Why "Owl" is an intellectual coward
db...@tampatrib.com
about his objections to Objectivism. This essay contains numerous errors,
although "Owl" lacks the courage to face this fact.
Here are some that I noted in the past, which prompted cowardly flight:
In article <7lku0o$bnd$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>,
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
> Again, I don't see what this has to do with my argument. My argument was
> deductively valid and had 3 premises:
Your argument is not valid, and the reasons have been given. You simply
evade the reasons.
> P1: If Objectivism is true, then [that O marries his mother] is the same
> thing as [that O marries Jocaste].
"Oedipus' mother" means Jocaste. You are unable to deny this and evade
the fact that you are so unable.
> P2: No one can both believe a thing and not believe that same thing at the
> same time.
As was already said, even though you evaded it, if the failure to believe
is contingent upon different words than the success in belief, it is
possible. I'll give the same example again, both because it's easy and
because it highlights the fact that you simply evade this point. You might
correctly believe, for example, that Navy submarines are propelled by
engines, while at the same time failing to believe that they are propelled by
steam turbines. But in the Navy, "engine" means "steam turbine." Your failure
to believe is contingent upon the use of the different words, "steam
turbine," while your success is contingent upon the use of the word "engine."
This example explains while you're totally wrong, although you evaded the
example last time.
Similarly, Oedipus believes he married Jocaste while not believing that he
married his mother.
> Which one of these premises are you trying to challenge?
The one that was challenged before. You simply evaded the challenge. Your
posts depend upon your evading the things that refute them.
In article <7lnh3f$96i$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>, Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
> If the word "a" and the word "b" refer to the same thing, then if
> a sentence containing "a" is true, you should be able to substitute "b" for
> "a" and still have a true sentence. Why doesn't this work on the oedipal
> sentences:
>
> 1. O believes that O is marrying Jocaste.
> 2. O believes that O is marrying O's mother.
Because sentence 1 does not completely and correctly express what Oedipus
believes, of course. Oedipus believes that Oedipus is marrying (Jocaste who
is not his mother). When you try to substitute (his mother) for (Jocaste who
is not his mother), it's easy to see that the error is in sentence 1.
Sentence 1 lacks context. You are claiming that sentence 1 represents what
Oedipus believes, but it only represents part of what he believes. Examining
everything Oedipus believes illuminates your error. When you properly
examine the things that Oedipus believes: x) I married Jocaste y) I did not
marry my mother ... it's easy to see that "my mother" means Jocaste. If it
didn't, x and y wouldn't contradict when they clearly do. Of course, this
has been pointed out already. You simply evade this point. Admittedly, the
above that you wrote is a new strategem, but it's a new strategem that relies
on the same evasion. We could whimsically call it "squirming."
> The problem with Objectivism, then, is that it ignores this second dimension
> of how language works: that people refer to things *via* senses.
The problem with your argument, then, is that it ignores a dimension of
how language works: that people refer to things with words and can be
mistaken about what those words mean. Already pointed out and evaded by you.
In article <7lnh3f$96i$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>, Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
> Here's another formulation of the problem (common in phil. of language):
> Everyone accepts Leibniz' law: If a=b, then any characteristic of a is a
> characteristic of b.
Characteristic of a, you say here. Let's remember that: characteristic of a.
> Now, that seems to imply the following principle about
> sentences: If the word "a" and the word "b" refer to the same thing, then if
> a sentence containing "a" is true, you should be able to substitute "b" for
> "a" and still have a true sentence.
No, it doesn't seem to imply this. Words are not necessarily
characteristics of a. Here comes the amusing part.
> Why doesn't this work on the oedipal
> sentences:
>
> 1. O believes that O is marrying Jocaste.
> 2. O believes that O is marrying O's mother.
You would have the reader believe that a is Jocaste and b is Oedipus'
mother, and that there is an x that is a characteristic of a and should be a
characteristic of b. And the characteristic of Jocaste that you here cite?
That Oedipus believes something about her. You are trying to say that
Oedipus' beliefs are a characteristic of Jocaste.
Well, that's absurd. This argument of yours isn't very well thought out.
In article <7lkvfs$c83$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>,
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
> >I have explained it quite clearly, and you fail to respond except by
> >blustering.
>
> As soon as you read my explanation of what "the principles of logic" are, I
> will stop my insufferable blustering.
As I have already said, your explanation is merely an *assertion* and
isn't *shown*. In order for your "proof" to be formally valid, the steps
would have to be shown. You haven't shown them, however, and have only
asserted them, as was already said several times now. Again, you don't even
attempt to show that "inference depends upon the principles of logic," but
merely assert it. Really, at this point you're not even managing to assert
it, much less attempting to show it. Perhaps that's because when you merely
assert it there's someone who points out that that's all you've done.
In article <7l46kg$rag$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>, Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
> >No, that's not egoism. That's subjective morality.
> >
> I did explain at some length in the essay why I think the egoist would
> distintegrate the homeless guy.
No, you explained why a person would disintegrate a homeless guy and then
*claimed* that that person was an egoist. As was just said, you have latched
onto subjective morality rather than egoism.
----------
I hope I don't make it sound like I have a monopoly on refuting "Owl." Far
from it.
-- at no extra charge
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Stephen Speicher
> From time to time, a fellow who calls himself "Owl" posts a lengthy essay
> about his objections to Objectivism. This essay contains numerous errors,
> although "Owl" lacks the courage to face this fact.
>
> Here are some that I noted in the past, which prompted cowardly flight:
> ...
Oh my, I'm shocked. Michael Huemer (aka Owl) an intellectual
coward? Who ever would have thought such a thing. :)
Next you'll tell me that he misrepresents the philosophy of
Objectivism, and then argues against his misrepresentations.
Stephen
s...@compbio.caltech.edu
You can always tell a pioneer by the arrows in his back.
Printed using 100% recycled electrons.
--------------------------------------------------------
anth...@hotmail.com
A meaning is something you have in your head. If "Jocaste" means the
same thing as "Oedipus' mother" then if Oedipus had the meaning of
Jocaste in his head, he must have known that she was his mother, which,
of course, he didn't.
Similarly, since "dbuel" and "the most foolish person on HPO" have the
same referent, on dbuel's theory, he must know he's a fool.
Wrathbone
db...@tampatrib.com
anth...@hotmail.com wrote:
> A meaning is something you have in your head. If "Jocaste" means the
> same thing as "Oedipus' mother" then if Oedipus had the meaning of
> Jocaste in his head --
He didn't know "Oedipus' mother" meant Jocaste, idiot. That's kind of the
point of the story.
> Similarly, since "dbuel" and "the most foolish person on HPO" --
See above.
Anthanson1
>From: db...@tampatrib.com
>Date: 4/13/00 6:58 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: <8d5tuk$tfk$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>
>
>In article <8d5r34$qgf$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>,
> anth...@hotmail.com wrote:
>
>> A meaning is something you have in your head. If "Jocaste" means the
>> same thing as "Oedipus' mother" then if Oedipus had the meaning of
>> Jocaste in his head --
>
>He didn't know "Oedipus' mother" meant Jocaste, idiot. That's kind of the
>point of the story.
That's right. But if the meaning of a term is the referent (your theory) then
he would have had to know that Jocaste was his mother, since "Jocaste" and
"Oedipus' mother" mean the same thing (because they have the same referent).
