Cagematch: Owl vs. Ivan
Kasigi 0mi
Hello, I would like to engineer a debate on the subject of ethics in which the
main participants are "Owl" and "Ivan Ordonez." Others are of course welcome,
and I will be partaking myself, but it is their particular philosophies that I
am interested in. I select these two because, of the regular posters here, they
seem to me to be the most rational. However, they differ significantly on one
topic that I am very intered in(ethics), and am trying to resolve for myself.
So I thought it would be interesting if they'd submit their reasoning skills to
this thread for a bit and we could get a better understanding of who is
correct.
I will try to start this off by highlightning the issue as I understand it:
Owl has presented an arugment in his "Why I am not an Objectivist" post that
looks sort of like this:
(1) Ethics is a body of objective knowledge.
(2) Every observation is descriptive in content.
(3) No evaluative propositions are known on the basis of descriptive
propositions alone, for
(a) No evaluative proposition is deduced from descriptive propositions; and
(b) No evaluative proposition is induced from descriptive propositions.
(4) Therefore, moral knowledge requires an a priori basis.
Owl never presented this *exact* argument. He posted this argument without the
first premise, which is the premise that I have questions about, and it seems
that Ivan disargees with. It seems that this first premise only clarifies Owl's
position and does not really change it. I think he left it out because he
thought it was assumed, but I may be wrong and I may have butchered his proof
somehow in a way that I cannot see. He also may have left it out because
without it his argument makes perfect sense, and he did not want to advertise
that his argument wasn't as logical as he presented it to be. But, since I've
read many of Owl's posts and get the feeling that he isn't the type of person
who would intentionaly do something like that, I will give him the benefit of
the doubt.
Now, it seems to me that the first premise that before was just "assumed" could
be easily contested. It seems to be the one that Ivan objects to and I must say
I find the idea of objective 'a priori' ethics sort of far-fetched. Why can't
"Good" and "Bad" just be social constructs that are assigned to certain things
by people?
Owl, you have used examples with Adolf Hitler and seemed to been relying on the
fact that we'd all strongly believe what he did was wrong, that there must be
something to it other than morals being arbitrary. Or something different about
the contrasting views "Murder is wrong vs Murder is right" and something
subjective like "I like toast vs. I don't like Toast."
It seems to me though, that the reason that some morals seem "obvious" to us is
just that we have been conditioned to believe in them since we were single
celled organisms billions of years ago.
Here is a little story to illustrate:
Something caused the earth to form and life began sprouting up. Now, because of
the nature of reality and of our planet, things that were alive would always
try to stay alive and reproduce, just because it was hardcoded into their DNA.
Little fish swimming around in the ocean avoided danger and try to mate with
other fish because that was how they were made.
Now fastforward to human-like creatures. It is still in our basic nature to
want to live. It comes from our genetics and the fact that we are human and the
fact that all life behaves this way because that is the way the world works,
you do not need any objective ethics for this.
Suppose that these humans found that they could flourish better in a society of
people instead of wandering around by themselves. Why did they want to
flourish? Because it is just in their nature. Why does little johnny like
icecream? It is just in the nature of little boys to like such things. He has
an urge to eat icecream that comes from his biology, just like humans have an
urge to live and be social and procreate because it is in their biology.
Now that humans have decided to be social, a problem arises: people are killing
eachother. This disrupts their society, makes it less efficient, and also makes
it less enjoyable. Why do they enjoy it less? Because of some objective body of
ethics? No, because it is just in their nature to want to live without threats
against their life, just as it is in a Mosquito's nature to fly toward
something animals and extract its blood. It is just wired that way because of
it's biology, as humans are wired a certain way because of their biology.
Now that everyone is killing eachother and they see how this makes their
society less satisfactory to their biological nature, they develop customs that
say "killing is bad", because killing harms their society. Similarly, humans
are wired in ways that make them not want to be lied to and taken advantage of,
so they come up with customs like "lying is bad."
They continue to develop all sorts of ethics because they serve a biological
purpose. They further the human race and they enable humans to live happier and
more in-line with their nature.
Objective "a priori" Ethics does not enter into this at all. Humans are a
certain way by nature, so they try to develop societies and ethics accordingly.
Doesn't sound too far-fetched to me.
So, there really is no such thing as an objective "good" and "bad." People just
use those terms like Objectivists use them. If you want to eat a lamb, then
there are certain things that are good for that goal, and certain things that
are bad for it. If you want to kill someone, then there are certain things that
are good for achieving that goal, and certain things that are bad for it.
"good" and "bad" do not exist outside of the 'good for what'? role. And even in
that case "good" does not exist as you think of it, but means "degree to which
this will achieve X goal"
I am not trying to define an objective "good" here like you talked about in
your essay, I am simply saying "good" doesn't exist, but people make the sound
"good" when refering to how effective something is at achieving a certain goal.
So a tree being chopped down is "good" for a lumberjack, who wants to use it to
make a house. But it is "bad" for the tree's survival. It is also "bad" for
someone who liked reading under that particular tree and is now being deprived
of it.
Owl, can you explain to me how your theory of some objective "goodness" or
"badness" floating around out there makes any sense when it seems this is a
much simpler and more realistic explaination?
It seems to me that Ivan's theory is somewhat similar to the one I have been
arguing, but is most likely not identical. The reason I tried to include Ivan
here is that his views seem quite similar to these ones that I think seriously
cast doubt on this "a priori ethics" stuff, and he seems much more familiar
with his ideas than I am and can probably argue them better than I can.
So Ivan, if you'd like to point out any additional flaws that you see in Owl's
reasoning(I recommend reading his essay "Why I am not an Objectivist" if you
haven't yet.. Or just the parts about 'a priori' knowledge and 'ethics') or if
you'd like to point out flaws in my reasoning, or if you'd like to point out
anything at all, I would find it helpful. I have already sort of began the
debate with the "ethics don't exist" side of the argument, which you seem to
subscribe to, so this particular post might not need a response, but when Owl
starts throwing out logical symbols that I don't understand and making all
sorts of "I-have-a-college-education" arguments that I am too ignorant to
refute properly, you may be in greater demand.
-Jesus
Robert F. Benz
Why do you a-holes insist on cluttering up the Objectivist board with your
idiotic barf? Your idea is fine, but there are ten thousand other boards
and newsgroups where it belongs, not here.
And if you really are Jesus, go bleeped your own mother to begit yourself,
and you got exactly what you deserved for inflicting a 2,000 year guiilt
trip on humanity.
Go away.
With utmost disrespect, Robert F. Benz
Kasigi 0mi
>Jesus,
>Why do you a-holes insist on cluttering up the Objectivist board with your
>idiotic barf?
>Your idea is fine, but there are ten thousand other boards
>and newsgroups where it belongs, not here.
I am not just posting an idea. I am trying to pick the brains of two certain
people. The only USENET board that I know of that they both post at is this
one. Since we are on the subject of philosophy and not fly-fishing or "MAKING
MONEY FAST," I don't think it is too out of place.
-Jesus
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
Kasigi 0mi <kasi...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:19990723222236...@ng-fi1.aol.com...
> (Note: This is Jesus)
>
> Hello, I would like to engineer a debate on the subject of ethics in
which the
> main participants are "Owl" and "Ivan Ordonez." Others are of course
welcome,
> and I will be partaking myself, but it is their particular
philosophies that I
> am interested in. I select these two because, of the regular posters
here, they
> seem to me to be the most rational.
Since you don't mind the "less rational" of us to post, here is my
contribution.
Morality is either:
1) Subjective.
2) Intrinsic.
3) Objective.
If there are other options, I'm not aware of them.
If 1) is correct, then the debate is an exchange of opinions.
If 2) is correct, then the debate must be concerned with demonstrating
this. (This would be the position of those who believe in God. They
maintain there is a "Good" that exists independent of anything it
relates to.)
If 3) is correct, then the debate must establish the reference. What
makes a thing good or bad, if not just the opinion of someone. What is
the measure, in other words.
Jesus said:
>
> Now fastforward to human-like creatures. It is still in our basic
nature to
> want to live. It comes from our genetics and the fact that we are
human and the
> fact that all life behaves this way because that is the way the
world works,
> you do not need any objective ethics for this.
These _are_ objective standards you are using. You *Do* need objective
standards, because that is the way the world works. (Do you understand
what objective means?)
> [clip]
> Now that humans have decided to be social, a problem arises: people
are killing
> eachother. This disrupts their society, makes it less efficient, and
also makes
> it less enjoyable. Why do they enjoy it less? Because of some
objective body of
> ethics? No, because it is just in their nature to want to live
without threats
> against their life, just as it is in a Mosquito's nature to fly
toward
> something animals and extract its blood. It is just wired that way
because of
> it's biology, as humans are wired a certain way because of their
biology.
But objective standards _are_ based on your nature. (Remember - Man
Qua Man, The nature of man?)
> Now that everyone is killing eachother and they see how this makes
their
> society less satisfactory to their biological nature, they develop
customs that
> say "killing is bad", because killing harms their society.
Similarly, humans
> are wired in ways that make them not want to be lied to and taken
advantage of,
> so they come up with customs like "lying is bad."
>
> They continue to develop all sorts of ethics because they serve a
biological
> purpose. They further the human race and they enable humans to live
happier and
> more in-line with their nature.
So far, you have been using objective criteria. They "develop" as you
say, an ethics based on their nature. You look at nature, and develop
your ethics based on nature. That is objective. (Good work Jesus)
> Objective "a priori" Ethics does not enter into this at all. Humans
are a
> certain way by nature, so they try to develop societies and ethics
accordingly.
> Doesn't sound too far-fetched to me.
>
> So, there really is no such thing as an objective "good" and "bad."
People just
> use those terms like Objectivists use them.
Are you confusing Intrinsic with objective? You are almost there in
understanding the basis of Objectivist Ethics. Remember, Objectivists
don't believe in a "floating" Good.
There is no such thing as an Intrinsic Good. (Is that what you meant
to say?)
>If you want to eat a lamb, then
> there are certain things that are good for that goal, and certain
things that
> are bad for it. If you want to kill someone, then there are certain
things that
> are good for achieving that goal, and certain things that are bad
for it.
