Can you solve these inductive problems?
Paw1015
inductive
arguments, which is of course circular. I believe that the nest time I throw a
football
into the air it will go up and then fall back to the earth rather than fly into
orbit or
hang in the sky. Why? In the past the football has always fallen to the ground.
But
why do I think the future will be like the past? I think this knowledge is
instictual. That's
not the standard answer however. The stanard answer is that I think the future
will
be like the past becuase in the past the future was like the past, and the laws
of nature
are uniform. But there is no *deductive* argument to support my claim.
2. Nelson Goodman, a modern American philosopher, was found another problem
with induction in the lack of an adaquate rule for telling if a generalization
is
accidential or lawlike. For example, the following is a valid or lawlike
generalization:
All pieces of copper that I have examined in the past have conducted
electricity, thus
the next piece of copper that I examine will conduct electricity. Here is an
accidential
generalization: all the women in this room are third daughters, therefor the
next
woman who walks into the room will be a third daughter.
In my mind, Hume has been rebutted pragmaticly by Han Reichenbacher, though
not refuted. Goodman's newer "riddle of induction" I have not found any answer
to, except that "we know when a generalization is lawlike when we see it,"
which is not an answer up to the standards of philosophy. (thought the Supreame
Court seems to like these sorts or arguments)
Gregory Weston
http://members.aol.com/gregweston
Mike Smith
>2. Nelson Goodman, a modern American philosopher, was found another problem
>with induction in the lack of an adaquate rule for telling if a
generalization
>is
>accidential or lawlike. For example, the following is a valid or lawlike
>generalization:
>All pieces of copper that I have examined in the past have conducted
>electricity, thus
>the next piece of copper that I examine will conduct electricity. Here is
an
>accidential
>generalization: all the women in this room are third daughters, therefor
the
>next
>woman who walks into the room will be a third daughter.
>
It seems to me that the answer to this one lies in that "conducts
electricity" is a *property* of copper, while "third daughter" is a
*category* to which the women in the room happen to belong. "Daughter" is a
property of all women. All women are the daughter of some parent(al pair).
However, obviously not all women can be "third daughters", since the
qualifier "third" implies that at least one woman, somewhere, is a "first
daughter", and one woman is a "second daughter".
I'm sure somebody here can express this better than I.
--
Mike Smith. No, the other one.
Robert J. Kolker
Mike Smith wrote:
> >next
> >woman who walks into the room will be a third daughter.
> >
>
> It seems to me that the answer to this one lies in that "conducts
> electricity" is a *property* of copper, while "third daughter" is a
> *category* to which the women in the room happen to belong. "Daughter" is a
> property of all women.
Actually daughter is not a property of a single female. It is the nameof a
relation that pairs women with their female offspring.
A man owned a dog who sired a litter with the help of a bitch.
I asked him is that dog yours. He replied yes. I asked him is that
dog a father to which he also responded affirmatively. From which
I concluded that dog is his father.
See the point?
Bob Kolker
Paw1015
1. David Hume has shown that the use of induction can
only be justified by inductive arguments, which is of
course circular. I believe that the nest time I throw a
football into the air it will go up and then fall back to the
earth rather than fly into orbit or hang in the sky. Why? In
the past the football has always fallen to the ground. But
why do I think the future will be like the past? I think this
knowledge is instictual. That's not the standard answer
however. The stanard answer is that I think the future will
be like the past becuase in the past the future was like the
past, and the laws of nature are uniform. But there is no
*deductive* argument to support my claim.
2. Nelson Goodman, a modern American philosopher,
found another problem with induction in the lack of an
adaquate rule for telling if a generalization is accidential or
lawlike. For example, the following is a valid or lawlike
generalization:
All pieces of copper that I have examined in the past have
conducted electricity, thus the next piece of copper that I
examine will conduct electricity.
Here is an accidential generalization: all the women in this
room are third daughters, therefor the next woman who
walks into the room will be a third daughter.
In my mind, Hume has been rebutted pragmaticly by Hans
Phil Roberts, Jr.
>
> Oops, here is my post reformatted:
>
Any suggestions on what to use?
> 1. David Hume has shown that the use of induction can
> only be justified by inductive arguments, which is of
> course circular.
Hume's notion of a rational belief was simply one which
is "true", at least according to Stephen Darwal. As such,
he held nothing like our current notion of justification,
in which it is never an all or nothing affair, but a matter
of degree, just like rationality. Although I am a great
admirer of Hume, I believe his thinking on this matter was
just plain kooky.
> I believe that the nest time I throw a
> football into the air it will go up and then fall back to the
> earth rather than fly into orbit or hang in the sky. Why? In
> the past the football has always fallen to the ground. But
> why do I think the future will be like the past? I think this
> knowledge is instictual.
Another explanation, derived from Hume himself, is that 'all
reasoning is simply comparing'. If this is so, then reasoning
is just conditioning writ large, where instead of cognizing
obvious similarity and difference (e.g., this A + B sequence
is similar to the one observed yesterday),one cognizes
ABSTRUSE similarity and difference (electricity is like
water flowing in a pipe). If so, then the whole notion
of absolutely rational or justified belief goes right out
the window in that similarity and difference are always
going to be one part reality and two parts in the eye of
the beholder.
> That's not the standard answer
> however. The stanard answer is that I think the future will
> be like the past becuase in the past the future was like the
> past, and the laws of nature are uniform. But there is no
> *deductive* argument to support my claim.
>
That's because certainty in empirical matters is a chimera.
But you are absolutely right, IMHO, that my expecting the
sun to rise tomorrow is not just that it happened yesterday,
but because I have observed on myriads of occasions that
that nature is orderly, and so it is inductions of inductions
of inductions in which my belief the sun will rise is an
all but removable component of a humongous COHERENT belief
system.
--
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Feelings of Worthlessness and So-Called Cognitive Science
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/5476
Paw1015
>I could use something for reformatting my own posts.
>Any suggestions on what to use?
I just hit enter after each line, unless I forget.
>Hume's notion of a rational belief was simply one which
>is "true", at least according to Stephen Darwal...
>Although I am a great admirer of Hume, I believe his
>thinking on this matter was just plain kooky.
Darwal is wrong about Hume. Hume thinks that beliefs about
the relationship of ideas are either true or false, but
beliefs about the future have only degrees of probablitiy.
>Another explanation, derived from Hume himself, is that 'all
>reasoning is simply comparing'. If this is so, then reasoning
>is just conditioning writ large, where instead of cognizing
>obvious similarity and difference (e.g., this A + B sequence
>is similar to the one observed yesterday),one cognizes
>ABSTRUSE similarity and difference (electricity is like
>water flowing in a pipe).
I don't know what you mean here by abstruse similarity.
Could you explain it more?
>If so, then the whole notion
>of absolutely rational or justified belief goes right out
>the window in that similarity and difference are always
>going to be one part reality and two parts in the eye of
>the beholder.
This would not be Hume's position. He was absolutly sure
that a triangle had three sides, two and two are four, that
that essays have words in them, etc. These are all
relationships between ideas, and here we can have complete
justification. Hume was not a Phyronian skeptic.
>That's because certainty in empirical matters is a chimera.
>But you are absolutely right, IMHO, that my expecting the
>sun to rise tomorrow is not just that it happened yesterday,
>but because I have observed on myriads of occasions that
>that nature is orderly, and so it is inductions of inductions
>of inductions in which my belief the sun will rise is an
>all but removable component of a humongous COHERENT belief
>system.
I'm glad you agree with me, but I am a phenomanalist and
a foundationalist, not a coherentist. I have never seen a
coherent's adaquatly reply to the isolation objection to his
system. Even then I would still have problems with his
system.
Gregory Weston
http://members.aol.com/gregweston
Whojgalt
In article <19981208194035...@ng51.aol.com>, Paw1015
<paw...@aol.comNOSPAM> writes:
>All pieces of copper that I have examined in the past have conducted
>electricity, thus
>the next piece of copper that I examine will conduct electricity. Here is an
>accidential
>generalization: all the women in this room are third daughters, therefor the
>next
>woman who walks into the room will be a third daughter.
