Evolution: no room for moral truth (was Intuitionalism vs Ev...)
Gordon G. Sollars
In article <20001111195957...@ng-ch1.aol.com>, User 1DE7
writes...
> >Subject: Re: Evolution: no room for moral truth (was Intuitionalism vs E
> >v...)
...
> >Yes, although they are not aware of them or able to evaluate them as
> >humans can.
>
> I assume you think having a good reason for doing something rather than not
> doing it means you *should* do it. So you are saying the worm *should* do
> certain things, even though it isn't aware of these things and can't evaluate
> whether or not to?
I'm not sure. Perhaps being able think about reasons, rather than just
having them, makes a difference.
> What are the sorts of things that you think a worm should
> do?
I don't know that much about worms.
...
> >> Their is no evidence that there is some
> >> objectively good reason why the ameoba does a certain thing and not
> >> another. We have a nice theory called evolution that explains its
> >> actions.
> >
> >What does this have to do with there not being good reasons?
>
> Because it is all explained without it,
My point was that the theory of evolution could provide the good reasons.
...
> >> > > (1) An argument that commits an is/ought fallacy is invalid.
> >> >
> >> > But I reject the truth of (1).
> >>
> >> Yep. Howabout this: Can you give any example at all of an argument with
> >> premises that are not about X implying a conclusion that is about X?
Sure. Let X stand for "This organism is healthy". A biologist uses a
large number of premises having to do with various aspects of an
organism, which, taken together warrant the conclusion X, yet no
individual premise by itself is about X. Each one is rather about some
functioning or measurement.
But tell me, does your skepticism include induction? After all, premises
like "The ball fell at time t1", "The ball fell at time t2",..., are not,
logically speaking, "about" the ball falling at some future time.
...
> >> What criteria do you use to determine if a reason is good or not?
> >
> >A variety of rather complex criteria - even more difficult to state than
> >to define "table". Do you have any criteria, or do you think that
> >reasons can not be good?
>
> I don't think they can be good.
So you have no good reason to think that you are not a brain in a vat?
...
> How do I know I am being objective? By actively seeking out flaws in my
> arguments, by freely admitting them and correcting them when they are
> discovered or pointed out by someone else. Trying to detach emotionaly from
> your argument so that you don't care if you are right ot wrong, trying to get
> into the mindset of the opposing view, maybe even telling yourself it'd b
> e even
> better if you were wrong since then you'd actualy learn something, and then
> attacking your own argument again with the renewed vigour of wanting to find
> errors. etc. Granted there's the possiblity that I am horribly biased and
> everything I say is absurdly irrational and I just don't know it, but I think
> if you try to do the things above you increase your chance of being objec
> tive.
Excellent! This holds as well as a description of how one tries to be
objective with regard to mortality.
> >> So? Who says having the option of going to a fast computer if your
> >> needs change is "good"?
> >
> >So far as I can tell, it is part of what "good" means.
>
> So, if you were to see a written out definition of "good", and it was acc
> urate
> somehow, you'd expect to see listed somewhere "having more options rather
> than
> fewer" or something?
No, but I do think that having a faster computer is good, all other
things being equal.
...
...
> >> I'll possibly look in a few days. I find your description relying a
> >> little too much on you being able to say "x is a good reason" and me
> >> accepting it without justification.
> >
> >I have given you a justification of why a certain watch is good for Blind
> >Bob.
>
> I remember you saying something about Bob wanting to tell the time, or
> something. I think that was your alleged "good reason." I was supposed to
> just
> accept this as a good reason, it seemed. I didn't see why it was a good r
> eason.
You can't think of a good reason for wanting to know what time it is?
Your skepticism is becoming bizarre.
...
> >How would a person justify
> >choosing a1? Or are you saying that there are no grounds for deciding
> >between a1 and a2?
>
> No grounds? Well the person chooses according to their dispositions, which I
> don't think are justified.
Perhaps your dispositions are not justified, but that does not say that
no dispositions are justified.
