heroism
HPO Jury = Malenoid
with his own happiness as the moral purpose of his life, with
productive achievement as his noblest activity, and reason as his only
absolute."
-- Ayn Rand
And this makes man a heroic being... how?
Scott Stephens
Because a man that:
serves the happiness of the collective in setting his moral compass
according to the desires of the wolf pack,
makes his idea of noble activity either enslaving others or being
enslaved to others,
makes decisions based on tradition rooted in superstition and
authoritarianism, to sanction his own authority,
is not heroic, but all too typically human, requiring no extraordinary
wisdom or strength.
--
Scott
**********************************
DIY Piezo-Gyro, PCB Drill Bot & More Soon!
http://home.comcast.net/~scottxs/
**********************************
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>> "My philosophy, in essence, is the concept of man as a heroic being,
>> with his own happiness as the moral purpose of his life, with
>> productive achievement as his noblest activity, and reason as his only
>> absolute."
>> -- Ayn Rand
>> And this makes man a heroic being... how?
>Because a man that:
>serves the happiness of the collective in setting his moral compass
>according to the desires of the wolf pack,
>makes his idea of noble activity either enslaving others or being
>enslaved to others,
>makes decisions based on tradition rooted in superstition and
>authoritarianism, to sanction his own authority,
>is not heroic, but all too typically human, requiring no extraordinary
>wisdom or strength.
So man is *required* to make a heroic effort to resist the pull of the
traditionalist's delusions? Or is it only a matter of arbitrary
choice?
Is "the concept of man as a heroic being" an ideal? If it's an ideal
of man, and not just a man, then wouldn't heroism be a moral
requirement and not a question of pre-moral choice? On the other hand,
if it's only an ideal of a particular man, then why is the essence of
Objectivism the concept of MAN as a heroic being?
DMF
> So man is *required* to make a heroic effort to resist the pull of the
> traditionalist's delusions? Or is it only a matter of arbitrary
> choice?
The heroism is not in resisting others -- though a secondhander
would certainly view it that way. The heroism is in one's dedication
to identification and creation, i.e., existence. Moreover, AR already
answered this line of attack in Galt's speech -- the choice is real
(and thus moral) and is not arbitrary...but even Malenoid knows that.
Regards,
David
Atlas Shrugged -- This Is John Galt Speaking
"No, you do not have to live; it is your
basic act of choice; but if you choose to
live, you must live as a man-by the work
and the judgment of your mind.
"No, you do not have to live as a man; it
is an act of moral choice. But you cannot
live as anything else-and the alternative
is that state of living death which you
now see within you and around you, the
state of a thing unfit for existence, no
longer human and less than animal, a thing
that knows nothing but pain and drags itself
through its span of years in the agony of
unthinking self-destruction."
Jerry Story
p349rn3o5f98...@4ax.com>...
It's not clear to me that Ayn Rand intended the last 3 of the 4 items
to imply the first.
Perhaps the question "What is a hero?" would be a useful question.
HPO Jury = Malenoid
wrote:
>Malenoid wrote...
>> So man is *required* to make a heroic effort to resist the pull of the
>> traditionalist's delusions? Or is it only a matter of arbitrary
>> choice?
>
>The heroism is not in resisting others -- though a secondhander
>would certainly view it that way. The heroism is in one's dedication
>to identification and creation, i.e., existence. Moreover, AR already
>answered this line of attack in Galt's speech -- the choice is real
>(and thus moral) and is not arbitrary...but even Malenoid knows that.
Actually, I do know something about that. It has to do with pre-moral
choice, which, in case you didn't know, is not moral because it is
pre-moral.
By the way, that last term was invented by JOHN DEWEY.
http://www.lspa.org/ethics/terms.htm
>Regards,
>David
>
>Atlas Shrugged -- This Is John Galt Speaking
>"No, you do not have to live; it is your
> basic act of choice; but if you choose to
> live, you must live as a man-by the work
> and the judgment of your mind.