That's kind of the point of Owl's argument.
In the same way, on your theory, you should know that you're the "Fool of HPO"
since "dbuel" and "The Fool of HPO" have the same referent. In understanding
"dbuel"
you must understand "The Fool of HPO."
If your theory is correct, then, you must know you're a fool.
Wrathbone
Anthanson1
>
>Next you'll tell me that he misrepresents the philosophy of
>Objectivism, and then argues against his misrepresentations.
How does he misrepresent Objectivism,
Huckleberry?
Wrathbone
db...@tampatrib.com
Anthanson1 <antha...@aol.com> wrote:
> That's right. But if the meaning of a term is the referent (your theory) then
> he would have had to know that Jocaste was his mother, since "Jocaste" and
> "Oedipus' mother" mean the same thing --
Bonehead, do you understand what the story is about? Oedipus does not know
who is meant by "Oedipus' mother." I swear, I can't believe you're trying to
talk about Oedipus when you don't know the story.
Why don't you read the story and get back to us.
> In the same way, on your theory, you should know that you're the "Fool of
ScheetzBrian
>then
>> he would have had to know that Jocaste was his mother, since "Jocaste" and
>> "Oedipus' mother" mean the same thing --
>
>Bonehead, do you understand what the story is about? Oedipus does not know
>who is meant by "Oedipus' mother." I swear, I can't believe you're trying to
>talk about Oedipus when you don't know the story.
>
>Why don't you read the story and get back to us.
>
>> In the same way, on your theory, you should know that you're the "Fool of
>> HPO" --
>
>See above.
>
>-- at no extra charge
>
>
>Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
>Before you buy.
>
You misunderstand them. They are trying to apply the principle of transitivity
to language, to somehow demonstrate that meanings of words are not related to
the referents of words.
They're basically saying:
1. Jocasta = Oedipus' mother [A=B]
2. Oedipus believes he married = Jocasta [C=A]
3. Therefore, transitively: Oedipus believes he married = his mother [C=B].
Since everyone knows that Oedipus did not believe he was marrying his mother,
the meaning of words cannot be the referent of words [or so the argument seems
to go].
Basically, whoever came up with this method of analyzing language [I think they
said it was Leibniz, but I'm not sure] is misapplying the transitive method.
_Naturally_, the method fails, when you are dealing with _falsehoods_ [in this
instance, Oedipus' lack of knowledge regarding the identity of his mother].
When Oedipus believes that Jocasta is not his mother, he is believing a
falsehood. It is inevitable that this falsehood will fail to be transitively
related to truths. Try repeating this experiment in a context where the
identifications of the participants are true.
db...@tampatrib.com
ScheetzBrian <scheet...@cs.com> wrote:
> You misunderstand them.
No, not at all. "Wrathbone" simply wants to pretend that Oedipus must know
who is meant by "Oedipus' mother." False.
> 1. Jocasta = Oedipus' mother [A=B]
A person equals a person.
> 2. Oedipus believes he married = Jocasta [C=A]
Oedipus' beliefs equal a person? Wrong. Beliefs are not people.
ScheetzBrian
>
>No, not at all. "Wrathbone" simply wants to pretend that Oedipus must know
>who is meant by "Oedipus' mother." False.
>
>> 1. Jocasta = Oedipus' mother [A=B]
>
>A person equals a person.
>
>> 2. Oedipus believes he married = Jocasta [C=A]
>
>Oedipus' beliefs equal a person? Wrong. Beliefs are not people.
>
>-- at no extra charge
>
>
>Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
>Before you buy.
>
>
>
>
>
>
Dude, I disagree with them too.
The use of "=" signs was my lame attempt to reproduce their [mis]application of
the mathematical concept of transitivity to language, in the context of the
Oedipus story. I set up the "=" signs in the places where they needed to be,
if they were going to do single-item replacement of the sort they were
attempting to describe.
I was trying to make their [incorrect] analysis comprehensible. Since it
seemed that other posters were arguing subordinate points, and not their actual
[if incorrect] point.
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
ScheetzBrian <scheet...@cs.com> wrote in message
news:20000414175756...@ng-fl1.news.cs.com...
> You misunderstand them. They are trying to apply the principle of
transitivity
> to language, to somehow demonstrate that meanings of words are not
related to
> the referents of words.
>
> They're basically saying:
>
> 1. Jocasta = Oedipus' mother [A=B]
> 2. Oedipus believes he married = Jocasta [C=A]
> 3. Therefore, transitively: Oedipus believes he married = his mother
[C=B].
>
> Since everyone knows that Oedipus did not believe he was marrying
his mother,
> the meaning of words cannot be the referent of words [or so the
argument seems
> to go].
>
> Basically, whoever came up with this method of analyzing language [I
think they
> said it was Leibniz, but I'm not sure] is misapplying the transitive
method.
> _Naturally_, the method fails, when you are dealing with
_falsehoods_ [in this
> instance, Oedipus' lack of knowledge regarding the identity of his
mother].
> When Oedipus believes that Jocasta is not his mother, he is
believing a
> falsehood. It is inevitable that this falsehood will fail to be
transitively
> related to truths. Try repeating this experiment in a context where
the
> identifications of the participants are true.
Well said, but it's been said before to no avail.
--
A.Broese-van-Groenou.
a
George Dance
essay
> about his objections to Objectivism. This essay contains numerous
errors,
> although "Owl" lacks the courage to face this fact.
I note that Owl has not replied to your post as yet. While he may have
been offended by your use of the word "coward," he has of course posted
in the past that he expects such language in a newsgroup. In any case,
it would be easy enough for him to ignore your post and to answer the
substance of your charges separately.
For myself, I see that you have objections to his essay, but I am not
clear exactly what those objections are. Nor do I really want to waste
your time and mine on trying to figure them out (and maybe get them
wrong in the end anyway) from lengthy backquotes.
Would it be possible for you to post a short summary or abstract of
what your main objections are?
I have in mind something like the post I sent earlier today questioning
his claim that his intuition can generate facts that are as valid as
those gained by observaton.
If he fails to reply, you will be left still pushing on a string, as it
were; but that seems to be the position you are in anyway. You will,
though, have provided a way in which your charge - that he is lacks the
courage to face objections to his essay - can be tested. If he is a
coward, he will continue to evade; if not, not.
> In article <7lku0o$bnd$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>,
> Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
>
> > P1: If Objectivism is true, then [that O marries his mother] is the
same
> > thing as [that O marries Jocaste].
>
> "Oedipus' mother" means Jocaste. You are unable to deny this and
evade
> the fact that you are so unable.
>
> > P2: No one can both believe a thing and not believe that same thing
at the
> > same time.
>
> As was already said, even though you evaded it, if the failure to
believe
> is contingent upon different words than the success in belief, it is
> possible. ...
>
> Similarly, Oedipus believes he married Jocaste while not believing
that he
> married his mother.
Your main objection seems to be that Oe
--
- 30 -
George Dance
A short summary of Mr. Speicher's charges would be welcome.
Just the main points, mind; there is no need to attempt to prove them,
in advance of any dialogue.
I should add that I am referring to dialogue with Owl, of course. You
may be able to refute all charges, to everyone's satisfaction; and there
is no reason you should not attempt to do so after they have been
summarized. However, that would indicate nothing re the issue of Owl's
alleged intellectual cowardice.
db...@tampatrib.com
ScheetzBrian <scheet...@cs.com> wrote:
> The use of "=" signs was my lame attempt to reproduce their [mis]applicat
> ion of
> the mathematical concept of transitivity to language, in the context of the
> Oedipus story.