> >
> >Suppose a person said, "You know, I have a basic preference for a1". How
> >is that preference consistent with getting both G1 and G2?
>
> Not sure what you mean here.
Remember that G1 and G2 are goals and a1 achieves G1 only, while a2
achieves both.
>
> >> Why is this an impoverished notion?
> >
> >Because it apparently leaves you no reason to take action a2 over a1.
> >
>
> You seem to be assuming your conclusion. I'd say that there is no justified
> reason to choose a2, so, the notion isn't deficient, because it entails w
> hat is
> true rather than entailing falsehoods.
The reason to choose a2, I thought, was clear. It achieves both G1 and
G2.
...
> We know two things cause behavior, genetics and environment. I don't know of
> any evidence that anything else causes behavior.
You have never done anything for a reason? I think there is plenty of
evidence that having reasons can cause behavior.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Jesus 1DE7
>Date: 12/1/00 10:43 PM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: <MPG.149247e8ae...@mail.nji.com>
>> >What does this have to do with there not being good reasons?
>>
>> Because it is all explained without it,
>
>My point was that the theory of evolution could provide the good reasons.
I don't really understand how this would work at all.
>> >> Yep. Howabout this: Can you give any example at all of an argument with
>> >> premises that are not about X implying a conclusion that is about X?
>
>Sure. Let X stand for "This organism is healthy". A biologist uses a
>large number of premises having to do with various aspects of an
>organism, which, taken together warrant the conclusion X, yet no
>individual premise by itself is about X. Each one is rather about some
>functioning or measurement.
>
But the premises really are about X, since health *means* the same thing that
the premises are about.
>But tell me, does your skepticism include induction? After all, premises
>like "The ball fell at time t1", "The ball fell at time t2",..., are not,
>logically speaking, "about" the ball falling at some future time.
>
Right, and they don't by themselves imply anything about the ball falling at
some future time. For that you need to throw in a premise about the uniformity
of nature.
>> >A variety of rather complex criteria - even more difficult to state than
>> >to define "table". Do you have any criteria, or do you think that
>> >reasons can not be good?
>>
>> I don't think they can be good.
>
>So you have no good reason to think that you are not a brain in a vat?
>
I have reasons that are justified by certain principles, like not stipulating
wild complex explainations for phenominon that can be explained much more
simply. I look favorably on this reason. It could be instrumentaly good for
discernment of truth, but I don't see how it could be objectively good.
>> I remember you saying something about Bob wanting to tell the time, or
>> something. I think that was your alleged "good reason." I was supposed to
>> just
>> accept this as a good reason, it seemed. I didn't see why it was a good r
>> eason.
>
>You can't think of a good reason for wanting to know what time it is?
>Your skepticism is becoming bizarre.
"Becoming"? My moral-skepticism should have you expecting that any time you ask
me if there is a good reason for X, I'll say no. What should seem bizarre,
given that you know I am a moral skeptic, is if I said there was a good reason
for wanting to know the time.
>> No grounds? Well the person chooses according to their dispositions, which
>I
>> don't think are justified.
>
>Perhaps your dispositions are not justified, but that does not say that
>no dispositions are justified.
>
Right. My reasons for saying dispositions are not justified are more than just
that my own are not justified.
>> We know two things cause behavior, genetics and environment. I don't know
>of
>> any evidence that anything else causes behavior.
>
>You have never done anything for a reason? I think there is plenty of
>evidence that having reasons can cause behavior.
>
And what are reasons caused by? Genetics and environment as far as I can see.
You may notice I am sort of brief in my responses and not really making an
effort to spur further discussion. This is beacuse I don't really see a way to
procede. Our disagreement seems to be too fundamental. You simply look at a
reason and call it good, and expect me to do the same, yet there doesn't seem
to be much explaination of how this works or why it is so. I'm just supposed to
be able to see the obvious goodness. This really doesn't make sense to me, so I
don't know how we'd proceed. With Owl I traced some of the difficulty to the
mind/body problem, and existance of universals, but from what you've said
earlier it doesn't seem like that would help, since I think you think your
position is compatible with a mind/body identity theory -- I may be wrong
though.
