What is the difference between Objectivism and materialism?
hmmmm
differ from classic materialism?
Randroid Terminator
They differ in some particulars, but they are both basically forms of
dogma. "Agent" brought up the free-will issue, for example.
Materialism is dogmatically inclined to be against it, while
Objectivism is dogmatically inclined toward believing in it. And while
both are dogmatically inclined against a belief in God, both have
their own forms of God and manner of expressing worship. The
materialist has faith in the hard sciences, while Objectivists worship
Man and Reason.
--
"Happiness, while it is pleasant to the possessor
of it, is not of itself absolutely and in all
respects good, but always presupposes morally right
behaviour as its condition." (Critique of Practical
Reason.)
--
"It's very typical of Objectivists, when they object
to something someone does, to have a strong opinion
as to motive -- in this case, to sell books and
make money. In other words, to them an honest
difference of opinion is not conceivable."
http://snipurl.com/cmb0
Robert Kolker
> They differ in some particulars, but they are both basically forms of
> dogma. "Agent" brought up the free-will issue, for example.
> Materialism is dogmatically inclined to be against it, while
> Objectivism is dogmatically inclined toward believing in it. And while
> both are dogmatically inclined against a belief in God, both have
> their own forms of God and manner of expressing worship. The
> materialist has faith in the hard sciences, while Objectivists worship
> Man and Reason.
The gods of material and energy give us a sign daily. The readings of
the GPS.
Science delivers.
Bob Kolker
Randroid Terminator
>Science delivers.
And what if some blob of goo and photons happens to disagree with you?
Do you want to exterminate those bad memes?
Puppet_Sock
> I am new to here, can someone define "objectivism"? How does it
> differ from classic materialism?
Well, one huge similarity between them is, the "Randroid
Terminator" has no knowledge whatsover of either.
Of course, this is not a useful category, as it has so
*many* items in it, and so few not in it, that it does
not provide any utility.
Objectivism is the philosophy of Ayn Rand. A form of
materialism is one part of it, but certainly not all.
Socks
Mark N
> hmmmm wrote:
>> I am new to here, can someone define "objectivism"? How does it
>> differ from classic materialism?
> There is consciousness (OK, that might not be a difference) and free will.
Could you define "free will"? :-)
Mark
Robert Kolker
>
> Could you define "free will"? :-)
Maybe I will. Maybe I won't. No matter. Never mind.
Bob Kolker
Mark N
> Mark N wrote:
>> Agent Cooper wrote:
>>> hmmmm wrote:
> For everyone, or for Objectivists? I don't think I can do either. One of
> the things my interactions with Fred have taught me is that there's a
> lot I don't quite get about Objectivism (yet).
All right, so you are saying that Objectivists believe in *something*
that they call "free will," and whatever that something is, it is a
thing that materialists don't believe in. Fair enough.
[...]
> I thought it important to say this for once: I really don't have a deep
> understanding of how Objectivism works. What I do have is views of my
> own which are *reminiscent* of views Objectivists have (Metaphysical
> realism, [...]
Funny you should mention "realism." I've never been able to figure out
what "realism" and "anti-realism" mean. Do you think that there are
clear, well-defined, standard meanings for those terms? If there are,
I've never been able to discover them. To me, they're about as clear and
meaningful as "theism" and "atheism." Maybe less.
In particular, I can never make any sense of "anti-realist" statements
like "there is no real world," or "there is no objective reality." (Am I
right in thinking that those are the sorts of statements that
characterize "anti-realism"?) And I have the impression that statements
of "realism" originate as reactions to such "anti-realist" statements.
But rather than trying to argue against "anti-realist" claims, I'm
inclined to take the "what do you mean" approach. It really isn't clear
to me what the "anti-realist" *does* mean. And until it becomes clear, I
don't see anything to argue about.
But maybe you will tell me that "realism" and "anti-realism" do, after
all, have clear meanings, that they refer to well-defined philosophical
positions, despite my impression to the contrary. I'm always happy to
learn something new.
[...]
> I myself am something of a compatibilist of the Dan Dennett sort. But
> tehre's a really fascinating looking book by George Ainslie _Breakdown
> of Will_ which might affect my views (I heard about it through Dennett).
Dennett seems to be pretty smart for a zombie.
