>Can someone please help me understand how anyone could ever confuse
>Objectivism for philosophy or genuine thinking? Forgive me if I am
>wrong, but my readings on Objectivism have led me to conclude that it
>is perhaps the sorriest, most shallow excuse for philosophical
>thinking -- something adopted by corporate drones who want to get a
>quick-fix for intellectual life.
A little hasty and simplistic a conclusion, don't ya think? Not that there
aren't signs that point in that direction, mind you, but with many other sy
stems
of belief, it attracts both reasonable people and less reasonable people. My
inductive experience indicates that very, very few accept (or proclaim to
accept) the philosophy in whole and are, at the same time, all that honest or
reasonable intellectually. Among those who are reasonable and might be
considered pretty close adherents of her ideas, there is usually the belief
that
some aspect(s) of Rand's thought are mistaken or poorly-argued or inadequate.
And very few I've encountered -- among either the reasonable or the
less-reasonable -- could be considered "corporate drones."
>At best, Rand is in the same league
>as pop "thinkers" such as Deepak Chopra. I highly doubt whether she
>ever really read the primary texts of philosophy. Given her shallow
>interpretations, I think not. Rather, I imagine that she did a cursory
>analysis of philosphical works for purposes of fulfilling her
>self-absorbed agenda. I sincerely ask that you folks pay a little
>respect to great thinkers such as Aristotle, Kant, and Nietzsche by
>not speaking their names in this group. Thanks.
Rand's main influence -- where she has garnered the most readership and
following -- is via her novels. As a philosopher, her writings haven't had
close to that much influence (after all, what's right in her philosophy was in
large part laid down in Aristotle's works many years ago, and given much better
argument by him than by Rand), and she herself perhaps as much as anybody knew
that the job of presenting her ideas to other philosophers was best left to
those whose area of expertise lies in that direction, while the basic ideas
originate from her pen. And the basic ideas, favorably interpreted, aren't
exactly dead ideas in philosophy -- e.g., direct realism, virtue-theory
eudaemonism, political individualism. Subjects such as these have received
more
than competent treatment in published works from academic-types who would
basically consider themselves in agreement with a substantial portion of her
ideas (e.g. David Kelley, Tara Smith, Eric Mack).
But it isn't any secret that Rand herself was, shall we say, impatient with
doing philosophy as it's more commonly done, and there's quite a bit about the
impatience in her approach that I (among others) wouldn't care to defend.
--
Chris Cathcart [email suffix: yahoo dot com]
"Beer is proof that God loves us and wants us to be happy." --Benjamin Franklin
"Baseball is only further proof." --Me
Ayn Rand is the only philosopher, to my knowledge, who holds that
self-interest is connected to respecting the rights of others. This is
hardly an idea to dismiss lightly, especially given the vast material
evidence from capitalism that it is correct.
> I sincerely ask that you folks pay a little respect to great thinkers
> such as Aristotle, Kant, and Nietzsche by not speaking their names
> in this group.
Hardly anyone talks about Kant here. Really, hardly anyone even in
academia talks about Kant. He wrote a nice refutation of the
Ontological Argument; about everything else he did was gibberish. As
to Nietzche, he has his one bright point, too; he wrote some great
criticisms of Christianity. But unlike Kant, he was worst than mere
gibberish; he believed in killing people for fun. I cannot see how can
you respect Kant and Nietzche without respecting Jesus and Hitler. I
prefer to respect none of them.
--
Dave O'Hearn
> Ayn Rand is the only philosopher, to my knowledge, who holds that
> self-interest is connected to respecting the rights of others. This is
> hardly an idea to dismiss lightly, especially given the vast material
> evidence from capitalism that it is correct.
So does Aristotle, in Books V, VIII, and IX of his Nicomachean Ethics.
[...]
Ken
Lon
[...]
>
>Ken
I should have said modern philosopher, as I am not very familiar with
classic philosophy. Greek philosophy didn't have the aversion to
egoism that is so automatic today, so I am not surprised, but I
haven't read the Nicomachean Ethics myself.
--
Dave O'Hearn
> Dave O'Hearn
Your exposé is one or two centuries too late. Without the benefit of your
analysis, the world had elevated those men to the rank of great thinkers.
Now you tell us! :-)
Carmichael
x
x
x
x
My exposé is hardly original. Kant is mocked left and right by
everyone except Christians, and even they have to dismiss him
ultimately, because the theological ones are all Catholic Thomists. It
is not that he was stupid or malicious, but his philosophy is so
bizarre that it presents a great social curiosity: why on earth did
people take it seriously?
And I said nothing that Nietzche won't tell you himself, over and over
again, every five pages. Besides that, most people consider him a
proto-Nazi, not a great thinker. Of course, that isn't quite accurate,
but it takes little skill to dismiss Nietzche; he asserted everything
and defended nothing.
--
Dave O'Hearn
Well, that takes care of those two. What about Rand, how does she rank in
relation to them?
They could still be 'great' and speak gibberish or worse; I think
'great' simply connotes important; and whether someone was important
to others is an objective matter of how often those others refer to
that person, not a mamatter of whether that person was right, or good,
or even sensible. Hitler is a greater historical figure than Kant, in
that his thoughts were more important, to more people, than Kant's;
yet Hitler's actual expressions of his thoughts were inferior to
Kant's in all those other respects.
> Can someone please help me understand how anyone could ever confuse
> Objectivism for philosophy or genuine thinking? Forgive me if I am
> wrong, but my readings on Objectivism have led me to conclude that it
> is perhaps the sorriest, most shallow excuse for philosophical
> thinking -- something adopted by corporate drones who want to get a
> quick-fix for intellectual life. At best, Rand is in the same league
> as pop "thinkers" such as Deepak Chopra. I highly doubt whether she
> ever really read the primary texts of philosophy. Given her shallow
> interpretations, I think not. Rather, I imagine that she did a cursory
> analysis of philosphical works for purposes of fulfilling her
> self-absorbed agenda.
Ayn Rand was the Grandma Moses of philosophy.
I sincerely ask that you folks pay a little
> respect to great thinkers such as
<names deleted by request> by
> not speaking their names in this group. Thanks.
Thanks for the advice. Of course, it's not very good advice, as it's
incomplete; for one thing, you give no idea of how such a thing could
be done. How for instance do we tell anyone who joins the group in
the future not to speak those names, without ourselves speaking those
names? If you've actually thought about what you were saying, you
should have an answer; since I don't, I'll wait with baited breath for
your reply.
It's the hat.
-- M. Ruff
> I sincerely ask that you folks pay a little
> > respect to great thinkers such as
> <names deleted by request> by
> > not speaking their names in this group. Thanks.
>
> Thanks for the advice. Of course, it's not very good advice, as it's
> incomplete; for one thing, you give no idea of how such a thing could
> be done. How for instance do we tell anyone who joins the group in
> the future not to speak those names, without ourselves speaking those
> names? If you've actually thought about what you were saying, you
> should have an answer; since I don't, I'll wait with baited breath for
> your reply.
That's an easy one. You put up a web page with the names of the people
we are not supposed to speak about. Then you tell people that they are
not supposed to speak about the people whose names they will find on
that web page.
Some people just don't appreciate the marvels of modern technology.
--
David Friedman
www.daviddfriedman.com/
Rand did not say very much that was not either Aristotelian or a
direct criticism of Marxism. In substance, it may turn out that Rand
is not very significant, as Marx was just so totally wrong.
Historically however, she advocated things that were extremely
unpopular, such as the virtue ethic, individualism, capitalism, direct
realism, and the non-initiation of force. This stuff is still
amazingly unpopular, and there are few people who advocate all of it,
especially on secular grounds. If you want a philosopher who said many
true, nonobvious things, and few false things, Rand is quite good.
Ultimately, I don't know what other quality you could desire in a
philosopher.
--
Dave O'Hearn
> ... If you want a philosopher who said many
> true, nonobvious things, and few false things, Rand is quite good.
It's amazing how people, heavy thinkers included. don't believe her.
Carmichael
In conventional language, that is a contradictio (as it applies to
thinkers).
>I think
> 'great' simply connotes important; and whether someone was important
> to others is an objective matter of how often those others refer to
> that person, not a mamatter of whether that person was right, or good,
> or even sensible.
That is not how greatness is adjudicated in philosophy. Objectively,
greatness is, I'm sorry to say, a collectivist assesment. In the absence of
consensus, a judgement of greatness is purely subjective and without
standing
>Hitler is a greater historical figure than Kant, in
> that his thoughts were more important, to more people, than Kant's;
Not by Rand's judgement, who thinks that Kant is a greater evil than Hitler.
Hitler's ideas are already discredited, but if one believes Rand (should
we?) Kant's ideas are still rampant in the Western world, to its detriment.
> yet Hitler's actual expressions of his thoughts were inferior to
> Kant's in all those other respects.
More gigbbery gibberish?
Carmichael
x
x
x
On 23 Oct 2001 by dave odden wrote:
Let it be Immanuel Kant: he gets beat up here all the time). Do we
need anything more?
What does a Google search on references to Kant in the newsgroup
humanities.philosophy.objectivism? (I assume "here" means this
newsgroup.)
Google spit out 52 pages of 512 references to Kant going back
almost 2 years, "here." I pasted 10 pages of them below (13
references were in this month alone; on average, roughly one
reference every 2 days):
-------------------------------------------
Re: Objectivism is pseudo-philosophy
... the rank of great thinkers. Now you tell us! :-) My exposé is
hardly original. Kant
is mocked left and right by everyone except Christians, and even they
have ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 23 Dec 2001 by Acar - View Thread
(9 articles)
Re: Facts, Suppositions, Statements, Correspondence
... elicited in consciousness by the real world via the senses. My
scant knowledge of
Kant (no pun) can't see a great difference with that scenario either.
(Do I ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 20 Dec 2001 by Bert Clanton - View
Thread (57 articles)
Re: Eternity
... between substance, the unconditional, and existence, the universe
as a whole? At
least Kant attempted to justify his findings. Rand did not. I'm not
sure what ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 20 Dec 2001 by malenor - View
Thread (114 articles)
Re: Jewish Objectivists
... are well displayed. Exactly, if it is done for profit it has no
moral worth (see:
Kant). If it is given away, with no expected return, it is good. Even
if the ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 19 Dec 2001 by Fred Weiss - View
Thread (217 articles)
Re: Why "Miss Rand"or "Ayn Rand"...?
As Mr. Kant said, "Just don't call me ding an sicht". Luka Yovetich
<lu...@earthlink.net>:
What's with the weird treatment of Rand's name? She was a woman ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 17 Dec 2001 by Robert Allen Leeper
- View Thread (16 articles)
Re: EVOLUTION OF THE HUMAN BRAIN
... Here it is, fellow Objectivists, proof positive that reading Kant
causes mind warts...
-- The smile of a sunny ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 16 Dec 2001 by Stephen Grossman -
View Thread (3 articles)
Re: Godel and Objectivism
... issue came up on FreeMarket.net, an Objectivist basically threw a
fit, abusing Godel
and implying he deserves a place in Objectivist Hell right next to
Kant.
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 13 Dec 2001 by David Tomlin - View
Thread (128 articles)
Fall 2001 Journal of Ayn Rand Studies is Here
... Literary Aims," by Gene H. Bell-Villada "Reply to George Walsh:
Rethinking Rand
and Kant," by R. Kevin Hill The Spring 2002 table of contents for THE
JOURNAL ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 13 Dec 2001 by Chris Matthew
Sciabarra - View Thread (1 article)
Re: A Logical Theory of Induction
... be true of things that I say as well. If Fred is misrepresenting a
view of say Kant
or Rand then it might be useful to look at those other things to see
how ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 10 Dec 2001 by Gordon G. Sollars -
View Thread (433 articles)
Re: Duty and Sacrifice
... value for a lesser is immoral. It is irrational, ie, evil.
Devotion to duty is evil.
Kant was the most evil character in history. Lol! xxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 08 Dec 2001 by malenor - View
Thread (65 articles)
Re: Objectivism: What's it all about?
... not being a cloud". Couldn't we produce better definitions? I
thought you had read
Kant. A bit. To do with reality, the Universe and God, as I recall. 1.
With ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 07 Dec 2001 by Jorge - View Thread
(36 articles)
Re: Ayn Rand contra Human Nature?
... online is at all indicitive, I recommend against it. You're better
off buying Kant
or Russell or Marx or some other philosopher Rand hated. They at least
will ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 06 Dec 2001 by Dave O'Hearn - View
Thread (8 articles)
Re: Morality on Deserted Island
... tradition to think that morality is self-directed rather than
outwardly motivated.
Kant, not surprisingly, has a category of duties to oneself. Possibly
of ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 02 Dec 2001 by Lon - View Thread
(121 articles)
Re: When is deception appropriate?
... this lesson until after I get a 4.0 for the semester?" "No! Go to
church, read more
Kant, and please take a vow of chastity so you can be a Jesuit monk. I
so ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 19 Nov 2001 by Dave O'Hearn - View
Thread (6 articles)
Re: HUOC is in session.
... that his only opinions are mere iconoclasm. How anyone can defend
both Kant and anarchy
is beyond understanding, except with this explanation. I welcome
others ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 19 Nov 2001 by Dave O'Hearn - View
Thread (15 articles)
Re: Infinite infinity
... of consciousness: Because one's notion (eg, of number) does not
specify a limit Kant
says this too. (First, I presume) It really goes back to the ancient
Greeks ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 19 Nov 2001 by Dave O'Hearn - View
Thread (64 articles)
Re: Is Obejctivism Under Attack?