It wasn't lame! :)
-- at no extra charge
db...@tampatrib.com
George Dance <georg...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> I note that Owl has not replied to your post as yet. While he may have
> been offended by your use of the word "coward," he has of course posted
> in the past that he expects such language in a newsgroup.
He won't reply. He quit replying way before I ever noted his cowardice -- way
back when he simply had no argument against the recognition of his many
errors.
> For myself, I see that you have objections to his essay, but I am not
> clear exactly what those objections are.
Well, it's not easy to collate them. I've never responded to his 33-part (on
my system) essay with a 33-part response. I responded to a part here and a
part there. "Owl" ran away after being trounced with regard to various
separate subthreads.
What you see in starting this thread are the last posts, the ones from which
he ran away, in those subthreads -- put together in one post. But the
original beginnings of those subthreads? That's not easy to find.
Here's some. Make sure you understand that "Owl" indeed talked about these
things below for a while, and the posts where he did so exist. The point at
which he ran away was the point noted in the post that began this thread, not
in the parts below.
----------
Owl: (1) Principles of logic are not observations. Me: This seems a
bold claim if you aren't going to say what the principles of logic are. How
do we know that things are themselves? Is that a principle of logic? But if
by "observations" you mean "perceptions," it can certainly be granted that
principles are not merely perceived. So, let's grant the argument so far.
Owl: (2) The principles of logic can not in general be known by inference.
Some principles of logic might be knowable by inference - if they could be
supported by reference to other principles of logic. But it couldn't be the
case that all principles of logic are known by inference, because this would
require circular reasoning. Me: Go on -- there *must* be some principles
of logic known by inference. For example, given principles of logic not known
by inference, we could then infer that they form a set. And this would be a
principle of logic -- that there were a set of such-and-such other
principles. So, if you were to say that there could not be any principles
of logic known by inference, you would be totally wrong. There must be some.
Of course, you didn't say that -- but this will be important in a moment.
But there is another objection. When you say it cannot be that all principles
of logic are known by inference, you are mistaken -- it merely cannot be that
they are known by inference from one another. Circular reasoning only comes
into play if it is claimed that they are known by inference from one another.
If one principle is known by inference from something else, something other
than the other principles, circular reasoning is not an issue. And there is
such a principle -- that things are themselves. Owl: Now it follows from
(1) and (2) that: (3) The principles of logic are known a priori. Me:
No, it absolutely does not. It only follows from (1) and (2) that there must
be a principle of logic not inferred from the others and not merely
perceived. And there is: The law of identity. The other principles of logic
may be inferred from it. Your a priori "proof" is not one.
----------
Owl: So I pull out the gun and disintegrate him, and then continue on my
way. The question is: Was my action morally right? If egoism is true, it
was. Me: No, that's not egoism. That's subjective morality. As I read
deeper into your essay, it gets increasingly incorrect about what it is that
Objectivism says.
----------
Owl: Oedipus, famously, wanted to marry Jocaste, and as he did so, he both
believed and knew that he was marrying Jocaste. The following sentence, in
other words, describes what Oedipus both wanted and believed to be the case:
(J) Oedipus marries Jocaste. However, Oedipus certainly did not want to
marry his mother, and as he did so, he neither knew nor believed that he was
marrying his mother. The following sentence, then, describes what Oedipus did
not want or believe to be the case: (M) Oedipus marries Oedipus' mother.
Me: You start with a thing Oedipus believes, and continue with a thing he
does not believe, and ask how he can believe the first without believing the
second if the words refer to the same thing. Well, the pitifully obvious
answer is that we do not always know to what words refer. Oedipus uses the
phrase, "Oedipus' mother," but he does not know to whom it refers. Obviously.
But a much more devastating argument is to compare what Oedipus believes
rather than what he believes with what he doesn't. Oedipus believes two
things: I married Jocaste. I did not marry my mother. Well, the second
is false, isn't it? But wait a minute, nonobjectivist: How can it be false if
Oedipus *means* something different by the second than by the first? Isn't
the second statement false precisely because "my mother" refers to Jocaste
and not merely to what Oedipus thinks it does? You aren't going to say that
these two beliefs "don't contradict," are you? Where's the "sense and
reference distinction" now? In what way is the distinction "valid" when the
second belief is *false*? Well, much of the remainder of your essay hinges
on the misconception just shattered.
----------
Now, if you take a look at the last part, there's an easier way to describe
what's preposterous about "Owl's" argument. "Owl" says that what Oedipus
believes is this: Oedipus married Jocaste. This is incomplete. What Oedipus
really believed was: Oedipus married Jocaste and Oedipus' mother was some
other lady who lived somewhere else.
"Owl's" argument then begins with ignoring the truth.
Owl
>
> 1. Jocasta = Oedipus' mother [A=B]
> 2. Oedipus believes he married = Jocasta [C=A]
> 3. Therefore, transitively: Oedipus believes he married = his mother
[C=B].
Well, that's not completely unrelated to what I was saying, but the
argument is explained better in the essay in question, which I just posted
under the subject "Why I am not an objectivist", section I.
Let me summarize very quickly. There are two ways of doing this:
Way 1:
1. If a term, A, means the same as a term, B, then in any sentence where
you see A appear, it is ok to substitute B. (premise)
2. Assume that meaning is reference. (Objectivist theory)
3. "Oedipus' mother" has the same reference as "Jocaste". (given by the
story)
4. Therefore, "Oedipus' mother" means the same as "Jocaste". (from 2,3)
5. Oedipus believed he was going to marry Jocaste. (given by the story)
6. It is ok to substitute "Oedipus' mother" for "Jocaste" in (5). (from
1,4)
7. Oedipus believed he was going to marry Oedipus' mother. (from 5,6)
Way 2:
1. If "O's mother" means the same as "Jocaste", then [the proposition that
O marries O's mother] = [the proposition that O marries Jocaste]. ("="
means "is identical with" or "is the same proposition as".)
2. If meaning = reference, then "O's mother" means the same as "Jocaste"
if and only if "O's mother" refers to the same person as "Jocaste".
3. "O's mother" refers to the same person as "Jocaste".
4. Therefore, if meaning = reference, then "O's mother" means the same as
"Jocaste".
5. Therefore, if meaning = reference, then [the proposition that O marries
O's mother] = [the proposition that O marries Jocaste].
6. Therefore, if meaning = reference, then Oedipus believed [the
proposition that O marries O's mother] if and only if he believed [the
proposition that O marries Jocaste]. (from 5)
7. Oedipus believed [the proposition that O marries Jocaste] and did not
believe [the proposition that O marries O's mother].
8. Therefore, meaning != reference.
I have written the argument in this manner, so that you can verify
conclusively that it is valid. Anyone who knows predicate logic can do
this -- I promise that your logic professor will get the same answer --
though I certainly can't guarantee that everyone on hpo will. There
should be absolutely no doubt about that (though somehow, I think there
still will be -- like people who would deny a mathematical proof). The
truth of the premises is the only thing that ought to be open to
discussion -- and then, anyone who wants to challenge either argument
should identify specifically which premise he claims is false.