> "good" and "bad" do not exist outside of the 'good for what'? role.
And even in
> that case "good" does not exist as you think of it, but means
"degree to which
> this will achieve X goal"
Keep this up, and you may soon see the light. (Ivan won't like this
one bit.)
> I am not trying to define an objective "good" here like you talked
about in
> your essay, I am simply saying "good" doesn't exist, but people make
the sound
> "good" when refering to how effective something is at achieving a
certain goal.
> So a tree being chopped down is "good" for a lumberjack, who wants
to use it to
> make a house. But it is "bad" for the tree's survival. It is also
"bad" for
> someone who liked reading under that particular tree and is now
being deprived
> of it.
So, "Good" implies a someone to relate it to. This means you are not
an Intrinsic(ist)?
> Owl, can you explain to me how your theory of some objective
"goodness" or
> "badness" floating around out there makes any sense when it seems
this is a
> much simpler and more realistic explaination?
Owl seems to be less of an Objectivist than you in this regard. He may
be a bit of an Intrincicist. (Is that a word?) You are right, Good is
not floating out there. That is certainly not an Objectivist position.
Ivan won't admit it, but I can't see how his views are anything but
subjective.
--
A.Broese-van-Groenou.
Bert Clanton
<bro...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
> Morality is either
> 1) Subjective.
> 2) Intrinsic.
> 3) Objective.
>
> If there are other options, I'm not aware of them.
> If 1) is correct, then the debate is an exchange of opinions.
> If 2) is correct, then the debate must be concerned with demonstrating
> this. (This would be the position of those who believe in God. They
> maintain there is a "Good" that exists independent of anything it
> relates to.)
> If 3) is correct, then the debate must establish the reference. What
> makes a thing good or bad, if not just the opinion of someone. What is
> the measure, in other words.
>
Well said!
I think that it makes good sense to say that the word "good" has three
distinct usages in moral philosophy, two of which are "evaluative" and one
of which I'd call "intersubjectively descriptive":
The evaluative ("emotive:) usages of "good":
1) "X is good" means something like "Hooray for X"! (expressive, subjective)
2) "X is good" means something like "Approve of X"! (evocational, subjective)
The intersubjectively descriptive usage of "good":
3) "X is good" means "X is a necessary or sufficient means to, or a part
of, at least the most precedent supreme desideratum of the moral system
which you and I share." (descriptive, intersubjective)
But of course this leaves open the questions: "Why choose the particular
supreme desiderata that you have chosen, and why adopt the particular
precedence-ranking among your supreme desiderata that you have adopted?"
First, those questions can't be answered *within* a particular moral
system: to do so would require circular reasoning. So if you're going to
give reasons for adopting a particular set of supreme desiderata, and for
adopting a particular precedence-ranking among the members of that set,
your reasons *must* be *non-moral* reasons.
Here I think the Objectivists have it basically right, when they propose
that what is most worthy of approval is what objectively conduces to the
survival and/or flourishing of "Man qua Man". In this sense, I'm a small-O
objectivist. Where I disagree with the Objectivists is that I think that
they have a seriously truncated view of the nature of "Man qua Man".
My point of view assumes, with the Objectivists, that moral systems are
not just "floating abstractions" or forms of "mental masturbation", but
are "for something": they are cultural inventions, intersubjectively
agreed upon; but some of them promote the objective well-being of "Man qua
Man" more effectively than others.
Best wishes,
Bert
Kiekeben
>
>Kasigi 0mi <kasi...@aol.com> wrote in message
>news:19990723222236...@ng-fi1.aol.com...
>> (Note: This is Jesus)
>>
>Since you don't mind the "less rational" of us to post, here is my
>contribution.
>Morality is either:
>1) Subjective.
>2) Intrinsic.
>3) Objective.
>
This false trichotomy is just Objectivism's way of setting itself apart.
Ethical statements either admit of truth and falsity or they don't. If they do,
then ethics is objective. If they don't, then it is subjective. That's only two
options. "Intrinsicism" is just Rand's label for non-Objectivist objectivism.
>Jesus said:
>>
>> Now fastforward to human-like creatures. It is still in our basic
>nature to
>> want to live. It comes from our genetics and the fact that we are
>human and the
>> fact that all life behaves this way because that is the way the
>world works,
>> you do not need any objective ethics for this.
>
>These _are_ objective standards you are using. You *Do* need objective
>standards, because that is the way the world works. (Do you understand
>what objective means?)
There is nothing in what Jesus said that an ethical subjectivist would in
essence disagree with. (Do you understand what subjective means?)
All Objectivist (capital O) ethical "truths" are conditional on first accepting
certain goals (the life of man qua man). But whether or not such goals should
be accepted is itself an ethical question. The question "is the life of MQM
something to be desired?" is an ethical one. But to answer it one must go
beyond Objectivist ethics. If there is no factual answer to ultimate ethical
questions like that (if the only answers you can give are merely expressions of
your preferences), then ethics ultimately rests on a subjective foundation.
Rand has done nothing to disprove this. (Just look at the mess Peikoff gets
himself into on this question in OPAR.)
db...@tampatrib.com
Kasigi 0mi <kasi...@aol.com> wrote:
> (Note: This is Jesus)
Are you sure? Not Napoleon?
> I select these two because, of the regular posters here, they
> seem to me to be the most rational.
MAKE LAFF
-- at no extra charge
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Share what you know. Learn what you don't.
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
Bert Clanton <be...@sonic.net> wrote in message
news:bert-24079...@d61.pm8.sonic.net...
> Here I think the Objectivists have it basically right, when they
propose
> that what is most worthy of approval is what objectively conduces to
the
> survival and/or flourishing of "Man qua Man". In this sense, I'm a
small-O
> objectivist. Where I disagree with the Objectivists is that I think
that
> they have a seriously truncated view of the nature of "Man qua Man".
Could you tell me more about this. Where do you think they are being
unrealistic, and where is your view more so?
a
a
a
--
A.Broese-van-Groenou.
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
Kiekeben <kiek...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:19990724172728...@ng-fj1.aol.com...
> Arnold Broese-van-Groenou bro...@ozemail.com.au wrote:
>
> >
> >Kasigi 0mi <kasi...@aol.com> wrote in message
> >news:19990723222236...@ng-fi1.aol.com...
> >> (Note: This is Jesus)
> >>
>
> >Since you don't mind the "less rational" of us to post, here is my
> >contribution.
> >Morality is either:
> >1) Subjective.
> >2) Intrinsic.
> >3) Objective.
> >
>
> This false trichotomy is just Objectivism's way of setting itself
apart.
> Ethical statements either admit of truth and falsity or they don't.
If they do,
> then ethics is objective. If they don't, then it is subjective.
That's only two
> options. "Intrinsicism" is just Rand's label for non-Objectivist
objectivism.
>
> >Jesus said:
> >>
> >> Now fastforward to human-like creatures. It is still in our basic
> >nature to
> >> want to live. It comes from our genetics and the fact that we are
> >human and the
> >> fact that all life behaves this way because that is the way the
> >world works,
> >> you do not need any objective ethics for this.
> >
> >These _are_ objective standards you are using. You *Do* need
objective
> >standards, because that is the way the world works. (Do you
understand
> >what objective means?)
>
> There is nothing in what Jesus said that an ethical subjectivist
would in
> essence disagree with. (Do you understand what subjective means?)
>
> All Objectivist (capital O) ethical "truths" are conditional on
first accepting
> certain goals (the life of man qua man). But whether or not such
goals should
> be accepted is itself an ethical question. The question "is the life
of MQM
> something to be desired?" is an ethical one.
I'm not sure about this. I would have thought that ethical values only
kick in once the goal has been chosen. Having chosen to live, the rest
follows.
I have never seen MQM as a narrow path. To me, it has meant any life
that is in harmony with reality. Correct choice is confirmed if you
are basically happy.
>But to answer it one must go
> beyond Objectivist ethics. If there is no factual answer to ultimate
ethical
> questions like that (if the only answers you can give are merely
expressions of
> your preferences), then ethics ultimately rests on a subjective
foundation.
> Rand has done nothing to disprove this. (Just look at the mess
Peikoff gets
> himself into on this question in OPAR.)
Objective choices do involve the subject, but, whether or not they are
subjective, depends on whether there is a clash with reality. If not,
then I would say they were objective.
--
A.Broese-van-Groenou.
Bert Clanton
<bro...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
Yes, I can.
For a start:
I believe that Objectivists would say that I am acting correctly if I act
to enhance the conditions of my own individual life, provided that I do so
without interfering with the efforts of others to do the same (i.e.,
without violating their rights), and provided that I do not initiate the
use of force. My own view is that such an individualistic viewpoint leaves
out of account certain very important facts:
1. We are all unavoidably and inextricably involved as participants in
multipersonal systems (groups, organizations, societies) and multi-species
systems (ecosystems) upon which we depend for our own survival and
well-being.
2. Such multipersonal systems have their own operational requirements *as
systems*, entirely independent of our own needs and goals as individual
participants in them: e.g., American Airlines has an operational
requirement for jet fuel, but no employee of AA has a personal organismal
requirement for jet fuel.
3. So some of the activities of at least some of us must go toward
satisfying the operational requirements of those multipersonal systems
crucial to our welfare, *whether or not* those activities further our own
individualistic personal goals. In fact, it is quite likely that some of
this necessary system-maintenance activity will *conflict* with our
attainment of some of our own individualistic personal goals.
4. But if this necessary system-maintenance activity *does not* take
place, then the operation of these crucial systems will be degraded.
5. If the operational effectiveness of these crucial multipersonal systems
is degraded, then since we depend upon these systems for our own survival
and well-being, our own survival and well-being will eventually be
compromised.
6. Hence, if we want to insure our own survival and well-being, at least
some of us must dedicate at least some of our efforts to
system-maintenance activities which do not necessarily further the
attainment of our own individualistic personal goals, and in some cases
may even interfere with our attainment of an individualistic personal
goal. That is, at least some of us must occasionally "sacrifice for the
collective survival or well-being".
7. That conclusion, which seems unavoidable to me, does not seem to be
compatible with Objectivism's "rational egoist" ethic. Hence I am not an
Objectivist.