>
>"No, you do not have to live as a man; it
> is an act of moral choice. But you cannot
> live as anything else-and the alternative
> is that state of living death which you
> now see within you and around you, the
> state of a thing unfit for existence, no
> longer human and less than animal, a thing
> that knows nothing but pain and drags itself
> through its span of years in the agony of
> unthinking self-destruction."
Galt's "moral choice" became an Objectivist "pre-moral choice" as time
went by. I will never understand how any rational choices can be
"pre-moral." Why? Because it is incomprehensible. If on the other hand
the pre-moral choice is PRE-RATIONAL, then it would make sense.
However, it does not explain why Rand and Peikoff tended to castigate
those who failed to make such a choice. At least they kept their
castigating to words and didn't go around engaging in Naziesque
butchering of those "parasites."
If "heroism " is part of the package Rand offers of what constitutes
man, then it consists in making a "pre-moral" choice to live. But as
someone else said, it is also necessary to ask what a "hero" is.
Scott Stephens
>> HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>
>
> So man is *required* to make a heroic effort to resist the pull of the
> traditionalist's delusions? Or is it only a matter of arbitrary
> choice?
In that it takes an uncommon effort, virtue, to exercise reason which,
for instance, causes one to realize the proverbial emperor is naked, it
is an exercise of heroic effort. But in other cases (such as mine, I
fear) one all to gleefully looks for ways in which abusive traditional
authority is criminally insane. So there is probably is no heroic effort
on my part in resisting the pull of authoritarian delusions, it is a
natural hatred of evil. Rather than a matter of arbitrary choice, its a
matter of disposition, experience and preference.
> Is "the concept of man as a heroic being" an ideal? If it's an ideal
> of man, and not just a man, then wouldn't heroism be a moral
> requirement and not a question of pre-moral choice?
Hmmm, ideally man should do the best, not the easy, so its of-man, not a
particular man. Looking up heroism, I find "legendary strength" and
"achievement" in the definitions. So heroism can refer to being
a-typical, extraordinary.
Its unreasonable to make being extraordinary an ordinary requirement!
But as far as idealism, ideally we want to live the best we can, which
is a pre-moral choice implicit in our continuing existence.
On the other hand,
> if it's only an ideal of a particular man, then why is the essence of
> Objectivism the concept of MAN as a heroic being?
Again it's unreasonable to make being extraordinary an ordinary
requirement. But I would say man can be a heroic being, in that he
doesn't have to organize his society in natural ignorance like a wolf
pack ("Lord of the Flies"), based on slavery and enslavement but can
honor freedom - a higher organizing principle which demands the virtue
of rationality rather than stupidity. The more heroic men are, the
faster they choose to do the right thing, rather than suffering the
repeated object lessons in virtue nature inevitably provides.
Nature provides man with the freedom it provides particles, atoms and
molecules, organisms and ecosystems, to organize themselves as they
will. But man must exercise wisdom to find the long-term path of least
resistance rather than the short term path, by deferring gratification.
Alas, our attention span is smaller than our wisdom, and our vision
exceeds our grasp. But those that make the effort and win the prize,
such as America's founders, are true heroes.
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>In that it takes an uncommon effort, virtue, to exercise reason which,
>for instance, causes one to realize the proverbial emperor is naked, it
>is an exercise of heroic effort. But in other cases (such as mine, I
>fear) one all to gleefully looks for ways in which abusive traditional
>authority is criminally insane. So there is probably is no heroic effort
>on my part in resisting the pull of authoritarian delusions, it is a
>natural hatred of evil. Rather than a matter of arbitrary choice, its a
>matter of disposition, experience and preference.
Why is making a heroic effort better than having a natural disposition
toward some value which requires little or no effort?
> > Is "the concept of man as a heroic being" an ideal? If it's an ideal
> > of man, and not just a man, then wouldn't heroism be a moral
> > requirement and not a question of pre-moral choice?
>
>Hmmm, ideally man should do the best, not the easy, so its of-man, not a
>particular man. Looking up heroism, I find "legendary strength" and
>"achievement" in the definitions. So heroism can refer to being
>a-typical, extraordinary.