Owl
news:HLPJ4.5629$5D.1...@ozemail.com.au...
> Well said, but it's been said before to no avail.
I'm surprised to see you saying that, Arnold. The message to which you
were referring was a pretty obvious garbling of what I had said, and I
would have expected you to recognize that, even if you didn't agree with
my argument.
I continue to be amazed that when I have stated an argument so clearly and
precisely people would continue to try to find something else to attack --
and never to identify which premise of what I actually said they're
claiming is false!
Désirée Davis
says...
> ScheetzBrian <scheet...@cs.com> wrote in message
> news:20000414175756...@ng-fl1.news.cs.com...
> > They're basically saying:
> >
> > 1. Jocasta = Oedipus' mother [A=B]
> > 2. Oedipus believes he married = Jocasta [C=A]
> > 3. Therefore, transitively: Oedipus believes he married = his mother
> [C=B].
>
> Well, that's not completely unrelated to what I was saying, but the
> argument is explained better in the essay in question, which I just posted
> under the subject "Why I am not an objectivist", section I.
>
> Let me summarize very quickly. There are two ways of doing this:
>
> Way 1:
>
> 1. If a term, A, means the same as a term, B, then in any sentence where
> you see A appear, it is ok to substitute B. (premise)
> 2. Assume that meaning is reference. (Objectivist theory)
> 3. "Oedipus' mother" has the same reference as "Jocaste". (given by the
> story)
> 4. Therefore, "Oedipus' mother" means the same as "Jocaste". (from 2,3)
> 5. Oedipus believed he was going to marry Jocaste. (given by the story)
> 6. It is ok to substitute "Oedipus' mother" for "Jocaste" in (5). (from
> 1,4)
> 7. Oedipus believed he was going to marry Oedipus' mother. (from 5,6)
>
> conclusively that it is valid. Anyone who knows predicate logic can do
> this -- I promise that your logic professor will get the same answer --
> though I certainly can't guarantee that everyone on hpo will. There
> should be absolutely no doubt about that (though somehow, I think there
> still will be -- like people who would deny a mathematical proof). The
> truth of the premises is the only thing that ought to be open to
> discussion -- and then, anyone who wants to challenge either argument
> should identify specifically which premise he claims is false.
>
>
>
believed he was going to marry Jocaste." when in fact it
should be "Oedipus believed he was going to marry
Jocaste, a woman who is not his mother." Given this, the
substitution in Line 6 is not valid, thus the argument
fails.
or you can leave line 5 as is and include line 4 1/2
which would be: "Oedipus believes Jocaste is not his
mother" Again, the contradiction comes from a false
belief on Oedipus' part, not the incorrectness of what
the concepts refer to, since you can't transitively
substitute words in regards to "believe" If the scenario
was "Oedipus *knows for a fact* that Jocaste is not his
mother" then maybe you'd have something.
Désirée- not anyone's mother
f
o
o
d
f
o
r
b
o
t
f
o
o
d
f
o
r
b
o
t
Peter Kinane
Désirée Davis <HBeac...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:MPG.1361f0ca...@news.csulb.edu...
> In article <8d994c$l9q$1...@slb7.atl.mindspring.net>, a@a.a
> says...
> > ScheetzBrian <scheet...@cs.com> wrote in message
> > news:20000414175756...@ng-fl1.news.cs.com...
Your post seems to imply that Objectivism does not feature that people
identify with eachother about stuff, in which case truth etc. would be
individual sensitive; you say that Jocaste means Oedipus' mother in the
story (if you accept 3), but not to Oedipus. Or else you are simply dropping
context.
> > 5. Oedipus believed he was going to marry Jocaste. (given by the story)
> The false statement is line 5 in which you say "Oedipus
> believed he was going to marry Jocaste." when in fact it
> should be "Oedipus believed he was going to marry
> Jocaste, a woman who is not his mother."
You are dropping the context of 5 - the earlier points, or else you imply
that meaning and reference is individual sensitive - at least not universal.
"2. Assume that meaning is reference. (Objectivist theory)
3. "Oedipus' mother" has the same reference as "Jocaste". (given by the
story)
4. Therefore, "Oedipus' mother" means the same as "Jocaste". (from 2,3)":
Given this "Oedipus believed he was going to marry Jocaste"; believed he was
going to marry his mother _if_ meaning is reference _and_ if people
identify with eachother about meaning and reference.
This issue of whether people identify with eachother about stuff does not
seem to have featured on hpo while I've been reading, and it strikes with me
as a crucial feature of a system.
Peter
--
For a detailed and formidably coherent account of the nature of things, in
just 3,000 words, see:
http://www.effectuationism.com/
Anthanson1
>Date: 4/14/00 12:32 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: <8d7rm9$1qm$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>
>then
>> he would have had to know that Jocaste was his mother, since "Jocaste" and
>> "Oedipus' mother" mean the same thing --
>
>Bonehead, do you understand what the story is about? Oedipus does not know
>who is meant by "Oedipus' mother." I swear, I can't believe you're trying to
>talk about Oedipus when you don't know the story.
I can only conclude that you have a non-permeable membrane of fat between the
two hemispheres of your brain.
I know the story. In fact, when I was in college I translated large portions of
it from the original.
Of course, he did not know Jocaste was his mother. But on your theory of
meaning he would have to, which proves the absurdity of your theory of meaning.
Wrathbone
Stephen Speicher
> Arnold Broese-van-Groenou <bro...@ozemail.com.au> wrote in message
> news:HLPJ4.5629$5D.1...@ozemail.com.au...
> > Well said, but it's been said before to no avail.
>
> I continue to be amazed that when I have stated an argument so clearly and
> precisely people would continue to try to find something else to attack --
> and never to identify which premise of what I actually said they're
> claiming is false!
>
This is the most openly blatant example of psychological
projection that one will ever see. It is Michael Huemer (aka Owl)
who has constantly been guilty of misrepresenting Objectivism,
and then criticizing the philosophy based on his own
misrepresentations. So many people have pointed this out to
Huemer but, as Arnold says, to no avail.
Gordon G. Sollars
writes...
...
> The false statement is line 5 in which you say "Oedipus
> believed he was going to marry Jocaste." when in fact it
> should be "Oedipus believed he was going to marry
> substitution in Line 6 is not valid, thus the argument
> fails.
Suppose that Jocaste had a hidden tattoo. You seem to be arguing that
"Oedipus believed he was going to marry Jocaste" is false simply because
Oedipus is unaware of the tattoo.
Further, if it is true that Oedipus believes A and B, doesn't it follow
that he believes A? (Let A = "he was going to marry Jocaste" and B =
"Jocaste was not his mother".) So even on your formulation it is true
that Oedipus believed "he was going to marry Jocaste", and that is all
the argument needs. You are indeed right to object to the substitution
of "Oedipus's mother" for "Jocaste", but that is because they do not have
the same meaning.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Anthanson1
>
>I continue to be amazed that when I have stated an argument so clearly and
>precisely people would continue to try to find something else to attack --
>and never to identify which premise of what I actually said they're
>claiming is false!
Why are you so amazed, Owl? Evaluating arguments requires a little training,
particularly on the distinction between soundness an validity. Without this
training
most beginners try to criticize arguments from some impressionistic
perspective.
