Rand's Nominalism/Realism - Whatever???
Malrassic Park
http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDiscussions/1772.shtml
Stephen Boydstun wrote:
"Rand's theory [of epistemology - Mal] is not realist, neither is it
nominalist."
Ignoring the bad grammar usually found on these forums ("neither"
should read "nor" (or the sentence should be re-written to exclude the
useless comma), and schools of philosophy are always capitalized (as
in Realist and Nominalist), the point made on Friday, August 25, 2006
at 9:36am is a valid one.
I recall the days, 20 years or more ago, when I would have like to
find some philosophical genre in which to firmly plant Randian
epistemology, to find out where it belongs. But the task was hopeless
(I did learn a lot more about philosophy, however). It wasn't until 20
years later that I discovered that Randian epistemology is not
epistemology, that it relies on an implicit epistemology which was
never directly discussed by Rand. And even though she discussed
Realism and Nominalism in very brief and often polemical terms, it
only served to confuse the issue since, despite the title of her
compendium of articles, Rand never wrote a book on Objectivist
epistemology (or an introduction to one, as the title suggests).
One would hope that an introduction to a topic would at least contain
elements of the topic itself.
Rand was certainly correct to state in that book's preface that all
the problems of epistemology originate in one basic problem, that of
Universals. The problem of Universals has taken many forms down
through the centuries, but she chose to focus on that form relevant to
the mid-20th-century discussion which is not exactly what one would
normally call an epistemology. Rather than discussing what makes
knowledge possible, they only discuss concepts, that is, pre-existing
knowledge that takes the form of words.
Rand took her epistemological cues from books written probably around
the 1950s to 60s, thus confusing concepts with knowledge. For example,
Lyle Bourne wrote in 1966:
"As a working definition we may say a concept exists whenever two or
more distinguishable objects have been grouped or classified together
and set apart from other objects on the basis of some common feature
or property characteristic of each." (Lyle Bourne, Human Conceptual
Behavior, p. 1.)
Lyle Bourne, on the other hand, did not make the mistake of
classifying his book as a work on epistemology or even an introduction
to one. And anyway, concept-formation and definition should not
comprise an introduction to epistemology, those topics are relevant
only after the fact of knowledge.
The question may then be asked: what is knowledge, if not concept?
The answer is simply to look to Rand's work itself in which she states
that knowledge is gained and held in conceptual form (ITOE, 1). That
says nothing about the formation of new knoweldge per se, only the
conceptual form it takes.
Malrassic Park
<male...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>On the RoR forum at
>http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDiscussions/1772.shtml
>Stephen Boydstun wrote:
>"Rand's theory [of epistemology - Mal] is not realist, neither is it
>nominalist."
I thought up a shorter form of explaining Randian "epistemology."
Take a problem of philosophy, sweep it under the rug ("Let those who
attempt to invalidate concepts by declaring that they cannot find
"manness" in men, try to invalidate algebra by declaring that they
cannot find "a-ness" in 5 or in 5,000,000"), then offer a "new"
epistemological foundation, based on some introspections and material
heisted from Bourne's work, having nothing to do with any of it.
Charles Bell
> I thought up a shorter form of explaining Randian "epistemology."
> Take a problem of philosophy, sweep it under the rug ("Let those who
> attempt to invalidate concepts by declaring that they cannot find
> "manness" in men,
Like David Friedman's asinine analysis of Objectivism, in which he
merely criticizes Rand for being a bad utiltitarian even though she
clearly rejects utilitarianism, you analyze Objectivism as though it
were a Realist philosophy that makes use of universals, Aristotlean
Essences or Platonic Forms, when she rejects universals. She also
rejects the nominalist alternative to realism. The problem in both
realism and nominalism is that concepts are not treated as
*objective*, produced in man's consciousness but in accordance with
facts of reality
You said Rand said: ". . . that all the problems of epistemology
originate in one basic problem, that of Universals." Universals do
not exist, and the "problem" is that classical realism treats them as
real.
You have been given the correct rendering of Rand's epistemology to
which you have never intelligently responded. That you simply repeat
yourself as if nothing had ever been presented to you is boring.
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>On Dec 7, 6:18�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I thought up a shorter form of explaining Randian "epistemology."
>> Take a problem of philosophy, sweep it under the rug ("Let those who
>> attempt to invalidate concepts by declaring that they cannot find
>> "manness" in men,
>
>
>Like David Friedman's asinine analysis of Objectivism, in which he
>merely criticizes Rand for being a bad utiltitarian even though she
>clearly rejects utilitarianism,
All that says is she rejected her own theory without understanding she
was doing so. I'm not saying that's the case, but by itself this
doesn't give you much grounds for complaint since it is possible that
one can reject a theory while at the same time upholding it.
> you analyze Objectivism as though it
>were a Realist philosophy that makes use of universals, Aristotlean
>Essences or Platonic Forms, when she rejects universals. She also
>rejects the nominalist alternative to realism. The problem in both
>realism and nominalism is that concepts are not treated as
>*objective*, produced in man's consciousness but in accordance with
>facts of reality
>
>You said Rand said: ". . . that all the problems of epistemology
>originate in one basic problem, that of Universals." Universals do
>not exist, and the "problem" is that classical realism treats them as
>real.
>
>You have been given the correct rendering of Rand's epistemology to
>which you have never intelligently responded. That you simply repeat
>yourself as if nothing had ever been presented to you is boring.
There is no correct rendering of Rand's "epistemology" besides the
one, right here in front of me, called Introduction to Objectivist
Epistemology. All I'm saying is that what Rand was not doing cannot be
called Nominalism or Realism because she was not doing epistemology to
begin with. The question does not concern the objectivity of those two
alternatives anyway, as those in both camps would conclude that their
own answers are objective in that real essences are, to them,
objectively real, even moreso than so-called objective reality around
us; or that names of things, as in Nominalism, are based on objective
concretes.
I must point out however that Rand did broach appropriate for such an
introductory work - the validity of the senses in the process of
knowledge acquisition - but she merely glossed over the question as
based on a stolen concept. And her idea that one cannot disprove the
validity of the senses without appealing to the senses is invalid. She
assumes, without proof, that all concepts are abstracted from sensory
material. In fact, one can at least deal with the topic without
appealing to the senses (whether or not they are valid or invalid),
that is, through concepts that have no origin in concretes. The words
"abstraction" and "concept" represent only two such concepts not
abstracted from concretes but only on the mind's method of
representing them. These so-called "concepts of method" (of
concept-formation) have utterly no basis in concretes.
On the other hand, one cannot PROVE the validity of the senses by
means of the senses without begging the question. So it is utterly
necessary, with this question, to appeal to concepts or entire
theories not originating with the senses. The same is true of
attempting to disprove the validity of the senses.
Jim Klein
> Universals do not exist, and the "problem" is that
> classical realism treats them as real.
If a universal is a statement that translates to,
"All x are y," in what manner does it not exist?
Or maybe I should ask, what exactly doesn't
exist? The x s exist and if they're all y, then
why isn't it right to say that (the referent of)
the universal exists?
The usual problem I think, the one that Rand
addressed, is the underlying belief that this
therefore means even non-instances must
follow this "law," since most universals are
introduced as laws. Rand of course, and originally
Peikoff too, understood the serious quagmires
that uninstantiated instances can create.
When one understands that laws only cover
instances, and therefore do translate into a
"All x are y" form of universal, it all falls into
place except for the rude awakening that
there are no laws which guide things separate
and apart from the actions and events that
take place (as the instances).
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>On Dec 7, 6:53 pm, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
>> Universals do not exist, and the "problem" is that
>> classical realism treats them as real.
>
>If a universal is a statement that translates to,
>"All x are y," in what manner does it not exist?
As a certain type of concept ending in -ness. One of Rand's examples
was that of "man-ness." Notice that concepts ending in the suffix
-ness always denote qualities of things, so the problem of Universals
involves the epistemic disposition of qualities inherent to every
member of a class of entities. For example, we represent redness as a
quality inherent to every member of a class of red entities. However,
in no way is the color red exactly identical in each and every
instantiation of it, there will always be variations in shade of color
even throughout a single red entity. And yet "redness" itself is
identical in each and every conceptualization of the members of this
set.
It is important to note above that we only represent redness as a
quality held in common by the members of this set, but the reason for
doing this involves the problem of Universals because it is a problem
involving our knowledge of redness itself and not merely how the
concept of it is formed afterward. The process of acquiring this
knowledge Rand simply took for granted, but it is the whole question
at the heart of the matter.
I did say that there is an underlying epistemology behind that book of
Rand's. No protestations to the contrary can reasonably deny the fact
that she relied heavily on Greek Conceptualism (a form of Nominalism)
in which thoughts are considered sensory products. Let's say, for
argument's sake, that Rand's focus on the origin of concepts differed
from that of Greek Conceptualism, wherein its theoretical origination
in consciousness lies in perception and not sensation ("Discriminated
awareness begins on the level of percepts," not sensation for which
there is no possibility of the awareness of a singular sensation).
What matters is that her implicit answer to the problem of Universals
(which she swept under the rug, but no matter) is the Conceptualism of
the Stoic school of philosophy.
>Or maybe I should ask, what exactly doesn't
>exist? The x s exist and if they're all y, then
>why isn't it right to say that (the referent of)
>the universal exists?
Ask Rand, she's the one who swept the problem under the rug. Oops, too
late.
>The usual problem I think, the one that Rand
>addressed, is the underlying belief that this
>therefore means even non-instances must
>follow this "law," since most universals are
>introduced as laws. Rand of course, and originally
>Peikoff too, understood the serious quagmires
>that uninstantiated instances can create.
..
>When one understands that laws only cover
>instances, and therefore do translate into a
>"All x are y" form of universal, it all falls into
>place except for the rude awakening that
>there are no laws which guide things separate
>and apart from the actions and events that
>take place (as the instances).
I don't see where law of some kind comes into play in any of these
questions. There are laws of thinking that we must obey in the
acquisition of knowledge, but these are not the same as Rand's rules
of concept-formation.
Malrassic Park
<male...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>If a universal is a statement that translates to,
>>"All x are y," in what manner does it not exist?
>
>As a certain type of concept ending in -ness.
This might be unclear to you to begin with. The concept itself is not
"out there," it is in the mind. But its concretization is also
non-existent "out there," although it seems to represent something
concrete. The problem is, if the concept has no origin in the
external, then how did it come to reside in the mind of a thinking
person?
Charles Bell
> On Dec 7, 6:53 pm, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > Universals do not exist, and the "problem" is that
> > classical realism treats them as real.
>
> If a universal is a statement that translates to,
> "All x are y," in what manner does it not exist?
>
That is not how I mean "universals". It is as a Platonic Form or
Aristotelean Essence. Both religionists and scientists typically use
the anti-concept of the universal as the real object of "truth", but
because such knowledge of the truth through universals (essences,
forms) is unattainable, for they do not exist, the door is left open
for sceptics to complain. Objectivism claims that concepts based on
the facts of reality by logical and sensible defintions are objective,
whereas philosophies giving reality to universals claim, to some
degree, concepts are merely subjective.
> Or maybe I should ask, what exactly doesn't
> exist? �The x s exist and if they're all y, then
> why isn't it right to say that (the referent of)
> the universal exists?
>
There is nothing wrong in claiming that a referent to what is being
called "x" exists (that is an Objectivist axiom), but Mal claims that
human definitions of the "manness" in "man" is not good enough for
knowledge of the truth of "man" because there is no way to objectively
(that is, according to Kant, outside of the human mind) to verfiy
those definitions.
To say "all x are y" where y is some proposed universal is a worthless
statement. To get at what x is, characteristics of x must be defined,
and of those characteristics there may be a defined "y" to which one
may refer. A Kantian simply refuses to accept any description of x
unless the "universal of x" is described, but there is no way of
knowing "universal of x" unless omnisicence (totality of objective
knowledge which exists outside of the human mind) is presumed.
> When one understands that laws only cover
> instances, and therefore do translate into a
> "All x are y" form of universal, it all falls into
> place except for the rude awakening that
> there are no laws which guide things separate
> and apart from the actions and events that
> take place (as the instances).
Although this is correct, it is not germane to how I meant
"universal".
Charles Bell
> On Mon, 07 Dec 2009 15:53:11 -0800, Charles Bell
>
> >On Dec 7, 6:18�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> >> I thought up a shorter form of explaining Randian "epistemology."
> >> Take a problem of philosophy, sweep it under the rug ("Let those who
> >> attempt to invalidate concepts by declaring that they cannot find
> >> "manness" in men,
>
> >Like David Friedman's asinine analysis of Objectivism, in which he
> >merely criticizes Rand for being a bad utiltitarian even though she
> >clearly rejects utilitarianism,
>
> All that says is she rejected her own theory without understanding she
> was doing so.
No, she did not reject her own theory by referrencing a long-standing
philosophical concept and then rejecting that.
> >You have been given the correct rendering of Rand's epistemology to
> >which you have never intelligently responded. That you simply repeat
> >yourself as if nothing had ever been presented to you is boring.
>
> There is no correct rendering of Rand's "epistemology" besides the
> one, right here in front of me, called Introduction to Objectivist
> Epistemology.
Which you do not understand, or more likely, prefer to distort for
your purposes.
> All I'm saying is that what Rand was not doing cannot be
> called Nominalism or Realism
Yes, she rejected both, and the garbled assertion here you are making
is that she simply did not understand what she rejected. The only
misunderstanding may be caused by her stated attachment to Aristotle
and careless (or, in you case, deliberate) misunderstanding of how she
fundamentally differs from Aristotle. Uyl and Rasmussen go on at
length to discuss how Rand is a failed Aristotelean when the fact is
she is not an Aristotelean at all, even though she starts grounded in
that failed classical philosophy.
>
> On the other hand, one cannot PROVE the validity of the senses by
> means of the senses without begging the question.
No one is proving the validity of the senses. One is taking them as
facts of reality, and that sense-datum is objective and not
subjective. Perhaps you would like to take the Red Hot Poker test I
offered to the little troll, Purcell?
> So it is utterly
> necessary, with this question, to appeal to concepts
By denying the validity of the senses -- in that one may assume that
they are not real and/or do not represent aspects of reality -- one
may also simply deny that existence exists and something is what it
is. Cause and effect requires that the sensation is caused by
something and it is that something which is to be investigated.
or entire
> theories not originating with the senses. The same is true of
> attempting to disprove the validity of the senses.- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>On Dec 7, 7:32�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, 07 Dec 2009 15:53:11 -0800, Charles Bell
>>
>> <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>> >On Dec 7, 6:18�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> >> I thought up a shorter form of explaining Randian "epistemology."
>> >> Take a problem of philosophy, sweep it under the rug ("Let those who
>> >> attempt to invalidate concepts by declaring that they cannot find
>> >> "manness" in men,
>>
>> >Like David Friedman's asinine analysis of Objectivism, in which he
>> >merely criticizes Rand for being a bad utiltitarian even though she
>> >clearly rejects utilitarianism,
>>
>> All that says is she rejected her own theory without understanding she
>> was doing so.
>
>No, she did not reject her own theory by referrencing a long-standing
>philosophical concept and then rejecting that.
I didn't say she did. You're not understanding me, all I said is that
IT SAYS she condemned Utilitarianism without knowing it to be related
to her own theory. I'm not saying she actually did that. Hers is no
"greatest happiness for the greatest number" ethical theory, it is
more like "the greatest happiness for the special elite and to hell
with everybod else." I can certainly see that theory at work in
today's world in which the Eddie Willers' of the world are slowly
being crushed beneath the feet of "giants" of industry. But these
industry leaders only think they are giants, they have an elitist
atttiude without have proven themselves worthy. In fact, there
are no Randian heroes out there.
>> >You have been given the correct rendering of Rand's epistemology to
>> >which you have never intelligently responded. That you simply repeat
>> >yourself as if nothing had ever been presented to you is boring.
>>
>> There is no correct rendering of Rand's "epistemology" besides the
>> one, right here in front of me, called Introduction to Objectivist
>> Epistemology.
>
>Which you do not understand, or more likely, prefer to distort for
>your purposes.
..
>> All I'm saying is that what Rand was not doing cannot be
>> called Nominalism or Realism
..
>Yes, she rejected both, and the garbled assertion here you are making
>is that she simply did not understand what she rejected. The only
>misunderstanding may be caused by her stated attachment to Aristotle
>and careless (or, in you case, deliberate) misunderstanding of how she
>fundamentally differs from Aristotle. Uyl and Rasmussen go on at
>length to discuss how Rand is a failed Aristotelean when the fact is
>she is not an Aristotelean at all, even though she starts grounded in
>that failed classical philosophy.
You have no clue as to what I understand or fail to understand.
However, I never said Rand failed to understand Nominalism or Realism.
You are so readily confused by all this. Nominalism and Realism are
relatively easy to understand, so I don't see the issue you're talking
about.
As for Aristotleanism, I am on record as having stated that Rand
thought she understood Aristotle, but in fact she only understood one
possible interpretation, when in fact parts of his work are
controversial under interpretation. So that means Rand's
interpretation is controversial, debatable, and not necessarily true.
(Part of that interpretation involves understanding Aristotle's
cultural context which influenced the terms he wrote in.) Furthermore,
she has made statements about Aristotle's work that I have never been
able to validate. It's not that they are not debatable, they simply
don't exist in his theories (particularly his ethics).
>> On the other hand, one cannot PROVE the validity of the senses by
>> means of the senses without begging the question.
>
>
>No one is proving the validity of the senses. One is taking them as
>facts of reality, and that sense-datum is objective and not
>subjective. Perhaps you would like to take the Red Hot Poker test I
>offered to the little troll, Purcell?
I have discussed the 'sense-datum' idea here many times. The idea is
based on a mechanistic, computerish view of the mind as a machine that
takes in data and generates concepts and theories. And that is indeed
the only view which can detract utterly from the subjectivist one in
taking the subjective out of the 'equation' entirely. But the long and
short of it is that it is only your and Rand's unwarranted assumption.
>> So it is utterly
>> necessary, with this question, to appeal to concepts
>
>By denying the validity of the senses -- in that one may assume that
>they are not real and/or do not represent aspects of reality -- one
>may also simply deny that existence exists and something is what it
>is. Cause and effect requires that the sensation is caused by
>something and it is that something which is to be investigated.
I said in my response that nobody, but nobody has denied objectivity
or reality. Extreme Realists may claim that essences are MORE real
than existences, but they have never denied the objective reality of
existences. And anyway, it doesn't matter since Extreme Realism lacks
credibility given today's scientific atmosphere, so it is hardly worth
dealing with as more than historical curiosity. Rand was merely
flailing at the ghosts of dead theories, while encouraging hordes of
Randroids to waste their time doing as she did.
What's more interesting and relevant, however, is the modern view of
concepts (of which Rand's theory is a part). The modern view conflates
the process of forming of concepts with the process of forming of
Universals - that is just as true of Rand as it was of Enlightenment
philosophers and holds true today. But even Aristotle got that part
right, he treated both processes differently, so it is obvious that
Rand failed to understand Aristotle's approach to this subject, or she
never read it. Aristotle treated with the problem of Universals, while
Rand and the other Modernists merely swept it under the rug conflating
it with concept-formation. Her non-answer to the problem of Universals
thoroughly equates Rand with the Modernists she despised, including
Lyle Bourne who published a book on concepts before Rand did and
stated some of the same principles without making Rand's mistake of
calling it epistemology or even foundational to epistemology.
Furthermore, as an aside but a crucial one, if Rand considered
epistemology to be a theory so essential to human survival, she should
have written a longer, more scholarly and comprehensive book on the
subject. Instead, all we get are the sound-bites originally published
in a small journal put out by her organization the NBI. If she
believed that one of her followers would write this work for her, she
was obviously mistaken since no such work has been published while
we've all sat on our thumbs and waited for 40 or more years. And no,
Peikoff's confused ramblings on the subject don't count.
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>On Dec 7, 8:48�pm, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>> On Dec 7, 6:53 pm, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
..
>> > Universals do not exist, and the "problem" is that
>> > classical realism treats them as real.
..
>> If a universal is a statement that translates to,
>> "All x are y," in what manner does it not exist?
..