Can there be such a thing as the extraordinary out of context with the
ordinary? Isn't the former concept genetically dependent upon the
latter? If so, then why isn't the ordinary of higher value than the
extraordinary?
>Its unreasonable to make being extraordinary an ordinary requirement!
>
>But as far as idealism, ideally we want to live the best we can, which
>is a pre-moral choice implicit in our continuing existence.
Meaning you ideally want to live up to the best possible within you.
How do you know what that best possible is?
>On the other hand,
>
> > if it's only an ideal of a particular man, then why is the essence of
> > Objectivism the concept of MAN as a heroic being?
>
>Again it's unreasonable to make being extraordinary an ordinary
>requirement. But I would say man can be a heroic being, in that he
>doesn't have to organize his society in natural ignorance like a wolf
>pack ("Lord of the Flies"), based on slavery and enslavement but can
>honor freedom - a higher organizing principle which demands the virtue
>of rationality rather than stupidity. The more heroic men are, the
>faster they choose to do the right thing, rather than suffering the
>repeated object lessons in virtue nature inevitably provides.
So "object lessons" are not required to learn what is the right thing
to do. Then Objectivism is not a consequentialist ethics? It is
oriented toward the best possible, a heroic ideal which is not
garnered through experience, but some other way -- through reason
alone. Wouldn't this make Objectivism deontological by default?
>Nature provides man with the freedom it provides particles, atoms and
>molecules, organisms and ecosystems, to organize themselves as they
>will. But man must exercise wisdom to find the long-term path of least
>resistance rather than the short term path, by deferring gratification.
>Alas, our attention span is smaller than our wisdom, and our vision
>exceeds our grasp. But those that make the effort and win the prize,
>such as America's founders, are true heroes.
Are their goals which are valuable, worth making an effort for,
despite the fact that they may not ever have a chance of being
achieved within one's lifetime? Is it therefore possible to achieve
goals for mankind at large, with one's vision set, not so much on the
path of least resistance for oneself, but on a path which is easier
for mankind? With heroic effort as one's standard, then wouldn't it
require the greatest of heroic efforts to defer gratification forever
in order to achieve goals that one will probably never get to
experience?
Helen
n.sonic.net>...
> "No, you do not have to live as a man; it
> is an act of moral choice. But you cannot
> live as anything else-and the alternative
> is that state of living death which you
> now see within you and around you, the
> state of a thing unfit for existence, no
> longer human and less than animal, a thing
> that knows nothing but pain and drags itself
> through its span of years in the agony of
> unthinking self-destruction."
God almighty... Thank you for reminding me of what kind of cheap
garbage the prose of Alissa Rosenbaum really is. And to think that
some people are able to read this kind of crap with a straight face...
-- Helen.
We
love
the
modbot
tobdom
eht
evol
eW
DMF
DMF wrote...
> >Malenoid wrote...
> >> So man is *required* to make a heroic effort to resist the
> >> pull of the traditionalist's delusions? Or is it only a matter
> >> of arbitrary choice?
> >
> >The heroism is not in resisting others -- though a secondhander
> >would certainly view it that way. The heroism is in one's dedication
> >to identification and creation, i.e., existence. Moreover, AR already
> >answered this line of attack in Galt's speech -- the choice is real
> >(and thus moral) and is not arbitrary...but even Malenoid knows that.
>
> Actually, I do know something about that. It has to do with pre-moral
> choice, which, in case you didn't know, is not moral because it is
> pre-moral.
I wasn't referring to your knowledge of the self-contradictory concept
of a "pre-moral choice". I was referring to the fact that the validation
of AR's position is self-evident -- to anyone who cares to take a
moment of honest introspection and see that focus and thinking require
a conscious effort to initiate and sustain and that you have the choice to
do it or not. Perhaps I was being a bit presumptuous assuming that you
are capable of such a prodigious feat. The fact remains that human
consciousness IS volitional and that the choice to use it is the FIRST
choice in a hierachy of moral choices.
> >Atlas Shrugged -- This Is John Galt Speaking
> >"No, you do not have to live; it is your
> > basic act of choice; but if you choose to
> > live, you must live as a man-by the work
> > and the judgment of your mind.