Wrathbone
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
Kwag7693
>1. If a term, A, means the same as a term, B, then in any sentence where
>you see A appear, it is ok to substitute B. (premise)
>2. Assume that meaning is reference. (Objectivist theory)
>3. "Oedipus' mother" has the same reference as "Jocaste". (given by the
>story)
>4. Therefore, "Oedipus' mother" means the same as "Jocaste". (from 2,3)
>5. Oedipus believed he was going to marry Jocaste. (given by the story)
>6. It is ok to substitute "Oedipus' mother" for "Jocaste" in (5). (from
>1,4)
>7. Oedipus believed he was going to marry Oedipus' mother. (from 5,6)
I am stunned that this debate still continues. I would really like to know how
Owl can equate Oedipus' belief about the meanings of Jocaste and O's mother
with their actual meanings. O's belief, by Objectivist theory, in the meaning
of the terms is not identical to the meaning of the terms. Jocaste and O's
mother have the same referent, neither of which is O's belief system. The
referent of Oedipus' belief in his mom and his belief in Jocaste is not Jocaste
or his mom. It is O's belief system.
If you try the same proof but drop out O's belief all problems disappear. Why
would the removal of a simple predicate change an entire proof if you hadn't
changed some fundamental element of the proof by introducing it? If I am wrong
here, will someone demonstrate why? If not, will Owl please quit reposting
this essay?
>1. If "O's mother" means the same as "Jocaste", then [the proposition that
>O marries O's mother] = [the proposition that O marries Jocaste]. ("="
>means "is identical with" or "is the same proposition as".)
>2. If meaning = reference, then "O's mother" means the same as "Jocaste"
>if and only if "O's mother" refers to the same person as "Jocaste".
>3. "O's mother" refers to the same person as "Jocaste".
>4. Therefore, if meaning = reference, then "O's mother" means the same as
>"Jocaste".
>5. Therefore, if meaning = reference, then [the proposition that O marries
>O's mother] = [the proposition that O marries Jocaste].
>6. Therefore, if meaning = reference, then Oedipus believed [the
>proposition that O marries O's mother] if and only if he believed [the
>proposition that O marries Jocaste]. (from 5)
See? Where the hell does Oedipus' belief come from? If it wasn't introduced
in 6., there would be no problem, but since Owl switches focus from the meaning
and reference of O's mom and Jocaste to O's beliefs, the problem's source is
pretty clear.
If Owl really thinks that this is a valid attack on Objectivism, maybe he would
care to come up with a proof that doesn't conflate the items of analysis.
Kevin
Jim Klein
"Gordon G. Sollars" <gsol...@pobox.com> wrote:
>You are indeed right to object to the substitution of "Oedipus's mother"
>for "Jocaste", but that is because they do not have the same meaning.
Except they do have the same meaning, at least in this example. Oedipus
does indeed believe that he's going to marry his mother. Maybe it would be
easier worded thusly, "Oedipus believes that he's going to marry (the person
who is his mother)." That's precisely what he believes even as he's unaware
that she's his mother, which is quite a separate claim as Kevin points out.
And I've still got the "referent as a referent" dodge still on the bench;
pleading as it does to context, there's nearly nothing that can't be
explained with it! But meanwhile, you guys want it both ways when it suits
your purposes. When we drink water we're drinking H2O because of what it
is, but suddenly Jocaste isn't Oedipus' mother even though she is.
Are you sure you're not an Objectivist?
jk
Gordon G. Sollars
...
> And I've still got the "referent as a referent" dodge still on the bench;
> pleading as it does to context, there's nearly nothing that can't be
> explained with it! But meanwhile, you guys want it both ways when it suits
> your purposes. When we drink water we're drinking H2O because of what it
> is, but suddenly Jocaste isn't Oedipus' mother even though she is.
I haven't been following the the H20 thread, so I don't know what the
others have said. But remember that Owl and Wrathbone are professional
philosophers, while I am just an amateur. However, O /is/ marrying his
mother, but it is not the case that he believes he is marrying his mother
(while it is true that he believes he is marrying Jocaste). Does that
help, or do I have to read the H20 thread now?
> Are you sure you're not an Objectivist?
On your view, I am an Objectivist whenever I hold the right position
with regard to something, so it is difficult for me /not/ to be an
Objectivist. ;-)
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Owl
where
> > you see A appear, it is ok to substitute B. (premise)
> > 2. Assume that meaning is reference. (Objectivist theory)
> > 3. "Oedipus' mother" has the same reference as "Jocaste". (given by
the
> > story)
> > 4. Therefore, "Oedipus' mother" means the same as "Jocaste". (from
2,3)
> > 5. Oedipus believed he was going to marry Jocaste. (given by the
story)
> > 6. It is ok to substitute "Oedipus' mother" for "Jocaste" in (5).
(from
> > 1,4)
> > 7. Oedipus believed he was going to marry Oedipus' mother. (from 5,6)
> The false statement is line 5 in which you say "Oedipus
> believed he was going to marry Jocaste." when in fact it
> Jocaste, a woman who is not his mother."
This doesn't make sense to me. Let's label your substitution (5a).
Compare:
(5a) Oedipus believed he was going to marry Jocaste, a woman who is not
his mother.
(5) Oedipus believed he was going to marry Jocaste.
5a *entails* 5, so your claim that 5 is false because 5a is true baffles
me. But fine, let's go ahead and put 5a into the argument instead. So we
get:
1. If a term, A, means the same as a term, B, then in any sentence where
you see A appear, it is ok to substitute B.
2. Assume that meaning is reference.
3. "Oedipus' mother" has the same reference as "Jocaste".
4. Therefore, "Oedipus' mother" means the same as "Jocaste".
5a. Oedipus believed he was going to marry Jocaste, a woman who was not
his mother.
6a. It is ok to substitute "Oedipus' mother" for "Jocaste" in (5a).
7a. Oedipus believed he was going to marry Oedipus' mother, a woman who
was not his mother.
Well, (7a) is at least as obviously false as the original (7) was. So
this is at least as good a refutation of the assumption in (2).
> or you can leave line 5 as is and include line 4 1/2
> which would be: "Oedipus believes Jocaste is not his
> mother"
You could do that, but what would be the point?
Saying that there is some *other* true proposition, not stated in the
original argument, does not constitute an objection to a deductive
argument. When it comes to deductive arguments, if (a) the premises are
all true, and (b) the conclusion follows from the premises, then the
conclusion is true. No ifs, ands or buts about it. Adding further
information to the premises cannot make a deductive argument turn invalid.
It cannot make the conclusion untrue.
Example:
"Socrates is a man.
All men are mortal.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal."
is a valid & sound argument, and its conclusion is true. No *further*
information that you add about Socrates can change that. If you suddenly
find out that Socrates had a beard, that doesn't mean the original
argument was unsound.
> Again, the contradiction comes from a false
> belief on Oedipus' part, not the incorrectness of what
> the concepts refer to, since you can't transitively
> substitute words in regards to "believe"
I don't understand what this means. I don't know what contradiction
you're talking about, and the issue here is not how to explain the source
of some contradiction. I also am not saying anything about any
'incorrectness of what concepts refer to' (whatever that would mean). And
I also am not saying that Oedipus didn't have a false belief.
All I am saying is that if you make the assumption in (2), conclusion (7a)
follows, that (7a) is false, and therefore (2) is false. All you have to
do is look at each premise, decide whether it is true, and then follow the
logical steps leading to (7a).