>That is not how I mean "universals". It is as a Platonic Form or
>Aristotelean Essence.
You're right for a change, Charles. The whole debate is traditionally
over a reconciliation of those two apparently opposing views. In the
Scholastic era they were finally reconciled through a theory called
Moderate Realism (but I'm not saying I agree with that theory.) At
least it was their opinion that the Moderate Realism of Aquinas and
others finally solved the riddle.
> Both religionists and scientists typically use
>the anti-concept of the universal as the real object of "truth", but
>because such knowledge of the truth through universals (essences,
>forms) is unattainable, for they do not exist, the door is left open
>for sceptics to complain. Objectivism claims that concepts based on
>the facts of reality by logical and sensible defintions are objective,
>whereas philosophies giving reality to universals claim, to some
>degree, concepts are merely subjective.
..
>> Or maybe I should ask, what exactly doesn't
>> exist? �The x s exist and if they're all y, then
>> why isn't it right to say that (the referent of)
>> the universal exists?
..
>There is nothing wrong in claiming that a referent to what is being
>called "x" exists (that is an Objectivist axiom), but Mal claims that
>human definitions of the "manness" in "man" is not good enough for
>knowledge of the truth of "man" because there is no way to objectively
>(that is, according to Kant, outside of the human mind) to verfiy
>those definitions.
I said that? A Kant follower would detract from the need to define
simple concretes as per Kant's example of the concept 'water' in the
CPR: one does not bother to define the concept 'water' but instead
uses science to experiment with water to determine its properties.
Your concept of 'water' will grow as your experiments proceed (it
freezes at thus and thus temperate, it boils at a certain temperature,
etc), but we all know what 'water' is on an intuitive level to begin
with (that is, we know it when we see it, smell it, taste it, etc), so
there is utterly no necessity in defining it but only a pointless
intellectual exercise.
What was paramount for Kant was not the resolution of such problems of
epistemology, but of problems of morality, politics, and religion. His
treatment of traditional metaphysics in the CPR was only one step on
the way to a much larger project. Beyond that, he was as much
concerned with promoting Reason and protecting Reason from assaults
from the intellectual vanguard as Rand was. He simply did not believe
that this concern with defining "rock" or "chair" had anything to do
with it.
>To say "all x are y" where y is some proposed universal is a worthless
>statement. To get at what x is, characteristics of x must be defined,
>and of those characteristics there may be a defined "y" to which one
>may refer. A Kantian simply refuses to accept any description of x
>unless the "universal of x" is described, but there is no way of
>knowing "universal of x" unless omnisicence (totality of objective
>knowledge which exists outside of the human mind) is presumed.
Not "description of x," but an absolute definition of x would for Kant
require omniscience, because as your knowledge of x grows the
possibility of having to alter your definition also grows. Kant was
not skeptical of knowledge per se (he was a scientist, after all), but
he was not terribly involved with defining simple terms but instead
went with defining a priori, philosophical terms such as "rights."
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>> All I'm saying is that what Rand was not doing cannot be
>> called Nominalism or Realism
>
>
>Yes, she rejected both, and the garbled assertion here you are making
>is that she simply did not understand what she rejected.
Well, it's definitely the case that if Rand called her book a work on
epistemology, then she didn't know what epistemology consists of.
1Z
> The problem in both
> realism and nominalism is that concepts are not treated as
> *objective*, produced in man's consciousness but in accordance with
> facts of reality
Not all concepts are objective int hat sense. Calling the ones
that aren't anti-concpepts is jsut a true scotsman manouvre.
Moreover, Realism is at least as objective as Randian
conceptualism. The objection to it should be that it is metaphyscially
over-egged.
1Z
> On the other hand, one cannot PROVE the validity of the senses by
> means of the senses without begging the question.
Uh-huh. Can one prove it by reduction--showing that the
alternatives are incoherent? Rand seems to be doing this,
and seems to be in need of a beter argument against apriori
knowledge.
1Z
> On Mon, 07 Dec 2009 17:48:04 -0800, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com>
> wrote:
>
> >On Dec 7, 6:53 pm, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> >> Universals do not exist, and the "problem" is that
> >> classical realism treats them as real.
>
> >If a universal is a statement that translates to,
> >"All x are y," in what manner does it not exist?
>
> As a certain type of concept ending in -ness.
Real universals are supposed ot be mind-indpendent
entities *corresponfing* to -ness words.
>However,
> in no way is the color red exactly identical in each and every
> instantiation of it, there will always be variations in shade of color
> even throughout a single red entity.
That probably isn;t true of fudnamental physical qualities like
the charge on an electron.
> It is important to note above that we only represent redness as a
> quality held in common by the members of this set, but the reason for
> doing this involves the problem of Universals because it is a problem
> involving our knowledge of redness itself and not merely how the
> concept of it is formed afterward.
The problem of universals is not jsut the epistemic
issue of how things are grouped together by us,
but also the metaphsyical question of how
objective resemblances work in the first place.
1Z
> On Dec 7, 8:48 pm, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
> > On Dec 7, 6:53 pm, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > > Universals do not exist, and the "problem" is that
> > > classical realism treats them as real.
>
> > If a universal is a statement that translates to,
> > "All x are y," in what manner does it not exist?
>
> That is not how I mean "universals". It is as a Platonic Form or
> Aristotelean Essence. Both religionists and scientists typically use
> the anti-concept of the universal as the real object of "truth",
Wrong, wrong and wrong. Neither religion nor
science is clearly dependent on realism about
universals, and no-one thinks real universals
are the referent of "true"
> but
> because such knowledge of the truth through universals (essences,
> forms) is unattainable,
Says who? Platonists say it is obtainable. You are givign
a fantastically muddled acount here.
> Mal claims that
> human definitions of the "manness" in "man" is not good enough for
> knowledge of the truth of "man"
Muddled.
"man" is no a propostition and has no truth-value
> To say "all x are y" where y is some proposed universal is a worthless
> statement. To get at what x is, characteristics of x must be defined,
> and of those characteristics there may be a defined "y" to which one
> may refer. A Kantian simply refuses to accept any description of x
> unless the "universal of x" is described,
Kantians are not Platonists, what you say is compeltely muddled.
1Z
> What's more interesting and relevant, however, is the modern view of
> concepts (of which Rand's theory is a part). The modern view conflates
> the process of forming of concepts with the process of forming of
> Universals -
WTH is "forming a universal"?
Malrassic Park
A Universal establishes through formalization a quality common to all
members of a set of entities. The big question is, "How does the mind
do this?" Rand and a whole host of other Modernists confounded this
process with the easier problem of concept-formation. By doing so,
Rand was able to simply sweep the hard problem of Universals under the
rug.
The following statement is precisely where Rand conflated the two
processes in ITOE: "Where is the "manness" in men? What, in reality,
corresponds to the concept "man" in our mind?" By equating these two
questions, by regarding them equally, she completely failed to
recognize the distinction between the concept "man," and the quality
of "manness." And so 17 pages later she was able to declare, "Let
those who attempt to invalidate concepts by declaring that they cannot
find "manness" in men, try to invalidate algebra by declaring that
they cannot find "a-ness" in 5 or in 5,000,000." She dealt with all
kinds of other concepts: nouns, prepositions, proper nouns, adverbs,
pronouns, and adjectives - but never did she deal with concepts
denoting qualities such as manness.
Malrassic Park
>On 8 Dec, 02:59, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On Mon, 07 Dec 2009 17:48:04 -0800, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> >On Dec 7, 6:53 pm, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>>
>> >> Universals do not exist, and the "problem" is that
>> >> classical realism treats them as real.
>>
>> >If a universal is a statement that translates to,
>> >"All x are y," in what manner does it not exist?
>>
>> As a certain type of concept ending in -ness.
>
>Real universals are supposed ot be mind-indpendent
>entities *corresponfing* to -ness words.
Well, yes, assuming they are real (concrete). The ancient version of
this problem was metaphysical. But if universals don't represent
concretes, as in the modern view, then what DO they represent?
Rand's tactic in ITOE is a dangerous one, because if a Universal can
be classified as just another concept, and if Universals are found not
to represent concretes - then all other concepts fall prey to the same
argument. And the same question can be asked: if the concept "table"
does not represent a concrete, then what does it represent?
>>However,
>> in no way is the color red exactly identical in each and every
>> instantiation of it, there will always be variations in shade of color
>> even throughout a single red entity.
>
>That probably isn;t true of fudnamental physical qualities like
>the charge on an electron.
In that case, then I need to remind you I'm dealing with the Universal
"redness" which is not a concept such as "charge of an electron."
Otherwise you will fall prey to Rand's error, although with a better
excuse: I'm the one who mentioned the color red and not the Universal
"redness" in my example above, although I did change it to "redness"
where it continues below.
>> It is important to note above that we only represent redness as a
>> quality held in common by the members of this set, but the reason for
>> doing this involves the problem of Universals because it is a problem
>> involving our knowledge of redness itself and not merely how the
>> concept of it is formed afterward.
>
>The problem of universals is not jsut the epistemic
>issue of how things are grouped together by us,
>but also the metaphsyical question of how
>objective resemblances work in the first place.
I agree that resemblance has a great role to play in all this, but it
also begs the question of what makes a resemblance possible in the
first place. "What" makes a resemblance possible is not only something
metaphyisically concrete (obviously there needs to be external
"data"), but the very resemblance itself is not at first conceptual,
it is represented to the mind as resemblance before any concept of it
is formed.
This is the case even in ITOE (although Rand would shun the word
"resemblance"). I have no doubt that Rand looked at two or more
entities and found features they had in common, and then formed a
concept of them. However, the process of discovering commonalities
(resemblances) has never been dealt with, it is merely taken for
granted implicitly as a power or faculty of reason or perception. And
in this question it is not so much the objective features of a thing
that cause the resemblance in our minds, because we all know what
these are, a posteriori. That still begs the question of how the
resemblance came to be noted as a feature of these entities before
conceptualization began, and that is some kind of mental process that
precedes concept-formation. So the big question involves this mental
process, and not the objective "data" that invokes the process in the
mind.
The modern answer to takes the riddle to the psychological level. Rand
was doing the same psychology but she called it epistemology.
Malrassic Park
>On 8 Dec, 00:32, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>> On the other hand, one cannot PROVE the validity of the senses by
>> means of the senses without begging the question.
..
>Uh-huh. Can one prove it by reduction--showing that the
>alternatives are incoherent? Rand seems to be doing this,
>and seems to be in need of a beter argument against apriori
>knowledge.
I don't see Rand doing anything but asserting the illusion of a stolen
concept premise as if it were something real. As I have shown on this
forum many times, it is not necessary to steal the concept of the
senses anyway. Nor did Rand give an example of any philosophical
treatise where such a sophomoric blunder in logic was made. Besides,
every philosopher throughout history knows you cannot prove that
everything you sense is an illusion without first being aware of what
is not illusion. Even Kant stated, in the first paragraph of the CPR,
that all knowledge begins with the senses. This completely detracts
from attempts to invalidate the senses through means other than the
senses, that is, through what Kant called Pure Reason. Thus he wrote a
Critique of Pure Reason, a criticism aimed at attempts at doing pure
philosophy or pure metaphysics which completely lack grounding in the
sensible world and its rules (or to put it another way, to treat the
noumenal as if it were phenomenally real). It is not the senses which
are deceived by the attempt, but reason which is deceived and pure
metaphysics which is the "airy" illusion for Kant.
1Z
> On Wed, 09 Dec 2009 09:56:16 -0800, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> >On 8 Dec, 14:40, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> >> What's more interesting and relevant, however, is the modern view of
> >> concepts (of which Rand's theory is a part). The modern view conflates
> >> the process of forming of concepts with the process of forming of
> >> Universals -
>
> >WTH is "forming a universal"?
>
> A Universal establishes through formalization a quality common to all
> members of a set of entities.
A real, mind-independent quality can't be "formed" by the mind
(by any process of formalisation or otherwise). The mind can
form a concept of a predicate *of* a common quality. But
a common quality itself has to be a real universal, or some other
metaphysical posit.
> The big question is, "How does the mind
> do this?" Rand and a whole host of other Modernists confounded this
> process with the easier problem of concept-formation.
What is the difference, if they a both mind-dependent?
1Z
> On Wed, 09 Dec 2009 09:49:52 -0800, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> >On 8 Dec, 02:59, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> >> On Mon, 07 Dec 2009 17:48:04 -0800, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com>
> >> wrote:
>
> >> >On Dec 7, 6:53 pm, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> >> >> Universals do not exist, and the "problem" is that
> >> >> classical realism treats them as real.
>
> >> >If a universal is a statement that translates to,
> >> >"All x are y," in what manner does it not exist?
>
> >> As a certain type of concept ending in -ness.
>
> >Real universals are supposed ot be mind-indpendent
> >entities *corresponfing* to -ness words.
>
> Well, yes, assuming they are real (concrete). The ancient version �of
> this problem was metaphysical. But if universals don't represent
> concretes, as in the modern view, then what DO they represent?
Nothing -- in short. The non-realist approaches are basically
deflationary and
say that there is no distinct univesal at all, that so-called
universals
are somehting else-- a word or concept.
> Rand's tactic in ITOE is a dangerous one, because if a Universal can
> be classified as just another concept, and if Universals are found not
> to represent concretes - then all other concepts fall prey to the same
> argument.
I am guessing that when you say it does not represent
a concrete, you mean it doesn not represent and individual...
>And the same question can be asked: if the concept "table"
> does not represent a concrete, then what does it represent?
..well, it doesn;t represent an individual. You are heading towards
the Russelian analysis, where only proper names and inidicatives
stand for individuals. So how is that a problem for Rand? She should
have dismissed common nouns like "table" and not just abstract nouns
like "tableness" as anti-concepts as well?
> >That probably isn;t true of fudnamental physical qualities like
> >the charge on an electron.
>
> In that case, then I need to remind you I'm dealing with the Universal
> "redness" which is not a concept such as "charge of an electron."
What;'s the difference?
> >The problem of universals is not jsut the epistemic
> >issue of how things are grouped together by us,
> >but also the metaphsyical question of how
> >objective resemblances work in the first place.
>
> I agree that resemblance has a great role to play in all this, but it
> also begs the question of what makes a resemblance possible in the
> first place.
Exactly my point. Dispensing of universals in the epsitemic/
psychological
arena does not dispense with them in the metaphysical arena--
especially
if one's epistemology leans on the unexplaoned fact that similar
things somehow
just do resemble each other.
"What" makes a resemblance possible is not only something
> metaphyisically concrete (obviously there needs to be external
> "data"), but the very resemblance itself is not at first conceptual,
> it is represented to the mind as resemblance before any concept of it
> is formed.
It actually is a resemblance before it has encountered a mind at all,
or there
is not hope of objectivity.
> This is the case even in ITOE (although Rand would shun the word
> "resemblance"). I have no doubt that Rand looked at two or more
> entities and found features they had in common, and then formed a
> concept of them. However, the process of discovering commonalities
> (resemblances) has never been dealt with, it is merely taken for
> granted
..which is why her accountis so incomplete...
>implicitly as a power or faculty of reason or perception.
..or a brute fact...
Malrassic Park
>On 9 Dec, 18:58, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On Wed, 09 Dec 2009 09:56:16 -0800, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>> >On 8 Dec, 14:40, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>> >> What's more interesting and relevant, however, is the modern view of
>> >> concepts (of which Rand's theory is a part). The modern view conflates
>> >> the process of forming of concepts with the process of forming of
>> >> Universals -
..
>> >WTH is "forming a universal"?
..
>> A Universal establishes through formalization a quality common to all
>> members of a set of entities.
..
>A real, mind-independent quality can't be "formed" by the mind
>(by any process of formalisation or otherwise). The mind can
>form a concept of a predicate *of* a common quality. But
>a common quality itself has to be a real universal, or some other
>metaphysical posit.
You are assuming that Universals are mind-independent. Nobody today
believes that the color red, and particularly redness, is
mind-independent. The color red is a product of the modifying sense of
sight acting upon light-waves. How the color then comes to
consciousness is another question that has never been answered. For
those of you who don't believe the products of sight are
modifications, the eyes literally turn the world as it would appear
upside-down if not for your mind turning it upright again.
>> The big question is, "How does the mind
>> do this?" Rand and a whole host of other Modernists confounded this
>> process with the easier problem of concept-formation.
>
>What is the difference, if they a both mind-dependent?
..
I would say the biggest difference is that concept-formation is
largely a conscious process, while the process of forming Universals
is a secret hidden in the depths of the mind.
Malrassic Park
Rand did not dismiss Universals as anti-concepts, Charles Bell did
that in a previous post ( where he wrote, "Both religionists and
scientists typically use the anti-concept of the universal..."). Of
course you have to consider the source - and I noticed you didn't ask
him for a cite so apparently you consider his knowledge of this
subject to be valid beyond question.
>> >That probably isn;t true of fudnamental physical qualities like
>> >the charge on an electron.
..
>> In that case, then I need to remind you I'm dealing with the Universal
>> "redness" which is not a concept such as "charge of an electron."
..
>What;'s the difference?
That is the very topic of this sub-thread.
>> >The problem of universals is not jsut the epistemic
>> >issue of how things are grouped together by us,
>> >but also the metaphsyical question of how
>> >objective resemblances work in the first place.
>>
>> I agree that resemblance has a great role to play in all this, but it
>> also begs the question of what makes a resemblance possible in the
>> first place.
>
>Exactly my point. Dispensing of universals in the epsitemic/
>psychological
>arena does not dispense with them in the metaphysical arena--
>especially
>if one's epistemology leans on the unexplaoned fact that similar
>things somehow
>just do resemble each other.
Rand's epistemology leans on that, but a proper epistemology would
actually deal with it instead of leaning, or in her case, assuming it.
Instead, Rand answered some relatively simple questions (and not very
well), and then behaved as if discovering an "answer" to the most
profound philosophical riddle of the ages was child's play for her
astonishing intellect - "And then I asked myself, "What is it that my
mind does when I use concepts? To what do I refer, and how do I learn
new concepts?" And within half an hour, I had the answer." (ITOE2,
307)
Yes, but she had an answer to a quite different question, not the
Problem of Universals.
>"What" makes a resemblance possible is not only something
>> metaphyisically concrete (obviously there needs to be external
>> "data"), but the very resemblance itself is not at first conceptual,
>> it is represented to the mind as resemblance before any concept of it
>> is formed.
..
>It actually is a resemblance before it has encountered a mind at all,
>or there is not hope of objectivity.
You have not shown how objectivity relies on the problem of
resemblance, and how your statement is not merely another straw man.
>> This is the case even in ITOE (although Rand would shun the word
>> "resemblance"). I have no doubt that Rand looked at two or more
>> entities and found features they had in common, and then formed a
>> concept of them. However, the process of discovering commonalities
>> (resemblances) has never been dealt with, it is merely taken for
>> granted
..
>..which is why her accountis so incomplete...
..
>>implicitly as a power or faculty of reason or perception.
..
>..or a brute fact...
A fact (brute or otherwise) has to be verified as a fact, and this
requires a mental process. You are confusing the product of a process
with a concrete.
1Z
> >A real, mind-independent quality can't be "formed" by the mind
> >(by any process of formalisation or otherwise). The mind can
> >form a concept of �a predicate *of* a common quality. But
> >a common quality itself has to be a real universal, or some other
> >metaphysical posit.
>
> You are assuming that Universals are mind-independent.
Real universals are mind-independent by definition.
The rest might as well be called predicates.
>Nobody today
> believes that the color red, and particularly redness, is
> mind-independent.
You mean the *quale*? What about sphereness? Is it impossible
for anything to be sphercial as an objective fact?
> The color red is a product of the modifying sense of
> sight acting upon light-waves. How the color then comes to
> consciousness is another question that has never been answered. For
> those of you who don't believe the products of sight are
> modifications, the eyes literally turn the world as it would appear
> upside-down if not for your mind turning it upright again.
How things resemble each other is one thing: how
we represent them is another.
> >What is the difference, if they a both mind-dependent?
>
> ..
> I would say the biggest difference is that concept-formation is
> largely a conscious process, while the process of forming Universals
> is a secret hidden in the depths of the mind.
It can't be just in the mind, or we would never be able
to have uniform perceptions and concpetions.