-User
Gordon G. Sollars
writes...
Gordon G. Sollars
> >Sure. Let X stand for "This organism is healthy". A biologist uses a
> >large number of premises having to do with various aspects of an
> >organism, which, taken together warrant the conclusion X, yet no
> >individual premise by itself is about X. Each one is rather about some
> >functioning or measurement.
> >
>
> But the premises really are about X, since health *means* the same thing that
> the premises are about.
Notice that if this criticism of yours is valid, I can say the same about
"good": certain (factual) premises are just what good *means*. I'm not
going to go down this path, but I did want to point out that you are
treating "healthy" and "good" differently, apparently without any good
reason for doing so. (But, then, you seem to reject the idea that there
are good reasons. ;-) )
However, it is not that case that health /means/ what the premises are
about; for one reason, knowledge can change over time. Instead, the
premises are evidence of the organism's health, /according to the best
understanding at the time/. George Washington's doctors thought they
could restore him to health by bleeding him. Did they /mean/ something
different by "health" than we do?
So, I think that biologists (broadly conceived) are all the time doing
what you claimed can not be done. To the extent that their theories are
correct, of course, we might be tempted to /say/ that these premises are
what health /means/, but all we can legitimately conclude is that, as far
as we know, these premises are correlated with health.
> >But tell me, does your skepticism include induction? After all, premises
> >like "The ball fell at time t1", "The ball fell at time t2",..., are not,
> >logically speaking, "about" the ball falling at some future time.
> >
>
> Right, and they don't by themselves imply anything about the ball falling at
> some future time. For that you need to throw in a premise about the unifo
> rmity
> of nature.
What is the "uniformity of nature" except a way to say that you /can/
make warranted statements abut the future, such as those about the ball?
Do you accept the "uniformity of nature" principle? Surely you see that
it logically goes beyond any evidence that you have? It seems that the
very reasons you have for being a moral skeptic are sufficient to make
you a physical skeptic as well.
...
> >So you have no good reason to think that you are not a brain in a vat?
> >
>
> I have reasons that are justified by certain principles, like not stipulating
> wild complex explainations for phenominon that can be explained much more
> simply. I look favorably on this reason.
Why do you "look favorably" upon it? Why would this reason provide any
less justification if you "looked badly" upon it?
...
> >You can't think of a good reason for wanting to know what time it is?
> >Your skepticism is becoming bizarre.
>
> "Becoming"? My moral-skepticism should have you expecting that any time y
> ou ask
> me if there is a good reason for X, I'll say no.
I did not say "moral skepticism" but "skepticism" generally. The other
human beings around you talk about having a good reason to do this or
that all the time. As to my expectations, I would expect that only if I
thought you would maintain moral skepticism no matter what.
...
> >Perhaps your dispositions are not justified, but that does not say that
> >no dispositions are justified.
> >
>
> Right. My reasons for saying dispositions are not justified are more than
> just
> that my own are not justified.
So you have reasons. What are they?
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
User 1DE7
>From: "Gordon G. Sollars" sol...@nji.com
>Message-id: <MPG.1492f5a6c2...@mail.nji.com>
>> But the premises really are about X, since health *means* the same thing
>that
>> the premises are about.
>
>Notice that if this criticism of yours is valid, I can say the same about
>"good": certain (factual) premises are just what good *means*
You can't say that and get the proscriptive part of the meaning that you want.
Obviously you can simply define goodness to be certain physical things. But
then I can ask "why should we desire good?" and the fact that the things fit
your definition of "good" would be no reason to.
I am doing nothing of the kind in saing that health just is a composite of
physical things. I'm not saying there is anything new being added by the health
concept analagous to the adding of a proscriptive component.