... a complete and logical moral and ethical theory without the flaws
of either Kant
or Neitchze. Yeah, I know Rand was bombastic, cantankerous, and even a
...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 17 Nov 2001 by George Dance - View
Thread (55 articles)
Re: Evolution & Value (version I meant to send originally)
... is a method for weighing conflicting values. Such a method can be
found in Mill or
Kant of course (or Rawls per the other discussion). I don't see that
calling ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 12 Nov 2001 by Lon - View Thread
(3 articles)
Re: Philosophy in one sentence
... them, no? Didn't that idea come much later? Like after the
"Enlightenment"? What,
Hegel? Kant? Nietsche? One of all of those guys? I think they call the
modern ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 10 Nov 2001 by Justin_Martyr2000 -
View Thread (28 articles)
Re: Reason or Preference?
... came upon this quotation at x-refer: <quote> Since the moral
theories of Kant, however,
it has generally been held that moral judgements are matters either of
...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 08 Nov 2001 by George Dance - View
Thread (4 articles)
Re: Explanation!
... I would argue impossible--position between these two philosophic
camps (eg, Aristotle,
Kant, W. James, Rand). If you decide with the rationalizers, then you
...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 06 Nov 2001 by Chris Cathcart -
View Thread (21 articles)
Re: from Fundamentalist to Humanist
... philosophy out there. We have the Ontological Argument, the
Argument From Design,
Kant's moral argument, and so on. Most of them are unsound, except the
...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 05 Nov 2001 by Justin_Martyr2000 -
View Thread (40 articles)
Re: Moral Sense
... fault if someone did not 'feel as he ought'. Since the moral
theories of Kant, however,
it has generally been held that moral judgements are matters either of
...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 05 Nov 2001 by George Dance - View
Thread (32 articles)
Re: Microsoft Settlement
... and good will yet enjoying uninterrupted prosperity can never give
pleasure to a
rational impartial observer. -- Kant, "Foundations of the metaphysics
of morals ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 05 Nov 2001 by Calvin Ostrum -
View Thread (128 articles)
Re: Marxism and the labor theory of value
... nothing that you are not leading up to figuring out if Marx, also,
like Kant, is
compatible with Objectivism and that the objections which we have to
Marx are ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 31 Oct 2001 by Fred Weiss - View
Thread (28 articles)
Re: An Open Letter to the Ayn Rand Institute
... what they are. ... Well, I'm fairly sure there are fundamental
aspects to eg Kant's
thought outside of ethics, but I don't know what they are. Oddly
enough, I ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 29 Oct 2001 by Ananda Gupta - View
Thread (179 articles)
Re: Understanding Collectivists
... CathKant - the mongrel of the pack. Not satisfied with trying to
make Kant compatible
with Objectivism, not satisfied with making Stanley Fish's
post-modernism ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 28 Oct 2001 by Fred Weiss - View
Thread (172 articles)
Re: The good is a species of the true
... that you claim to posses, you must undoubtedly be a thinker
greater than Kant, greater
than Newton, greater than Hawking, maybe even greater than Rand. If
you ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 28 Oct 2001 by Acar - View Thread
(246 articles)
Re: Islam and Nihilism
... the answer you want is "live." This is not exactly an original
observation. Kant's
argument against suicide similarly notes that in order to be rational
one ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 26 Oct 2001 by Lon - View Thread
(274 articles)
Re: Objective punishments
... hehe) let's say, you are the judge (I guess then we need a new
victim. Let it be
Immanuel Kant: he gets beat up here all the time). Do we need anything
more?
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 23 Oct 2001 by dave odden - View
Thread (17 articles)
Re: TOC position on combating terrorism
... that Stanley Fish is compatible with Objectivism the way that you
attempted to show
that Kant is? Or what? No. "Here we go again" as in you are going to
be the ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 23 Oct 2001 by Chris Cathcart -
View Thread (486 articles)
Re: there's no such thing as an atheist in foxhole
... population of sampled philosophers. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle,
Augustine, Aquinas,
Kant, Kierkegaard, Hegel, Descartes, Pascal, Whitehead and a few
others ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 11 Oct 2001 by Jorge - View Thread
(42 articles)
Re: Little Boy Sunshine
... kill them because they're not us. He and his faithful flock like
to spout how Kant
was the most evil man in history, but they themselves have more
categorical ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 11 Oct 2001 by Jim Klein - View
Thread (68 articles)
Re: "Through Your Most Grievous Fault"
... life. Am I overlooking something, or is she indeed trying to have
it both ways?
She is mainly objecting here to Immanuel Kant's Metaphysics of Morals.
-- Ken
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 09 Oct 2001 by Ken Gardner - View
Thread (38 articles)
Re: From the Memory Hole
... 18908$ev2....@www.newsranger.com... He does it all the time with
Immanuel Kant,
for instance. This is too funny. CathKant, are you still working on
figuring ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 07 Oct 2001 by Fred Weiss - View
Thread (122 articles)
Re: Comments on the Terrorist Attacks (Brave vs suicidal)
... try to relate it to morality, you'll have a disaster. This is
almost exactly what
Kant meant when he said that deads done out of habit or self-interest
have no ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 24 Sep 2001 by Jorge - View Thread
(9 articles)
Re: Rand's predictions about Rawls
... us better data with which to make decisions. But this basic thing
is not what Kant
was saying at all. He said that experience as such, not just science,
tells ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 21 Sep 2001 by Dave O'Hearn - View
Thread (49 articles)
HPO Top Ten List: ARIan A-Holes!
... of their approach to ideas. Favorite topics include: the evils of
Immanuel Kant,
the evils of modern philosophy, the evils of homosexuality, the evils
lurking ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 19 Sep 2001 by Chris Cathcart -
View Thread (9 articles)
Re: Evolution
... of course, it's logical. But the logic comes from out minds, not
from the world
(Kant would say) I don't know to what you are referring exactly. The
logic of ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 17 Sep 2001 by AynRand12 - View
Thread (54 articles)
The one becomes the other...
... we begin I need to remind you that reality television is still
television." Manny
Kant said that. His hands were folded together, his thumbs pressed
tightly to ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 16 Sep 2001 by Greg Swann - View
Thread (2 articles)
Re: de re and de dicto
So Kant says: Imagine (a) space. Now imagine-away all the things which
fill this
space (all the way to the very last atom). Can you do this? Yes. But
can you ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 07 Sep 2001 by Symmetry - View
Thread (9 articles)
Re: What you ought to do (Ethics)
... of determinism and the free will. So if I look up compatibilism I
end up reading
Kant, Hume, and Hobbes - to begin with. But the thing is that none of
these ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 06 Sep 2001 by Jorge - View Thread
(60 articles)
Re: Ken vs. Fred (was: The role of errors in the death ...
... in the history of science of of a false, but apparently true,
theory. Ironically,
Kant came up with his epistemology (more specifically, his notion of a
priori ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 05 Sep 2001 by Ken Gardner - View
Thread (121 articles)
Re: connection between quantum mechanics and consciousness
... another story, though pointing in the same direction... Sometimes
I'm reminded of
Kant, that some things you have to believe because they are
"unknowable". In ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 05 Sep 2001 by Kilgore - View
Thread (106 articles)
Re: Godel? Godel...
... another story, though pointing in the same direction... Sometimes
I'm reminded of
Kant, that some things you have to believe because they are
"unknowable". In ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 04 Sep 2001 by Kilgore - View
Thread (1 article)
Re: The Great Theft
... bypassing consciousness by whatever means. It is an oxymoron. I am
told that Immanuel
Kant came to the same conclusion (that there is no way to get direct
...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 03 Sep 2001 by Acar - View Thread
(48 articles)
Re: Analycity
... not 'meaningful'.) I'm afraid I'll have to fall back on Kant's
terminology: true
synthetic propositions are 'augmentative' (as knowing them increases
our ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 03 Sep 2001 by Joe Durnavich -
View Thread (51 articles)
Re: The role of errors in the death penalty debate
but I have read somewhere that Kant had developed the notion of an a
priori synthetic
truth (including the principle of causality) in order to explain why
...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 03 Sep 2001 by Ken Gardner - View
Thread (170 articles)
Re: A Problem With Objectivists
... t need proving. Well, that certainly sounds like the sort of
approach taken by Kant
and Rawls. It's been noted before that whenever one of the charges
against ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 23 Aug 2001 by Owl - View Thread
(37 articles)
Re: What do you mean by
... taller'). That, in short, is Betsy's reasoning, and it is the same
as Kant's. Are
you saying that to claim we derive knowledge from a process of
reasoning is ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 22 Aug 2001 by Betsy Speicher -
View Thread (88 articles)
Re: "english" philosopher
... but most of the views of the great philosophers (including Plato,
Descartes, Kant,
Wittgenstien, Ayer) are being found inadequate. If Objectivists refuse
to ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 21 Aug 2001 by GKrumbel - View
Thread (43 articles)
Re: Objectivism & Homosexuality: Interviews Requested
... smuggled Liberal English Concepts into the presently volatile
Continental Enlightenment
Marketplace?? " Dr. Johnson kicks Prof. Kant's butt -- circa 1781 :-)
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 20 Aug 2001 by DontAskWooster -
View Thread (3 articles)
Re: Justice and egoism
... Hence, as Steve Smolinski pointed out, Rand found the most
profound evil of all
in Kant, because of the sheer scope of fact which he had to evade to
come up ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 17 Aug 2001 by Kent - View Thread
(468 articles)
Re: Dilemma....... OF DEATH!
... may accept.) (Have I covered all the possibilities? I wouldn't
want to get too Kant-like
in my endless inventorying now, would I?) vvvvvv vv __ Chris Cathcart
...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 14 Aug 2001 by Chris Cathcart -
View Thread (167 articles)
Re: Spanking Children
" Immanuel Kant (1734-1804) was born, raised, lived, and died in the
town of Koigsberg
in East Prussia (now part of western Russia). His parents belonged to
...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 13 Aug 2001 by Dave O'Hearn - View
Thread (114 articles)
Re: near-death-experiences
... rather sloppy way of asking that question. What is this, an
invocation of Kant's
Cornucopia -- "posit as many entities as you can imagine"? Maybe it's
best to ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 12 Aug 2001 by Chris Cathcart -
View Thread (76 articles)
Re: Free will --> uncaused?
... No argued for incompatibilism unitl Hobbes launched the first
compatibilist argument.
Kant is a perfect example. And Descarte defined God so vaguely that
...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 11 Aug 2001 by 1Z - View Thread
(89 articles)
Re: Adler on Kant: Not Very Reliable
===== Original Message From Jay Allen <allenja...@yahoo.com>
==== MISTAKES threw me ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 08 Aug 2001 by Jay Allen - View
Thread (4 articles)
Re: Speicher and Sandin calling it like it is
... it might tend to validate "objects of the mind" ala
Decartes-Locke-Berkeley-Kant,
but as I understand you, the implications of how the internal
symbolization ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 08 Aug 2001 by Jim Klein - View
Thread (114 articles)
Re: Objectivist=Psychopath
... loving yourself. In fact, pretty much everyone except Christians
and Immanuel Kant
agree, and even some Christians do. -General poverty in major
affective ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 07 Aug 2001 by Dave O'Hearn - View
Thread (24 articles)
Re: Kant and Idealism
consciousness was dissected out and pickled in a
jar, or whether he believes that he has a ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 07 Aug 2001 by Robert J. Kolker -
View Thread (42 articles)
Re: Relationships are Man-Made
... perceptions are, but require a comparison in order to be grasped.
This is Kant
again. You are saying, explicitly, that BECAUSE they require a
comparison in ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 06 Aug 2001 by Eudaimonus - View
Thread (355 articles)
Re: Rand on Weiss
I'll mention one that he didn't: we have Kant to thank for the
Analytic-Synthetic
Dichotomy. Or is it just that we college freshman survey course 101
Arians ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 02 Aug 2001 by Jay Allen - View
Thread (65 articles)
Re: what's wrong with determinism?
... like that at all. So we get extremely confusing things, such as
the idea that Kant
is the most evil man ever. In certain senses, this could be considered
true ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 01 Aug 2001 by Dave O'Hearn - View
Thread (414 articles)
Re: Relationship != Comparison (was: Relationships are Man- ...
... color is red, or non-red. But it doesn't have a color! Similarly
(given Kant's
system) one would say that asking what is the spacio-temporal extent
of the ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 31 Jul 2001 by Eudaimonus - View
Thread (67 articles)
Re: Death penalty
... have elected congressmen who pass those laws. And then you might
ask where those
ideas come from. Kant? Christ? Alec Baldwin? 2 out of 3 ain't bad.
Fred Weiss
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 30 Jul 2001 by Fred Weiss - View
Thread (40 articles)
For Ken (Re: reading Kant)
Have you tried his _Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics_?
It serves as a relatively short ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 29 Jul 2001 by Chris - View Thread
(1 article)
Re: The Zeroeth Law of Esthetics
... with the senses, proceeds then to the understanding, and ends with
reason. There
is nothing higher than reason. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason,
1781
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 27 Jul 2001 by Chris Porter - View
Thread (131 articles)
Re: Logic, Math & (for R. Lawrence)
... intuitions are not logical deductions, but some other form of
knowledge (which Kant
called "synthetic a priori" knowledge), and that therefore the fact
that we ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 26 Jul 2001 by R Lawrence - View
Thread (26 articles)
Re: Causation and Volition
... leaves us with just constant conjunctions which are insufficient
for essentialist
arguments. Kant, like you, can also be understood as trying to defend
the ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 23 Jul 2001 by Lon - View Thread
(16 articles)
Re: Announcing: www.ImportanceOfPhilosophy.com
... id: <3a3cfa4e.01071...@posting.google.com> Your
assesments of Plato and
Kant are grossly inaccurate. The most relevant aspect of philosphy for
most ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 19 Jul 2001 by Symmetry - View
Thread (22 articles)
Re: Message to the International Olympic Committee
... I'm happy to service you evil racism. 5. I am a racist.... An
admission of guilt.