> >
> >"No, you do not have to live as a man; it
> > is an act of moral choice. But you cannot
> > live as anything else-and the alternative
> > is that state of living death which you
> > now see within you and around you, the
> > state of a thing unfit for existence, no
> > longer human and less than animal, a thing
> > that knows nothing but pain and drags itself
> > through its span of years in the agony of
> > unthinking self-destruction."
>
> Galt's "moral choice" became an Objectivist "pre-moral choice"
> as time went by. I will never understand how any rational choices
> can be "pre-moral." Why? Because it is incomprehensible. If on
> the other hand the pre-moral choice is PRE-RATIONAL, then it
> would make sense. However, it does not explain why Rand and
> Peikoff tended to castigate those who failed to make such a choice.
> At least they kept their castigating to words and didn't go around
> engaging in Naziesque butchering of those "parasites."
You can call it whatever you like and even divert attention away
from the issue by ranting about the alleged moral failings of AR and
LP. When you are done venting it is still true, even if you disagree
with AR, that there must be a first moral choice. What are you
proposing as the alternative, death?
> If "heroism" is part of the package Rand offers of what constitutes
> man, then it consists in making a "pre-moral" choice to live. But as
> someone else said, it is also necessary to ask what a "hero" is.
The essence of what you are saying is why can't I choose death as
my ideal. We already have a concept for people who choose death,
its called suicide -- go right ahead, no one is stopping you. But that
is not what you want. What you want is to choose death and yet
continue to live and act -- and try to survive without living as a man,
i.e., as a parasite. It is not AR that you resent.
For those who choose to live then AR's moral system follows. And
man the hero is man the creator because creation does not mean
something from nothing but something from something -- through
volitional identification. Aristotle's logic or Newton's physics or AR's
Objectivism (not to mention her novels) are heroic feats because they
did not have to do these things and what each created was incredibly
difficult indeed. This is the best possible, achievable ideal of man the
hero -- according to AR.
Regards,
David
DMF
> DMF wrote...(quoting Galt's speech)
> > "No, you do not have to live as a man; it
> > is an act of moral choice. But you cannot
> > live as anything else-and the alternative
> > is that state of living death which you
> > now see within you and around you, the
> > state of a thing unfit for existence, no
> > longer human and less than animal, a thing
> > that knows nothing but pain and drags itself
> > through its span of years in the agony of
> > unthinking self-destruction."
>
> God almighty... Thank you for reminding me of what kind of cheap
> garbage the prose of Alissa Rosenbaum really is. And to think that
> some people are able to read this kind of crap with a straight face...
You are welcome... and here's some more in case you forget what
your convictions are regarding AR
Enjoy,
David
More Galt's speech...
"Your morality tells you to renounce the material
world and to divorce your values from matter. A
man whose values are given no expression in
material form, whose existence is unrelated to his
ideals, whose actions contradict his convictions, is
a cheap little hypocrite -- yet that is the man who
obeys your morality and divorces his values from
matter. The man who loves one woman, but sleeps
with another -- the man who admires the talent of
a worker, but hires another -- the man who
considers one cause to be just, but donates his
money to the support of another -- the man who
holds high standards of craftsmanship, but devotes
his effort to the production of trash -- [the man who
thinks an author's novels are trash and his ideas are
utter non-sense, but participates in a forum dedicated
to the study of his works] -- these are the men who
have renounced matter, the men who believe that the
values of their spirit cannot be brought into material
reality."
HPO Jury = Malenoid
wrote:
>Malenoid wrote...
>> Actually, I do know something about that. It has to do with pre-moral
>> choice, which, in case you didn't know, is not moral because it is
>> pre-moral.
>I wasn't referring to your knowledge of the self-contradictory concept
>of a "pre-moral choice". I was referring to the fact that the validation
>of AR's position is self-evident -- to anyone who cares to take a
>moment of honest introspection and see that focus and thinking require
>a conscious effort to initiate and sustain and that you have the choice to
>do it or not. Perhaps I was being a bit presumptuous assuming that you
>are capable of such a prodigious feat. The fact remains that human
>consciousness IS volitional and that the choice to use it is the FIRST
>choice in a hierachy of moral choices.