Owl
news:8datq4$df6$1...@slb0.atl.mindspring.net...
> Except they do have the same meaning, at least in this example. Oedipus
> does indeed believe that he's going to marry his mother. Maybe it would
be
> easier worded thusly, "Oedipus believes that he's going to marry (the
person
> who is his mother)."
So we ask him, "Oedipus, are you going to marry your mother?" He says,
"No, of course not." Is he lying? Is he expressing a belief of his? If
so, what belief?
Gordon G. Sollars
writes...
...
> If Owl really thinks that this is a valid attack on Objectivism, maybe he
> would
> care to come up with a proof that doesn't conflate the items of analysis.
I don't need a proof. Some time back, I gave a simple counter example to
the Objectivist view using not O and J, but the equally venerable Morning
Star and Evening Star. The referent of both is, of course, the planet
Venus. But Bob knows nothing about astronomy. Early one day just before
sunrise, Bob is walking with Alice who points at Venus and utters the
true statement, "There is the Evening Star!" Bob is baffled by this
pronouncement because he can not imagine why the bright object in the
morning sky is being called an /evening/ star.
So sense of a term is not the same as its reference, as this simple
example shows. However, this is not a counter example to the Objectivist
view, /if/ Objectivists want to identify meaning with reference rather
than with sense (as most non-Objectivists do). Fine - labels don't
matter to me. I will simply say to Objectivists that sense is not the
same as meaning.
Now, if any students of Objectivism think they have a way to re-label
things so that sense and reference are the same, /that/ would be
interesting.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Owl
news:20000415143253...@ng-fk1.aol.com...
> Why are you so amazed, Owl? Evaluating arguments requires a little
training,
> particularly on the distinction between soundness an validity. Without
this
> training
> most beginners try to criticize arguments from some impressionistic
> perspective.
Yes, that's exactly what's going on. Rigorous thinking would teach you to
just think in terms of (1) is each premise true, (2) is each inferential
step valid, but most people try to assess an argument somehow without
doing that. And yet the whole point of having arguments like this is to
make it easy for people to think step by step. I would think most people
had some exposure to this in math classes.
Owl
I went to the trouble of setting out my proofs step by step. If you think
you have an objection, the least you could do would be to identify *which
step* you're claiming is false and why. I'm not going to respond to some
vague impressionistic criticism that doesn't show any indication of having
tried to follow through the steps that I laid out.
Gordon G. Sollars
Czarnecki writes...
...
> Premise 1 is true only in a particular context and is false in respect to
> beliefs, you commit the 'masked man fallacy' in your reasoning.
Who was that masked man?
I can believe it is true that nine is greater than seven, but false that
the number of planets is greater than seven. Is this the kind of thing
you are thinking of? Quine's term for this is "referential opaqueness".
I'll let Owl defend his argument, but even if it is flawed that doesn't
show that sense and reference are the same, as I pointed out in a nearby
post using the Morning Star and the Evening Star.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Owl
news:MPG.1362f39974...@mail.nji.com...
> I can believe it is true that nine is greater than seven, but false that
> the number of planets is greater than seven. Is this the kind of thing
> you are thinking of? Quine's term for this is "referential opaqueness".
You mean opacity. That's another good example.
> I'll let Owl defend his argument, but even if it is flawed that doesn't
> show that sense and reference are the same, as I pointed out in a nearby
> post using the Morning Star and the Evening Star.
The substitution of "the # of planets" for "9" is invalid (in
referentially opaque contexts). The question for philosophy of language
is why that is so. Why can there be opaque contexts? It was Frege who
first identified the correct explanation for the phenomenon.
Kwag7693
>I went to the trouble of setting out my proofs step by step. If you think
>you have an objection, the least you could do would be to identify *which
>step* you're claiming is false and why.
Ok. I am claiming you are introducing premises into your derivation that
aren't proven, given or even valid. The step I am claiming is false is either
your application of one or the step at which you begin to change the focus of
your proof from the meaning of the terms Jocaste and O's mother to the objects
of Oedipus' belief (step 5 in your first derivation and step 6 in your second),
depending on how you interpret your own manuever.
O's belief system hasn't entered into the derivation before that point, but you
conflate his belief structure with the actual meaning of the terms you
previously discussed, namely O's mom and Jocaste.
>1. If a term, A, means the same as a term, B, then in any sentence where
>you see A appear, it is ok to substitute B. (premise)
>2. Assume that meaning is reference. (Objectivist theory)
>3. "Oedipus' mother" has the same reference as "Jocaste". (given by the
>story)
>4. Therefore, "Oedipus' mother" means the same as "Jocaste". (from 2,3)
>5. Oedipus believed he was going to marry Jocaste. (given by the story)
See? Suddenly, at 5, you stop talking about the meaning of the terms and
start talking about O's belief system. Why? O believes X cannot be
transcribed in a similar fashion to X, which isn't surprising. If you
transcribe your proof into predicate logic you will either find you cannot
derive 7 from the preceding six, or more likely, that 7 doesn't contradict the
following sentence: Oedipus marries his mother. I think the latter is more
likely, because I know the following two sentences don't contradict: Oedipus
marries his mother, Oedipus believes he does not marry his mother.
Premise number one is not a rule of predicate logic, as you apply it. If a=b
then you can substitute Rb for Ra. What you try to do and cannot do is to
substitute an object of Oedipus' belief for the meaning of a term. 'O believes
he marries Jocaste' has a massively different transcription than 'O marries
Jocaste.' The latter could be (Ex)Mxj(Oedipus marries Jocaste); the former is
too tough for me to transcribe with my very limited exploration of predicate
logic. I can be certain it would NOT be a simple two place predicate. To say
Oedipus believes that Jocaste and O's mom don't have the same referent is
different than saying Jocaste and O's mom don't have the same referent. It is
easy for both to be consistent, because 'Jocaste and O's mom' stands under the
rule of a different relationship (O's belief) in the first instance, and so
isn't interchangeable with the second instance.
Nothing in Objectivism requires that concept-formation be infallible. You are
conflating the Objectivist position on meaning with the Objectivist position on
the context of knowledge. Oedipus doesn't know the referent of the concept
"O's mom". That Jocaste isn't his mom is a belief he holds, though it is a
presumption that is unsupported by evidence. What does this have to do with
the meaning of the terms involved? You switch the context of your derivation
at 5, and as a result you get step 7 conflating the referent of a term with
Oedipus' beliefs about same.
If you were doing a derivation, you wouldn't be able to discharge 5, ever,
because nothing in 1 through 4 leads to its contradiction. Since HE doesn't
know the meaning/referent of the term 'O's mother' is the same as Jocaste's
meaning/referent, we can't use the former to contradict the latter, because in
HIS belief system marrying Jocaste but not Mom doesn't contradict. The two
facts contradict in reality, but that cannot be used to contradict his BELIEF
until it becomes an object of HIS knowledge, which given our premises, it
won't.
Is that clear enough? Nothing in Objectivist theory mandates that people hold
contradictory beliefs.
Kevin
Kwag7693
>Venus. But Bob knows nothing about astronomy. Early one day just before
>sunrise, Bob is walking with Alice who points at Venus and utters the
>true statement, "There is the Evening Star!" Bob is baffled by this
>pronouncement because he can not imagine why the bright object in the
>morning sky is being called an /evening/ star.