The second is not so much an accidental generalization as it is
a hasty one based on only two observations. The observation
about copper is a recognition of not only a vast number of
prior observations, but knowledge about the basic nature
of copper. Even without knowledge of the atomic
structure of copper, we know of many examples
of copper in many different forms and shapes, with the
essential aspect always being that it is copper, and it is
always conductive. In the case of corroded copper, we
know that its nature is changed by simple appearance. The
fact that it does not conduct does not then contradict our
observation that copper in its uncorrodedstate does conduct.
We know that the basic nature of women is not
to be third daughters. If we were to know something about
why the women in this room were here, and that that
reason had something to do with being third daughters,
we could then make a generalization in accordance with the
nature of the sample. Otherwise, your generalization clearly
contradicts the nature of the entities you are observing.
--Kyle Bennett
Robert J. Kolker
Paw1015 wrote:
> I'm glad you agree with me, but I am a phenomanalist and
> a foundationalist, not a coherentist.
What is a foundationalist?
Bob Kolker
Robert J. Kolker
Whojgalt wrote:
> We know that the basic nature of women is not
> to be third daughters. If we were to know something about
> why the women in this room were here, and that that
> reason had something to do with being third daughters,
Of course, if the observation about third daughters took
place at the Third Daughters of America Convention held
in Daughtersvill Ohio (about 10 miles from Twinsburg
Ohio) we might have some reason to go with the
induction.
Bob Kolker
PS: Don't laugh. There is an organization whose membership consists
of seventh sons of sevenths sons.
cath...@my-dejanews.com
Paw1015 <paw...@aol.comNOSPAM> wrote:
> The stanard answer is that I think the future
> will
> be like the past becuase in the past the future was like the past, and the
laws
> of nature
> are uniform. But there is no *deductive* argument to support my claim.
To which an answer might be: so what? A conclusion that doesn't answer to the
requirements of deduction need not thereby be weakened, if one considers
induction and deduction to both be reliable sources of conclusions (though
admittedly different in kind).
-----------== Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ==----------
http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Discuss, or Start Your Own
Jim Klein
<paw...@aol.comNOSPAM> writes:
>1. David Hume has shown that the use of induction can only be
>justified by inductive arguments, which is of course circular. I
>believe that the nest time I throw a football into the air it will go
>up and then fall back to the earth rather than fly into orbit or
>hang in the sky. Why?
Why does the football go down, or why do you believe it? Those are two
entirely different questions. Modern philosophy is all caught up with
answering the latter, but it's the former which is important. That's
why there are tons more engineers than philosophers.
And notice that after thousands of years, the engineers can now build
spaceships to other planets, but the philosophers still can't answer
the same damn question. Hell...they're still arguing about whether we
really know that the football will come down, even as every grunt in
the NFL knows the answer to that!
>In the past the football has always fallen to the ground.
That may be why you believe it, but it's not why it came back down. As
cognitive beings, we are able to know why it came back down with
explanations besides, "It always did." Though admittedly, that's a
decent start in the absence of any other knowledge about it.
>But why do I think the future will be like the past? I think this
>knowledge is instictual.
How could any knowledge be instinctual when it depends upon perception
and symbol formation to arise? The ability to do those things may be
genetically hard-wired, but certainly the actions themselves aren't.
>That's not the standard answer however. The stanard answer is that I
>think the future will be like the past becuase in the past the future
>was like the past, and the laws of nature are uniform.
Those are both comments about our beliefs, but not necessarily about
nature. "The laws of nature are uniform" is a conclusion based upon
observation, but not a law itself. Technically, there are no "laws
themselves," since all laws are inherently symbolic representations of
sets of existents, rather than the existents themselves. The map is
not the territory.
>But there is no *deductive* argument to support my claim.
That would be because all deductive arguments are essentially
restatements of the same claim or claims. You cannot support a claim
with the claim itself---that requires claims which are independent, and
deductive arguments can't do that.
>2. Nelson Goodman, a modern American philosopher, was found another
>problem with induction in the lack of an adaquate rule for telling if
>a generalization is accidential or lawlike.
This is a problem which doesn't exist. The difference is exclusively a
human imposition.
>For example, the following is a valid or lawlike generalization:
>All pieces of copper that I have examined in the past have conducted
>electricity, thus the next piece of copper that I examine will conduct
>electricity. Here is an accidential generalization: all the women in
>this room are third daughters, therefor the next woman who walks into
>the room will be a third daughter.
Both accidental generalizations and universal laws take the form, "All
As are B;" as such they are the same. The difference is generally in
the size of the set A and its (subjective) usefulness for arriving at
subsequent conclusions.
"All the coins in Nelson Goodman's pocket are silver" will not be
particularly useful for most of the world in formulating subsequent
true statements, but it's not inherently different than Einstein's
general relativity. Both statements cover a set of "All As" and both
are equally supportive of counterfactual conditionals, which doesn't
really matter anyway because "being supportive of counterfactual
conditionals" is a statement about the statement, not a statement about
the fact. The fact describes that which is, not that which isn't.
>In my mind, Hume has been rebutted pragmaticly by Han Reichenbacher,
>though not refuted. Goodman's newer "riddle of induction" I have not
>found any answer to, except that "we know when a generalization is
>lawlike when we see it," which is not an answer up to the standards of
>philosophy.
That's because the standards of philosophy suck on this topic. The
answer is a good one because you're not going to find any existential
difference between the two types of statements. There is only what is,
and there are statements about what is. Both types of statements
describe a subset of what is, delineated by the term "all As."
IMO, the best way to approach this whole topic is to begin with
Peikoff's "Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy."
>(thought the Supreame Court seems to like these sorts or arguments)
Every once in a while, even the Supreme Court can be reasonable. If I
heard correctly, it happened just yesterday.
jk
Robert J. Kolker
Jim Klein wrote:
> >In the past the football has always fallen to the ground.
>
> That may be why you believe it, but it's not why it came back down. As
> cognitive beings, we are able to know why it came back down with
> explanations besides, "It always did." Though admittedly, that's a
> decent start in the absence of any other knowledge about it.
>
On the other hand, if we supply causes, such as : the earth exerts a
forceon the football or the earth curves space in its vicinity and the
football
is merely following the straightest possible path in the curved space,
we get to a level where we have to say that is the way it is.
Why does the earth ( or any massive body) exert a force on other
massive bodies? I dunno. Nobody knows. Or if you reject gravity
as a force then how do you account for the motion of massive bodies
in each other's vicinity. I dunno. Nobody knows. You see how
quickly we get to bedrock.
What is more important that the why is the how. Newton, who feigned
no hypothesis on why bodies appear to attract each other described
the (apparent) attraction with his inverse square law. That law derived
from the spherical symmetry of the gravitational force deployment
was sufficient to described the motion of the planets for a few hundred
years. It did not work for Mercury and Venus which is why we have
a different theory of gravity.
Actually Einstein does not supply a cause for gravity either. He got his
theory from the Equivalence Principle.
As to the question of belief. We must first believe we are seeing an honest
go goodness event or object that would exist independent of our seeing it
before we can supply causes for its being.
That is why none of us ask how pink elephants fly, whether we are
engineers,
philosophers or drunkards.
Bob Kolker
GRADinc
>Paw1015
> [phlosophers are] still arguing about whether we
>really know that the football will come down, even as every grunt in
>the NFL knows the answer to that!
Sure. Footballs haven't failed us yet.
More to the point in todays world is that scientists and
tobacco company lawyers etc are still debating whether
smoking causes cancer.
The football goes up the football always comes down.
The person smokes, the person more frequently gets lung
cancer etc.
Is the second as good as basis for induction as the first?
>How could any knowledge be instinctual when it depends upon perception
>and symbol formation to arise?
Depends on what you mean by knowledge. If you mean
conscious knowledge then, yes, by definition no knowledge
is instinctual. However, it could be said that the football
grunts have knowledge of how to catch the ball even though
they flunked physics.
>>2. Nelson Goodman, a modern American philosopher, was found another
>>problem with induction in the lack of an adaquate rule for telling if
>>a generalization is accidential or lawlike.
