Objectivist philosophy?
Adrian
"Now man actually finds in himself a power which distinguishes him from
all other things -- and even from himself so far as he is affected by
objects. That power is *reason*."
"A rational being counts himself, qua intelligence, as belonging to the
intelligible world, and solely qua efficient cause belonging to the
intelligible world does he give to his causality the name of 'will'."
--
Adrian
Do not do to others what you would have not done to you.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Ka84376
>Who said this?
>
>"Now man actually finds in himself a power which distinguishes him from
>all other things -- and even from himself so far as he is affected by
>objects. That power is *reason*."
It sounds like Kant. Am I right or wrong?
--
Kathryn P. O'Mara
Adrian
Ka84376 <ka8...@aol.comRemove> wrote:
<snip>
>
> It sounds like Kant. Am I right or wrong?
>
> --
> Kathryn P. O'Mara
>
Yep. Actually, it is right out of the _Groundwork to the Metaphysic of
Morals_. I read that thinking, "Does Rand just hate Kant because he
said it all first?" Their views are certainly different, all things
considered, when it comes to morality. Kant seems to be a bit
conservative to me, though I can see how one would justify a welfare
state or some such thing based on his writings.
In any case, why Kant out of everyone to hate? Kant rebuked the
dialectic that Hegel used. He certainly was not against reason. As
far as people to hate why not Hobbes or something -- an autocrat. Kant
was nto ultra conservative or something. Or how about the logical
positivists who think that morality is subjective ("Emotivist")?
Marx's philosophy (if that is what it is) is based on Hegels
abandonment of reason -- the dialectic.
Stephen Speicher
>
> In any case, why Kant out of everyone to hate? ...He certainly
> was not against reason.
Why not read what Ayn Rand thought about Kant, and learn why she
reached her conclusions. You can start with an early reference,
_For The New Intellectual_.
> Kant rebuked the dialectic that Hegel used.
That would be a pretty neat trick. Kant died in 1804, about the
time Hegel was still just tutoring, or perhaps having just
started as a professor. Hegel's _The Phenomenology of Mind_
wasn't until 1807.
> Marx's philosophy (if that is what it is) is based on Hegels
> abandonment of reason -- the dialectic.
>
And Hegel's dialectical was influenced by Kant's dialectical of
antinomies.
Stephen
s...@compbio.caltech.edu
Save the photons--don't look!
Printed using 100% recycled electrons.
-------------------------------------------
Owl
news:850g8u$jpg$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> Yep. Actually, it is right out of the _Groundwork to the Metaphysic of
> Morals_. I read that thinking, "Does Rand just hate Kant because he
> said it all first?" Their views are certainly different, all things
> considered, when it comes to morality. Kant seems to be a bit
> conservative to me, though I can see how one would justify a welfare
> state or some such thing based on his writings.
I think he's very conservative, in the sense that he winds up completely
agreeing with conventional morality (even though he provides a highly
original and interesting basis for it).
Of course, Rand disliked his defense of altruism, duty, and moral realism.
(Moral realism holds that moral values exist as objective properties of
states of affairs and/or actions. The 'Objectivists' won't admit it, but
they're opposed to realism.)
> In any case, why Kant out of everyone to hate? Kant rebuked the
> dialectic that Hegel used. He certainly was not against reason. As
> far as people to hate why not Hobbes or something -- an autocrat. Kant
Probably because Hobbes wasn't as influential. Rand saw Kant as the
harbinger of the modern era in philosophy, an era of subjectivism.
Rand, however, was probably just ignorant of much of the history of
philosophy. Hume would have been the best person to hate -- both because
of his general anti-reason stance (unlike Kant) and because of his great
influence on later thinkers.
Chris Cathcart
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
> (Moral realism holds that moral values exist as objective properties
of
> states of affairs and/or actions. The 'Objectivists' won't admit it,
but
> they're opposed to realism.)
I think what you mean by "objective" properties, Objectivists will
refer to as "intrinsic" properties. If "realism" means the kind of
moral realism in the tradition of G.E. Moore, in which the good is a
non-natural property similar to the way Plato's forms are, then it
would fall squarely into what Objectivists would call the intrinsicist
tradition. Hence not surprising that Kant would be considered by
Objectivists a moral intrinsicist if he is indeed a moral realist as
you use the term.
(do you have a real email address, BTW?)
--
Chris Cathcart
Owl
news:852caq$u8c$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> I think what you mean by "objective" properties, Objectivists will
> refer to as "intrinsic" properties. If "realism" means the kind of
Maybe so; this objectivist trichotomy has never made any sense to me. By
"objective" I mean existing independent of the observer. An objective
property is one that an object has independent of our perceptions,
desires, beliefs, or other attitudes toward it.
Steve Davis
> In any case, why Kant out of everyone to hate?
I don't think Rand hated Kant to the exclusion of other philosophers. But
because Kant is such a "big name" in modern philosophy and since practically
all of the utter crap that passed for philosophy in Rand's time was
genetically derived from Kant (especially via Hegel), he made for an easy
target.
> Kant rebuked the dialectic that Hegel used.
Hegel came after Kant.
> He certainly was not against reason.
Except that he claimed that reason could not know reality, and that reason
was anathema to morality.
> As far as people to hate why not Hobbes or something
Hobbes isn't nearly as important as Kant to the big picture.
> Or how about the logical positivists who think that morality is
> subjective ("Emotivist")?
Logical positivism grew out of Kant's metaphysics, and overall is epsilon
compared to Kant's importance.
Steve Davis
> I think he's very conservative, in the sense that he winds up completely
> agreeing with conventional morality (even though he provides a highly
> original and interesting basis for it).
The entire purpose of Kant's philosophy was to re-affirm
altruist-collectivist morality. He did so by erecting an elaborate straw
man metaphysics and declaring ethics to be outside the province of reason.
Adrian
was developing into an extensive post about Hegel and how not like Kant he
was. Hegel critiqued Kant, and purportedly built his philsoophy and German
Idealism out of Kant's Transcendental Idealism. However, while Hegel and
his rendition of the dialectic was more like a departure from Aristotelian
Logic, Kant was more like just the opposite.
My copy was translated bty H J Paton. Here is his assessment of part of the
ground work:
"The ordinary man needs philosophy because of the claims of pleasure tempt
him to become a self-deceiver and to argue sophistically against what appear
to be the harsh demands of morality. This gives rise to what Kant calls a
natural dialectic -- a tendency to indulge in plausible arguments which
contradict one another, and in this way undermine the claims of duty. This
may be disasterous to morality in practice, so disasterous that in the end
ordinary human reason is impelled to seek for some solution of its
difficulties. This solution is to be found only in philosophy, and in
particular a critique of practical reason [i.e. an exploration of what is
apprehendable by the use of practical reason], which will trace our moral
principle to its source in REASON itself." (emphasis added)
Incidentally, "critique" the way Kant used it was more like a compliment.
If a philosopher critiques someone then it isd because they thought enough
of their ideas to mention them and discuss themat length. Hegel critiqued
Kant which meant that he thought he was building on that philosophy. A
Critique of ure reason is not what it may sound like -- a criticism of the
use of reason or an argument against the use of reason -- but more of an
endorsement of it and a fleshing out of what is truly possible with reason.
It was Kant's intent to purge philosophy of dialectics and to resolve the
seeming contradictions of empiricism and rationalism -- not to embrace
dialectics. Hegel would say that emiricism and idealism are both right on
their own terms (though I guess idealism is more right somehow). Kant would
say something more like they are both wrong and here is the right answer....
In any case, with regard to ethics he had a very low regard of what he
called the dialectic and indeed saw philosophy as saving us from that and
the resulting antimonies. Here is what Kant actually said (with regard to
the dialectic) that Paton is refering to above:
"From this there arises a _natural dialectic_ -- that is, a disposition to
quibble with these strict laws of duty, to throw doubt on their validity or
at least on their purity and strictness, and to make them, where possible,
more adapted to our wishes and inclinations; that is, to pervert their very
foundations and to destroy their whoel diginity -- a result which in the end
even ordinary human reason is unable to approve.
....Thus ordinary reason, when cultivated in its practical use , gives rise
insensibly to a _dialectic_ which constrains it to seek help in philosophy,
just as happens in its theoretical use; and consequently in the first case
as little as in the second will it anywhere else than in a full critique of
our reason find a place."
Here is another quote from the Groundwork:
"From this there arises a dialectic of reason, since the freedom attributed
to the will seems incompatible with the necessity of nature.... Reasom must
therefore suppose that no genuine contradiction is to be found between the
freedom asnd the natural necessity ascribed to the very same human actions;
fo rit can abandon the concept of nature as little as it can abandon that of
freedom."
Sound familiar? He is saying that man's will is both free and determined
and that reason must understand this and reject what appears to be a
dialectic (a seeming contradiction). That is, we do not undertand it
dialectically in a way that Hegel would come back later and say that we
understood everything as being both true on its own grounds and also partly
flase on another ground. What we do is actually remove the contradiction
under normal logic by coming up with a broader understanding of what is
going on all the time applying the standard laws of logic. Hegel would just
throw his hands up and admit of a contradiction on classical logical
grounds -- that is why we use the dialectic (according to him or what second
hand information I have gleaned).
The dialectic goes way back to Plato's dialogues. The Socratic method is a
dialectical method (though not quite what Hegel was specifically referring
to I think). Hegel had something more specific in mind than what appears at
first glance (I have not researched this thoroughly) to refer to general
philosophical enquiry. Indeed the excerpt I read makes a dialectician look
like someone that merely breaks propositions down into true and false. So
you could almost use "dailectician" as a synonym for "philosopher" or even
"scientist" in todays lingo. In any case, potentially making the same
mistake that Rand did, I think it is Hegel that gave both the dialectic and
philosophy its bad name (or at least its stereotype of being all about
BSing) -- not Kant. Kant did not argue for skepticism and especially when
it comes to morality it doesn't get more rational and reason-based than
deontology.
Adrian
Steve Davis wrote in message ...
That's the most ridiculous thing I have ever heard. You have just simply
not read him if you think that. I have quoted him several times trying to
secure the rational foundations of morality and to gound a practical method
for drawing conlusions without falling into spurious justifications for
immoral acts he called a "natural dialectic". In fact, his whole deal is to
purge philosophy of the dialectic which is what you are really describing as
pulling morality out of the realm of reason with a bogus metaphysics (or
really epistemology). This was Hegel -- not Kant.
Adrian
Owl wrote in message <851ctr$bt0$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>...
>Adrian <adrian...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
>news:850g8u$jpg$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
>> Yep. Actually, it is right out of the _Groundwork to the Metaphysic of
>> Morals_. I read that thinking, "Does Rand just hate Kant because he
>> said it all first?" Their views are certainly different, all things
>> considered, when it comes to morality. Kant seems to be a bit
>> conservative to me, though I can see how one would justify a welfare
>> state or some such thing based on his writings.
>
>agreeing with conventional morality (even though he provides a highly
>original and interesting basis for it).
Well, it is that universailty principle that he should go down in the anals
for. That is right up there with Aristotelian Logic in my book. But, he
was quite myopic and unimaginative with its application, which is just so
amazing to see. It would be like watching Evander Hollyfield (sp?) come out
and kick Tyson's butt and then be knocked out in the first round by my
grandma. He is just a watered down Hobbes. For the same reasons that
Hobbes argues we need a sovereign he argues the same only to a lesser extent
armed with his deontology to bolster a more liberal point of view. He still
thinks that we are buty bound to exit the state of nature (i.e. that you can
force me into a civil condition with you a priori). He still thinks that
the legislative authority is irreproachable, the executive irresistable, and
the judicial irreversible. You may complain if you are being mistreated by
the government, but you cannot do anythign about it (according to Kant).
Especially for his day and having published the Metaphysics of Morals years
after the American Revolution, you would think he could do better than this.
C'est la vis.
>
>Of course, Rand disliked his defense of altruism, duty, and moral realism.
>(Moral realism holds that moral values exist as objective properties of
>states of affairs and/or actions. The 'Objectivists' won't admit it, but
>they're opposed to realism.)
>
I think that liberals like to blow this way out of proportion. In the 19th
ccentury and early twentieth century, lets face it -- everybody was
construed as being radically leftist. What you have to realize is that upon
further discussion (in the Metaphysics of Morals) a lot of the examples he
gives of duties end up being duties to oneself. They are not only not a
matter of public right -- they are not even possible to legislate
politically. For instance the duty of beneficence is a duty to oneself not
to those you would be beneficent to. You cannot universalize callousness
not because it is inconsistent but because you could not _will_ such
treatment to yourself. Thus, it is a duty repsecting _your own_ humanity to
treat others with beneficence. And that is just a for isntance.
In the sections of the Metaphysics of Morals where he discusses the right of
the state and the rights of nations and the rights entailed in the several
nations he only mentions the right of the soveriegn (and at that poitn he is
even using Hobbes' lingo -- "sovereign") to establish insitutions to help
the poor. And this is a right of the soverieng to do in so much as he feels
appropriate not a duty. Meanwhile he talks of such things as public decency
laws, specifically outlawing prostitution and begging for instance, as more
of a duty to as a practical measure reduce crime. This view, though
possibly not conservative for a German at that time (i.e. he wasn't a
monarchist at least), is certainly conservative by today's standards. For
crying out loud, the guy did not even think that sex outside of procreation
was permissible!
He is still construed by many as liberal, though -- go figure.
Incidentally I do not think Kant was a realist quite like Plato, but I will
save that for my next post.
>> In any case, why Kant out of everyone to hate? Kant rebuked the
>> dialectic that Hegel used. He certainly was not against reason. As
>> far as people to hate why not Hobbes or something -- an autocrat. Kant
>
>Probably because Hobbes wasn't as influential. Rand saw Kant as the
>harbinger of the modern era in philosophy, an era of subjectivism.
>
>Rand, however, was probably just ignorant of much of the history of
>philosophy. Hume would have been the best person to hate -- both because
>of his general anti-reason stance (unlike Kant) and because of his great
>influence on later thinkers.
In fact, just to underscore this point, Rand is ranting against a common
tactic of applying a moral subjectivist view to rebut your opponents and
then hold up your own views as an alternative to moralizing (or specifically
normative ethics). The movement that this was really done in was the
logical positivist movement built on none other that Wittgenstein (who
rejected Kant's critical philosophy) and Hume. (Incidentally, there at
least one good reason Rand should not have criticized Hume. He was buddies
with Adam Smith and was very much a laissez faire type of guy. At least
Kant drew a whole lot of conclusions that Rand could disagree with. I don;t
think Hume did as much and although he was very skeptical of the possiblity
of knowledge of ethics, he was just as skeptical of everything else. He
ultimately rejected the church, and is generally looked upon as something of
a friend of liberty -- at least a friend of a friend.) In any case, just to
reflect on some of the losers in that movement (of which Ayer and Carnap,
for instance, probably were *not* losers), I believe Otto Neurath was the
most vocal zealot of logical positivism from the moral and political
perspective among them even though no one else listened to him. (Nowadays
you always see that essay by Stevenson about the meaning of ethical terms).
Well, I have a book with "Sociology and Physicalism" by Otto Neurath. I
just think he is the biggest loser, and I hope I am not offending anyone by
saying that, btu he is some kind of wierd radical marxist. He spouts all
that "replace philsophy with social science" crap you hear even today (by
social scientists not surprisingly). He like all the logical positivists
thought that social science was inherently the same as physical science and
possibly unlike the other members of the Vienna Circle actually sought to
secure their foundations and really make them into the same sort of activity
and to replace morality with this. He is just a raving leftist -- what can
I say?
Anyway, why go after Kant when you have something liek this to attack, and
it is founded on a philosophical view that is antithetical to Kant?
Adrian
Steve Davis wrote in message ...
>
>> In any case, why Kant out of everyone to hate?
>
>because Kant is such a "big name" in modern philosophy and since
practically
>all of the utter crap that passed for philosophy in Rand's time was
>genetically derived from Kant (especially via Hegel), he made for an easy
>target.
>
You see that is it right there. A lot of very well educated philosophers
make the mistake of assuming that Hegel is really the natural building of
Kants ideas. I have read very little of Hegel. Most of what UI understand
is second hand information. I have very little interest in changing that.
The reason is because as far as I am concerned, he ios what has $%^*$&%*-up
philosophy for the modern era. His views -- especially his anti-reason
views in ethics that seem to give rise to such gems as naziism and
stalinism -- are the antithesis of Kant. Kant wanted to purge philosophy of
dialectics. Hegel embraced the dialectic as *the* method of philosophy.
Kant took all that altruism stuff that you thik his philosophy was all about
bolstering and put it squarely in a realm as far removed as possible from
what could possibly ever be put into law according to him. Failing in our
duty of beneficence is not even a wrong that we do to others but just a
wrong we do to ourselves, ccording to Kant, let alone something that society
could actually be required to pass laws about.
>> Kant rebuked the dialectic that Hegel used.
>
>Hegel came after Kant.
Hegel suposedly built German Idealism on Kants Transcendental Idealism. I
am not saying that Kant critiqued Hegel. I am saying that the very thing
that Hegel took out of Kant's books and held up as if it was Kant's and that
Kant failed to get it right but that Hegel was trying to correct, was
actually more like something Kant condemned and specifically was trying to
get rid of in philosophy. I am talking about the spurious double talk
philosophy is notorious for. Kant wanted philosophy to be more legitimate
than that and everythign that Rand would condemn about Hegel, Kant would
have, too, and did before Hegel even wrote it!
See the quotes posted in this thread.
>
>> He certainly was not against reason.
>
>Except that he claimed that reason could not know reality, and that reason
>was anathema to morality.
Not even remotely close. I posted the quotes on morality. I am no expert
on his metaphyscis but I know enough to knwo that Kant's whole agenda was to
put an end to the skepticism of empiricism wihtout having to embrace
idealism. He rejected the possibility of any knowledg of things in
themselves ecxcept that they exist. Their very existence is what idealists
first question and the first item on his agenda is to secure that fact as a
synthetic a priori proposition. And then he admits as the emiricists keep
arguing (like Hume) that we can have no certain knowledge of these nuomenal
objects -- in fact, he'll even say we have no knowledge of them! In fact,
we don;t even care about the noumenal objects -- what we care about is the
phenomenon that we actually experience of which we have perfect knowledge
and should not doubt our senses on!
Kant was not a skeptic. And as far as his moral philosophy -- it is more
grounded in reason than Rand's since it is not even based on man's nature
but on the possibility of knowledge with regard to ethics in the first
palce.
>
>> As far as people to hate why not Hobbes or something
>
>Hobbes isn't nearly as important as Kant to the big picture.
The liberals seem to be in love with him lately. Especially arguments that
Kant himself seemed to stray away from his a priori moral rationalism from
for like that we must give up our sovereingty to one persone (the
sovereign). Doing this is how a lot of people argue for the moral
permissibility of welfare or anything else they want for that matter. Kant
was not nearly as bad as Hobbes, and what is really funny is that the
liberals have to reduce to such measures as aligning themselves with
radically conservative philosophers like Hobbes.
>
>> Or how about the logical positivists who think that morality is
>> subjective ("Emotivist")?
>
>Logical positivism grew out of Kant's metaphysics, and overall is epsilon
>compared to Kant's importance.
Not true! Logical positivism grew out of the skepticism of Wittgenstein and
Hume. Logical positivists want to get rid of philosophy metaphysics and
all. They think that metaphysics is bogus.
Adrian
Chris Cathcart wrote in message <852caq$u8c$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>...
>of
>> states of affairs and/or actions. The 'Objectivists' won't admit it,
>but
>> they're opposed to realism.)
>
>refer to as "intrinsic" properties. If "realism" means the kind of
>non-natural property similar to the way Plato's forms are, then it
>would fall squarely into what Objectivists would call the intrinsicist
>tradition. Hence not surprising that Kant would be considered by
>Objectivists a moral intrinsicist if he is indeed a moral realist as
>you use the term.
Moore might have been a variation on the theme of KAnt, but not the other
way around. Moral realism is the view not merely that morality is objective
but that morals are like physical objects. This sort view fits right into
Plato's theory of forms. It is a naive realism that leads to idealism that
basically has it that to know an idea we must experience it. So to know
that a bed exists we expereince it somehow directly. This is to be
contrasted of course with representative realism which would hold that I
instead have a model of the bed in my head and do nto actually expereince
the bed itself. In the same way we actually experience the bed itself, we
can experience morality and geometry for instance. They have the same
status as physical objects as all really existing in Ideas, and this is
reality -- what's really real are the ideas.