Mark
Mark N
> Mark N wrote:
There is nothing "mental" about any of this. It is all done with photons
and meat. :-)
Mark
Mark N
> tehre's a really fascinating looking book by George Ainslie _Breakdown
> of Will_ which might affect my views (I heard about it through Dennett).
Wow, that guy on the front cover looks cheerful! :-)
Mark
David Buchner
> I've got so many fish to fry that I don't have the time ....
That's okay, I've read that fish is good for you.
> ....But *after* tenure, I'm gonna be all over this shit.
Wow. Spoken like a true really weighty intellectual philosopher type
guy. :-)
Reminds me of that _Ghostbusters_ line (from memory: "and we should be
able to really kick some ass! ...in a spiritual sense, of course..."
Reggie Perrin
Mark N wrote:
> Agent Cooper wrote:
> [...]
> Funny you should mention "realism." I've never been able to figure
out
> what "realism" and "anti-realism" mean. Do you think that there are
> clear, well-defined, standard meanings for those terms? If there are,
> I've never been able to discover them. To me, they're about as clear
and
> meaningful as "theism" and "atheism." Maybe less.
>
> In particular, I can never make any sense of "anti-realist"
statements
> like "there is no real world," or "there is no objective reality."
(Am I
> right in thinking that those are the sorts of statements that
> characterize "anti-realism"?)
Well, anti-realism is of course just a negative definition that could
in theory encompass idealism, pragmatism etc. In the philosophy of
science at anti-realism usually equates to empiricism, not idealism.
Robert Kolker
>
> Caveat: this won't work for mental states, since mental states are
> obviously dependent upon the mind having them. So someone who thinks
> that there *are* mental states would be a mental states realist. So what
> would a mental states *anti-realist* be? Someone who believes that the
> existence of X's mental states depends upon Y's *opinions* about X's
> mental states. Thus X's mental states are not Y-mind-independent. This,
> BTW, is something like Dennett's view of mental states, which I reject.
> He says that mental states are sort of like instrumentalist fictions we
> use to interpret other people's behavior. Uh oh. I hear Fred coming...
Yoo hoo! Mental states are brain states. Have a PET scan done and see
for yourself.
Bob Kolker
fred...@papertig.com
> Agent Cooper wrote:
> > ... Uh oh. I hear Fred coming...
>
> Yoo hoo! Mental states are brain states. Have a PET scan done and see
> for yourself.
Here he is.
Can someone remind me, did Bob ever answer the question, "What is the
brain state of 'the truth'?" Not to mention how that would show up on a
PET scan.
I don't feel badly that I don't remember, since he never remembers
anything I say either.
Fred Weiss
hmmmm
Obejctivist are kind of like Materialist except they think they have
observed some kind of interuption in cause and effect in some people
(volition) but they don't know for sure if it is real or not unless
they are Objective Realist in which case they are pretty certain some
people practice free even when they aren't looking or thinking about
it. Am I getting warm?
R Lawrence
To the extent that I can understand you (you've got a bit of a run-on
sentence there), you appear to be confusing materialism with
determinism. There is often a high degree of correspondence between the
two (many materialists are determinists and vice-versa), but they are
distinct ideas.
Materialism is specificly the belief that everything that exists is some
form of matter or its equivalent. (Thus, for example, materialists have
no problem admiting the existence of energy, provided that matter and
energy are interchangeable forms of the same substance.) Materialism can
be contrasted with idealism (the belief that everything that exists is
some form or equivalent of ideas or spirit). Materialism and idealism
are both types of monism (the belief that there is only one type of
substance in existence), which can be contrasted with dualism (which
holds that both matter and spirit exist as separate and distinct
substances).
AFAIK, Objectivism does not endorse any of these metaphysical positions.
Rand was explicitly agnostic on the question of whether there was more
than one type of substance, or what those substances (if there is more
than one) might be. She considered this an issue of *scientific*
investigation, not metaphysical reasoning. See the appendix to the
second edition of _Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology_ for her
explicit discussion of this.
In contrast, determinism is not a belief about how many substances there
are, or what those substances are. Thus, one can find examples of
determinists who are not materialists (though that is uncommon these
days, at least in the Western world), and materialists who are not
determinists. Determinism is the belief that all events are necessitated
before they happen. On this subject there is a clear position in
Objectivism, which is that determinism is false. Objectivism holds that
some actions are self-motivated and not necessitated by prior events.