>This is a problem which doesn't exist. The difference is exclusively a
>human imposition.
It's a very real problem with big economic implications in the tobacco
cases.
Tom Clarke
Paw1015
>What is a foundationalist?
One who thinks all beliefs must be grounded on unprovable
assumptions. There are two major types. The classical ones,
who thought the foundation had to infallable. Descartes and
Rand are two examples. The other type is fallable
foundationalists, who don't think the foundations or axioms
of a systems must be undoubtable.
Foundationalism is opposed to coherentism, a theory that
the truth or the justificiation of a proposition rests on its
coherence with the set of a group of other propositions,
rather than being based on unprovable principles.
Gregory Weston
Paw1015
>We know that the basic nature of women is not
>to be third daughters.
Interesting response, but could you clarify for
me the meaning of "basic nature?
Gregory Weston
Paw1015
>> The stanard answer is that I think the future
>> will
>> be like the past becuase in the past the future was like the past, and the
>laws
>> of nature
>> are uniform. But there is no *deductive* argument to support my claim.
>
>To which an answer might be: so what? A conclusion that doesn't answer to
>the
>requirements of deduction need not thereby be weakened, if one considers
>induction and deduction to both be reliable sources of conclusions (though
>admittedly different in kind).
Why do you consider induction reliable *now?* Sure it was
in the past, but only by using inudction can one then come
to the conclusion that it will in the future. If I am allowed to
use circular arguments like that, let's see what damage I can
do: I think crystal ball gazing can give me knowledge. Why?
Becuase the crystal ball gave me that knowledge. This is the
same form of argument that your inductive one rest upon.
Gregory Weston
http://members.aol.com/gregweston
Paw1015
>Why does the football go down, or why do you believe it? Those are two
>entirely different questions. Modern philosophy is all caught up with
>answering the latter, but it's the former which is important. That's
>why there are tons more engineers than philosophers.
That's an interesting way of determining value.
>And notice that after thousands of years, the engineers can now build
>spaceships to other planets, but the philosophers still can't answer
>the same damn question.
When a question in philosophy is resolved, then some other
field claims it. Appied science was once part of philosophy.
Science in general was once known as natural philosophy.
>That may be why you believe it, but it's not why it came back down. As
>cognitive beings, we are able to know why it came back down with
>explanations besides, "It always did."
Incorrect. A particular phenomanon might be explained by
something other that "It always did," but that is what is at the
end of every justified scientific argument. I can explain
the football falling by saying gravity did it. But what is gravity?
Our word that generalizes a large number of facts about how
objects move together.
>How could any knowledge be instinctual when it depends upon perception
>and symbol formation to arise?
Even brute animals in thier infancy know that if a thing causes
pain once, it will again. I call that instict. Do you have a better
word?
>That's because the standards of philosophy suck on this topic
Oh. Sorry I asked.
>The answer is a good one because you're not going to
>find any existential difference between the two types of
>statements.
Exactly!
>IMO, the best way to approach this whole topic is to begin with
>Peikoff's "Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy."
Is it only your opinion? You must not be in the ARI. They
know beyond any doubt that Peikoff is always right.
Actually, I have read it a few times, but found Peikoff's
arguements weak. Benjamin Franklin was given a book when
he was a boy that attempted to refute deism. Franklin had
never heard of deism before, but as soon as he heard about
it in the refutation, he bacame one, finding the revererd
author's arguments ineffective. The same was true with
the A-S Dichotomy and me. I hadn't yet even heard about
it until I read Peikoff's article. I *wanted* Peikoff's
arguments to work, but after many rereadings, I realized
they didn't. But that is for another thread.
Gregory Weston
Mike Smith
>
>
>Mike Smith wrote:
>
>> >next
>> >woman who walks into the room will be a third daughter.
>> >
>>
>> electricity" is a *property* of copper, while "third daughter" is a
>> *category* to which the women in the room happen to belong. "Daughter"
is a
>> property of all women.
>
> Actually daughter is not a property of a single female. It is the
nameof a
>relation that pairs women with their female offspring.
>
>A man owned a dog who sired a litter with the help of a bitch.
>
>I asked him is that dog yours. He replied yes. I asked him is that
>dog a father to which he also responded affirmatively. From which
>I concluded that dog is his father.
>
>See the point?
>
No. "Daughter" describes an "is-a" relationship that applies uniformly to
*all* females. "Father" describes an "is-a" relationship that applies to
*some* males. Both words also happen to describe a relationship between two
people.
Robert J. Kolker
Paw1015 wrote:
> Kyle Bennett writes:
>
> >We know that the basic nature of women is not
> >to be third daughters.
>
> Interesting response, but could you clarify for
> me the meaning of "basic nature?
>
In this instance it is possible for a women to be a3rd daughter or not
be a 3rd daugher. The
woman's gender is independent of her birth
order, which is accidental, hence not part
of her essential nature (aka basic nature).
Bob Kolker
John Alway
> Bob Kolker writes:
> >What is a foundationalist?
> One who thinks all beliefs must be grounded on unprovable
> assumptions.
Is that belief also grounded in an unprovable assumption?
Greg, you move in mysterious ways.
...John
Taganov
>inductive
>arguments, which is of course circular. I believe that the nest time I throw
>a
>football
>into the air it will go up and then fall back to the earth rather than fly
>into
>orbit or
>ground.
>But
>why do I think the future will be like the past? I think this knowledge is
>not the standard answer however. The stanard answer is that I think the
>future
>will
>be like the past becuase in the past the future was like the past, and the
>laws
>of nature
>are uniform. But there is no *deductive* argument to support my claim.
Before I begin, David Hume also taught that you cannot get normative
conclusions from non-normative premises, meaning that you cannot deduce
morality from "facts." The problem with this approach is that logic also
consists of INDUCTION. The fact that makes induction possible is the Law of
Identity. A is A at the same time and in the same respect. The Law of
Identity is axiomatic, meaning that it cannot be denied since all who attempt
to deny it must accept it first. So, I think that the football will fall back
to the earth because in order for it not to fall back to the earth, there would
have to be some fundamental difference in the conditions in which I threw the
football, such as if I were in space and I threw the football. IT should be
noted that all statements, inductive and deductive alike, are made in a
conceptual context. This means that it is inappropriate to judge the truth or
falsity of the the statement by abandoning it from the context of the speaker.
Thus, an 18th century doctor that knows about blood-types, but not about the
RH factor, but has never observed an instance where A blood did not replace A
blood and so on, is uttering a true statement when he says that "A blood will
replace A blood." His statement is true for the conditions under which he has
observed the phenomenon, known and unknown, because of the Law of Identity.
The first time A blood doesn't mix with A blood, NEW conditions are present.
He doesn't know what they are yet, but his original statement was not made to
cover them, whatever they are. IT is because of the Law of Identity that he
knows that there is something DIFFERENT about the blood transfusion this time.
ANd eventually, he discovers the RH factor. His statement, "A blood mixes with
A blood." would no longer be true given his present context of knowledge, but
the statement "A+ blood mixes with A+ blood would be." Maybe one day, some new
factor will make an A+/A+ transfusion fail, that possibility does not
invalidate the certainty of the A+/A+ statement, given our present context.
The way that the Law of Identity helps us in induction is as follows: I know
that given all of the same conditions, the same entities will always act the
same way. If any one of the entities should act any different, it is because
one or more of the conditions is different.
Mike Smith
--
Mike Smith. No, the other one.
>Robert J. Kolker wrote in message <366D8769...@usa.net>...
>>
>>Mike Smith wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> It seems to me that the answer to this one lies in that "conducts
>>> electricity" is a *property* of copper, while "third daughter" is a
>>> *category* to which the women in the room happen to belong. "Daughter"
>is a
>>> property of all women.
>>
>> Actually daughter is not a property of a single female. It is the
>nameof a
>>relation that pairs women with their female offspring.
>>
>>I asked him is that dog yours. He replied yes. I asked him is that
>>dog a father to which he also responded affirmatively. From which
>>I concluded that dog is his father.