8. This point of view also seems to me to be quite inconsistent with the
philosophy of laissez-faire capitalism. Hence I am not a philosophical
adherent of laissez-faire capitalism.
Best wishes,
Bert
Owl
> (2) Every observation is descriptive in content.
> (3) No evaluative propositions are known on the basis of descriptive
> propositions alone, for
> (a) No evaluative proposition is deduced from descriptive
propositions; and
> (b) No evaluative proposition is induced from descriptive
propositions.
> (4) Therefore, moral knowledge requires an a priori basis.
>
> Owl never presented this *exact* argument. He posted this argument
without the
> first premise, which is the premise that I have questions about, and
it seems
Given the word "requires" (distinct from "has"), the conclusion can be
read as meaning: In order to have moral knowledge, we would have to have
a priori knowledge. In that case, (1) is unnecessary.
To conclude that we do have a priori, moral knowledge, I would need the
premise "There is moral knowledge" -- but note that the word "objective"
(which you insert) is not needed.
Anyway, the reason I did not mention (1) was that my essay was supposed
to be debating with Objectivists, who believe in moral knowledge.
> I find the idea of objective 'a priori' ethics sort of far-fetched.
Why can't
> "Good" and "Bad" just be social constructs that are assigned to
certain things
> by people?
First, questions like "why can't such-and-such be the case?" are often
used as devices for shifting burden of proof illegitimately. (Compare:
"Why couldn't you be a brain in a vat?") It isn't the burden of the
non-skeptic to refute relativism; it is the burden of the relativist to
give evidence of relativism.
Second, I've discussed the objections to relativism previously, in "The
Subjectivist's Dilemma" (_Objectivity_ 2(4), 1996, pp. 77-91).
> It seems to me though, that the reason that some morals seem "obvious"
to us is
> just that we have been conditioned to believe in them since we were
single
> celled organisms billions of years ago.
...
> Now that humans have decided to be social, a problem arises: people
are killing
> eachother. This disrupts their society, makes it less efficient, and
also makes
> it less enjoyable. Why do they enjoy it less? Because of some
objective body of
> ethics? No, because it is just in their nature to want to live without
threats
> against their life, just as it is in a Mosquito's nature to fly toward
> something animals and extract its blood. It is just wired that way
because of
> it's biology, as humans are wired a certain way because of their
biology.
Notice that so far, none of this says anything about the actual nature
of moral value. It says nothing, that is, as to what goodness is, nor
as to what the word "good" means.
> Now that everyone is killing eachother and they see how this makes
their
> society less satisfactory to their biological nature, they develop
customs that
> say "killing is bad", because killing harms their society. Similarly,
humans
This, again, says nothing about the actual CONTENT of the statement
"killing is bad". What, exactly, is it that the people are saying about
killing? That it's BAD, but what is BADNESS?
> Objective "a priori" Ethics does not enter into this at all. Humans
are a
> certain way by nature, so they try to develop societies and ethics
accordingly.
> Doesn't sound too far-fetched to me.
>
> So, there really is no such thing as an objective "good" and "bad."
People just
Notice three things now:
First, that the last sentence from you is a non sequitur (it's an
instance of the 'genetic fallacy'). You started by speculating about
what forces might have caused people to be opposed to killing, with the
implication that they also caused people to say "Killing is bad". Even
if that were true, nothing would follow about (a) the correct analysis
of the expression "bad", nor (b) whether the statement "killing is bad"
is true.
To see this, compare an analogous argument. Suppose I give a story
about how you learned the Pythagorean theorem. Suppose you learned it
by having some teachers tell it to you, and you accepted it. Now,
suppose I say, "So, therefore the Pythagorean theorem is false, or
'subjective' (whatever that means)." I think you can see that this is a
non sequitur.
Second, notice that you didn't provide any actual evidence; you just
gave speculation. I might just as well tell you a story where people
have a series of a priori insights into the nature of moral value, and
that makes them adopt certain laws and social conventions. Now, you say
my story is "farfetched". But it doesn't seem farfetched to me. Why is
your story better than mine?
Third, and most importantly, notice that you haven't so far actually
given a theory about the nature of ethics. So far, we know what you
DENY to be the nature of ethics. And we know what you think causes
ethical beliefs. But you haven't said anything positively about what
good and bad ARE, whether they exist, or what "good" and "bad" mean.
But perhaps you are just about to do that:
> "good" and "bad" do not exist outside of the 'good for what'? role.
And even in
> that case "good" does not exist as you think of it, but means "degree
to which
> this will achieve X goal"
>
> I am not trying to define an objective "good" here like you talked
about in
> your essay, I am simply saying "good" doesn't exist, but people make
the sound
> "good" when refering to how effective something is at achieving a
certain goal.
You need to clarify what you're saying. First, avoid the use/mention
errors. Your above statement appears to be that the word "good" doesn't
exist, which is certainly false.
Second, are you saying nothing is good? That "x is good" is always
FALSE? One would infer that from your statement that good doesn't
exist.
Or are you, rather, saying that "is good" means "will achieve X goal"?
In which case, goodness does exist, since there certainly are things
that achieve goals, and "x is good" is often TRUE.
I have found that moral skeptics constantly make confusions of this
kind; they can't get straight what they're saying. I can't tell you
what's wrong with your position, until I am sure what it is.
Third, the expression "degree to which this will achieve X goal" doesn't
make sense in the context in which it appears. What is X? Were you
saying that a thing is good whenever there is SOME goal it achieves?
(So everything is good.) Or a thing is good if it achieves EVERY goal?
(So nothing is good.) Or is there some specific goal, such that a thing
is good if it achieves THAT goal? (If so, what is that goal?) Or
perhaps you wanted to say "y is good" is always elliptical for "y is
good relative to x" where x is some goal the speaker has in mind.
> Owl, can you explain to me how your theory of some objective
"goodness" or
> "badness" floating around out there makes any sense when it seems this
is a
> much simpler and more realistic explaination?
Well, when are you going to stop beating your wife? This is a 'complex
question'. First, I didn't say that good and bad floated around.
Second, your view doesn't seem to me much simpler and more realistic.
It seems to me that the simplest explanation is that people think things
are right or wrong, because those things ARE right or wrong. Third,
you're asking me to explain how my theory "makes any sense", but you
didn't explain a reason why it doesn't make sense, so I don't have much
to respond to.
Ok, look, I'll give a short (very short) exposition of the possible
theories of ethics. There are five possible views, which include two
forms of 'realism' and two forms of 'anti-realism':
Moral realism: The view that some things have moral value, independently
of the attitudes of observers towards those things. (The last phrase is
what makes value "objective".)
1. Ethical naturalism: The form of realism which says moral value is
reducible to, or can be defined in terms of, some natural (non-moral)
properties.
2. Intuitionism: The form of realism which says moral value is
irreducible.
Anti-realism: The denial of realism. There are 3 possible kinds of
anti-realism:
3. Nihilism: The theory that nothing has moral value.
4. Relativism/subjectivism: The theory that some things have moral
value, but their value is dependent on the attitudes of observers
towards those things.
5. Non-cognitivism: The theory that putative statements about moral
value do not assert propositions; so the word "good" does not purport to
refer to a property at all. There are at least 2 forms of
non-cognitivism:
5a) Emotivism: Moral words are just used to express people's feelings.
So, again, they are not used to assert anything.
5b) Prescriptivism: Moral language is used to issue imperatives to
people, rather than to make assertions.
(Incidentally, you might have views which combine 2 or more of the
above. E.g., you could think moral language has *both* a prescriptive
and an emotive meaning.)
Now, my own view is (2). As far as I understand it, the Objectivist
view is (1). I can't tell yet what your view is.
o
Owl
> 1. We are all unavoidably and inextricably involved as participants in
> multipersonal systems (groups, organizations, societies) and
multi-species
> systems (ecosystems) upon which we depend for our own survival and
> well-being.
>
> 2. Such multipersonal systems have their own operational requirements
*as
> systems*, entirely independent of our own needs and goals as
individual
> participants in them: e.g., American Airlines has an operational
> requirement for jet fuel, but no employee of AA has a personal
organismal
> requirement for jet fuel.
>
> 3. So some of the activities of at least some of us must go toward
> satisfying the operational requirements of those multipersonal systems
> crucial to our welfare, *whether or not* those activities further our
own
> individualistic personal goals. In fact, it is quite likely that some
of
> this necessary system-maintenance activity will *conflict* with our
> attainment of some of our own individualistic personal goals.
This doesn't follow. To use your example, employees of AA do in fact
procure jet fuel for the company; yet it is not against their interests
to do so. They do not do it out of altruistic concern for the company.
They get paid to do it. You certainly know this already, so I don't
understand how you could come to conclusion (3).
o
Owl
news:19990724172728...@ng-fj1.aol.com...
> Ethical statements either admit of truth and falsity or they don't. If
they do,
> then ethics is objective. If they don't, then it is subjective. That's
only two
> options. "Intrinsicism" is just Rand's label for non-Objectivist
objectivism.
I think this is a bit simplistic. See my earlier message to Jesus for
the list of 5 possibilities.
o
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
> satisfying the operational requirements of those multipersonal
systems
> crucial to our welfare, *whether or not* those activities further
our own
> individualistic personal goals. In fact, it is quite likely that
some of
> this necessary system-maintenance activity will *conflict* with our
> attainment of some of our own individualistic personal goals.
What I find interesting, is that you say: "requirements of those
multipersonal systems crucial to our welfare", and then continue,
saying these systems may conflict with your goals (welfare). Do they
or don't they contribute to your welfare, and if they do, what is the
problem?
> 5. If the operational effectiveness of these crucial multipersonal
systems
> is degraded, then since we depend upon these systems for our own
survival
> and well-being, our own survival and well-being will eventually be
> compromised.
Indeed. So, it would appear that these systems _are_ involved in your
interests. So, where's the problem?
> 6. Hence, if we want to insure our own survival and well-being, at
least
> some of us must dedicate at least some of our efforts to
> system-maintenance activities which do not necessarily further the
> attainment of our own individualistic personal goals, and in some
cases
> may even interfere with our attainment of an individualistic
personal
> goal. That is, at least some of us must occasionally "sacrifice for
the
> collective survival or well-being".