I believe the essay at the following link --
http://www.rationalmind.net/essay/21freewill -- although not from any
"official" source, is a relatively clear and accurate account of the
Objectivist position on determinism. Note the absence of any reference
to matter or materialism, which is a different subject.
HTH
--
Richard Lawrence
Visit the Objectivism Reference Center: http://www.noblesoul.com/orc/
Randroid Terminator
<RL0...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>hmmmm wrote:
>>Ok, I 've read all the post. Let me see if I am getting close.
>>Obejctivist are kind of like Materialist except they think they have
>>observed some kind of interuption in cause and effect in some people
>>(volition) but they don't know for sure if it is real or not unless
>>they are Objective Realist in which case they are pretty certain some
>>people practice free even when they aren't looking or thinking about
>>it. Am I getting warm?
>To the extent that I can understand you (you've got a bit of a run-on
>sentence there), you appear to be confusing materialism with
>determinism. There is often a high degree of correspondence between the
>two (many materialists are determinists and vice-versa), but they are
>distinct ideas.
I would put it this way: determinism doesn't necessarily entail
materialism.
hmmmm
is false how can an objectivism avoid all the implications that
volition raises? I guess it is hard for me to see how a true dyed in
the wool materialist could not be a determinist . Even though I see
how determinism can be discussed apart from substance it has huge
implications it would seem.
Reggie Perrin
hmmmm wrote:
> Thanks. I am an ameteur for sure in this. But by saying determinism
> is false how can an objectivism avoid all the implications that
> volition raises?
I'm not sure what you mean by that. Belief in free will doesn't
necessarily entail dualism, if that's what you're thinking.
> I guess it is hard for me to see how a true dyed in
> the wool materialist could not be a determinist . Even though I see
> how determinism can be discussed apart from substance it has huge
> implications it would seem.
Oh-oh, cue the physics brigade.. maybe I can sneak in and defuse this
one quickly. The most popular interpretation of quantum mechanics
posits that the world is fundamentally indeterminate. So that's one
easy escape route for the materialist who doesn't want to commit to
determinism.
R Lawrence
>hmmmm wrote:
>>I guess it is hard for me to see how a true dyed in
>>the wool materialist could not be a determinist . Even though I see
>>how determinism can be discussed apart from substance it has huge
>>implications it would seem.
>
>Oh-oh, cue the physics brigade.. maybe I can sneak in and defuse this
>one quickly. The most popular interpretation of quantum mechanics
>posits that the world is fundamentally indeterminate. So that's one
>easy escape route for the materialist who doesn't want to commit to
>determinism.
There is also the issue of whether causation is event-based (the causes
of an action are previous events) or entity-based (the causes of an
action are the natures of the acting entities). If causation is
event-based, then determinism seems to follow, *unless* there are
uncaused actions. Quantum effects would presumably be instances of
uncaused action. If causation is entity-based (as Objectivists believe),
then causation carries no implication of determinism in the first place,
so one does not have the dichotomy of causal determinism vs. acausal
indeterminism. Any non-deterministic actions (quantum or not) would
proceed according to the natures of the acting entities.
So in theory a person could be a "dyed in the wool" materialist monist,
but not a determinist, if that person also held to entity-based
causation. However, my impression is that most materialists either
believe in event-based causation, or are unaware that there are
alternative theories of causation. Thus they end up either embracing
determinism or taking the "escape route" you mention.
Reggie Perrin
Agent Cooper wrote:
> Reggie Perrin wrote:
>
> > Oh-oh, cue the physics brigade.. maybe I can sneak in and defuse
this
> > one quickly. The most popular interpretation of quantum mechanics
> > posits that the world is fundamentally indeterminate. So that's one
> > easy escape route for the materialist who doesn't want to commit to
> > determinism.
>
>
> *dice* *throws* that are beyond my control?
Hmmm? Too cryptic for me, Coop. I'm not advocating materialism if
R Lawrence
>Reggie Perrin wrote:
>>Oh-oh, cue the physics brigade.. maybe I can sneak in and defuse this
>>one quickly. The most popular interpretation of quantum mechanics
>>posits that the world is fundamentally indeterminate. So that's one
>>easy escape route for the materialist who doesn't want to commit to
>>determinism.
>
>I'm morally responsible for my actions because they are controlled by
>*dice* *throws* that are beyond my control?