>>
>
Whojgalt
In article <366E7A45...@usa.net>, "Robert J. Kolker" <bobk...@usa.net>
writes:
Bob pretty much got it, but I'll expand.
We know of many women who are not third daughters. The concept
"woman" includes both third daughters and non-third daughters.
Being a third daughter is therefore not essential to the concept
"woman". If all you know about the sample in question is that
they are women, that concept does not include the proerty of
being a third daughter.
In fact, if all you know about the sample in question is that
they are people, it is just as hasty a genralization to assume
that the next person to walk into the room will be a woman.
But since your question stipulated that your sample is
limited to women, then you know something about the sample
in question: That for some reason unstated you know that the
people represented are limited to women. Therefore it is
appropriate to generalzie that the next person will be a
woman.
If you knew that the sample was for some reason limited
(or at least biased towards) third daughters, then the concept
you are dealing with is no longer "women", but "women who
are third daughters". Your genralization is therefore legitimate.
--Kyle Bennett
Paw1015
>> >What is a foundationalist?
>> One who thinks all beliefs must be grounded on unprovable
>> assumptions.
>Is that belief also grounded in an unprovable assumption?
Actually, that is an objection to classical foundationalism, which
is Rand's positon, among others, but not my fallable version.
Maybe I did not explain it adaquatly. Foundationalists argue
that all beliefs must have a foundation in either percpetion,
innate ideas, axioms, intuition, or whatever. This has been the
attitude of nearly every philosopher. The major coherentists
can be counted on one hand: Hegel, Bradley, Fitche,
BonJour.
>Greg, you move in mysterious ways.
And you date yourself by referencing old pop music :)
Gregory Weston
http://members.aol.com/gregweston
Paw1015
>Before I begin, David Hume also taught that you cannot get normative
>conclusions from non-normative premises, meaning that you cannot deduce
>morality from "facts."
I know that, but I don't see how that is relevent. Are you
trying to discredit him by saying this?
>The fact that makes induction possible is the Law of
>Identity. A is A at the same time and in the same respect. The Law of
>Identity is axiomatic, meaning that it cannot be denied since all who attempt
>to deny it must accept it first.
A tautology like A is A cannot "make induction possible" or
anything, for that matter. As Locke puts it in his Essay
Concerning Human Understanding:
"These all being equivalent to this proposition, viz. what is, is;
i.e. what hath existence, hath existence; or, who hath a soul,
hath a soul. What is this more than trifling with words? It is but
like a monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other:
and had he but words, might no doubt have said, "Oyster in
right hand is subject, and oyster in left hand is predicate": and
so might have made a self-evident proposition of oyster, i.e.
oyster is oyster; and yet, with all this, not have been one whit
the wiser or more knowing: and that way of handling the
matter would much at once have satisfied the monkey's
hunger, or a man's understanding, and they would have
improved in knowledge and bulk together."
> So, I think that the football will fall back
>to the earth because in order for it not to fall back to the earth, there
>would
>have to be some fundamental difference in the conditions in which I threw the
>football, such as if I were in space and I threw the football.
Exactly! How do you know the future will be like the past, or as you put it,
not some " fundamental difference in the conditions" that you based your
inductive arguements on.
The objectivist attempt to escape this is to say that "falls when
thrown" is part of the idea of "football" so it is not actually
a synthetic arguement to say that the football will fall when
thrown. A cute attempt, I think, but redefining what ideas are
in this novel way is not really an argument.
>Thus, an 18th century doctor that knows about blood-types, but not about the
>RH factor, but has never observed an instance where A blood did not replace A
>blood and so on, is uttering a true statement when he says that "A blood will
>replace A blood."
Are there any Objectivists here who take issue with this
rather subjective idea of truth?
Gregory Weston
http://members.aol.com/gregweston
cath...@my-dejanews.com
Taganov <tag...@aol.comklQQ> wrote:
> Before I begin, David Hume also taught that you cannot get normative
> conclusions from non-normative premises, meaning that you cannot deduce
> morality from "facts."
Prove it. Show the passage in Hume where he said that this *cannot* be done.
> The problem with this approach is that logic also
> consists of INDUCTION. The fact that makes induction possible is the Law of
> Identity. A is A at the same time and in the same respect.
Any "action" of an entity by definition could not contradict the nature of
that entity. If it was in the nature of an entity to bounce like a ball on
Tuesdays and stick like glue on Fridays, that wouldn't contradict the law of
identity. If the earth were to suddenly stop rotating, so that the sun
wouldn't rise tomorrow in this hemisphere, that would have been an action
possible to the nature of the earth. So even by basing induction on the law
of identity, we don't get apodictically the conclusion that the sun will rise
tomorrow.
> The Law of
> Identity is axiomatic, meaning that it cannot be denied since all who attempt
> to deny it must accept it first.
No one denies this axiom, as far as I know.
> So, I think that the football will fall back
> to the earth because in order for it not to fall back to the earth, there
would
> have to be some fundamental difference in the conditions in which I threw the
> football, such as if I were in space and I threw the football.
Or it could be in the nature of the football such that all of a sudden, it
were to float away. Again, *any* "action" it takes would be expressive of
its identity, so its floating away would be expressive of its identity. If
there was some principle of randomness such that it fell back on some
occasions and floated away on others, the law of identity would still not be
contravened. Nothing short of contradiction would be in violation of the law
of identity.
> IT should be
> noted that all statements, inductive and deductive alike, are made in a
> conceptual context. This means that it is inappropriate to judge the tru
> th or
> falsity of the the statement by abandoning it from the context of the
speaker.
> Thus, an 18th century doctor that knows about blood-types, but not about the
> RH factor, but has never observed an instance where A blood did not replace A
> blood and so on, is uttering a true statement when he says that "A blood will
> replace A blood." His statement is true for the conditions under which h
> e has
> observed the phenomenon, known and unknown, because of the Law of Identity.
> The first time A blood doesn't mix with A blood, NEW conditions are present.
> He doesn't know what they are yet, but his original statement was not made to
> cover them, whatever they are. IT is because of the Law of Identity that he
> knows that there is something DIFFERENT about the blood transfusion this
> time.
> ANd eventually, he discovers the RH factor. His statement, "A blood mixes
with
> A blood." would no longer be true given his present context of knowledge
> , but
> the statement "A+ blood mixes with A+ blood would be." Maybe one day, some
new
> factor will make an A+/A+ transfusion fail, that possibility does not
> invalidate the certainty of the A+/A+ statement, given our present context.
I've already read OPAR, so you needn't repeat it all here.
> The way that the Law of Identity helps us in induction is as follows: I
> know
> that given all of the same conditions, the same entities will always act the
> same way. If any one of the entities should act any different, it is because
> one or more of the conditions is different.
What about free will then? You going to adopt a compatibilist view then, I
gather?
Regardless, a libertarian conception of free will could very well follow from
basing the law of causality on the law of identity. It would not be in
violation of the law of identity for an entity to "act" in a certain way
given a specific set of conditions at one point in time, and "act" in a
different way given an identical set of conditions at another point in time.
There was a time that I thought the Objectivist reformulation of the law of
causality, to speak of it as an entity-"act" relationship rather than an
event-event relationship, provided a genuine solution to the problem of
causality and induction that could easily overcome Humean objections. But it
really is open to the very same objections. All that we know about the
nature of an entity is from observation of its "actions" which could be
different in the future given the same conditions. Seeing as the sense of
"could" here is a metaphysical one and not epistemological, my statement
cannot be open to the charge of being epistemologically arbitrary. It is the
Objectivist, after all, who acknowledges that the law of identity and
causality are metaphysical, and only contradictions are not possible
metaphysically. An entity "acting" differently at different times yet under
identical conditions each time, would not be a contradiction.
Paw1015
>> Before I begin, David Hume also taught that you cannot get normative
>> conclusions from non-normative premises, meaning that you cannot deduce
>> morality from "facts."
>Prove it. Show the passage in Hume where he said that >this *cannot* be done.
Actually he is correct. Hume is the originator of the is-ought
dichotomy that annoys Randians so much. Look in part
I of book III of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature.