You are worse than Hitler, though nowhere near as bad as Kant. Joe
Teicher
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 15 Jul 2001 by JoeOrrion - View
Thread (12 articles)
Re: Questions about objectivism: I'm new to objectivism and ...
... those questions, but near the top of my list are the ones on Kant,
Mother Teresa,
and toleration of ideological disagreement as morally evil. You've
definately ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 12 Jul 2001 by Acar - View Thread
(45 articles)
Re: Study of Art Gives Insight Into Brain's Structure
... that the philosophers who battled longest with problems of
epistemology, like Plato
and Kant, also devoted much of their time to the study of art.
Furthermore ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 09 Jul 2001 by Darcy - View Thread
(3 articles)
Re: The 22 Immutable Laws Of Marketing
... else is an illusion."> How is it possible that nobody in this NG
recognizes this
as Kant? Jerry Story Well, who cares if it is? I think the thrust here
is that ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 08 Jul 2001 by
Mar...@lara.pathlink.com, "Michael E." - View Thread (19 articles)
Re: Rational Television
... art actually is. [... Impressionism is in fact a reflection of the
influence of
Kant: that we cannot really know reality, ie that reality is just a
(distorted ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 08 Jul 2001 by Ken Gardner - View
Thread (33 articles)
Re: ARIans as inherently dishonest
... someone a man, but them not dying of old age happens not to be
one. You mean Kant
didn't notice that men are made out of fragile stuff, they get ill,
they get ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 05 Jul 2001 by Kwag7693 - View
Thread (683 articles)
Re: Knowledge and truth are essentially the same thing
... to someone (it may have been you), this argument comes very close
to Kant's categories
-- which any non-idealistic philosophy should reject. That should be
non ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 05 Jul 2001 by Ken Gardner - View
Thread (26 articles)
Re: Is the Unknown True or False?
... I agree, and would add that this notion comes dangerously close to
Kant's so-called
"categories." [.. My question is: are the one-place attributes of ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 05 Jul 2001 by Ken Gardner - View
Thread (936 articles)
Re: Mortimer Adler has died
... has nothing on Adler in his relentless criticism of people like
Locke, Hume, and
Kant. The first half of the book covers whether the intellect is
material or ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 04 Jul 2001 by Ken Gardner - View
Thread (10 articles)
Re: Is St. John's the only one?
... it conflicts with 99% of what is taught at most colleges; it
conflicts with Kant,
with Hegel, with Hume, with Neitzche, with Spinoza, with Plato, etc.
The only ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 01 Jul 2001 by Churl Beck - View
Thread (13 articles)
Re: Correspondence, coherence, and the arbitrary
... such as Aristotle and Rand. As opposed to such luminaries as you,
your husband,
Kant, and Hegel. But Don is a bright guy. He'll eventually see through
the ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 28 Jun 2001 by Ken Gardner - View
Thread (105 articles)
Re: Shelton on beauty
... of the environment, and a bunch of tree hugging hippie crap. Books
were beautiful
until Kant wrote one. This is funny if it's a joke; sad if it's not.
--CHuRL
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 28 Jun 2001 by Churl Beck - View
Thread (5 articles)
Re: Rand's ethics v. Aristotle's ethics
... specifically an attack on the idea of "duty". In that context,
specifically against
Kant who maintained the opposite, she is asserting that you do not
have a ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 27 Jun 2001 by Fred Weiss - View
Thread (35 articles)
Re: What is Objectivism, anyway?
And her recognition of his horrendous dishonesty and evil. Whose ox
did Kant gore?
Whose house or field did he set afire? Whose purse did he cut? Whose
blood ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 25 Jun 2001 by Robert J. Kolker -
View Thread (105 articles)
Re: young, depressed O'ists?
... and that for too long -- arguably at least since the days of
Descartes and Kant
-- metaphysics has taken a back seat to epistemology. And be thankful
for that ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 22 Jun 2001 by Robert J. Kolker -
View Thread (128 articles)
Re: Red Planet
... A is A Exterminators wrote in message ... With respect to your understa
nding of Kant,
do you emphasize faith above re ason? Do you rationalize all facts to
fit ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 04 Jun 2001 by EricK - View Thread
(8 articles)
Re: Teleologism vs. Consequentialism
... advocates a principle just for the sake of the principle. Ever
heard of Immanuel
Kant? If his principles had nothing to do with consequences, how did
he pick ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 04 Jun 2001 by Tym Parsons - View
Thread (59 articles)
Re: On original intent and strict construction of the ...
... is practically no one alive who endorses Plato's theory of
justice, and (b) Kant's
political views would general agree with ours.) Of course, people who
have ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 01 Jun 2001 by Owl - View Thread
(57 articles)
Who was worse ?
... and monkey. Thus have emerged donkey-state, horse-state and
monkey-state. (5) Kant,
Hitler, Stalin are no ordinary human beings. They are brain-cells of
mega ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 30 May 2001 by Bhanu Padmo - View
Thread (4 articles)
Re: Senses.
... In other words, objects exist with only their primary quality (i
think Kant called
this 'transcendence' or possibly 'essence'). Their primary quality has
no ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 30 May 2001 by 6079 Smith W - View
Thread (176 articles)
Re: What Is Altruism?
... the weight that we should normally give to her views. It's one
thing to say that
Kant was bad news, but if you really want to nail him, quote some
particularly ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 29 May 2001 by Ken Gardner - View
Thread (183 articles)
Re: On philosophical "experts," and more Rand v. Aristotle ( ...
... and conclusions clearly and logically so that they can be
understood and evaluated.
Kant doesn't just fail, but fails miserably in this regard (at least
in ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 26 May 2001 by Owl - View Thread
(6 articles)
Re: How Important Is Philosophy?
... can find a general consensus. (For instance, there is a general
agreement that Kant
believed in synthetic, a priori knowledge, and on what that means.) I
don't ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 26 May 2001 by Owl - View Thread
(35 articles)
Re: Cruelty to animals
... company I enjoy and avoid people whose company I find onerous or
boring. Even Kant
noted that you would always use people, he just commanded that one
also note ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 25 May 2001 by John Harrington -
View Thread (433 articles)
Re: Objectivist reasons for respecting rights
... in ethics. It would have been better if she had realized how close
she was to Kant.
The Formula of the End-in-itself is so close to Randian ethics. Alas,
all ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 25 May 2001 by Owl - View Thread
(91 articles)
Re: Poor Kwag's pain
... motives with duties, okay. Knowing Ross to be a Kantian apologist
and knowing Kant's
take on the "subjective inclinations of men" I didn't expect "duty" to
...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 23 May 2001 by Kwag7693 - View
Thread (4 articles)
Re: Who was worse?
Have you looked at the state of theoretical physics lately? Kant
appears to be
a primary professor of the subject. I judge the science by the
technology it ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 23 May 2001 by Robert J. Kolker -
View Thread (144 articles)
Re: Agent Cooper's Essential Reading List (besides Rand, Hayek ...
... Antichrist Alberto Coffa, To the Vienna Station: the semantic
tradition from Kant
to C arnap Owen Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered Philip Kitcher,
The ...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 23 May 2001 by Greg - View Thread
(2 articles)
Re: Dana Berliner to speak at Cato event
... the evidence against him is incontrovertible), while treating
David Kelley or Immanuel
Kant as people who are guilty until proven innocent (except that the
...
humanities.philosophy.objectivism - 22 May 2001 by Chris Cathcart -
View Thread (250 articles)
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------------------------
Searching back to 1997 revealed 3,030 *more* references to
Kant, for a grand total of 3,542. A little math reveals that the
references still average about one every 2 days.
> Kant is mocked left and right by
> everyone except Christians, and even they have to dismiss him
> ultimately, because the theological ones are all Catholic Thomists.
On the contrary, Kant is held in high esteem by analytic philosophers as
a profoundly original thinker who raised novel questions and proposed
novel solutions. The same may be said of Plato, viewed in historical
perspective. To think otherwise requires rejecting the idea of progress
as applied to philosophical thought.
--
Best wishes,
RAL
A slave is yet a slave if his master
Allows him to make any decision
About which he, the master,
Is utterly indifferent.
They [philosophers] could still be 'great' and speak
gibberish or worse; I think 'great' simply connotes
important; and whether someone was important to others
is an objective matter of how often those others refer
to that person, not a matter of whether that person was
right, or good, or even sensible.
Counterexample: Hegel - very influential, but "great" by no other
criterion.
Exactly. I look at Rand as probably the best jumping off point for anyone
interested in philosophy. If you can take what's good, and figure out what's
bad, you'll gain a lot.
Besides, I'd rather live next to ten confused Randians than ten philosophy
PhD's.
Don Watkins
************************************************************
My Old Objectivist Site
http://www.geocities.com/mrgalt.geo
************************************************************
That progress is one best left in a dumpster. More like a bad acid trip, I'd
say.
Tom Scheeler
--
"Ask not, what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your
country"
"Thus state of mind, which subordinates the interests of the
ego to the conservation of the community, is really the first
premise for every truly human culture..." Adolf Hitler, 'Mein Kampf'
I meant in actual substance, not merely as an originator. And the view
of Kant as posing good original questions is quite mixed. It is not
uncommon to hear his entire method being dismissed, because he did
little except ask for explanations of necessary truth, which can have
no explanation.
As to progress, from a social perspective, Kant is a throwback. He
made philosophy arcane and academic, whereas up to Hume, it was for
the general audience. I can think of little that is together original,
true, and progressive about Kant. His criticism of the Ontological
Argument, and similar metaphysical errors, fits. But not much else; I
think his ethics is so obviously bungled that one must be Christian
beforehand in order to even humor it.
--
Dave O'Hearn
Yes, I said so myself, in exactly those words: amazing.
However, I also listed the things these "heavy thinkers" are denying:
the virtue ethic, individualism, capitalism, direct realism or the
non-initiation of force. It is certainly amazing that many thinkers
deny these things, and a very interesting topic of study. However, it
is little grounds for anyone serious about life, as opposed to
academics, to humor the denial of such obvious things.
--
Dave O'Hearn
Actually I think Hegel is a prime example of my point, and I'd even go
so far as to call him a type: Carmichael's 'philosophical consensus'
does consider him one of the 'great philosophers, yet (as Popper shows
well) much of what he wrote was pure gibberish.
Whether Hegel was great by 'other criteria,' is hard to say, as it
depends on what those criteria are. Absolutely none, besides
importance, have been proposed.
Golly gee! I must be a heavy thinker!
I think that the virtue ethic is defective, in that it doesn't tell you
why virtues are virtues, and doesn't give you any way to resolve
differences of belief about what's virtuous and what isn't.
I think that individualism is way cool, but only when leavened with a
heavy dose of empathy for other folks.
I think that a mixed economy, largely capitalist but not laissez-faire,
is the way to go.
I think that realism is cool, but direct realism is naive.
I guess I'm too laid back to initiate much force, so I'll let that one
pass.
Best wishes,
Bert
> In article <3e05f9e4.01122...@posting.google.com>,
> Dave O'Hearn <dave...@pobox.com> wrote:
>>However, I also listed the things these "heavy thinkers" are denying:
>>the virtue ethic, individualism, capitalism, direct realism or the
>>non-initiation of force. It is certainly amazing that many thinkers
>>deny these things, and a very interesting topic of study. However, it
>>is little grounds for anyone serious about life, as opposed to
>>academics, to humor the denial of such obvious things.
> I think that the virtue ethic is defective, in that it doesn't tell you
> why virtues are virtues, and doesn't give you any way to resolve
> differences of belief about what's virtuous and what isn't.
> I think that individualism is way cool, but only when leavened with a
> heavy dose of empathy for other folks.
Do you view empathy as a virtue? If yes, isn't your advocation that
empathy is what people ought to have for other folks itself an example
of the virtue ethic?
-RKN
Beaten Paths Are For Beaten Men
I view empathy as a natural state of the human nervous system, which can
be squelched by intellectualization or extremely unpleasant experiences
involving emnotionally important other people. I wouldn't use the term
"virtue" to refer to natural states of the human nervous system.
"Virtue ethics", as I understand it, is a kind of moral theory which
takes "the virtues", however chosen, as logically foundational, rather
than proposing ways to choose what we'll regards as virtuous. For me,
virtuous actions are not those on some "list", but rather those which
have, or are intended to have, certain kinds of beneficial results for
the entities which they affect.
Best wishes,
Bert
> In article <3C276C04...@rknibbe.com>, Rod Nibbe <r...@rknibbe.com>
> wrote:
>>Bert Clanton wrote:
>>>In article <3e05f9e4.01122...@posting.google.com>,
>>> Dave O'Hearn <dave...@pobox.com> wrote:
>>>>However, I also listed the things these "heavy thinkers" are denying:
>>>>the virtue ethic, individualism, capitalism, direct realism or the
>>>>non-initiation of force. It is certainly amazing that many thinkers
>>>>deny these things, and a very interesting topic of study. However, it
>>>>is little grounds for anyone serious about life, as opposed to
>>>>academics, to humor the denial of such obvious things.