Not at all. If your personal goal, causes you to have a conflict with
systems which insure your survival, then, such systems should rightly
be incorporated into your value system, not outside of it. In that
case, there is no sacrifice (meaning giving up more than you receive)
Either it is worth it, or it isn't. If it is, what's the problem?
> 7. That conclusion, which seems unavoidable to me, does not seem to
be
> compatible with Objectivism's "rational egoist" ethic. Hence I am
not an
> Objectivist.
Whatever is in your rational interest, fits in. I can't see why you
place a barrier between these two sets of values. Are you talking of
*your* values, or, are you discussing the values others place on the
items in question? Is the conflict between your's and others values,
rather than yours alone?
> 8. This point of view also seems to me to be quite inconsistent with
the
> philosophy of laissez-faire capitalism. Hence I am not a
philosophical
> adherent of laissez-faire capitalism.
This didn't seem obvious to me at first. Have I missed something. I
did not see you call for the use of force, only a concern for
institutions you thought were valuable. Now, it appears that you want
to force others to value the institutions you value. (That is not
nice). Rest assured, if any institution is worthwhile, it will survive
without force.
--
A.Broese-van-Groenou.
Iván Ordóñez
[...]
>Or are you, rather, saying that "is good" means "will achieve X goal"?
>In which case, goodness does exist, since there certainly are things
>that achieve goals, and "x is good" is often TRUE.
That would indicate that "the good" does indeed exist; it's just that it
would be subjective. Jesus was refering to the existence of the objective
good.
[....]
>Third, the expression "degree to which this will achieve X goal" doesn't
>make sense in the context in which it appears.
I have no trouble understanding it.
> What is X?
Whatever you want: you pick your own goals. If you are Hitler and your
goal is to kill all Jewish people... you get my drift.
[...] Or
>perhaps you wanted to say "y is good" is always elliptical for "y is
>good relative to x" where x is some goal the speaker has in mind.
I think that's the obvious interpretation.
[...]
>It seems to me that the simplest explanation is that people think things
>are right or wrong, because those things ARE right or wrong.
That does not explain what right or wrong is. Besides, you could as well
have said 500 years ago: "It seems to me that the simplest explanation is
that people think the earth is flat, because the earth IS flat."
> Third,
>you're asking me to explain how my theory "makes any sense", but you
>didn't explain a reason why it doesn't make sense, so I don't have much
>to respond to.
It doesn't make sense because it makes no attempt to provide a
subject-independent method to determine whether something is right or
wrong.
For example, statements such as "it is raining" can be objectively
verified, and one method to do so is to look out the window. What is the
analogous method for moral determinations? What senses do we use to look
at the right in such way that there is no possibility of rational
disagreement?
If I understand your position correct, you appeal to moral intuition. Do
you have a foundation for it? Can you justify it any better than a
religious person can justify faith? Can you state why you believe that my
intuitions must necessarily be the same as yours?
--
Iván Ordóñez
http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/~iordonez
email is iordonez at columbus dot rr dot com
Bert Clanton
> Bert Clanton <be...@sonic.net> wrote in message
> news:bert-25079...@d163.pm12.sonic.net...
> >
> > 3. So some of the activities of at least some of us must go toward
> > satisfying the operational requirements of those multipersonal systems
> > crucial to our welfare, *whether or not* those activities further our
> own
> > individualistic personal goals. In fact, it is quite likely that some
> of
> > this necessary system-maintenance activity will *conflict* with our
> > attainment of some of our own individualistic personal goals.
>
> This doesn't follow. To use your example, employees of AA do in fact
> procure jet fuel for the company; yet it is not against their interests
> to do so. They do not do it out of altruistic concern for the company.
> They get paid to do it. You certainly know this already, so I don't
> understand how you could come to conclusion (3).
>
> o
I certainly agree that it is not "against the interests" of AA employees
to procure jet fuel for AA. In fact it is in their interests to do so. But
it is not an *individualistic personal goal* of theirs, in the sense that
having a good meal, or a nice house, or a satisfying sexual encounter, are
individualistic personal goals. In fact, what makes it possible for AA to
operate is that some of its employees adopt as *personal* goals the
procurement of fuel for AA. But this is not in and of itself an
*individualistic* goal, even though it is a *personal* goal. In fact, some
of us are motivated by such things as "hazard pay" to adopt as personal
goals even things which are dangerous to our health. Although "hazard pay"
might be a *means* to the attainment of individualistic personal goals,
subjecting oneself to danger is not itself something that one would
ordinarily adopt as an individualistic personal goal on its own merits. So
we *can* be induced to perform "system maintenance" tasks which are
unpleasant or frustrating or even dangerous at the personal level. If that
were not so, systems like AA could not exist. That does not make such
performance an *individualistic* personal goal, in the sense I mean. And
in my view, that does not negate the point that I was making. Perhaps I
could have made the point more clearly.
I don't mean to say that AA employees procure fuel for AA out of
altruistic concern for the company. They don't--and in fact we might
consider anyone who did to be somewhat eccentric. They do it because
that's the job they're paid to do--even if they'd much rather be lying on
the beach drinking Margaritas.
Again, I don't see that you've refuted my conclusion (3).
Best wishes,
Bert
Bert Clanton
<bro...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
> Bert Clanton <be...@sonic.net> wrote in message
> news:bert-25079...@d163.pm12.sonic.net...
> >
> > 3. So some of the activities of at least some of us must go toward
> > satisfying the operational requirements of those multipersonal
> systems
> > crucial to our welfare, *whether or not* those activities further
> our own
> > individualistic personal goals. In fact, it is quite likely that
> some of
> > this necessary system-maintenance activity will *conflict* with our
> > attainment of some of our own individualistic personal goals.
>
> What I find interesting, is that you say: "requirements of those
> multipersonal systems crucial to our welfare", and then continue,
> saying these systems may conflict with your goals (welfare). Do they
> or don't they contribute to your welfare, and if they do, what is the
> problem?
>
My *goals* are not the same as my *welfare*. These multipersonal systems
are crucial for my objective welfare. But I may have personal goals which
conflict directly with the requirements of those systems, and hence
conflict in the long run with objective human welfare. By objective
welfare at the personal level, I basically mean survival and health. There
is nothing to guarantee that what I pursue as personal goals are
consistent with my survival or my health, or with the survival and health
of other people.
> > 5. If the operational effectiveness of these crucial multipersonal
> systems
> > is degraded, then since we depend upon these systems for our own
> survival
> > and well-being, our own survival and well-being will eventually be
> > compromised.
>
> Indeed. So, it would appear that these systems _are_ involved in your
> interests. So, where's the problem?
>
No problem at all. I insisted that those systems *are* involved
*crucially* in my welfare. In fact, your "indeed" seems to imply that you
agree with the point I made.
>
> > 6. Hence, if we want to insure our own survival and well-being, at
> least
> > some of us must dedicate at least some of our efforts to
> > system-maintenance activities which do not necessarily further the
> > attainment of our own individualistic personal goals, and in some
> cases
> > may even interfere with our attainment of an individualistic
> personal
> > goal. That is, at least some of us must occasionally "sacrifice for
> the
> > collective survival or well-being".
>
> Not at all. If your personal goal, causes you to have a conflict with
> systems which insure your survival, then, such systems should rightly
> be incorporated into your value system, not outside of it. In that
> case, there is no sacrifice (meaning giving up more than you receive)
> Either it is worth it, or it isn't. If it is, what's the problem?
>
Exactly! No problem at all! That's exactly what I attempt to do in
adopting a value-system which *does* incorporate those systems. And
rightly so, as you say.
It seems that by "sacrifice", I mean something different than what
Objectivists mean. I don't mean "giving up more than I receive". I mean
foregoing the attainment of something that I want very much to get
something which, on balance, I want even more. I'd agree: if I value what
I give up more than what I strive for, I'm acting irrationally. I don't
think that I'm adopting an irrational set of values if I value the
long-term survival of my species or my country or my family or myself more
than I value my own personal pleasure.
> > 7. That conclusion, which seems unavoidable to me, does not seem to
> be
> > compatible with Objectivism's "rational egoist" ethic. Hence I am
> not an
> > Objectivist.
>
> Whatever is in your rational interest, fits in. I can't see why you
> place a barrier between these two sets of values. Are you talking of
> *your* values, or, are you discussing the values others place on the
> items in question? Is the conflict between your's and others values,
> rather than yours alone?
>
I'd say it differently. Whatever fits in, whatever promotes the survival
and effective operation of those multipersonal systems that I depend upon,
is what is in my rational interest. I place a barrier between egocentric
personal goals and systems-maintenance goals only in so far as specific
personal goals conflict with the goal of maintaining those crucial
systems. Quite often, there is no such conflict--provided that we have
chosen our personal goals rationally, in accordance with the *reality* of
our dependence upon those suprapersonal systems. It seems to me that
Objectivists often deny the reality of their dependence upon such
suprapersonal systems.
> > 8. This point of view also seems to me to be quite inconsistent with
> the
> > philosophy of laissez-faire capitalism. Hence I am not a
> philosophical
> > adherent of laissez-faire capitalism.
>
> This didn't seem obvious to me at first. Have I missed something. I
> did not see you call for the use of force, only a concern for
> institutions you thought were valuable. Now, it appears that you want
> to force others to value the institutions you value. (That is not
> nice). Rest assured, if any institution is worthwhile, it will survive
> without force.
I am quite willing to let anyone value whatever they value. But if their
values motivate them to *act* in ways which I am convinced pose a real
long-term danger to the survival of my family, or my society, or my
species, then I will do what I can to prevent them from taking those
actions--by force, as a last resort, even if what they are motivated to do
doesn't involve force.
I'm willing to stipulate that I am "not nice".
As for worthwhile institutions surviving without force--tell that to the
aboriginal inhabitants of North America or Tasmania.
Best wishes,
Bert
Owl
> I certainly agree that it is not "against the interests" of AA employees
> to procure jet fuel for AA. In fact it is in their interests to do so.