How does this counter the objectivist view? Rand said the meaning of a conept
is its referent. Bob doesn't know very much about his referent if he thinks
that Venus, the morning and evening stars are separate entities in the world.
He has faulty concepts. Nothing IN Objectivism mandates that humans
automatically form correct concepts, so why is citing some mistaken guy's
conflation of one object with multiple objects a proof that meaning and
reference aren't the same? He doesn't know the full meaning of morning or
evening star or Venus, as Objectivists use the term.
Gordon G. Sollars
writes...
> > The referent of both is, of course, the planet
> >Venus. But Bob knows nothing about astronomy. Early one day just before
> >sunrise, Bob is walking with Alice who points at Venus and utters the
> >true statement, "There is the Evening Star!" Bob is baffled by this
> >pronouncement because he can not imagine why the bright object in the
> >morning sky is being called an /evening/ star.
>
> How does this counter the objectivist view? Rand said the meaning of a c
> onept
> is its referent.
And Humpty-Dumpty said, "When I use a word it means just what I choose it
to mean - neither more nor less." If Objectivists, starting with Ayn
Rand, want to use a special language that's fine with me. I am
interested in the real distinctions, not what they are called.
> Bob doesn't know very much about his referent if he thinks
> that Venus, the morning and evening stars are separate entities in the world.
He has never heard the terms before, so he has thought nothing at all
about them. He could know that some small, bright objects in the sky are
called stars. (He does know that it is morning and not evening.) No one
is born with this sort of knowledge, so there is nothing strange about
Bob. What is strange, and the point of my example, is that Alice chooses
to say "There is the Evening Star" in the early morning hours. She is
correct in some sense, since the object she is pointing to - Venus - is
the Evening Star. Perhaps it would be more correct for her to say "That
is the object sometimes called the Evening Star." Bob would still be
puzzled, because the /sense/ of "Evening Star" is that of an object in
the evening sky, and here it is morning.
I have already said that it is of no major moment if students of
Objectivism wish to identify meaning with reference - although it
sometimes leads to confusion in talking with them - as long as they do
not deny that words have senses as well as referents.
> He has faulty concepts. Nothing IN Objectivism mandates that humans
> automatically form correct concepts, so why is citing some mistaken guy's
> conflation of one object with multiple objects
That is not what is going on in my version of the story (and, btw, there
are not multiple objects - just one, Venus). That Bob is rightly puzzled
by Alice's true statement shows that there are senses apart from
references.
> a proof that meaning and
> reference aren't the same? He doesn't know the full meaning of morning or
> evening star or Venus, as Objectivists use the term.
At one time no human being knew that Venus in the morning sky was the
same object as Venus in the evening sky. So no one had a "correct
concept" of Venus? Heavens! ;-) What other incorrect concepts do we
have in use today?
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Gordon G. Sollars
Czarnecki writes...
...
> The "masked man fallacy" is the mistake of arguing that because someone
> knows something under one description, they must therefore know it as the
> same thing under another description. The point I make about misapplying
> Leibniz's law to that of beliefs is another way of claiming 'referential
> opaqueness'.
In my example, Bob does not know Venus under any description, so we do
not have to worry about the complications of opacity.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
George Dance
However, it does apply to Owl's Oedipus paradox, because Oedipus does
know Jocaste.
I would be interested in reading the full post that you were replying
to, as this may be the fallacy that Owl's paradox utilizes. However, it
does not appear on the thread, and your article is not linked to it.
Where can I find it?
--
- 30 -
George Dance
> Gordon G. Sollars <gsol...@pobox.com> wrote in message
> news:MPG.1362f39974...@mail.nji.com...
> > I'll let Owl defend his argument, but even if it is flawed that
doesn't
> > show that sense and reference are the same, as I pointed out in a
nearby
> > post using the Morning Star and the Evening Star.
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
> The substitution of "the # of planets" for "9" is invalid (in
> referentially opaque contexts). The question for philosophy of
language
> is why that is so. Why can there be opaque contexts? It was Frege
who
> first identified the correct explanation for the phenomenon.
Of course, the "defence" called for here was an explanation of what the
"phenomenon" is, and why it would not apply to Owl's Oedipus Paradox.
Of course, Owl does not attempt either one.
vanosaur
> Oedipus
> does indeed believe that he's going to marry his mother. Maybe it would
> be easier worded thusly, "Oedipus believes that he's going to marry (the
> person who is his mother)." That's precisely what he believes even as
> he's unaware
> that she's his mother, which is quite a separate claim as Kevin points
> out.
What does poor Oedipus do when he finds out who Jocasta is? He plucks
his eyes out, in his pain and agony. Why? Because, although he MEANT to
marry Jocaste, he did not MEAN to marry his mother.
An unknown part of the stpory is that before the forementioned tragedy
took place, Joe the joker asked Oedipus who he married.
- Jocaste.
- You mean you married your mother?
- Don't be ridiculous.
(Ok, so I made that up). The only way to make sense of the O'ists
position is to claim that Oedipus _does not know_ what he means, which
is, of course, a ridiculous position, because it goes completely against
the common understanding we have of the term "meaning."
Meaning and reference are different because meaning is about intention,
while reference is not.
--
email is iordonez at columbus dot rr dot com
My sugar-free music at http://www.mp3.com/SicTransitGloria
Kwag7693
>are not multiple objects - just one, Venus). That Bob is rightly puzzled
>by Alice's true statement shows that there are senses apart from
>references.
I know you are using Frege's example and that there is only one object of
reference. Alice is not right in calling Venus the evening star, unless she
simply means it as a proper name for the star. The obvious etymology of the
term evening star is star that appears in evening; if anything it is a holdover
from when people didn't understand the full context of the planet's appearance.
If Bob wondered why she called that planet Venus when Venus was to his
knowledge a statue in a museum would you still have the same problem with sense
and reference?
>At one time no human being knew that Venus in the morning sky was the
>same object as Venus in the evening sky. So no one had a "correct
>concept" of Venus?
Right. They also didn't have correct concepts of the morning or eveening star,
as evidenced by their faulty belief that all three were separate.
>What other incorrect concepts do we
>have in use today?
If I am using them, I obviously don't know what they are.
Owl
news:20000416010248...@ng-ci1.aol.com...
> >1. If a term, A, means the same as a term, B, then in any sentence
where
> >you see A appear, it is ok to substitute B. (premise)
> >2. Assume that meaning is reference. (Objectivist theory)
> >3. "Oedipus' mother" has the same reference as "Jocaste". (given by
the
> >story)
> >4. Therefore, "Oedipus' mother" means the same as "Jocaste". (from
2,3)
> >5. Oedipus believed he was going to marry Jocaste. (given by the
story)
>
> See? Suddenly, at 5, you stop talking about the meaning of the terms
and
> start talking about O's belief system. Why? O believes X cannot be
The only relevant questions, when you're assessing a deductive argument,
are (a) is each premise *true*, and (b) does the conclusion follow from
the premises. I don't see you as doing either here. Are you claiming (5)
isn't true?
> transcribed in a similar fashion to X, which isn't surprising. If you
> transcribe your proof into predicate logic you will either find you
cannot
> derive 7 from the preceding six, or more likely, that 7 doesn't
contradict the
> following sentence: Oedipus marries his mother. I think the latter is
more
> likely, because I know the following two sentences don't contradict:
That's right -- but I'm not saying that (7) contradicts the fact that
Oedipus marries his mother, so this isn't an objection to my argument.