The relevent chapters are entitled:
I. Moral distictions not deriv'd from reason
II. Moral distictions deriv'd from a Moral Sense
>Or it could be in the nature of the football such that all of a sudden, it
>were to float away. Again, *any* "action" it takes would be expressive of
>its identity, so its floating away would be expressive of its identity. If
>there was some principle of randomness such that it fell back on some
>occasions and floated away on others, the law of identity would still not be
>contravened. Nothing short of contradiction would be in violation of the law
>of identity.
Well put. The objectivists love to dodge the
analytic-sythentic dichotomy using the silly idea that
every fact that can be said about an object is the same as
one's idea of it. But there is no way to get around this fact:
I only know from expiriance that footballs don't fly into
orbit when thrown, but I know analyticly that a football
is made out of liquid.
Gregory Weston
Paw1015
I only know from expiriance that footballs don't fly into orbit when thrown,
but I know analyticly that a football is _not_ made out of liquid.
Gregory Weston
Robert J. Kolker
cath...@my-dejanews.com wrote:
>
>
>
> Or it could be in the nature of the football such that all of a sudden, it
> were to float away.
If my football were to float away in an uncharacteristic fashion I wouldloo
k for
reason. Did some villain fill it with helium. Are there strings
attached to it that something is pulling. Has a sudden wind come up,
strong enough to suspend it in the air?
When things happen there are reasons for their happening.
Bob Kolker
Robert J. Kolker
Paw1015 wrote:
> Short correction:
>
> I only know from expiriance that footballs don't fly into orbit when thrown,
> but I know analyticly that a football is _not_ made out of liquid.
>
A football made out of glass is made from a liquic. Of course it would notlast
very well if dropped.
Glass does not have a crystalline structure characteristic of solids. It is a
very viscous liquid. The stained glass windows of the great European
cathedrals are slowly running to the bottom of their frames. Someone
ought to turn them over.
Bob Kolker
Taganov
>anything, for that matter.
The law of Identity is a metaphysical fact. Note the 'at the same time and in
the same respect." SInce A is A, then given the same set of circumstances, the
same thing will happen. Given you on a field with a football throwing it into
the air, it will fall back toward the earth.
You do not know that new conditions will not arise in the future, the like of
which you have never seen. That does not change the fact that you know for
certain through induction that the football will fall back to the earth when
thrown. You know that, provided nothing outside your context of knowledge
interferes, that the football will fall back to the earth. And you know that
with absolute 100% certainty.
>
>The objectivist attempt to escape this is to say that "falls when
>thrown" is part of the idea of "football" so it is not actually
>a synthetic arguement to say that the football will fall when
>thrown.
Objectivism does not recognize the analytic\synthetic dichotomy. But
Objectivism would say that "falls when thrown" is a part of the concept of
football. A concept is identiFIED by its definition; it is not identiCAL to
it. THe concept contains everything known about its referent. The definition
tells you what the referent is, and its relationship to rest of your body of
knowledge.
Taganov
GRADinc
>The stained glass windows of the great European
>cathedrals are slowly running to the bottom of their frames. Someone
>ought to turn them over.
This may be an urban legend. Various calculations have
shown that the flow rate of glass is insignificant on historical
time scales.
The glass is thicker at the bottom, but this is because of
the way it was made - a cylinder was blown and then opened
out flat. The cylinder and thus the sheet was thicker at the
bottom as the viscuous melted glass did flow.
The glaziers then mounted the glass with the thicker side
down.
Tom Clarke
Jim Klein
<paw...@aol.comNOSPAM> writes:
>>Why does the football go down, or why do you believe it? Those are
>>two entirely different questions. Modern philosophy is all caught up
>>with answering the latter, but it's the former which is important.
>>That's why there are tons more engineers than philosophers.
>
>That's an interesting way of determining value.
I think you read my comment backwards. I wasn't saying that because
there are more engineers than philosophers, we know that the former is
more important. I was saying that because the former is more
important, there are more engineers than philosophers. It was meant as
evidence, not proof.
>>And notice that after thousands of years, the engineers can now build
>>spaceships to other planets, but the philosophers still can't answer
>>the same damn question.
>
>When a question in philosophy is resolved, then some other
>field claims it. Appied science was once part of philosophy.
>Science in general was once known as natural philosophy.
Could you give an example of something you consider to have been a
"resolved question of philosophy" that is now considered a part of
applied science? Just curious.
>>That may be why you believe it, but it's not why it came back down.
>>As cognitive beings, we are able to know why it came back down with
>>explanations besides, "It always did."
>
>Incorrect.
No, it's correct. Ask Kolker or Clarke...they could probably each
write a book about it, with explanations galore.
>A particular phenomanon might be explained by something other that "It
>always did," but that is what is at the end of every justified
>scientific argument. I can explain the football falling by saying
>gravity did it. But what is gravity? Our word that generalizes a
>large number of facts about how objects move together.
Oh sure, but that's a different claim. Here you're pointing out that
all knowledge is essentially inductive, which happens to be a major
focus of Objectivism. I was only pointing out that we know the
football will come down with greater confidence than merely the
knowledge that it always has. We know it because of _other things_
that have always occured. This we call support and explanation.
>>How could any knowledge be instinctual when it depends upon
>>perception and symbol formation to arise?
>
>Even brute animals in thier infancy know that if a thing causes
>pain once, it will again. I call that instict. Do you have a better
>word?
I agree that it's instinct; where I disagree is that I don't think
it's knowledge. I reserve knowledge for conceptual (i.e. symbolic)
representation and storage, and I don't think other animals do that.
But that's just my usage of the word, and my opinion about animals.
>>That's because the standards of philosophy suck on this topic
>
>Oh. Sorry I asked.
That's okay, as long as you gained something!
>>The answer is a good one because you're not going to
>>find any existential difference between the two types of
>>statements.
>
>Exactly!
>
>
>>IMO, the best way to approach this whole topic is to begin with
>>Peikoff's "Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy."
>
>Is it only your opinion?
Actually, it's not even that strictly; I was just offering a simple
tip. Really, I think the best way is to figure it out yourself.
>You must not be in the ARI.
An understatement if ever there were one!
>They know beyond any doubt that Peikoff is always right.
Cults are like that. This one's just a bit more bizarre because it
throws in "not being cultlike" as an excuse for being cultlike. Sorta
like, "You're not reading this sentence," and about as sensible.
>Actually, I have read it a few times, but found Peikoff's
>arguements weak.
Could you give a specific example or two from that essay that you think
are incorrect?
>Benjamin Franklin was given a book when
>he was a boy that attempted to refute deism. Franklin had
>never heard of deism before, but as soon as he heard about
>it in the refutation, he bacame one, finding the revererd
>author's arguments ineffective. The same was true with
>the A-S Dichotomy and me. I hadn't yet even heard about
>it until I read Peikoff's article. I *wanted* Peikoff's
>arguments to work, but after many rereadings, I realized
>they didn't. But that is for another thread.
This is analagous to why I think Objectivists are the best proponents
of anarchy around...their arguments against it are so weak. They still
haven't convinced me, but they've done a pretty good job of proving
that their imagined governmental system is nothing but a whimsical
fantasy which ought to be relegated to the Fairy Tale section of the
library with Heaven and Hell.
Regardless, I'm not sure I understand what "not working" means here.
Are you claiming that there is such a thing as knowledge which is not
inductively derived? You seemed to deny that yourself, earlier. As I
understand it, the foundation of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy is
that there are two ways through which we have knowledge--that which is
inductively inferred beginning with observation of the senses
(synthetic), and that which we know by virtue of the meanings of the
words (analytic). Obviously (at least to me), all of the _knowledge_
we have came from our integration of sense data, not from analyzing the
meanings of words.