But
> it is not an *individualistic personal goal* of theirs, in the sense
that
> having a good meal, or a nice house, or a satisfying sexual encounter,
are
> individualistic personal goals. In fact, what makes it possible for AA
to
> operate is that some of its employees adopt as *personal* goals the
> procurement of fuel for AA. But this is not in and of itself an
> *individualistic* goal, even though it is a *personal* goal. In fact,
some
What's the difference between "individualistic" and "personal"?
Is making money an 'individualistic' goal? If X is an individualistic
goal, and you adopt Y as a means to X, is Y then 'individualistic' as
well? I guess not, but I don't know why not.
Anyway, as I understood it, you were trying to refute egoism. But if the
behavior you're saying is good, can be justified as a *means* to selfish
ends which the Objectivists approve of, then it won't be any sort of
refutation of Objectivism.
o
Owl
news:taVm3.2309$gT.1...@ozemail.com.au...
> What I find interesting, is that you say: "requirements of those
> multipersonal systems crucial to our welfare", and then continue,
> saying these systems may conflict with your goals (welfare). Do they
> or don't they contribute to your welfare, and if they do, what is the
> problem?
Well, I was expecting Bert to say: It's a prisoner's dilemma-type
situation. It is in each person's interest for everyone to support the
system; but it's not in the interests of a single individual to support
the system. That would have been a good answer.
Alas, Bert didn't say that, so never mind. Instead, Bert seems to believe
that Objectivism says the following: Whatever goals you have are ipso
facto good for you, and you should pursue whatever is good for you.
Needless to say, that's not the Objectivist position.
o
Kiekeben
>Kiekeben <kiek...@aol.com> wrote
>
>> Ethical statements either admit of truth and falsity or they don't. If
>they do,
>> then ethics is objective. If they don't, then it is subjective. That's
>only two
>> options. "Intrinsicism" is just Rand's label for non-Objectivist
>objectivism.
>
>I think this is a bit simplistic. See my earlier message to Jesus for
>the list of 5 possibilities.
>
The list Owl is referring to is:
"There are five possible views, which include two
forms of 'realism' and two forms of 'anti-realism':
Moral realism: The view that some things have moral value, independently
of the attitudes of observers towards those things. (The last phrase is
what makes value "objective".)
1. Ethical naturalism: The form of realism which says moral value is
reducible to, or can be defined in terms of, some natural (non-moral)
properties.
2. Intuitionism: The form of realism which says moral value is
irreducible.
Anti-realism: The denial of realism. There are 3 possible kinds of
anti-realism:
3. Nihilism: The theory that nothing has moral value.
4. Relativism/subjectivism: The theory that some things have moral
value, but their value is dependent on the attitudes of observers
towards those things.
5. Non-cognitivism: The theory that putative statements about moral
value do not assert propositions; so the word "good" does not purport to
refer to a property at all."
We're just using terms differently. What I mean by "objectivism" above is
"realism" and what I mean by "subjectivism" is "anti-realism". The latter is
how Rand uses the term "subjectivism", as far as I can tell.
In this sense Ayer, for example, is a subjectivist, even though he specifically
denies being one (because he uses "subjectivism" pretty much the way you do).
Kiekeben
>Objective choices do involve the subject, but, whether or not they are
>subjective, depends on whether there is a clash with reality. If not,
>then I would say they were objective.
I'm not sure what you mean by "clashing with reality". Suppose I chose to
perform action x, based on my opinion that x is right, but that at the same
time (being a subjectivist) I admit that my opinion that x is right is merely a
reflection of my preferences or attitudes. IOW, that there is no fact of the
matter regarding x being right or wrong. Does my choice clash with reality?
Bert Clanton
I like your "Prisoner's Dilemma" answer. But even so, I'm not sure I
communicated *my* answer clearly enough. If you think that I meant to say
that "whatever goals you have are good for you, and you should pursue
whatever is good for you", or that Objectivists accept such a principle,I
*really* didn't communicate clearly.
I'll try again, incorporating the "Prisoners' Dilemma"..
1. The suprapersonal systems that I mentioned have their own operational
requirements, distinct from and partly independent of the objective needs
of the individual persons who participate in them, and *certainly*
distinct from and independent of any *egocentric personal goals* that
those individuals might pursue. (Of course, not all personal goals are
egocentric.)
2. Sometimes there is an unavoidable conflict between one's personal
egocentric goals and the operational requirements of the suprapersonal
systems upon which one depends for survival and well-being.
3. In such a case, a "Prisoners' Dilemma" situation arises, in which it is
in each person's long-term interest to satisfy the objective operational
requirements of the relevant suprapersonal system, rather than to pursue
his or her own egocentric personal goal.
Better?
Best wishes,
Bert
Kasigi 0mi
>used as devices for shifting burden of proof illegitimately. (Compare:
>"Why couldn't you be a brain in a vat?") It isn't the burden of the
>non-skeptic to refute relativism; it is the burden of the relativist to
>give evidence of relativism.
Ok, I should not have phrased it that way.
What I am basicaly saying though, is that we can describe 'morals' in terms of
evidence that we KNOW to exist (my theory, which I will elaborate on shortly),
or we can come up with some 'a priori' concept that we do not have any good
evidence for, as far as I have seen.
>Second, I've discussed the objections to relativism previously, in "The
>Subjectivist's Dilemma" (_Objectivity_ 2(4), 1996, pp. 77-91).
>
Im not sure exactly what this is. You seem to be refering to a newsgroup post
that you've written titled "_objectivity_" (or maybe "the subjectivist's
dilemma" but that seems to be a section title) and dated 2-4-96? But your style
is sort of weird. There does not seem to be a reason why you'd put "4" in
parenthasis. And that you have labeled the pages 77-91 makes it seem like your
post must have been quite long, if this indeed was a post. I tried searching
for such a post using a few different methods, but there were no matches.
Perhaps you are refering to a book? I don't know. If there is some post that
you were refering to, could you tell me some specifics about it so I can find
it? Or provide a link to it?
>> something animals and extract its blood. It is just wired that way
>because of
>> it's biology, as humans are wired a certain way because of their
>biology.
>
>Notice that so far, none of this says anything about the actual nature
>of moral value. It says nothing, that is, as to what goodness is, nor
>as to what the word "good" means.
But it does provide some evidence for what living organisms want, which will be
helpful later on:
>this makes
>their
>> society less satisfactory to their biological nature, they develop
>customs that
>> say "killing is bad", because killing harms their society. Similarly,
>humans
>
>This, again, says nothing about the actual CONTENT of the statement
>"killing is bad". What, exactly, is it that the people are saying about
>killing? That it's BAD, but what is BADNESS?
I was using "bad" here as simply a man-made construct that means "I don't like
this" You're right though, I should not have used the term "bad" here, it is
sort of confusing.
>Notice three things now:
>
>First, that the last sentence from you is a non sequitur (it's an
>instance of the 'genetic fallacy')
I'm not sure what "non sequitur" or "genetic fallacy" are. From your example I
am guessing that 'non sequitur' means 'does not follow' or something?
>You started by speculating about
>what forces might have caused people to be opposed to killing, with the
>implication that they also caused people to say "Killing is bad". Even
>if that were true, nothing would follow about (a) the correct analysis
>of the expression "bad", nor (b) whether the statement "killing is bad"
>is true.
I see your point, but I was just using language sloppily. I should not have
been using the terms "good" and "bad" here. I was refering to them as meaning
"I like" and "I don't like", and I did not make that clear enough.
>Second, notice that you didn't provide any actual evidence; you just
>gave speculation. I might just as well tell you a story where people
>have a series of a priori insights into the nature of moral value, and
>that makes them adopt certain laws and social conventions. Now, you say
>my story is "farfetched". But it doesn't seem farfetched to me. Why is
>your story better than mine?
My story is better because there is evidence for its validity even in non-human
organisms, and since humans are so similar to other animals, there does not
seem to be a reason to reject it, as we shall see:
>> I am not trying to define an objective "good" here like you talked
>about in
>> your essay, I am simply saying "good" doesn't exist, but people make
>the sound
>> "good" when refering to how effective something is at achieving a
>certain goal.
>
>You need to clarify what you're saying. First, avoid the use/mention
>errors. Your above statement appears to be that the word "good" doesn't
>exist, which is certainly false.
Not sure what use/mention errors are, but anyhow: What do you mean by the
"word" good? I obviously think that people make the sound "good." and that it
is defined in the dictionary and such. I am just saying that the concept that
you mean when you use it has no basis in reality.
>Second, are you saying nothing is good? That "x is good" is always
>FALSE? One would infer that from your statement that good doesn't
>exist.
I don't think YOUR meaning of good exists.
>Or are you, rather, saying that "is good" means "will achieve X goal"?
>In which case, goodness does exist, since there certainly are things
>that achieve goals, and "x is good" is often TRUE.
>
Correct. But you cannot just say "X is good" without relating X to something. X
is only good in relation to things. X might be good for me and bad for you. Or
X might be good for the health of the forest but bad for the health of your
mom. Etc.
>
>Third, the expression "degree to which this will achieve X goal" doesn't
>make sense in the context in which it appears. What is X? Were you
>saying that a thing is good whenever there is SOME goal it achieves?
>(So everything is good.)
No.
>Or a thing is good if it achieves EVERY goal?
>(So nothing is good.)
No.
>Or is there some specific goal, such that a thing
>is good if it achieves THAT goal? (If so, what is that goal?)
Yes. And that goal is whatever you want it to be. There is no objective
criteria for determining what your goals should be. But once you have a goal,
there is an objective criteria for achieving it. If I decide to go murder some
kittens today, then certain things will be good for that goal (like finding a
blunt object) and certain things will be bad for that goal (like going surfing
all day instead of killing the kittens). If on the other hand my goal was to go
get a tan and meet some hot chicks, then killing the kittens would be bad in
relation to my goal, and going surfing would be good in relation to my goal.
>Or
>perhaps you wanted to say "y is good" is always elliptical for "y is
>good relative to x" where x is some goal the speaker has in mind.
I know what an ellipse is, but I am not sure what this word means in your
contect. Perhaps "synonymous" or something. Are we supposed to picture "y is
good" and "y is good relative to x" as two foci on the elipse?