> Premise number one is not a rule of predicate logic, as you apply it.
True, it isn't a rule of predicate logic; it's just a premise that I'm
asserting. Are you saying it's false?
> If a=b
> then you can substitute Rb for Ra. What you try to do and cannot do is
to
> substitute an object of Oedipus' belief for the meaning of a term.
Huh?
> 'O believes
> he marries Jocaste' has a massively different transcription than 'O
marries
> Jocaste.' The latter could be (Ex)Mxj(Oedipus marries Jocaste); the
former is
> too tough for me to transcribe with my very limited exploration of
predicate
> logic. I can be certain it would NOT be a simple two place predicate.
Actually, "O marries Jocaste" would be just M(o,j). O believes he marries
Jocaste would be B(o,[M(o,j)]), where the bracketed phrase refers to the
proposition, M(o,j). In other words, it's a 2-place relation between
Oedipus and the proposition M(o,j).
So now, why would not the substitution be legitimate in that context?
> You switch the context of your derivation
> at 5, and as a result you get step 7 conflating the referent of a term
with
> Oedipus' beliefs about same.
Step (7) was "O believed he was going to marry O's mother." I think your
remark here is the same as above. You're saying, again, that the
substitution of "O's mother" for "Jocaste" is illegitimate when the latter
term appears in the "B(o,[M(o,j)])" context. Why?
I agree that it's illegitimate, but I have an explanation for it (Frege's
explanation), which has to do with the sense-reference distinction and how
the two terms don't have the same meaning. I'd like to see you explain it
without using the sense-reference distinction.
> If you were doing a derivation, you wouldn't be able to discharge 5,
ever,
> because nothing in 1 through 4 leads to its contradiction.
(5) isn't what's supposed to get 'discharged'. (2) is the assumption in
the argument that gets discharged. I didn't make this explicit, but the
final reasoning would involve that (7) "O believed he was marrying his
mother" is false (i.e., we take on the additional premise that O did not
believe he was marrying his mother), and then we conclude that the
assumption in (2) was false.
> Is that clear enough?
Yes, thanks. I still think it's wrong though.
Gordon G. Sollars
writes...
...
> reference. Alice is not right in calling Venus the evening star, unless she
> simply means it as a proper name for the star.
What she "means"? ;-) To try to stay clear, she was using a proper
name. That is why I capitalized it (perhaps I failed to be consistent
about that).
> The obvious etymology of the
> term evening star is star that appears in evening; if anything it is a ho
> ldover
> from when people didn't understand the full context of the planet's appea
> rance.
Indeed. Now a student of Objectivism might want to argue that if the
"full context" was always understood, then meaning (or sense) and
reference would always coincide. But, of course, it is not always
understood.
> If Bob wondered why she called that planet Venus when Venus was to his
> knowledge a statue in a museum would you still have the same problem with
> sense
> and reference?
He might be momentarily confused, but most users of a language would
quickly understand that the name "Venus" was simply being used in a
different way. The problem could be the same, but I prefer my version,
because it is not as easy to know what sense a speaker attaches to
"Venus" as it is to "Evening Star". Bob knows that a star is a small,
bright object in the sky, so the sense of "Evening Star" is, obviously, a
star that appears in the evening.
Here's another, true life example. Many years ago in the Ancient Days of
computing, IBM published a green-colored, folding cardboard card with all
sorts of useful information for the System 360 assembly language
programmer on it. It was called, simply enough, the "Green Card". Then
one day (as I recall, when the System 370 was introduced), the same
information was printed on a yellow card. It was not uncommon for one
old timer to ask another if he could borrow his "Green Card" and be
calmly handed a yellow card, while a newcomer would scratch his head
trying to figure out what was happening. The sense of "Green Card"
suggested a green card, yet it did not refer, after the 370 was
introduced, to a green card, but to a yellow one.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Kwag7693
>are (a) is each premise *true*, and (b) does the conclusion follow from
>the premises. I don't see you as doing either here. Are you claiming (5)
>isn't true?
I don't think it relates to 1 through 4. It is a switch in cotext that
invalidates the rest of the derivation.
>> Premise number one is not a rule of predicate logic, as you apply it.
>
>True, it isn't a rule of predicate logic; it's just a premise that I'm
>asserting. Are you saying it's false?
Yes. You can't substitute across an assumption when the assumption includes
the entity you want to substitute. To go from (Ex)Mx to M(Jocaste), you have
to do an assumption governed by 'Jocaste'. If you do that, you cannot
substitute your identity Jocaste=Oedipus' Mom into the subderivation and you
won't be able to discharge the subderivation.
>Actually, "O marries Jocaste" would be just M(o,j). O believes he marries
>Jocaste would be B(o,[M(o,j)]), where the bracketed phrase refers to the
>proposition, M(o,j). In other words, it's a 2-place relation between
>Oedipus and the proposition M(o,j).
Yeah, but you have eliminated the existentials, which isn't helpful in a
derivation, how would it look with the existentials?
>So now, why would not the substitution be legitimate in that context?
See above; when you use the rule of existential elimination, you aren't going
to be able to use your identity any more.
>Step (7) was "O believed he was going to marry O's mother." I think your
>remark here is the same as above. You're saying, again, that the
>substitution of "O's mother" for "Jocaste" is illegitimate when the latter
>term appears in the "B(o,[M(o,j)])" context. Why?
>
>I agree that it's illegitimate, but I have an explanation for it (Frege's
>explanation), which has to do with the sense-reference distinction and how
>the two terms don't have the same meaning. I'd like to see you explain it
>without using the sense-reference distinction.
Fine. Here is what I am getting out of your argument: you claim an explicit
contradiction when we conjoin 3 premises: 1) Oedipus believes he doesn't marry
his mother 2) Oedipus believes he marries Jocaste and 3) Jocaste and Oedipus'
mother have the same referent. The reason this is wrong is that 1 & 2 are
governed by Oedipus' beliefs and the third is not.
Oedipus doesn't believe that his mother and Jocaste are two names for one
entity. He knows the referent/meaning of Jocaste but not the referent/meaning
of the equally particular "O's mom". We do, but that is irrelevant to any
assumption governed by Oedipus' belief.
From p. 237 in the ITOE: "Prof. A: "By "understanding the meaning of a concept"
you mean understanding what a concept means?" AR: "Yes, understanding which
existents it refers to in reality."" and also "Understanding the meaning of a
concept is an epistemological issue. It is understanding to what in reality
that concept refers. Its being able to distinguish the referents from all
other existents."
We understand the meaning of the O's mom; O doesn't. Can he distinguish O's
mom from all other referents? He can't even identify her while sharing her
bed. Simply put, he doesn't know what O's mom means.
No fact from our omniscient context of knowledge will prove his beliefs lead to
an *internal* contradiction; since you depend on that internal contradiction in
your proof, it is wrong. His belief is non-contradictory. You can't
interchange the meaning of two terms within the context of a belief that holds
them non-identical.
Bottom line: Since he doesn't know what "O's mom" means/ to what it refers,
there cannot be a contradiction arising out of meaning is referent, him
believing he doesn't marry his mother, him believing he marries Jocaste, him
marrying Jocaste and Jocaste having the same referent as O's mom. I mentioned
this same point in my last post but you snipped it.
Kevin