Kant's philosophy is not like that at all. What is real are these things in
themselves that we expereince phenomenologically. We never have knowledge
of the thing in itself, just the phenomenon of the thing that we actually
expereince. The facts of geometry and morals are not nuomenal objects like
a tree or a rock. They are rather a priori propositions that we can know
simply due to the possibility of knowledge of such things. I am a little
weak on what Kant has specifically said about math for instance, but I have
read quite a bit of his moral and political philosophy. He condemned what
he called heteronomy:
"If the will seeks the law that is to determine it _anywhere else_ than in
the fitness of the maxims fo its own making of universal law -- if therefore
in going beyond itself it seeks this law in the character of any of its
objects -- the result is always _heteronomy_. In that case, the will does
not give itself the law, but the object does so in virtue of its relation to
the will."
He goes on to say that with heteronomy you always have a conditional
statement that is of the form "IF you desire X, THEN do Y," instead of the
unconditional statement (aka categorical imperative) we need in morality of
simply "do Y." This is why you can never have morality based outside the
pure rational conception of morality in the first place (on science
perhaps). In particular, Moore's conception of morality would have it that
we experience moral facts much like in Platos conception of all of reality.
Moore's challenge works great to underscore Kant's point about basing
morality on natural grounds -- you can always ask if the condition is itself
good or why should we "desire X?" (Incidentally, supopsing X is economic
prosperity fro instance, Moore while he would certianly not dispute that we
all desire this and that it seems very plausible to say that we should
desire it, still there must be a reason why and he would like to know what
that is. If you cannot in principle satisfy him, then there must be some
other ground for morality, and that is the point. Even if "do Y" is true
because "If you desire X, then do Y," is true and we almost universally
desire X, this is not the *reason* we are morally obliged to do Y since
there is no way to know we are morally obliged to desire X regardless of how
universally desired it is.) However, I do not think that the idea that
morals themselves or the categorical imperative, say, were these noumenal
objects would be acceptable to Kant. He would say that we are then put back
to trying to observe them somehow empirically and thus basing them in nature
(which obvioulsy Moore is specifically trying to avoid) which will lead to
heteronomy.
So, I woudl say that Kant is a moral rationalist (as opposed to realist).
He thinks that morality is like mathematics. IT doesn't exist "out there"
as a noumenal object that we would physically come into contact with like a
tree or a rock. It is a purely rational concept. The concepts are
objective and exist inasmuch as they are *possible* to consider. But they
do not have existence above and beyond that as physical objects which are
not only logically possible but seem to exist in their own right.
Chris Cathcart
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
> Chris Cathcart <cath...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
> news:852caq$u8c$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> > refer to as "intrinsic" properties. If "realism" means the kind of
>
me. By
> "objective" I mean existing independent of the observer. An objective
> property is one that an object has independent of our perceptions,
> desires, beliefs, or other attitudes toward it.
Yes, that is the usual notion of what an objective property is;
however, the Objectivists use the trichotomy to distinguish objective,
as they employ the term, from intrinsic as they employ that term. An
objective value in this terminology is one that is an objective aspect
of reality *in relation to* the needs, interests, goals, desires, etc.
of a living being. They are not features of reality themself without a
specific, identifiable relation to their benefit for a living organism.
I appreciate Adrian's post pointing out the difference between Moore-
style realism and Kantian rationalism, so maybe the label doesn't apply
to Kant in the same sense it would apply to Moore. But either would
fall under the "intrinsicist" category in that the good, or the right,
is an aspect of reality that we can presumably identify by some
rational means or other, but which do not serve a specific,
identifiable role in fulfilling the needs, goals, etc. of a living
thing. Kant and Moore hold similar views about how we can come to
understand the "rational necessity" of acting morally independently of
how doing so promotes one's needs, interests, etc.
But is Rand a realist if that is taken to mean that she considers
things objectively right and wrong, independent of our beliefs,
desires, attitudes ("wishes, hopes, or fears"), etc.? I would have to
say that the answer is yes -- and that she would hold things to be
objectively right or good in virtue of their serving a specific role in
fulfilling the needs, goals, etc. of a living thing. But she would
certainly want to distance herself from the moral realist tradition
(after all, you acknowledged that this is one point of her disagreement
with Kant) in holding that knowledge of values is inductively arrived
at based on observations about the nature of living entities and what
promotes their survival and flourishing. The methodology and
conclusions of someone like Moore and Kant are noticeably different
from Rand's.
Adrian
Chris Cathcart <cath...@my-deja.com> wrote:
<snip>
> The methodology and
> conclusions of someone like Moore and Kant are noticeably different
> from Rand's.
Actually, I think the real difference is one of teleology versus
deontology. Kant makes a big deal out of arguing against teleological
theories of ethics. To him, this type of approach leads to heteronomy
and hopeless antimonies and dialectics. We can always question the
assumptions on which a conclusion is based in teleology and when there
is a real debate going on it doesn't even have to be very reasonable of
a complaint on the surface. (In other words, they could even get away
in philosophy with disputing that we all want to be happy. Who knows?
Maybe they have a point in some pathological case. In any case, it's
like opening pandoras box if we allow heteronomy and we can't get away
with just being reasonable anymore. It's like we have to get all wierd
and ethereal about it.)
Now Rand has actually very similar sentiments to Kant, I think, in
reagrds to Kant's rejection of the dialectic. However, one way in
which both Moore and Rand seem to differ from Kant is in their
consequentialist philosophy. For instance, consider you are stranded
on deserted island with a shed full of food. That shed is obviously
someone else's property, but you will die if you do not break into it
and save yourself, compensating the owner if possible later when you
get saved. Rand would say that it is not wrong to break into the
shed. I think Moore would say use your intuition to see what seems
like the best thing to do. Kant would say no we can objectively see
that it is wrong to break into the shed.
For Kant it defintely shows disrespect to the owner of the shed to
break into it and that is what it really means for something to be
right or wrong. Unfortunately for Kant, he also imagines that a
perfectly rational will would also be perfectly moral -- or at least he
says that a lot. The problem this presents us with is walking away
with the impression that we would always act morally if we only had the
sense to. In the above example this assessment seems not just rather
harsh (don't break into the shed and dies) but just plain wrong if it
is to say that this guy will not break into the shed the more rational
he is. In my own opinion, I think it is both wrong to break into the
shed and that a perfectly rational will (which is an oxymoron anyway)
will break into the shed. This is why we need a police officer there
stopping it from happening all things being equal.
In any case, in this regard it is Moore and Rand that really go
together and not Moore and Kant. Rand may look on Moore as being more
like Kant than her, but the truth of the matter is that this betrayal
of principle for consequences is what really makes the difference (in
my book at least). And this is one reason I am not an Objectivist. I
hold to rational ethics specifically because they are not about self-
interest and are a separate evaluation of behavior. I think that
breaking into the shed is wrong. I would almost surely do it and would
expect almost anyone else to do it. I do not think that the prudential
question of whether or not we ought to disapprove of someone that does
this is relelvant, but as a purely *prudential* matter I see no reason
why we ought to disapprove of the person. However, the fact that it is
indeed wrong means that the thief should compensate the owner later
on. If it were not for the fact that the deed is wrong then the thief
would not be obliged afterwards to compensate the owner.
I guess *my* real point would be that self-interest and justice need
not and indeed should generally not coincide with each other. And,
perhaps as an additional item, I would say that something like
disapproval of actions is really a reaction that has no moral issue
attached to it. So, saying something like (as is often
criticized), "But, then we must disapprove of the thief and that seems
wrong. No one would disapprove of those actions since everyone would
do the same," is not a strong rebuttal since we are never morally
obliged to have feelings and morality and self-interest are independent
of each other. It is an equivocation really between moral ought and
prudential ought.
--
Adrian
Do not do to others what you would have not done to you.
Steve Davis
> A Critique of ure reason is not what it may sound like -- a criticism of
the
> use of reason or an argument against the use of reason -- but more of an
> endorsement of it and a fleshing out of what is truly possible with
reason.
Yes Kant "endorsed" reason by declaring it to be impotent to discuss matters
of religion, morality, and the soul. He then elevated "faith" in the
supernatural, immortality of the soul, and free will (something which
apparently he did not appreciate) to the same level as reason-- as a tool of
cognition. This faith, he declared, was the only kind of "reason" that
would allow someone to be moral (i.e. to blindly accept and follow
altruist-collectivist deontological ethics).
Steve Davis
> >The entire purpose of Kant's philosophy was to re-affirm
> >altruist-collectivist morality. He did so by erecting an elaborate straw
> >man metaphysics and declaring ethics to be outside the province of
reason.
"Adrian":
> That's the most ridiculous thing I have ever heard. You have just simply
> not read him if you think that.
Sigh. Here we go again. What do they teach people in college these days?
It's obviously not reading comprehension.
Adrian, Kant explicitly stated the purpose of his philosophy no fewer than
three times in the preface to the second edition of his CPR. I shall quote
the Norman Kemp Smith translation at length with my comments interjected in
[square brackets]:
[Beginning with the first sentence of the first paragraph of the Preface to
First Edition:]
PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION
HUMAN reason has this peculiar fate that in one species
of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as pre-
scribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to
ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also
not able to answer.
[Reason is "not able to answer" certain "questions". Kant could not decide
if this was his premise, or his thesis.]
The perplexity into which it thus falls is not due to any
fault of its own. It begins with principles which it has no
option save to employ in the course of experience, and which
this experience at the same time abundantly justifies it in
using. Rising with their aid (since it is determined to this
also by its own nature) to ever higher, ever more remote,
conditions, it soon becomes aware that in this way -- the
questions never ceasing -- its work must always remain
incomplete; and it therefore finds itself compelled to resort
to principles which overstep all possible empirical employ-
ment, and which yet seem so unobjectionable that even
ordinary consciousness readily accepts them. But by this
procedure human reason precipitates itself into darkness
and contradictions; and while it may indeed conjecture
that these must be in some way due to concealed errors,
it is not in a position to be able to detect them. For since
the principles of which it is making use transcend the limits
of experience, they are no longer subject to any empirical
test. The battle-field of these endless controversies is called
metaphysics.
[Reason is unable to answer metaphysical questions, because principles based
on experience cannot transcend to "higher, ever more remote" aspects of
reality.]
Time was when metaphysics was entitled the Queen of
all the sciences; and if the will be taken for the deed, the pre-
eminent importance of her accepted tasks gives her every
right to this title of honour. Now, however, the changed
fashion of the time brings her only scorn; a matron outcast
P 008
and forsaken, she mourns like Hecuba: Modo maxima rerum,
tot generis natisque potens -- nunc trahor exul, inops.
Her government, under the administration of the dogmat-
ists, was at first despotic. But inasmuch as the legislation
still bore traces of the ancient barbarism, her empire gradu-
ally through intestine wars gave way to complete anarchy;
and the sceptics, a species of nomads, despising all settled
modes of life, broke up from time to time all civil society.
[Science used to be subjugated to religious dogma. But more recently
science has battled with dogmatic claims over metaphysical questions. The
result of these "intestine wars" is "complete anarchy". In Kant's view, the
worst of these new scientists are the "sceptics" who he believes "despise
all settled mode of life."]
Happily they were few in number, and were unable to prevent
its being established ever anew, although on no uniform and
self-consistent plan. In more recent times, it has seemed as
if an end might be put to all these controversies and the
claims of metaphysics receive final judgment, through a
certain physiology of the human understanding -- that of the
celebrated Locke. But it has turned out quite otherwise. For
however the attempt be made to cast doubt upon the pre-
tensions of the supposed Queen by tracing her lineage to
vulgar origins in common experience, this genealogy has,
as a matter of fact, been fictitiously invented, and she has
still continued to uphold her claims.
[Kant identifies and then attacks the greatest of the emperical
philosophers, John Locke. Locke's fault was attempting trace metaphysical
ideas to "vulgar origins in common experience." Kant declares this
"genealogy" to be "fictitiously invented."]
Metaphysics has accord-
ingly lapsed back into the ancient time-worn dogmatism, and
so again suffers that depreciation from which it was to have
been rescued. And now, after all methods, so it is believed,
have been tried and found wanting, the prevailing mood is
that of weariness and complete indifferentism -- the mother,
in all sciences, of chaos and night, but happily in this case
the source, or at least the prelude, of their approaching
reform and restoration. For it at least puts an end to that ill-
applied industry which has rendered them thus dark, confused,
and unserviceable.
[And thus religious dogma once again reigns over metaphysics. But, Kant
believes, this is not nearly so bad as trying to ground metaphysical
questions on "that ill-applied industry" (science).]
[In the rest of the first preface, Kant explains that faith and reason
continue to over-step one anothers' boundries and that Kant has discovered
where to draw the line between the two. He promises to construct a critique
of reason in order to show what kinds claims of emperical knowledge are
"lawful" and which are "groundless pretentions."]
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
[In the second preface, Kant is more specific about his intentions.]
WHETHER the treatment of such knowledge as lies within the
province of reason does or does not follow the secure path of a
science, is easily to be determined from the outcome. For if
after elaborate preparations, frequently renewed, it is brought
to a stop immediately it nears its goal; if often it is com-
pelled to retrace its steps and strike into some new line of
approach; or again, if the various participants are unable to
agree in any common plan of procedure, then we may rest
assured that it is very far from having entered upon the secure
path of a science, and is indeed a merely random groping. In
these circumstances, we shall be rendering a service to reason
should we succeed in discovering the path upon which it can
securely travel, even if, as a result of so doing, much that is
comprised in our original aims, adopted without reflection,
may have to be abandoned as fruitless.
That logic has already, from the earliest times, proceeded
upon this sure path is evidenced by the fact that since Aris-
totle it has not required to retrace a single step, unless, indeed,
we care to count as improvements the removal of certain need-
less subtleties or the clearer exposition of its recognised teach-
ing, features which concern the elegance rather than the cer-
tainty of the science.
[Kant is convinced of the Truth of Aristotle's logic. He claims that there
has been no need to "retrace a single step" of Aristotle's method.]
It is remarkable also that to the present
day this logic has not been able to advance a single step, and
is thus to all appearance a closed and completed body of doc-
trine. If some of the moderns have thought to enlarge it by
introducing psychological chapters on the different faculties of
knowledge (imagination, wit, etc. ), metaphysical chapters on
the origin of knowledge or on the different kinds of certainty
according to difference in the objects (idealism, scepticism, etc. ),
or anthropological chapters on prejudices, their causes and
remedies, this could only arise from their ignorance of the
P 018
peculiar nature of logical science. We do not enlarge but
disfigure sciences, if we allow them to trespass upon one
another's territory. The sphere of logic is quite precisely de-
limited; its sole concern is to give an exhaustive exposition and
a strict proof of the formal rules of all thought, whether it be
a priori or empirical, whatever be its origin or its object, and
whatever hindrances, accidental or natural, it may encounter
in our minds.
[Aristotle's logic, Kant believed, was unimproved and unimprovable over the
centuries. Moreover, logic is the special form of science which can deal
with "a priori" knowledge.]
That logic should have been thus successful is an advan-
tage which it owes entirely to its limitations, whereby it is
justified in abstracting -- indeed, it is under obligation to do
so -- from all objects of knowledge and their differences, leav-
ing the understanding nothing to deal with save itself and its
form. But for reason to enter on the sure path of science is,
of course, much more difficult, since it has to deal not with
itself alone but also with objects. Logic, therefore, as a pro-
paedeutic, forms, as it were, only the vestibule of the sciences;
and when we are concerned with specific modes of know-
ledge, while logic is indeed presupposed in any critical
estimate of them, yet for the actual acquiring of them we
have to look to the sciences properly and objectively so
called.
[This "a priori" nature of logic is not only its strength, but also its
limitation. Because it deals with abstractions, it is a science of form.
But, Kant believes, in order to grasp the object, logic alone is not
sufficient.]
Now if reason is to be a factor in these sciences, something
in them must be known a priori, and this knowledge may be
related to its object in one or other of two ways, either as
merely determining it and its concept (which must be supplied
from elsewhere) or as also making it actual. The former is
theoretical, the latter practical knowledge of reason. In both,
that part in which reason determines its object completely
a priori, namely, the pure part -- however much or little this part
may contain -- must be first and separately dealt with, in case
it be confounded with what comes from other sources. For it
is bad management if we blindly pay out what comes in, and
are not able, when the income falls into arrears, to distinguish
which part of it can justify expenditure, and in which line we
must make reductions.
[Kant asserts that there must be a distinction on one hand between "a
priori" and "emperical" knowledge, and on the other hand between
"theoretical" and "practical" knowledge. In both the theoretical and
practical realms, Kant chose to designate the reasoning that deals solely
with "a priori" knowledge as "pure".]
[A brief history of the experimental method snipped.]
Metaphysics is a completely isolated speculative science of
reason, which soars far above the teachings of experience, and
in which reason is indeed meant to be its own pupil. Meta-
physics rests on concepts alone -- not, like mathematics, on their
application to intuition. But though it is older than all other
sciences, and would survive even if all the rest were swallowed
up in the abyss of an all-destroying barbarism, it has not yet
had the good fortune to enter upon the secure path of a science.
[This is essentially a repetition of the first sentence I quoted.
Metaphysics is outside the bound of reason, because it is "completely
isolated" and "speculative" (meaning that its object is not attainable
through experience).]
For in it reason is perpetually being brought to a stand, even
when the laws into which it is seeking to have, as it professes,
an a priori insight are those that are confirmed by our most com-
mon experiences. Ever and again we have to retrace our steps,
as not leading us in the direction in which we desire to go. So
far, too, are the students of metaphysics from exhibiting any
kind of unanimity in their contentions, that metaphysics has
rather to be regarded as a battle-ground quite peculiarly suited
for those who desire to exercise themselves in mock combats,
and in which no participant has ever yet succeeded in gaining
even so much as an inch of territory, not at least in such
manner as to secure him in its permanent possession. This
shows, beyond all questioning, that the procedure of meta-
physics has hitherto been a merely random groping, and,
what is worst of all, a groping among mere concepts.
What, then, is the reason why, in this field, the sure road
to science has not hitherto been found? Is it, perhaps, im-
possible of discovery? Why, in that case, should nature have
visited our reason with the restless endeavour whereby it is
ever searching for such a path, as if this were one of its most
important concerns. Nay, more, how little cause have we to
place trust in our reason, if, in one of the most important
domains of which we would fain have knowledge, it does
not merely fail us, but lures us on by deceitful promises, and
in the end betrays us! Or if it be only that we have thus far
failed to find the true path, are there any indications to justify
the hope that by renewed efforts we may have better fortune
than has fallen to our predecessors?
[Reason, Kant declares, "does not merely fail us, but lures us on by
deceitful promises, and in the end betrays us!" Nevertheless, mankind has a
relentless need to discover the answers to metaphysical questions. How then
will these matters be finally resolved?]
The examples of mathematics and natural science, which
by a single and sudden revolution have become what they
P 022
now are, seem to me sufficiently remarkable to suggest our
considering what may have been the essential features in the
changed point of view by which they have so greatly bene-
fited. Their success should incline us, at least by way of experi-
ment, to imitate their procedure, so far as the analogy which,
as species of rational knowledge, they bear to metaphysics may
permit.
[The success of mathematics and natural science, Kant believed, were the
result of "sudden revolution" of thought. And so, "at least by way of
experimentation," Kant formulated a revolution of thought which may give
similar success to finally answering metaphysical questions. And he reveals
the nature of this revolution in the following sentence ...]
Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge
must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our know-
ledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them
a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption,
ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we
may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if
we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.
[This is the Kantian revolution. Kant is the grand father of all modern
philosophers who attempt to subjugate existence to consciousness. Why did
he choose this course? Read on ...]
This
would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should
be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining
something in regard to them prior to their being given.
[The notion of objects conforming to consciousness is, according to Kant,
more agreeable to "what is desired." What Kant desires is knowledge of
objects, independent of experience. Kant reveals more about which objects
he desires to have a priori "knowledge" of further on. We will shortly see
him narrow his focus from the broad topic of metaphysics to specific
articles of faith.]