Anyway, if it means 'synonymous' or 'the same' then my answer is yes.
>First, I didn't say that good and bad floated around
But it is an objective 'property' of things or actions or ideas, like
'whiteness'?
>Second, your view doesn't seem to me much simpler and more realistic.
>It seems to me that the simplest explanation is that people think things
>are right or wrong, because those things ARE right or wrong.
People believe in all sorts of irrational things. That is no reason to conclude
that they exist. How many people believe in God or some supernatural power, in
spirits and ghosts and psychics? Quite a lot of people. Probably a vast
majority of people believe in some sort of mysticism. Should we believe in it
as well, because others do?
I think it is appearant that the human mind likes to know things. It likes to
feel certain and it likes to feel correct. Objective morality sort of satisfies
this need, just like God does for some people. I would guess that even without
any of your evidence or logical theories, just the concept that morality is
objective and things are right or wrong is more appealing to you than the
subjectivist theory.
But that the mind craves order and knowledge and such, and likes to think it
knows what is good or bad doesn't prove that there is no good or bad. What it
does do is provide a rational explaination for why so many people believe in
objective ethics.
>Third,
>you're asking me to explain how my theory "makes any sense", but you
>didn't explain a reason why it doesn't make sense, so I don't have much
>to respond to.
I will address this later in the post:
>1. Ethical naturalism: The form of realism which says moral value is
>reducible to, or can be defined in terms of, some natural (non-moral)
>properties.
>2. Intuitionism: The form of realism which says moral value is
>irreducible.
>4. Relativism/subjectivism: The theory that some things have moral
>value, but their value is dependent on the attitudes of observers
>towards those things.
>Now, my own view is (2). As far as I understand it, the Objectivist
>view is (1). I can't tell yet what your view is.
>
I suppose 4 seems to fit my view. Though since that is a short version of the
theory, maybe when it is expanded it will contain things that I do not agree
with. I think I have explained my view pretty well though earlier in the post,
when I was talking about kittens and surfing and such.
>Moral realism: The view that some things have moral value, independently
>of the attitudes of observers towards those things. (The last phrase is
>what makes value "objective".)
Now, this is what your view falls under, so I have a question:
If there was no life on earth, would goodness and badness still exist? Would a
shift in the earth's crust be good? bad? Would sunlight shining down on the
barren landscape be good? bad? A book that I just checked out from the library
on philosophy says something similar as some sort of argument for subjectivism.
But it seems to me that I would say that goodness and badness deals with humans
or other animals as its subject matter, but is not dependant on their thoughts.
So the book seems to me to be presenting an invalid argument, because in fact
you don't have to be a subjectivsts to say that morality doesn't exist without
life. Is this the view that you take? Or do you actualy think goodness and
badness would still exist in the situation I described?
____________
Now I shall try to give a clearer version of my view:
We know that all living creatures generaly seek to preserve themselves and
reproduce and such. We know that all living things have a certain nature that
guides their actions and guides what their goals will be and what they will
seek and such.
The fact that humans do not like to be killed, and like to live and flourish is
part of our nature. We are geneticaly predisposed to want to live, and to want
to prosper and such, much like other organisms are geneticaly disposed to want
certain things.
In order for us to have certain things that we want, like the benefits of
living in a society(to help us flourish and engage in relationships with other
people and such -- another need determined by genetics), we need to construct
certain codes of conduct that enable us to get what we want (life with other
people) without lots of things that we don't want happening to us(people
killing us, people stealing our property). A good way to do this is to
establish rules for behavior within the society. It is in everyone's interest
to make rules saying "we should not kil eachother" and "we should not steal
from eachother" and such. These things are considered undesirable because they
conflict with the goals of humans(namely living).
Therefore, ethics will form in a reality without properties of 'goodness' and
'badness' so long as the people in this reality have goals. They will start to
make rules of behavior that enable them to achieve their goals more easily.
Since a concept of ethics will form in a reality without "goodness" and
"badness" as you use the terms, and since we live in a society that has a
concept of ethics, it seems that without further evidence, we can conclude that
there is no "goodness" and "badness."
Can you bring forth some evidence that shows why we should reject this view
that seems to work with known evidence, without postulating objective ethical
properties?
At face value, it seems there is no reason not to accept my theory. We have
evidence for it(the stuff about organisms having goals, and that they'd make
rules of behavior if they benefited their goals). Is there any evidence that
conflicts with this? (maybe this is all answered in that post that you
referred to, and you'll just have to give me a link)
You've mentioned a few times about how I shift the burden of proof onto you. I
am not really arguing here to beat you in some argument. I am arguing so that I
can understand and hopefuly logicaly believe in your view of ethics, because
they appeal to me more than this subjectivism stuff. The problem is that
subjectivism seems to me, so far, to be logicaly far superior, and I cannot in
good conscience just believe something because I'd like to, without any logic
to back it up.
So if you could generously accept some burden of proof, or at least direct me
to some sort of proof(your 'why i am not an objectivist' essay only proved
things after having already accepted that ethics was objective), that would be
"good."
-Jesus
Kasigi 0mi
>kick in once the goal has been chosen. Having chosen to live, the rest
>follows.
>I have never seen MQM as a narrow path.
I notice another thing wrong with objectivists. When someone choses to live,
O's seem to think that the must chose to live as an end. When they talk about
"after the first choice, everything else follows" they assume people will be
chosing to live solely in order to live. But many people could be chosing it as
a means. So if an objectivist can only say that their philosophy is only valid
after someone has chosen to live, they make an incorrect assumption that this
choice cannot be a means to another end that is not "life". So their philosophy
is essentialy empty. You can't call anyone else immoral if objectivist morality
only kicks in after you've chosen life as an END, instead of just chosen it. If
you say "hey, stealing my property is objectively immoral" they can just say
"hey, I chose life only as a means to steal property, therefore I am moral."
Wow. I wonder how many ways objectivism can be refuted. I have lost count.
-Jesus
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
Bert Clanton <be...@sonic.net> wrote in message
news:bert-26079...@d173.pm5.sonic.net...
>I don't
> think that I'm adopting an irrational set of values if I value the
> long-term survival of my species or my country or my family or
myself more
> than I value my own personal pleasure.
I would have thought all those things were involved in your personal
pleasure. I have a hard time understanding how you put the things you
value, in two different camps.
Make it simple. You value them, or you don't. I don't have any such
split myself. I strive for the things I value.
ABvG also wrote:
>> Now, it appears that you want
> > to force others to value the institutions you value. (That is not
> > nice). Rest assured, if any institution is worthwhile, it will
survive
> > without force.
> I am quite willing to let anyone value whatever they value. But if
their
> values motivate them to *act* in ways which I am convinced pose a
real
> long-term danger to the survival of my family, or my society, or my
> species, then I will do what I can to prevent them from taking those
> actions--by force, as a last resort, even if what they are motivated
to do
> doesn't involve force.
So, if you find Medicare to your liking, but others don't support it,
you would coerce them into providing it? Are your wants superior to
the wants of others?
> I'm willing to stipulate that I am "not nice".
Tell us more. ;-)
> As for worthwhile institutions surviving without force--tell that to
the
> aboriginal inhabitants of North America or Tasmania.
*I* did not advocate using force as a means of creating of destroying
institutions.
What I said, applied in a laissez-faire system. The reference to
aboriginies is not relevant here.
--
A.Broese-van-Groenou.
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
It comes down to this. If you want x, you must do y.
If you want to be a doctor, you must study.
If you want to live, you must supply your body with nourishment and
protection from the elements.
That you *want* to be a doctor, is a subjective choice.
However, the choice is subject to objective limits set by your nature.
You must be willing and able. If not, this will be a clash with
reality. As a result, you will not succeed.
If you meet all objective requirements, such as studying hard, you
will succeed.
--
A.Broese-van-Groenou.
Owl
> 1. The suprapersonal systems that I mentioned have their own operational
> requirements, distinct from and partly independent of the objective
needs
> of the individual persons who participate in them, and *certainly*
> distinct from and independent of any *egocentric personal goals* that
> those individuals might pursue. (Of course, not all personal goals are
> egocentric.)
>
> 2. Sometimes there is an unavoidable conflict between one's personal
> egocentric goals and the operational requirements of the suprapersonal
> systems upon which one depends for survival and well-being.
>
> 3. In such a case, a "Prisoners' Dilemma" situation arises, in which it
is
> in each person's long-term interest to satisfy the objective operational
> requirements of the relevant suprapersonal system, rather than to pursue
> his or her own egocentric personal goal.
>
> Better?
Yes. Still, I'd rephrase 3. It is in each person's interest that
*someone* satisfy the operational requirements of the system. The way you
have it written, it sounds like it is in MY long-term interests that *I*
satisfy those requirements. But if that were so, then an egoist would
satisfy those requirements -- egoists don't put short-term goods before
long-term goods; nor do they put whims before objective interests. In
other words, what you're saying wouldn't really conflict with egoism.
o
Owl
> What I am basicaly saying though, is that we can describe 'morals' in
terms of
> evidence that we KNOW to exist (my theory, which I will elaborate on
shortly),
> or we can come up with some 'a priori' concept that we do not have any
good
> evidence for, as far as I have seen.
I note that you should not expect *empirical* evidence for the things I
say are a priori knowledge. If you do, you won't find any. Rather, the
kind of 'evidence' (if you want to call it that) is a priori evidence.
What's a priori evidence like? It consists in your seeing, not literally
but intellectually, that something is so (also called "intellectual
insight" or "rational intuition").
Suppose I asked you what evidence there is that 7 is greater than 2.
Well, you can just *think* about it and see that it is.
> >Second, I've discussed the objections to relativism previously, in "The
> >Subjectivist's Dilemma" (_Objectivity_ 2(4), 1996, pp. 77-91).
>
> Im not sure exactly what this is. You seem to be refering to a newsgroup
post
It's the journal _Objectivity_ (which is a quasi-Objectivist journal). 2
is the volume, 4 is the number.
> My story is better because there is evidence for its validity even in
non-human
> organisms, and since humans are so similar to other animals, there does
not
> seem to be a reason to reject it, as we shall see:
I don't think there is such evidence. Are you saying that non-human
animals have moral concepts?