You might say that the proscriptive component was never added -- it is always
present in all physical facts. In that case I simply have no idea what you're
talking about.
>I'm not
>going to go down this path, but I did want to point out that you are
>treating "healthy" and "good" differently, apparently without any good
>reason for doing so.
See the reason above.
>However, it is not that case that health /means/ what the premises are
>about; for one reason, knowledge can change over time. Instead, the
>premises are evidence of the organism's health, /according to the best
>understanding at the time/. George Washington's doctors thought they
>could restore him to health by bleeding him. Did they /mean/ something
>different by "health" than we do?
No. They meant by health a certain functioning of the body and mind that was
energetic and without defect or something. That is what I meant health means,
more or less. I don't know what you are doing bringing in things about bleeding
people. Did you actualy write out a formal argument with non-health premises
and a health-conclusion before? Or did you just mention that it could be done?
I don't remember the argument, so if you did not do it, maybe this would be
more clear if you did.
I am not saying health is literaly about bleeding people, whatever that would
mean. Health means a type of physical condition. Bleeding people was thought to
help bring about the condition that health means, but I don't know why you seem
to be suggesting that I think bleeding people was actualy part of what health
meant.
>So, I think that biologists (broadly conceived) are all the time doing
>what you claimed can not be done. To the extent that their theories are
>correct, of course, we might be tempted to /say/ that these premises are
>what health /means/
What specific premises are you talking about? I never tried to imply that the
meaning of health had anything to do with theories about how to bring it about.
I was thinking of something like this.
(1) Bleeding people lets out the demons that infect them.
(2) Letting out the demons that infect people contributes to their ability to
move around without difficulty and escalates their happiness and frees them of
pain.
(3) Therefore bleeding people makes them healthy.
When I say what the premises are about is what health means I don't mean the
bleeding, or the demons. What health means is described in the last part of the
second premise only. So, you should see how 'health' doesn't introduce anything
new here, but neither is it equivilant to anything appearing in any premise
that you pick.
>> Right, and they don't by themselves imply anything about the ball falling
>at
>> some future time. For that you need to throw in a premise about the unifo
>> rmity
>> of nature.
>
>What is the "uniformity of nature" except a way to say that you /can/
>make warranted statements abut the future, such as those about the ball?
Warranted by what? The uniformity of nature principle is not logicaly warrented
by anything else as far as I can see, so without it, nothing warrants
predictions about the future based on the past. However if you accept it as a
premise, then things can be warrented in terms of it. So, the principle is
nessesary if you want your statements about the future to be warrented by
anything, because they aren't warrented simply by facts about the past.
>Do you accept the "uniformity of nature" principle?
Sure.
>Surely you see that
>it logically goes beyond any evidence that you have?
Yep.
>It seems that the
>very reasons you have for being a moral skeptic are sufficient to make
>you a physical skeptic as well.
Hm, I don't see this. You'll have to elaborate.
>> >So you have no good reason to think that you are not a brain in a vat?
>> >
>>
>> I have reasons that are justified by certain principles, like not
>stipulating
>> wild complex explainations for phenominon that can be explained much more
>> simply. I look favorably on this reason.
>
>Why do you "look favorably" upon it?
Maybe because of some biological compulsion of mine, or due to how a structure
in my brain evolved, who knows.
>Why would this reason provide any
>less justification if you "looked badly" upon it?
Not sure I see what you are saying. Whether S is justified by J doesn't depend
at all on how I feel about J. I suspect you may have some ideas about absolute
justification that I wouldn't find sensical.
>> >You can't think of a good reason for wanting to know what time it is?
>> >Your skepticism is becoming bizarre.
>>
>> "Becoming"? My moral-skepticism should have you expecting that any time y
>> ou ask
>> me if there is a good reason for X, I'll say no.
>
>I did not say "moral skepticism" but "skepticism" generally.
Right, but you were referring to in instance resulting directly from my
moral/normative skepticism.
>The other
>human beings around you talk about having a good reason to do this or
>that all the time.