We
should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus'
primary hypothesis. Failing of satisfactory progress in ex-
plaining the movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposi-
tion that they all revolved round the spectator, he tried whether
he might not have better success if he made the spectator
to revolve and the stars to remain at rest. A similar experi-
ment can be tried in metaphysics, as regards the intuition
of objects.
[Here he is likening himself to Copernicus.]
[I have deleted a few paragraphs describing his method.]
This method, modelled on that of the student of nature, con-
sists in looking for the elements of pure reason in what admits of con-
firmation or refutation by experiment. Now the propositions of pure
reason, especially if they venture out beyond all limits of possible
experience, cannot be brought to the test through any experiment
with their objects, as in natural science. In dealing with those con-
cepts and principles which we adopt a priori, all that we can do is to
contrive that they be used for viewing objects from two different
points of view -- on the one hand, in connection with experience, as
objects of the senses and of the understanding, and on the other
hand, for the isolated reason that strives to transcend all limits of
experience, as objects which are thought merely. If, when things are
viewed from this twofold standpoint, we find that there is agreement
with the principle of pure reason, but that when we regard them
only from a single point of view reason is involved in unavoidable
self-conflict, the experiment decides in favour of the correctness of
this distinction.
[Here Kant describes his essential distinction between two "points of view"
about knowledge. First, there is the kind of "reason" that deals with
issues of natural science. This is what he calls "reason". Second, there
is the kind of "reason" that deals with issues that "trancend all limits of
experience."]
P 023
But this deduction
of our power of knowing a priori, in the first part of metaphysics,
has a consequence which is startling, and which has the appearance
P 024
of being highly prejudicial to the whole purpose of meta-
physics, as dealt with in the second part. For we are brought
to the conclusion that we can never transcend the limits of
possible experience, though that is precisely what this science
is concerned, above all else, to achieve. This situation yields,
however, just the very experiment by which, indirectly, we
are enabled to prove the truth of this first estimate of our
a priori knowledge of reason, namely, that such knowledge
has to do only with appearances, and must leave the thing
in itself as indeed real per se, but as not known by us.
[The first and most fundamental aspect of distinguishing between the two
"points of view" above is that the meaning of emperical knowledge is
drastically changed. Kant declares that reason deals "only with
appearances." The object, the "thing in itself" is unknowable.]
[Some paragraphs deleted. In these paragraphs Kant once again draws the
distinction between "speculative" or theoretical reason and "practical"
reason, and explains that he is leaving his ideas about practical reason to
a different work.]
But, it will be asked, what sort of a treasure is this that
we propose to bequeath to posterity? What is the value of
the metaphysics that is alleged to be thus purified by criti-
cism and established once for all? On a cursory view of the
present work it may seem that its results are merely negative,
warning us that we must never venture with speculative reason
beyond the limits of experience. Such is in fact its primary use.
[This is Kant stating the purpose of his philosophy for the first time. The
"primary use" of CPR is to warn humanity "that we must never venture with
speculative reason beyond the limits of experience."]
But such teaching at once acquires a positive value when we
recognise that the principles with which speculative reason
ventures out beyond its proper limits do not in effect extend
the employment of reason, but, as we find on closer scrutiny,
inevitably narrow it. These principles properly belong [not
to reason but] to sensibility, and when thus employed they
threaten to make the bounds of sensibility coextensive with
the real, and so to supplant reason in its pure (practical) em-
ployment.
[The danger, in Kant's mind, is in making "the bounds of sensibility
coextensive with the real." It simply won't do to have man's knowledge
trample on certain questions which are rightly left to (presumably "unreal")
sensibilities.]
So far, therefore, as our Critique limits speculative
reason, it is indeed negative; but since it thereby removes an
obstacle which stands in the way of the employment of practi-
cal reason, nay threatens to destroy it, it has in reality a posi-
tive and very important use. At least this is so, immediately
we are convinced that there is an absolutely necessary prac-
tical employment of pure reason -- the moral -- in which it
P 027
inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility.
[Here Kant states the purpose of his philosophy a second time. Kant
believes that reason "threatens to destroy" the "absolutely necessary"
employment of "practical reason"-- namely morality. He intends his Critique
to limit reason and thus remove any "obstacle which stands in the way" of
his moral beliefs.]
At least this is so, immediately
we are convinced that there is an absolutely necessary prac-
tical employment of pure reason -- the moral -- in which it
P 027
inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility. Though
[practical] reason, in thus proceeding, requires no assistance
from speculative reason, it must yet be assured against its
opposition, that reason may not be brought into conflict
with itself. To deny that the service which the Critique renders
is Positive in character, would thus be like saying that the
police are of no positive benefit, inasmuch as their main busi-
ness is merely to prevent the violence of which citizens stand
in mutual fear, in order that each may pursue his vocation in
peace and security.
[While morality "requires no assistance" from reason, it must nonetheless be
protected from reason less man's knowledge contradict Kant's moral beliefs.]
That space and time are only forms of sens-
ible intuition, and so only conditions of the existence of things
as appearances; that, moreover, we have no concepts of under-
standing, and consequently no elements for the knowledge of
things, save in so far as intuition can be given corresponding
to these concepts; and that we can therefore have no knowledge
of any object as thing in itself, but only in so far as it is an
object of sensible intuition, that is, an appearance -- all this is
proved in the analytical part of the Critique. Thus it does in-
deed follow that all possible speculative knowledge of reason
is limited to mere objects of experience. But our further con-
tention must also be duly borne in mind, namely, that though
We cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we
must yet be in position at least to think them as things in them-
selves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion
that there can be appearance without anything that appears.
[Here Kant says that although his philosophy leads to "absurd conclusion[s]"
about the nature of existence, one ought to avoid thinking about them.]
Now let us suppose that the distinction, which our Critique has
shown to be necessary, between things as objects of experience
and those same things as things in themselves, had not been
made.
["If you think my philosophy is bad, consider the alternative ..."]
To know an object I must be able to prove its possibility, either
from its actuality as attested by experience, or a priori by means of
reason. But I can think whatever I please, provided only that I do
not contradict myself, that is, provided my concept is a possible
thought. This suffices for the possibility of the concept, even though
I may not be able to answer for there being, in the sum of all possi-
bilities, an object corresponding to it. But something more is re-
quired before I can ascribe to such a concept objective validity, that
is, real possibility; the former possibility is merely logical. This some-
thing more need not, however, be sought in the theoretical sources of
knowledge; it may lie in those that are practical.
P 027
In that case all things in general, as far as they are
P 028
efficient causes, would be determined by the principle of caus-
ality and consequently by the mechanism of nature. I could
not, therefore, without palpable contradiction, say of one and
the same being, for instance the human soul, that its will is free
and yet is subject to natural necessity, that is, is not free. For
I have taken the soul in both propositions in one and the same
sense, namely as a thing in general, that is, as a thing in itself;
and save by means of a preceding critique, could not have done
otherwise. But if our Critique is not in error in teaching that
the object is to be taken in a twofold sense, namely as appear-
ance and as thing in itself; if the deduction of the concepts of
understanding is valid, and the principle of causality there-
fore applies only to things taken in the former sense, namely,
in so far as they are objects of experience -- these same objects,
taken in the other sense, not being subject to the principle --
then there is no contradiction in supposing that one and the
same will is, in the appearance, that is, in its visible acts,
necessarily subject to the law of nature, and so far not free,
while yet, as belonging to a thing in itself, it is not subject
to that law, and is therefore free. My soul, viewed from the
latter standpoint, cannot indeed be known by means of specu-
lative reason (and still less through empirical observation);
and freedom as a property of a being to which I attribute effects
in the sensible world, is therefore also not knowable in any
such fashion. For I should then have to know such a being as
determined in its existence, and yet as not determined in time --
which is impossible, since I cannot support my concept by any
intuition. But though I cannot know, I can yet think freedom;
that is to say, the representation of it is at least not self-con-
tradictory, provided due account be taken of our critical dis-
tinction between the two modes of representation, the sensible
and the intellectual, and of the resulting limitation of the pure
concepts of understanding and of the principles which flow
from them.
[This is Kant's first article of faith: Immortality of the soul. He
believes that such a thing would be rendered "impossible" by reason, if it
were allowed to venture into questions that transcend experience.]
If we grant that morality necessarily presupposes freedom
(in the strictest sense) as a property of our will; if, that is to
say, we grant that it yields practical principles -- original prin-
ciples, proper to our reason -- as a priori data of reason, and
that this would be absolutely impossible save on the assump-
P 029
tion of freedom; and if at the same time we grant that
speculative reason has proved that such freedom does not
allow of being thought, then the former supposition -- that
made on behalf of morality -- would have to give way to this
other contention, the opposite of which involves a palpable
contradiction. For since it is only on the assumption of free-
dom that the negation of morality contains any contradiction,
freedom, and with it morality, would have to yield to the
mechanism of nature.
Morality does not, indeed, require that freedom should be
understood, but only that it should not contradict itself, and
so should at least allow of being thought, and that as thus
thought it should place no obstacle in the way of a free act
(viewed in another relation) likewise conforming to the mechan-
ism of nature. The doctrine of morality and the doctrine of
nature may each, therefore, make good its position. This,
however, is only possible in so far as criticism has previously
established our unavoidable ignorance of things in themselves,
and has limited all that we can theoretically know to mere
appearances.
[This is Kant's second article of faith: Freedom of the will. He believes
that reason might contradict the notion of free will, and thus must be
stopped from examining the question.]
This discussion as to the positive advantage of critical
principles of pure reason can be similarly developed in regard
to the concept of God and of the simple nature of our soul; but
for the sake of brevity such further discussion may be omitted.
[This is Kant's third article of faith: God.]
From what has already been said, it is evident that even the
assumption--as made on behalf of the necessary practical em-
ployment of my reason -- of God, freedom, and immortality is
not permissible unless at the same time speculative reason be
deprived of its pretensions to transcendent insight. For in order
to arrive at such insight it must make use of principles which,
in fact, extend only to objects of possible experience, and
which, if also applied to what cannot be an object of experience,
always really change this into an appearance, thus rendering
all practical extension of pure reason impossible. I have therefore
found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room
for faith.
[This is the third and most blatant statement of Kant's purpose. "I have
therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for
faith." To Kant, faith in certain religious notions is necessary to employ
practical reason-- to be moral. Reason and scientific knowledge were, in
his mind, a threat to moral existence. They had to be "denied". And he has
thus far been largely successful at doing it.]
Owl
> as they employ the term, from intrinsic as they employ that term. An
> objective value in this terminology is one that is an objective aspect
> of reality *in relation to* the needs, interests, goals, desires, etc.
> of a living being. They are not features of reality themself without a
I find it difficult to distinguish that from what everyone else calls
"subjective" or "relative" properties. "Objective aspect of reality in
relation to the needs, interests, goals, desires, etc. of a living being"
sounds like an oxymoron. What is the meaning of the adjective "objective"
in that phrase?
> But is Rand a realist if that is taken to mean that she considers
> things objectively right and wrong, independent of our beliefs,
> desires, attitudes ("wishes, hopes, or fears"), etc.? I would have to
> say that the answer is yes -- and that she would hold things to be
> objectively right or good in virtue of their serving a specific role in
> fulfilling the needs, goals, etc. of a living thing. But she would
Are you drawing a distinction between "needs, interests, goals, desires"
and "beliefs, desires, attitudes"? It sounds like, first, you said that,
for Rand, values are dependent on our needs, interests, goals, and
desires; but then you went on to say they are independent of our beliefs,
desires, and attitudes. I don't get it.
Owl
> he is. In my own opinion, I think it is both wrong to break into the
> shed and that a perfectly rational will (which is an oxymoron anyway)
> will break into the shed. This is why we need a police officer there
> stopping it from happening all things being equal.
I find this extremely counter-intuitive. You are saying that the person
has a moral obligation to die rather than steal someone's food? And if
there is a police officer nearby, he should, morally, stop the person from
taking the food, thereby ensuring the person's death?
It seems to me that there are some things more important than the
shed-owner's property right over a bit of food, and that a person's life,
in an emergency, is one of those things. You went on, however, to argue:
> why we ought to disapprove of the person. However, the fact that it is
> indeed wrong means that the thief should compensate the owner later
> on. If it were not for the fact that the deed is wrong then the thief
> would not be obliged afterwards to compensate the owner.
That's not clear to me. What is clear is that, if the deed is not wrong,
then the thief should not be *punished* for what he did. But of course,
the purpose of the compensation is not punishment or retribution; it is
just to restore the owner to his former position. Couldn't one hold that
it is wrong to take the food & not compensate the owner, but it is okay to
take the food & compensate the owner -- i.e., the compensation (together,
of course, with the emergency circumstances) *make* the action not-wrong.
Owl
news:Wafd4.2348$ps.2...@news4.mia...
> way around. Moral realism is the view not merely that morality is
objective
> but that morals are like physical objects. This sort view fits right
into
> Plato's theory of forms. It is a naive realism that leads to idealism
that
> basically has it that to know an idea we must experience it. So to know
I don't think this is correct about what 'moral realism' is in
contemporary meta-ethics. I consider myself a moral realist, and moral
realists are generally taken to include the likes of G.E. Moore and Peter
Railton. Now, you say a number of things about moral realists:
1. They think morals are like physical objects.
Well, no doubt there are some respects in which morals are 'like'
physical objects -- e.g., that they have objective existence. But neither
I, nor Moore, nor the naturalists like Railton, think they are very much
like physical objects.
2. Moral realism fits in with Plato's theory of the Forms.
I think you have to be a universals-realist of some sort in order to
be a moral realist, simply because you say there are moral properties, and
properties are universals. However, (a) that's not saying much, since you
have to a universals-realist in order to believe ANY sort of properties
exist, including physical properties, and (b) you do not have to be a
Platonic realist; you can just as well be an immanent realist.
3. Moral realism is a form of naive realism.
G. E. Moore's view of good is certainly analogous to what they call
'naive realism' in the theory of perception. But Railton's is not at all
(cf. the rest of the ethical naturalists, like Sturgeon, Boyd).
4. It leads to idealism.
Huh?
5. It holds that to know an idea we must experience it.
I don't understand why talk about 'knowing ideas' came in here, and
I'm not sure what you mean by 'ideas' in this context, or what is meant by
knowing them.
Of course, Moore's view was that to know about moral value, you had to
have intuitions. If you want to call intuitions "experiences", then his
view was that to know moral truths, you have to 'experience' them. But
Moore would not have called moral truths "ideas." And the view of the
ethical naturalists is quite different.
Adrian
Steve Davis <st...@pobox.com> wrote:
> "Adrian" :
>
> > A Critique of ure reason is not what it may sound like -- a
criticism of
> the
> > use of reason or an argument against the use of reason -- but more
of an
> > endorsement of it and a fleshing out of what is truly possible with
> reason.
>
matters
> of religion, morality, and the soul. He then elevated "faith" in the
> supernatural, immortality of the soul, and free will (something which
> apparently he did not appreciate) to the same level as reason-- as a
tool of
> cognition. This faith, he declared, was the only kind of "reason"
that
> would allow someone to be moral (i.e. to blindly accept and follow
> altruist-collectivist deontological ethics).
>
Look. Kant was not collectivist or altruistic. Just read his book on
his moral philosophy _The Metaphysics of Morals_. The only time he
praises religion in this work is where he figures that the only way we
can be sure a man is doing the right thing is if he is swearing to a
god he fears. He elevated nothing above reason.
Owl
> Not even remotely close. I posted the quotes on morality. I am no
expert
> on his metaphyscis but I know enough to knwo that Kant's whole agenda
was to
> put an end to the skepticism of empiricism wihtout having to embrace
> idealism.
> Not true! Logical positivism grew out of the skepticism of Wittgenstein
and
> Hume. Logical positivists want to get rid of philosophy metaphysics and
> all. They think that metaphysics is bogus.
I agree with you. Kant is, in many ways, a reaction to Hume, who was the
true root of skepticism, anti-rationalism, and subjectivism in modern
philosophy. It was Hume who claimed morality -- along with all beliefs --
rested on "sentiment", and Kant who tried to found it on reason. It was
Hume who claimed inductive reasoning had no justification, and Kant who
tried to provide a justification for it. And of course, it was Hume who
led to illogical positivism.
Owl
[quoting Paton:]
> "The ordinary man needs philosophy because of the claims of pleasure
tempt
> him to become a self-deceiver and to argue sophistically against what
appear
> to be the harsh demands of morality. This gives rise to what Kant calls
a
Just thought I'd remark that this statement is reminiscent of what H.A.
Prichard claimed was the origin of moral philosophy. Of course,
Prichard's solution is quite different from Kant's... (see "Does Moral
Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?")
MSFE2
>physical objects -- e.g., that they have objective existence. But neither
>I, nor Moore, nor the naturalists like Railton, think they are very much
>like physical objects.
First let me say this is by *far* the most fascinating & illuminating thread I
have read since joining this newsgroup, in fact the type of discussion I was
hoping to find all along.
Having no real exposure to philosophy, aside from Rand's & what I have learned
here, I hope this observation of the quoted paragraph is not too pedestrian.
I fail to see how moral's *could* be like physical objects. Morals exist only
as a result of the nature and reality of living beings and how they interact
*with* physical objects.. Obviously if men were like ants or bees, morality
would be far different. In fact, if living creatues did not exist, morality
would not either, non sentient living matter would *always* act according to
it's nature. Thus morality does not exist *before* or outside of or
independently of physcial objects, as they do to one another.
Owl
news:20000108004513...@ng-fk1.aol.com...
> I fail to see how moral's *could* be like physical objects. Morals
exist only
"Like" in what respects? Part of the point I wanted to make is that "x is
like y" is a very vague statement. Is a loaf of bread like a dog? Well,
that depends -- like it in what way?
> as a result of the nature and reality of living beings and how they
interact
> *with* physical objects.. Obviously if men were like ants or bees,
morality
> would be far different. In fact, if living creatues did not exist,
morality
> would not either, non sentient living matter would *always* act
according to
> it's nature. Thus morality does not exist *before* or outside of or
> independently of physcial objects, as they do to one another.
If living creatures did not exist, then stomachs would not exist. Also,
if men were like ants or bees, then our stomachs would be different. But
of course, this doesn't show that stomachs aren't like physical objects,
since in fact they are physical objects.
Owl
> his moral philosophy _The Metaphysics of Morals_. The only time he
> praises religion in this work is where he figures that the only way we
> can be sure a man is doing the right thing is if he is swearing to a
> god he fears. He elevated nothing above reason.
That's funny, because I tend to think that's a way you can be sure a man
is doing the wrong thing...
Robert J. Kolker
Owl wrote:
>
> That's not clear to me. What is clear is that, if the deed is not wrong,
> then the thief should not be *punished* for what he did. But of course,
> the purpose of the compensation is not punishment or retribution; it is
> just to restore the owner to his former position. Couldn't one hold that
> it is wrong to take the food & not compensate the owner, but it is okay to
> take the food & compensate the owner -- i.e., the compensation (together,
> of course, with the emergency circumstances) *make* the action not-wrong.
The action is wrong, but compensating the one wronged may lead him to
forgive you and cut you some slack. We wrong each other in little ways.
We bump into each other, we waste each other's time. Mini-wrongings
seem to be inevitable. So the only issues are avoidance of wronging,
compensation for wrongs done and forgiveness when possible and appropriate.
Bob Kolker
Robert J. Kolker
MSFE2 wrote:
>
> I fail to see how moral's *could* be like physical objects. Morals exist
> only
> as a result of the nature and reality of living beings and how they interact
> *with* physical objects.. Obviously if men were like ants or bees, morality
> would be far different. In fact, if living creatues did not exist, morality
> would not either, non sentient living matter would *always* act according to
> it's nature. Thus morality does not exist *before* or outside of or
> independently of physcial objects, as they do to one another.
In short morality is relational and contextual. Example. Taking a pee on
a beach is wrong in a social context because you are peeing on someone
else's beach without their permission. Taking a pee on a beach on a desert
island has no moral import whatsoever. So an action in and of itself cannot
be morally judged, but only in context and in relations to other people.