> Not sure what use/mention errors are, but anyhow: What do you mean by
the
> "word" good? I obviously think that people make the sound "good." and
that it
A confusion between using a word normally, and mentioning the word.
(Mentioning a word is talking about the word as such.) When a word is
mentioned, it is conventionally put in quotation marks. When used, it is
not. So, of the following sentences:
1. Red is a color.
2. "Red" is a color.
(1) is true, and (2) false, because "Red" isn't a color; it's just a
3-letter word. (2) is a use/mention error.
Anyway, by the word "good", I refer to the property of goodness,
naturally. Disappointed? Goodness is not reducible to anything else, so
don't ask me what goodness really is.
> is defined in the dictionary and such. I am just saying that the concept
that
> you mean when you use it has no basis in reality.
I know. I was being picky.
> >Or is there some specific goal, such that a thing
> >is good if it achieves THAT goal? (If so, what is that goal?)
>
> Yes. And that goal is whatever you want it to be. There is no objective
...
> >Or
> >perhaps you wanted to say "y is good" is always elliptical for "y is
> >good relative to x" where x is some goal the speaker has in mind.
>
> I know what an ellipse is, but I am not sure what this word means in
your
> contect. Perhaps "synonymous" or something. Are we supposed to picture
"y is
> good" and "y is good relative to x" as two foci on the elipse?
"elliptical for" means basically "short for" or "a shortened form of".
(Think of ellipsis ("..."), which is used when you omit something.) So,
on your view, the full statement someone means to make is "x is good,
relative to goal y," but they commonly shorten this to "x is good."
> But it is an objective 'property' of things or actions or ideas, like
> 'whiteness'?
Yep.
> >Second, your view doesn't seem to me much simpler and more realistic.
> >It seems to me that the simplest explanation is that people think
things
> >are right or wrong, because those things ARE right or wrong.
>
> People believe in all sorts of irrational things. That is no reason to
conclude
> that they exist. How many people believe in God or some supernatural
power, in
> spirits and ghosts and psychics? Quite a lot of people. Probably a vast
People also believe in rocks, and trees, and bits of string. And they
exist. Most of the things people believe are true.
What I was saying is, I have the simplest explanation for moral beliefs.
If you think that explanation is false, you can always give evidence
against it. (You can also give evidence that belief in God is caused by
irrational factors, but that's a different discussion.) Just saying,
"Some beliefs are false," however, gives no such evidence; if it did, then
we should have a presumption against everything we believe, merely because
we believe it.
The simplest explanation for why I seem to be seeing a computer monitor
right now, is that there IS a computer monitor here, and I AM seeing it.
Does that mean I'm saying hallucinations are impossible? No, but if you
think I'm hallucinating, you have to tell me why. "Sometimes people
hallucinate" isn't enough.
The simplest explanation for why the apple looks red is that it IS red,
and I'm seeing its redness. Again, does that mean I'm saying there are
never any illusions? No, but if you think color is an illusion, you have
to explain why. "Some things are illusory" isn't enough.
The simplest and most straightforward explanation for why murder strikes
everyone as wrong, is that murder IS wrong. You can fill in the rest.
> But that the mind craves order and knowledge and such, and likes to
think it
> knows what is good or bad doesn't prove that there is no good or bad.
What it
> does do is provide a rational explaination for why so many people
believe in
> objective ethics.
I have met almost no one who believes in objective ethics.
There is another tendency of the mind that deserves to be noted. The
human mind is also disposed to accept the current fashions of the culture
in which that mind resides. The culture of the 20th century United States
is one of rampant subjectivism, skepticism, and nihilism. These
tendencies themselves are just a fashion peculiar to our present culture;
but to the people living in this culture, they can seem 'natural' and
'simple', and anything else might seem 'farfetched'.
> >4. Relativism/subjectivism: The theory that some things have moral
> >value, but their value is dependent on the attitudes of observers
> >towards those things.
> I suppose 4 seems to fit my view. Though since that is a short version
of the
Yes, I think so.
> If there was no life on earth, would goodness and badness still exist?
Would a
> shift in the earth's crust be good? bad? Would sunlight shining down on
the
I think it would be morally neutral.
> barren landscape be good? bad? A book that I just checked out from the
library
Also morally neutral.
> on philosophy says something similar as some sort of argument for
subjectivism.
> But it seems to me that I would say that goodness and badness deals with
humans
> or other animals as its subject matter, but is not dependant on their
thoughts.
> So the book seems to me to be presenting an invalid argument, because in
fact
> you don't have to be a subjectivsts to say that morality doesn't exist
without
> life. Is this the view that you take?
Right. You're smarter than the author of that book. An objectivist could
very well believe that all values consist in, or in some way depend upon
life. The capitol "O" Objectivists here all believe that. In fact, you
could even be a hedonistic objectivist (pleasure is the sole thing with
objective value).
> We know that all living creatures generaly seek to preserve themselves
and
> reproduce and such. We know that all living things have a certain nature
that
> guides their actions and guides what their goals will be and what they
will
> seek and such.
Ok, as long as you're not denying free will.
> The fact that humans do not like to be killed, and like to live and
flourish is
> part of our nature. We are geneticaly predisposed to want to live, and
to want
> to prosper and such, much like other organisms are geneticaly disposed
to want
> certain things.
Ok.
> In order for us to have certain things that we want, like the benefits
of
> living in a society(to help us flourish and engage in relationships with
other
> people and such -- another need determined by genetics), we need to
construct
> certain codes of conduct that enable us to get what we want (life with
other
> people) without lots of things that we don't want happening to us(people
> killing us, people stealing our property). A good way to do this is to
> establish rules for behavior within the society. It is in everyone's
interest
Who do you think established these rules, when, and how? (There's an
important point here: nobody *chose* the rules of conduct for our society,
any more than anyone decided one day to make the English language.)
> to make rules saying "we should not kil eachother" and "we should not
steal
> from eachother" and such. These things are considered undesirable
because they
> conflict with the goals of humans(namely living).
I'm not sure where the "should" came from. So far, I understood why the
people do not want killing and stealing to go on. I don't see, however,
how they are supposed to have gotten the concept of moral obligation. As
far as I can tell, at this point in your story, the people should just be
saying to each other, "I don't want you to kill or steal."
> Therefore, ethics will form in a reality without properties of
'goodness' and
> 'badness' so long as the people in this reality have goals. They will
start to
> make rules of behavior that enable them to achieve their goals more
easily.
> Since a concept of ethics will form in a reality without "goodness" and
> "badness" as you use the terms, and since we live in a society that has
a
> concept of ethics, it seems that without further evidence, we can
conclude that
> there is no "goodness" and "badness."
Okay, here's where we differ. I don't think that the concept we have of
'good' and 'bad' is the way you describe it. This is a point about the
content of the concept (it's 'meaning', if you like), not a point about
its history. That is: I don't think "x is good" means "x will serve some
goal of mine."
Notice, by the way, that what I'm saying is a purely descriptive, factual
claim. I'm saying you're mistaken about the correct analysis of a certain
concept. And it will follow from this that your explanation of the origin
of this concept cannot be correct.
Now, why are you mistaken about what "good" means, you ask. You say, "x
is good" = "x serves goal y". But
1. Actually, this still doesn't make any sense, because you have to
specify what y is (I raised this last time, but you didn't seem to get the
problem). If y varies, then, in order to have given a theory, you have to
say how to identify what y is in a given situation.
2. Pleasure is good. But it is not the case that pleasure serves some
ulterior goal that I have. That is, in this case, there is no y that you
could plausibly claim the goodness is relative to. (Same goes for any
intrinsic value.)
3. I'm not sure (because of point 1), but it *appears* that your view
implies that the following sentence is true:
"If I were to pursue x as a goal, then actions leading to x would be
(morally) good."
So, for example, the following would be true:
"If I aimed to exterminate the Jews, then it would be morally correct
to round up Jews and force them into gas chambers."
This would have to be true on your analysis, because if it's true that
forcing the Jews into gas chambers would serve my goal under the
hypothesized condition -- right? However, no one thinks that sentence is
true (except for Nazis). Rather, what we think is that if I aimed to
exterminate the Jews, then I would have an evil goal; what satisfies an
evil goal is not thereby made good.
So, the concept "moral good" is not simply the concept of that which
satisfies one's goals.
I hope this argument is clear. If your view about what the *concept*
of good is is correct, then it should be able to explain the judgements
people make using that concept. And people should judge that whenever
they pursue goal x, anything leading to x is morally good - on your view,
that's a tautology.
> Can you bring forth some evidence that shows why we should reject this
view
> that seems to work with known evidence, without postulating objective
ethical
> properties?
Remember my remarks at the top about a priori 'evidence'. Among the
'evidence' against relativism is the fact that not everything a person
pursues as a goal is good. That's as good evidence as anything.
o
Bert Clanton
<bro...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
> Bert Clanton <be...@sonic.net> wrote in message
> news:bert-26079...@d173.pm5.sonic.net...
>
> >I don't
> > think that I'm adopting an irrational set of values if I value the
> > long-term survival of my species or my country or my family or
> myself more
> > than I value my own personal pleasure.
>
> I would have thought all those things were involved in your personal
> pleasure. I have a hard time understanding how you put the things you
> value, in two different camps.
> Make it simple. You value them, or you don't. I don't have any such
> split myself. I strive for the things I value.
>
The question is: what does one do when two of one's values *collide*: my
valuing a new whizbang computer versus my valuing a new refrigerator for
the family, or my valuing of keeping a growth of old redwoods uncut versus
my valuing of keeping the price of lumber low? You have to prioritize,
> ABvG also wrote:
> >> Now, it appears that you want
> > > to force others to value the institutions you value. (That is not
> > > nice). Rest assured, if any institution is worthwhile, it will
> survive
> > > without force.
>
> > I am quite willing to let anyone value whatever they value. But if
> their
> > values motivate them to *act* in ways which I am convinced pose a
> real
> > long-term danger to the survival of my family, or my society, or my
> > species, then I will do what I can to prevent them from taking those
> > actions--by force, as a last resort, even if what they are motivated
> to do
> > doesn't involve force.