Okay, okay...I know the retort. The "dichotomy" is about statements,
not technically knowledge, right? But that fudges the issue. The
claim is explicitly that there are two types of truths...those we know
through inductive inference and those we know with certainty,
deductively if you will. Well, that's wrong. A truth is _about_
reality; that's the point. And we _can't_ know anything about reality
save what we integrate through our sense data. Any deductive "truth"
is merely a restatement of an inductive one, else it's not really a
truth--it's a definition. Except through introspection (which is a
subset of sense data really), we cannot gain any _knowledge_ about
reality except that which we synthesize based upon our collection of
sense data. Do you disagree?
jk
Robert J. Kolker
Taganov wrote:
> You do not know that new conditions will not arise in the future, the like of
> which you have never seen. That does not change the fact that you know for
> certain through induction that the football will fall back to the earth when
> thrown. You know that, provided nothing outside your context of knowledge
> interferes, that the football will fall back to the earth. And you know that
> with absolute 100% certainty.
>
Until such time as the football does not obligingly go toground. In another
posting
I came up with physically
possible scenarios in which this could happen. Just suppose
that some jerk filled your football with helium as a
practical joke.
An inductively supported hypothesis is held as true until such
time as new evidence indicates that it is not true. Then it is
time to modify or discard the hypothesis. When hypothesis
that have served well go awry, it is usually because some
peripheral condition was assumed implicitly in the first
place and violated latter on. If that is the case you can save
the hypothesis by more carefully deliniating the conditions
under which it will hold.
Make sure that football is filled with air, not helium.
Bob Kolker
Robert J. Kolker
GRADinc wrote:
> Robert J. Kolker
>
> >The stained glass windows of the great European
> >cathedrals are slowly running to the bottom of their frames. Someone
> >ought to turn them over.
>
> This may be an urban legend. Various calculations have
> shown that the flow rate of glass is insignificant on historical
> time scales.
Nontheless, the glass is liquid. It has no crystalline structure.
ftb
ftb
ftb
ftb
ftb
Bob Kolker
cath...@my-dejanews.com
Paw1015 <paw...@aol.comNOSPAM> wrote:
> Cathcacr writes:
>
> >> Before I begin, David Hume also taught that you cannot get normative
> >> conclusions from non-normative premises, meaning that you cannot deduce
> >> morality from "facts."
>
> >Prove it. Show the passage in Hume where he said that >this *cannot* be
done.
>
> dichotomy that annoys Randians so much. Look in part
> I of book III of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature.
To the best of my understanding, Hume was remarking upon an odd tendency he
observed among philosophers, which was to start out talking about facts, and
then suddenly the word "ought" creeps into their remarks. (He wasn't
specific about who he was referring to.) He found it odd that this tended to
happen, when the supposed connection between the two kinds of statements
might be made more explicit if that is indeed what these philosophers were
trying to do, but he didn't deny that there couldn't be a connection as far
as I can tell. (This is all aside from the question, of course, whether
there indeed could be a connection regardless of what Hume said.)
cath...@my-dejanews.com
Taganov <tag...@aol.comklQQ> wrote:
> >A tautology like A is A cannot "make induction possible" or
> >anything, for that matter.
>
> The law of Identity is a metaphysical fact. Note the 'at the same time a
> nd in
> the same respect." SInce A is A, then given the same set of circumstances,
the
> same thing will happen.
The last part doesn't follow from "A is A". It says that in one unrepeatable
instance, under certain circumstances, the entity cannot to both A and not-A.
However, if you repeat the procedure under the identical circumstances at a
different time, then it might do non-A whereas the previous time it did A.
And again, there is the problem of how this is reconciled with free will,
unless perhaps you want to take a compatibilist view.
> Given you on a field with a football throwing it into
> the air, it will fall back toward the earth.
Consider, however, what you would say *if* it didn't fall back to earth but
floated away. You would have to say that such an action *was* consistent
with the identity of the thing, because the identity determines all the
possible "actions" open to that entity. Whatever an entity did, that would
not be something in violation of its nature, because whatever it does is
expressive of its nature. That's why trying to base induction on the law of
identity doesn't really address the problem of induction.
(There might be a way -- I haven't thought it through enough -- to say that
if at a certain time, the laws of gravity hold on planet earth such that any
object of a specific density, mass, air resistance, etc. were dropped, this
applies in the case of all entities that are thrown up, whether a football or
any other physical object, so that the football will fall back to earth.
However, I am still unsure whether one couldn't just say that the specific
laws of physics [such as the specific rate of acceleration of things falling
toward earth] could be localized to time and place, that universal laws of
physics applying to everything, everywhere [or, say, just all the objects
existing within the vicinity of earth] doesn't follow from "A is A". I don't
know what the answer to this would be.)
Paw1015
>Glass does not have a crystalline structure characteristic of solids. It is a
>very viscous liquid.
IMHO, any definition of liquid that includes glass is faulty.
Gregory Weston
http://members.aol.com/gregweston
Paw1015
>Could you give an example of something you consider to have been a
>"resolved question of philosophy" that is now considered a part of
>applied science? Just curious.
What is matter made of? was once a question for
philosophers, but now that a good atomic theory has been
worked out, that theory now serves as the foundation for
many other theories.
>Regardless, I'm not sure I understand what "not working" means here.
>Are you claiming that there is such a thing as knowledge which is not
>inductively derived?
I think the knowledge induction works is instinctual.
>Obviously (at least to me), all of the _knowledge_
>we have came from our integration of sense data, not from analyzing the
>meanings of words.
True, accept for the knowledge induction itself works.
Gregory Weston
BTW, a wrote a more detailed reply earlier, but AOL lost it.
Oh well.
Robert J. Kolker
Paw1015 wrote:
> Jim Klein writes:
>
> >Could you give an example of something you consider to have been a
> >"resolved question of philosophy" that is now considered a part of
> >applied science? Just curious.
>
> What is matter made of? was once a question for
> philosophers, but now that a good atomic theory has been
> worked out, that theory now serves as the foundation for
> many other theories.
Democritus and Leucippus only *speculated* on the possibility thatmatter
consisted of atoms (small indivisible particles). The
empirical proof that there were small invisible components of matter had
to wait until J.J. Thompson showed that small charged particles existed
and manifested themselves by making a phosphor screen glow.
Furthermore the understanding of Brownian motion as a manifestation of
the motion of small particles impacting visible particles had to wait for
Einstein's paper on Brownian Motion (published in that wunderjahr
1905). There were adumbrations the atomic nature of matter when
it was observed that the elements in metallic compounds occur in
fixed integral quantities (or nearly so).
All of these proofs of the atomic nature of matter arose out of scientific
observation and NOT out of philosophical speculation. The weight
of evidence finally overcame opposition to the atomic theory. Even
so Ernst Mach was practically on his death bed before he admitted the
possibility in (I think) 1916. The atomic theory of matter was really
not fully accepted (in the sense of being supported by empirical
evidence) until the early part of this century.
The bottom line is that 2500 years passed from the initial *speculation*
about the atomic constitution of matter to hard evidence that the
speculation was true. The atomic theory was NOT derived from abstract
ontological considerations, but was produced by observation and
measurement.
I think it is fair to say that if Democritus and Leucippus had not existed
or
their original speculations on the nature of matter were lost an atomic
theory would have arisen anyhow just from normal scientific observations
and measurements.
Bob Kolker
Regnirps
Date: Thu, Dec 10, 1998 8:59 PM
Message-id: <19981210235829...@ng54.aol.com>
>Bob Kolker writes:
>>Glass does not have a crystalline structure characteristic of solids. It is a
>>very viscous liquid.
>IMHO, any definition of liquid that includes glass is faulty.
You seem to be having trouble with the world in general. All right, how about
fluid? It has measurable viscosity, it flows at room temperature (slowly) and
is not a crystal nor a gas nor a plasma.
Charlie Springer
Paw1015
>>IMHO, any definition of liquid that includes glass is faulty.
>You seem to be having trouble with the world in general.
No, the world is treating me very well. Why do you say this?
>All right, how about fluid? It has measurable viscosity, it
>flows at room temperature (slowly) and is not a crystal
>nor a gas nor a plasma.
I seem to remember my middle school science textbook
calling glass a super-cooled liquid. And it also mentioned
windows being thicker on the bottom. Whatever the case is,
galss, for me, has NO viscosity. You might be able to
percieve it, I can't, so it's a solid for me.