If we were like ants and bees and were totally programmed (bugs do not
have the facility of choice or so it appears) then there is no moral import
to what they do. Moral judgment can apply only in situations where
there is choice.
Bob Kolker
MSFE2
>exist only
>
>like y" is a very vague statement. Is a loaf of bread like a dog? Well,
>that depends -- like it in what way?
"Llike" in exactly the way was contextually obvious. "Like" in the was
specifically defined. "Like" in the way that they do no exist independently,
they depend on *other* things for their existence and definition.
>In fact, if living creatues did not exist,
>morality
>> would not either, non sentient living matter would *always* act
>according to
>> it's nature. Thus morality does not exist *before* or outside of or
>> independently of physcial objects, as they do to one another.
>
>If living creatures did not exist, then stomachs would not exist. Also,
>if men were like ants or bees, then our stomachs would be different. But
>of course, this doesn't show that stomachs aren't like physical objects,
>since in fact they are physical objects.
Our stomachs *are* us (just as our arms, hands and spleens are us). They are
integral to our existence and definition and their purpose and role in our
existence does not need to be determined of even investigated. They exist and
function independently of our reason and will. Morals exist as a function of
decisions (concious or not) that man makes to guide his actions. They exist
because the nature of man gives rise to their necessity, but this does not make
them exist independently of man anymore than skyscrapers do. But, just as
skyscrapers must take into account the laws of reality *and* the needs of man
to exist (both requiring reason to properly implement), so do morals.
MSFE2
>> praises religion in this work is where he figures that the only way we
>> can be sure a man is doing the right thing is if he is swearing to a
>> god he fears. He elevated nothing above reason.
>
>That's funny, because I tend to think that's a way you can be sure a man
>is doing the wrong thing...
>
Agreed completely. If one is faced with a decision which reason dicates he
takes a specific action, but he takes the opposite action out of *fear* to
authority which rules by decree, he has obliterated reason.
Adrian
> > he is. In my own opinion, I think it is both wrong to break into
the
> > shed and that a perfectly rational will (which is an oxymoron
anyway)
> > will break into the shed. This is why we need a police officer
there
> > stopping it from happening all things being equal.
>
> I find this extremely counter-intuitive. You are saying that the
person
> has a moral obligation to die rather than steal someone's food? And
if
> there is a police officer nearby, he should, morally, stop the person
from
> taking the food, thereby ensuring the person's death?
Are you equivocating again? What do you mean when you say that is a
police officer is nearby, then he *should* stop the man? I am saying
there should (prudential and moral) be a law against it. I am saying
that the policeman will likely let the man steal the food and the man
wioll likely do it. That does not change the fact that it is not fair
to the owner of the shed, and that is all the moral evaluation means.
The problem is with trying to get it to be its own motivation. I am
with Hume that we are always motivated by irrational desires. A
"rational will" is an oxymoron. So that means that we have a lot more
concerns than just whether or not we are being fair to someone, but
this fact does not change what it means to be fair.
>
> It seems to me that there are some things more important than the
> shed-owner's property right over a bit of food, and that a person's
life,
> in an emergency, is one of those things. You went on, however, to
argue:
>
> > why we ought to disapprove of the person. However, the fact that
it is
> > indeed wrong means that the thief should compensate the owner later
> > on. If it were not for the fact that the deed is wrong then the
thief
> > would not be obliged afterwards to compensate the owner.
>
> That's not clear to me. What is clear is that, if the deed is not
wrong,
> then the thief should not be *punished* for what he did. But of
course,
> the purpose of the compensation is not punishment or retribution; it
is
> just to restore the owner to his former position. Couldn't one hold
that
> it is wrong to take the food & not compensate the owner, but it is
okay to
> take the food & compensate the owner -- i.e., the compensation
(together,
> of course, with the emergency circumstances) *make* the action not-
wrong.
>
I think you are trying to hard to align the moral evaluation with your
personal evaluation. Incidentally, we can see here where Kant and
Moore radically diverge. Almost surely Moore would have to say that it
is probably okay to steal the food since we all have this overwhelming
urge to think it is okay. This would be that Platonic intuitionism
that he is refering to -- that moral sixth sense.
Rand has a similar reaction, but lets just get past the idea that our
moral evaluation would actually ever result in the guy being prevented
from the food. No policeman is going to stop the guy and no one is
going to restrain themselves. That is just a foregone conclusion based
on what is in our best self-interests. Now, what does "ought" mean in
a moral sense, and is it possible that he ought not take the food? We
have to have moral ought to necessarily diverege from prudential ought
at some point for them to be two different oughts at all.
Adrian
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
<snip>
> I find it difficult to distinguish that from what everyone else calls
> "subjective" or "relative" properties. "Objective aspect of reality
in
> relation to the needs, interests, goals, desires, etc. of a living
being"
> sounds like an oxymoron. What is the meaning of the adjective
"objective"
> in that phrase?
>
Consider the statement "I like chocolate icecream." It does nto
satisfy the law of identity unless we know what the "I" refers to. In
particualr, the truth or falsity of the proposition vairies as it is
considered by different subjects who associate the "I" with
themselves. So this statement is "subjective". On the other hand, the
statement "Adrian likes chocolate icecream." Is not at all subjective
and has the same truth value for everyone.
What makes a matter subjective is the indeterminacy of the statements
that define the subject. If the statements are not meaningful until
some particular person considers them, then the matter is subjective.
Otherwise, it is objective. In particular, I can objectively say if
some act on your part was just a stupid move *for you* or not.
Adrian
> > way around. Moral realism is the view not merely that morality is
> objective
> > but that morals are like physical objects. This sort view fits
right
> into
> > Plato's theory of forms. It is a naive realism that leads to
idealism
> that
> > basically has it that to know an idea we must experience it. So to
know
>
> I don't think this is correct about what 'moral realism' is in
> contemporary meta-ethics. I consider myself a moral realist, and
moral
> realists are generally taken to include the likes of G.E. Moore and
Peter
> Railton. Now, you say a number of things about moral realists:
>
> 1. They think morals are like physical objects.
> physical objects -- e.g., that they have objective existence. But
neither
> I, nor Moore, nor the naturalists like Railton, think they are very
much
> like physical objects.
The difference is like that of science to mathematics. Science is
fundamentally different in that one does experiments to verify their
hypotheses. In math you don't see people measure 100 triangles to see
that their angles sum to 180 to actually prove that it is the case in
general. Instead a purely a priori process occurs to prove it.
>
> 2. Moral realism fits in with Plato's theory of the Forms.
> I think you have to be a universals-realist of some sort in order
to
> be a moral realist, simply because you say there are moral
properties, and
> properties are universals. However, (a) that's not saying much,
since you
> have to a universals-realist in order to believe ANY sort of
properties
> exist, including physical properties, and (b) you do not have to be a
> Platonic realist; you can just as well be an immanent realist.
>
Here I am jsut drawing an analogy between moral realism and idealism.
For morals you have to have the same general view that Plato did,
namely that morals exist "out there", as opposed to a realist embracing
representative realism who might think that morals like math are these
coherent concepts that we can hve but are not really a part of nature
per se. They do not exist "out there" any more than the rules of logic
do, nor are they any sort of abstract characteristics of physical
objects.
> 3. Moral realism is a form of naive realism.
> G. E. Moore's view of good is certainly analogous to what they
call
> 'naive realism' in the theory of perception. But Railton's is not at
all
> (cf. the rest of the ethical naturalists, like Sturgeon, Boyd).
>
> 4. It leads to idealism.
> Huh?
Naive realism, that is, leads to idealism as opposed to a belief that
morals are real. If you think that for one to know of a bed, you must
have the bed inside your mind somehow or that your mind must come
directly in contact with the bed, then you would be a naive realist
(because that is what naive realism means) and you would likely be an
idealist.
>
> 5. It holds that to know an idea we must experience it.
> I don't understand why talk about 'knowing ideas' came in here,
and
> I'm not sure what you mean by 'ideas' in this context, or what is
meant by
> knowing them.
> Of course, Moore's view was that to know about moral value, you
had to
> have intuitions. If you want to call intuitions "experiences", then
his
> view was that to know moral truths, you have to 'experience' them.
But
> Moore would not have called moral truths "ideas." And the view of the
> ethical naturalists is quite different.
>
Okay -- I did not mean to say that you have to be an idealist to be a
moral realist. Another possibility is that you just think that
morality is a natural phenomenon like a volcano (or perhaps more like
an abstract property of physical objects like potential energy, say).
If you want to understand a volcano, then you just scientifically
observe it. I was more talking about Moore. His view that we
understand moral intuitively is just like Plato on every other Idea.
Our minds experience these ideas through our intutition.
I would say that the difference between moral realism and moral
rationalism, incidentally, is (as I said above) basically the same as
that of math to science. Moral realists should approach morality
scientifically and empirically in the end. Perhpas you do it like
Moore with the intuitionism, or perhaps you examine the group dynamics
of apes or perhaps you go around looking at different cultures.
(Ironically, the folks I am alluding to usually are subjectivists.) I
am a moral rationalist. I do not think that morality is founded on
anything empirical. Rand and Moore were realists -- Moore for obvious
reasons, Rand because she is ultimately basing morality on human nature
or some such thing (which must be observed empirically). Kant was a
moral rationalist (as I am using the terms).
Adrian
MSFE2 <ms...@aol.com> wrote:
Incidentally, Plato would not say that physical objects are like
physical objects -- that reality is a world of Ideas. So, when I said
that a moral realist thinks that morals are like physical objects that
is more like what I think their position really entails than it is what
they themsleves say. However, how could they dispute me as I thik we
might see in my reaction to your statements below?
<snip>
>
> I fail to see how moral's *could* be like physical objects. Morals
exist only
> as a result of the nature and reality of living beings and how they
interact
> *with* physical objects.. Obviously if men were like ants or bees,
morality
> would be far different. In fact, if living creatues did not exist,
morality
> would not either, non sentient living matter would *always* act
according to
> it's nature. Thus morality does not exist *before* or outside of or
> independently of physcial objects, as they do to one another.
>
But your position *is* that morals are like physical objects if to
change our nature changes how we are to evaluate the acts of volitional
beings. Morality changes as the physical world does. Basically your
view is that morals are not themselves physical objects (like how I
think Moore is really making it out to be), but that they are abstract
properties of physical objects -- perhaps like potential energy. The
potential energy is not so much a physical object but a property of
physical objects that one can observe indirectly.
I am saying that it is not like that at all. I am saying that morals
hold universally. They are like the facts of Euclidean Geometry --
they are just as true whether or not anyone is here to know them or
even if they don't apply to anything (of course I do think they
apply). They cannot, then, depend on our nature or some such thing to
derive what they are. Our nature can change the dilemmas we are faced
with and so cause us to ask different moral questions. But, the
answers themselves cannot depend on our nature so much as just be about
beings of our nature. The answers have to be derived from something
else -- something a priori and purely rational.
Adrian
Steve Davis <st...@pobox.com> wrote:
> > Steve Davis:
>
> > >The entire purpose of Kant's philosophy was to re-affirm
> > >altruist-collectivist morality. He did so by erecting an
elaborate straw
> > >man metaphysics and declaring ethics to be outside the province of
> reason.
>
> "Adrian":
>
> > That's the most ridiculous thing I have ever heard. You have just
simply
> > not read him if you think that.
>
> Sigh. Here we go again. What do they teach people in college these
days?
> It's obviously not reading comprehension.
Have you read his books about morality and politics? Are you serious?
Are you trying to say that the **introduction** of his book on
epistemology and metaphysics is the place he does all his moral theory?
That is absurd. He wrote at least three books concerning ethics and
politics: The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, the Metaphysics
of Morals, and The Critique of Practical Reason. So, basically you are
judging his moral philosophy without having read any of these.
Brilliant.
>
> Adrian, Kant explicitly stated the purpose of his philosophy no fewer
than
> three times in the preface to the second edition of his CPR. I shall
quote
> the Norman Kemp Smith translation at length with my comments
interjected in
> [square brackets]:
>
> [Beginning with the first sentence of the first paragraph of the
Preface to
> First Edition:]
>
> PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION
> HUMAN reason has this peculiar fate that in one species
> of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as pre-
> scribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to
> ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also
> not able to answer.
>
> [Reason is "not able to answer" certain "questions". Kant could not
decide
> if this was his premise, or his thesis.]
So if I were to say that it is meaningless to ask why the rules of
logic are "true" because the rules of logic are entailed in my
unsderstanding anythign you say in the first place, then you would say
that my saying this question is beyond reason is an abandonment of
reason? I think Aristotle would say the same -- we presume the rules,
like the law of contradiction, just to understand anything.
<snip>
All of what I just snipped is hardly relevant to a serious examination
of his books on moral philosophy, say. You are just speculating about
what his real views are if you are basing it on this. Let me also
point out bay the way, that the logical positivists basing their views
in large part on Hume which puts them in the tradition of skeptics were
a bunch of scientists. If you are to chose between Kant and the kind
of skeptical scientists that he is talkign about, then your choices are
not Aristotle or Kant like you seem to think but rather Hume or Kant.
Your choice would not be between Rand and Hegel, but more like Otto
Neurath (the skeptical scientist) and doing philosphy at all.
>
> Happily they were few in number, and were unable to prevent
> its being established ever anew, although on no uniform and
> self-consistent plan. In more recent times, it has seemed as
> if an end might be put to all these controversies and the
> claims of metaphysics receive final judgment, through a
> certain physiology of the human understanding -- that of the
> celebrated Locke. But it has turned out quite otherwise. For
> however the attempt be made to cast doubt upon the pre-
> tensions of the supposed Queen by tracing her lineage to
> vulgar origins in common experience, this genealogy has,
> as a matter of fact, been fictitiously invented, and she has
> still continued to uphold her claims.
>
> [Kant identifies and then attacks the greatest of the emperical
> philosophers, John Locke. Locke's fault was attempting trace
metaphysical
> ideas to "vulgar origins in common experience." Kant declares this
> "genealogy" to be "fictitiously invented."]
By the way, Locke was not just a political philosopher. He did write a
great deal about other matters as well. In the tradition of Lockes
*political* philosophy Kant restates his categorical imperative in
terms a principle of universal freedom delaring it to be the one indorn
natural right. So, in the sense that he falls squarely on the side of
natural rights theorists, he is an awful lot more like Locke when it
comes to morality and politics than Marx (for instance).
>
> Metaphysics has accord-
> ingly lapsed back into the ancient time-worn dogmatism, and
> so again suffers that depreciation from which it was to have
> been rescued. And now, after all methods, so it is believed,
> have been tried and found wanting, the prevailing mood is
> that of weariness and complete indifferentism -- the mother,
> in all sciences, of chaos and night, but happily in this case
> the source, or at least the prelude, of their approaching
> reform and restoration. For it at least puts an end to that ill-
> applied industry which has rendered them thus dark, confused,
> and unserviceable.
>
> [And thus religious dogma once again reigns over metaphysics. But,
Kant
> believes, this is not nearly so bad as trying to ground metaphysical
> questions on "that ill-applied industry" (science).]
He is right. If you think he is rejecting science as a means to
acquiring knowledge you are nuts. He just thinks that metaphysics is
not a matter of science but of philosophy. If you disagree with this
then that puts you squarely in the logical postivist campe with Otto
Neurath -- congratulations.
<snip>
> [Kant is convinced of the Truth of Aristotle's logic. He claims that
there
> has been no need to "retrace a single step" of Aristotle's method.]
>
Sound familiar? Now compare this to Hegel's dialectic and MArx's
method, and tell me again how he is somehow responsioble for that kind
of altruism and collectivism.
<snip>
>
> Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge
> must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our know-
> ledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them
> a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption,
> ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we
> may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if
> we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.
>
> [This is the Kantian revolution. Kant is the grand father of all
modern
> philosophers who attempt to subjugate existence to consciousness.
Why did
> he choose this course? Read on ...]
I don't think so. He is saying that we must ground ourselves somewhere
else besides in Locke's empiricism. That is not a rejection of science
nor an embracing of idealism. It certainy does not put him in the same
camp as Hegel, if that is where you are going with this. I am still
trying to find out where he becomes the collectivist/altruist that you
claim he is and where he is specifically saying that moral judgments
are not the result of reason but rather whatever else it is that you
think he thinks they are.
<snip>
> [Some paragraphs deleted. In these paragraphs Kant once again draws
the
> distinction between "speculative" or theoretical reason and
"practical"
> reason, and explains that he is leaving his ideas about practical
reason to
> a different work.]
>
Did you read that book? Perhaps you should have.
<snip>
>
> [Here Kant states the purpose of his philosophy a second time. Kant
> believes that reason "threatens to destroy" the "absolutely necessary"
> employment of "practical reason"-- namely morality. He intends his
Critique
> to limit reason and thus remove any "obstacle which stands in the
way" of
> his moral beliefs.]
*LMAO* You would really have to read some of his thoughts on moral
philosophy. HE does nto abandon reason in the general sense. What he
abandons is science as a means to understand morality unlike Otto
Neurath (whom you seem to be in agreement with). He thinks that
morality is a purely a priori "science". You should read what he has
to say about it, instead of trying to speculate based on the preface to
a Critique of Pure Reason which is not even where he even discusses the
matter.
>
> At least this is so, immediately
> we are convinced that there is an absolutely necessary prac-
> tical employment of pure reason -- the moral -- in which it
> P 027
> inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility. Though
> [practical] reason, in thus proceeding, requires no assistance
> from speculative reason, it must yet be assured against its
> opposition, that reason may not be brought into conflict
> with itself. To deny that the service which the Critique renders
> is Positive in character, would thus be like saying that the
> police are of no positive benefit, inasmuch as their main busi-
> ness is merely to prevent the violence of which citizens stand
> in mutual fear, in order that each may pursue his vocation in
> peace and security.
>
> [While morality "requires no assistance" from reason, it must
nonetheless be
> protected from reason less man's knowledge contradict Kant's moral
beliefs.]
>
He says that it must not contradict itself. It is almost on this
principle which all of kants moral philosophy is based on (according to
him). You are only showing your lack of reading his book on ethics.
<snip>
What?!? Reread that section. He is arguing for free will -- not the
immortality of the soul. He is saying that we are on the one hand
subject to the law of nature which would predestine our actions. But,
on the other hand we have a will that (if you would read his books on
morality -- the Groundwork is short) makes us subject to morality. It
is about how we can have a determined will but still be subject to
morality. It looks like Peikoff ripped this off from Kant in his book,
reading "Human Actions, Mental and Physical, as Both Caused and Free".
********* what does this mean? *********
>
> If we grant that morality necessarily presupposes freedom
> (in the strictest sense) as a property of our will; if, that is to
> say, we grant that it yields practical principles -- original prin-
> ciples, proper to our reason -- as a priori data of reason, and
> that this would be absolutely impossible save on the assump-
> P 029
> tion of freedom;
And here he is saying how morality yeilds original principles proper to
our reason.
> and if at the same time we grant that
> speculative reason has proved that such freedom does not
> allow of being thought, then the former supposition -- that
> made on behalf of morality -- would have to give way to this
> other contention, the opposite of which involves a palpable
> contradiction. For since it is only on the assumption of free-
> dom that the negation of morality contains any contradiction,
> freedom, and with it morality, would have to yield to the
> mechanism of nature.
Here he says that it *seems* to be a contradiction that morality should
yield such principles, so we would *seem* to have to accept that our
wil is determined rulign out the possibility of morality.
> Morality does not, indeed, require that freedom should be
> understood, but only that it should not contradict itself, and
> so should at least allow of being thought, and that as thus
> thought it should place no obstacle in the way of a free act
> (viewed in another relation) likewise conforming to the mechan-
> ism of nature. The doctrine of morality and the doctrine of
> nature may each, therefore, make good its position. This,
> however, is only possible in so far as criticism has previously
> established our unavoidable ignorance of things in themselves,
> and has limited all that we can theoretically know to mere
> appearances.
Here he resolves the apparent conflict and shows there is no genuine
contradiction. We cannot know our own souls so well as to be able to
determine them. If we did, it would show that there was no sould
there. Now just replace "soul" with "will" and it will sound just like
Rand, I bet.
>
> [This is Kant's second article of faith: Freedom of the will. He
believes
> that reason might contradict the notion of free will, and thus must be
> stopped from examining the question.]