As do I.
>As to my expectations, I would expect that only if I
>thought you would maintain moral skepticism no matter what.
You seem to be writing as if you had just presented a compelling argument that
I might possibly accept, and you'd expect me to accept it unless my skepticism
was extremely bizarre or something. I don't see that you presented an argument
at all. You simply asked if someone had a good reason to be able to tell the
time. How is that supposed to be so convincing that you are surprised when I
don't make a radical departure from my position when asked it?
>> Right. My reasons for saying dispositions are not justified are more than
>> just
>> that my own are not justified.
>
>So you have reasons. What are they?
I can't interpret absolute justification as a sensical concept. The whole thing
seems like an absurd attempt to make human thought seem majestic.
I understand justification as a relationship between something that is
justified, and something else that does the justifying.
It'd be like if you told me that something was absolutely smaller. I would
think you were being nonsensical, as I do now. I would say that my saying
things can't simply be "smaller" is not simply because nothing that I own is
objectively smaller. That isn't the only reason. The reason is that it simply
doesn't make any sense to say anything that anyone owns is objectively smaller.
-User
George Dance
[Gordon Sollars wrote:]
> Notice that if this criticism of yours is valid, I can say the same
about
> "good": certain (factual) premises are just what good *means*. I'm
not
> going to go down this path, but I did want to point out that you are
> treating "healthy" and "good" differently, apparently without any good
> reason for doing so. (But, then, you seem to reject the idea that
> there are good reasons. ;-) )
Well, obviously "good" does not mean the same as "healthy" - you are not
asking for "healthy reasons." What you apparently mean by a "good
reason" is one that should obligate me, if I am committed to being
rational, to accept it. Similarly, "X is good" seems to mean only that,
if I am committed to rationality, I should accept or agree with X
occurring - not just that I agree that X does occur, but that X should
occur - which is a fact only about what I believe.
> However, it is not that case that health /means/ what the premises are
> about; for one reason, knowledge can change over time. Instead, the
> premises are evidence of the organism's health, /according to the best
> understanding at the time/. George Washington's doctors thought they
> could restore him to health by bleeding him. Did they /mean/
> something different by "health" than we do?
No. And they evidently shared the same belief that "health is good."
But they obviously also believed that different actions sustained
health, which was of course a question of fact and therefore
falsifiable. Similarly, the present belief that "Y [= 'Whatever doctors
do nowadays for people in Washington's condition'] is good" depends on
both the factual (and therefore falsifiable) belief that "Y sustains
health" and the apparently non-factual "health is good."
> So, I think that biologists (broadly conceived) are all the time doing
> what you claimed can not be done. To the extent that their theories
are
> correct, of course, we might be tempted to /say/ that these premises
are
> what health /means/, but all we can legitimately conclude is that, as
far
> as we know, these premises are correlated with health.
Agreed; "Y sustains health" is a factual statement, or proposition.
--
- 30 -
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Gordon G. Sollars
...
> Well, obviously "good" does not mean the same as "healthy" - you are not
> asking for "healthy reasons."
Well, "good" is a good word that gets used a goodly amount. My point was
not that "good" and "healthy" mean the same. User had asked me to give
an argument with a conclusion X, such X did not appear in the premises;
he claimed that this could not be done, as part of his claim that an
"ought" can not be derived from an "is". I pointed out that the
conclusion "This organism is healthy" (where "healthy" plays the role of
X) is the conclusion of such an argument. That is, a biologist (or
doctor) can give the conclusion after making a number of observations
that do not mention health.
Of course, User might claim that these observation statements /somehow/
do include X; then I will claim that similar "is" statements /somehow/
include "good". Or User might say that these statement "involve" health;
then I will claim that similar "is" statements "involve" the good. Be
that as it may, I think I have shown that User's original challenge has
been met, using health as X.
Of course, this does not "prove" that moral realism, in my flavor or any
other, is correct. But, then, I have never said that I could prove that
moral realism was correct.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com