>>>I think that the virtue ethic is defective, in that it doesn't tell you
>>>why virtues are virtues, and doesn't give you any way to resolve
>>>differences of belief about what's virtuous and what isn't.
>>>I think that individualism is way cool, but only when leavened with a
>>>heavy dose of empathy for other folks.
>> Do you view empathy as a virtue? If yes, isn't your advocation that
>>empathy is what people ought to have for other folks itself an example
>>of the virtue ethic?
> I view empathy as a natural state of the human nervous system, which can
> be squelched by intellectualization or extremely unpleasant experiences
> involving emnotionally important other people. I wouldn't use the term
> "virtue" to refer to natural states of the human nervous system.
Okay, but you conditioned your approval of individualism with what to
me read like an *ought* - i.e. a heavy dose of empathy. By which I
understood you to mean that individualists ought to have empathy. But
here you're proposing that empathy is really a physiological phenomenon,
which means it's not an ought, it is an *is.* Am I understanding you
correctly?
Assuming yes, I find this to be vulnerable to similar kinds of
arguments of it (empathy) being non universal, that I have to defend
against when arguing for the rational basis for a healthy ego. Are you
aware of any persuasive scientific evidence for your view of empathy?
I'm curious what researchers (or you) suggest would be the reason for
the evolution of this relatively elaborate mechanism in humans.
> "Virtue ethics", as I understand it, is a kind of moral theory which
> takes "the virtues", however chosen, as logically foundational, rather
> than proposing ways to choose what we'll regards as virtuous.
I of course like the development of Rand's argument that the virtues
we select be based on what accords our nature - psychological as well as
physical. Someone might counter that with: "Why should we identify and
adopt virtues consonant with our nature?" For me, it's a sufficiently
axiomatic place to begin.
> For me,
> virtuous actions are not those on some "list", but rather those which
> have, or are intended to have, certain kinds of beneficial results for
> the entities which they affect.
Ditto me.
Perhaps it contradicts with the ideal concept of a 'thinker', but
certainly not with entities actually identified as thinkers; Hegel
again being the obvious counterexample.
> >I think
> > 'great' simply connotes important; and whether someone was important
> > to others is an objective matter of how often those others refer to
> > that person, not a mamatter of whether that person was right, or good,
> > or even sensible.
>
> That is not how greatness is adjudicated in philosophy. Objectively,
> greatness is, I'm sorry to say, a collectivist assesment. In the absence of
> consensus, a judgement of greatness is purely subjective and without
> standing
To even be used to measure something like a 'philosophical consensus,'
one needs a quantifiable standard of some kind, which has to be a
matter of fact about opinion, but a matter of fact and not of opinion
(if you get the difference). In academic circles, 'times cited' does
serve as such a standard. Each such citation, of course, being merely
an individual opinion based on personal or subjective beliefs and
values.
> >Hitler is a greater historical figure than Kant, in
> > that his thoughts were more important, to more people, than Kant's;
>
> Not by Rand's judgement, who thinks that Kant is a greater evil than Hitler.
Kant was "the most evil." I wish you would get the quotes straight.
> Hitler's ideas are already discredited, but if one believes Rand (should
> we?) Kant's ideas are still rampant in the Western world, to its detriment.
I would say that few, if any, of even Hitler's ideas have been
discredited. Genocide and racism, of course; but corporatism, war
economy, and the leadership principle are all alive and thriving.
> > yet Hitler's actual expressions of his thoughts were inferior to
> > Kant's in all those other respects.
>
> More gigbbery gibberish?
From what I've read, mostly unsupported opinions about subjects (from
anthropology to economics) about which he knew little.
You misinterpret (I think). We didn't progress *to* Plato and Kant, but
*from* them.
Someone (J.L. Austin) once said that it takes one type of philosophical
genius to make a basic, ground-floor mistake. Plato and Kant had that
kind of genius in abundance.
> "Ask not, what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your
> country"
>
> "Thus state of mind, which subordinates the interests of the
> ego to the conservation of the community, is really the first
> premise for every truly human culture..." Adolf Hitler, 'Mein Kampf'
"There is no such thing as other people's children" - Hillary Clinton
Two propositions from Kant's ethics that are still relevant (and were
novel at the time):
[1] Moral principles must (in order to count as moral principles) be
universalizable - ie., purely general and not relative to any particular
person (or time or place, though this is a later elaboration),
[2] Moral principles are "categorical imperatives", not factual
generalizations as to what sorts of consequences result from certain
types of action.
Note I said "relevant", though I think that properly understood, both
are correct.
>
> I of course like the development of Rand's argument that the virtues
> we select be based on what accords our nature - psychological as well as
> physical.
May I remind you that when you invoke human nature you are invoking
genetics. Are you, in turn, aware of any persuasive scientific evidence for
this specific content of the human genetic package? What reaserch data
persuaded Rand of the genetic basis for those virtues? Should genetically
determined traits be properly called virtues? Or was she just looking
around, but failed to detect "empathy"?
Carmichael
No. This is a philosophy ng, and philosophy deals with the eternal and
unchangeable aspects of nature. Genetics is obviously a science that
deals with the changeable in nature.
I'm beginning to see your form of counter-argument again and again on
this ng. This is because people come here with no idea of what
philosophy is, and think they can debate on this level. The subject
matter is basically not science, and counterarguments from science
fall flat before getting out of the gate.
That's a misuse of reductionism, and it's a fallacy. One needn't
reduce everything to genetics or particle physics to have knowledge,
and old knowledge does not become useless everytime someone makes a
breakthrough reduction. This is hardly a specifically Objectivist
rejection here; Freud was a materialist but rather than wait for
physics to explain the brain, he invented modern psychology. A great
deal of it was culturally-specific and doesn't work anymore, but he
was able to do psychology without waiting centuries for physics to
catch up.
Rand's claims about human nature are empirical, but they are rather
simple things that are hard to deny. She said many times that the
human mind has a specific nature, and that recognizing its nature and
respecting it was a precondition for generating theories of
epistemology and ethics that are true and useful. If you'd like, you
can make all the objections you want without dragging in genetics.
Simply saying, "There are genetics and Rand didn't talk about them,
therefore Rand is false," is just plain silly, however.
--
Dave O'Hearn
> Acar <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote:
>>May I remind you that when you invoke human nature you are invoking
>>genetics. Are you, in turn, aware of any persuasive scientific evidence for
>>this specific content of the human genetic package? What reaserch data
>>persuaded Rand of the genetic basis for those virtues? Should genetically
>>determined traits be properly called virtues? Or was she just looking
>>around, but failed to detect "empathy"?
> Rand's claims about human nature are empirical, but they are rather
> simple things that are hard to deny. She said many times that the
> human mind has a specific nature, and that recognizing its nature and
> respecting it was a precondition for generating theories of
> epistemology and ethics that are true and useful. If you'd like, you
> can make all the objections you want without dragging in genetics.
> Simply saying, "There are genetics and Rand didn't talk about them,
> therefore Rand is false," is just plain silly, however.
Nicley stated. Brief and to the point.
Bravo.
> Rand's claims about human nature are empirical, but they are rather
> simple things that are hard to deny. She said many times that the
> human mind has a specific nature, and that recognizing its nature and
> respecting it was a precondition for generating theories of
> epistemology and ethics that are true and useful.
Anthropology, an empirical science, is just as useless in this respect
as genetics. While I'm sure she made many simple anthropological
observations, there is a more basic human nature that acts to ground
empirical theories of man, epistemology and ethics. When she claims
the mind has a specific nature, an *identity*, she is referring back
to her statements about the eternality of existence. Therefore, it
is a metaphysical statement. Metaphysics, as she said, is the soil
of a forest of which the trees are the individual sciences. There
can be only one precondition, and as metaphysical it must at the same
time be trans-empirical. Any statement about the nature of a thing,
seen in the context of its eternality (it's continuing identity
throughout all changes) cannot be merely empirical.
When you say Rand made many empirical claims about human nature,
you are falling into the same trap as the geneticist.
> If you'd like, you
> can make all the objections you want without dragging in genetics.
> Simply saying, "There are genetics and Rand didn't talk about them,
> therefore Rand is false," is just plain silly, however.
Yes, brilliant point. Genetics can't be dismissed though by
claiming there is another merely empirical science which stands
in a superior relationship to it. It is as if to say, "My empirical
science can beat up your empirical science." Although you did
not say if it was anthropology or what, the fact that they were
simple empirical observations would seem to indicate something
like it, or psychology. You (and Rand) have a science that is
superior to genetics, and refusing to name that science only
makes it more difficult for another empiricist to answer your
assertions, but not impossible.
In fact, I don't think that the observation that man's mind has
a specific identity, is simple in theory. It is a simple statement
yes, but it is backed up by much previous thought going back
2500 years. And in fact, it is an idea that primitive humans cannot
even begin to conceive of. The question of identity (specific nature),
also known as the problem of Universals, is one of those issues
that Rand deals with fairly bluntly. But "bluntness" or "simplicity"
does not empiricism make. The question has been dealt with by
hundreds of scholars of metaphysics down through the centuries, and
there are many schools of thought based on it (such as Radical
Realism).
It becomes more evident over time that Metaphysics is a dead science,
even on HPO, the ng which pretends to carry on the work of the
woman who has been called philosophy's greatest salesman. (salesperson?)
Philosophical principles have existential consequences. Rand's philosophy is
reality based, which looks as man as a biologic entity with a highly
developed brain. She rejects mystical or esoteric imperatives. The
conclusion that man's nature is defined by the best available knowledge of
his biologic makeup is a direct and inevitable consequence of her
philosophical position. Any philosophy is irrelevant if it does not have
real life consequences.
Carmichael
x
x
x
x
> Acar <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote:
> > May I remind you that when you invoke human nature you are invoking
> > genetics. Are you, in turn, aware of any persuasive scientific evidence
for
> > this specific content of the human genetic package? What reaserch data
> > persuaded Rand of the genetic basis for those virtues? Should
genetically
> > determined traits be properly called virtues? Or was she just looking
> > around, but failed to detect "empathy"?
>
> That's a misuse of reductionism, and it's a fallacy. One needn't
> reduce everything to genetics or particle physics to have knowledge,
> and old knowledge does not become useless everytime someone makes a
> breakthrough reduction. This is hardly a specifically Objectivist
> rejection here; Freud was a materialist but rather than wait for
> physics to explain the brain, he invented modern psychology. A great
> deal of it was culturally-specific and doesn't work anymore, but he
> was able to do psychology without waiting centuries for physics to
> catch up.
>
> Rand's claims about human nature are empirical,
Ok, but you need to decide. If they are empirical, she forgot empathy. If
you just look around, that is as obvious as the ones that she selected. I
claim that her *philosophical* view of the nature of man leads directly to
genetics for ruling in or out natural tendencies. It is all empirical. Her
empirical philosophical claims should not contradict the empirical data
raised by science.
>but they are rather
> simple things that are hard to deny.
Such as empathy.
> She said many times that the
> human mind has a specific nature, and that recognizing its nature and
> respecting it was a precondition for generating theories of
> epistemology and ethics that are true and useful.
I agree. As long as the list is not selective.
>If you'd like, you
> can make all the objections you want without dragging in genetics.
> Simply saying, "There are genetics and Rand didn't talk about them,
> therefore Rand is false," is just plain silly, however.
It's not the fact that she did not connect virtues to genetics. It is the
fact that the connection follows from her view of man as a biologic machine.
Carmichael
> Dave O'Hearn
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Unfortunately it does not get yous off the hook!
:-)
Carmichel
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Try as I may, I fail to see the counterargument there. I see the
ludicrous implication that my statement was mystical in nature. It
also implies that, "if it's not science, then it's mysticism." I
reject the false alternative handed me between science and mysticism.
Rand had a "loose" definition of "mystic" such that it could be made
to apply to just about anybody who doesn't follow her strict view of
how philosophy must proceed. And yet, by your much looser definition,
Rand herself can be called a mystic -- because she wasn't a scientist
(in particular, not a biologist).
Your claim that Rand's philosophy "looks at man as a biologic entity"
only says that Rand rejected spiritual views of Man. (It's also
telling in other ways, to be developed below.) Furthermore, this is a
basic proposition taken from her ethics. So the real life consequences
you refer to are ethical, and beyond that, political. It is as if you
are saying, Rand's philosophy begins with her ethics and its denial
that man is a spiritual being divorced from his own body.
And yet she states in other places that man has a soul. But she does
reject the soul/body dichotomy, a metaphysical theory which, of
course, has practical/ethical consequences. What you don't realize is
that this "biologic" view of man is based on a more broader conflict
in philosophy known as the Problem of Universals, which can be renamed
the problem of the ontological status of metaphysical substance.
For more information on this problem, see:
http://www.ets.uidaho.edu/ivan/phil-309/25.htm
You will find there that Rand held to the Conceptual school of thought
regarding this ancient problem. She would only disgree with Abelard's
view that Universals have ontological status in the minds of
individuals. Concepts are not, as she says, "images." But she would
agree with the rest.
What does this have to do with man as a biologic entity? If one
considers the "soul" to be a metaphysical substance at the basis of
"man-ness" (what it means to be a man, a human), then the historical
problem of Universals becomes applicable to this universal also. As
such, the conflict does not take place through scientific
investigations into man, for such investigations do not determine
anything about the soul, man's identity, that which identifies him as
the same being throughout all accidents of his existence. Science only
investigates these accidental attributes of man and has nothing to say
nothing about the basic metaphysical elements of man's being. The
debate takes place on the level of pure concept. It becomes a
question, not of man's soul versus his body, but of man's most primary
identity, and how this Universal attribute, as a consequence, relates
to the physical (non-conceptual) aspect of man. While science has
something to say about the empirical identity of man, of course, the
basic conflict at the root of man's metaphysical relationship to the
universe and to himself, is the problem of Universals. It is necessary
to solve this technical philosophical issue before science can take
off from there.