Not at all. He thinks that science teaches and can only ever teach
that the will is determined. It takes some sort of a priori apprioach
to talk about free wills. He does not reject reason. As you said
above he has complete belief in Aristotle's laws.
>
> This discussion as to the positive advantage of critical
> principles of pure reason can be similarly developed in regard
> to the concept of God and of the simple nature of our soul; but
> for the sake of brevity such further discussion may be omitted.
>
> [This is Kant's third article of faith: God.]
This may indeed be his *first* artickle of faith or more likely a
statement that he thinks he can prove the necessity of God.
>
> From what has already been said, it is evident that even the
> assumption--as made on behalf of the necessary practical em-
> ployment of my reason -- of God, freedom, and immortality is
> not permissible unless at the same time speculative reason be
> deprived of its pretensions to transcendent insight. For in order
> to arrive at such insight it must make use of principles which,
> in fact, extend only to objects of possible experience, and
> which, if also applied to what cannot be an object of experience,
> always really change this into an appearance, thus rendering
> all practical extension of pure reason impossible. I have therefore
> found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room
> for faith.
>
> [This is the third and most blatant statement of Kant's purpose. "I
have
> therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room
for
> faith." To Kant, faith in certain religious notions is necessary to
employ
> practical reason-- to be moral. Reason and scientific knowledge
were, in
> his mind, a threat to moral existence. They had to be "denied". And
he has
> thus far been largely successful at doing it.]
>
Actually ghe specifically mentions what he thinks is necessary with
regard to religion in employing morality. If you read _The Metaphysics
of Morals_ there are pages and pages of how to derive moral principles
and aplpy them and then there is one point in which he wonders how it
would be that a court could rely on the testimony of a man. He thinks
that religion steps in quite nicely to motivate people to keep their
promises. He certianly does not make faith the basis of his moral
philosophy. I think it is an absurd twisting of his philsophy to do
something like take the preface of a book on empistemology and construe
this as the definitive statement of his moral philosophy. Where is the
collectivist altruism you spoke of, by the way?
It is like misquoting him or quoting him out of context. I am sure I
could do the same with Rand and make her out to be some kind of
collectivist, too, by misconstruing and twisting some of the things she
says in some random statement of work of hers.
Steve Davis
> Have you read his books about morality and politics?
I certainly have, and I have commented on them extensively on this newsgroup
and elsewhere. The content of Kant's ethics and politics are interesting,
but they are not relevant to the point I made and which you declared was the
"most rediculous thing" you had ever heard.
> Are you trying to say that the **introduction** of his book on
> epistemology and metaphysics is the place he does all his moral theory?
I never suggested that Kant "does" all his moral theory in CPR, much less
the introduction. But I did not make a specific claim about his ethics. I
was referring to his purpose, his aim, and his general method. What I said
was: "The entire purpose of Kant's philosophy was to re-affirm
altruist-collectivist morality. He did so by erecting an elaborate straw
man metaphysics and declaring ethics to be outside the province of reason."
He did all of that in CPR, and he was kind enough to summarize it all in the
preface. That is why I was able to demonstrate that my claim was true by
quoting only a dozen or so pages.
Adrian
Steve Davis <st...@pobox.com> wrote:
<snip>
> What I said
> was: "The entire purpose of Kant's philosophy was to re-affirm
> altruist-collectivist morality. He did so by erecting an elaborate
straw
> man metaphysics and declaring ethics to be outside the province of
reason."
And this is still absurd. You are still taking the introduction of his
book on epistemology to prove definitively his intention with his work
in ethics. That is silly. I have already quoted his philosophical
development of ethics directly.
> He did all of that in CPR, and he was kind enough to summarize it all
in the
> preface. That is why I was able to demonstrate that my claim was
true by
> quoting only a dozen or so pages.
The reason you only quoted his preface is because you cannot support
your assertion except by twisting what he says in a place that is
susceptible to that. Nowhere did you support the "altruist-
collectivist" attitude of his philosophy that you claim. And
everything else you had was mostly a twisting of what his philosophy
was about. He splits up activities all of which are about applying the
normal rules of logic to different issues. He does not separate ethics
from the province of reason. I cannot imagine you having read his
books on morality and walked away with that impression.
If he has abandoned reason, then how do explain the quotes I have given
from his groundwork? He seems to talk quite a bit about reason and
what is derived from it.
Owl
> Consider the statement "I like chocolate icecream." It does nto
> satisfy the law of identity unless we know what the "I" refers to. In
> particualr, the truth or falsity of the proposition vairies as it is
> considered by different subjects who associate the "I" with
> themselves. So this statement is "subjective". On the other hand, the
> statement "Adrian likes chocolate icecream." Is not at all subjective
> and has the same truth value for everyone.
This makes it seem like the issue of whether a statement is subjective is
merely semantic. I mean, the fact that you like ice cream and the fact
that Adrian likes ice cream are not two different sorts of facts. That's
just one fact described in 2 ways. When you say "I like ice cream" you
are asserting the same thing as when you say "Adrian likes ice cream"; the
only difference is in the conventions associated with the word "I", which
make it refer to a different person when a different person is using the
word.
So, my question is, do you think the dispute between objectivists and
subjectivists is just a semantic one -- that is, just a dispute about what
are the conventions governing moral language?
Owl
news:38771DE6...@usa.net...
> The action is wrong, but compensating the one wronged may lead him to
> forgive you and cut you some slack. We wrong each other in little ways.
Does this mean you are saying that, in the situation described, you should
just starve to death? Would you do that? Would that be rational?
Steve Davis
> > What I said was: "The entire purpose of Kant's philosophy
> > was to re-affirm altruist-collectivist morality. He did so by
> > erecting an elaborate straw man metaphysics and declaring
> > ethics to be outside the province of reason."
> And this is still absurd. You are still taking the introduction of his
> book on epistemology to prove definitively his intention with his work
> in ethics.
No, to prove his intention with his work as a philosophy as a whole. I do
not care about the particular details of Kant's ethics except insofar as
they reinforce altruist-collectivist morality (and if you want me to prove
that, as a seperate claim, I could easily do so). The fact is that Kant
made his intentions blindingly obvious to anyone who would actually _read_
his words for _comprehension_.
The only reason why my statement of Kant's purpose is controversial at all
is that some philosophy texts (not all) have endeavored to promulgate a
totally atheistic conception of Kant, apologizing for or brushing over his
references to God, the immortal soul, and absurd Christian moral premises
such as original sin. But the fact is that Kant was a protestant Christian
and his entire purpose from start to finish was to save Christian morality
from modern skepticism of religious doctrines, while at the same time
recognizing the legitimacy of that skepticism.
> If he has abandoned reason, then how do explain the quotes I have given
> from his groundwork? He seems to talk quite a bit about reason and
> what is derived from it.
There is a difference between the common usage of a word, and its usage in
technical jargon. Kant's philosophy is full of jargon, and it's essential
that you grasp the meanings of terms as they are used by the philosopher as
opposed to the meanings of terms as they are used by the average joe on the
street. Kant (actually his English translators, but nevertheless, Kant)
used a technical term to denote the concept that the average joe would
probably call "faith." He called it "pure practical reason".
"Pure" in Kantian lingo is a modifier that means "without reference to
experience." "Practical" is one of the three modifiers the word "reason"
that Kant used. "Practical reason" means thinking about ideas of action
(namely, moral ideas). The objects of "pure practical reason," as my quoted
passages from CPR showed, include the concepts of free will, the immortal
soul, and God.
In the realm of pure (theoretical) reason, Kant asserted that his twelve
categories were a "complete and exhaustive" list of a priori concepts that
acted to regulate the ordering of man's experience into meaningful
knowledge. By the same token, in the realm of so-called pure practical
reason Kant asserted that such a priori concepts as god, free will, and
immortality were the regulative concepts that ordered man's thinking about
morality into meaningful principles of action.
Whenever Kant discusses ethics, he talks about objects of faith: God, free
will, immortal soul. This is because, to him, they are the foundation of
morality in the same way that he thought that the categories of quantity,
quality, relation, and modality were the foundation of our understanding of
the objects of experience.
Owl
> >"Like" in what respects? Part of the point I wanted to make is that "x
is
> >like y" is a very vague statement. Is a loaf of bread like a dog?
Well,
> >that depends -- like it in what way?
>
> "Llike" in exactly the way was contextually obvious. "Like" in the was
> specifically defined.
That's not helpful. There are many characteristics of physical objects
that might be compared or contrasted with moral properties. For instance,
physical objects are *objects* (not properties). Physical objects occupy
space. Physical objects can be observed by the 5 senses. Physical
objects have mass. Physical objects have objective existence. I'm sure
you can think of some more. It is not immediately obvious, if someone
says, "moral properties are different from physical objects", which of
those (if any), he has in mind and which he doesn't. Much less confusion
would be invited if you just specify exactly which property you're talking
about (in which case it's superfluous to mention comparison to physical
objects at all).
> "Like" in the way that they do no exist independently,
> they depend on *other* things for their existence and definition.
Okay. I'm afraid you're going to get frustrated now, because there are
multiple possible meanings to "depend on other things." Ex.:
Tables depend on human beings for their existence: if there were no
humans, there'd be no tables, since there'd be no one to put them
together.
The redness of an apple depends on something else (namely, the apple,
itself) for its existence; if there were no apple, there'd be no redness
(at least, not THAT particular redness).
Is either of these the kind of dependence you're talking about?
As for definitions: all words and concepts depend on human minds for their
definitions (and nothing other than words and concepts has a definition).
So as far as that goes, that doesn't seem to be saying anything
interesting about moral concepts or properties.
> >If living creatures did not exist, then stomachs would not exist.
Also,
> >if men were like ants or bees, then our stomachs would be different.
But
> >of course, this doesn't show that stomachs aren't like physical
objects,
> >since in fact they are physical objects.
>
> Our stomachs *are* us (just as our arms, hands and spleens are us).
They are
> integral to our existence and definition and their purpose and role in
our
> existence does not need to be determined of even investigated. They
exist and
Well, our stomachs are parts of us, yes.
> function independently of our reason and will. Morals exist as a
function of
> decisions (concious or not) that man makes to guide his actions. They
exist
> because the nature of man gives rise to their necessity, but this does
not make
> them exist independently of man anymore than skyscrapers do. But, just
as
> skyscrapers must take into account the laws of reality *and* the needs
of man
> to exist (both requiring reason to properly implement), so do morals.
What I am trying to get at is whether you have an *argument* to try to
show that moral properties are, in some sense, non-objective -- or, if you
prefer, to show that moral properties are different from physical
properties in some interesting way.
Last time, it sounded like your argument was this: if there were no
humans, there'd be no moral properties; therefore, moral properties are
non-objective, and different from physical objects. The point of my
remark, above, was to show that this argument is invalid, for the premise
is also true of some physical objects (e.g., stomachs), but the conclusion
obviously is not true of those objects.
(Logical aside: The background assumption here is that, if you assert that
A is F *because* it is G, then you are committed to holding that anything
that was G would be F.)
Now, in your concluding remark, you seem to be comparing morals to
skyscrapers. Skyscrapers, of course, are physical objects, and they also
have 'objective' existence (in most people's usage of the word
"objective"). Therefore, it seems that you have switched sides, that you
are no longer trying to show how morals are different from physical
objects. Is that right?
Owl
> I would say that the difference between moral realism and moral
> rationalism, incidentally, is (as I said above) basically the same as
> that of math to science. Moral realists should approach morality
> scientifically and empirically in the end. Perhpas you do it like
> Moore with the intuitionism, or perhaps you examine the group dynamics
> of apes or perhaps you go around looking at different cultures.
Your grouping together of Moore's intuitionism with a possible practice of
observing apes and people's behavior puzzles me -- as if you're treating
'intuition' as counting as an example of empirical research just like the
anthropological studies. Certainly it is not normally classified that
way. Moreover, the 'intuitions' of the intuitionists (Moore, Ross,
Prichard) are an exercise of the rational faculty -- they're not supposed
to be a 'sixth sense', or a form of mystical experience such as in new age
literature. I therefore find it impossible to distinguish this form of
'realism' from 'rationalism.'
> (Ironically, the folks I am alluding to usually are subjectivists.) I
> am a moral rationalist. I do not think that morality is founded on
> anything empirical.
As I say, the intuitionists agree.
> Rand and Moore were realists -- Moore for obvious
> reasons, Rand because she is ultimately basing morality on human nature
> or some such thing (which must be observed empirically). Kant was a
> moral rationalist (as I am using the terms).
Rand's position is hard to make out, but at least according to one way it
is usually interpreted around here, she is a subjectivist, not a realist.
(The Randians wouldn't admit this, because they'd be afraid of the word
"subjectivist.") Specifically, the interpretation in question is that
Rand thought that what was good (relative to you) was dependent upon
either the choices you actually make (so if you choose to live, then
things become good; but if you don't, then there are no moral facts for
you), or on your desires (so if you want x, then the things leading to x
thereby become good for you). This is really paradigmatic relativism.
Robert J. Kolker
Owl wrote:
Would I steal food to stay alive and there were no other way to get food?
Probably if doing so did not doom the victim of the theft to starve to death.
If it were one of these water for two guys in the desert scenarios, I do not
know any reason why I have anymore right to live than the other fellow.
If I resort to force, I can hardly call it rationally justified. On the other
hand
if stealing the food only inconvenienced the other fellow I might steal the
food,
but I would make it a number one priority to repay and then some as soon as
I could.
Bob Kolker
MSFE2
>> specifically defined.
>
>That's not helpful. There are many characteristics of physical objects
>that might be compared or contrasted with moral properties. For instance,
>physical objects are *objects* (not properties). Physical objects occupy
>space. Physical objects can be observed by the 5 senses. Physical
>objects have mass. Physical objects have objective existence. I'm sure
>you can think of some more. It is not immediately obvious, if someone
>says, "moral properties are different from physical objects", which of
>those (if any), he has in mind and which he doesn't. Much less confusion
>would be invited if you just specify exactly which property you're talking
>about (in which case it's superfluous to mention comparison to physical
>objects at all).
The exact property that was contextually obvious, the exact property that was
specifically defined. I am sure it was quite clear to you, are we going to
play semantic twister now? My point is *not* that you can't smell morals. The
analogy between morals and phsysical objects was made (not by me) to
essentially assert that a correct morality *exists* presumably this would make
it axiomatic and self-evident without the need for reason to *create* it.
>Tables depend on human beings for their existence: if there were no
>humans, there'd be no tables, since there'd be no one to put them
>together.
Is your point that I can touch a table and not a moral? Table are very *much*
like morals as a matter of fact;
A table does not exist without the existence of man, his nature, his need, his
reason, his will and his production. It required that he exist, observe his
need, observe nature and create the proper tool to serve him. Notice the table
did not *have* to exist just because he did, while his stomach did. His
stomach will go on serving it's purpose as long as he exists, the table will
only serve the purpose *he* gives it *after* he creates it *and* if he chooses
to use it correctly. It did not exist *without* him *and* it did not exist
just because he did. Thus it's existence is conditional. He is not. His
stomach is not. Notice he can also build a table with 2 legs, one shoter than
the other, with a surface made of pine needles and dried pig shit. He can
still call this a table, he might get away with it for awhile, but it will not
serve the purpose he intended it to, since it does not serve his nature *nor*
the physical laws of nature.
>Last time, it sounded like your argument was this: if there were no
>humans, there'd be no moral properties; therefore, moral properties are
>non-objective, and different from physical objects.
My point is *not* that morals are non-objective, I believe they *are*
objective. Man can create that which did not exist based on objective fact.
>Now, in your concluding remark, you seem to be comparing morals to
>skyscrapers. Skyscrapers, of course, are physical objects, and they also
>have 'objective' existence (in most people's usage of the word
>"objective"). Therefore, it seems that you have switched sides, that you
>are no longer trying to show how morals are different from physical
>objects. Is that right?
No Professor Semantic, it is not. I did not say that morals do not *exist* (in
the way and for the reasons skyscrapers do), nor even say they *differ* from
skyscrapers because you cannot take an elevator to their observation deck
(which is true but superfluous). I have already made my table/moral analogy, I
won't waste bandwith with a skysrcaper/moral analogy. If skyscrapers just
sprouted when man was born you might have an analogy to axiomatic morality,
"look, a skysrcaper, that is the proper form and construction for man", but
they don't, nor does morality.Both require man, both can be incorrectly
constructed, this makes their existence subjective to both existence and
rationality. The rules governeing their foundation is objective.
Jason Czarnecki
Owl <a@a.a> wrote in message news:859of3$7i8$1...@nntp3.atl.mindspring.net...
(snip)
> Rand's position is hard to make out, but at least according to one way it
> is usually interpreted around here, she is a subjectivist, not a realist.
Interpreted by whom?
> (The Randians wouldn't admit this, because they'd be afraid of the word
> "subjectivist.") Specifically, the interpretation in question is that
> Rand thought that what was good (relative to you) was dependent upon
> either the choices you actually make (so if you choose to live, then
> things become good; but if you don't, then there are no moral facts for
> you), or on your desires (so if you want x, then the things leading to x
> thereby become good for you). This is really paradigmatic relativism.
You need to reread Ayn Rand, as this analysis of Objectivism is terribly
flawed. What makes Objectivist morality objective is the standard of life.
Things, actions do not just become good because you want to live. Rather it
is the choice of life or death that allows one to evaluate whether something
is good or bad. If you choose death it is not the case that moral facts
cease to be applicable to you. Rand rejected the idea that a person could be
amoral. Your suggestion that one's desires make things good or bad is
false.
Owl
> The exact property that was contextually obvious, the exact property
that was
> specifically defined. I am sure it was quite clear to you, are we going
to
> play semantic twister now? My point is *not* that you can't smell
morals. The
If it was, I wouldn't have asked. The message that started this was
Adrian's remark that moral realists think "morals are like physical
objects." That doesn't make clear in what respect they are supposed to be
like physical objects. You responded merely disagreeing with the
suggestion, which does not by itself clarify what the suggestion was. I
do not have telepathic powers. Now, do you want to go on playing the hpo
game of accusing each other of dishonesty?
> >Tables depend on human beings for their existence: if there were no
> >humans, there'd be no tables, since there'd be no one to put them
> >together.
>
> Is your point that I can touch a table and not a moral? Table are very
*much*
> like morals as a matter of fact;
No, my point was merely to find out what your point was. I am not sure
why you responded to this with hostility. It's almost as if you consider
clarifying positions before talking about whether they are true or false
to be an unnecessary detail getting in the way of the important stuff.
However, in philosophy, if you accept an imprecise formulation of an idea
and then go on to argue about it, you can go on interminably disagreeing
because you and your interlocutor are not talking about the same thing. I
prefer to avoid that; moreover, I prefer to avoid confusion in my own
thinking.
> >Now, in your concluding remark, you seem to be comparing morals to
> >skyscrapers. Skyscrapers, of course, are physical objects, and they
also
> >have 'objective' existence (in most people's usage of the word
> >"objective"). Therefore, it seems that you have switched sides, that
you
> >are no longer trying to show how morals are different from physical
> >objects. Is that right?
>
> No Professor Semantic, it is not. I did not say that morals do not
*exist* (in
> the way and for the reasons skyscrapers do), nor even say they *differ*
from
> skyscrapers because you cannot take an elevator to their observation
deck
> (which is true but superfluous). I have already made my table/moral
analogy
At the end, I raised two questions (one of which is snipped). The first
was whether you had an *argument* to show why morals must be different
from physical objects (or whatever it is you were trying to show). The
second was whether you had in effect switched sides in offering the
skyscraper analogy.
I don't think you answered either of them. What you did with the
table/moral analogy was to make a series of assertions about morality, in
response to which I could simply assert the opposite. If your thesis is
that morality is like a skyscraper, in that human beings literally
construct goodness and rightness, then you need an argument for that,
unless you think that's a self-evident truth, in which case I'll simply
have to say I don't find it self-evident.
As to the second question. You did in fact say that you didn't see how
morals could be like physical objects, so you were apparently trying to
argue that they are not. Now, however, you are saying they *are* like
skyscrapers and tables. Skyscrapers and tables are physical objects.