I just think that if focusing my consciousness was something I had to
do all the time, out of moral necessity, then sleeping would become a
necessary evil.
>u can call it whatever you like and even divert attention away
>from the issue by ranting about the alleged moral failings of AR and
>LP. When you are done venting it is still true, even if you disagree
>with AR, that there must be a first moral choice. What are you
>proposing as the alternative, death?
I can't argue that the notion of a 'first moral choice' is right or
wrong because it is too obscurely presented.
>> If "heroism" is part of the package Rand offers of what constitutes
>> man, then it consists in making a "pre-moral" choice to live. But as
>> someone else said, it is also necessary to ask what a "hero" is.
>The essence of what you are saying is why can't I choose death as
>my ideal. We already have a concept for people who choose death,
>its called suicide -- go right ahead, no one is stopping you. But that
>is not what you want. What you want is to choose death and yet
>continue to live and act -- and try to survive without living as a man,
>i.e., as a parasite. It is not AR that you resent.
>For those who choose to live then AR's moral system follows. And
>man the hero is man the creator because creation does not mean
>something from nothing but something from something -- through
>volitional identification. Aristotle's logic or Newton's physics or AR's
>Objectivism (not to mention her novels) are heroic feats because they
>did not have to do these things and what each created was incredibly
>difficult indeed. This is the best possible, achievable ideal of man the
>hero -- according to AR.
I prefer Scott Stephen's clearer idea that heroism requires making an
extraordinary effort, although you do present that idea however
obscurely. And I can't identify "man the hero"with "man the creator"
with "something from something" with "volitional identification"
because the logical links are missing.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Mindviews
79tupf4agqc9...@4ax.com>...
I suppose you can always take the point of view that choosing life is
rational _in retrospect_ and that any other choice would have been
irrational. But that's just saying "A is good" and then asking, "is A
good"? Not very satisfying.
Also, it is possible to think rationally and make rational
determinations without a moral standard. However, evaluating a choice
is an inherently moral process. We're in something of a Catch-22, as
you point out: how can we say that the choice to live is the right
choice when it must be made without a standard of value against which
to measure?
I have a suspicion that there is way out of this one, and I think the
key is consciousness. Let me describe the line of reasoning...
The lack of a moral standard does not prohibit rational thought, as I
mentioned above. Therefore, you can be aware that you are human and
have the capacity for rational thought. Further, when it comes to the
pre-moral choice, you can recognize that it would be irrational for a
human being to choose not to live as a human being. Ultimately, you
cannot evaluate your choice to live as good, however you can say it is
rational.
If rational thought is indeed a significant part of what it means to
be human, then it would be straightforward to conclude that someone
has chosen irrationally if they do not choose life. But only with a
moral standard could that choice judged good or evil.
I guess I don't have your (Mal's) problem with condemning the "wrong"
pre-moral choice simply because using my own standard of moral value,
I am free to judge the actions and choice of everyone else. The only
person it seems I cannot judge is myself in regards to that
question...
Maurice Willey
news:c0b90b13.03101...@posting.google.com:
snip
>
> The lack of a moral standard does not prohibit rational thought, as I
> mentioned above.
Under Objectivist terminology you cannot have rational thought without a
moral standard, if by thought you include decision-making. Objectivism
identifies a moral standard as the set of values by which one makes
choices. No values, no choices, no rational thought.
Or turn it on its ear: if one makes a rational decision, then one has made
a choice, then one has used a set of values and has defined a moral
standard for oneself. Notice that this syllogism does not say anything
about the content of the standards, just that they are a necessary
component of rational thought.