1Z
> >Exactly my point. Dispensing of universals in the epsitemic/
> >psychological
> >arena does not dispense with them in the metaphysical arena--
> >especially
> >if one's epistemology leans on the unexplaoned fact that similar
> >things somehow
> >just do resemble each other.
>
> Rand's epistemology leans on that, but a proper epistemology would
> actually deal with it instead of leaning, or in her case, assuming it.
True up to a point, although it takes you outside metaphysics.
> Yes, but she had an answer to a quite different question, not the
> Problem of Universals.
>
>
>
> >"What" makes a resemblance possible is not only something
> >> metaphyisically concrete (obviously there needs to be external
> >> "data"), but the very resemblance itself is not at first conceptual,
> >> it is represented to the mind as resemblance before any concept of it
> >> is formed.
> ..
> >It actually is a resemblance before it has encountered a mind at all,
> >or there is not hope of objectivity.
>
> You have not shown how objectivity relies on the problem of
> resemblance, and how your statement is not merely another straw man.
It comes about from a consideration that Kant ignores: how different
people come to uniform judgements. If nothing actually resembles
anythign else at all, then any declaration to the effect that they
do must be arbitrary, and therefore different people's declarations
will be chaotically non-uniform.
> >> This is the case even in ITOE (although Rand would shun the word
> >> "resemblance"). I have no doubt that Rand looked at two or more
> >> entities and found features they had in common, and then formed a
> >> concept of them. However, the process of discovering commonalities
> >> (resemblances) has never been dealt with, it is merely taken for
> >> granted
> ..
> >..which is why her accountis so incomplete...
> ..
> >>implicitly as a power or faculty of reason or perception.
> ..
> >..or a brute fact...
>
> A fact (brute or otherwise) has to be verified as a fact, and this
> requires a mental process.
A *brute* fact is by definition somehting that *is* whether
or not is known to be, so that is quite wrong. A brute fact
is *not* just a true proposition
> You are confusing the product of a process
> with a concrete.
You are confusing facts with truths.
Malrassic Park
>On 9 Dec, 20:39, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>> >A real, mind-independent quality can't be "formed" by the mind
>> >(by any process of formalisation or otherwise). The mind can
>> >form a concept of �a predicate *of* a common quality. But
>> >a common quality itself has to be a real universal, or some other
>> >metaphysical posit.
..
>> You are assuming that Universals are mind-independent.
..
>Real universals are mind-independent by definition.
>The rest might as well be called predicates.
You're about 2,500 years out of date.
>>Nobody today
>> believes that the color red, and particularly redness, is
>> mind-independent.
>
>You mean the *quale*? What about sphereness? Is it impossible
>for anything to be sphercial as an objective fact?
You are conflating "spherical" with "sphereness."
>> The color red is a product of the modifying sense of
>> sight acting upon light-waves. How the color then comes to
>> consciousness is another question that has never been answered. For
>> those of you who don't believe the products of sight are
>> modifications, the eyes literally turn the world as it would appear
>> upside-down if not for your mind turning it upright again.
..
>How things resemble each other is one thing: how
>we represent them is another.
Yes, the process (the how) is not the same as the product
(representation).
>> >What is the difference, if they a both mind-dependent?
..
>> I would say the biggest difference is that concept-formation is
>> largely a conscious process, while the process of forming Universals
>> is a secret hidden in the depths of the mind.
..
>It can't be just in the mind, or we would never be able
>to have uniform perceptions and concpetions.
No, that's how you get uniform perceptions and conceptions.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/universals-medieval/
..
..
..
..
..
..
Malrassic Park
>On 9 Dec, 20:58, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>> >Exactly my point. Dispensing of universals in the epsitemic/
>> >psychological
>> >arena does not dispense with them in the metaphysical arena--
>> >especially
>> >if one's epistemology leans on the unexplaoned fact that similar
>> >things somehow
>> >just do resemble each other.
..
>> Rand's epistemology leans on that, but a proper epistemology would
>> actually deal with it instead of leaning, or in her case, assuming it.
..
>True up to a point, although it takes you outside metaphysics.
You seem to be unaware of another aspect of all this: the metaphysics
involving the mind itself, that is, a metaphysical investigation into
the mind itself (which is not psychology).
>> Yes, but she had an answer to a quite different question, not the
>> Problem of Universals.
..
>> >"What" makes a resemblance possible is not only something
>> >> metaphyisically concrete (obviously there needs to be external
>> >> "data"), but the very resemblance itself is not at first conceptual,
>> >> it is represented to the mind as resemblance before any concept of it
>> >> is formed.
..
>> >It actually is a resemblance before it has encountered a mind at all,
>> >or there is not hope of objectivity.
..
>> You have not shown how objectivity relies on the problem of
>> resemblance, and how your statement is not merely another straw man.
..
>It comes about from a consideration that Kant ignores: how different
>people come to uniform judgements. If nothing actually resembles
>anythign else at all, then any declaration to the effect that they
>do must be arbitrary, and therefore different people's declarations
>will be chaotically non-uniform.
A metaphysics of the human mind would give you one of two different
answers: either every mind processes the same "data" the same way (red
is red to every perceiving being), or if not, then it doesn't matter
if, let's say, the color red appears different to you than it does to
me because we can still all agree that it is a perception of
"redness."
I don't see how Kant ignored that consideration, it was his conclusion
that the laws of perception, reality, consciousness, work the same for
everybody.
>> >> This is the case even in ITOE (although Rand would shun the word
>> >> "resemblance"). I have no doubt that Rand looked at two or more
>> >> entities and found features they had in common, and then formed a
>> >> concept of them. However, the process of discovering commonalities
>> >> (resemblances) has never been dealt with, it is merely taken for
>> >> granted
..
>> >..which is why her accountis so incomplete...
..
>> >>implicitly as a power or faculty of reason or perception.
..
>> >..or a brute fact...
..
>> A fact (brute or otherwise) has to be verified as a fact, and this
>> requires a mental process.
..
>A *brute* fact is by definition somehting that *is* whether
>or not is known to be, so that is quite wrong. A brute fact
>is *not* just a true proposition
..
>> You are confusing the product of a process
>> with a concrete.
..
>You are confusing facts with truths.
I have not referred to those concepts. But you are more than welcome
to study up on the Problem of Universals before getting back to me
with a response. I'll wait.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/universals-medieval/
1Z
> >Real universals are mind-independent by definition.
> >The rest might as well be called predicates.
>
> You're about 2,500 years out of date.
You're confusing universals and qualia.
> >>Nobody today
> >> believes that the color red, and particularly redness, is
> >> mind-independent.
>
> >You mean the *quale*? What about sphereness? Is it impossible
> >for anything to be sphercial as an objective fact?
>
> You are conflating "spherical" with "sphereness."
That's trivial. To be X-ical is to instantiate X-ness,and vice-versa.
> >How things resemble each other is one thing: how
> >we represent them is another.
>
> Yes, the process (the how) is not the same as the product
> (representation).
You've never really got to how things resemble each other,
because you've never got outside the mind.
> >It can't be just in the mind, or we would never be able
> >to have uniform perceptions and concpetions.
>
> No, that's how you get uniform perceptions and
> conceptions.http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/universals-medieval/
Nope. Uniform operations of the mind alone are not sufficient to
povide a uniform output unless there
is uniformity in the input
Malrassic Park
>
>> You are confusing the product of a process
>> with a concrete.
>
>You are confusing facts with truths.
Consider this statement close to the beginning of the page I cited for
you: "Of course, from our point of view, the important thing about
this demonstration is not so much the truth of its conclusion as the
way it proves this conclusion. For the conclusion is a universal
theorem, which has to concern all possible triangles inscribed in any
possible semicircle whatsoever, not just the one inscribed in the
semicircle in the figure above. Yet, apparently, in the demonstration
above we were talking only about that triangle. So, how can we claim
that whatever we managed to prove concerning that particular triangle
will hold for all possible triangles?"
So you see, the universal in his example is not a simple truth, it is
the product of a rational process, in this case, a theorem involving a
right triangle inscribed in a circle. You may say it is a truth, or
even a fact, but only AFTER it has been established through a
reasoning process.
1Z
> >It comes about from a consideration that Kant ignores: how different
> >people come to uniform judgements. If nothing actually resembles
> >anythign else at all, then any declaration to the effect that they
> >do must be arbitrary, and therefore different people's declarations
> >will be chaotically non-uniform.
>
> A metaphysics of the human mind would give you one of two different
> answers: either every mind processes the same "data" the same way (red
> is red to every perceiving being), or if not, then it doesn't matter
> if, let's say, the color red appears different to you than it does to
> me because we can still all agree that it is a perception of
> "redness."
Only on the basis that one red thing looks like another
red thing TO ME -- EVEN IF I HAVE AN IDOSYNCRATIC
REDNESS-QUALE. If tomatos and strawberries and "stop" lights
look different to EACH OTHER , then I have no basis on which to
apply an uniform term to them, (Specifically, I have no basis to
recognise a novel red object --as blind people can't--even if I have
first memorised a list
of conventional red items -- as blind people can).
> I don't see how Kant ignored that consideration, it was his conclusion
> that the laws of perception, reality, consciousness, work the same for
> everybody.
Uniform processing does not produce uniform output without uniform
input.
1Z
> I have not referred to those concepts. But you are more than welcome
> to study up on the Problem of Universals before getting back to me
> with a response. I'll
> wait.http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/universals-medieval/
"In metaphysics, a universal is what particular things have in common,
namely characteristics or qualities. In other words, universals are
repeatable or recurrent entities that can be instantiated or
exemplified by many particular things.[1] For example, suppose there
are two chairs in a room, each of which is green."
Nothing about universals being mind-dependent there.
"The problem of universals is an ancient problem in metaphysics
whether universals exist. The problem arises from attempts to account
for the phenomenon of similarity or attribute agreement among things."
Nothing about universals being unconentiously real due to the falsity
of naive realism...
Charles Bell
> On Tue, 08 Dec 2009 03:25:38 -0800, Charles Bell
>
>
>
>
>
> >On Dec 7, 7:32�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> >> On Mon, 07 Dec 2009 15:53:11 -0800, Charles Bell
>
> >> <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> >> >On Dec 7, 6:18�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> >> >> I thought up a shorter form of explaining Randian "epistemology."
> >> >> Take a problem of philosophy, sweep it under the rug ("Let those who
> >> >> attempt to invalidate concepts by declaring that they cannot find
> >> >> "manness" in men,
>
> >> >Like David Friedman's asinine analysis of Objectivism, in which he
> >> >merely criticizes Rand for being a bad utiltitarian even though she
> >> >clearly rejects utilitarianism,
>
> >> All that says is she rejected her own theory without understanding she
> >> was doing so.
>
> >No, she did not reject her own theory by referrencing a long-standing
> >philosophical concept and then rejecting that.
>
> I didn't say she did. You're not understanding me, all I said is that
> IT SAYS she condemned Utilitarianism without knowing it to be related
> to her own theory.
No, she specifically rejected utilitarianism and said exactly why. She
rejected classical realism and said exactly why.
> >> >You have been given the correct rendering of Rand's epistemology to
> >> >which you have never intelligently responded. That you simply repeat
> >> >yourself as if nothing had ever been presented to you is boring.
>
> >> There is no correct rendering of Rand's "epistemology" besides the
> >> one, right here in front of me, called Introduction to Objectivist
> >> Epistemology.
>
> >Which you do not understand, or more likely, prefer to distort for
> >your purposes.
> ..
> >> All I'm saying is that what Rand was not doing cannot be
> >> called Nominalism or Realism
> ..
> >Yes, she rejected both, and the garbled assertion here you are making
> >is that she simply did not understand what she rejected. �The only
> >misunderstanding may be caused by her stated attachment to Aristotle
> >and careless (or, in you case, deliberate) misunderstanding of how she
> >fundamentally differs from Aristotle. �Uyl and Rasmussen go on at
> >length to discuss how Rand is a failed Aristotelean when the fact is
> >she is not an Aristotelean at all, even though she starts grounded in
> >that failed classical philosophy.
>
> You have no clue as to what I understand or fail to understand.
> However, I never said Rand failed to understand Nominalism or Realism.
No, she understood Nominalism and (classical) Realism, she rejected
Nominalism and Realism, and she expalined why.
> As for Aristotleanism, I am on record as having stated that Rand
> thought she understood Aristotle, but in fact she only understood one
> possible interpretation,
One might fault Rand in not properly distancing herself from Aristotle
(indeed she held him as a hero), but she admired what he established
in naturalist-realism and deductive logic, and certainly used
Aristotle as a starting point, but one is clear in her departure with
Aristotle by studying her epistemology. It has been alleged that
Aristotle had the making for contextual epistemology and that Rand
merely finished up, but I have never seen a good demonstration of
that.
>
> I have discussed the 'sense-datum' idea here many times. The idea is
> based on a mechanistic, computerish view of the mind as a machine that
> takes in data and generates concepts and theories.
Oh you can say that, but you are wrong. The obective basis for concept-
formation starts with something that is undeniably real (stick a poker
up your butt and see how).
>
> I said in my response that nobody, but nobody has denied objectivity
> or reality.
The denial consists in the denial of the objectivity of concepts.
> The modern view conflates
> the process of forming of concepts with the process of forming of
> Universals -
All of which is debunked by Objectivism.
> Aristotle treated with the problem of Universals, while
> Rand and the other Modernists merely swept it under the rug conflating
> it with concept-formation.
There is no such thing as a 'universal'. No rug. No confusion.
Charles Bell
> largely a conscious process, while the process of forming Universals
> is a secret hidden in the depths of the mind
The voo-doo you do.
Malrassic Park
>On 9 Dec, 21:53, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>> >It comes about from a consideration that Kant ignores: how different
>> >people come to uniform judgements. If nothing actually resembles
>> >anythign else at all, then any declaration to the effect that they
>> >do must be arbitrary, and therefore different people's declarations
>> >will be chaotically non-uniform.
>>
>> A metaphysics of the human mind would give you one of two different
>> answers: either every mind processes the same "data" the same way (red
>> is red to every perceiving being), or if not, then it doesn't matter
>> if, let's say, the color red appears different to you than it does to
>> me because we can still all agree that it is a perception of
>> "redness."
>
>Only on the basis that one red thing looks like another
>red thing TO ME -- EVEN IF I HAVE AN IDOSYNCRATIC
>REDNESS-QUALE. If tomatos and strawberries and "stop" lights
>look different to EACH OTHER , then I have no basis on which to
>apply an uniform term to them, (Specifically, I have no basis to
>recognise a novel red object --as blind people can't--even if I have
>first memorised a list of conventional red items -- as blind people can).
We can agree that light-waves are the cause of the sensation from one
instance to another, correct? But is a light-wave itself colored? No,
it is too small to be seen, and besides, a light-wave has no color,
only things can have color. And the cause of the sensation is not the
sensation itself, otherwise you would have to say that sensations lie
outside the mind, which is the reductio at the basis of your idea of
objective universals.
>> I don't see how Kant ignored that consideration, it was his conclusion
>> that the laws of perception, reality, consciousness, work the same for
>> everybody.
..
>Uniform processing does not produce uniform output without uniform
>input.
Dogmatic computer analogies are dissatisfying to me, but they can be
useful. It's not necessarily the case, at any rate, that uniform
"input" actually exists, or that it even has to exist in order to
create the desired "output." It is logically sufficient for the mind
to create the uniformity prior to the "output" in an idealized version
of reality as it really might be.
And so you are given the example of the right triangle inscribed in
the circle at the webpage cited. It is not the ideal triangle, it is
actually quite inaccurate, but it is adequate to the task. In other
words, we can make a triangle out of it, at least in our minds, and
represent it idealistically. This process is often employed in
examples where part of a figure is drawn and the mind is somehow
"forced" to envision the part that was omitted. Your mind will fill in
the blanks with you, and without your conscious participation or any
thinking involved.
So when we say it is a "process," I wonder what process is involved
since no part of it can form in your awareness only the "output."
Malrassic Park
>On 9 Dec, 21:53, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>> I have not referred to those concepts. But you are more than welcome
>> to study up on the Problem of Universals before getting back to me
>> with a response. I'll
>> wait.http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/universals-medieval/
..
>"In metaphysics, a universal is what particular things have in common,
>namely characteristics or qualities. In other words, universals are
>repeatable or recurrent entities that can be instantiated or
>exemplified by many particular things.[1] For example, suppose there
>are two chairs in a room, each of which is green."
..
>Nothing about universals being mind-dependent there.
..
>"The problem of universals is an ancient problem in metaphysics
>whether universals exist. The problem arises from attempts to account
>for the phenomenon of similarity or attribute agreement among things."
..
>Nothing about universals being unconentiously real due to the falsity
>of naive realism...
I simply asked you to learn about the topic you're discussing, not to
throw out of context bits of a webpage in my virtual face.
Answer this question honestly, one way or the other: Are you willing
to learn philosophy, or not?
Malrassic Park
..
>> >How things resemble each other is one thing: how
>> >we represent them is another.
..
>> Yes, the process (the how) is not the same as the product
>> (representation).
..
>You've never really got to how things resemble each other,
>because you've never got outside the mind.
Learn about the problem before responding again.
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
Your entire response of one-liners is irrelevant.
Charles Bell
> On Wed, 09 Dec 2009 15:35:59 -0800, Charles Bell
>
No, the entirety of your post is irrelevant. And notice the only bite
you can get from this trolling expedition is the imbecile from England
(who hates black people). Come back when you have something new to
say. Everything else is just tried crap you recycle from time to time.
1Z
> >> A metaphysics of the human mind would give you one of two different
> >> answers: either every mind processes the same "data" the same way (red
> >> is red to every perceiving being), or if not, then it doesn't matter
> >> if, let's say, the color red appears different to you than it does to
> >> me because we can still all agree that it is a perception of
> >> "redness."
>
> >Only on the basis that one red thing looks like another
> >red thing TO ME -- EVEN IF I HAVE AN IDOSYNCRATIC
> >REDNESS-QUALE. If tomatos and strawberries and "stop" lights
> >look different to EACH OTHER , then I have no basis on which to
> >apply an uniform term to them, (Specifically, I have no basis to
> >recognise a novel red object --as blind people can't--even if I have
> >first memorised a list of conventional red items -- as blind people can).
>
> We can agree that light-waves are the cause of the sensation from one
> instance to another, correct? But is a light-wave itself colored? No,
> it is too small to be seen, and besides, a light-wave has no color,
> only things can have color. And the cause of the sensation is not the
> sensation itself, otherwise you would have to say that sensations lie
> outside the mind, which is the reductio at the basis of your idea of
> objective universals.
No it isn't: you are taking "Universal" to mean "quale" again.
My argument stands: objective knowledge requires a basis outside of
the mind. Uniform mental operations are not enough. The objective
basis of (dis)similarity might be something other than real
universals, but
it remains the case that univerals have to be shown to be redundant
both metaphyscially and epistemologically.
> >> I don't see how Kant ignored that consideration, it was his conclusion
> >> that the laws of perception, reality, consciousness, work the same for
> >> everybody.
> ..
> >Uniform processing does not produce uniform output without uniform
> >input.
>
> Dogmatic computer analogies are dissatisfying to me, but they can be
> useful.
I argue the same point in detail above.
> It's not necessarily the case, at any rate, that uniform
> "input" actually exists, or that it even has to exist in order to
> create the desired "output."
I have argued that it must exist in order to produce
intersubjective agreement.
> It is logically sufficient for the mind
> to create the uniformity prior to the "output" in an idealized version
> of reality as it really might be.
You are making the typically Kantian mistake
of ignoring the way *pluralities* of minds operate.
> And so you are given the example of the right triangle inscribed in
> the circle at the webpage cited. It is not the ideal triangle, it is
> actually quite inaccurate, but it is adequate to the task. In other
> words, we can make a triangle out of it, at least in our minds, and
> represent it idealistically. This process is often employed in
> examples where part of a figure is drawn and the mind is somehow
> "forced" to envision the part that was omitted. Your mind will fill in
> the blanks with you, and without your conscious participation or any
> thinking involved.
Whatever. I am not disputing that there *are* qualia,
percepts, sense-data, automatic processes or whatever.