Hence my question as to whether you had changed your mind. Notice that I
did not ask you whether you thought morals do not exist. I also did not
ask if you were saying they differ from skyscrapers because you cannot
take an elevator to the observation deck. If you reread my question and
your response, I think you will see that you did not answer it; instead,
you attributed some bizarre other questions to me and then mockingly
answered these other questions. A better discussion might be had if you
started by accepting my questions as sincere and meaning what they say,
and if you avoided sarcasm and other hostility. Then we could be
discussing the nature of morality rather than discussing each other.
Towards which goal, I pose a concluding question. The assertion that
'morals are created' just as tables are created is puzzling. First, we
have to ask what a 'moral' is. We could be talking about abstract moral
properties, i.e. goodness, rightness, wrongness. Or we could be talking
about moral facts, such as the fact that happiness is good. Or, we could
merely be talking about people's *beliefs* about the moral properties of
things.
Now, I know how people create tables or skyscrapers. They manipulate
some pre-existent materials, which they find in nature, until those
materials are in a new configuration. We then call that bunch of material
so configured a 'table.'
But how could someone make a moral property? That doesn't seem to
make any sense. I can't literally construct the universal, goodness, can
I? What would I DO by way of making it?
Perhaps, then, the idea is that of making moral facts. But again, how
would I, for example, 'make' the fact that happiness is good? What would
I do by way of making it the case that happiness is good? The idea just
seems totally bizarre, like Descartes' idea that God 'made' the
mathematical truths. One objector asked Descartes if God could have made
it so that a triangle didn't have 3 sides. Similarly, on your view, could
we have made it so that happiness was bad?
Adrian
chocolate icecream is good without some subject for it to be good with
repsect to, we can say if it is good with repsect to some subject. In
other words, what is in your personal rational self-interest is an
objective matter not a subjective one. And, figuring out morality
boils down to answering this question (according to the Objectivists).
It turns out, in fact, that we as humans all share some of the same
universal self-interests. The first and foremost must be our own
existence, for if we are not interested in this, then we can be
interested in nothing else (since our being interested in something
entails our own existence).
Take it from here -- we all know the drill. They think they have
derived all of morality proceeding from here. I personally think they
are right in pointing out that what is in a particular person's
rational self-interest is an objective matter. In the preceeding I was
just trying to more precisely define "subjective". I think that the
reason we think the matter of whether or not chocolate icecream is good
is subjective is because of an inherent indeterminacy in the matter.
Once we eliminate this by making sure to refer to a specific
individual, we have a clearly objective matter.
Adrian
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
> Adrian <adrian...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
> news:857u24$s0n$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> > rationalism, incidentally, is (as I said above) basically the same
as
> > that of math to science. Moral realists should approach morality
> > scientifically and empirically in the end. Perhpas you do it like
> > Moore with the intuitionism, or perhaps you examine the group
dynamics
> > of apes or perhaps you go around looking at different cultures.
>
practice of
> observing apes and people's behavior puzzles me -- as if you're
treating
> 'intuition' as counting as an example of empirical research just like
the
> anthropological studies. Certainly it is not normally classified that
> way.
But it is an empirical process. What is your intuition?
> Moreover, the 'intuitions' of the intuitionists (Moore, Ross,
> Prichard) are an exercise of the rational faculty
Is vision a "rational faculty"? I don't think it is supposed to be an
instance of logcial analysis. Your intuition is an observation not an
argument.
> -- they're not supposed
> to be a 'sixth sense', or a form of mystical experience such as in
new age
> literature.
I am not talking about that. Although, my choice of words was a bit
derogatory.
> I therefore find it impossible to distinguish this form of
> 'realism' from 'rationalism.'
Okay, perhaps there is some ambiguity in the terminology. When I say
"rationalist" I am not referring to the idea that morality is derived
internally. I am refering more to the idea that morality is derived a
priori sort of "out of thin air" through a rational analysis of the
subject. Clearly this is not what Moore's intuitionism is all about.
He simply says that morality cannot keep harkening back to some
condition on which the good is founded. Having provided us with a
reason not to accept any alternative, he throws his hands up and says
that we must then just have these basic reactions to certain things
that make them good or evil.
Don't confuse this with a deontological view that morality is like
math, a purely a priori idea derived rationally from the very nature of
the idea. Moore still has us observing goodness through our
intuition. That is just as empirical as any other means of observing
it.
>
> > (Ironically, the folks I am alluding to usually are
subjectivists.) I
> > am a moral rationalist. I do not think that morality is founded on
> > anything empirical.
>
> As I say, the intuitionists agree.
Your intuition is empirical -- it is like a sixth sense. Moore is
arguing that we must be able to see the intrinsic good in something.
That is, if someone acts in a certain way, then one property of that
action might be that it is good. If so, then we can see this directly
in this irreducible way through our intuitions. Then as far as I can
tell, the goodness of the action is just like any other physical
property of the action. We observe, for instance, that the action
happened by irreducible thoughts from our brain that were presumably
the result of photons striking our retinas. The goodness of the act is
exactly the same, according to Moore. That is a type of realilsm not a
type of rationalism from my perspective.
In any case, Kant would have rebuked Moore's utilitarianism as being
founded on something outside of the a priori nature of morals. I like
his open question argument, and he may well have gotten the idea from
Kant, but that alone doesn't make him fundamentally like Kant. In
fact, I think the way he bases his morality in intrinsic properties of
the natural world (again, the goodness of an act is a fundamental
property of the act just like a yellow hue might be a fundamental
property of a flower) is just like Rand finding a universal end.
>
> > Rand and Moore were realists -- Moore for obvious
> > reasons, Rand because she is ultimately basing morality on human
nature
> > or some such thing (which must be observed empirically). Kant was a
> > moral rationalist (as I am using the terms).
>
> Rand's position is hard to make out, but at least according to one
way it
> is usually interpreted around here, she is a subjectivist, not a
realist.
> (The Randians wouldn't admit this, because they'd be afraid of the
word
> "subjectivist.") Specifically, the interpretation in question is that
> Rand thought that what was good (relative to you) was dependent upon
> either the choices you actually make (so if you choose to live, then
> things become good; but if you don't, then there are no moral facts
for
> you), or on your desires (so if you want x, then the things leading
to x
> thereby become good for you). This is really paradigmatic relativism.
>
I think Rand's approach is to come up with an end that we must all
seek. Once we have this universal end established, then the goodness
of an act can be found in whether or not it promotes this end. So, her
philosophy is teleological. However, it is not a utilitarianism or
some such thing designed to promote happiness, say (a worthy end). It
seeks to promote some other end -- she has concluded that soem other
end is the universally desired end and the true foundation of morality.
I guess the gist is that all creatures must pursue their own existence
in order to pursue anything. For man, this entials being rational.
Therefore, we humans must all pursue our rational self-interest. That
you can reduce this into a subjectivism I will not contest because I
and Kant, I think, would have to agree with you. It will basically
suffere from the same antimonies and dialectics of any other heteronomy.
Adrian
Steve Davis <st...@pobox.com> wrote:
<snip>
> I do
> not care about the particular details of Kant's ethics
I see that!
<snip>
>
> Whenever Kant discusses ethics, he talks about objects of faith
That is funny. He seemed to feel the need to justify these objects
with regular reason.
You still have not addressed the miryad of quotes I have provided that
seem to show that he is quite interested in a rational justification
for morality and not at all willing to take it all on faith.
Adrian
"Robert J. Kolker" <bobk...@usa.net> wrote:
<snip>
> If I resort to force, I can hardly call it rationally justified.
<snip>
On the contrary, it would be plenty *rationally* justified. It just
would not be *morally* justified. If morality were always in the
rational self-interest of a person, then there would be very little
need to discuss it. Some of us would just be wrong and be losers and
others would be right and prevail. I just don't think that saying "It
was wrong for you to do that to me," is supposed to mean "It was in
your self-interest to treat me better." Usually the former statement
is said in respose to actions for which the latter statement is clearly
not true.
Steve Davis
> You still have not addressed the miryad of quotes I have provided that
> seem to show that he is quite interested in a rational justification
> for morality and not at all willing to take it all on faith.
This is because you do not understand the difference between pure reason and
practical reason, or the difference between pure practical reason and
practical reason. They do not all mean the same thing. And _none of the
above_ mean "reason" in the sense that I or Ayn Rand use the term.
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Besides, there is a much simpler and more direct means of accomplishing
the same thing. Simply abandon the self-interest assumption.
IOW, assume that 'being rational' is not a matter of 'being logical'
(computationalism), nor a matter of 'being efficient' (means/end
theory), nor a matter of 'maximizing self-interest' (egoism), but
rather a matter of 'being able to "see" what is going on'. Once
you do this, then morality (selflessness) just IS rationality.
One ought to be moral if and only if one wants to be rational,
not because it is universalizable, but simply because 'being
rational'= 'being objective', both epistemically AND
valuatively. This would also explain why nature's most
rational species is most plagued with morality problems
and problems of emotional instability, in that they are
simply two sides of the same valuative objectivity/impartiality
coin.
--
Phil Roberts, Jr.
The Psychodynamics of Genetic Indeterminism:
Why We Turned Out Like Captain Kirk Instead of Mr. Spock
http://www.fortunecity.com/victorian/dada/90/
MSFE2
>reason we think the matter of whether or not chocolate icecream is good
>is subjective is because of an inherent indeterminacy in the matter.
>Once we eliminate this by making sure to refer to a specific
>individual, we have a clearly objective matter.
Once we identify that a subject is determining the value of an object we can
redefine that value as objective???
Adrian
We do not. The matter of whether or not chocolate icecream is good in
general is subjective. The matter of whether or not some particular
person thinks chocolate icecream is good is objective. The reason the
former is subjective is because the results of the latter come out
differently for each different person. But, what if we had something
(obviously not icecream, but perhaps something else like life or some
such thing) that we all had to necessarily think is good. Then we
would have an _objective_ criterion for what is "good". Now, if we
have such a criterion, then isn't that going to have to be what ethical
terms are referring to?
I have made it clear in this thread that I think the answer is no. In
any case, we could in principle have this objective criterion for the
good by coming up with a value that we all must have by virtue of the
fact that we exist or by virtue of the fact that we ask what it means
to be "good" or something along those lines. The reason it is an
objective criterion, and not like just about anything else which is
only good or bad depending on the tastes of a particular individual at
any given point in time, is because of this universality.
David Buchner
> forgive you and cut you some slack. We wrong each other in little ways.
> seem to be inevitable.
Don't tell this to Ordonez, who wants to be able to sue you for damages
if you break a date to watch a baseball game.
--
David
buc...@wcta.net Osage MN USA http://customer.wcta.net/buchner
Owl
> But it is an empirical process. What is your intuition?
I'm not sure what you mean by 'empirical process.' Is reasoning an
empirical process?
> Is vision a "rational faculty"? I don't think it is supposed to be an
> instance of logcial analysis. Your intuition is an observation not an
> argument.
That depends what you mean by "logical analysis." Moore said that
propositions about the good are always synthetic, not analytic. (He
misspoke, of course, since you can have a proposition like "the good is
good," but that's beside the point.) In that sense, then, the exercise of
intuition cannot consist in logical analysis. But Kant would agree with
that too.
Also, it seems like you are using "observation" in a very broad sense, to
refer to any sort of immediate awareness. As far as I can tell, that is
the only point that intuition has in common with (what is usually called)
perception.
> Okay, perhaps there is some ambiguity in the terminology. When I say
> "rationalist" I am not referring to the idea that morality is derived
> internally. I am refering more to the idea that morality is derived a
> priori sort of "out of thin air" through a rational analysis of the
> subject. Clearly this is not what Moore's intuitionism is all about.
No, not if "rational analysis" means something like analyzing concepts.
But if "rational analysis" just means thinking about something, rationally
and intelligently, then yes, that's just what Moore's intuitionism is
about.
> He simply says that morality cannot keep harkening back to some
> condition on which the good is founded. Having provided us with a
> reason not to accept any alternative, he throws his hands up and says
> that we must then just have these basic reactions to certain things
> that make them good or evil.
I don't think this is quite fair as a description of Moore's methodology.
I don't think, that is, that Moore arrived at intuitionism in despair of
finding anything better. Rather, I think that Moore *tried it*, and it
worked. Which is to say, he tried thinking about some moral propositions,
and found that some of them seemed obviously correct, and others seemed
obviously wrong.
> Don't confuse this with a deontological view that morality is like
> math, a purely a priori idea derived rationally from the very nature of
> the idea.
I'm not sure what you're assuming about the nature of mathematics, so I
don't know what you're telling me not to confuse it with. "Derived from
the very nature of the idea" makes it sound like you're saying math is
analytic, but as a good Kantian, you know that isn't so (just as Moore
realizes).
> Moore still has us observing goodness through our
> intuition. That is just as empirical as any other means of observing
> it.
Again, the only thing this has in common with observation is being a form
of direct awareness of something. I should point out that the people who
label *themselves* as empiricists would never accept intuition as counting
as 'observation' or 'empirical.'
Now, if you want to extend the term 'observation' in this way, you can.
But then I would have to say that the alternative position you are trying
to occupy, where you reject moral 'observation', you reject naturalism,
you reject skepticism, subjectivism, and non-cognitivism, does not exist
in logical space.
Briefly, this is because the regress argument shows that
foundationalism is true. Thus, there has to be foundational knowledge.
Further, because of the is/ought gap, some of the foundational knowledge
will have to be foundational *moral* knowledge. And any foundational
moral knowledge, it seems, you are going to automatically call
"observation." Thus, I think that a non-'empirical' (in your sense of the
term) cognitivism is impossible.
Owl
> On the contrary, it would be plenty *rationally* justified. It just
> would not be *morally* justified. If morality were always in the
Hey, aren't you a Kantian? Aren't you supposed to think that "moral" =
"rational"?
Adrian
I'm not that kinda Kantian. *G* You are quie right, though. A
perfectly rational will would act perfectly morally according to Kant.
Indeed, it seems that he starts here (at least in the groundwork) with
a good will. It would want only to be moral. I think that is absurd.
First of all, I think that "rational will" is an oxymoron in the first
place, but if we are to consider such a thing, then I think that a very
rational volitional being (lets say) will tend to do what is truly in
their best self-iterests. Indeed, morality would not be an issue if it
were just the case that a person violating another person were just a
mistake on their part as to what they really wanted to do. It would be
like saying "Oh, you are confused -- you didn't really *want* to do
that Mr Ghengis Kahn. If you search your soul you will see that you
are just a flower carrying free love sort of guy." As the narrator of
Conan said to this idea, "BAHHH!" I cannot think of anything more
collectivist than to think that we each desire our own piece of one
harmonious end. (Rand was a collectivist! Should I go around
slandering her now like her followers slander Kant? What a mind f...)
No -- I think self-interest is independent of justice. It does not
have to be the case that our self-interests conflict but it can just as
well be the case also that they do truly conflict with each other.
And, when there is a true conflict, we are often wondering about such
things as "What would an ideal judge say," or "What is the fair
resolution," or something along these lines. This issue is objective
and is what all objective morality is based on. Virtue is simply one's
propensity toward justice. And, it is contingent on our subjective
inclinations. For instance, if we say that breaking a contract is
unjust, then there are at least two ways to view promiscuity.
On the one hand there are monogomous folks that will view this sort of
behavior as lacking virtue. A promiscuous person living in a
monogomous society will tend to inadvertantly end up in a contract of
monogomy and break it thus having an extra propensity toward injustice
that a monogomous person would not have under such a circumstance. On
the other hand, a monogomous person living in a promiscuous society
will tend to enter into a contract allowing promiscuity (an open
marriage) and violate the terms of that contract by trying to enforce
monogomy. So a monogomous person would appear lacking in virtue to a
promiscuous person in that case, each making the assumption that the
rest of society is like them when it comes down to it (surely they can
find a like-minded niche).
I am definitely Kantian in the big picture since I will be the first to
say that morality is deontological. However, I do disagree with a
great deal of what Kant actually concluded about morality and about
particular actions as to their status morally. But, actually
discussing what he really concluded is the last thing that will ever
take place in this group apparently. <disgruntled> I am no flower
carrying cult member -- a follower of <insert icon>. How could I be a
member of some kind of individualist collective? I am an idividualist -
- I have my own ideas. I evaluate my favorite philosophers
*independently* and I detest any belligerent meme that says "Believe
this, that and the other, and -- oh yeah -- also never question the
authority of this meme." That is exactly what is going on here with
the Randians (not to be confused with David Kelly and the real
Objectivists). You come up with cites and build an argument and they
dismiss it as a conspiracy to distort the truth -- "Don't listen to
Kant. He was just an altruist/collectivist." I normally do not
reference such classics as ad hominem, but that is only because most
people aren't usually culpable of such blatant fallacies.
Adrian
> > But it is an empirical process. What is your intuition?
>
> empirical process?
>
an
> > instance of logcial analysis. Your intuition is an observation not
an
> > argument.
>
> propositions about the good are always synthetic, not analytic. (He
> misspoke, of course, since you can have a proposition like "the good
is
> good," but that's beside the point.) In that sense, then, the
exercise of
> intuition cannot consist in logical analysis. But Kant would agree
with
> that too.
Wait just a second here. I don't think that synthetic a priori means
no logical analysis. In fact, here is the essential difference bwtween
Kant and Moore. Moore says that we have this one last irreducible
intuitionistic fact. Kant would say that we have this one last
irreducible rational conclusion. Moore would say that the fact is like
a fact of observing somethign with eye sight. In a true Kantian vein
you would say that maybe what I saw was an illusion, but there is no
disputing that I saw that illusion. Moore would say the same about
morality. Maybe my intuition is off about this, but my guts tell me....
Kant would say that that synthetic a priori result is the result of
rational thought -- not a phenomenological observation of some object
in iteself. There is a big difference between rationally sorting out
what seems good and building a rational basis for the good. This
latter effort is what Kant is doing. And the approaches are very
different to. Kant spends a lot of time at the foundation and ends up
with a deontological ethos. Moore ends teleologically in ideal
utilitarianism.
>
> Also, it seems like you are using "observation" in a very broad
sense, to
> refer to any sort of immediate awareness. As far as I can tell, that
is
> the only point that intuition has in common with (what is usually
called)
> perception.
In Kantian terms, morals are not noumenal objects for which we have
only a phenomenological knowledge (or are noumenal in any case). They
are just ideas like the facts of geometry that we can know and that are
true a priori. They result in these analytic systems perhaps founded
on some synthetic a priori facts that are required for the mere
possibility of considering the matter. If you think that morals are
like the color yellow -- just like a car can be seen by anyone as being
yellow, an act can be seen by anyone as being moral -- then you are
treating them like noumenal objects. It is this treatment that to me
is a realist treatment.
>
> > Okay, perhaps there is some ambiguity in the terminology. When I
say
> > "rationalist" I am not referring to the idea that morality is
derived
> > internally. I am refering more to the idea that morality is
derived a
> > priori sort of "out of thin air" through a rational analysis of the
> > subject. Clearly this is not what Moore's intuitionism is all
about.
>
> No, not if "rational analysis" means something like analyzing
concepts.
> But if "rational analysis" just means thinking about something,
rationally
> and intelligently, then yes, that's just what Moore's intuitionism is
> about.
Then, any moral philosopher is a moral rationalist.
<snip>
>
> > Don't confuse this with a deontological view that morality is like
> > math, a purely a priori idea derived rationally from the very
nature of
> > the idea.
>
> I'm not sure what you're assuming about the nature of mathematics, so
I
> don't know what you're telling me not to confuse it with. "Derived
from
> the very nature of the idea" makes it sound like you're saying math is
> analytic, but as a good Kantian, you know that isn't so (just as Moore
> realizes).
Kant does not derive it from the definition of the word, but from the
very nature of the idea. The analytic/synthetic distinction is a
semantic one whereas the a posteriori/a priori distinction is
epistemological. Mathematics and morality follow from the very nature
of the ideas involved -- that is Kants gimmick.
>
> > Moore still has us observing goodness through our
> > intuition. That is just as empirical as any other means of
observing
> > it.
>
> Again, the only thing this has in common with observation is being a
form
> of direct awareness of something. I should point out that the people
who
> label *themselves* as empiricists would never accept intuition as
counting
> as 'observation' or 'empirical.'
Well, that would only be because intuition is not one of the five
senses. Inutition is not just a direct awareness of something but a
direct awareness of a noumenal object.