Gregory Weston
Regnirps
>Date: Fri, Dec 11, 1998 15:50 EST
>Message-id: <19981211154922...@ng55.aol.com>
>
>Charlie Springer writes:
>
>>>IMHO, any definition of liquid that includes glass is faulty.
>
>>You seem to be having trouble with the world in general.
>
>No, the world is treating me very well. Why do you say this?
Logic and glass are both giving you a hard time. its a broad range.
>>All right, how about fluid? It has measurable viscosity, it
>>flows at room temperature (slowly) and is not a crystal
>>nor a gas nor a plasma.
>
>I seem to remember my middle school science textbook
>calling glass a super-cooled liquid. And it also mentioned
>windows being thicker on the bottom. Whatever the case is,
>galss, for me, has NO viscosity. You might be able to
>percieve it, I can't, so it's a solid for me .
O.K. I could assume that for you the stars are not moving, the continents do
not drift and rocks do not weather. I could probably show you the flow off
glass at room temperature, but you would have to believe that an interferometer
can be used to measure very small displacements.
Charlie Springer
Phil Roberts, Jr.
>
> Paw1015 wrote:
>
> > Jim Klein writes:
> >
> > >"resolved question of philosophy" that is now considered a part of
> > >applied science? Just curious.
> >
> > philosophers, but now that a good atomic theory has been
> > worked out, that theory now serves as the foundation for
> > many other theories.
>
> Democritus and Leucippus only *speculated* on the possibility thatmatter
> consisted of atoms (small indivisible particles). The
> empirical proof that there were small invisible components of matter had
> to wait until J.J. Thompson showed that small charged particles existed
> and manifested themselves by making a phosphor screen glow.
>
Nope. Roger Dalton merely INFERRED atoms from the law of multiple
proportions. Operationalists would have had to reject the hypothesis
on the grounds that there was no DIRECT evidence.
> Furthermore the understanding of Brownian motion as a manifestation of
> the motion of small particles impacting visible particles had to wait for
> Einstein's paper on Brownian Motion (published in that wunderjahr
> 1905). There were adumbrations the atomic nature of matter when
> it was observed that the elements in metallic compounds occur in
> fixed integral quantities (or nearly so).
>
> All of these proofs of the atomic nature of matter arose out of scientific
> observation and NOT out of philosophical speculation.
Atomism has not been proven. It is merely an INFERENCE
TO THE BEST EXPLANATION a la Pierce, Lycan, Thagard, etc.
IOW, there is sufficient evidence that reasonable men find
it compelling.
> The weight
> of evidence finally overcame opposition to the atomic theory. Even
> so Ernst Mach was practically on his death bed before he admitted the
> possibility in (I think) 1916. The atomic theory of matter was really
> not fully accepted (in the sense of being supported by empirical
> evidence) until the early part of this century.
>
Not even electronmicroscopopic proof is proof, since you still have
to infer from the instrument a causal origin. Causal origins are
never observed, always inferred, with the single acception of
the minds effectations and affectations (Hume, 1739)
> The bottom line is that 2500 years passed from the initial *speculation*
> about the atomic constitution of matter to hard evidence that the
> speculation was true. The atomic theory was NOT derived from abstract
> ontological considerations, but was produced by observation and
> measurement.
>
Its still based on abstract ontological considerations. Quantum physics
has given us a lot of reason to have serious doubts about all this
atomism business, if I'm not mistaken.
--
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Feelings of Worthlessness and So-Called Cognitive Science
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/5476
Paw1015
[arguments from intimadation snipped]
The problem with are dispute is with definition of solid.
Here is what Merriam Webster has to say:
2 a : a substance that does not flow perceptibly under
moderate stress, has a definite capacity for resisting forces
(as compression or tension) which tend to deform it, and
under ordinary conditions retains a definite size and shape.
Notice it does not say "a substance that does not flow at all,"
but "flow perceptibly."
Here is the definition of liquid
(noun)
1 : a liquid consonant
2 : a fluid (as water) that has no independent shape but has
a definite volume and does not expand indefinitely and
that is only slightly compressible
(adj)
1 : flowing freely like water
Now tell me does glass flow freely like water? Does glass
have no independent shape? No, and no. Thus, glass is not
a liquid.
Does glass under ordinary conditions retains a definite size
and shape? Does it have a definite capacity for resisting
forces (as compression or tension) which tend to deform it?
Yes and yes. Thus glass is a solid.
I repeat, if scienctists call glass a liquid, they have a bad
definition of liquid. Something does not have to have
a crystalline structure to be a solid.
Gregory Weston
http://members.aol.com/gregweston
Regnirps
>Date: Fri, Dec 11, 1998 17:48 EST
>Message-id: <19981211174811...@ng51.aol.com>
>
>Charlie Springer writes:
>
>[arguments from intimadation snipped]
>
>The problem with are dispute is with definition of solid.
>
>Here is what Merriam Webster has to say:
It would go smoother in these discussions if you stated up front when you
switch between science, logic, and Webster.
>2 a : a substance that does not flow perceptibly under
>moderate stress, has a definite capacity for resisting forces
>(as compression or tension) which tend to deform it, and
>under ordinary conditions retains a definite size and shape.
>
>
>Notice it does not say "a substance that does not flow at all,"
>but "flow perceptibly."
Kind of depends on how strong you are too.
>Here is the definition of liquid
>(noun)
>1 : a liquid consonant
>2 : a fluid (as water) that has no independent shape but has
> a definite volume and does not expand indefinitely and
>that is only slightly compressible
>
>(adj)
>1 : flowing freely like water
Doesn't mention a time scale. Water holds a pretty definite shape as it falls
through the air. A glass has pretty definite shape over human lifetimes.
>Now tell me does glass flow freely like water? Does glass
>have no independent shape? No, and no. Thus, glass is not
>a liquid.
Well, glass DOES flow freely, and like water in the manner of flowing but not
like water in the manner of speed.
>Does glass under ordinary conditions retains a definite size
> and shape? Does it have a definite capacity for resisting
>forces (as compression or tension) which tend to deform it?
>Yes and yes. Thus glass is a solid.
>I repeat, if scienctists call glass a liquid, they have a bad
>definition of liquid. Something does not have to have
>a crystalline structure to be a solid.
But it does have certain properties like the kinds of waves that can propogate.
Heaven knows, Webster was never wrong, even though the definitions of many
words in Webster change every 20 years, unlike the OED
I suggest that we call this alternate form of stuff that is not liquid and not
solid a "glass". How would that be?
Charlie Springer
Robert J. Kolker
Phil Roberts, Jr. wrote: > Atomism has not been proven. It is merely an
INFERENCE
> TO THE BEST EXPLANATION a la Pierce, Lycan, Thagard, etc.
> IOW, there is sufficient evidence that reasonable men find
> it compelling.
That is what "proven" means in a scientific context.
One has abducted to the best explanation anyone can
think of and part of the abduction is empirical evidence.
There are no absolute proofs in the scientific realm, only
supportable hypotheses which have not been disproven
by experiment.
Scientific proof should not be confused with mathematical
proof.
> Not even electronmicroscopopic proof is proof, since you still have
> to infer from the instrument a causal origin. Causal origins are
> never observed, always inferred, with the single acception of
> the minds effectations and affectations (Hume, 1739)
Again abduction implies prior conditions have something to do
with current conditions, even if the connection is not deterministic.
>
>
> > The bottom line is that 2500 years passed from the initial *speculation*
> > about the atomic constitution of matter to hard evidence that the
> > speculation was true. The atomic theory was NOT derived from abstract
> > ontological considerations, but was produced by observation and
> > measurement.
> >
>
> Its still based on abstract ontological considerations. Quantum physics
> has given us a lot of reason to have serious doubts about all this
> atomism business, if I'm not mistaken.
Actually, quantum theory has *saved* the atom. Classical electrodynamics
implies that a moving electron should radiate aways its energy and
collapse, heaving and panting as it were upon the bosom of the nucleus.
The Bohr model which postualated descrete allowable energy levels
within the elecron orbitals permits a sustained atom. It requires the
quantizing of energy levels of the electrons.