I am disputing that, alone, they are adequate to
explain intersubjective agreement.
> So when we say it is a "process," I wonder what process is involved
> since no part of it can form in your awareness only the "output."
An unconscious process. You idealism is showing.
Malrassic Park
>On 9 Dec, 23:43, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>> >> A metaphysics of the human mind would give you one of two different
>> >> answers: either every mind processes the same "data" the same way (red
>> >> is red to every perceiving being), or if not, then it doesn't matter
>> >> if, let's say, the color red appears different to you than it does to
>> >> me because we can still all agree that it is a perception of
>> >> "redness."
..
>> >Only on the basis that one red thing looks like another
>> >red thing TO ME -- EVEN IF I HAVE AN IDOSYNCRATIC
>> >REDNESS-QUALE. If tomatos and strawberries and "stop" lights
>> >look different to EACH OTHER , then I have no basis on which to
>> >apply an uniform term to them, (Specifically, I have no basis to
>> >recognise a novel red object --as blind people can't--even if I have
>> >first memorised a list of conventional red items -- as blind people can).
..
>> We can agree that light-waves are the cause of the sensation from one
>> instance to another, correct? But is a light-wave itself colored? No,
>> it is too small to be seen, and besides, a light-wave has no color,
>> only things can have color. And the cause of the sensation is not the
>> sensation itself, otherwise you would have to say that sensations lie
>> outside the mind, which is the reductio at the basis of your idea of
>> objective universals.
..
>No it isn't: you are taking "Universal" to mean "quale" again.
I did not say that a Universal is a sensation of redness, I am only
showing the ridiculousness of asserting that Universals are "out
there." Read the webpage: there is no universal triangle out there, if
there was then it would have to be every type of triangle conceivable,
which is a contradiction since a triangle cannot be both scalene and
isoscoles at the same time.
As you can see from that example, a Universal is not a sensation, of
redness or whatever, nor is it a particular of any kind (and only
particulars can be said to be concretes). It is a generalized pattern,
a schema, a description that can be applied to every member of a set
of particulars. You recognize the quale of redness because it is
similar to the pattern, the Universal, of redness formed somewhere in
your mind.
>My argument stands:
You have no argument, only assertions that beg the question, as I have
shown.
> objective knowledge requires a basis outside of
>the mind. Uniform mental operations are not enough. The objective
>basis of (dis)similarity might be something other than real
>universals, but
>it remains the case that univerals have to be shown to be redundant
>both metaphyscially and epistemologically.
You are tackling a straw man that was never discussed on this thread,
at least not by me.
>> >> I don't see how Kant ignored that consideration, it was his conclusion
>> >> that the laws of perception, reality, consciousness, work the same for
>> >> everybody.
..
>> >Uniform processing does not produce uniform output without uniform
>> >input.
..
>> Dogmatic computer analogies are dissatisfying to me, but they can be
>> useful.
..
>I argue the same point in detail above.
..
>> It's not necessarily the case, at any rate, that uniform
>> "input" actually exists, or that it even has to exist in order to
>> create the desired "output."
..
>I have argued that it must exist in order to produce
>intersubjective agreement.
No, you have only assumed what you started out to prove - and you had
some statement concerning intersubjective agreement which I agreed
with, in these terms: either the process is the same for all, or if it
is not then we can all agree that red is red even if it appears
differently to everybody.
But intersubjective agreement didn't prove enough to you, at which
point you took the argument to a new level: you yourself
hypothetically cannot decide on a color being red from a stop sign to
a tomato, therefore, you think uniformity of these universals is
important for perceiving them as being the same. But that is patently
false, as it is not the case that every instantiation of a universal
is identical to every other; yet you perceive them that way
nevertheless. A Universal cannot be a concrete.
>> It is logically sufficient for the mind
>> to create the uniformity prior to the "output" in an idealized version
>> of reality as it really might be.
..
>You are making the typically Kantian mistake
>of ignoring the way *pluralities* of minds operate.
You yourself took it to the level of the individual who cannot decide
on the color of various red objects. And anyway, for Kant the laws of
understanding are true (necessary) for all rational beings throughout
the universe, or so goes the argument in the transcendental deduction
of categories.
>> And so you are given the example of the right triangle inscribed in
>> the circle at the webpage cited. It is not the ideal triangle, it is
>> actually quite inaccurate, but it is adequate to the task. In other
>> words, we can make a triangle out of it, at least in our minds, and
>> represent it idealistically. This process is often employed in
>> examples where part of a figure is drawn and the mind is somehow
>> "forced" to envision the part that was omitted. Your mind will fill in
>> the blanks with you, and without your conscious participation or any
>> thinking involved.
..
>Whatever. I am not disputing that there *are* qualia,
>percepts, sense-data, automatic processes or whatever.
..
>I am disputing that, alone, they are adequate to
>explain intersubjective agreement.
Well, you can always start a new thread involving the new topic you
have invented.
>> So when we say it is a "process," I wonder what process is involved
>> since no part of it can form in your awareness only the "output."
..
>An unconscious process. You idealism is showing.
Your assumptions are showing. There is no way to know if a process is
truly involved, it is only a useful way of discussing the matter.
Malrassic Park
Charles, Charles, Charles. Since you did have a good point earlier
about the nature of the debate over Universals, I'll take a little
time to justify my statement there with a little more detail.
The first statement you made in that post above had nothing to do with
what I said. The second statement you made in that post above had
nothing to do with what I said.
The third paragraph diverged into stuff that Rand thought about
Aristotle, and stated that Aristotle was, let's call it, a
proto-Randite in the realm of epistemology. But I have already stated
my own thought that Aristotle knew more about the issue of
concept-formation versus the formation of universals than Rand who
conflated the two. So you were aiming your thoughts at entirely the
wrong person here.
The fourth paragraph was some stupid example about red hot pokers
which at best would only involve qualia (heat sensation) and not
universals but has nothing to do with the topic - so it is irrelevant.
Your final three statements were one-liners without substance.
1Z
That problem doesn't apply to the *definition* of a triangle as a
three-sided
figure. It therefore need not apply to the universal either. Your
argument
surreptitiously assumes that the Universal of a Triangle is a also
a *particular* triangle. If it is not a particular, there is no reason
to
suppose it would have to have specific lengths and angles a
particulars do.
Moreover, you don't get to assume that there *are* subjective
universals
just because there are no objective ones .
> As you can see from that example, a Universal is not a sensation, of
> redness or whatever, nor is it a particular of any kind (and only
> particulars can be said to be concretes). It is a generalized pattern,
> a schema, a description that can be applied to every member of a set
> of particulars. You recognize the quale of redness because it is
> similar to the pattern, the Universal, of redness formed somewhere in
> your mind.
That description in every way fits a concept except that is held to
be pre-conscious.
> >My argument stands:
>
> You have no argument, only assertions that beg the question, as I have
> shown.
>
> > objective knowledge requires a basis outside of
> >the mind. Uniform mental operations are not enough. The objective
> >basis of (dis)similarity might be something other than real
> >universals, but
> >it remains the case that �univerals have to be shown to be redundant
> >both metaphyscially and epistemologically.
>
> You are tackling a straw man that was never discussed on this thread,
> at least not by me.
You assert below the fallacy that uniform mental operations are
sufficient to deliver objectivity.
> >> It's not necessarily the case, at any rate, that uniform
> >> "input" actually exists, or that it even has to exist in order to
> >> create the desired "output."
> ..
> >I have argued that it must exist in order to produce
> >intersubjective agreement.
>
> No, you have only assumed what you started out to prove - and you had
> some statement concerning intersubjective agreement which I agreed
> with, in these terms: either the process is the same for all, or if it
> is not then we can all agree that red is red even if it appears
> differently to everybody.
That is what I a disputing. The sameness of the process is not enough,
you also
need the sameness of the perceived objects
> But intersubjective agreement didn't prove enough to you, at which
> point you took the argument to a new level: you yourself
> hypothetically cannot decide on a color being red from a stop sign to
> a tomato, therefore, you think uniformity of these universals is
> important for perceiving them as being the same.
I think their being the same is important for their being perceived
the same. In my example the objects *themselves* are varying randomly,
*not* my process of assigning qualia to them,
>But that is patently
> false, as it is not the case that every instantiation of a universal
> is identical to every other;
You have no evidence of that. It may well be the case
that every instance of a *true universal is identical to every
other..and also possible
that many of our categorisations are only approximations to the true
universals.
Your mistake is assuming that universals have to correspond exactly
to predicates in the English language. But there are (for instance)
more
wavelengths of light than we could possible have words for.
> yet you perceive them that way
> nevertheless.
Then there is *more* objective resemblance out there
than I need. So what? I am arguing that intersubjective agreement
cannot be based on zero objective resemblance.
> A Universal cannot be a concrete.
Says who? You only have an argument that it can't be aparticular. A
little
question-begging, n'est pas
> >> It is logically sufficient for the mind
> >> to create the uniformity prior to the "output" in an idealized version
> >> of reality as it really might be.
> ..
> >You are making the typically Kantian mistake
> >of ignoring the way *pluralities* of minds operate.
>
> You yourself took it to the level of the individual who cannot decide
> on the color of various red objects. And anyway, for Kant the laws of
> understanding are true (necessary) for all rational beings throughout
> the universe, or so goes the argument in the transcendental deduction
> of categories.
But he doesn;t think that through. He doesn't realise that
uniform operation doesn't provide uniform output without a uniform
input
> >> So when we say it is a "process," I wonder what process is involved
> >> since no part of it can form in your awareness only the "output."
> ..
> >An unconscious process. You idealism is showing.
>
> Your assumptions are showing. There is no way to know if a process is
> truly involved, it is only a useful way of discussing the matter.
How do we "know" that perception is indierct then, Mr idealist?
Charles Bell
> On Wed, 09 Dec 2009 16:29:29 -0800, Charles Bell
>
> >On Dec 9, 7:00嚙緘m, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> >> On Wed, 09 Dec 2009 15:35:59 -0800, Charles Bell
>
> >> <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> >> Your entire response of one-liners is irrelevant.
>
> >you can get from this trolling expedition is the imbecile from England
> >say. 嚙瘟verything else is just tried crap you recycle from time to time.
>
> Charles, Charles, Charles. Since you did have a good point earlier
> about the nature of the debate over Universals, I'll take a little
> time to justify my statement there with a little more detail.
>
We went on for quite a bit about this exact same subject a year or so
ago, and there is nothing wrong in revisiting a subject, but the least
you could do is to take into account what was said then and try a new
tactic taking into account the arguments then used.
> The third paragraph diverged into stuff that Rand thought about
> Aristotle, and stated that Aristotle was, let's call it, a
> proto-Randite in the realm of epistemology. But I have already stated
> my own thought that Aristotle knew more about the issue of
> concept-formation versus the formation of universals than Rand who
> conflated the two. So you were aiming your thoughts at entirely the
> wrong person here.
>
This is saying that Aristotle was wrong and Rand was right. Okay,
fine. What else do you have? Again, I say Rand abolished Aristotle's
Essences to the the rubbish heap of useless philosophical tools,
without discarding Aristotle's naturalistic method of concept-
formation. The concept of the "universal" is a dead-end metaphysical
concept, hence, the "problem of the universal", and has thus become an
annoying anti-concept for people like you to criticize Rand in a way
no different than the theist will use the anti-concept, "God", to
criticize atheist moral philosophers.
> The fourth paragraph was some stupid example about red hot pokers
> which at best would only involve qualia (heat sensation) and not
> universals but has nothing to do with the topic - so it is irrelevant.
>
I challenge you to take the test and get back to me on the possibility
of the un-realness of the sensation as a mere subjective quality of
conscious experience. "Qualia" is no less a dead-end anti-concept
than "universal". Reality impinges upon a body in an objective way
and the body will respond in an objective way -- the response being an
objective quality which cannot be changed by consciousness. The
purpose of science is to explore the objective nature of these things.
The purpose of your voo-doo is to deny to science the full range of
discovery. By rejecting nominalism and direct-realism, Rand gives
science the full range of discovery without also giving any scientist
omniscience or claim to direct metaphysical enlightenment.
Charles Bell
> On 7 Dec, 23:53, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > �The problem in both
> > realism and nominalism is that concepts are not treated as
> > *objective*, produced in man's consciousness but in accordance with
> > facts of reality
>
> Not all concepts are objective int hat sense. Calling the ones
> that aren't anti-concpepts is jsut a true scotsman manouvre.
> Moreover, Realism is at least as objective as Randian
> conceptualism. The objection to it should be that it is metaphyscially
> over-egged.
The anti-concept is not a concept that is a mere fantasy but has a
specific meaning:
<< An anti-concept is an artificial, unnecessary and rationally
unusable term designed to replace and obliterate some legitimate
concept. >> AR, Causality versus Duty
"God" is an anti-concept to replace a whole set of useful concepts
like scientific investigation and the origins of the universe and the
source of morality.
"Duty" negates causality in human action.
Classical Realism fails at the so-called "problem of the univerivals"
<< To negate man's mind, it is the conceptual level of his
consciousness that has to be invalidated. Under all the tortuous
complexities, contradictions, equivocations, rationalizations of the
post-Renaissance philosophy-the one consistent line, the fundamental
that explains the rest, is: a concerted attack on man's conceptual
faculty. Most philosophers did not intend to invalidate conceptual
knowledge, but its defenders did more to destroy it than did its
enemies. They were unable to offer a solution to the "problem of
universals," that is: to define the nature and source of abstractions,
to determine the relationship of concepts to perceptual data--and to
prow the validity of scientific induction. Ignoring the lead of
Aristotle, who had not left them a full answer to the problem, but had
shown the direction and the method by which the answer could be found,
the philosophers were unable to refute the Witch Doctor's claim that
their concepts were as arbitrary as his whims and that their
scientific knowledge had no greater metaphysical validity than his
revelations. >> AR, For the New Intellectual, Chapt 1
Jim Klein
> >If a universal is a statement that translates to,
> >"All x are y," in what manner does it not exist?
>
> As a certain type of concept ending in -ness.
Very good---you caught my ambiguity. You see,
the "it" there was meant to be an it. Fine detective
that you are, you correctly looked and saw that "it"
must be referencing "statement," like literally. And
so you begin to ramble on about certain types of
concepts that "it" is being.
Don't worry. Charles got my meaning and answered
the question. Forgive me that I haven't time today
for the rest of your unresponsive and solipsistic
meanderings. This one sentence was enough.
Should that have been "looked-and-saw"?
jk
Jim Klein
> We went on for quite a bit about this exact same subject a year or so
> ago, and there is nothing wrong in revisiting a subject, but the least
> you could do is to take into account what was said then and try a new
> tactic taking into account the arguments then used.
LOL...who's talking counterfactuals now?
jk
1Z
> I challenge you to take the test and get back to me on the possibility
> of the un-realness of the sensation as a mere subjective quality of
> conscious experience. "Qualia" is no less a dead-end anti-concept
> than "universal".
Well opined. So are you sayign they don't exist in any sense at all,
or
they do you have a phsycial explanation up your sleave?
>Reality impinges upon a body in an objective way
> and the body will respond in an objective way --
Uh-huh. Problem being that we don't know what
the "objective" response of a bat to incoming sonar
seems like form the inside.
>the response being an
> objective quality which cannot be changed by consciousness.
Uh-huh. So I can't consciously focus my
attention on different stimuli then?
>The
> purpose of science is to explore the objective nature of these things.
> The purpose of your voo-doo is to deny to science the full range of
> discovery. By rejecting nominalism and direct-realism, Rand gives
> science the full range of discovery without also giving any scientist
> omniscience or claim to direct metaphysical enlightenment.
Hurrah for science! Except evolution, which is 50:50 with
creationism...
1Z
> They were unable to offer a solution to the "problem of
> universals," that is: to define the nature and source of abstractions,
> to determine the relationship of concepts to perceptual data--and to
> prow the validity of scientific induction.
None of those three things is the "problem of universals".
And Rand does not have an answer to the problem of induction.
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>On Dec 9, 11:38嚙緘m, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On Wed, 09 Dec 2009 16:29:29 -0800, Charles Bell
..
>> <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>> >On Dec 9, 7:00嚙緘m, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> >> On Wed, 09 Dec 2009 15:35:59 -0800, Charles Bell
..
>> >> <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>>Your entire response of one-liners is irrelevant.
..
>> >No, the entirety of your post is irrelevant. 嚙璀nd notice the only bite
>> >you can get from this trolling expedition is the imbecile from England
>> >(who hates black people). 嚙瘠ome back when you have something new to
>> >say. 嚙瘟verything else is just tried crap you recycle from time to time.
..
>> Charles, Charles, Charles. Since you did have a good point earlier
>> about the nature of the debate over Universals, I'll take a little
>> time to justify my statement there with a little more detail.
..
>We went on for quite a bit about this exact same subject a year or so
>ago, and there is nothing wrong in revisiting a subject, but the least
>you could do is to take into account what was said then and try a new
>tactic taking into account the arguments then used.
You're free to go back to your fruitless political discussions which
change nothing about politics in reality and change nobody's mind.
>> The third paragraph diverged into stuff that Rand thought about
>> Aristotle, and stated that Aristotle was, let's call it, a
>> proto-Randite in the realm of epistemology. But I have already stated
>> my own thought that Aristotle knew more about the issue of
>> concept-formation versus the formation of universals than Rand who
>> conflated the two. So you were aiming your thoughts at entirely the
>> wrong person here.
..
>This is saying that Aristotle was wrong and Rand was right.
You're not reading me, Charles. What I said was that Aristotle had a
better grasp on the issue than Rand. It doesn't matter if Aristotle's
conclusion was wrong or right, at least he had his premises together
whereas Rand did not.
> Okay, fine. What else do you have? Again, I say Rand abolished Aristotle's
>Essences to the the rubbish heap of useless philosophical tools,
>without discarding Aristotle's naturalistic method of concept-
>formation. The concept of the "universal" is a dead-end metaphysical
>concept, hence, the "problem of the universal", and has thus become an
>annoying anti-concept for people like you to criticize Rand in a way
>no different than the theist will use the anti-concept, "God", to
>criticize atheist moral philosophers.
I don't see criticism as being fundamental to an anti-concept. And I
don't see "God" or "Universal" as being anti-concepts even by
Objectivist standards.
>> The fourth paragraph was some stupid example about red hot pokers
>> which at best would only involve qualia (heat sensation) and not
>> universals but has nothing to do with the topic - so it is irrelevant.
..
>I challenge you to take the test and get back to me on the possibility
>of the un-realness of the sensation as a mere subjective quality of
>conscious experience. "Qualia" is no less a dead-end anti-concept
>than "universal". Reality impinges upon a body in an objective way
>and the body will respond in an objective way -- the response being an
>objective quality which cannot be changed by consciousness. The
>purpose of science is to explore the objective nature of these things.
>The purpose of your voo-doo is to deny to science the full range of
>discovery. By rejecting nominalism and direct-realism, Rand gives
>science the full range of discovery without also giving any scientist
>omniscience or claim to direct metaphysical enlightenment.
Nominalism and direct-realism? Your ignorance is showing, Charles,
"direct-realism" is not one of the topics in the debate. And I never
said that sensation was unreal, that is a straw man. "Omniscience" and
"claim to direct metaphysical enlightenment" are straw men, scientists
don't need Rand's protection from straw men.
Malrassic Park
Nope, I never once implied that a Universal is a particular. The
argument specifically proves that a Universal cannot be a particular -
because, hypothetically speaking, a Universal-particular triangle
would have to be both scalene and isosceles at the same time, which
is a contradiction.
This is not to say what a Universal actually is, it only eliminates
one possibility.
>Moreover, you don't get to assume that there *are* subjective
>universals just because there are no objective ones .
The disposition of the Universal was not proven through the triangle
example at that page. It just says that a Universal triangle is not
and cannot be any particular triangle. That does not speak to its
subjectivity or objectivity, it says that a Universal does not
correspond to any object, which is precisely what I have said from the
beginning. Furthermore, you need help with the concept of
"objectivity" which you merely equate with "being an object," whereas
in fact it refers to a certain method used by a thinking person when
attempting to bracket out all subjective considerations (emotions,
feelings, and the like) in forming a judgment.