>
> Now, if you want to extend the term 'observation' in this way, you
can.
> But then I would have to say that the alternative position you are
trying
> to occupy, where you reject moral 'observation', you reject
naturalism,
> you reject skepticism, subjectivism, and non-cognitivism, does not
exist
> in logical space.
> Briefly, this is because the regress argument shows that
> foundationalism is true. Thus, there has to be foundational
knowledge.
> Further, because of the is/ought gap, some of the foundational
knowledge
> will have to be foundational *moral* knowledge. And any foundational
> moral knowledge, it seems, you are going to automatically call
> "observation." Thus, I think that a non-'empirical' (in your sense
of the
> term) cognitivism is impossible.
>
But, I am not saying that all foundational knowledge is observational.
I am saying that all foundational knowledge *of external noumenal
objects* is observational. Moore is treating morality as if it were a
noumenal object that we have this innate sense for. He specifically
uses the color yellow to characterize his view. Our intuition for
morality is like our intuition for yellow. But yellow is a physical
property of a noumenal object. The yellowness we see is our perception
of something external. This is a moral realism with emphasis on real.
I think that the foundation of morality is not some collection of
phenomenological facts of an external world. I think that they are
just concepts that are necessary because of what we are thinking
about. In other words, this foundation comes from the fact that we
just decided to think about something -- not because we bumped into
it "out there" and encountered a phenomenon. In some sense there is
this dichotomy of ideas -- those that just appear in my mind as a
result of external stimulation and those that I create myself. Think
of making a robot that would interact with the environment. The
subroutines that would interpret and deal with the external world, for
instance, would have to be there before you ever turned on the robot.
So in this sense they are part of the robot not prompted by external
stimulation. In the same way, ideas like "there exists an external
world" are known internally prior to stimulation from the external
world (or more as an a priori condition of receiving certain
stimulation).
The foundation of morality exists in this way rather than being part of
the stimulation from the external world. Moreover, morality, itself,
is a different object from the external world at that. The foundation
of morality exists in the same way as the foundation of the external
world, but these foundations give us two distinct areas. For Moore, I
don't think that is the case. I think that if good is like yellow,
then we have something that is more like a part of the external world.
Morality would be a subset of what is external to us. Perhpas morals
are themselves physical objects or perhaps they are more like
properties of physical objects (that is why I said "like" physical
objects), but the point is that they are part of the world external to
us. Some think you can only indirectly observe them like potential
energy. Others like Moore, think you directly see them as part of your
reaction to the physical world like the color of an object.
mdhjwh
Owl wrote:> It was
Hume who claimed inductive reasoning had no justification,<
Oddly enough , inductively
John H
Robert J. Kolker
mdhjwh wrote:
How do we know induction works? Because it
has always worked in the past. Right?
Bob Kolker
Stephen Grossman
<adrian...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>"rational will" is an oxymoron
you confess to an irrational will!
It does not
> have to be the case that our self-interests conflict but it can just as
> well be the case also that they do truly conflict with each other.
you kantians are a confused bunch
> Virtue is simply one's
> propensity toward justice. And, it is contingent on our subjective
> inclinations.
ie, you evade reason
> morality is deontological.
if i saw you having a heart attack Id walk away
>David Kelly and the real> Objectivists).
Kelly, following Kant, splits fact and value
________________________________________________
Reason is man's basic means of survival. AYN RAND
------------------------------------------------------
Tracking Marxist dialectical revolution: ZigZag
Radically systematic radical metaphysics: Existence 2
http://home.att.net/~sdgross
-------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Grossman Fairhaven, MA, USA sdg...@att.net
Stephen Grossman
<adrian...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> Kant would say that that synthetic a priori result is the result of
> rational thought
is absurdity a synthetic priori?
Adrian
access.att.net>,
Stephen Grossman <sdg...@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
> In article <85fit4$7se$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, Adrian
> <adrian...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>
> >"rational will" is an oxymoron
>
> you confess to an irrational will!
Desire is irrational by nature. You Randites are about as coherent as
the Christians when it comes to this part of your religion. You
treat "rational self-interest" just like Christians treat the holy
trinity.
>
> It does not
> > have to be the case that our self-interests conflict but it can
just as
> > well be the case also that they do truly conflict with each other.
>
> you kantians are a confused bunch
I am not a Kantian. Self-interest is independent of justice. Randomly
selecting two idividuals and examining their respective self-interests
might just as well reveal a conflict between them as not.
>
> > Virtue is simply one's
> > propensity toward justice. And, it is contingent on our subjective
> > inclinations.
>
> ie, you evade reason
ie we should not be legislating virtue but rather simply justice (which
*is* objective)
>
> > morality is deontological.
>
> if i saw you having a heart attack Id walk away
The feeling is more than mutual
>
> >David Kelly and the real> Objectivists).
>
> Kelly, following Kant, splits fact and value
Not quite. As far as I know Kelly does not appreciate Kant either.
But, at least Kellly does nto seem to be a half baked crack pot like
you and the other Rand worshippers.
--
Adrian
"Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in
accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of
choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a
universal law."
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals
Robert J. Kolker
Stephen Grossman wrote:
> In article <85fn7p$bbd$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, Adrian
> <adrian...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>
> > Kant would say that that synthetic a priori result is the result of
> > rational thought
>
> is absurdity a synthetic priori?
Actually the synthetic apriori is absurd. That is a major
flaw in Kant's metaphysics. There is no synthetic apriori.
Bob Kolker
Adrian
>
> > In article <85fn7p$bbd$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, Adrian
> > <adrian...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> >
of
> > > rational thought
> >
>
> Actually the synthetic apriori is absurd. That is a major
> flaw in Kant's metaphysics. There is no synthetic apriori.
>
> Bob Kolker
>
Actually, I used to wholeheartedly agree with that. That is basically
the thesis of logical poisitivism. I have never agreed really with the
idea that metaphysics is meaningless. I used to sort of think that
ethics was like aesthetics until I took an introductory course in it.
I used to think aesthetics was basically subjective until I thought
about that some more, also.
All of this was many years ago, and back then I might very likely have
called myself a logical positivist if I had knonw what the term
referred to. However, I do not think that Kant's philosophy is that
flawed so much as possibly his description of it -- that is rests on
all these synthetic propositions that might actually be analytic. In
fact, I am not sure if the synthetic/analytic dichotomy will hold upon
rigorous scrutiny, and if it does I am never entirely sure what one has
in mind by it.
For instance, I do think that justice is like geometry in its nature.
To some extent it is just a construction, but just like Euclidean
Geometry, it is not up for grabs as to what that construction is. Now
if we say that mathematics (and so geometry) is really all just
analytic, then I will be inclined to say that the problem with Kant is
in identifying the categorical imperative (for instance) as actually
synthetic. I would say that it seems synthetic enough, but it turns
out it isn't.
On the other hand, if we stick to a strict interpretation of analytic
that would say that a proposition is only analytic if the predicate
follows *directly* from the subject, then I woudl not only reject
geometry as being analytic but also reject the idea that synthetic a
priori is impossible. The classic example I am thinking of is "All
bachelors are male." "Bachelor" means "unmarried male," so the
proposition is really "All unmarried males are male." On the other
hand, we might consider a proposition from Euclidean Geometry: "The sum
of angles in a triangle is 180 degrees." It is not clear that I can
actually rephrase the above statement in a strictly identical way to
the preceeding illustration to have the predicate contained in teh
subject. Perhaps I would have to combine several concepts to get at it
even if it basically follows from a priori from what it means to make
the statement in teh given context (i.e. is loosely speaking analytic).
--
Adrian
"Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in
accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of
choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a
universal law."
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals
Bert Clanton
<adrian...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> On the other
> hand, we might consider a proposition from Euclidean Geometry: "The sum
> of angles in a triangle is 180 degrees." It is not clear that I can
> actually rephrase the above statement in a strictly identical way to
> the preceeding illustration to have the predicate contained in teh
> subject. Perhaps I would have to combine several concepts to get at it
> even if it basically follows from a priori from what it means to make
> the statement in teh given context (i.e. is loosely speaking analytic).
>
I'm not quite sure what you mean here. But in my perspective, the
proposition "The sum of the angles in a triangle is 180 degrees" cannot
be analytic in any absolute sense, since there are equally valid kinds
of geometry in which it is false. If one means "The sum of angles in a
triangle *in a Euclidean space* is 180 degrees", it is surely true, but
then could one still say that the predicate of that proposition is
"contained in" the subject, given the equal validity of kinds of
geometry in which the proposition is false?
Consider:
1. "The sum of the angles in a triangle in a Euclidean ("flat") space is
180 degrees".
2. "The sum of the angles in a triangle in a hyperbolic space is less
than 180 degrees".
3. The sum of the angles in a triangle in an elliptical space is greater
than 180 degrees".
If any one of these statements about triangles is enalytic, then they
all are. Doesn't that fact at least decouple analyticity of statements
from the notion of "self-evident truth"?
Or is there anyone here who would propose that the only "real" geometry
is Euclidean geometry, and that non-Euclidean geometry is a kind of
evasion of reality? If so, you'd have a hard time convincing any modern
physicist.
Best wishes,
Bert
cbm80
> On the other hand, if we stick to a strict interpretation of analytic
> that would say that a proposition is only analytic if the predicate
> follows *directly* from the subject, then I woudl not only reject
> geometry as being analytic but also reject the idea that synthetic a
> priori is impossible. The classic example I am thinking of is "All
> bachelors are male." "Bachelor" means "unmarried male," so the
> hand, we might consider a proposition from Euclidean Geometry: "The sum
> of angles in a triangle is 180 degrees." It is not clear that I can
> actually rephrase the above statement in a strictly identical way to
> the preceeding illustration to have the predicate contained in teh
> subject.
Not easily, but the statement is no less analytic because of the
difficulty. Math statements are deceptively simple-looking, but
you need a lot of concepts to understand them, and some of the
concepts don't translate easily into words. In other words, I
claim that something that can be analytic even if it isn't
verbally (trivially) analytic.
Do any mathematicians think that math is synthetic? The (very few)
I have known do not.
--
Free audio & video emails, greeting cards and forums
Talkway - http://www.talkway.com - Talk more ways (sm)
Robert J. Kolker
cbm80 wrote:
>
> Do any mathematicians think that math is synthetic? The (very few)
> I have known do not.
Most mathematicians behave as though mathematical entities
have a real existence. Or at least part of the time. Mathematicians,
while they are going mathematics, are closet Platonists.
Ask your self this. Do integers really exist? We behave as though
they do.
Bob Kolker
Adrian
Bert Clanton <be...@sonic.net> wrote:
> In article <86q034$hjl$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, Adrian
sum
> > of angles in a triangle is 180 degrees." It is not clear that I can
> > actually rephrase the above statement in a strictly identical way to
> > the preceeding illustration to have the predicate contained in teh
at it
> > even if it basically follows from a priori from what it means to
make
> > the statement in teh given context (i.e. is loosely speaking
analytic).
> >
>
> I'm not quite sure what you mean here. But in my perspective, the
> proposition "The sum of the angles in a triangle is 180 degrees"
cannot
> be analytic in any absolute sense, since there are equally valid
kinds
a
> triangle *in a Euclidean space* is 180 degrees", it is surely true,
but
> then could one still say that the predicate of that proposition is
> "contained in" the subject, given the equal validity of kinds of
> geometry in which the proposition is false?
Well, for starters, I was indeed talking about Euclidean Geometry
spoecifically. And your above argument seems to make a strong argument
for the analyticity of geometry since the truth or falsity of the
proposition seems to be based on the context it is made in.
>
> Consider:
>
> 1. "The sum of the angles in a triangle in a Euclidean ("flat") space
is
> 180 degrees".
>
> 2. "The sum of the angles in a triangle in a hyperbolic space is less
> than 180 degrees".
>
> 3. The sum of the angles in a triangle in an elliptical space is
greater
> than 180 degrees".
>
> If any one of these statements about triangles is enalytic, then they
> all are.
That would be the contention -- all of the above statements are
analytic. Just because it is analytic does not mean it is true. For
that matter, all of the following categorizations of propositions are
independent of the truth or falsity of those propositions: a priori, a
posteriori (aka empirical), synthetic, analytic.
Here are some further examples of false propositions:
Analytic A Priori:
"All Bachelors are women."
Synthetic A Posteriori:
"I am not typing on the keyboard right now."
Synthetic (?) A Priori:
"I do not think."
> Doesn't that fact at least decouple analyticity of statements
> from the notion of "self-evident truth"?
Strictly speaking even the famous synthetic a priori statements Kant
claims to show are not necessarily self-evident truths in as much as
they might be disputed. The negation of every statement he claims to
prove are self-evident falsehoods according to him and so are equally
synthetic a priori but just false instead of true.
>
> Or is there anyone here who would propose that the only "real"
geometry
> is Euclidean geometry, and that non-Euclidean geometry is a kind of
> evasion of reality? If so, you'd have a hard time convincing any
modern
> physicist.
And you would have a hard time convincing a mathematician. Neither
geometry renders the other somehow invalid. They are both necessarily
valid axiomatic systems. An often seen criticism of or response to the
idea that morality is like geometry is that then it must be subjective
since there are several different equally valid geometries with no way
to tell them apart in principle. I woudl argue then that is like
"Euclidean Geometry" rather than just "geometry" which there is only
one of. Indeed perhaps the question is more like which geometry (read
"axiomatic system") do ethical terms refer to in particular contexts?
Sometimes we really do use ethical terms subjectively referring to
something like virtue. Other times we use the terms objectively
refering to something more like justice or equity in a transaction or
fair play or equal treatment or something of that sort.
--
Adrian
"Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in
accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of
choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a
universal law."
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals
David Buchner
> I used to sort of think that
> ethics was like aesthetics until I took an introductory course in it.
> I used to think aesthetics was basically subjective until I thought
> about that some more, also
This is something I still don't "get." Seems awfully subjective to me
still. Share your thoughts.
Adrian
We do? We behave as though the concepts of mathematics are possible,
but I do not see how we behave as though they have some existence
beyond their possibility as a concept. Personally, I would argue that
all they are are concepts that we see crop up a lot in independent
developments because of the fundamental similarity in their developers'
condition.
For instance, if we encountered a creature (a disembodied brain,
perhaps) that had no experience of external objects the way we do, then
perhaps when we first break through to such a consciousness or society
of consciousnesses (perhaps a netweork of artifically intelligent
computers) we would find that they have never considered Euclidean
Geometry. In fact, maybe they never would. If Euclidean Geometry had
an existence apart from our conceiving it, then you would not
necessarily expect that. You would expect all creatures to experience
these mathematical realities in the same order despite their particular
condition (their need for such a thing) in the same way you expect us
all to first become aware of the sun and solar system and then other
planets and stars just because of their proximity.
Just for the record, a lot of interesting things have happened recently
concerning the philosophy of mathematics and science. There are at
least two schools of thought: the formalists and the Platonists. The
Platonists have already been mentioned -- they believe that math has
existence independent of its conception. The formalists think that
mathematics is more like as I have described it above. It is a formal
system -- a collection of definitions and axioms that define a set of
propositions and say exactly how to determine the validity of those
propositions. A great deal of work has been done to figure out what
exactly those axioms and definitions are and it seems to in large part
boil down to the nature of arithmetic. In particular, there are a set
of axioms, Peano's Axioms, that provide a formal basis for doing
arithmetic. The drive then would be to show two things about Peano's
axioms: consitency and completeness.
We need consitency for obvious reasons, but what is completeness and
why is it important? Completeness just means that Peano's Axioms along
with the rules of logic are sufficient to prove everything that is
relevant to arithmetic. In general, the whole point is to come up with
a formal system that, based solely on that system, we can draw all the
mathematical conclusions we need to draw -- a formal system by which to
do all of mathematics. So not only do we need the system to not
contradict itself (consistency), but we also need for it to completely
determine all that we wish to understand as mathematics
(completeness).
Unfortunately, Godel proved that Peano's Axioms are not complete and
propositional calculus (logic) is complete thus not only separating
logic from mathematics inexorably (i.e. math is not just logic plus
some definitions) but also to a large extent ending any project of
formalizing mathematics. It would take infinitely many axioms to have
a complete, consistent formal mathematical system that tells us
formally how to do arithmetic and also can be demonstrated to be
consistent (using its own rules of inference). We could start with
Peano's Axioms but would not be able to prove all the relevant facts of
arithmetic (in particular that Peano's Axioms are consistent). We
could fix this by constructing P2 which consists of Peano's Axioms and
an additional axiom that says that Peano's Axioms are consistent. But
then we would not know if P2 was consistent. And so on. If we ever
tried to construct a set of axioms P2' that consists of Peano's Axioms
and the axiom that says that P2' is consistent, then Godel showed we
will get a contradiction (i.e. P2' will be inconsistent).
So anyway the big conclusion that seems to be made is that Plato was
right after all. There is no way to satisfactorily formalize
mathematics and ultimately we will have to rely on some sort of
intuition or informal conception of it to have a complete conception of
mathematics. I do not know if I would go so far as that, personally,
but I do think it shows something important to the rest of us laymen,
namely that mathematics is not just the rules of logic plus some
definitions. That is to say, it is not the case that science provides
us some basic facts (like Newton's Laws or perhaps something more
sophisticated to account for modern physics) from which we merely draw
a bunch of logical deductions to conclude everything else to get this
world-according-to-science-view of reality in stark contrast to, say,
what academic philosophy might offer us. The reason this view is
mistaken is because all of those "logical deductions" are really
mathematical extrapolations and math is not reducible to logic. So
there is this a priori project that goes on outside of science
(mathematics and philosophy) that helps us build on the a posteriori
knowledge we gain from science.
Incidentally, in addition to Peano's Axioms there seems to be at least
the Axiom of Choice to get something as sophisticated as Newton's
Calculus. So, even if we just forget about Godel and look only at what
it takes to produce the basic tools of physics, we are still left with
this nontrivial a priori subject based on extrapolating from vastly
more axioms than just those of logic. And whereas this subject may be
Derrida's nightmare and otherwise just not what you think of when you
think of academic philosophy, it really is just formal philosophy. In
fact, I would go so far as to say that the only two a priori academic
subjects are math and philosophy.
Adrian
David Buchner <buc...@wcta.net> wrote:
> Adrian <adrian...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>
> > I used to sort of think that
> > ethics was like aesthetics until I took an introductory course in
it.
> > I used to think aesthetics was basically subjective until I thought
> > about that some more, also
>
> This is something I still don't "get." Seems awfully subjective to me
> still. Share your thoughts.
>
Well, I am not sure what you are after as far as my personal thoughts
on the matter, but I can tell you about my own experience. I would say
that when I was 19 I was more or less of the opinion that science and
math was what one did if they were truly interested in pursuing
knowledge. If it could be done like physics, then it was like a
pursuit of knowledge and if it could not then it was art. Moreover,
areas like psychology (say) are in principle like physics -- just
poorly done -- while areas like art history are only objective in that
they catalogue events in the art community not in any assessment of the
art itself. I would say this sort of summed up my attitude at the
time. It is very much the logical positivist view of philosophy.
In particular, ethics seemed to me to be "like aesthetics -- its all
subjective," to quote myself or perhaps something my father once said.
Just consider: what does it mean to say something is "good"? What
is "good art"? What is "good behavior"? When I make such an
evaluation it seems like I am just making an evaluation about what I
like or emotionally appreciate. If I find a picture interesting to
look at or otherwise like it, then I will say it is "good art". If
someone acts in a way that makes me happy or that I appreciate or
identify with, then I say it is "good behavior". It is all just an
emotional reaction. When I say "Jones is a good man," I am really just
saying "Jones is a man," and "Hooray for Jones!" all in one statement --
nothing more.
While I tend to agree even now with the above reaction or at least
identify with it, I think there is a big equivocation taking place.
Everything I have said above is certainly possible. In other words, it
is *possible* for me to do no more than express my approval for Jones
and say that he is a man in the statement "Jones is a good man." It is
*possible* for me to mean nothing more than that I like a piece of art
by saying that it is "good art". However, the question is whether or
not such statements *could* be more meaningful than just this. In
other words, while it is *possible* to have only a noncognitive
emototive meaning in these statements, it may not be *necessary* to
have *only* this meaning. And if there is any other possible
understanding, then that is what objective ethics and aesthetics is
going to be about in the end. In fact, if I could show that
utilitarianism (say) is emotive and so subjective but that deontology
(for instance) is objective, then I have very likely successfully
refuted utilitarianism and established deontology.