Does Rand deal with the problem of Universals? Yes, and I think the
main work where she deals with it would be ITOE, particularly page 1,
where she states, "The issue of concepts (known as the 'problem of
universals') is philosophy's central issue." Furthermore (to use a
term you yourself brought in): "If, in the light of such 'solutions'
[the various schools of thought on the subject], the problem might
appear to be esoteric, let me remind you that the fate of human
societies, of knowledge, of science, of progress and of every human
life, depends on it." (Ibid, p 2.)
So Rand is not afraid to deal with a subject the appears to be
esoteric. And neither am I, because I know that it is not esoteric: it
is technical philosophy, which is not the same thing as mysticism even
by Rand's broad definition of the term.
The work that proceeds from there is, unfortunately, merely analytical
in nature. For instance, she tells the reader to "remember the axiom:
Existence exists" -- before she has even established it in argument.
Furthermore, Chapter One begins with simple psychological observations
of consciousness as such.
Analytically, she is tearing apart concepts she already takes for
granted in order to see how they operate, and considers this proof
that they are based on a true philosophy. It takes for granted that a
problem that goes back 2500 years or more was solved simply by
re-defining the problem of Universals as a problem of
conceptualization ("The issue of concepts..."), because it is the only
interpretation that is not "a concerted attack on man's conceptual
faculty." The implication is that that philosophy which does not
engage in such a concerted attack is the correct one. A further and
similiarly superficial example of this is her dismissal of the
mind/body dichotomy by merely contrasting her view of man with that of
the Mystic of Mind and the Mystic of Muscle. Man, she declares, is a
rational being, therefore doctrines that act to negate this essential
being are evil because they are detrimental to man's welfare. (This is
known as ethical intrincisism.)
The practical consequences of the beliefs, therefore, become for her
more important than the hard work of doing the actual philosophy. So
it is not surprising that Objectivism, over time, has deteriorated
into a simple materialism divorced from ideas (while at the same time
maintaining the necessary facade that "ideas have practical
consequences.") This is made possible by many factors, such as: the
paucity of her metaphysics; her treatment of epistemology as
psychology; her view that ideas have practical consequences,
demonstrated, not proven, *from* the consequences, as a high-flung
philosophy that amounts to nothing more than simple prudence (if you
believe "this," then "that" will be the result). It is understandable,
from the example she herself sets in her writing, that her
practitioners have accepted the mind/body dichotomy in spirit, if not
in practice, by rejecting all attempts to think in terms of the
highest concepts, any concept higher than science, as "mysticism."
Actual acts of empathy are exceedingly rare. You can go for weeks or
months without acting out of empathy. Rand's ethics does not exclude
empathy, but I think it is correct in not making a big deal out of it.
Most things that are commonly classed as empathetic, such as
friendship or love, are closer to the trader principle when viewed
empirically. Basically, if there's any sort of relationship at all, it
probably is not empathy that motivates postive behavior towards
another person.
Most of the scientific stuff about the importance of empathy is
inferred as necessary to certain theories, not directly observed. It
generally goes like this:
1. Evolution. [premise]
2. But humans are not always killing each other for food. [premise]
3. Therefore, there must be a higher level of evolution, where
societies evolve based on certain traits, not just individual
organisms.
4. And the biggest trait in question is empathy; when the members of
society possess this trait, the society will beat out other societies
in evolution. [inference to the best explanation for 3]
I think the inference to 4 is a massive leap, and even the
justification for 3 shaky, if interesting. Knowledge and trade can
explain the benefits of social life, without needing to put so much
stake in empathy. Certainly, empathy exists and has its effect, but it
is not observed behaviorally nearly so much as knowledge and trade (or
more simply, cooperation) are. So while one must recognize empathy, I
don't think it is warranted to make such a big deal out of it.
Also, I don't see why empathy is any more special than hunger. It is
just a gross way of motivating humans to cooperate, in the same way
that hunger gets us to eat. Sometimes empathy is irrational, but
sometimes hunger is too; this is not of very much significance. It is
very easy to constraint acts of empathy if they are irrational. One
example would be not supporting communism, since it kills millions of
people, however empathetic it may be. So again, I don't see what the
big deal is.
> > If you'd like, you can make all the objections you want without
> > dragging in genetics. Simply saying, "There are genetics and Rand
> > didn't talk about them, therefore Rand is false," is just plain silly,
> > however.
>
> It's not the fact that she did not connect virtues to genetics. It is the
> fact that the connection follows from her view of man as a biologic
> machine.
Her definition of "life" is not biological, although the only known
entities that meet the definition are biological. (And I'm not saying
that it might be used one day to call certain machines "life"; such a
revoluationary thing might require revision of the concept; we can't
say now.) The point is that her definition and her argument require
only that an entity must act in certain ways and not others in order
to maintain its existence. There are many other interesting things
about life, such as its cellular and genetic nature, but these are not
relevant to the argument.
--
Dave O'Hearn
Your argument seems to be this:
1. Things have identity.
2. Things change.
3. Therefore, N/P distinction, proof of God, Marxist dialectic,
you-name-it.
I don't think this is a very interesting argument, is it requires some
form of realism to work, and Rand's theory of concepts doesn't need
it. I do think it is a good example of the mess realism will get you
into, however.
> When you say Rand made many empirical claims about human nature,
> you are falling into the same trap as the geneticist.
As long as the claim can be predicated of a human throughout its
lifetime, we don't have to resurrect the problem of universals to
evaluate it.
> Yes, brilliant point. Genetics can't be dismissed though by
> claiming there is another merely empirical science which stands
> in a superior relationship to it. It is as if to say, "My empirical
> science can beat up your empirical science."
I said the opposite of that, that empirical observations need not
"beat up" each other. New theories do not automatically ruin old
theories simply for being new. They must make specifically different
predictions in a given area in order to conflict.
> Although you did not say if it was anthropology or what, the fact
> that they were simple empirical observations would seem to indicate
> something like it, or psychology. You (and Rand) have a science
> that is superior to genetics, and refusing to name that science
> only makes it more difficult for another empiricist to answer your
> assertions, but not impossible.
A science is a large, sophisticated body of knowledge with unifying
theories and delimitted bounds. Rand's observations about human nature
are not as complex as that. Not all knowledge is scientific; indeed,
most knowledge is not scientific. The whole issue of science is
irrelevant here. If you want to object to Rand's observations, then
object to them using any science or any piece of evidence you like.
> In fact, I don't think that the observation that man's mind has
> a specific identity, is simple in theory. It is a simple statement
> yes, but it is backed up by much previous thought going back
> 2500 years. And in fact, it is an idea that primitive humans cannot
> even begin to conceive of. The question of identity (specific nature),
> also known as the problem of Universals, is one of those issues
> that Rand deals with fairly bluntly. But "bluntness" or "simplicity"
> does not empiricism make. The question has been dealt with by
> hundreds of scholars of metaphysics down through the centuries, and
> there are many schools of thought based on it (such as Radical
> Realism).
As a general rule, if your solution is more complicated than your
problem, it is not a solution. With that principle in mind, all of
Kantianism goes out the window, thankyouverymuch.
--
Dave O'Hearn
That 1 and 2 are not contradictions of each other is a fact that has been
explained for 2,400 years - unfortunately it's the solution to the apparent
paradox is not taught anymore.
It "seems" to be such, in light of your tribalistic tendency to deal
with non-Objectivists through intimidation rather than reason.
Rand developed the axiom 'Existence exists' by determining that which
does not change with time, that which retains its identity throughout
time and changes. And since everything in the universe changes, her
statements with regard to Existence and Identity cannot be labeled
'empirical.' So she is prone by your reasoning (whatever that may be)
to "Marxist dialectics" and GOD KNOWS WHAT EVIL.
But that would not be my own conclusion.
> I don't think this is a very interesting argument, is it requires some
> form of realism to work, and Rand's theory of concepts doesn't need
> it. I do think it is a good example of the mess realism will get you
> into, however.
Well no, her theory of concepts does not need anything except the
belief of its adherents, and admonitions about what will happen to you
if you don't accept her assertions. Whether it's interesting or not
depends on the freedom of your intellect from authoritarian views of
Truth. Any view that does not seem to reflect this Truth of course,
becomes "uninteresting."
If by "realism" you mean Radical Realism, then she is also prone to
that charge.
But using the term "trans-empirical" is not in itself any ontological
claim about the nature of Universals, nor does it imply one. It is too
general a term, and only a knee-jerk reactionary will automatically
reject it without first finding out what it means.
> > When you say Rand made many empirical claims about human nature,
> > you are falling into the same trap as the geneticist.
>
> As long as the claim can be predicated of a human throughout its
> lifetime, we don't have to resurrect the problem of universals to
> evaluate it.
I guess I made the unfortunate mistake of bringing philosophy into a
newsgroup with philosophy in its title, in fact, in the very title of
this thread. Your post only vindicates that title. Far be it for me to
bring up what Rand herself called the central problem of philosophy.
> > Yes, brilliant point. Genetics can't be dismissed though by
> > claiming there is another merely empirical science which stands
> > in a superior relationship to it. It is as if to say, "My empirical
> > science can beat up your empirical science."
>
> I said the opposite of that, that empirical observations need not
> "beat up" each other. New theories do not automatically ruin old
> theories simply for being new. They must make specifically different
> predictions in a given area in order to conflict.
The nature of man was not meant to be a subject matter for science,
scientific theories, or predictions, genetics, anthropology,
psychology, or simple common sense statements. It is furthermore a
fact that Rand was capable of more than common sense statements, and
that limiting her to same would limit the scope of her intellect to
whatever sense was common at the time she wrote and pondered.
> > Although you did not say if it was anthropology or what, the fact
> > that they were simple empirical observations would seem to indicate
> > something like it, or psychology. You (and Rand) have a science
> > that is superior to genetics, and refusing to name that science
> > only makes it more difficult for another empiricist to answer your
> > assertions, but not impossible.
>
> A science is a large, sophisticated body of knowledge with unifying
> theories and delimitted bounds. Rand's observations about human nature
> are not as complex as that. Not all knowledge is scientific; indeed,
> most knowledge is not scientific. The whole issue of science is
> irrelevant here. If you want to object to Rand's observations, then
> object to them using any science or any piece of evidence you like.
That's just it, she did more than make observations. At least I would
hope she did more than that, in order to retain the label of
philosopher. I do not object to her observations, but to the way she
is treated so dispicably by her alleged proponents here.
If Rand has been diminished on this newsgroup to the level of an
insightful observer of mankind, then that would relegate her to a mere
yet highly intelligent reporter, or on the ethical level, an Ann
Landers.
snip
> As a general rule, if your solution is more complicated than your
> problem, it is not a solution. With that principle in mind, all of
> Kantianism goes out the window, thankyouverymuch.
The solution to a broken arm is more complicated than the breaking of
it. It requires more knowledge to build than to destroy.
I will stick with principles, and you can label your obtuseness
"principled" --
but I think Rand was better than that.
This is a long reply (and it is appreciated) to try to prove that humans are
not genetically wired for empathy or, as an alternative perspective, that
empathy can not be postulated as a trait of human nature by simply observing
humans in action (empirical data). The latter is obvious to anyone but
deliberate "evaders" and the former is a reasonable conclusion from the view
of man as flesh and bones.
I think that you attribute to Rand a little more mysticism than she would
like. In Rand's view man is an animal with a highly developed brain. The
ineffable or esoteric is not among the "existents" to which she attributes
objective status. Universal concepts, yes, of course, but not the soul in a
sense other than a psychological profile.
There are many views of Objectivism and many self-described interpreters of
the true Rand. I recommend that you check with Dr. Peikoff who was her
personal confidante for many years and with Nathaniel Branden who knew her
well and still knows exactly what she meant, even though he may now think
differently from her in some respects. You are attempting to use your mind
and this can be a problem. One problem with Objectivism is that on the one
hand it encourages you to use your own mind and on the other it tells you
that there is only one correct conclusion. (This is an inevitable sequel of
objectivity). To know what that is, no one is in a better position to say
than the apostles, so I would rather take their word regarding her view of
the human brain as 2 1/2 pounds of flesh.
> Most things that are commonly classed as empathetic, such as
> friendship or love, are closer to the trader principle when viewed
> empirically.
!!!!
> Dave O'Hearn
That is a long way to say that people do not feel for each other (and that
Clinton does not feel your pain :-)). I think that the claim falls of its
own weight so I will let your remarks stand.
Carmichael
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>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Dave O'Hearn" <dave...@pobox.com>
>Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
>Sent: Sunday, December 23, 2001 2:41 PM
>Subject: Re: Objectivism is pseudo-philosophy
>
>
>> ... If you want a philosopher who said many
>> true, nonobvious things, and few false things, Rand is quite good.
>
>It's amazing how people, heavy thinkers included. don't believe her.
>Carmichael
That's not really much of an argument.
--
Pete McCutchen
That was an interesting reply -- put-offish on the one hand, honestly
self-deprecatory on the other. Short, but an enjoyable read. I'll
start
my reply (if such you desire) with paragraph 1.