>> As you can see from that example, a Universal is not a sensation, of
>> redness or whatever, nor is it a particular of any kind (and only
>> particulars can be said to be concretes). It is a generalized pattern,
>> a schema, a description that can be applied to every member of a set
>> of particulars. You recognize the quale of redness because it is
>> similar to the pattern, the Universal, of redness formed somewhere in
>> your mind.
..
>That description in every way fits a concept except that is held to
>be pre-conscious.
Concepts result from concept-formation. Remember, that is a process of
thinking which is intended toward a certain mental goal. But the mind
also has intentions which we are not directly aware of, only by their
products, the general goal being to make sense of things in perception
and not so much in concept at this level. One common experiment
demonstrating this mental capacity is to take a drawing of something
familiar to us, remove elements from it so that it becomes more
"abstract," then show it to someone and see if they can recognize the
original form. Our minds will readily fill in the blanks where
elements were removed, and solve the problem without any guidance
from concept or any thinking process whatsoever.
>> >My argument stands:
>>
>> You have no argument, only assertions that beg the question, as I have
>> shown.
>>
>> > objective knowledge requires a basis outside of
>> >the mind. Uniform mental operations are not enough. The objective
>> >basis of (dis)similarity might be something other than real
>> >universals, but
>> >it remains the case that �univerals have to be shown to be redundant
>> >both metaphyscially and epistemologically.
>>
>> You are tackling a straw man that was never discussed on this thread,
>> at least not by me.
>
>You assert below the fallacy that uniform mental operations are
>sufficient to deliver objectivity.
I would need a cite to the effect that there is some such official
fallacy anywhere but in your own mind. Anyway, "objectivity" does not
correspond to any concretes but to a method of forming judgments.
>> >> It's not necessarily the case, at any rate, that uniform
>> >> "input" actually exists, or that it even has to exist in order to
>> >> create the desired "output."
>> ..
>> >I have argued that it must exist in order to produce
>> >intersubjective agreement.
>>
>> No, you have only assumed what you started out to prove - and you had
>> some statement concerning intersubjective agreement which I agreed
>> with, in these terms: either the process is the same for all, or if it
>> is not then we can all agree that red is red even if it appears
>> differently to everybody.
>
>That is what I a disputing. The sameness of the process is not enough,
>you also need the sameness of the perceived objects
How do you know they have "sameness"?
>> But intersubjective agreement didn't prove enough to you, at which
>> point you took the argument to a new level: you yourself
>> hypothetically cannot decide on a color being red from a stop sign to
>> a tomato, therefore, you think uniformity of these universals is
>> important for perceiving them as being the same.
>
>I think their being the same is important for their being perceived
>the same. In my example the objects *themselves* are varying randomly,
>*not* my process of assigning qualia to them,
Yes, therefore your own example refutes you. And in fact, the redness
is not the same from object to object, you only recognize it through
the same Universal thus they appear as identical to you.
Quale, as sensation, is simply the form in which the "data" come to
recognition. Two right triangles of apparently the same dimensions may
appear identical to the naked eye, but under a microscope they are
not. The mind only idealizes them so they can pertain to the concept
of "sameness" in a form which is more useful to our understanding.
That is why the Kantian concept of "appearance" is so important to
understanding this topic.
>>But that is patently
>> false, as it is not the case that every instantiation of a universal
>> is identical to every other;
>
>You have no evidence of that. It may well be the case
>that every instance of a *true universal is identical to every
>other..and also possible that many of our categorisations are only
>approximations to the true universals. Your mistake is assuming that
>universals have to correspond exactly to predicates in the English
>language. But there are (for instance) more
>wavelengths of light than we could possible have words for.
You didn't understand me. I'm just saying that no two instances of a
triangle drawn on paper are going to be identical, no matter how hard
you may try to make their dimensions exactly the same. You should only
flunk me for assuming that you read and understood the webpage.
>> yet you perceive them that way nevertheless.
>
>Then there is *more* objective resemblance out there
>than I need. So what? I am arguing that intersubjective agreement
>cannot be based on zero objective resemblance.
>> A Universal cannot be a concrete.
>
>Says who? You only have an argument that it can't be aparticular. A
>little question-begging, n'est pas
Particulars are material concretes, although that argument would also
have to apply to energy-waves and not just to matter.
>> >> It is logically sufficient for the mind
>> >> to create the uniformity prior to the "output" in an idealized version
>> >> of reality as it really might be.
..
>> >You are making the typically Kantian mistake
>> >of ignoring the way *pluralities* of minds operate.
..
>> You yourself took it to the level of the individual who cannot decide
>> on the color of various red objects. And anyway, for Kant the laws of
>> understanding are true (necessary) for all rational beings throughout
>> the universe, or so goes the argument in the transcendental deduction
>> of categories.
..
>But he doesn;t think that through. He doesn't realise that
>uniform operation doesn't provide uniform output without a uniform
>input
That is not something to "realize," but something to debate about - as
where you say the objects in your example are varying randomly, yet
the mind can deal with the situation nevertheless.
>> >> So when we say it is a "process," I wonder what process is involved
>> >> since no part of it can form in your awareness only the "output."
..
>> >An unconscious process. You idealism is showing.
..
>> Your assumptions are showing. There is no way to know if a process is
>> truly involved, it is only a useful way of discussing the matter.
..
>How do we "know" that perception is indierct then, Mr idealist?
There is a recognition involved, but it is not a conscious thought
process, nor it is not in awareness at all, the product occurs so
rapidly that one cannot very well fathom the mechanism allegedly
involved. It is only a realization (to borrow from your own term) that
is not the product of any perceivable process, a product of
consciousness whose origin cannot itself be made conscious.
1Z
> Nope, I never once implied that a Universal is a particular. The
> argument specifically proves that a Universal cannot be a particular -
> because, hypothetically speaking, a Universal-particular triangle
> would have to be both scalene and isosceles at the same time, which
> is a contradiction.
>
> This is not to say what a Universal actually is, it only eliminates
> one possibility.
You have backtracked: earlier you were sayign that it was
a disproof of universals: " Read the webpage: there is no universal
triangle out there,"
> >Moreover, you don't get to assume that there *are* subjective
> >universals just because there are no objective ones .
>
> The disposition of the Universal was not proven through the triangle
> example at that page. It just says that a Universal triangle is not
> and cannot be any particular triangle. That does not speak to its
> subjectivity or objectivity, it says that a Universal does not
> correspond to any object, which is precisely what I have said from the
> beginning.
No, you have said that there is a kind of mental
universal which has somehting to do with non-consious
mental processes.
> Furthermore, you need help with the concept of
> "objectivity"
No I don;t
> >That description in every way fits a concept except that is held to
> >be pre-conscious.
>
> Concepts result from concept-formation. [snippage]
That doesn't change anything.
> >You assert below the fallacy that uniform mental operations are
> >sufficient to deliver objectivity.
>
> I would need a cite to the effect that there is some such official
> fallacy anywhere but in your own mind.
Explain how feeding the different
data into the same processing can
result in the same output.
>Anyway, "objectivity" does not
> correspond to any concretes but to a method of forming judgments.
Epistemic objectivity is evidenced by intersubjective agreement.
Metaphsycial objectivity *can* but need not, in all cases, underpin
epistemic objectivity.
If judgements are empirical and about real-world objects, metaphsycial
objectivity must in that case be involved.
> >> No, you have only assumed what you started out to prove - and you had
> >> some statement concerning intersubjective agreement which I agreed
> >> with, in these terms: either the process is the same for all, or if it
> >> is not then we can all agree that red is red even if it appears
> >> differently to everybody.
>
> >That is what I a disputing. The sameness of the process is not enough,
> >you also need the sameness of the perceived objects
>
> How do you know they have "sameness"?
I have repeatedly explained. The output has uniformity, so the input
must
> >> But intersubjective agreement didn't prove enough to you, at which
> >> point you took the argument to a new level: you yourself
> >> hypothetically cannot decide on a color being red from a stop sign to
> >> a tomato, therefore, you think uniformity of these universals is
> >> important for perceiving them as being the same.
>
> >I think their being the same is important for their being perceived
> >the same. In my example the objects *themselves* are varying randomly,
> >*not* my process of assigning qualia to them,
>
> Yes, therefore your own example refutes you.
How?
>And in fact, the redness
> is not the same from object to object, you only recognize it through
> the same Universal thus they appear as identical to you.
How do you know what objects in fact are? Have
you stepped out of your mind?
> Quale, as sensation, is simply the form in which the "data" come to
> recognition. Two right triangles of apparently the same dimensions may
> appear identical to the naked eye, but under a microscope they are
> not.
That resuilt cannot be gerneralised into the claim
that there are no exact objective resemblances.
> You didn't understand me. I'm just saying that no two instances of a
> triangle drawn on paper are going to be identical, no matter how hard
> you may try to make their dimensions exactly the same.
That cannot be generalised. Science says every electron is identical
to every other.
> >> A Universal cannot be a concrete.
> >Says who? You only have an argument that it can't be aparticular. A
> >little question-begging, n'est pas
> Particulars are material concretes, although that argument would also
> have to apply to energy-waves and not just to matter.
That says nothign about what universals can be
> >But he doesn;t think that through. He doesn't realise that
> >uniform operation doesn't provide uniform output without a uniform
> >input
> That is not something to "realize," but something to debate about - as
> where you say the objects in your example are varying randomly, yet
> the mind can deal with the situation nevertheless.
Sighhh..the point was that it cannot deal with it.
> >How do we "know" that perception is indierct then, Mr idealist?
> There is a recognition involved, but it is not a conscious thought
> process, nor it is not in awareness at all, the product occurs so
> rapidly that one cannot very well fathom the mechanism allegedly
> involved. It is only a realization (to borrow from your own term) that
> is not the product of any perceivable process, a product of
> consciousness whose origin cannot itself be made conscious.
That does not answer the question. I didn't ask "give me your opinion
on how perception works". I want to know what justifies your opinion.
Charles Bell
> On 10 Dec, 10:58, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > I challenge you to take the test and get back to me on the possibility
> > of the un-realness of the sensation as a mere subjective quality of
> > conscious experience. �"Qualia" is no less a dead-end anti-concept
> > than "universal".
>
> Well opined. So are you sayign they don't exist in any sense at all,
> or
> they do you have a phsycial explanation up your sleave?
>
"Qualia" is undiluted sophistry.
> >Reality impinges upon a body in an objective way
> > and the body will respond in an objective way --
>
> Uh-huh. Problem being that we don't know what
> the "objective" response of a bat to incoming sonar
> seems like form the inside.
>
Every living thing will have it limitations, the difference being that
man, through reason, can go beyond his physical limitations and errors
in perception. Man now has his own sonar, right?
> >the response being an
> > objective quality which cannot be changed by consciousness.
>
> Uh-huh. So I can't consciously focus my
> attention on different stimuli then?
>
There are techniques which can be used to overcome/inhibit/distort
sensual input, but that implies there is real sensory input to be
overcome, not that it is subjective. See above on overcoming
limitations through reason,
Charles Bell
> On Thu, 10 Dec 2009 02:58:31 -0800, Charles Bell
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >On Dec 9, 11:38�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> >> On Wed, 09 Dec 2009 16:29:29 -0800, Charles Bell
> ..
> >> <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> >> >> On Wed, 09 Dec 2009 15:35:59 -0800, Charles Bell
> ..
> >> >> <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> >>Your entire response of one-liners is irrelevant.
> ..
> >> >you can get from this trolling expedition is the imbecile from England
> >> >say. �Everything else is just tried crap you recycle from time to time.
> ..
> >> Charles, Charles, Charles. Since you did have a good point earlier
> >> about the nature of the debate over Universals, I'll take a little
> >> time to justify my statement there with a little more detail.
> ..
> >We went on for quite a bit about this exact same subject a year or so
> >ago, and there is nothing wrong in revisiting a subject, but the least
> >you could do is to take into account what was said then and try a new
> >tactic taking into account the arguments then used.
>
> You're free to go back to your fruitless political discussions which
> change nothing about politics in reality and change nobody's mind.
>
>
>
Do you really suppose that your fruitless and endlessly repetitive
Kantian babble can poke holes in Objectivism?. You just say your
nonsense over and over again; you are refuted over and over again; and
you come back with exactly the same babble, almost word for word. You
simply deny Rand said what she said on epistemology or set up strawman
arguments. For example, you say that Rand failed to solve the problem
of the universals and swept the problem under the rug. Well. you must
also say that Lavoisier failed to solve the problem of phlogiston. Is
that right?
> >This is saying that Aristotle was wrong and Rand was right.
>
> You're not reading me, Charles. What I said was that Aristotle had a
> better grasp on the issue than Rand.
Which is saying Aristotle was right and Rand was wrong. An absurd
assertion if there if there ever was one. Rand did not have a problem
of universals embedded in her philosophy.
> It doesn't matter if Aristotle's
> conclusion was wrong or right,
Really? What was important was that he tried very hard, is that it?
> at least he had his
wrong
> premises together
> whereas Rand did not
have wrong premises.
Right.
> I don't see criticism as being fundamental to an anti-concept. And I
> don't see "God" or "Universal" as being anti-concepts even by
> Objectivist standards.
>
Of course, they are. They are fantasies and work against, rather than
for, understanding.
>
> Nominalism and direct-realism? Your ignorance is showing, Charles,
> "direct-realism" is not one of the topics in the debate.
It is for the other participant, as far as anyone can tell. At any
rate, call the other side consisting of all forms of realism not
Objectivsm and nominalism and your Kantian voo-doo, if you like. This
other side of the argument is stuck with the problem of the universals
and Objectivism is not.
> And I never
> said that sensation was unreal,
No, you sink to the level of dismissing<< the validity of the senses
using the senses >> nonsense.
>"Omniscience" and
> "claim to direct metaphysical enlightenment"
Kant, simply put, said that because man has no omniscience or mental
reach into the metaphysical he is therefore incapable of knowing the
*real* reality behind the perceived reality. Scientists have been
fighting Kant in a empirical fashion through logical positivism or
Popperism and other failed philosophies or in a rationalist fashion
through a kind of Pythagorean mathematical mysticism or Cartesian
nonsense or fall back on God. Everyone knows Kant did not do a damn
thing for science, but only Rand correctly identified why.
Charles Bell
You're being cryptic. I would not expect anyone unfamiliar with that
discussion to know what I am talking about, but Mal is using a
different pretext to say EXACTLY the same thing he said a year ago,
and I dutifully [sic] put in all the appropriate Rand quotations from
ITOE in refutation that Mal pretended he did not know.
1Z
> On Dec 10, 8:52�am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > On 10 Dec, 10:58, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > > I challenge you to take the test and get back to me on the possibility
> > > of the un-realness of the sensation as a mere subjective quality of
> > > conscious experience. �"Qualia" is no less a dead-end anti-concept
> > > than "universal".
>
> > Well opined. So are you sayign they don't exist in any sense at all,
> > or
> > they do you have a phsycial explanation up your sleave?
>
> "Qualia" is undiluted sophistry.
OK. That tells me something: you don't have an reasoned argeumetnt
whatosever, and you are just spouting opinion.
> > >Reality impinges upon a body in an objective way
> > > and the body will respond in an objective way --
>
> > Uh-huh. Problem being that we don't know what
> > the "objective" response of a bat to incoming sonar
> > seems like form the inside.
>
> Every living thing will have it limitations, the difference being that
> man, through reason, can go beyond his physical limitations and errors
> in perception. �Man now has his own sonar, right?
It's not an issue of competence or ability or perfomance. We
can translate sonar into oneof our inherent sensory
modalities..and that tells us nothing
about the "whai-is-is-like" issue.
> > >the response being an
> > > objective quality which cannot be changed by consciousness.
>
> > Uh-huh. So I can't consciously focus my
> > attention on different stimuli then?
>
> There are techniques which can be used to overcome/inhibit/distort
> sensual input, but that implies there is real sensory input to be
> overcome, not that it is subjective.
I wasn't arguing that it as subjective as in that sense.
I was arguing that response" is not so objective
as to be completley beyond volition
Charles Bell
> On 10 Dec, 11:12, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > They were unable to offer a solution to the "problem of
> > universals," that is: to define the nature and source of abstractions,
> > to determine the relationship of concepts to perceptual data--and to
>
> None of those three things is the "problem of universals".
>
Yes, they are.
<< The general questions asked about universals include: are they
discovered or invented? How are we to think of something that has
itself no spatial position, yet is instanced at many places and times?
What is the relation of instantiation? Can sharing the same property
be analysed in terms of resemblance? How does the mind perceive the
general property as well as the particular instance of it? >> Oxford
Dict.Phil.
> And Rand does not have an answer to the problem of induction.
The purpose of induction is to infer a generality from specific
instances and a "universal" is a property instanced by particular
things, so if there is a logical problem with the universal [see
above], there is a problem with inductive inference (Hume). That is
what Rand meant by "to prove the validity of scientific induction"
which begins by discarding the universal, and any problem associated
with it, as a valid philosophical tool.
Charles Bell
> On 8 Dec, 11:06, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
> > That is not how I mean "universals". �It is as a Platonic Form or
> > Aristotelean Essence. �Both religionists and scientists typically use
> > the anti-concept of the universal as the real object of "truth",
>
> Wrong, wrong and wrong. Neither religion nor
> science is clearly dependent on realism about
> universals, and no-one thinks real universals
> are the referent of "true"
>
The source of your delusion about truth stems from such a
misunderstanding. That is why your "discussion" on aGWT resembles a
religious revivalist sermon on things about which there can be no
debate.
Malrassic Park
No, and the only similarity I see between him and Rand is that they
were both cradle-robbers.
>> >This is saying that Aristotle was wrong and Rand was right.
>>
>> You're not reading me, Charles. What I said was that Aristotle had a
>> better grasp on the issue than Rand.
>
>Which is saying Aristotle was right and Rand was wrong.
Listen to me carefully, Charles. It does not logically read any such
thing, it only says that Aristotle's grasp of the subject was
sufficient enough to distinguish a Universal from a concept, whereas
Rand's was not. Whether he was right or wrong about the problem is a
completely different question.
> An absurd
>assertion if there if there ever was one. Rand did not have a problem
>of universals embedded in her philosophy.
>
>> It doesn't matter if Aristotle's
>> conclusion was wrong or right,
>
>Really? What was important was that he tried very hard, is that it?
I imagine it took him longer than a half-hour, if that's what you
mean. But no, that doesn't matter, what matters is exactly what I
wrote without your hallucinating between the lines.
>> I don't see criticism as being fundamental to an anti-concept. And I
>> don't see "God" or "Universal" as being anti-concepts even by
>> Objectivist standards.
..
>Of course, they are. They are fantasies and work against, rather than
>for, understanding.
Simple introspection into how perception operates reveals that
concept-formation is not the beginning of cognition, but rather, the
end.
>> Nominalism and direct-realism? Your ignorance is showing, Charles,
>> "direct-realism" is not one of the topics in the debate.
..
>It is for the other participant, as far as anyone can tell. At any
>rate, call the other side consisting of all forms of realism not
>Objectivsm and nominalism and your Kantian voo-doo, if you like. This
>other side of the argument is stuck with the problem of the universals
>and Objectivism is not.
1Z did not mention any direct-realism, the two schools are generally
known as Realism and Nominalism. Anyway, it doesn't matter what
Objectivism is stuck with since only a relatively few people take it
seriously and regard it positively.
>> And I never said that sensation was unreal,
>
>No, you sink to the level of dismissing<< the validity of the senses
>using the senses >> nonsense.
Now you are lying.
>>"Omniscience" and "claim to direct metaphysical enlightenment"
>
>Kant, simply put, said that because man has no omniscience or mental
>reach into the metaphysical he is therefore incapable of knowing the
>*real* reality behind the perceived reality. Scientists have been
>fighting Kant in a empirical fashion through logical positivism or
>Popperism and other failed philosophies or in a rationalist fashion
>through a kind of Pythagorean mathematical mysticism or Cartesian
>nonsense or fall back on God. Everyone knows Kant did not do a damn
>thing for science, but only Rand correctly identified why.
To try to "simply put" anything Kantian is bound to lead you into
error. But your take on it is interesting nevertheless.
