.
I am not interested in the purpose of the definition except to the extent
that it is revealed in the words of the definition itself.
> > That all modes of human expression are symbolic and thus all human
> > constructions are recreations of reality according to the individual's
> > metaphysical value judgements.
>
> But that's not true. None of the many counter-examples seem to have
> registered with you.
My reply to the counter examples did not register with you. When you write a
shopping list, do you do it according to your metaphysical value judgements?
Yes or no? Answer that and then read the definition.
> > I further believe that the above objections are significant.
>
> They aren't, but I don't suppose we'll ever be able to get you to stop
> trying to make them significant because you are determined to prove a
point
> that isn't there.
> Fred Weiss
On the contrary I tried to accomodate various versions that were offered and
all of them seem to be wanting in some way.
Carmichael
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Robert J. Kolker" <bobk...@mediaone.net>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Sent: Friday, May 04, 2001 11:00 AM
Subject: Re: Definition of art
>
>
> Acar wrote:
>
> >
> > Paradoxical to me is also the fact that you should endeavor to divorce
> > esthetics from beauty as a perceived attribute of reality
I "answer" to myself here in order to elaborate. The above does not refer to
finding beauty in a specific object. It refers to forsaking the idea that
the concept that beauty flows from the attributes of "Reality" (Nature and
the Universe, etc.) such as balance, symmetry and order on the one hand and
chaos and conflict on the other. The quote does not disclose my views. It
simply points out that it is paradoxical for an Objectivist to go the
relativistic, floating way instead of the anchored-in-reality way.
Carmichael
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Agent Cooper" <rkh...@lulu.acns.nwu.edu>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Definition of art
I don't want to posture as someone who as a matter of hubris refuses to read
about the subjects that are on the table. Consider that I have no Objectist
source material - (even my second hand copy of Atlas Srugged is 3000 miles
away) and all my books are in boxes and have been for some time. For an
unspecified amount of time my main source of "research" is the web and and
the available time is hierarchically allocated. Consider also that I don't
suscribe to the idea that in order to raise questions about Objectivism one
has to devote considerable time to studying the source material. In this
type of forum it is appropriate to ask question and to be prepared for
responses that contain appropriate refutations and clarifications. I am not
impressed by the line: "You are not persuaded by my answers but if only you
study you will find answers." If you believe that I write or respond in a
manner that is intractable and stubborn and irrational, then call me that
and let the matter rest there, but please don't send me to study. Of course
there is nothing wrong with suggesting reading material - but I just want to
explain that is not a subject that I need to pursue in that manner. For my
purposes it is enough to discuss the matter in terms of what you understand
and believe, if you are equally interested in doing so. I realize that my
criticism is not technical but that should make it all the easier to shoot
down.
As far as Fred is concerned, from the manner in which he promotes it I would
expect him to understand it.
Carmichael
Carmichael
Dean Sandin
> > But the
> > fixation on beauty as central is a sterile, superficial approach.
> > It leads to the false alternative of art as intrinsic, Platonic,
> > and revealed vs. art as subjective, relative, and uncaused.
>
> Unless beauty is an attribute of reality. That is unless the human sense of
> what is beautiful is traceable back to attributes of reality itself. As
> everyone knows the classic elements of beauty have long been considered to
> be symmetry, balance and such. Objectivists must not forget that the
> artist's search for beauty in the other aspect of reality, namely turmoil
> and chaos, has been referred to as realism. So IMO Objectivists do not need
> to disrespect beauty based on the knee-jerk ideological phobia for so called
> mysticism - a "rationalistic" stance.
>
> Paradoxical to me is also the fact that you should endeavor to divorce
> esthetics from beauty as a perceived attribute of reality and choose to
> emphasize entirely subjective, floating criteria as yardsticks for
> evaluating the quality of human re-creations of reality.
> Carmichael
I don't see how you're going to be able to intelligently critique
Objectivist ideas in the philosophy of art until you've understood
what "intrinsic", "subjective", and "objective" mean. You are
bouncing between the false alternatives of beauty as "attributes of
reality itself" and as "entirely subjective". Objectivism rejects
_both_ perspectives.
Ayn Rand pointed out the _hierarchy_ of philosophic subject areas.
Esthetics is highly dependent on epistemology, both directly and
via psycho-epistemology.
You mentioned to Fred that you are assessing the Objectivist
philosophy of art without having read or even obtained Ayn Rand's
book of definitive essays on the subject. That's a big reason why
I simply stopped discussing the topic with you. You're pushing
the responsibility for acting to produce your own understanding
away from yourself and onto others, and expecting them to be as
thorough and deep about it as Ayn Rand was as a path-breaking
philosopher -- in their spare time! Nope.
--Dean
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Dean Sandin" <dsa...@bellsouth.net>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Sent: Saturday, May 05, 2001 8:19 AM
Subject: Re: Definition of art
No problem.
Contrary to you I believe that generic definitions need to stand on their
own. That's what dictionaries are about. That was my initial approach. From
there on I asked some questions and reacted to the answers. That seems
normal to me.
If I were to discard the beliefs that have been the foundations of art
theory from time immemorial in favor a different approach I would make damn
sure that I understood its rationale well enough to defend it.
I am not laying responsibility for my education on anybody. You make
conversation or you don't. I was the challenger. When a challenger is ill
equipped he should be easy pickings for those who choose to engage.
I don't boast that my answers will be correct but I don't mind telling you
what I have gleamed from messages in hpo.:
"Intrinsic" to Objectivists is a (proposed) self-existing quality of
abstractions. These abstractions have absolute identity of their own,
independent of "existence" or consciousness. To some intuitionists beauty is
one such abstraction.
Objective (to O's) means having demostrable or potentially demonstrable
identity independently of consciousness.
Subjective (to O's) means that identity is assigned by consciousness.
By the way if Reality exists independently of consciousness it must have
objective attributes. (Objectivism 101). And in Objectivism, aren't values
attributed by the observer in the context of his life experience (sense of
life?)? Your rejection of beauty as a value that follows from the attributes
of Reality still seems paradoxical.