In Reggie's defense, he was only mapping an escape route from
determinism for materialists, not mounting a defense of free will or
moral responsibility. It is possible to posit indeterminism without free
will or moral responsibility. (I believe most Objectivists would say
that acausal indeterminism is actually *incompatible* with free will.)
Mark N
> There is also the issue of whether causation is event-based (the causes
> of an action are previous events) or entity-based (the causes of an
> action are the natures of the acting entities). If causation is
> event-based, then determinism seems to follow, *unless* there are
> uncaused actions. Quantum effects would presumably be instances of
> uncaused action. If causation is entity-based (as Objectivists believe),
> then causation carries no implication of determinism in the first place,
Oh yeah? Try telling Peikoff that. His view is that determinism follows
from the Law of Identity. Um, except when it doesn't, as in the case of
beings with volitional consciousness! :-)
Mark
R Lawrence
>R Lawrence wrote:
>>If causation is entity-based (as Objectivists believe),
>>then causation carries no implication of determinism in the first place,
>
>Oh yeah? Try telling Peikoff that. His view is that determinism follows
>from the Law of Identity. Um, except when it doesn't, as in the case of
>beings with volitional consciousness! :-)
You may recall that about a year ago I was involved in a dispute on the
subject of Peikoff's explanations of causality. I see no need to repeat
that discussion, which is archived for all to read. My initial post
critiquing Peikoff's arguments is at http://tinylink.com/?aRgvEwpPmH ,
and the various responses and counter-responses can be found in the
related thread.
Randroid Terminator
<RL0...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>Mark N wrote:
>>R Lawrence wrote:
>
>>>If causation is entity-based (as Objectivists believe),
>>>then causation carries no implication of determinism in the first place,
>>
>>Oh yeah? Try telling Peikoff that. His view is that determinism follows
>>from the Law of Identity. Um, except when it doesn't, as in the case of
>>beings with volitional consciousness! :-)
>
>You may recall that about a year ago I was involved in a dispute on the
>subject of Peikoff's explanations of causality. I see no need to repeat
>that discussion, which is archived for all to read. My initial post
>critiquing Peikoff's arguments is at http://tinylink.com/?aRgvEwpPmH ,
>and the various responses and counter-responses can be found in the
>related thread.
--begin quote--
In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action
possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity. This is
the action it will take, the action that is *caused* and necessitated
by its nature.
Thus, under ordinary circumstances, if a child releases a balloon
filled with helium, only one outcome is possible: the balloon will
rise. If he releases a second balloon filled with sand, the nature of
the entity is different, and so is its action; the only possible
outcome now is that it will fall. If, under the same circumstances,
several actions were possible -- e.g., a balloon could rise *or* fall
(or start to emit music like a radio, or turn into a pumpkin),
everything else remaining the same -- such incompatible outcomes
would have to derive from incompatible (contradictory) aspects of
the entity's nature. But there are no contradictory aspects. A is A.
Cause and effect, therefore, is a universal law of reality. Every
action has a cause (the cause is the nature of the entity which acts);
and the same cause leads to the same effect (the same entity, under
the same circumstances, will perform the same action).
--end quote--
(Leonard Peikoff, _Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand_, pp.
14-15, emphasis in original)
(Isn't Lenny brilliant, lol!)
hmmmm
Dualism of some sort is what free will seems to imply, It implies
something more than just material. Is Heidelberg's uncertainty
principle the big gun for a materialists to be able to deal with
volition. If so Quantum Mechanics is a tiny winy (literally)
foundation. Don't the skeptics and pragmatist use the same thing
to support their claims (string theroies and everyything being tied
together and all that)?
Randroid Terminator
I'm not sure which I dislike more: posts such as that one which don't
include any quoted material at all, or posts which include quotes but
fragment the original post into a million separate responses.
Usenet etiquette recommends bottom-posting, which is to post a
response below content quoted from the post being responded to. For
example, the response I am now making.
Randroid Terminator
<te...@southlandbc.org> wrote:
>I am new to here, can someone define "objectivism"? How does it
>differ from classic materialism?
I'd also like to add that there is a distinction between strict
empiricism and Objectivism which often pretends to be a strict
empiricism, but then allows for such concepts as the "benevolent
universe premise." I don't see any benevolent universe. Where is it?
fred...@papertig.com
> ...I don't see any benevolent universe. Where is it?
Malenoid the Malevolent.