What it says is that man has no faculty of intellectual intuition.
That being the case, there is no way of knowing if there is a "real"
reality somewhere behind phenomena. That does not mean, however,
that one cannot logically postulate the existence of another reality -
whether it is more or less real than phenomena would seem to be beside
the point for Kant since I don't recall him discussing it anywhere.
But he does justify logically postulating such a realm nevertheless.
What he would postulate, however, is that the noumenal is ideal in the
sense of being perfect in every respect. But that boils down to
nothing more than asking *what if* the ideal were phenomenal, what
kind of world would it be like, particularly in the moral sense. And
further, that we should all act as if the moral ideal is real, and in
this way the ideal is made real through your practical, moral activity
which results from acts of will.
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>On Dec 9, 11:38嚙緘m, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On Wed, 09 Dec 2009 16:29:29 -0800, Charles Bell
>>
>> <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>> >On Dec 9, 7:00嚙緘m, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> >> On Wed, 09 Dec 2009 15:35:59 -0800, Charles Bell
..
>> >> <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
..
>> >> Your entire response of one-liners is irrelevant.
..
>> >No, the entirety of your post is irrelevant. 嚙璀nd notice the only bite
>> >you can get from this trolling expedition is the imbecile from England
>> >(who hates black people). 嚙瘠ome back when you have something new to
>> >say. 嚙瘟verything else is just tried crap you recycle from time to time.
..
>> Charles, Charles, Charles. Since you did have a good point earlier
>> about the nature of the debate over Universals, I'll take a little
>> time to justify my statement there with a little more detail.
..
>We went on for quite a bit about this exact same subject a year or so
>ago, and there is nothing wrong in revisiting a subject, but the least
>you could do is to take into account what was said then and try a new
>tactic taking into account the arguments then used.
Maybe some newbie here who doesn't know my arguments would like to
take me on.
>> The third paragraph diverged into stuff that Rand thought about
>> Aristotle, and stated that Aristotle was, let's call it, a
>> proto-Randite in the realm of epistemology. But I have already stated
>> my own thought that Aristotle knew more about the issue of
>> concept-formation versus the formation of universals than Rand who
>> conflated the two. So you were aiming your thoughts at entirely the
>> wrong person here.
..
>This is saying that Aristotle was wrong and Rand was right. Okay,
>fine. What else do you have? Again, I say Rand abolished Aristotle's
>Essences to the the rubbish heap of useless philosophical tools,
>without discarding Aristotle's naturalistic method of concept-
>formation. The concept of the "universal" is a dead-end metaphysical
>concept, hence, the "problem of the universal", and has thus become an
>annoying anti-concept for people like you to criticize Rand in a way
>no different than the theist will use the anti-concept, "God", to
>criticize atheist moral philosophers.
What is simply says is that Aristotle knew more than Rand, not that
anybody was right or wrong.
The Universal is a dead-end concept only because you people haven't
figured it out. What you have to show is that the Universal is based
on invalid premises.
>> The fourth paragraph was some stupid example about red hot pokers
>> which at best would only involve qualia (heat sensation) and not
>> universals but has nothing to do with the topic - so it is irrelevant.
..
>I challenge you to take the test and get back to me on the possibility
>of the un-realness of the sensation as a mere subjective quality of
>conscious experience. "Qualia" is no less a dead-end anti-concept
>than "universal". Reality impinges upon a body in an objective way
>and the body will respond in an objective way -- the response being an
>objective quality which cannot be changed by consciousness. The
>purpose of science is to explore the objective nature of these things.
>The purpose of your voo-doo is to deny to science the full range of
>discovery. By rejecting nominalism and direct-realism, Rand gives
>science the full range of discovery without also giving any scientist
>omniscience or claim to direct metaphysical enlightenment.
Nobody tried to claim anything was unreal, you can even say an
illusion is real, or that your hallucinations about what I write are
real, because they are real illusions and real hallucinations - and
they are strictly yours, products of your idiosyncratic Randroid
mentality, therefore they are subjectively real.
Malrassic Park
>On 10 Dec, 15:27, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Nope, I never once implied that a Universal is a particular. The
>> argument specifically proves that a Universal cannot be a particular -
>> because, hypothetically speaking, a Universal-particular triangle
>> would have to be both scalene and isosceles at the same time, which
>> is a contradiction.
>>
>> This is not to say what a Universal actually is, it only eliminates
>> one possibility.
>
>You have backtracked: earlier you were sayign that it was
>a disproof of universals: " Read the webpage: there is no universal
>triangle out there,"
You're simply not understanding. No triangle in perception is a
Universal triangle. That's what the webpage starts out proving. It
eliminates only the one possibility, at the start, of what a Universal
is. It does not however state at that point what a Universal triangle
is. I have stated in a previous post that it must be the form, schema,
or pattern of triangleness in the mind enabling you to recognize some
thing or figure as a triangle even before the thought itself or any
definition of "triangle" comes to mind. Definitions are inessential to
the recognition of triangles, they are neither the sufficient nor
necessary condition for recognition but are completely irrelevant to
their perception.
>> >Moreover, you don't get to assume that there *are* subjective
>> >universals just because there are no objective ones .
>>
>> The disposition of the Universal was not proven through the triangle
>> example at that page. It just says that a Universal triangle is not
>> and cannot be any particular triangle. That does not speak to its
>> subjectivity or objectivity, it says that a Universal does not
>> correspond to any object, which is precisely what I have said from the
>> beginning.
>
>No, you have said that there is a kind of mental
>universal which has somehting to do with non-consious
>mental processes.
But does that render them objective or subjective? What do you mean by
the term "objective"?
>> Furthermore, you need help with the concept of
>> "objectivity"
>
>No I don;t
>
>
>
>> >That description in every way fits a concept except that is held to
>> >be pre-conscious.
>>
>> Concepts result from concept-formation. [snippage]
>
>That doesn't change anything.
IOW, it doesn't change your mind? I didn't expect it to.
>> >You assert below the fallacy that uniform mental operations are
>> >sufficient to deliver objectivity.
>>
>> I would need a cite to the effect that there is some such official
>> fallacy anywhere but in your own mind.
>
>Explain how feeding the different
>data into the same processing can
>result in the same output.
As an analogy, you mean? You have different "data" every time you
change your example from stop-lights to tomatoes. And yet the 'output'
- redness - remains the same.
>>Anyway, "objectivity" does not
>> correspond to any concretes but to a method of forming judgments.
>
>Epistemic objectivity is evidenced by intersubjective agreement.
>Metaphsycial objectivity *can* but need not, in all cases, underpin
>epistemic objectivity.
>If judgements are empirical and about real-world objects, metaphsycial
>objectivity must in that case be involved.
I don't see anything particularly metaphysical about phenomena, but I
do see that your ideas on this keep changing with each and every post
you send.
>> >> No, you have only assumed what you started out to prove - and you had
>> >> some statement concerning intersubjective agreement which I agreed
>> >> with, in these terms: either the process is the same for all, or if it
>> >> is not then we can all agree that red is red even if it appears
>> >> differently to everybody.
>>
>> >That is what I a disputing. The sameness of the process is not enough,
>> >you also need the sameness of the perceived objects
>>
>> How do you know they have "sameness"?
>
>I have repeatedly explained. The output has uniformity, so the input
>must
And now you have abandoned the need for intersubjective agreement.
>> >> But intersubjective agreement didn't prove enough to you, at which
>> >> point you took the argument to a new level: you yourself
>> >> hypothetically cannot decide on a color being red from a stop sign to
>> >> a tomato, therefore, you think uniformity of these universals is
>> >> important for perceiving them as being the same.
>>
>> >I think their being the same is important for their being perceived
>> >the same. In my example the objects *themselves* are varying randomly,
>> >*not* my process of assigning qualia to them,
>>
>> Yes, therefore your own example refutes you.
>
>How?
Because the objects in your example vary randomly, while by the same
token, not varying randomly, that is, uniformity, seems to be
essential for your idea.
>>And in fact, the redness
>> is not the same from object to object, you only recognize it through
>> the same Universal thus they appear as identical to you.
>
>How do you know what objects in fact are? Have
>you stepped out of your mind?
The colors of red in your examples have varying wavelengths.
>> Quale, as sensation, is simply the form in which the "data" come to
>> recognition. Two right triangles of apparently the same dimensions may
>> appear identical to the naked eye, but under a microscope they are
>> not.
>
>That resuilt cannot be gerneralised into the claim that there are no exact
>objective resemblances.
Nor do I recognize your assertions about it as being beyond reproach.
>> You didn't understand me. I'm just saying that no two instances of a
>> triangle drawn on paper are going to be identical, no matter how hard
>> you may try to make their dimensions exactly the same.
>
>That cannot be generalised. Science says every electron is identical
>to every other.
False, not only because an electron is not an object of perception
(and all examples must be of perception), but because electrons exist
in varying states.
>> >> A Universal cannot be a concrete.
>
>> >Says who? You only have an argument that it can't be aparticular. A
>> >little question-begging, n'est pas
>
>> Particulars are material concretes, although that argument would also
>> have to apply to energy-waves and not just to matter.
>
>That says nothign about what universals can be
I've already stated something about their function as forms, schema,
or patterns, what they actually ARE is quite another question
altogether.
>> >But he doesn;t think that through. He doesn't realise that
>> >uniform operation doesn't provide uniform output without a uniform
>> >input
..
>> That is not something to "realize," but something to debate about - as
>> where you say the objects in your example are varying randomly, yet
>> the mind can deal with the situation nevertheless.
..
>Sighhh..the point was that it cannot deal with it.
The qualia are uniform from object to object, as you said.
>> >How do we "know" that perception is indierct then, Mr idealist?
..
>> There is a recognition involved, but it is not a conscious thought
>> process, nor it is not in awareness at all, the product occurs so
>> rapidly that one cannot very well fathom the mechanism allegedly
>> involved. It is only a realization (to borrow from your own term) that
>> is not the product of any perceivable process, a product of
>> consciousness whose origin cannot itself be made conscious.
..
>That does not answer the question. I didn't ask "give me your opinion
>on how perception works". I want to know what justifies your opinion.
I never stated how perception works, I've only stated that Universals
must perform this or that function for perception and find any
mechanistic explanations to be mere assumptions however usefully they
serve as analogies. So I cannot very well justify an opinion I don't
hold to.
Jim Klein
> What it says is that man has no faculty of intellectual intuition.
> That being the case, there is no way of knowing if there is a "real"
> reality somewhere behind phenomena.
Poppycock. Do you understand that what you
wrote translates directly to, "We know that
having a faculty of intellectual intuition is the
only way by which we could know if there were
a 'real' reality somewhere behind phenomena."
Do you at least agree that this is a fair and
direct translation, and that it follows from
simple so-called logic rules?
> That does not mean, however,
> that one cannot logically postulate the existence of another reality -
If you don't mind sharing, why would you waste
your time thinking about the postulation of other
realities when you can't even come to terms with
the existence of this one?
jk
Jim Klein
I was speaking of the counterfactual that he might
take into account the arguments then used. Why,
how many times have you seen that happen?
One of the points of Kantianism is that you /never/
have to do it, the arguments having no necessary
correlation to reality in the first place, let alone
relevance to living one's life.
What that leaves that does exactly, I'm not sure.
jk
Arnold Broese
news:8eecbf6d-c05a-4dc5...@e22g2000vbm.googlegroups.com...
> If you don't mind sharing, why would you waste
> your time thinking about the postulation of other
> realities when you can't even come to terms with
> the existence of this one?
He doesn't like this one?
.
.
-.-
Arnold
Ray
news:hfspgs$705$2...@vulture.killfile.org...
You hit the nail on the head.
Or is it that the hammer of reality has bashed his skull in
so often that he's looking for an alternate form of existence.
Ray
1Z
> On Thu, 10 Dec 2009 08:37:42 -0800, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> >On 10 Dec, 15:27, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> >> Nope, I never once implied that a Universal is a particular. The
> >> argument specifically proves that a Universal cannot be a particular -
> >> because, hypothetically speaking, a Universal-particular triangle
> >> would have to be both scalene and �isosceles at the same time, which
> >> is a contradiction.
>
> >> This is not to say what a Universal actually is, it only eliminates
> >> one possibility.
>
> >You have backtracked: earlier you were sayign that it was
> >a disproof of universals: " Read the webpage: there is no universal
> >triangle out there,"
>
> You're simply not understanding. No triangle in perception is a
> Universal triangle.
Which just means you can't have universal that is also a particular
>That's what the webpage starts out proving. It
> eliminates only the one possibility, at the start, of what a Universal
> is. It does not however state at that point what a Universal triangle
> is. I have stated in a previous post that it must be the form, schema,
> or pattern of triangleness in the mind enabling you to recognize some
> thing or figure as a triangle even before the thought itself or any
> definition of "triangle" comes to mind.
Since it is in the mind, it is a concept, not a real universal.
And I have demonstrated that there must be objective resemblances
or objective judgments cannot be made. Real universal are
a possible explanation of objective resemblances.
So you have not demonstrated
that your schema is all there is to universals.
> >No, you have said that there is a kind of mental
> >universal which has somehting to do with non-consious
> >mental processes.
>
> But does that render them objective or subjective? What do you mean by
> the term "objective"?
I mean judgments which are not arbitrary products
of a mind
> >That doesn't change anything.
>
> IOW, it doesn't change your mind? I didn't expect it to.
I excepted relevance
> >> >You assert below the fallacy that uniform mental operations are
> >> >sufficient to deliver objectivity.
>
> >> I would need a cite to the effect that there is some such official
> >> fallacy anywhere but in your own mind.
>
> >Explain how feeding the different
> >data into the same processing can
> >result in the same output.
>
> As an analogy, you mean?
Either way
>You have different "data" every time you
> change your example from stop-lights to tomatoes. And yet the 'output'
> - redness - remains the same.
Sighh..suppose I look at one tomato after another. How
am i going to keep producing the uniform output "redness" if they
are not in fact uniformly red? You "counterexample" just assumes
that stop-lights an tomatoes do in fact resemble each other
in colour, as common-sense says -- but that is just the point.
The common-sense fact that things resemble each other is just what is
being pointed out. One has to imagine what it would be like if they
did not, to
see what role resemblance plays.
> >> >That is what I a disputing. The sameness of the process is not enough,
> >> >you also need the sameness of the perceived objects
>
> >> How do you know they have "sameness"?
>
> >I have repeatedly explained. The output has uniformity, so the input
> >must
>
> And now you have abandoned the need for intersubjective agreement.
Not even remotely, you have completely
misunderstood
> >> >I think their being the same is important for their being perceived
> >> >the same. In my example the objects *themselves* are varying randomly,
> >> >*not* my process of assigning qualia to them,
>
> >> Yes, therefore your own example refutes you.
>
> >How?
>
> Because the objects in your example vary randomly, while by the same
> token, not varying randomly, that is, uniformity, seems to be
> essential for your idea. �
No. re-read it.
> >> Quale, as sensation, is simply the form in which the "data" come to
> >> recognition. Two right triangles of apparently the same dimensions may
> >> appear identical to the naked eye, but under a microscope they are
> >> not.
>
> >That resuilt cannot be gerneralised into the claim that there are no exact
> >objective resemblances.
>
> Nor do I recognize your assertions about it as being beyond reproach.
You haven;t made that *particular* point. Whether anyone is "beyond
reproach"
is neither here nor there...
> >> You didn't understand me. I'm just saying that no two instances of a
> >> triangle drawn on paper are going to be identical, no matter how hard
> >> you may try to make their dimensions exactly the same.
>
> >That cannot be generalised. Science says every electron is identical
> >to every other.
>
> False, not only because an electron is not an object of perception
> (and all examples must be of perception),
Now you are just appelaing to idealism dogmatically.
>but because electrons exist
> in varying states.
The state is not considered part of the electron
> >> Particulars are material concretes, although that argument would also
> >> have to apply to energy-waves and not just to matter.
>
> >That says nothign about what universals can be
>
> I've already stated something about their function as forms, schema,
> or patterns, what they actually ARE is quite another question
> altogether.
You;ve said something about the mental side of th eissue
whilst idealistically ignoring the non-mental side.
> >> That is not something to "realize," but something to debate about - as
> >> where you say the objects in your example are varying randomly, yet
> >> the mind can deal with the situation nevertheless.
> ..
> >Sighhh..the point was that it cannot deal with it.
>
> The qualia are uniform from object to object, as you said.
I didn't.
> I never stated how perception works, I've only stated that Universals
> must perform this or that function for perception and find any
> mechanistic explanations to be mere assumptions however usefully they
> serve as analogies. So I cannot very well justify an opinion I don't
> hold to.
Again, you have not dispensed with the idea that real univserals
play a role in the world, you just idealistcially prefer not to think
about the world.
Charles Bell
> On Thu, 10 Dec 2009 02:58:31 -0800, Charles Bell
>
> >We went on for quite a bit about this exact same subject a year or so
> >ago, and there is nothing wrong in revisiting a subject, but the least
> >you could do is to take into account what was said then and try a new
> >tactic taking into account the arguments then used.
>
> Maybe some newbie here who doesn't know my arguments would like to
> take me on.
>
They don't come here. I'm afraid this is an old elephant resting
place..
x.
xx.
xxx.
xx.
x.
1Z
> > And Rand does not have an answer to the problem of induction.
>
> The purpose of induction is to infer a generality
a generally true statement or proposition
>from specific
> instances and a "universal" is a property instanced by particular
> things,
which is not necessaily the same kind of gerneality at all.
It is quite possible to accept induction and reject univerals.
>so if there is a logical problem with the universal [see
> above], there is a problem with inductive inference (Hume). That is
> what Rand meant by "to prove the validity of scientific induction"
> which begins by discarding the universal, and any problem associated
> with it, as a valid philosophical tool.
She doesn't have an adequate replacment for real universals,
and she doesn't have a solution to the Problem of Induction
Charles Bell
> On 11 Dec, 01:09, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > > And Rand does not have an answer to the problem of induction.
>
> > The purpose of induction is to infer a generality
>
> a generally true statement or proposition
>
> >from specific
> > instances and a "universal" is a property instanced by particular
> > things,
>
> which is not necessaily the same kind of gerneality at all.
> It is quite possible to accept induction and reject univerals.
>
In Objectivism, absolutely, but not in Kantianism or modern philosophy
generally, and that was Rand's point. Hume picked at induction
*because* of the problem of the universals.
> >so if there is a logical problem with the universal [see
> > above], there is a problem with inductive inference (Hume). �That is
> > what Rand meant by "to prove the validity of scientific induction"
> > which begins by discarding the universal, and any problem associated
> > with it, as a valid philosophical tool.
>
> She doesn't have an adequate replacment for real universals,
There is no need for "real universals" since such things do not exist
and serve only to complicate understanding to the point of never
understanding;
Really, how is this different than saying: Rand has no adequate
replacement for God?
Rand's Razor:
The requirements of cognition determine the objective criteria of
conceptualization. They can be summed up best in the form of an
epistemological "razor": concepts are not to be multiplied beyond
necessity--the corollary of which is: nor are they to be integrated in
disregard of necessity.
1Z
> There is no need for "real universals" since such things do not exist
> and serve only to complicate understanding to the point of never
> understanding;
The fact that things are capable of resembling each other needs
explanation
> Really, how is this different than saying: Rand has no adequate
> replacement for God?
Replacing God does not mean just asserting "there is no God".
You need replacement theories, like evolution, the Big bang,
naturalised ethics and so on. Coming up with improbved theories
is hard work. The "anti-concpet" fatwa is a short-cut that leads
nowhere.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>On Dec 10, 8:41 pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>> What it says is that man has no faculty of intellectual intuition.
>> That being the case, there is no way of knowing if there is a "real"
>> reality somewhere behind phenomena.
..
>Poppycock. Do you understand that what you
>wrote translates directly to, "We know that
>having a faculty of intellectual intuition is the
>only way by which we could know if there were
>a 'real' reality somewhere behind phenomena."
..
>Do you at least agree that this is a fair and
>direct translation, and that it follows from
>simple so-called logic rules?
Agreed. A spiritual realm, having its own necessary laws special to
it, would be completely undetectable by our senses or any scientific
devices since those are only capable of detecting phenomena that obey
only the metaphysical laws of this realm.