Bob Kolker
PS: Scientfic theories are never proven. The only definite
process with regard to scientific theories is there *disproof*.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
>
>
> There are no absolute proofs in the scientific realm, only
> supportable hypotheses which have not been disproven
> by experiment.
>
> Scientific proof should not be confused with mathematical
> proof.
>
If this is what you mean by proof then for once we agree
on something. But it really didn't seem to be reading that
way. You made it sound very much as if atomic theory were
a proven fact rather than an established theory.
> > Not even electronmicroscopopic proof is proof, since you still have
> > to infer from the instrument a causal origin. Causal origins are
> > never observed, always inferred, with the single acception of
> > the minds effectations and affectations (Hume, 1739)
>
> Again abduction implies prior conditions have something to do
> with current conditions, even if the connection is not deterministic.
>
Not quite clear on this point.
> >
> >
> > > The bottom line is that 2500 years passed from the initial *speculation*
> > > about the atomic constitution of matter to hard evidence that the
> > > speculation was true. The atomic theory was NOT derived from abstract
> > > ontological considerations, but was produced by observation and
> > > measurement.
> > >
> >
> > Its still based on abstract ontological considerations. Quantum physics
> > has given us a lot of reason to have serious doubts about all this
> > atomism business, if I'm not mistaken.
>
> Actually, quantum theory has *saved* the atom. Classical electrodynamics
> implies that a moving electron should radiate aways its energy and
> collapse, heaving and panting as it were upon the bosom of the nucleus.
>
But it also makes the atom looks a lot more like a ghostly phantom.
Plus
we also have the wave/particle problem, to say nothing of the fact that
the ontic theatre (space/time) in which these particles are supposed to
reside is equally phantasmic (that is a word, isn't it?)
> The Bohr model which postualated descrete allowable energy levels
> within the elecron orbitals permits a sustained atom. It requires the
> quantizing of energy levels of the electrons.
>
Point taken. Oh! It wasn't Roger Dalton. I must have
been thinking of Roger Daltry of The Who. I think it was Robert Dalton
who first postulated atomic theory in modern times. I'm pretty sure
I'm right about the law of multiple proportions being the impetus,
however.
> PS: Scientfic theories are never proven. The only definite
> process with regard to scientific theories is there *disproof*.
I'm not so sure about this one. Have you a specific example or two
in mind? Hasn't Popper been largely dismissed as a holdover from
the good ole days of logical positivism?
repo...@iag.net
Paw1015 <paw...@aol.comNOSPAM> wrote:
> I only know from expiriance that footballs don't fly into orbit when thrown,
Yes, you do.
> but I know analyticly that a football is _not_ made out of liquid.
No, you don't.
> Gregory Weston
Paw1015
>> but I know analyticly that a football is _not_ made out of liquid.
>No, you don't.
I give up. Your argument is just too strong for me to
overcome. <sigh>
Gregory Weston
http://members.aol.com/gregweston
Olaf Weber
> Paw1015 <paw...@aol.comNOSPAM> wrote:
>> 1 : flowing freely like water
> Doesn't mention a time scale. Water holds a pretty definite shape as
> it falls through the air. A glass has pretty definite shape over
> human lifetimes.
It holds a definite shape over much longer timespans: glass objects
from Roman times and earlier show no signs of deformation due to
"flowing". And as has been pointed out earlier, neither do medieval
cathedral windows.
>> Now tell me does glass flow freely like water? Does glass
>> have no independent shape? No, and no. Thus, glass is not
>> a liquid.
> Well, glass DOES flow freely, and like water in the manner of
> flowing but not like water in the manner of speed.
At room temperature and atmospheric pressure, glass does not flow.
Reality is not beholden to fit the schemes by which we classify it,
but if you _have_ to fit glass somewhere in the solid-liquid-gas
trichotomy, it should be considered a solid, even though it may be an
atypical solid.
..
> I suggest that we call this alternate form of stuff that is not
> liquid and not solid a "glass". How would that be?
IIRC, acrystalline solids are called "glasses" because of their
similarity. They've got some interesting properties compared to their
crystalline variants, like being tougher.
--
Olaf Weber
SIGSIG -- signature too long (core dumped)
Regnirps
>At room temperature and atmospheric pressure, glass does not flow.
>Reality is not beholden to fit the schemes by which we classify it,
>but if you _have_ to fit glass somewhere in the solid-liquid-gas
>trichotomy, it should be considered a solid, even though it may be an
>atypical solid.
Please ellucidate. It is not crystaline. Doesn't flow at STP but does flow at
higher temperatures. Is there a transition point or phase change from not flow
to flow, and if so where?
Charlie Springer
Matt Ruff / Lisa Gold
Here's what Cecil Adams, the "Straight Dope" columnist, has to say on
the matter:
"Despite its appearance, glass is really a highly viscous liquid rather
than a solid...Conventional liquids, when cooled, have a freezing point
at which they suddenly become solid. Liquid glass, by contrast, simply
gets gradually stiffer as it cools. At room temperature its rate of flow
is so slow that it would take billions of years to ooze out of shape,
and for most practical purposes it may be treated as a solid. Its
internal structure, though, is not the regular crystalline latticework
of your standard solid but rather is essentially random, like the
typical liquid."
This would explain why Roman-era glassware and medievil stained glass
windows have not noticeably deformed, despite being liquid -- not enough
time has gone by.
-- M. Ruff
Olaf Weber
> Olaf Weber <ol...@infovore.xs4all.nl> wrote:
>> At room temperature and atmospheric pressure, glass does not flow.
>> Reality is not beholden to fit the schemes by which we classify it,
>> but if you _have_ to fit glass somewhere in the solid-liquid-gas
>> trichotomy, it should be considered a solid, even though it may be an
>> atypical solid.
> Please ellucidate. It is not crystaline. Doesn't flow at STP but
> does flow at higher temperatures. Is there a transition point or
> phase change from not flow to flow, and if so where?
There is no transition point, but rather a "transition trajectory"
where a glass will neither be completely liquid nor completely solid.
Roughly speaking, in a solid neighbouring atoms or molecules "share"
electrons, and while they "vibrate" in place, they do no change
position w.r.t. each other. In a liquid, the constituents also share
electrons, but move freely w.r.t. to each other, and are perforce in
close contact. In a gas, electrons of the constituent atoms or
molecules are not shared between them. (And in a plasma, sometimes
known as the fourth state of matter, the outer electrons are stripped
from the atoms making up the gas.)
So the question whether glass is a solid can be approached by
investigating whether, under "normal conditions", its constituent
atoms move with respect to each other, and if so, whether they do so
to a larger extent than those of a "conventional" solid. At room
temperature and atmospheric pressure, the atoms in glass behave like
they're part of a solid, not a liquid. Which is a good reason to
call glass a solid, its jumbled-up nature nonwithstanding.
GRADinc
>At room
>temperature and atmospheric pressure, the atoms in glass behave like
>they're part of a solid, not a liquid. Which is a good reason to
>call glass a solid, its jumbled-up nature nonwithstanding.
The confusion is between the technical terms crystalline solid and
fluid, versus the common language terms solid and liquid.
An experiment. Make a 1 centimeter square bar, 10 centimeters
long of glass, lead and quartz.
Clamp the bar and hand a 10 kg weight at the free end.
What happens?
They all deflect a bit under the force of the weight,
Wait a while.
The lead bar will slowly deform since it is a plastic solid. The
small crystallites which the lead is made from slide past one
another.
The quartz bar will remain the same forever since the atoms in
the quartz are electronically bonded into definite positions.
The glass bar will also slowly deform (I think slower than the
lead) as the individual atoms move around and readjust
relative to each other.
The concept solid is not so simple.
Tom Clarke
repo...@iag.net
Paw1015 <paw...@aol.com> wrote:
> >> but I know analyticly that a football is _not_ made out of liquid.
>
> >No, you don't.
>
> I give up. Your argument is just too strong for me to
> overcome. <sigh>
Yes, it is. You know footballs from experience, not from someone handing you
a definition on a card. Therefore, your previous "analytic" nonsense is
exactly that. Thanks.