Try taking your head outa your ass - or maybe that's why you put it in
there in the first place.
Fred Weiss
Randroid Terminator
wrote:
Ok, I did. Now stop evading the question, and tell me: where is this
benevolent universe?
Robert Kolker
>
> Try taking your head outa your ass - or maybe that's why you put it in
> there in the first place.
Phredd, phredd. Malevolence and Benevolence are charatertic of persons.
The Kosmos is not a person. It is neither. It just is.
Since living species arise by genetic variation and natural selection it
follows that species who survive are doing that which promotes their
further reproduction and is in line with physical laws. So to stretch
the notion of benevolence, one can say for limited periods of time
species can flourish until the environment turns hostile to them.
Our species cannot survive the destruction of our sun. As a species we
are not going to other stars or galaxies because they are too far away,
so when the sun's heat dries up the oceans we are quite literally toast.
The Kosmos which was once benevolent becomes malevolent, if you insist
on using this terminology (which is very silly).
Bob Kolker
Robert Kolker
>
> Ok, I did. Now stop evading the question, and tell me: where is this
> benevolent universe?
In its current state, human beings can survive and even flourish. But
that is not due to the good will of the Kosmos. The Kosmos does not have
will, either good or bad. We live in a world were some of us can live
quite happily and if people were smarter, most of us could live quite
happily.
Bob Kolker
Randroid Terminator
>Randroid Terminator wrote:
The "benevolent universe premise" is subjectivism. I'm not saying
that's a bad thing, only that its a non-empirical thing.
Mark N
> Our species cannot survive the destruction of our sun.
Sounds like an arbitrary assertion to me.
> As a species we
> are not going to other stars or galaxies because they are too far away,
> so when the sun's heat dries up the oceans we are quite literally toast.
It's amazing how certain you are of this. That imagination of yours,
which is so fertile when you are considering the question of
moon-jumping cows, seems non-existent here. You seem to be saying, "I've
never seen any detailed account of how human beings might leave the
solar system and live elsewhere, so it must be impossible." And that's
just arbitrary, as far as I can see.
Mark
Robert Kolker
> Robert Kolker wrote:
>
>> Our species cannot survive the destruction of our sun.
It isn't.
1. We cannot go fast enough to get to a star. Even a hibernation ship
can only move a few people out of the solar system.
2. The sun is going to become a red giant. The physics predicting this
is extremely well supported by experiment.
3. Before the sun goes into its final death phase it will get hot enough
to boil all the water from the Earth.
4. If we do manage to set up habitats far enough away (but in the solar
system) when the sun goes into its white dwarf phase the outer reaches
of the solar system will be too cold to support life.
Barring any new development in physics, the prediction that we are not
going to outlive our sun is extremely well founded. There is nothing
arbitrary about it. It is supported by theory which is in turn extremely
well supported by experiment.
Even if by some miracle we discover faster than light propulsion the
entire kosmos will become cold, dark and lifeless somewhere up the line
and we will die then.
The laws of thermodynamics are ironclade We are going to die one way or
another as a species, and certainly we shall all die as individuals.
Bob Kolker
R Lawrence
>Dualism of some sort is what free will seems to imply, It implies
>something more than just material.
I don't see how you have reached that conclusion, unless you have some
unexpressed beliefs that would lead to it. For example, you could reach
the conclusion that free will implies dualism IF you also believed:
1) that the only possible monist substance is matter (which means that
theories of idealism are wrong);
2) that the behavior of all entities composed of matter must be causally
deterministic (which means theories of material indeterminism or
self-determinism are wrong); and
3) that causal determinism is incompatible with free will (which means
that theories of compatibilism are wrong).
Perhaps you believe you have strong arguments for (1), (2) and (3) -- or
perhaps you are making some significant unexamined assumptions.
hmmmm
It seems that more than one monist substance is a contridiction in
terms.
and yes it also seems materialism implies cause and effect at all
levels except at absolute zero I guess. And yes causal determinism
cancels free will (again by definition). A ripple in the pond doesn't
ever just occur does it, a finger or stone or fish jumping has to be
there, doesn't it?
Mark N
> R Lawrence wrote:
>>hmmmm wrote:
>>>Dualism of some sort is what free will seems to imply, It implies
>>>something more than just material.