So, let us then (and this is maybe how I started to think about it in
my ethics class) not couch the discussion in the very ambiguous
language of "good art" or "a good man" or "the good" and think more in
terms of "art skillfully performed" or "a fair man" or "justice"
or "skill". Do you really think there is no difference between your
five year old's picture and a Davinci -- none at all? Do you really
think that there is no way to formulate a concept of equitable
treatment that would be objective? Is law a *purely* subjective
matter? Is there really no possible objective content to any of these
things? I don't think I ever really thought any of that about what you
might consider to be "skill" or "fairness". And I think that the main
thing that happened to change my mind about ethics and aesthetics as
areas in academic philosophy was that I more properly identified the
subject matter. I think that the above statement "all that is just
emotive" is only half the story. I would have said: "'Good', 'bad' --
all that moralizing is just emotive...not at all like what is 'fair' --
now that is objective."
So, in a sense I guess you could say I always thought that morality was
objective but just didn't realize that it was morality that I was
really thinking about. In another more accurate sense, you could say I
was just confused and not really aware of all the implications of my
beliefs on the matter. We always come to these matters with our own
preconceived notions -- our intuition. I came to the realization then
that my intuition much more agreed with a moral objectivist view and
now that I have actually read Otto Neurath (for instance) I am quite
sure that I am not a logical positivist at least with regard to
ethics.
In fact, you may find if you consider the issue more carefully that
subjectivity in morality is not what you are after so much as
subjectivity in several moral systems you may have yet been exposed
to. More specifically, perhaps your inclination is not so much to
think that morality is subjective but that everybody is wrong about
what they think is moral and immoral without a very clear-cut criterion
of your own about what is moral or immoral. In this case, you
certainly need moral *objectivism* just to say they are wrong and not
just babbling. This is the problem I have with logical positivism
about both metaphysics and ethics. Strictly speaking the logical
positivists say something more like "God exists," isn't even meaningful
rather than that the theists are wrong. Or, they say that "Thou shalt
not covet thine neighbors wife," actually has no propositional content
and so among other things cannot be something like "false". My
intuition rejects both of these assessments. The theists aren't just
babbling -- they are wrong -- there is no god. I more or less
understand what the commandment says, and the commandment is *false*
(i.e. it is not always correct) not *meaningless*.
--
Adrian
"Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in
accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of
choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a
universal law."
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals
David C Collver
>pursuit of knowledge and if it could not then it was art
Maybe this is running off on a tangeant, but if I remember correctly, Aristotle
defined "science" as those things which are known well, and "art" as those
things which are done well.
Disarm
David's Anthem
http://hometown.aol.com/disarm01
David Buchner
so, and I got way behind in reading all this stuff...
Adrian wrote:
> So, in a sense I guess you could say I always thought that morality was
> objective but just didn't realize that it was morality that I was
> really thinking about. ....
Good. Interesting way to put it.
> ....In fact, you may find if you consider the issue more carefully that
> subjectivity in morality is not what you are after so much as
> subjectivity in several moral systems you may have yet been exposed
> to. More specifically, perhaps your inclination is not so much to
> think that morality is subjective but that everybody is wrong about
> what they think is moral and immoral without a very clear-cut criterion
> of your own about what is moral or immoral.
But I don't hold that view now, at all. I think you misread my question.
Certainly, I used to accept it as a given, that ethics/morality/whatever
was all made-up and subjective and that there could be no clear,
absolute "right" or "wrong" about anything. I'm responding to your
quoted words above anyway, because I think you described that state of
mind so well.
"...Not so much...that morality is subjective but that everybody is
wrong..."
Oh yes, indeed! In some ways, I was simply unenthused back then, about
the categories of things the popular moralists claim are "moral" issues.
They get all bent about some guy a thousand miles away looking at naked
pictures, or people who don't go to church. They view morality as
something to enforce on other people, to suit *their* judgement, in the
context of their own lives -- rather than applied to the context of the
other person's life. (That is -- that rather than a personal thing, they
use ethics to figure out what other people "ought" or are obligated to
do?) In a word, busybodies. They don't really have it based in anything
but faith and habit, and I was very suspicious of anything that couldn't
be argued factually.
I think this part is good, too:
> The theists aren't just babbling -- they are wrong -- there is no god. I
> more or less understand what the commandment says, and the commandment is
> *false* (i.e. it is not always correct) not *meaningless*.
If they make claims about reality, you can evaluate them and see if
they're just plain wrong. You don't need to keep a special off-limits
domain for "beliefs" which can't be tested or proven or challenged.
But again, I don't really have a problem here. My original question was
about the esthetics part. I agree that morality can be anchored in
reality and therefore verifiable. I still have a difficult time seeing
how the same distinction works here. I still tend to agree with the view
you outline as, "When I make such an evaluation it seems like I am just
making an evaluation about what I like or emotionally appreciate. If I
find a picture interesting to look at or otherwise like it, then I will
say it is "good art". " Perhaps this too is a matter of definition;
perhaps I'm defining "art" as "stuff a person appreciates" or in some
such way which precludes objectivity.
Adrian
David Buchner <buc...@wcta.net> wrote:
<snip>
> But again, I don't really have a problem here. My original question
was
> about the esthetics part. I agree that morality can be anchored in
> reality and therefore verifiable. I still have a difficult time seeing
> how the same distinction works here. I still tend to agree with the
view
> you outline as, "When I make such an evaluation it seems like I am
just
> making an evaluation about what I like or emotionally appreciate. If
I
> find a picture interesting to look at or otherwise like it, then I
will
> say it is "good art". " Perhaps this too is a matter of definition;
> perhaps I'm defining "art" as "stuff a person appreciates" or in some
> such way which precludes objectivity.
>
Sorry about that. Well, first let me point out something I was saying
about ethics. What was the case for me once is that I didn't really
think too carefully about it. What I tended to think was the case was
that a lot of people were making up all this stuff that wasn't even
objectively compelling as though it would show how evil we all were. I
was confident that they were all wrong and that their issues were
subjective. What I failed to realize at the time that I disputed them
as being wrong because there was implicit in my inutuition an objective
component to ethics and the very fact of their subjectivity made it
objectively wrong for them to subject me to it.
I think the same may be true for aesthetics. Perhaps what is really
the case is that ideas like the golden mean and evaluating realism as
being better than cubism and the like is what is all subjective. But,
that is hardly the limit of what is possible in aestheitc judgments.
What about evaluating how good a football player is? How about merit
raises (as opposed to performance based pay) for an employee that has
acquired a greater skill or mastery of his job? How about evaluating
Euler or Gauss as great mathematicians (as opposed to myself who hasn't
nearly their ability in discovering and proving theorems)? What about
painters -- of the fence variety -- can't we tell if the job was done
adequately or even well?
I think that there is this whole other issue -- whether we call it
"aesthetics" or not -- concerning skill. It is not an ethics issue and
it is certainly not about metaphysics although possibly related. (For
instance, the metaphysical facts are that rain will warp the wood on
your fence and you need to cover it with paint. Now the aesthetic
issue is what painter is the best at accomplishing this task.) In the
general consideration of fine art, the issue is over rendering. At
first possibly the whole goal and evaluation might have centered around
realist renderings. It is simple in this case -- who can most
accurately render reality in a model of some sort (sculpture, painting,
etc) is superior aesthetically. But, if we get away from realism, we
start to lose touch with what it is all about so to speak which is just
rendering in general -- perhaps rendering structure in cubism or
emotion in surrealism or absurdity in dadaism. To tell you the truth,
I don't know what these genres are supposed to render, but I think they
do render something, and that someone that really likes cubism can tell
when they are looking at a real officionado's work or just at someone
with a straight edge.
Btw: I tried to post earlier, but I don't think it went through which
is a good thing because it was way too long. I really need to learn to
be more concise!
David Buchner
> ....about ethics. What was the case for me once is that I didn't really
> think too carefully about it. What I tended to think was the case was
> that a lot of people were making up all this stuff that wasn't even
> objectively compelling as though it would show how evil we all were. I
> was confident that they were all wrong and that their issues were
> subjective. What I failed to realize at the time that I disputed them
> as being wrong because there was implicit in my inutuition an objective
> component to ethics and the very fact of their subjectivity made it
> objectively wrong for them to subject me to it.
Interesting. I don't know if I would have thought that. Certainly I
wasn't thinking carefully or thoroughly, and certainly I eschewed their
morality because I was sure it was all subjective. But I think I would
have rationalistically reduced it to the notion that *no* morality could
be objective, because in the end it doesn't make any difference to the
Universe and everything will end up the same way anyway and we'll all be
dead no matter what. Nothing makes any difference, so morals are just
silly made-up games we play with ourselves. Delusions.
Anyone is welcome to name the error I would have been committing in my
teenage earnestness.
David Buchner
> I think the same may be true for aesthetics. Perhaps what is really
> the case is that ideas like the golden mean and evaluating realism as
> being better than cubism and the like is what is all subjective.
I don't know. To me, it's still quite different. I'd agree readily, that
those kind of measurements are arbitrary and subjective. I think you
pointed out before that if "realism" was the criterion -- why not just
take a picture?
Your suggestion that "skill" has something to do with it might have
promise. Not so much what he chose to try to do, but how well he used
the materials to communicate it just so?
I haven't read much of Rand's opinions on Art, but I'm guessing an
Objectivist theory of aesthetics would have to use the same criteria as
Objectivist-everything-else. Does it (improve, enrich, enable, inspire,
whatever) us to live our lives as human beings?
So then isn't the criteria more to do with the *content*? I assume, the
content combined with the skill.
And for me, this is where the subjectivity comes back. I might really
get something out of a movie or a song, which somebody else -- often
somebody more "learned" about film or music or whatever -- condemns and
derides as total schlock. There's no telling the odd B movie in which
I'll find some little nugget of character or philosophy or image that
makes it worthwhile to me.
Adrian
David Buchner <buc...@wcta.net> wrote:
<snip>
>
> I haven't read much of Rand's opinions on Art, but I'm guessing an
> Objectivist theory of aesthetics would have to use the same criteria
as
> Objectivist-everything-else. Does it (improve, enrich, enable,
inspire,
> whatever) us to live our lives as human beings?
>
> So then isn't the criteria more to do with the *content*? I assume,
the
> content combined with the skill.
Well, and here is the point, perhaps I am wrong about my assessment of
what objective aesthetics is all about. But, one thing is for sure is
that no matter what, I have provided at least a *possible* criterion
for objective aesthetics. It sounds like the only way to prove it
wrong is to provide a different better criterion. This is sufficient
to show that aesthetics is objective because no subjective criterion
could be better than an objective one for "objective aesthetics".
>
> And for me, this is where the subjectivity comes back. I might really
> get something out of a movie or a song, which somebody else -- often
> somebody more "learned" about film or music or whatever -- condemns
and
> derides as total schlock. There's no telling the odd B movie in which
> I'll find some little nugget of character or philosophy or image that
> makes it worthwhile to me.
Then we would have to reject the criterion. And, just because it is
nto good art (according to me criterion) does not mean that it is not
beautiful or appealing in a nonaesthetic sense. So, perhaps if the art
critics are just there to predict what you will like, then we should
dispense with them, too.
David Friedman
<buc...@wcta.net> wrote:
> I think you
> pointed out before that if "realism" was the criterion -- why not just
> take a picture?
I haven't been following this thread, but I was recently reading a
chapter in _The Adapted Mind_ that dealt with how human vision works,
and it occured to me that it might be relevant.
It turns out that going from the pattern of light entering our eyes to
what we actually see is an extremely difficult problem--one that
computer image recognition has still not adequately solved. The human
mind is doing very sophisticated information processing, in order to
deliver to your consciousness, not a pattern of color, but a perception
of a three dimensional reality--a chair over there, a person sitting in
it, etc.
Consider something a simple as color. Edwin Land demonstrated, about
thirty years ago, that human color vision doesn't really work the
everyone had supposed--by showing that he could create a picture that
humans saw as having a range of colors in it, none of which were
actually there from the point of view of a scientific instrument
measuring the wavelength of the light.
The explanation appears to be that a crucial feature of color vision is
the ability to see the same object as the same color in different
settings, with different incident light, in order to use color to
identify objects. So the mind has a sophisticated procedure for deducing
the characteristics of the incident light from the observed colors of
the objects in the visual field and automatically compensating. Of
course, it only works for the range of incident light spectra that were
common in the environment we evolved in--which presumably explains why
things sometimes look off color in some kinds of artificial light.
The point of which is that an artist's image may be an attempt to
present, not simply the pattern of light we would get from looking at
the scene, but something part of the way between that and the pattern
that comes out the other end of our built in image processing software.
--
David Friedman
http://www.best.com/~ddfr
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
David Buchner <buc...@wcta.net> wrote in message
news:1e5nxy0.3rc...@ppp260.wcta.net...
>
> And for me, this is where the subjectivity comes back. I might
really
> get something out of a movie or a song, which somebody else -- often
> somebody more "learned" about film or music or whatever -- condemns
and
> derides as total schlock. There's no telling the odd B movie in
which
> I'll find some little nugget of character or philosophy or image
that
> makes it worthwhile to me.
I loved the legends of Romance and Chivalry when I was a child. I wept
at the death of King Arthur. I only saw the purposeful heroism in
saving the damsel in distress, or searching for the holy grail. In the
same way, Robin Hood was someone who refused to bow to the state, and
went about recovering stolen money from the sheriff and his thugs.
That was the context in which I valued these heroes. Now, one could
concentrate on the mysticism of Merlin, and the hand that came out of
a lake to catch Excalibur, and dismiss it all as fairy stories without
rationality. Likewise, one could regard Robin Hood as an Altruist,
stealing what wasn't his to take.
So, to get to your point, 'contextual' might be a more appropriate
word than 'subjective'. It depends on the contextual references,
whether or not anything is good or bad. Context is everything.
--
A.Broese-van-Groenou.
David Buchner
[skill]
> ....I have provided at least a *possible* criterion for objective
> aesthetics. It sounds like the only way to prove it wrong is to provide a
> different better criterion. This is sufficient to show that aesthetics is
> objective because no subjective criterion could be better than an
> objective one for "objective aesthetics".
Oh, I think your "skill" definition has a lot going for it. And, in
practice, I think it's what a lot of us use anyway. Think: isn't a lot
of the commonsense "rebellion" against "abstract modern art" that it's
perpetrators aren't really *doing* anything? "He just threw a bunch of
paint on there and glopped it all around! This is ART?" If something is
well-done, well-executed... if we can SEE that a lot of work or
cleverness or thought went into it... that not "just anybody" coulda
done it... well, that usually counts for a lot more, regardless of what
the artist is "trying to say."
> ....just because it is not good art (according to me criterion) does not
> mean that it is not beautiful or appealing in a nonaesthetic sense. So,
> perhaps if the art critics are just there to predict what you will like,
> then we should dispense with them, too.
Well I sure wouldn't have any problem with that. We'll put them on the
"B" Ark. What means, "appealing in a nonaesthetic sense"? Is this
related to the mysterious distinction my art-school-type friends have
between "art" and "crafts"?
David Buchner
> I haven't been following this thread, but I was recently reading a
> chapter in _The Adapted Mind_ that dealt with how human vision works,
Fascinating stuff!
> The point of which is that an artist's image may be an attempt to
> present, not simply the pattern of light we would get from looking at
> the scene, but something part of the way between that and the pattern
> that comes out the other end of our built in image processing software.
But I'm sort of unclear about your interpretation of it. Do you mean,
perhaps, that a good (painting, anyway -- since this is about color) is
in some ways *more* "realistic" than a straight photographic image of
the same scene? Or maybe that the artist, if he does his work well, is
giving us a glimpse at what *he* sees when he looks at that scene? Some
kind of representation of what goes on in his image processing software?
And since we have the same basic equipment and the same basic
programming, when it works right we can understand what it's like for
him too?
David Friedman
<buc...@wcta.net> wrote:
What I am saying is that what the observer "sees" is not the actual
pattern of light entering his eyes but the information structure that
comes out the far end of his information processing software when that
pattern of light comes in the near end. That information structure
depends not only on the immediate input, but on lots of other
things--for instance, what the observer knows about the objects he is
seeing that lets him interpret a particular pattern of light as a
particular object. An artist might (I'm not an artist) be able to create
a picture that produced an input to the eye that produced an
interesting/beautiful/etc. output from the image processing software,
not because it was an accurate picture but because it took advantage of
features of how that image processing software worked. Among other
things, that might let an artist present to person B a more accurate
picture of how person A would see a particular scene than B would get
from seeing the scene himself--since B doesn't have A's background
informatino.
Consider an analogy--compression technology. MP3 and video equivalents
don't simply compress the same information into fewer bytes, the way
(say) stuffit does. They actually replace a pattern of sound or video
with a smaller pattern that sounds/looks the same to the human
senses--and doing so requires knowing a lot about the human senses.
Consider an even simpler example--a movie film. Your perception of the
real world is continuous--not 60 frames per second. But it turns out
that 60 fps (or whatever) is enough so that it looks continuous to you.
When you go from a 600 fps video to a 60 fps video, you are throwing
away 90% of the information--with no loss to what you perceive.
David Schwartz
David Friedman wrote:
> What I am saying is that what the observer "sees" is not the actual
> pattern of light entering his eyes but the information structure that
> comes out the far end of his information processing software when that
> pattern of light comes in the near end.
No, that information structure _is_ the seeing. What the observer sees
is the light.
> That information structure
> depends not only on the immediate input, but on lots of other
> things--for instance, what the observer knows about the objects he is
> seeing that lets him interpret a particular pattern of light as a
> particular object.
Of course. If two different people see the same thing, the two
'seeings' are different, and can differ in all sorts of ways. But the
thing seen is the same.
> An artist might (I'm not an artist) be able to create
> a picture that produced an input to the eye that produced an
> interesting/beautiful/etc. output from the image processing software,
> not because it was an accurate picture but because it took advantage of
> features of how that image processing software worked. Among other
> things, that might let an artist present to person B a more accurate
> picture of how person A would see a particular scene than B would get
> from seeing the scene himself--since B doesn't have A's background
> informatino.
Perhaps.
[snip]
> Consider an even simpler example--a movie film. Your perception of the
> real world is continuous--not 60 frames per second. But it turns out
> that 60 fps (or whatever) is enough so that it looks continuous to you.
> When you go from a 600 fps video to a 60 fps video, you are throwing
> away 90% of the information--with no loss to what you perceive.
This is why it is fortunate that man can use technology to augment his
senses.
DS
Owl
news:38A3D877...@webmaster.com...
> David Friedman wrote:
> > What I am saying is that what the observer "sees" is not the actual
> > pattern of light entering his eyes but the information structure that
> > comes out the far end of his information processing software when that
> > pattern of light comes in the near end.
>
> No, that information structure _is_ the seeing. What the observer sees
> is the light.
You're both wrong. What the observer sees is the physical object. The
light and the 'information structure' are both part of the means by which
the observer sees the physical object. When you look at an apple, you see
something red and round in front of you. Mere reflection should be
sufficient to tell you that you are not seeing light rays, since light
rays are not round and are not located in the place where the object you
see is. Reflection should tell you even more clearly that you are not
seeing brain processes or 'information structures', since brain processes
and information structures (whatever those are -- abstract objects?) are
neither red, nor round, nor located in front of you.
David Buchner
> What I am saying is that what the observer "sees" is not the actual
> pattern of light entering his eyes but the information structure that
> comes out the far end of his information processing software when that
> .....An artist might.... be able to create a picture that produced an
> input to the eye that produced an interesting/beautiful/etc. output from
> the image processing software, not because it was an accurate picture but
> because it took advantage of features of how that image processing
> software worked.
Interesting. The movie example is one concrete, can you think of others?
What came to mind aas I read the above is whatever school of painting
that is/was in which a scene is made up of many little blobs of paint --
extremely obvious little dabbly brushstrokes making up a blurry image.
Impressionism is an art-word stuck in my head associated with this, but
that doesn't mean much.