>
> So, if you find Medicare to your liking, but others don't support it,
> you would coerce them into providing it? Are your wants superior to
> the wants of others?
>
My wants are in no way superior to the wants of others. But I'm not
talking about *wants*. I'm talking about *needs*. I'm talking about people
who threaten the long-term survival of other people, not people who don't
do what I want. Granted, I "want" long-term survival of my species, etc.;
but that's a very different kind of "want" than wanting a big chocolate
ice cream cone.
> > I'm willing to stipulate that I am "not nice".
> Tell us more. ;-)
Ask Jim Klein. He insists that I'm a collectivist thug. (I like him
anyhow: he's one of the folks around HPO who most often seem to me to make
some sense.)
>
> > As for worthwhile institutions surviving without force--tell that to
> the
> > aboriginal inhabitants of North America or Tasmania.
>
> *I* did not advocate using force as a means of creating of destroying
> institutions.
> What I said, applied in a laissez-faire system. The reference to
> aboriginies is not relevant here.
I propose that there are worthwhile institutions other than economic
institutions, and that laissez-faire capitalism has had a corrosive and
disintegrative effect upon many such institutions, in many places--often
by exerting force..
Best wishes,
Bert
Bert Clanton
> Bert Clanton <be...@sonic.net> wrote in message
Okay.
To the extent that my own acts have an effect upon the satisfaction of the
operational requirements of the system, it is in my interest that *I*
perform those acts which promote such satisfaction. But in any event, as
you say, it is in my interest that *someone* satisfy the operational
requirements of the system. It is therefore in my interest that they--and
I--adopt a moral system which motivates them--and me, when appropriate--to
do so.
I could get along very well with an egoist who put long-term goods ahead
of short-term goals, and who put objective interests before
whims--provided that he regarded it as a long-term good that people who
live long after he dies have their interests satisfied too.
Hmm. Maybe an "enlightened" egoist would be indistinguishable from an
environmentalist communitarian! But I see precious few such egoists in
HPO!
Best wishes,
Bert
P.S. How would I address a personal e-mail to you?
Kiekeben
>It comes down to this. If you want x, you must do y.
>If you want to be a doctor, you must study.
>If you want to live, you must supply your body with nourishment and
>protection from the elements.
>
>That you *want* to be a doctor, is a subjective choice.
>However, the choice is subject to objective limits set by your nature.
>You must be willing and able. If not, this will be a clash with
>reality. As a result, you will not succeed.
>If you meet all objective requirements, such as studying hard, you
>will succeed.
Well obviously, but I don't see what this has to do with the ethical
objectivism/subjectivism debate. You seem to be implying that an ethical
subjectivist is someone who says "I want x, and I don't care that it cannot be
attained unless I do y: I'm gonna try to achieve x without y anyway. Reality be
damned." But ethical subjectivism and the philosophers that Rand attacked as
ethical subjectivists never said anything even remotely like that.
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
Bert Clanton <be...@sonic.net> wrote in message
news:bert-27079...@d78.nas16.sonic.net...
>
> The question is: what does one do when two of one's values
*collide*: my
> valuing a new whizbang computer versus my valuing a new refrigerator
for
> the family, or my valuing of keeping a growth of old redwoods uncut
versus
> my valuing of keeping the price of lumber low? You have to
prioritize,
Of course. But, "prioritise values", is not the same as a "conflict
with others".
Choices can be hard. Do you keep your cake, or do you eat it?
> > ABvG also wrote:
> > So, if you find Medicare to your liking, but others don't support
it,
> > you would coerce them into providing it? Are your wants superior
to
> > the wants of others?
> >
>
> My wants are in no way superior to the wants of others. But I'm not
> talking about *wants*. I'm talking about *needs*. I'm talking about
people
> who threaten the long-term survival of other people, not people who
don't
> do what I want. Granted, I "want" long-term survival of my species,
etc.;
> but that's a very different kind of "want" than wanting a big
chocolate
> ice cream cone.
>
> I propose that there are worthwhile institutions other than economic
> institutions, and that laissez-faire capitalism has had a corrosive
and
> disintegrative effect upon many such institutions, in many
places--often
> by exerting force.
With all due respect, I don't think you understand laissez-faire, if
you think:
1) It won't allow other than economic institutions to survive.
2) That it embraces initiating the use of force. ( Which by the way,
you yourself seem willing to initiate at any stage you feel a "Need".)
IMO the problems you seem to be haveing with Objectivism, are of your
own making. They aren't there in the way you see them.
--
A.Broese-van-Groenou.
Kasigi 0mi
>"I want x, and I don't care that it cannot be
>attained unless I do y: I'm gonna try to achieve x without y anyway. Reality
>be
>damned." But ethical subjectivism and the philosophers that Rand attacked as
>ethical subjectivists never said anything even remotely like that.
Right. Ayn WAS actualy a moral subjectivist in the way that I have been arguing
for. The subjective part is choosing your goal, not in obtaining it. The
subjective part is in choosing what is valuable. Ayn has nothing objective to
back up her "Life is the ultimate value" claim, so it must instead be "If you
choose life as your ultimate value, then you must hold life as your ultimate
value" which says nothing about the morality of anyone who does not choose life
MQM as their ultimate goal. Therefore, objectivists ARE subjectivists.
-0mi
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Yes. I always thought being objective was having as close to a detached
view of one's own importance as possible. And I've always assumed it was
the hallmark of rationality was objectivity. That's why I have always
found objectivists' use of the term objective as peculiar and confusing.
Maybe someone can explain it to me.
--
Phil Roberts, Jr.
The Mechanics of Genetic Indeterminism
http://www.fortunecity.com/victorian/dada/90/
Feelings of Worthlessness from the Perspective of
So-Called Cognitive Science
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/5476
Kiekeben
>Right. Ayn WAS actualy a moral subjectivist in the way that I have been
>arguing
>for. The subjective part is choosing your goal, not in obtaining it. The
>subjective part is in choosing what is valuable. Ayn has nothing objective to
>back up her "Life is the ultimate value" claim, so it must instead be "If you
>choose life as your ultimate value, then you must hold life as your ultimate
>value" which says nothing about the morality of anyone who does not choose
>life
>MQM as their ultimate goal. Therefore, objectivists ARE subjectivists.
In one very important sense, that's true: if you take what Rand claims to its
logical conclusion, and don't limit ethics to the choices made after the choice
to live as MQM, then her ethics is a form of subjectivism.
But of course Objectivists do attempt to limit ethics in the above way. Peikoff
states that the choice to live precedes morality, and as a result claim to have
discovered an objective ethics. Of course the problem is that that's not the
way ethical terms are used -- they are not limited in this way. One can
meanigfully ask whether or not the choice to live as MQM is a good thing. One
can also meaningfully say that life itself is good. On Objectivist principles,
one simply cannot say thjat. Life is neither good nor bad. All goodness and
badness presuppose that one has already chosen life as a goal (with the
qualification that it be life as MQM). And because ethical language is not
limited to what Objectivists mean by it, they sometimes slip. The funniest
example is Peikoff in OPAR: in attempting to refute the above view, Peikoff
says that someone who did not choose life would belong on the lowest rung of
hell and should be condemned as a monster. But if claiming that someone belongs
on the lowest rung of hell and condemning them as a monster aren't moral
judgements, then what are they?
Owl
> But of course Objectivists do attempt to limit ethics in the above way.
Peikoff
> states that the choice to live precedes morality, and as a result claim
to have
> discovered an objective ethics. Of course the problem is that that's not
the
> way ethical terms are used -- they are not limited in this way. One can
> meanigfully ask whether or not the choice to live as MQM is a good
thing. One
> can also meaningfully say that life itself is good. On Objectivist
principles,
> one simply cannot say thjat. Life is neither good nor bad. All goodness
and
I suspect this is one of Peikoff's distortions. Peikoff's real philosophy
is more positivist and anti-realist than Rand. I think Rand was an
ethical naturalist; I think she held that life (or life 'qua man') was
identical with intrinsic goodness. But since Peikoff is really, at heart,
an anti-realist/positivist (not just about ethics, but about reality in
general), he transformed that into the closest available form of
subjectivism. Another example of Peikoff doing this, I think, is the
business about the 'arbitrary' being neither true nor false, and the whole
confused 'contextual theory of knowledge'.
o
Kiekeben
>I suspect this is one of Peikoff's distortions. Peikoff's real philosophy
>is more positivist and anti-realist than Rand. I think Rand was an
>ethical naturalist; I think she held that life (or life 'qua man') was
>identical with intrinsic goodness. But since Peikoff is really, at heart,
>an anti-realist/positivist (not just about ethics, but about reality in
>general), he transformed that into the closest available form of
>subjectivism.
That's interesting. I too originally interpreted Rand's metaethics the way you
do (before reading OPAR). But now I'm not so sure. The problem is that Rand
often doesn't take an issue sufficiently far to determine what her real
position on it is. That seems to be the case as far as her views on metaethics
is concerned.
One reason for disagreeing with what you say is that OPAR is based on lectures
Peikoff gave that Rand personally endorsed. Of course, in writing it Peikoff
may have added material to cover possible objections. That may be what happened
in the chapter on ethics.
> Another example of Peikoff doing this, I think, is the
>business about the 'arbitrary' being neither true nor false, and the whole
>confused 'contextual theory of knowledge'.
With respect to these two I have greater doubts about what you say. The
sections in the A.R. Lexicon from Peikoff's lectures seem to contain all the
essential elements covered in OPAR, as far as I can remember the latter.
Franz "does this mean I've turned into a Rand scholar?" Kiekeben
http://members.aol.com/kiekeben/home.html
Stephen Grossman
<kasi...@aol.com> wrote:
> (a) No evaluative proposition is deduced from descriptive propositions; and
Ethics is factual knowledge in the context of human survival. "You should
reason" means "reason, relative to human life, is the basic method," a
fact.
________________________________________________
Reason is man's basic means of survival. AYN RAND
------------------------------------------------------
Tracking Marxist dialectical revolution: ZigZag
Radically systematic radical metaphysics: Existence 2
http://home.att.net/~sdgross
-------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Grossman Fairhaven, MA, USA sdg...@att.net