>>I don't see how you have reached that conclusion, unless you have some
>>unexpressed beliefs that would lead to it. For example, you could reach
>>the conclusion that free will implies dualism IF you also believed:
>>
>>1) that the only possible monist substance is matter (which means that
>>theories of idealism are wrong);
>>2) that the behavior of all entities composed of matter must be causally
>>deterministic (which means theories of material indeterminism or
>>self-determinism are wrong); and
>>3) that causal determinism is incompatible with free will (which means
>>that theories of compatibilism are wrong).
>>
>>Perhaps you believe you have strong arguments for (1), (2) and (3) -- or
>>perhaps you are making some significant unexamined assumptions.
> It seems that more than one monist substance is a contridiction in
> terms.
No, I think Richard meant that there is more than one *possible* monist
substance, that is, different *alternative* monist substances. In
particular, "mind" *or* "matter."
> and yes it also seems materialism implies cause and effect at all
> levels except at absolute zero I guess.
I have no idea what that means.
> And yes causal determinism
> cancels free will (again by definition).
Well, there are different senses of the term "free will." In particular,
there is "incompatibilist free will," which is, by stipulation,
incompatible with determinism. On the other hand, there is
"compatibilist free will," which does not involve the aforementioned
stipulation. So what you are referring to here is "incompatibilist free
will" (also known as "libertarian free will"). Some people doubt the
philosophical significance of that notion.
So, when someone says "free will," there is more than one possible
meaning that he could have in mind. Apparently, when you said, "Dualism
of some sort is what free will seems to imply, It implies something more
than just material," you meant "free will" in the "incompatibilist"
sense. So Richard's third point above can be taken as pointing out an
ambiguity in what you said. You didn't specify that you meant
"incompatibilist free will."
> A ripple in the pond doesn't
> ever just occur does it, a finger or stone or fish jumping has to be
> there, doesn't it?
Is this a trick question?
Mark
R Lawrence
>It seems that more than one monist substance is a contridiction in
>terms.
I think you misunderstood me. I did not mean that there could be more
than one substance under monism -- you are correct that this would be a
contradiction in terms. Rather, I meant that the sole substance might be
something other than matter. That is the position of idealists. If
everything is mind/spirit, then there doesn't seem to be any problem
with positing free will without dualism. (And to be doubly clear, I'm
not trying to defend idealism. I'm just pointing out a gap in your
reasoning that you ought to work on filling.)
>and yes it also seems materialism implies cause and effect at all
>levels except at absolute zero I guess.
"Cause and effect" does not equal "determinism," nor do I see how
materialism per se implies anything about whether everything is caused.
(Cue Reggie's "physics brigade" to start talking about quantum
indeterminancy.) Perhaps you believe that materialism does carry that
implication, but your argument for that belief is not in evidence.
> And yes causal determinism cancels free will (again by definition).
Compatibilists would disagree. Again, I'm not attempting to defend this
view, but it is very common, and a refutation of it requires more than
simply referencing definitions that you haven't even offered.
> A ripple in the pond doesn't
>ever just occur does it, a finger or stone or fish jumping has to be
>there, doesn't it?
An indeterminist might think it could "just occur," without being a
dualist. Even if it doesn't "just occur," I don't see what this has to
do with whether free will implies dualism. A non-dualist could still
argue that the ripple is *caused* without being *determined* (two
distinct concepts whose relationship is not universally agreed upon),
and/or that the rippling behavior of ponds is deterministic while some
other behavior -- say, the choices of human beings -- is
non-deterministic (two distinct events/objects that may have different
causal properties). And even if they bought into your assumptions about
the relationship between causality and determinism, they could still
argue compatibilism.
In short, there are a lot more variations and combinations of
metaphysical belief than you seem to acknowledge.
Mark N
> Even if by some miracle we discover faster than light propulsion the
> entire kosmos will become cold, dark and lifeless somewhere up the line
> and we will die then.
Oh. Well, now you've got me depressed, Bob. Thanks a lot! :-(
> The laws of thermodynamics are ironclade We are going to die one way or
> another as a species, and certainly we shall all die as individuals.
But that's just our bodies, Bob. You're forgetting that our immortal
Souls will live forever! :-)
Mark
Galen Rutledge
Robert Kolker <now...@nowhere.com> wrote:
> Barring any new development in physics, the prediction that we are not
> going to outlive our sun is extremely well founded. There is nothing
> arbitrary about it. It is supported by theory which is in turn extremely
> well supported by experiment.