1. I am not concerned with empathy as such, as to whether it is
innate or learned. Empathy is not even a concept of metaphysics, but
of psychology. But I'm glad you think at least part of my point was
"obvious," because on this ng I'm likely to be accused of obfuscation
if I am not perfectly clear in my ideas.
The main point of my article was, the spirit of Rand's writing has
been lost in materialism in order that her proponents can
avoid the charge of mysticism, or because Rand did more non-philosophy
than philosophy, or other reasons cited above in my article. Afraid to
speak of anything like a "soul," the proponents of her philosophy
have reverted or regressed to a form of material reductionism. This
is quite in line with 20th-century philosophy, and on into the 21st
with no end in sight to this intellectual deterioration of man's
spirit. Rand's attempt to set herself apart from "evil modern
philosophers" has failed because she was ironically too much a part
of the 20th-century intellectual establishment, the set of ideas
extant at the time she did her primary work (particularly, the
1940s - 50s). The strong, spirited language and "daring originality"
of her works is peeling away to reveal the bare bones of a philosophy
that reflected an unwillingness to make any thoughtful, scholarly
effort to create new ideas. Where such an effort may actually be seen,
today's proponents of Objectivism easily overlook it, or dismiss it
with some rationalization or other. They then fall prey to the
temptation of brute empiricism and the stolen concepts it offers as a
vision of life. Man becomes, not a being to be worshipped, but a
subject for scientific investigation, in essence a cold, dead pile
of meat and bones acting as a vehicle for bundles of nasty habits and
rationalizations.
Rand loved humanity -- but hated individuals humans. There were very
few people that lived up to her high intellectual standards. But in
order to love humanity, it is necessary to have the intellectual
ability to think in terms of an abstract concept such as Man -- for
her more than the totality of all humans, but an ideal that transcends
the human race and all its particular members combined. And then, to
feel love and adoration, worship, for this abstract concept, implies
the existence of a trans-empirical religious theory that barely if
ever made it down on paper, except between the lines of her novels.
For one cannot love the mere totality of all humans, particularly in
light of her evident disappointment in humans generally, the
disappointment of an idealist failing to find the ideal actualized.
What Rand means by the concept "Man," as an ideal, is a question
that has been pondered by other scholars, but it is difficult to try
to fill in the blanks of Rand's unspoken sense of life, while at the
same time overcoming the dry empiricism which she most often
propounded.
> I think that you attribute to Rand a little more mysticism than she would
> like. In Rand's view man is an animal with a highly developed brain.
2. I did not attribute to Rand any mysticism whatsoever in that
article. As for Rand's alleged view of man stated there, Do you
actually believe Rand intended to worship "an animal with a highly
developed brain"?
I reject the distorted interpretation of my thinking as a mysticism
disguised with the label "trans-empiricism." My definition of
mysticism is "the belief that one can have knowledge in complete
disregard to the method with which it is acquired." The definition
is not, therefore, a belief in the supernatural; my definition
accentuates the method, not the belief itself which is only a
consequence of the method. On this newsgroup, on the other hand,
I see belief rejected as mysticism, not because of the method
required to obtain the belief, but because it "seems" to be mysticism,
because you "smell" mysticism in between the lines, because "it
appears to match something I vaguely recall Rand wrote somewhere about
mystics," or simply because it is *not* brute empiricism.
The implication of focusing on the belief rather than the method by
which the belief is acquired is that the present stage of man's
intellectual evolution is the highest one. He has risen from the
level of tribalistic savages and acquired a civilization based on
principles. While this is true, it does not mean he is trapped on
this level, in fact it implies the possibility of more evolution
to come. We are limited to our present stage of intellectual
development, and not to acknowledge these limits is to stifle all
progress. But although we are limited to this stage, we are not
therefore limited *by* it. The boundaries are set by the methods we
use to acquire new knowledge, and have heretofore been
empirically-based and oriented. To determine the whys and wherefores
*of* those boundaries requires a *trans-empirical* investigation into
these limits serving to bring them into conscious focus, and enabling
us to get a glimpse of what may lie beyond the boundaries of human
understanding.
"In the name of the values that keep you alive, do not let your vision
of man be distorted by the ugly, the cowardly, the mindless in those
who have never achieved his title. Do not lose your knowledge that
man's proper estate is an upright posture, an intransigent mind and
a step that travels unlimited roads." (Galt's Speech.)
3. You are encouraging me to stop thinking for myself and study the
works of Rand's apostles. (Perfect name to apply to them, btw.)
Guess what -- I am highly familiar with all those works, and more.
That is why I think I am qualified to take up this issue on my own
terms and do the original thinking which is apparently forbidden to
the average Objectivist here.
But regarding your statement about "2 1/2 pounds of flesh," I think
you should go back and study Branden some more. It is not brains
he is dealing with as a psychologist, but minds. Branden is not a
brain surgeon.
Dave O'Hearn <dave...@pobox.com> wrote in message news:<3e05f9e4.011227180
9.663...@posting.google.com>...
> malenor <mal...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > When she claims the mind has a specific nature, an *identity*, she is
> > referring back to her statements about the eternality of existence.
> > Therefore, it is a metaphysical statement. Metaphysics, as she said,
> > is the soil of a forest of which the trees are the individual sciences.
> > There can be only one precondition, and as metaphysical it must at the
> > same time be trans-empirical. Any statement about the nature of a
> > thing, seen in the context of its eternality (it's continuing identity
> > throughout all changes) cannot be merely empirical.
>
> Your argument seems to be this:
>
> 1. Things have identity.
> 2. Things change.
> 3. Therefore, N/P distinction, proof of God, Marxist dialectic,
> you-name-it.
It "seems" to be such, in light of your tribalistic tendency to deal
with non-Objectivists through intimidation rather than reason.
Rand developed the axiom 'Existence exists' by determining that which
does not change with time, that which retains its identity throughout
time and changes. And since everything in the universe changes, her
statements with regard to Existence and Identity cannot be labeled
'empirical.' So she is prone by your reasoning (whatever that may be)
to "Marxist dialectics" and GOD KNOWS WHAT EVIL.
But that would not be my own conclusion.
> I don't think this is a very interesting argument, is it requires some
> form of realism to work, and Rand's theory of concepts doesn't need
> it. I do think it is a good example of the mess realism will get you
> into, however.
Well no, her theory of concepts does not need anything except the
belief of its adherents, and admonitions about what will happen to you
if you don't accept her assertions.
Whether it's interesting or not depends on the freedom of your
intellect from authoritarian views of Truth. Any view that does not
seem to reflect this Truth of course, becomes "uninteresting."
If by "realism" you mean Radical Realism, then she is also prone to
that charge.
But using the term "trans-empirical" is not in itself any ontological
claim about the nature of Universals, nor does it imply one. It is too
general a term, and only a knee-jerk reactionary will automatically
reject it without first finding out what it means.
> > When you say Rand made many empirical claims about human nature,
> > you are falling into the same trap as the geneticist.
>
> As long as the claim can be predicated of a human throughout its
> lifetime, we don't have to resurrect the problem of universals to
> evaluate it.
Predicated, meaning, you don't care how it was developed as long as
Rand says it's true.
I guess I made the unfortunate mistake of bringing philosophy into a
newsgroup with philosophy in its title, in fact, in the very title of
this thread.
> > Yes, brilliant point. Genetics can't be dismissed though by
> > claiming there is another merely empirical science which stands
> > in a superior relationship to it. It is as if to say, "My empirical
> > science can beat up your empirical science."
>
> I said the opposite of that, that empirical observations need not
> "beat up" each other. New theories do not automatically ruin old
> theories simply for being new. They must make specifically different
> predictions in a given area in order to conflict.
The nature of man was not meant to be a subject matter for science,
scientific theories, or predictions, genetics, anthropology,
psychology, or simple common sense statements. It is furthermore a
fact that Rand was capable of more than common sense statements, and
that limiting her to same would limit the scope of her intellect to
whatever sense was common at the time she wrote and pondered.
> > Although you did not say if it was anthropology or what, the fact
> > that they were simple empirical observations would seem to indicate
> > something like it, or psychology. You (and Rand) have a science
> > that is superior to genetics, and refusing to name that science
> > only makes it more difficult for another empiricist to answer your
> > assertions, but not impossible.
>
> A science is a large, sophisticated body of knowledge with unifying
> theories and delimitted bounds. Rand's observations about human nature
> are not as complex as that. Not all knowledge is scientific; indeed,
> most knowledge is not scientific. The whole issue of science is
> irrelevant here. If you want to object to Rand's observations, then
> object to them using any science or any piece of evidence you like.
That's just it, she did more than make observations. At least I would
hope she did more than that, in order to retain the label of
philosopher. I do not object to her observations, but to the way she
is treated so dispicably by her alleged proponents here.
If Rand has been diminished on this newsgroup to the level of an
insightful observer of mankind, then that would relegate her to a mere
yet highly intelligent reporter, or on the ethical level, an Ann
Landers.
snip
> As a general rule, if your solution is more complicated than your
> problem, it is not a solution. With that principle in mind, all of
> Kantianism goes out the window, thankyouverymuch.
The solution to a broken arm is more complicated than the breaking of
it. It requires more knowledge to build than to destroy.
I will stick with principles, and you can label your obtuseness
"principled" --
but I think Rand was better than that.
>
> 1. I am not concerned with empathy as such, as to whether it is
> innate or learned. Empathy is not even a concept of metaphysics, but
> of psychology.
Empathy is the point of the argument. Rand, not being stupid, was unable to
ignore it, but she found a hedge: benevolence. There is a very funny program
on cable called "Curb Your Enthusiasm" (now on hiatus). If you enjoyed
Seinfeld you will enjoy that. I call Rand's benevolence "curb your
compassion". Rand and Randians would tell you that Feed the Children, The
Red Cross, The Salvation Army and thousands of other initiatives, as well as
the innate tendency of lending a helping hand to people in need are just
expressions of benevolence (on Mondays), or maybe the corroding influence of
Kantian evil (on Tuesdays), or maybe supremely selfish trades for long term
returns (on Wednesdays). They will give you all kinds of evasive bullshit to
try to cover the sky with the palm of the hand. That "evasion" is another
aspect of The Great Theft.
You may be correct to some extent. To that extent Rand was indeed "faking"
reality.
>And then, to
> feel love and adoration, worship, for this abstract concept, implies
> the existence of a trans-empirical religious theory that barely if
> ever made it down on paper, except between the lines of her novels.
> For one cannot love the mere totality of all humans, particularly in
> light of her evident disappointment in humans generally, the
> disappointment of an idealist failing to find the ideal actualized.
> What Rand means by the concept "Man," as an ideal, is a question
> that has been pondered by other scholars, but it is difficult to try
> to fill in the blanks of Rand's unspoken sense of life, while at the
> same time overcoming the dry empiricism which she most often
> propounded.
The unspoken verges dangerously on the ineffable. I understand what you are
saying, but I think that to the extent that it is correct it is Rand's b.s.
To the extent that you are inserting your own idealization, it is strictly
your reading and therefore without authority as a recognized rendition of
Objectivism. As I said before, you are thinking for yourself and this a
no-no, not only to Randians but to Rand. Rand encouraged all to think for
themselves, but excommunicated the "irrational" (not thinking as she did).
> > I think that you attribute to Rand a little more mysticism than she
would
> > like. In Rand's view man is an animal with a highly developed brain.
>
> 2. I did not attribute to Rand any mysticism whatsoever in that
> article. As for Rand's alleged view of man stated there, Do you
> actually believe Rand intended to worship "an animal with a highly
> developed brain"?
I do. I think that she worshiped "reason" as a faculty of that particular
animal.
Objectivism rejects (and must do so) the idea that anything may lie beyond
the boundaries of human understanding.
> "In the name of the values that keep you alive, do not let your vision
> of man be distorted by the ugly, the cowardly, the mindless in those
> who have never achieved his title. Do not lose your knowledge that
> man's proper estate is an upright posture, an intransigent mind and
> a step that travels unlimited roads." (Galt's Speech.)
Inspirational rhetoric in praise of reason.
> 3. You are encouraging me to stop thinking for myself and study the
> works of Rand's apostles. (Perfect name to apply to them, btw.)
> Guess what -- I am highly familiar with all those works, and more.
> That is why I think I am qualified to take up this issue on my own
> terms and do the original thinking which is apparently forbidden to
> the average Objectivist here.
As an someone who does not believe Objectivism I accept their version as the
true version of Rand's Objectivism. Yours may well be more sensible, though,
but still corrupted by the basic fallacies of Objectivist "rationalistic"
deductions.
> But regarding your statement about "2 1/2 pounds of flesh," I think
> you should go back and study Branden some more. It is not brains
> he is dealing with as a psychologist, but minds. Branden is not a
> brain surgeon.
Rand believed that the mind is a function of the brain.
Carmichael
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Yes, the argument was about empathy, and I did not at that time bother
to read the previous posts in your discussion.. I did later.
I don't have cable TV. I did like Seinfeld.
Rand favored charity as long as it didn't amount to self-sacrifice;
beyond that, it was a matter of personal choice. She called the
question
of charity a side-issue or something like that.
What the average Randian thinks, well, I would not quote one of them
as evidence of any positive philosophical point.
I did not wish to try to solve your discussion issues, but only found
there a place to insert my own views on things.
It has been noted by Rand scholars that her novels reveal more depth
to her thought than is found in her non-fiction. Some of them say, if
you really want to understand Rand's philosophy, to read her novels.
There are implications of philosophical thought found in them that
she never develops formally. That is what interests me, not the
non-fictional accounts which are really quite ... well, let's put it
this way, she counted herself as a novelist before a philosopher.