>> That does not mean, however,
>> that one cannot logically postulate the existence of another reality -
..
>If you don't mind sharing, why would you waste
>your time thinking about the postulation of other
>realities when you can't even come to terms with
>the existence of this one?
In what sense? You don't know me well enough to psychologize me and to
apply that ad hom to me personally. But Kant's moral theory comes to
terms with the existence of man's rational nature, and then applies
that metaphysical nature to moral theory.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>You hit the nail on the head.
>Or is it that the hammer of reality has bashed his skull in
>so often that he's looking for an alternate form of existence.
You've run out of ideas, Ray, or more likely you never had any to
begin with.
Malrassic Park
>On 11 Dec, 02:24, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On Thu, 10 Dec 2009 08:37:42 -0800, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>> >On 10 Dec, 15:27, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> You're simply not understanding. No triangle in perception is a
>> Universal triangle.
>
>Which just means you can't have universal that is also a particular
It means that the set of all Universals and the set of all Particulars
are mutually exclusive.
>>That's what the webpage starts out proving. It
>> eliminates only the one possibility, at the start, of what a Universal
>> is. It does not however state at that point what a Universal triangle
>> is. I have stated in a previous post that it must be the form, schema,
>> or pattern of triangleness in the mind enabling you to recognize some
>> thing or figure as a triangle even before the thought itself or any
>> definition of "triangle" comes to mind.
>
>Since it is in the mind, it is a concept, not a real universal.
"Since it is in the mind," therefore, everything in the mind is a
concept? Nonsense.
>And I have demonstrated that there must be objective resemblances
>or objective judgments cannot be made. Real universal are
>a possible explanation of objective resemblances.
>So you have not demonstrated that your schema is all there is to universals.
You have demonstrated nothing, only asserted your religion. However, I
am not detracting from the influence of something external at all. You
are merely asserting the contradiction that the world makes sense
before any mind has made sense of it.
>> >No, you have said that there is a kind of mental
>> >universal which has somehting to do with non-consious
>> >mental processes.
>>
>> But does that render them objective or subjective? What do you mean by
>> the term "objective"?
>
>I mean judgments which are not arbitrary products of a mind
If the world makes sense before the mind has made sense of it then
what do you need mental products for?
>> >That doesn't change anything.
>>
>> IOW, it doesn't change your mind? I didn't expect it to.
>
>I excepted relevance
Expected or excepted?
>> As an analogy, you mean?
>
>Either way
Oh I see, you're talking about GIGO. That principle doesn't apply to
the mind because there is nobody inputting the "data" into your mind.
It is not garbage or otherwise, the concepts don't apply in this case.
The "data" is simply the given. Thus it cannot be "either way."
The mind is amazing in that it can take "garbage" input (so to speak)
and make sense of it. Even Rand referred to the very first sensations
in your life as undifferentiated. Even Rand recognized that
perception, and not sensation, is the beginning of cognition.
I don't disagree with her there. It's just that she never accounted
for whatever it is that makes discriminated perception possible,
"As far as can be ascertained, an infant's sensory experience is an
undifferentiated chaos. Discriminated awareness begins on the level of
percepts."
and then by treating Universals as conceptual in nature she missed the
boat when it comes to the problem of Universals.
It is the level of Universals that makes discrimination possible.
Since man does not start out as a baby making sense of the world by
creating theories and hypotheses about the world around him, something
in the mind, previous to the very possibility of thought, cognition,
or even imagination, first has to strive to make sense of sensory
input. This process does not require any conscious effort. But only
after this ordering of sensations has been accomplished does the
possibility of thinking become established. Only by the self-creation
of Universals as ordering principles of perception is thought itself
made possible.
>>You have different "data" every time you
>> change your example from stop-lights to tomatoes. And yet the 'output'
>> - redness - remains the same.
>
>
>Sighh..suppose I look at one tomato after another. How
>am i going to keep producing the uniform output "redness" if they
>are not in fact uniformly red? You "counterexample" just assumes
>that stop-lights an tomatoes do in fact resemble each other
>in colour, as common-sense says -- but that is just the point.
>The common-sense fact that things resemble each other is just what is
>being pointed out. One has to imagine what it would be like if they
>did not, to see what role resemblance plays.
Their respective redness resemble each other. However, you're saying
that the resemblance exists before awareness occurs. To me, that is
like saying the judgment (redness) exists before awareness occurs.
>> >> >That is what I a disputing. The sameness of the process is not enough,
>> >> >you also need the sameness of the perceived objects
>> >> How do you know they have "sameness"?
>> >I have repeatedly explained. The output has uniformity, so the input
>> >must
>> And now you have abandoned the need for intersubjective agreement.
>Not even remotely, you have completely misunderstood
Is it ok that I don't think perceptual awareness is a matter up for a
consensus count?
>> >> Quale, as sensation, is simply the form in which the "data" come to
>> >> recognition. Two right triangles of apparently the same dimensions may
>> >> appear identical to the naked eye, but under a microscope they are
>> >> not.
>>
>> >That resuilt cannot be gerneralised into the claim that there are no exact
>> >objective resemblances.
>>
>> Nor do I recognize your assertions about it as being beyond reproach.
>
>You haven;t made that *particular* point. Whether anyone is "beyond
>reproach" is neither here nor there...
It is if you've already made up your mind before making any attempt to
study the topic.
>> >> You didn't understand me. I'm just saying that no two instances of a
>> >> triangle drawn on paper are going to be identical, no matter how hard
>> >> you may try to make their dimensions exactly the same.
>>
>> >That cannot be generalised. Science says every electron is identical
>> >to every other.
>>
>> False, not only because an electron is not an object of perception
>> (and all examples must be of perception),
>
>Now you are just appelaing to idealism dogmatically.
What is idealism?
>>but because electrons exist in varying states.
>
>The state is not considered part of the electron
The entire subject can only be approached in terms of mathematical
ideas anyway. Every electron is the "ideal," mathematically perfect
electron. So it appears that you're the idealist here.
>> >> Particulars are material concretes, although that argument would also
>> >> have to apply to energy-waves and not just to matter.
>>
>> >That says nothign about what universals can be
>>
>> I've already stated something about their function as forms, schema,
>> or patterns, what they actually ARE is quite another question
>> altogether.
>
>You;ve said something about the mental side of th eissue
>whilst idealistically ignoring the non-mental side.
Look back, I've given attention to the issue of light-waves, for
example. What you're failing to recognize, which I mentioned in this
context, is that the color "red" doesn't exist outside of your
perception of it. And anyway, most of your examples (with the
exception of electrons) consist of objects of perception not
objects-in-themselves. And now you've stepped your foot in it with the
electrons example for two reasons: 1. you cannot perceive an
elementary unit of matter such as an electron, therefore 2. physics is
forced to deal with them idealistically, that is, as mathematically
perfect points in every instance.
>> >> That is not something to "realize," but something to debate about - as
>> >> where you say the objects in your example are varying randomly, yet
>> >> the mind can deal with the situation nevertheless.
>> ..
>> >Sighhh..the point was that it cannot deal with it.
>>
>> The qualia are uniform from object to object, as you said.
>
>I didn't.
>
>
>> I never stated how perception works, I've only stated that Universals
>> must perform this or that function for perception and find any
>> mechanistic explanations to be mere assumptions however usefully they
>> serve as analogies. So I cannot very well justify an opinion I don't
>> hold to.
>
>Again, you have not dispensed with the idea that real univserals
>play a role in the world, you just idealistcially prefer not to think
>about the world.
Your last statement is a complete lie, all my posts, including this
one, prove that you are lying. And what is a "real Universal" anyway?
Another one of your lies?
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>On Dec 10, 8:52�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> On Thu, 10 Dec 2009 02:58:31 -0800, Charles Bell
..
>> >We went on for quite a bit about this exact same subject a year or so
>> >ago, and there is nothing wrong in revisiting a subject, but the least
>> >you could do is to take into account what was said then and try a new
>> >tactic taking into account the arguments then used.
..
>> Maybe some newbie here who doesn't know my arguments would like to
>> take me on.
..
>They don't come here. I'm afraid this is an old elephant resting
>place..
There have been noobies here, but in an effort to stifle intellectual
discussion Fred sends them warning e-mails about me and chases them
away.
Charles Bell
> On 11 Dec, 11:05, Charles Bell <cbel...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>
> > There is no need for "real universals" since such things do not exist
> > and serve only to complicate understanding to the point of never
> > understanding;
>
> The fact that things are capable of resembling each other needs
> explanation
>
This is the way it works: find explanations about why things resemble
other things and do not make up myths and fairy tales.
> > Really, how is this different than saying: Rand has no adequate
> > replacement for God?
>
> Replacing God does not mean just asserting "there is no God".
It means giving up on myths and fairy tales.
Charles Bell
> There have been noobies here, but in an effort to stifle intellectual
> discussion Fred sends them warning e-mails about me and chases them
> away.
Anyone scared away from hpo by an email from Weiss is unworthy to be
in hpo.
Jim Klein
> Look back, I've given attention to the issue of light-waves, for
> example. What you're failing to recognize, which I mentioned in this
> context, is that the color "red" doesn't exist outside of your
> perception of it.
I can't believe I read something of yours in passing,
and this is it. I don't know what you wrote about
light-waves that might lend sense to this, and I'll
even concede your courage in writing stuff like
this in public. This is supposed to be an Objectivism-
oriented newsgroup and you deserve far more
kudos than the self-imagined "Orthodox Objectivists"
who scurry like rats to hide their beliefs and opinions
from the public.
Which explains why the public is so generally unfamiliar
with Rand's principles...that and the fact that when
they do yap out loud, they make mincemeat of
Rand's Objectivism. One might say they Perfectly
Invert it.
All that said, this is sick shit and you need to get
out of it already. This is not rocket science and
while this may pleasantly pass your time, imagine
how pleasant it could be using /reality/ instead of
wild meanderings.
Here's the sentence you wrote:
------------------------------
What you're failing to recognize, which I mentioned in this
context, is that the color "red" doesn't exist outside of your
perception of it.
------------------------------
There is NO context, outside of a purely imaginary
one created in a consciousness, in which
"the color 'red' doesn't exist outside of your
perception of it."
None, nada, never happened, never would, never
COULD. It is false-to-fact; it is a misapprehension
of reality; it is an untruth. It is a complete and utter
identification breakdown, unfortunately instilled in
you to accomplish precisely that purpose.
This is why in important ways, it's not your fault. You
honestly never understood the function of words
and how they are /representative/ of reality,
rather than discrete objects themselves. Natch
that doesn't mean they're not discrete objects, but
their nature as objects (phonemic denotations)
has NOTHING to do with what they are representing.
I don't need to know the context you used and I
don't need to hear your excuses and rationalizations.
WHATEVER you might mean by "the color 'red'," up
to and including the concept itself, DOES exist
"outside your perception of it." Yes, even the
concept---it wouldn't exist outside of a consciousness
and yes it wouldn't exist inside were it not for
perception--it's still the case that even ITS existence
does NOT rely on any perception of IT.
But of course, you weren't saying that anyway. You
were talking about "the color red" and in whatever
way you were talking about it, it DOES exist
independently of your perception of it. Whether you
choose to look at it as the reflection of light waves,
or the sensing of light waves, or both (as Rand
would choose to describe it as) or any part of
those processes, or some other process or some
other event or what-the-fuck-ever---IT is as IT IS,
totally and completely independently of ANY
perception of it.
It's worthy to consider how accurately we are
integrating the nature of what is, but that can
only be done in an environment where it's
understood that that's what we're doing.
Sentences such as you present here are
explicitly claiming that such is NOT what
we're doing, since we can't figure out if
that's really what we're doing, and (I guess)
figuring that out is necessary to actually
doing it.
Well, that's wrong. We're doing it anyway and
we're doing it all the time. That's why we get
pits in our stomachs when this country goes
down the road it is. That's why we turn against
each other, even while we shriek that we do
everything for everyone else.
That's why the problems are never going to stop
until we each individually choose to stop them.
So please, I'm beggin' you already, stop yours.
jk
Jim Klein
> >If you don't mind sharing, why would you waste
> >your time thinking about the postulation of other
> >realities when you can't even come to terms with
> >the existence of this one?
>
> In what sense? You don't know me well enough to psychologize me and to
> apply that ad hom to me personally. But Kant's moral theory comes to
> terms with the existence of man's rational nature, and then applies
> that metaphysical nature to moral theory.
Yeah right, except "that metaphysical nature" can't
be really known, or known to be known.
So what exactly is being applied, is anyone's guess.
That's why you keep doing that. Why not just once
guess that you do know and see what happens?
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>On Dec 11, 3:38 pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Look back, I've given attention to the issue of light-waves, for
>> example. What you're failing to recognize, which I mentioned in this
>> context, is that the color "red" doesn't exist outside of your
>> perception of it.
>
>I can't believe I read something of yours in passing,
>and this is it. I don't know what you wrote about
>light-waves that might lend sense to this, and I'll
>even concede your courage in writing stuff like
>this in public. This is supposed to be an Objectivism-
>oriented newsgroup
(In which philosophy, much less Objectivism, is rarely discussed
anymore)
>and you deserve far more
>kudos than the self-imagined "Orthodox Objectivists"
>who scurry like rats to hide their beliefs and opinions
>from the public.
>
>Which explains why the public is so generally unfamiliar
>with Rand's principles...that and the fact that when
>they do yap out loud, they make mincemeat of
>Rand's Objectivism. One might say they Perfectly
>Invert it.
The general public is more comfortable with traditional religious
forms and not secularized forms of which Objectivism is one. The
general public, for that matter, doesn't know how to pronounce the
word "philosophy." The general public is, at best, more concerned
with making money and raising their personal standard of living or, at
worst, just trying to survive the recession.
>All that said, this is sick shit and you need to get
>out of it already. This is not rocket science and
>while this may pleasantly pass your time, imagine
>how pleasant it could be using /reality/ instead of
>wild meanderings.
>
>Here's the sentence you wrote:
>
>------------------------------
>What you're failing to recognize, which I mentioned in this
>context, is that the color "red" doesn't exist outside of your
>perception of it.
>------------------------------
>
>There is NO context, outside of a purely imaginary
>one created in a consciousness, in which
>"the color 'red' doesn't exist outside of your
>perception of it."
I'm not saying that the color red exists purely in imagination- a
concept which you apparently equate with fantasy. I fully grant 1Z his
idea that Universals are objective, only they are not "out there." The
problem is proving they are objective, and yet not "out there," which
1Z has not done without appealing to the unwarranted assertion that
Universals are extant.
His idea is that uniformity - a purely Universal concept - must be
extant (objective) for perception of uniformity to occur. We do not
however perceive uniformity, or else someone must explain to me what
does a "uniformity" look like anyway? Because I have never seen one.
Uniformity does not exist as a particular but is a pure concept of
judgment precisely because we use it to form judgments but cannot
reduce it to any particulars or concretes.
Agreed, light-waves exist, but light-waves have no property of color.
For instance, the color red has no amplitude, wavelength, or
frequency, the three properties of waves. But the color red has
intensity and shade, whereas the light-waves have none of those. Yes,
you can certainly translate "intensity" and "shade" into objective
terms, yet those do not exist in light-waves.
I read the rest of your post but it is void of intellectual content
and only declares that I'm evil and must censor myself.
Charles Bell
> Agreed, light-waves exist, but light-waves have no property of color.
Red light may be defined as light of wavelength between 700 and 635
nm. Thus, all light in that range has a property of being perceived
by humans as "red". If there is no perceiver (all life in the universe
ceases to be), the range of light of wavelength 700 - 635 nm does not
disappear from existence and continues to have the same properties
(wavelength, amplitude, frequency).
> For instance, the color red has no amplitude, wavelength, or
> frequency, the three properties of waves.
See above. Perhaps, not a *single* wavelength but rather in a range.
> But the color red has
> intensity and shade,
. . .which are a properties of things other than light affecting
perception.
Because all (sighted) people perceive the color red in the same way,
it is an objective property and can have as precise a defintion as is
needed. We could call a kind of red light precisely of wavelength
632.8 nm "dumble red" if there was any need for that, but scientists,
using laser light, for example, simply specify the wavelength as a
descriptor rather than making up words. Nevertheless, highly coherent
light of a precise wavelength always does exactly the same thing every
time (i.e., may be perceived in only one way) and demonstrates the
objective nature of the source (sense-datum) of the perception.
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>On Dec 12, 10:51�am, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Agreed, light-waves exist, but light-waves have no property of color.
>
>Red light may be defined as light of wavelength between 700 and 635
>nm. Thus, all light in that range has a property of being perceived
>by humans as "red". If there is no perceiver (all life in the universe
>ceases to be), the range of light of wavelength 700 - 635 nm does not
>disappear from existence and continues to have the same properties
>(wavelength, amplitude, frequency).
Agreed, only the perception of red disappears, the light-waves still
exist.
As for the measurements of wavelength, Newton was unable to find an
absolute location in space from which to determine magnitudes in a
non-relative way. So we still measure those nanometers in human terms
and cannot provide any absolute measuring stick by means of which to
measure them. Man is still the measure of all things, our notion of
absolute space is only an assumption providing our concepts of
measurement with seeming objectivity.
Rand would have us believe that the units we choose for measurement
are merely a matter of convenience. But there is no measurement to
begin with that is not relative measurement, and calling it objective
does not render it absolute.
>> For instance, the color red has no amplitude, wavelength, or
>> frequency, the three properties of waves.
..
>See above. Perhaps, not a *single* wavelength but rather in a range.
..
>> But the color red has intensity and shade,
..
>. . .which are a properties of things other than light affecting
>perception.
..
>Because all (sighted) people perceive the color red in the same way,
You assume...
>it is an objective property and can have as precise a defintion as is
>needed.
You are confusing "objective" with "intersubjective."
>We could call a kind of red light precisely of wavelength
>632.8 nm "dumble red" if there was any need for that, but scientists,
>using laser light, for example, simply specify the wavelength as a
>descriptor rather than making up words. Nevertheless, highly coherent
>light of a precise wavelength always does exactly the same thing every
>time (i.e., may be perceived in only one way) and demonstrates the
>objective nature of the source (sense-datum) of the perception.
If nobody ever had "red" cones in their retinas then the perception of
redness would not exist, and so neither would its concept, at least
not until science discovered the wavelengths. Then there would only be
the scientific descriptor of its wavelength and perhaps a made-up word
comparable to "infrared."
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>On Dec 11, 3:39�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>> There have been noobies here, but in an effort to stifle intellectual
>> discussion Fred sends them warning e-mails about me and chases them
>> away.
..
>Anyone scared away from hpo by an email from Weiss is unworthy to be
>in hpo.
That's true, but I haven't seen the content of the e-mails.
Jim Klein
> I read the rest of your post but it is void of intellectual content
> and only declares that I'm evil and must censor myself.
Quite the opposite. My point with you has always been
that you're not evil and so therefore may uncensor yourself.
If you tried my way, you might stop getting
everything backwards!
jk
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>On Dec 12, 10:51 am, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>> I read the rest of your post but it is void of intellectual content
>> and only declares that I'm evil and must censor myself.
..
>Quite the opposite. My point with you has always been
>that you're not evil and so therefore may uncensor yourself.
..
>If you tried my way, you might stop getting everything backwards!
Of course everybody wants me to adopt their religion as the only way
to do anything, where every other way is backwards.
That is known as the fallacy of the false alternative.
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" <male...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> The question may then be asked: what is knowledge, if not concept?
> The answer is simply to look to Rand's work itself in which she states
> that knowledge is gained and held in conceptual form (ITOE, 1). That
> says nothing about the formation of new knoweldge per se, only the
> conceptual form it takes.
She defined knowledge as "the mental grasp [identification] of a fact of
reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason
based on perceptual observation." The knowledge that you gain by "a process
of reason based on perceptual observation" is in conceptual form.
When you look at a person, on the perceptual level you have knowledge of
that particular person, in other words THAT he exists. On the conceptual
level, you can explicitly identify him as a person (or an animal, or an
organism), in other words WHAT he is. The identification itself is what
Rand means by knowledge on the conceptual level. "Existence is identity,
consciousness is identification."