Check http://tinyurl.com/3wcw4
Robert, perhaps you aren't aware of the staggering amount of time we
have before the sun goes red giant? According to that article we have in
the order of 4,000,000,000 years to leave the solar system.
I do think that perhaps something will probably change in the next 4
billion years. Are you aware of the possible ramifications of
nanotechnology on human biology?
It seems generally understood that fully-fledged nanotechnology will be
indistinguishable from magic -- by our standards, and some believe such
things are possible in the natural lifetimes of our children or
grand-children.
Galen
Robert Kolker
> In article <GK2dnecmuLG...@comcast.com>,
> Robert Kolker <now...@nowhere.com> wrote:
>
>
>>Barring any new development in physics, the prediction that we are not
>>going to outlive our sun is extremely well founded. There is nothing
>>arbitrary about it. It is supported by theory which is in turn extremely
>>well supported by experiment.
>
>
> Check http://tinyurl.com/3wcw4
>
> Robert, perhaps you aren't aware of the staggering amount of time we
> have before the sun goes red giant? According to that article we have in
> the order of 4,000,000,000 years to leave the solar system.
Long before our Sun becomes a red giant, it will grow hotter and boil
off the oceans. That may be between one and two billion years from now.
That gives us an upper bound.
The longest lasting species on this planet has lasted a half billion years.
There is no reason to think we will last that long. Species extinction
is as common as air.
There is no reason to believe that the upperfound on material transport
and information transport is not the speed of light in vacuo, but there
is no way of proving some loophole does not exist either.
However if you goes with the prevalance of evidence there will be no
mass migration of our species out of the solar system.
If you go with the prevalance of evidence you will conclude that our
species is toast.
=
>
> I do think that perhaps something will probably change in the next 4
> billion years. Are you aware of the possible ramifications of
> nanotechnology on human biology?
I am. I also am familiar with the laws of thermodynamics. Any naninites
small enough to repair dna is subject to Heisenberg Uncertainty. Do not
bet little nanites will keep anyone alive forever. If if we do have
little nannites repearing us, what will keep them from mutating? If you
think about it DNA is a nannite.
There is also the matter of brain capacity. Do not believe the old
canard that we use only ten percent of our brains. It is flat out false.
We use all of brains. Now if the nanites keep us alive for a few
thousand years we are going to have to forget stuff to make room for new
stuff. Is that immortality? I don't think so.
>
> It seems generally understood that fully-fledged nanotechnology will be
> indistinguishable from magic -- by our standards, and some believe such
> things are possible in the natural lifetimes of our children or
> grand-children.
Yada yada. I read Arthur C. Clarke too. If you get past the razzle
dazzle the underlying of principles of physics and mathematics have not
changed all that much. If Isaac Newton could come back he would
recognize and understand the underlying principles of modern physics.
Look, I have fond hopes but I do not let them get in the way of the
facts. Physics is a very solid science. It is supported by millions of
experiments and tens of millions of applications based on the underlying
theory. We are not going faster than light. We probably will not get
much better than a tenth of the speed of light. And just where will we
aim our sleeper-star-ships. Do you know any good earthlike planets in
the neighborhood? Ah. I thought so.
For a new home we need an earthlike planet with water that is not too
hot and not too cold and with sufficient oxygen if not free, then
extractable. Face it. Our species is an accident that happened in a
particular place at a particular time. The chances of finding another
place that is compatable with our physiology is well... there are two
chances to find it. Slim and None. Get used to the idea of extinction.
Which means all of our striving and effort in the long long long run is
pure futility.
Bob Kollker
Joe Teicher
Our species is gone within a million years for sure. Our species has
managed to go from hunting and gathering in small groups to being
software engineers in large cities. This transition has been very fast,
so that we are still in many ways more adapted to hunting and gathering
than we are to software engineering. It seems unlikely that we will
remain hunter-gatherers banging away at keyboards forever. As time
goes by, those features of human beings that don't work that well
anymore are going to fade away and new features that better adapt us to
lives of plenty in very complex social and technological environments
should grow. I think this process is evident right now. People in rich
countries are no longer reproducing enough to maintain their own
numbers. While this might partially be a fad produced by the
man-hating movement of fucking bull dykes with armpit hair known as
"feminists" (just kiddin' ladies, you know I love you), it might also
show that human beings are just not well adapted to their present
environment. Give people cheap birth control, interesting careers and
Tivo, and all of a sudden having kids doesn't seem so important.