She was honest at that.
snip
> The unspoken verges dangerously on the ineffable. I understand what you are
> saying, but I think that to the extent that it is correct it is Rand's b.s.
> To the extent that you are inserting your own idealization, it is strictly
> your reading and therefore without authority as a recognized rendition of
> Objectivism. As I said before, you are thinking for yourself and this a
> no-no, not only to Randians but to Rand. Rand encouraged all to think for
> themselves, but excommunicated the "irrational" (not thinking as she did).
I did something that I am often criticized for in Randian newsgroups,
and
looked up "ineffable" in the dictionary. The first definition is:
"incapable of being expressed in words." (As usual I went to
www.m-w.com.)
The etymology is: "from Latin ineffabilis, from in- + effabilis
capable of being expressed, from effari to speak out, from ex- + fari
to speak."
It was not unusual for Rand, in her novels, to refer to certain
emotions
as being beyond words or "unspeakable." She would have referred to
the 9-11 murders as unspeakably evil.
But I understand the rest of your point. Fortunately, I am not a
Randite,
and therefore not bound by their social mores. I take pride in being
a free spirit who is not way out 'on the edges' lol, like a lot of
them
are.
snip
> > The implication of focusing on the belief rather than the method by
> > which the belief is acquired is that the present stage of man's
> > intellectual evolution is the highest one. He has risen from the
> > level of tribalistic savages and acquired a civilization based on
> > principles. While this is true, it does not mean he is trapped on
> > this level, in fact it implies the possibility of more evolution
> > to come. We are limited to our present stage of intellectual
> > development, and not to acknowledge these limits is to stifle all
> > progress. But although we are limited to this stage, we are not
> > therefore limited *by* it. The boundaries are set by the methods we
> > use to acquire new knowledge, and have heretofore been
> > empirically-based and oriented. To determine the whys and wherefores
> > *of* those boundaries requires a *trans-empirical* investigation into
> > these limits serving to bring them into conscious focus, and enabling
> > us to get a glimpse of what may lie beyond the boundaries of human
> > understanding.
>
> Objectivism rejects (and must do so) the idea that anything may lie beyond
> the boundaries of human understanding.
And that is why it is so limited. But if Rand had any greatness in her
as a philosopher, she should have been seeking to overcome all
limitations. Her followers, of course, will limit themselves to the
words themselves and not dare seek beyond them. But then I'm not a
follower.
> > "In the name of the values that keep you alive, do not let your vision
> > of man be distorted by the ugly, the cowardly, the mindless in those
> > who have never achieved his title. Do not lose your knowledge that
> > man's proper estate is an upright posture, an intransigent mind and
> > a step that travels unlimited roads." (Galt's Speech.)
>
> Inspirational rhetoric in praise of reason.
And what would she think of such criticism?
snip
> As an someone who does not believe Objectivism I accept their version as the
> true version of Rand's Objectivism. Yours may well be more sensible, though,
> but still corrupted by the basic fallacies of Objectivist "rationalistic"
> deductions.
There is not an ounce of rationalism in any of my statements.
> > But regarding your statement about "2 1/2 pounds of flesh," I think
> > you should go back and study Branden some more. It is not brains
> > he is dealing with as a psychologist, but minds. Branden is not a
> > brain surgeon.
>
> Rand believed that the mind is a function of the brain.
That is not a quote, but an interpretation. It is nothing more than
to say Rand did not accept the soul/body dichotomy. We all know that.
But to say that mind is a function of the brain is to place them in a
relationship which separates them, creates a certain relationship in
which one may be determined to be more important ontologically over
the other. In order to determine this, one needs to know what the
mind is. Is it the brain? But mind is a function of the brain.
What is it? Consciousness? But that is just creating synonyms.
Mind is the result of the functioning of the brain. So? What is
this mind thing anyway that results from that functioning?
Awwww, too many hard question that spoil simplistic statements.
But of course, if the solution is more complicated than the
question or problem, we must pray to Rand's soul for forgiveness.
The question is "Do I forgive Rand?". I may, if she forgives Kant first.
Otherwise I can't.
Carmichael
I don't know what you mean by empathy, but when sociologists measure
empathy, they are talking about immediate, emotional reactions to help
people, with no thought of compensation. It is exceedingly rare. This
is my main point, however short; the rest of this post is
clarifications.
In a relationship that lasts more than a day, one might feel positive
emotions towards another person, but these emotions are conducive to
the actual mutuality in the relationship, not independent of it. These
cases of empathy are not evidence that it is important ethically; they
are actually evidence against it, as the empathy is completely
rational. And these are the vast majority of cases.
> That is a long way to say that people do not feel for each other (and that
> Clinton does not feel your pain :-)). I think that the claim falls of its
> own weight so I will let your remarks stand.
I am not saying that people do not feel for each other. I am saying
that there is nothing irrational about these feelings requiring
additional ethical principles for explanation. That people feel
empathy for their friends and loved ones is of no more significance
than that they feel hunger when they need food. The emotion is in no
conflict with reason.
--
Dave O'Hearn
I realize that my reply did not do justice to the seriousness and depth of
your analysis. I simply do not have the time, but I do appreciate the
complexity of the issues that you raise and the soundness of your argument.
This of course in no way changes my disagreement with your conclusions about
the ultimate merit of Rand's view of the world or the (lack of) importance
of her contributions to philosophy.
I am comfortably persuaded that Rand was delusional about the magnitude of
her talents, a delusion which was made possible by that fact that her
talents were in fact considerable. This fact combined with her dogmatic,
persuasive, controlling and charismatic personality made it possible for a
number of groupies with derivative minds sitting at her feet as willing
receptacles to persuade her that she was a great philosopher, thus causing
her to talk and behave as if she were one such. Her powerful and colorful
defense of reason, freedom and capitalism in a hostile social environment
fed her mystique and made possible whatever degree of recognition she
achieved. Of course all this sounds as if your exegesis went over my head
but I doubt it. I simply disagree with the greatness of what is original and
the originality of what is great.
Carmichael
----- Original Message -----
From: "Acar" <g...@d-g-s.com>
To: "HPO submit" <tskirv...@crhc.uiuc.edu>
Sent: Friday, December 28, 2001 9:09 PM
Subject: Re: Objectivism is pseudo-philosophy
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "malenor" <mal...@hotmail.com>
> Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
> Sent: Friday, December 28, 2001 3:25 PM
> Subject: Re: Objectivism is pseudo-philosophy
>
>
> >
> > 1. I am not concerned with empathy as such, as to whether it is
> > innate or learned. Empathy is not even a concept of metaphysics, but
> > of psychology.
>
> Empathy is the point of the argument. Rand, not being stupid, was unable
to
> ignore it, but she found a hedge: benevolence. There is a very funny
program
> on cable called "Curb Your Enthusiasm" (now on hiatus). If you enjoyed
> Seinfeld you will enjoy that. I call Rand's benevolence "curb your
> compassion". Rand and Randians would tell you that Feed the Children, The
> Red Cross, The Salvation Army and thousands of other initiatives, as well
as
> the innate tendency of lending a helping hand to people in need are just
> expressions of benevolence (on Mondays), or maybe the corroding influence
of
> Kantian evil (on Tuesdays), or maybe supremely selfish trades for long
term
> returns (on Wednesdays). They will give you all kinds of evasive bullshit
to
> try to cover the sky with the palm of the hand. That "evasion" is another
> aspect of The Great Theft.
>
> >And then, to
> > feel love and adoration, worship, for this abstract concept, implies
> > the existence of a trans-empirical religious theory that barely if
> > ever made it down on paper, except between the lines of her novels.
> > For one cannot love the mere totality of all humans, particularly in
> > light of her evident disappointment in humans generally, the
> > disappointment of an idealist failing to find the ideal actualized.
> > What Rand means by the concept "Man," as an ideal, is a question
> > that has been pondered by other scholars, but it is difficult to try
> > to fill in the blanks of Rand's unspoken sense of life, while at the
> > same time overcoming the dry empiricism which she most often
> > propounded.
>
> The unspoken verges dangerously on the ineffable. I understand what you
are
> saying, but I think that to the extent that it is correct it is Rand's
b.s.
> To the extent that you are inserting your own idealization, it is strictly
> your reading and therefore without authority as a recognized rendition of
> Objectivism. As I said before, you are thinking for yourself and this a
> no-no, not only to Randians but to Rand. Rand encouraged all to think for
> themselves, but excommunicated the "irrational" (not thinking as she did).
>
> > > I think that you attribute to Rand a little more mysticism than she
> would
> > > like. In Rand's view man is an animal with a highly developed brain.
> >
> > 2. I did not attribute to Rand any mysticism whatsoever in that
> > article. As for Rand's alleged view of man stated there, Do you
> > actually believe Rand intended to worship "an animal with a highly
> > developed brain"?
>
> I do. I think that she worshiped "reason" as a faculty of that particular
> animal.
>
> > I reject the distorted interpretation of my thinking as a mysticism
> > disguised with the label "trans-empiricism." My definition of
> > mysticism is "the belief that one can have knowledge in complete
> > disregard to the method with which it is acquired." The definition
> > is not, therefore, a belief in the supernatural; my definition
> > accentuates the method, not the belief itself which is only a
> > consequence of the method. On this newsgroup, on the other hand,
> > I see belief rejected as mysticism, not because of the method
> > required to obtain the belief, but because it "seems" to be mysticism,
> > because you "smell" mysticism in between the lines, because "it
> > appears to match something I vaguely recall Rand wrote somewhere about
> > mystics," or simply because it is *not* brute empiricism.
> >
> > The implication of focusing on the belief rather than the method by
> > which the belief is acquired is that the present stage of man's
> > intellectual evolution is the highest one. He has risen from the
> > level of tribalistic savages and acquired a civilization based on
> > principles. While this is true, it does not mean he is trapped on
> > this level, in fact it implies the possibility of more evolution
> > to come. We are limited to our present stage of intellectual
> > development, and not to acknowledge these limits is to stifle all
> > progress. But although we are limited to this stage, we are not
> > therefore limited *by* it. The boundaries are set by the methods we
> > use to acquire new knowledge, and have heretofore been
> > empirically-based and oriented. To determine the whys and wherefores
> > *of* those boundaries requires a *trans-empirical* investigation into
> > these limits serving to bring them into conscious focus, and enabling
> > us to get a glimpse of what may lie beyond the boundaries of human
> > understanding.
>
> Objectivism rejects (and must do so) the idea that anything may lie beyond
> the boundaries of human understanding.
>
> > "In the name of the values that keep you alive, do not let your vision
> > of man be distorted by the ugly, the cowardly, the mindless in those
> > who have never achieved his title. Do not lose your knowledge that
> > man's proper estate is an upright posture, an intransigent mind and
> > a step that travels unlimited roads." (Galt's Speech.)
>
> Inspirational rhetoric in praise of reason.
>
> > 3. You are encouraging me to stop thinking for myself and study the
> > works of Rand's apostles. (Perfect name to apply to them, btw.)
> > Guess what -- I am highly familiar with all those works, and more.
> > That is why I think I am qualified to take up this issue on my own
> > terms and do the original thinking which is apparently forbidden to
> > the average Objectivist here.
>
> As an someone who does not believe Objectivism I accept their version as
the
> true version of Rand's Objectivism. Yours may well be more sensible,
though,
> but still corrupted by the basic fallacies of Objectivist "rationalistic"
> deductions.
>
> > But regarding your statement about "2 1/2 pounds of flesh," I think
> > you should go back and study Branden some more. It is not brains
> > he is dealing with as a psychologist, but minds. Branden is not a
> > brain surgeon.
>
> Rand believed that the mind is a function of the brain.
> Carmichael
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
> Acar <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote:
> > Dave O'Hearn wrote:
> > > Most things that are commonly classed as empathetic, such as
> > > friendship or love, are closer to the trader principle when viewed
> > > empirically.
> >
> > !!!!
>
> I don't know what you mean by empathy, but when sociologists measure
> empathy, they are talking about immediate, emotional reactions to help
> people, with no thought of compensation. It is exceedingly rare. This
> is my main point, however short; the rest of this post is
> clarifications.
Well, I reject your main point as inaccurate and obviouly so. That is why I
said that an assertion like that stands as its own refutation. You claim
that disinterested responses are not just rare, but exceedingly rare. All my
life I have observed that they are not just common, but the natural response
of normal individuals. Any one could go on and on with examples from one's
own experienece.
> In a relationship that lasts more than a day, one might feel positive
> emotions towards another person, but these emotions are conducive to
> the actual mutuality in the relationship, not independent of it. These
> cases of empathy are not evidence that it is important ethically; they
> are actually evidence against it, as the empathy is completely
> rational. And these are the vast majority of cases.
>
> > That is a long way to say that people do not feel for each other (and
that
> > Clinton does not feel your pain :-)). I think that the claim falls of
its
> > own weight so I will let your remarks stand.
>
> I am not saying that people do not feel for each other. I am saying
> that there is nothing irrational about these feelings requiring
> additional ethical principles for explanation. That people feel
> empathy for their friends and loved ones is of no more significance
> than that they feel hunger when they need food. The emotion is in no
> conflict with reason.