Note that Rand is very careful to say in VOS is that conceptualization
ENABLES us to identify and integrate the facts, not that the process of
concept-formation itself is the actual identification and integration. And
in ITOE, page 69, she describes concepts (including language) as the MEANS
BY WHICH we grasp and classify facts, not the actual process of grasping and
classifying these facts. The whole point of a theory of concepts is to
explain why or how concepts can perform this function, but you still have to
use these concepts to do the actual identifying and integrating that
constitutes the pursuit of knowledge (and the end product of that pursuit).
That's where logic comes in -- a subject not covered in ITOE except in a
handful of very brief mentions.
ITOE is Rand's explanation for how concepts can validly perform this
function, but otherwise very little about the overall process of reasoning
itself. You won't find in ITOE most of the material that you find in
Chapter 4 of OPAR, although you will find bits and pieces and hints of some
of that material.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>She defined knowledge as "the mental grasp [identification] of a fact of
>reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason
>based on perceptual observation." The knowledge that you gain by "a process
>of reason based on perceptual observation" is in conceptual form.
You don't know that "mental grasp" is equivalent to "identification."
And she doesn't explain how perceptual observation alone, without
reason, leads to knowledge. Her definition there is only an unproven
assertion.
>When you look at a person, on the perceptual level you have knowledge of
>that particular person, in other words THAT he exists. On the conceptual
>level, you can explicitly identify him as a person (or an animal, or an
>organism), in other words WHAT he is. The identification itself is what
>Rand means by knowledge on the conceptual level. "Existence is identity,
>consciousness is identification."
Rand wrote, "A sensation does not tell man *what* exists, but only
*that* it exists." So you are confusing the sensory level of
consciousness with the perceptual level in Rand's theory.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>Note that Rand is very careful to say in VOS is that conceptualization
>ENABLES us to identify and integrate the facts, not that the process of
>concept-formation itself is the actual identification and integration. And
>in ITOE, page 69, she describes concepts (including language) as the MEANS
>BY WHICH we grasp and classify facts, not the actual process of grasping and
>classifying these facts. The whole point of a theory of concepts is to
>explain why or how concepts can perform this function, but you still have to
>use these concepts to do the actual identifying and integrating that
>constitutes the pursuit of knowledge (and the end product of that pursuit).
>That's where logic comes in -- a subject not covered in ITOE except in a
>handful of very brief mentions.
>
>ITOE is Rand's explanation for how concepts can validly perform this
>function, but otherwise very little about the overall process of reasoning
>itself. You won't find in ITOE most of the material that you find in
>Chapter 4 of OPAR, although you will find bits and pieces and hints of some
>of that material.
And how does that not contradict this on page 71? "None of [the
traditional theories of concepts] regards concepts as objective, i.e.,
as neither revealed nor invented, but as produced by man's
consciousness in accordance with the facts of reality, as mental
integrations of factual data computed by man--as the products of a
cognitive method of classification whose processes must be performed
by man, but whose content is dictated by reality."
Arnold Broese
news:sdk8i5dr0uvgs1gjv...@4ax.com...
>
> You don't know that "mental grasp" is equivalent to "identification."
> And she doesn't explain how perceptual observation alone, without
> reason, leads to knowledge. Her definition there is only an unproven
> assertion.
Even a cockroach can perceive. When it perceives, it learns there is
something there. It reacts differently to food and people. It needs to know
which is which. If it is people, it hides. Without that knowledge (which it
perceives), it would be killed.
--
Arnold
Charles Bell
> On Sat, 12 Dec 2009 08:47:21 -0800, Charles Bell
>
> >On Dec 12, 10:51�am, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> >> Agreed, light-waves exist, but light-waves have no property of color.
>
> >Red light may be defined as light of wavelength between 700 and 635
> >nm. �Thus, all light in that range has a property of being perceived
> >by humans as "red". If there is no perceiver (all life in the universe
> >ceases to be), the range of light of wavelength 700 - 635 nm does not
> >disappear from existence and continues to have the same properties
> >(wavelength, amplitude, frequency).
>
> Agreed, only the perception of red disappears, the light-waves still
> exist.
>
> As for the measurements of wavelength, Newton was unable to find an
> absolute location in space from which to determine magnitudes in a
> non-relative way. So we still measure those nanometers in human terms
> and cannot provide any absolute measuring stick by means of which to
> measure them. Man is still the measure of all things, our notion of
> absolute space is only an assumption providing our concepts of
> measurement with seeming objectivity.
>
. . . and any notion of Einstein's relative space in absolute space-
time is only an assumption (by metaphysical concept) providing a
concept of measurement WITHIN THAT CONTEXT. You are complicating the
discussion for purpose of evasion. You made a false statement: that
light has no property of color.
> Rand would have us believe that the units we choose for measurement
> are merely a matter of convenience. But there is no measurement to
> begin with that is not relative measurement, and calling it objective
> does not render it absolute.
>
The reality being indentified in this instance is the color red as
sensed by the retina. That color is light of wavelength 700-625 nm.
As far as anything Herr Dr Einstein might have to say on the subject,
it would be that for each wavelength is associated a discrete energy
in E=mc*2 and thus "relative measurement" in your above statement
means that everything in measurement is relative to the speed of
light, the thing being identified here. Measurements within a single
inertial farme are going to be the same in any case even if we were
not discussing that to which everything is relative (non-inertial
farme). Identifying the reality of the color red in an inertial frame
in which I am travelling near the speed of light is not some context I
am familiar with, nor you, I imagine.
> >Because all (sighted) people perceive the color red in the same way,
>
> You assume...
>
> >it is an objective property and can have as precise a defintion as is
> >needed.
>
> You are confusing "objective" with "intersubjective."
>
Unless you are discussing the color red from light emanating from Sol
while you are traveling near the speed of light and I am discussing
the color red traveling through the universe at whatever speed I am
traveling, which is much less than the speed of light, we are not
talking "intersubjectivity". If we are both in the same
epistemological context (traveling through the universe at the same
speed), we are always talking "objective" when speaking of scientific
matters.
> If nobody ever had "red" cones in their retinas then the perception of
> redness would not exist,
. . . therefore, any talk of a universal called "redness" is nonsense.
Malrassic Park
<arnold_br...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>"Malrassic Park" <male...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>news:sdk8i5dr0uvgs1gjv...@4ax.com...
..
>> You don't know that "mental grasp" is equivalent to "identification."
>> And she doesn't explain how perceptual observation alone, without
>> reason, leads to knowledge. Her definition there is only an unproven
>> assertion.
>Even a cockroach can perceive. When it perceives, it learns there is
>something there. It reacts differently to food and people. It needs to know
>which is which. If it is people, it hides. Without that knowledge (which it
>perceives), it would be killed.
Anthropomorphizing. If cockroaches have knowledge, you might as well
say that humans have cockroach instincts.
Malrassic Park
You made an assertion: that I made a false statement. And there is no
Einsteinian relative space in absolute space-time, that is a very
confused and absurd notion as the only absolute for Einstein was the
speed of light in a vacuum. And anyway, I did not mention Einstein, it
was Newton who discovered that space and time are relative and failed
to find an absolute but only postulated one. Einstein never refuted
Newton's notion of relativity, and in this context he only combined
relative space and time into relative space-time.
I have history's greatest thinkers to back me up. And anyway, it's
only complicated to you, but really all I did was digress and I have
absolutely no need to evade.
>> Rand would have us believe that the units we choose for measurement
>> are merely a matter of convenience. But there is no measurement to
>> begin with that is not relative measurement, and calling it objective
>> does not render it absolute.
..
>The reality being indentified in this instance is the color red as
>sensed by the retina. That color is light of wavelength 700-625 nm.
>As far as anything Herr Dr Einstein might have to say on the subject,
>it would be that for each wavelength is associated a discrete energy
>in E=mc*2 and thus "relative measurement" in your above statement
>means that everything in measurement is relative to the speed of
>light, the thing being identified here. Measurements within a single
>inertial farme are going to be the same in any case even if we were
>not discussing that to which everything is relative (non-inertial
>farme). Identifying the reality of the color red in an inertial frame
>in which I am travelling near the speed of light is not some context I
>am familiar with, nor you, I imagine.
Not personally, no. But Doppler shift theory will have the
wave-lengths either compress or expand, thus creating the impression
or appearance of some color other than red or even no color such as
infra-red.
The three types of cones of the retina sense light-waves - not color-
and translate them into basically three colors: blue, green, and red.
The rest is done by the brain. The reality you perceive provides only
the physical light, not the perceived color.
>> >Because all (sighted) people perceive the color red in the same way,
..
>> You assume...
..
>> >it is an objective property and can have as precise a defintion as is
>> >needed.
..
>> You are confusing "objective" with "intersubjective."
..
>Unless you are discussing the color red from light emanating from Sol
>while you are traveling near the speed of light and I am discussing
>the color red traveling through the universe at whatever speed I am
>traveling, which is much less than the speed of light, we are not
>talking "intersubjectivity". If we are both in the same
>epistemological context (traveling through the universe at the same
>speed), we are always talking "objective" when speaking of scientific
>matters.
..
>> If nobody ever had "red" cones in their retinas then the perception of
>> redness would not exist,
You speak of science while ignoring its findings in some instances and
misapplying them in others. Science was not the source of your
conflation anyway, it was this: "Because all (sighted) people perceive
the color red in the same way, it is an objective property and can
have as precise a defintion as is
needed."
That statement is a complete non sequitur based on your assumption
that all sighted peole perceive the color red in the same way - which
you cannot possibly know and would be very difficult for you to prove.
The other weakness of your assertion is the word "all," for which it
would only be necessary to find a single exception to disprove your
rule. But it would first be necessary to prove your rule through the
impossibility of examining all people.
>. . . therefore, any talk of a universal called "redness" is nonsense.
It would be impossible to have a Universal in the absence of
perceptual material from which to derive similarities. It is not
concepts that save you from the necessity of thinking about every
perceived object, but the Universal which lies implicit to its very
perception.
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
>>She defined knowledge as "the mental grasp [identification] of a fact of
>>reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of
>>reason
>>based on perceptual observation." The knowledge that you gain by "a
>>process
>>of reason based on perceptual observation" is in conceptual form.
> You don't know that "mental grasp" is equivalent to "identification."
On the conceptual level, the two are equivalent. Conceptually, to grasp
something is to identify, in conceptual terms, what it is.
> And she doesn't explain how perceptual observation alone, without
> reason, leads to knowledge. Her definition there is only an unproven
> assertion.
On the perceptual level, you know that something exists because you can see
it, hear it, touch it, smell it, or taste it.
[...]
> Rand wrote, "A sensation does not tell man *what* exists, but only
> *that* it exists."
Exactly. On the sensory and perceptual levels, you know THAT things exist.
On the conceptual level, you identify explicitly, in conceptual terms, what
they are.
>So you are confusing the sensory level of
> consciousness with the perceptual level in Rand's theory.
I'm not confused. Maybe you are.
Ken Gardner
"Malrassic Park" wrote:
>>ITOE is Rand's explanation for how concepts can validly perform this
>>function, but otherwise very little about the overall process of reasoning
>>itself. You won't find in ITOE most of the material that you find in
>>Chapter 4 of OPAR, although you will find bits and pieces and hints of
>>some
>>of that material.
> And how does that not contradict this on page 71? "None of [the
> traditional theories of concepts] regards concepts as objective, i.e.,
> as neither revealed nor invented, but as produced by man's
> consciousness in accordance with the facts of reality, as mental
> integrations of factual data computed by man--as the products of a
> cognitive method of classification whose processes must be performed
> by man, but whose content is dictated by reality."
It doesn't. Concept-formation is only the first step in reasoning. We make
identifications and gain, maintain, and organize conceptual knowledge by
organizing concepts into true propositions about the facts of reality (and,
later, making logical inferences from such propositions, such as in
traditional Aristotelian logic). Concepts are the elements of propositions.
If you cannot explain how concepts are based on and derived from the facts
of reality, you won't be able to validate any propositions either. Rand
actually makes this point in the first part of Chapter 8 of ITOE, as well as
in parts of Chapter 5 on definitions.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
..
..
>>>ITOE is Rand's explanation for how concepts can validly perform this
>>>function, but otherwise very little about the overall process of reasoning
>>>itself. You won't find in ITOE most of the material that you find in
>>>Chapter 4 of OPAR, although you will find bits and pieces and hints of
>>>some
>>>of that material.
>> And how does that not contradict this on page 71? "None of [the
>> traditional theories of concepts] regards concepts as objective, i.e.,
>> as neither revealed nor invented, but as produced by man's
>> consciousness in accordance with the facts of reality, as mental
>> integrations of factual data computed by man--as the products of a
>> cognitive method of classification whose processes must be performed
>> by man, but whose content is dictated by reality."
>It doesn't. Concept-formation is only the first step in reasoning. We make
>identifications and gain, maintain, and organize conceptual knowledge by
>organizing concepts into true propositions about the facts of reality (and,
>later, making logical inferences from such propositions, such as in
>traditional Aristotelian logic). Concepts are the elements of propositions.
>If you cannot explain how concepts are based on and derived from the facts
>of reality, you won't be able to validate any propositions either. Rand
>actually makes this point in the first part of Chapter 8 of ITOE, as well as
>in parts of Chapter 5 on definitions.
Alll you're saying now is that concepts enable the formation of new
concepts, and new knowledge. So what if the ITOE isn't ONLY about
concept-formation, all I'm saying is that it is NOT about Universals,
that it delves into a relatively easy subject since concept-formation
is a conscious process and therefore avoids the far more difficult
topic of Universals which are important for a unified awareness.
Dealing merely with the easy problem of concept-formation only gives
Rand an excuse to claim she solved an ancient riddle in only a
half-hour, when in fact in her sleight-of-hand method she never dealt
with it at all.
The way the ITOE deals with the problem of Universals is like a
magician doing a magic disappearing trick, she reveals the object at
the start, then surreptiously slips it into a pocket (discusses
concept-formation and definitions instead), never to be seen again
while giving the appearance that it is still present in the trick.
Then she lifts the scarf and the object is magically "gone."
In a lot of ways you seem to be just talking around me. I want more
attention paid to perceptual identification, that's what this thread
is really about. This talk of "implicit concept" in ITOE only assumes
that some concept is involved on an implicit or subconscious level.
What's crazy about that is it implies that man can have a concept of
something before he has a concept of it. And no, Charles, this present
topic is not a re-run from a year ago, because I don't recall locating
the Universal in the production of perception itself at that time.
You previously wrote "The identification itself is what Rand means by
knowledge on the conceptual level. "Existence is identity,
consciousness is identification'." But identification is a perceptual
task. And consciousness is used synonymously with perception. I
disagree that the identify something conceptually is the same thing as
perceiving it.
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>
>
>"Malrassic Park" wrote:
>
>>>She defined knowledge as "the mental grasp [identification] of a fact of
>>>reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of
>>>reason
>>>based on perceptual observation." The knowledge that you gain by "a
>>>process
>>>of reason based on perceptual observation" is in conceptual form.
..
>> You don't know that "mental grasp" is equivalent to "identification."
..
>On the conceptual level, the two are equivalent. Conceptually, to grasp
>something is to identify, in conceptual terms, what it is.
..
>> And she doesn't explain how perceptual observation alone, without
>> reason, leads to knowledge. Her definition there is only an unproven
>> assertion.
..
>On the perceptual level, you know that something exists because you can see
>it, hear it, touch it, smell it, or taste it.
..
>> Rand wrote, "A sensation does not tell man *what* exists, but only
>> *that* it exists."
..
>Exactly. On the sensory and perceptual levels, you know THAT things exist.
>On the conceptual level, you identify explicitly, in conceptual terms, what
>they are.
..
>>So you are confusing the sensory level of
>> consciousness with the perceptual level in Rand's theory.
..
>I'm not confused. Maybe you are.
Then explain how you get "When you look at a person, on the perceptual
level you have knowledge of that particular person, in other words
THAT he exists" from Rand's "A sensation does not tell man *what*
exists, but only *that* it exists."
Never mind - upon closer inspection I've decided it is Rand who was
confused, and that you unwittingly got closer to the truth than she
did. And that it was Rand who failed to secure her own concepts by
identifying them more closely, as in this case identifying what she
meant by "sensations" here - "Sensations, as such, are not retained in
man's memory...Discriminated awareness begins on the level of
percepts" - versus here - "A sensation does not tell man what exists,
but only that it exists." Both statements may be true but they seem to
be referring to different things.
I've often said that Randites themselves often conflict on these
issues because Rand herself was so confusing. Without critics such as
myself to give you a common enemy to unite against Objectivism would
have self-destructed long ago.
Ray
> On Sun, 13 Dec 2009 11:20:05 -0800, Ken Gardner <kesgar...@att.net>
> wrote:
>
> Alll you're saying now is that concepts enable the formation of new
> concepts, and new knowledge. So what if the ITOE isn't ONLY about
> concept-formation, all I'm saying is that it is NOT about Universals,
> that it delves into a relatively easy subject since concept-formation
> is a conscious process and therefore avoids the far more difficult
> topic of Universals which are important for a unified awareness.
> Dealing merely with the easy problem of concept-formation only gives
> Rand an excuse to claim she solved an ancient riddle in only a
> half-hour, when in fact in her sleight-of-hand method she never dealt
> with it at all.
>
What is your definition of Universals?
What do you mean by "unified awareness"?
RoL
wants
to
know
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>>
>
>What is your definition of Universals?
>What do you mean by "unified awareness"?
Universals are generally defined as characteristics held in common,
not only as similar between entities but as identical. In order for
awareness to be unified the same objects, identified by their
characteristics, must hold their identity for our perception from one
time to the next or we would have to re-identify them every time we
encountered them again. Awareness is a unity when its Universals
maintain this recognition over time.
Arnold Broese
Obviously it is not conceptual knowledge. But one cannot deny that when you
walk into a room with a cockroach on the floor, it knows you are there. That
is perceptual awareness - a knowledge of your presence. It's reaction to
that awareness, is to run and hide. That reaction is instinctive, not
considered thought.
--
Arnold
Malrassic Park
<arnold_br...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>"Malrassic Park" <male...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>news:kqv9i5huht5dsel3c...@4ax.com...
>> On Sun, 13 Dec 2009 01:45:21 -0800, Arnold Broese
>> <arnold_br...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>>Even a cockroach can perceive. When it perceives, it learns there is
>>>something there. It reacts differently to food and people. It needs to
>>>know
>>>which is which. If it is people, it hides. Without that knowledge (which
>>>it perceives), it would be killed.
>> Anthropomorphizing. If cockroaches have knowledge, you might as well
>> say that humans have cockroach instincts.
>Obviously it is not conceptual knowledge. But one cannot deny that when you
>walk into a room with a cockroach on the floor, it knows you are there. That
>is perceptual awareness - a knowledge of your presence. It's reaction to
>that awareness, is to run and hide. That reaction is instinctive, not
>considered thought.
But then what is perceptual knowledge? As in your statement, " Without
Malrassic Park
wrote:
>"Malrassic Park" <male...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>news:v8iai596i4b95o076...@4ax.com...
>> On Sun, 13 Dec 2009 11:20:05 -0800, Ken Gardner <kesgar...@att.net>
>> wrote:
..
>> Alll you're saying now is that concepts enable the formation of new
>> concepts, and new knowledge. So what if the ITOE isn't ONLY about
>> concept-formation, all I'm saying is that it is NOT about Universals,
>> that it delves into a relatively easy subject since concept-formation
>> is a conscious process and therefore avoids the far more difficult
>> topic of Universals which are important for a unified awareness.
>> Dealing merely with the easy problem of concept-formation only gives
>> Rand an excuse to claim she solved an ancient riddle in only a
>> half-hour, when in fact in her sleight-of-hand method she never dealt
>> with it at all.
..
>What is your definition of Universals?
>What do you mean by "unified awareness"?
I've tried defining it, and I don't know if you're stumped or what, so
let me try this. The idea of Univerals belongs to the theory of
properties, that is, of qualities possessed by things which makes them
what they are. If we can say that the same properties belong to
different things in virtue of what they are, then we call those
properties Universals. Those properties are identical throughout all
changes of these things, and throughout all changes of things ilke it.