Clearly, the "people" of the future won't feel that way, or else they
won't exist.
> For a new home we need an earthlike planet with water that is not too
> hot and not too cold and with sufficient oxygen if not free, then
> extractable. Face it. Our species is an accident that happened in a
> particular place at a particular time. The chances of finding another
> place that is compatable with our physiology is well... there are two
> chances to find it. Slim and None.
If our progeny are around when the sun is about to become a red giant,
they will presumably have some pretty nice gizmos. I don't see why a
fleet of a few thousand spaceships each capable of comfortably and
permanently housing a million people is so ridiculous. If we can build
New York city, then our descendants should be able to build New York
city with big rockets attached. And, if they can build something that
could allow them to live the decades or centuries needed to get
somewhere nice, why would they ever have to leave their spaceships?
>Get used to the idea of extinction.
> Which means all of our striving and effort in the long long long run
is
> pure futility.
>
> Bob Kollker
I don't need the eventual extinction of my species to make my efforts
futile. My own death does nicely for that.
Joe Teicher
Galen Rutledge
Robert Kolker <now...@nowhere.com> wrote:
> Galen Rutledge wrote:
> > In article <GK2dnecmuLG...@comcast.com>,
> > I do think that perhaps something will probably change in the next 4
> > billion years. Are you aware of the possible ramifications of
> > nanotechnology on human biology?
>
> I am. I also am familiar with the laws of thermodynamics. Any naninites
> small enough to repair dna is subject to Heisenberg Uncertainty.
And what does that mean to nanotech?
> Do not
> bet little nanites will keep anyone alive forever. If if we do have
> little nannites repearing us, what will keep them from mutating? If you
> think about it DNA is a nannite.
And yet DNA works, despite the tyrrany of your 'Heisenberg Uncertainty'
on nanites.
Galen
Robert Kolker
>
> And yet DNA works, despite the tyrrany of your 'Heisenberg Uncertainty'
> on nanites.
It is esitmated that 99 percent of all species that ever existed on this
planet have become extinct. DNA works, sort of. DNA did not help the
dinosauts after the big asteroid or comet hit about 65 million years ago.
Bob Kolker
Mark N
> I am. I also am familiar with the laws of thermodynamics. Any naninites
> small enough to repair dna is subject to Heisenberg Uncertainty.
You get a lot of mileage out of that Uncertainty Principle, don't you,
Bob? If you are trying to make some "impossibility" argument, and you
can't quite make it work, just say "Uncertainty Principle," and you're
halfway home! It's like Objectivists with the the Law of Identity! :-)
Mark
Robert Kolker
The uncertainty principle appears to be a fact about the real world. If
you want to locate a small particle precisely you have to bang it with a
high energy light beam with small wavelength. This knocks the particle
about, so you cannot be certain both of its position and momentum. That
is just the way the world is.
As for the laws of thermodynamics, you can take them to the bank. They
have never been falsified despite very streneous efforts to do so.
Everyone would like free energy and perpetual motion but they are not
going to have it. In the long run entropy will be the death of us.
Unlike A is A, the uncertainty principle and the laws of thermodynamics
are very very specific and exact. And you can develop correct
predictions, which are assertions about the world from them. From A is A
you get bupkis, nada, zero. A is A is more of a contraint rule than a
productive principle. If you are ever in a shuda wuda cuda mood and wish
it were otherwise, then you are probably violating the law of identity.
Bob Kolker
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Mark N" <ma...@myinboxisbroken.com>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Sent: Friday, February 25, 2005 9:14 PM
Subject: Re: What is the difference between Objectivism and materialism?
> hmmmm wrote:
>
> > R Lawrence wrote:
> >>2) that the behavior of all entities composed of matter must be causally
> >>deterministic (which means theories of material indeterminism or
> >>self-determinism are wrong); and
>
> > and yes it also seems materialism implies cause and effect at all
> > levels except at absolute zero I guess.
>
> I have no idea what that means.
It means that material reality must have a cause or else the belief that
"all entities composed of matter must be causally deterministic" is wrong.
The exception at absolute zero is where The Great Theft occurs -- the
"stolen concept". Absolute zero stands for "axiomatic" or "self-evident", or
"don't bother me with meaningless questions".