The original question (from this side) is whether egoism as defined by Rand
reflects human nature. This may branch into a discussion as to whether the
thinking machine (the machine which needs rationality in order to survive)
(and I agree that it does) is a complete and therefore accurate
characterization of human nature. It is the question of whether Objectivism
successfully resolves the apparent dichotomy between reason and feelings; in
other words, whether reducing feeling to the category of objective
"existents" is not a category error. It is also the question of whether
feelings or reason are the primary motivators of human attitudes and
actions, and of whether they should be, vis a vis human nature. It is the
entire question of whether the so-called "primacy of existence" necessarily
translates into a supporting role for the affective side of the human
psyche. Consider the fact that you, Dave O'Hearn, uses reason exclusively as
a tool to devise strategies to gratify your feelings. You are a feeling
entity, Dave, before you are a thinking machine. And so was Rand as we all
know but too well.
Carmichael
Do you mean that when things change or are destroyed, there is a
substrate that is unaffected? I think that's a fairly good answer, but
that it runs into problems of what counts as a substrate and what
doesn't, if there is a hierarchy of substrates, and so on. I find
Rand's theory of measurement omission more natural. The screwdriver on
my desk, for example, is always exchanging kinetic energy with the
air, interacting with the electrical fields from the building's
wiring, and so forth. But my concept of screwdriver has omitted all
these measurements. It only requires that something be the proper size
that I can pick it up, and that it can turn screws. This avoids all
the problems of realism, without the subjectivity of nominalism, if
one accepts the validity of sense perception and the principle of
unit-economy.
Of course, you could argue that the validity of sense perception is a
weak form of realism, or that unit-economy requires some form of
conceptualism. But the major classical problems are avoided, and the
categorization doesn't work well, as realism and
conceptualism/nominalism are supposed to be mutually exclusive.
--
Dave O'Hearn
Another contemptuous slam lol.
> I realize that my reply did not do justice to the seriousness and depth of
> your analysis. I simply do not have the time, but I do appreciate the
> complexity of the issues that you raise and the soundness of your argument.
> This of course in no way changes my disagreement with your conclusions about
> the ultimate merit of Rand's view of the world or the (lack of) importance
> of her contributions to philosophy.
>
> I am comfortably persuaded that Rand was delusional about the magnitude of
> her talents, a delusion which was made possible by that fact that her
> talents were in fact considerable. This fact combined with her dogmatic,
> persuasive, controlling and charismatic personality made it possible for a
> number of groupies with derivative minds sitting at her feet as willing
> receptacles to persuade her that she was a great philosopher, thus causing
> her to talk and behave as if she were one such. Her powerful and colorful
> defense of reason, freedom and capitalism in a hostile social environment
> fed her mystique and made possible whatever degree of recognition she
> achieved. Of course all this sounds as if your exegesis went over my head
> but I doubt it. I simply disagree with the greatness of what is original and
> the originality of what is great.
> Carmichael
>
Well said.
While I have certainly done my share of slamming her, I do not
wish to take part in the kind of absolutist, monarchical
thinking which is seen in some of her more "colorful" writing.
I am not going to turn the tables and demonize her the way she
demonized Kant. Her writing has merit, it is only hard to find.
On the other hand, it is not my intention to spend a great deal of
time on such a side-issue to the detriment of more important tasks
at hand. Rand is not even a footnote in the history of philosophy.
I will, though, feel free on this newsgroup to use her as an example
for developing some of my principles. On other newsgroups, many
readers would wonder who the hell I was talking about. It does not
matter whether I refer to Rand or some other thinker. What is
relevant is the principle of seeking above our present point of
understanding; only, it is unfortunate that I brought her up in
such a positive sense in response to one of her detractors.
> Acar <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:<001401c1909e$703c0a20$6401a8c0@
> cinci.rr.com>...
> > Dear Melanor,
>
> Another contemptuous slam lol.
Why would you say that? I meant it as a special show of respect for your two
replies, which I was forced to answer casually.
I misunderstood your purpose. I responded as if you were yet another
interpreter of the "true message of Objectivism." I suppose that in a sense
you are, at least to the extent that you find in her a spiritual dimension
which is not normally attributed in the same way, but I can see that you are
following your own path. Happy hunting.
Well, the name was mis-spelled. Purposely? The first time it happened
recently, the guy admitted it. Sorry if I mis-read your intent.
snip
> I misunderstood your purpose. I responded as if you were yet another
> interpreter of the "true message of Objectivism." I suppose that in a sense
> you are, at least to the extent that you find in her a spiritual dimension
> which is not normally attributed in the same way, but I can see that you are
> following your own path. Happy hunting.
> Carmichael
Last note: I am doing just that, and yes I am happy :).
When I first read The Fountainhead, I found it to be highly religious
in its own way, and obviously so. The object of worship is Man, and
the
feelings expressed toward this "sorta" deity are those normally
reserved for God and religion: exaltation, adoration, joyousness.
Rand's philosophy is transcendent in the normally religious fashion,
but expressed secularly.
Like I said, I won't spend time on the subject, I just don't
understand
how anybody can miss it. I do realize, however, that her non-fiction
rarely expresses that so-called spiritual dimension to her thought.
> Acar <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:<001e01c190eb$7755a3a0$6401a8c0@
> cinci.rr.com>...
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "malenor" <mal...@hotmail.com>
> > Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
> > Sent: Saturday, December 29, 2001 6:19 PM
> > Subject: Re: Objectivism is pseudo-philosophy
> >
> >
> > > Acar <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
> > news:<001401c1909e$703c0a20$6401a8c0@
> > > cinci.rr.com>...
> > > > Dear Melanor,
> > >
> > > Another contemptuous slam lol.
> >
> > Why would you say that? I meant it as a special show of respect for your
two
> > replies, which I was forced to answer casually.
>
> Well, the name was mis-spelled. Purposely? The first time it happened
> recently, the guy admitted it. Sorry if I mis-read your intent.
Didn't realize the misspelling until now. I spend a lot of time correcting
transpositions of letters, and don't catch them all. Believe it or not the
intention was to start on a note of cordiality. Looks like I goofed again.
Hazards of Usenet.
> Bert Clanton wrote:
>
>
> > I view empathy as a natural state of the human nervous system, which can
> > be squelched by intellectualization or extremely unpleasant experiences
> > involving emnotionally important other people. I wouldn't use the term
> > "virtue" to refer to natural states of the human nervous system.
>
>
> Okay, but you conditioned your approval of individualism with what to
> me read like an *ought* - i.e. a heavy dose of empathy. By which I
> understood you to mean that individualists ought to have empathy. But
> here you're proposing that empathy is really a physiological phenomenon,
> which means it's not an ought, it is an *is.* Am I understanding you
> correctly?
I believe that empathy is an evolutionarily developed physiologically
based phenomenon in undamaged human nervous systems. I believe that
individualists are somewhat prone to squelching this instinctual
empathetic function by adopting belief/attitude systems which evaluate
this natural state negatively. I think that this is unfortunate. Equally
unfortunate in my view is adopting a belief/attitude system which
overemphasizes empathy to the extent that it squelches one's equally
natural tendency to act to satisfy one's own needs.
> Assuming yes, I find this to be vulnerable to similar kinds of
> arguments of it (empathy) being non universal, that I have to defend
> against when arguing for the rational basis for a healthy ego. Are you
> aware of any persuasive scientific evidence for your view of empathy?
> I'm curious what researchers (or you) suggest would be the reason for
> the evolution of this relatively elaborate mechanism in humans.
>
Empathy. like other normal physiological functions, is not universal:
our "hardware" can get messed up very early in life. People who may be
very intelligent, but who seem to be devoid of empathy, are usually
labeled "sociopaths". Sometimes it appears to me that some extreme
individualists are trying unsuccessfully to argue themselves into being
sociopaths.
>
> > "Virtue ethics", as I understand it, is a kind of moral theory which
> > takes "the virtues", however chosen, as logically foundational, rather
> > than proposing ways to choose what we'll regards as virtuous.
>
> I of course like the development of Rand's argument that the virtues
> we select be based on what accords our nature - psychological as well as
> physical. Someone might counter that with: "Why should we identify and
> adopt virtues consonant with our nature?" For me, it's a sufficiently
> axiomatic place to begin.
>
Given an accurate understanding of what "our nature" is, I agree. But I
find the Objectivist view of "our nature" seriously defective, to the
extent that it is strictly egoistic.
Best wishes,
Bert
<< I believe that empathy is an evolutionarily developed physiologically
based phenomenon in undamaged human nervous systems. I believe that
individualists are somewhat prone to squelching this instinctual
empathetic function by adopting belief/attitude systems which evaluate
this natural state negatively. I think that this is unfortunate. Equally
unfortunate in my view is adopting a belief/attitude system which
overemphasizes empathy to the extent that it squelches one's equally
natural tendency to act to satisfy one's own needs. >>
There is truth in this, but error as well. The "evolutionarily developed"
empathy that Mr. Clanton refers to is largely a "group" empathy, i.e., an
empathy only for a certain class of people. That class could be one's family,
slaves, tribe, country, etc. but it is rarely mankind at large. It probably
"evolved" from hostilities between rival group. Groups with strong "in-group"
empathy have a definite advantage in war over groups with weak in-group
empathy. War has always been the greatest threat to individualism.
The trouble with "evolutionary developed" empathy is that it developed to meet
conditions prevailing before the development of modern civilization. Today, we
find a great many people instinctually drawn to beliefs that are at odds with
the modern system of an extensive division of labor and freedom of contract.
Empathy in its modern form--i.e., humanitarianism and socialism-- soon takes on
a destructive aspect. Social empathy nowadays is clearly pathological.
Instead of empathizing with the truly unfortunate, we find widespread empathy
for criminals, louts, genocidal 3rd World fanatics, reckless hedonists, and
shiftless persons who don't want to work.
Greg Nyquist
jrnyquist.com
homepage.mac.com/machiavel
> Bert Clanton wrote:
>
>
> << I believe that empathy is an evolutionarily developed physiologically
> based phenomenon in undamaged human nervous systems. I believe that
> individualists are somewhat prone to squelching this instinctual
> empathetic function by adopting belief/attitude systems which evaluate
> this natural state negatively. I think that this is unfortunate. Equally
> unfortunate in my view is adopting a belief/attitude system which
> overemphasizes empathy to the extent that it squelches one's equally
> natural tendency to act to satisfy one's own needs. >>
>
> There is truth in this, but error as well. The "evolutionarily developed"
> empathy that Mr. Clanton refers to is largely a "group" empathy, i.e., an
> empathy only for a certain class of people. That class could be one's
> family,
> slaves, tribe, country, etc. but it is rarely mankind at large.
I completely agree. I'd venture, in fact, that there is no *instinctual*
empathy at all for mankind at large. I'd guess that anyone who feels
empathy for mankind at large has gone through a process with at least
three stages: he/she manifests an instinctual empathy for a few people,
he/she extrapolates conceptually from this small group to mankind at
large as an appropriate subject of empathy, and he/she comes to feel
what was at first an emotion *conceived* to be appropriate. I think that
the first two stages are essential for ethics, and the third advisable.
> It probably
> "evolved" from hostilities between rival group. Groups with strong
> "in-group"
> empathy have a definite advantage in war over groups with weak in-group
> empathy. War has always been the greatest threat to individualism.
>
> The trouble with "evolutionary developed" empathy is that it developed to
> meet
> conditions prevailing before the development of modern civilization.
True. In fact I think that this is the problem not only with empathetic
feelings but also with aggressive feelings.
> Today,
> we
> find a great many people instinctually drawn to beliefs that are at odds with
> the modern system of an extensive division of labor and freedom of contract.
> Empathy in its modern form--i.e., humanitarianism and socialism-- soon takes
> on
> a destructive aspect.
I'd certainly agree that both *can* take on a destructive aspect if
implemented in a doctrinaire way. I would not agree at all that anything
more "collectivist" than laissez-faire capitalism inherently has such
destructive consequences.
> Social empathy nowadays is clearly pathological.
Whoa!
> Instead of empathizing with the truly unfortunate, we find widespread empathy
> for criminals, louts, genocidal 3rd World fanatics, reckless hedonists, and
> shiftless persons who don't want to work.
>
Not on my part, or on the part of anyone that I know. I'll settle for
empathizing with the truly unfortunate. Of course, reasonable people can
and do disagree about exactly who should be included among "the truly
unfortunate". But to propose that "social empathizers" as a class weep
for professional criminals, genocidal 3rd world fanatics, hedonists who
are heedless of the results of their behavior, or people who don't work
because they don't want to, is to caricature reality.
Best wishes,
Bert
Fair enough, my statement was perhaps too strong. Let us say "most" social
empathizers, or if that's too strong "many" social emphasizers, with stress on
the word "social," here used in the same sense of "social" justice. I'm
suspicious of kind of "social" justice or "social" empathy, because it tends to
be rather abstract. I much prefer justice and empathy to be applied to
individuals, not to groups. Social empathy often becomes merely a vague
passion for doing good for (perhaps against) others. In such circumstances, it
frequently becomes irresponsible and, even more regrettable, a mask for darker
motives (perhaps cowardice?--fear of using force to put down socially
dysfunctional elements?). We see this phenomenon very clearly with very many
of our dear humanitarians on the Left. Starting out from the desire to
empathize with the unfortunate, they end up pursuing policies which benefit
criminals and foreign aggressors. Think of all the legislation that has
benefited criminals in the last 40 years! Or, to bring it closer today, just
look at how the Left can't help sympathizing with the Palestinians, despite the
fact that Arab extremists set the agenda for this group and this agenda is to
destroy Israel. Here we have in capsule form one of the principle driving
forces of that "suicide of the West" that James Burnham wrote about 40 years
ago.
Greg Nyquist
jrnyquist.com
homepage.mac.com/machiavel