Cheers,
Maurice
HPO Jury = Malenoid
By invoking reason at all, with or without a standard, you are also
invoking free-will -- thus the possible imputation of moral blame or
praise. For we can only be blamed or praised for actions we took from
our own free-will. Furthermore, any action we took on the basis of our
own free-will must also invoke a certain moral responsibility. This
free-will can be limited by internal or external circumstances, the
former involving the present state of one's knowledge. But as adults,
we always regard ourselves as having sufficient knowledge to make
moral choices, and are thus considered sufficiently free to be
considered as moral agents. If it turns out that our knowledge was not
sufficient to make the proper choice, if the information simply wasn't
available somehow, then our choice was not sufficiently free to impute
full responsibility for it.
The pre-moral "choice" involves a number of factors, most of which are
not entirely within our volitional control. If certain pre-conceptual
ideas are lying in wait, dormant within us, to be triggered by a
source of inspiration, then the positive emotional response gives us a
new source of information about ourselves not formerly available.
Once this information (in the form of an emotional/aesthetic response)
comes into conscious awareness, we are then and only then
responsible for acting upon it. But previously to that event, we are
not responsible for failing to act on information we did not possess
and therefore could not have evaded. If one fails to act upon the new
information, and the moment of inspiration passes perhaps because it
was obviated by some sudden anxiety accompanied by thoughts of
imminent disaster, then one could rightly be deemed a moral coward who
is doomed merely to be blown around by chance whims of the moment.
The ironic thing is that the moment of inspiration itself is reliant
on that very same whim-orientation, in a sense, although it also
invokes, at the same time, more of a sense of freedom from the old
enslaved way of thinking, attempting to open the door, through the
vehicle of emotion, to an entirely new kind of "world." We are at
first enslaved by whims, then a new 'whim' comes along, seemingly
rather arbitrarily and happenstance, which nevertheless opens the door
of our whim-worshipping cage to a whole new realm of possibilities. It
is only after going through this door that we can look back and see
that the event which saved us was not so incidental after all, that
something within us was driving us toward a certain goal, and that,
although at a very passive stage of development in that earlier time,
there was still always something active, though very subconscious,
within us, moving us toward a certain, but at the time indefinite,
goal.
It is Rand's attempt to inspire her readers through her writing that
is directly relevant to the Objectivist theory of pre-moral choice.
Acar
Lies and more lies. Here Galt is denouncing hypocrisy (paying lip servoce to
one set of values while practicing another). Hypocrisy is already condemned
by conventional morality. It is a dirty lie told by dirty liars (Franken) to
say that conventional morality encourages those things.
>the men who believe that the
> values of their spirit cannot be brought into material
> reality."
Rand mistakenly believed that the values of her spirit had been brought by
her into material reality. (Read the postscript appended to Atlas Shrugged).
Everybody else knows that the ideal goal of morality (perfection) in
unattainable to humans by virtue of their mixed genetic heritage of
rationality and irrationality.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Scott Stephens" <sco...@comcast.net>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: heroism
> HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>
> >> HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
> >
> >
> > So man is *required* to make a heroic effort to resist the pull of the
> > traditionalist's delusions? Or is it only a matter of arbitrary
> > choice?
>
> In that it takes an uncommon effort, virtue, to exercise reason which,
> for instance, causes one to realize the proverbial emperor is naked, it
> is an exercise of heroic effort. But in other cases (such as mine, I
> fear) one all to gleefully looks for ways in which abusive traditional
> authority is criminally insane. So there is probably is no heroic effort
> on my part in resisting the pull of authoritarian delusions, it is a
> natural hatred of evil. Rather than a matter of arbitrary choice, its a
> matter of disposition, experience and preference.
>
> > Is "the concept of man as a heroic being" an ideal? If it's an ideal
> > of man, and not just a man, then wouldn't heroism be a moral
> > requirement and not a question of pre-moral choice?
>
> Hmmm, ideally man should do the best, not the easy, so its of-man, not a
> particular man.
No, no, no. That doesn' make any sense. It should require absolutely no
effort to be the "qua" thing. It would be the natural thing to be. You would
make an excellent Christian with that agonic, tortured sense of life. If
rationality requires an extraordinary effort then it runs against some very
basic identifying aspects of human nature which by your description are the
default qua man.
> Looking up heroism, I find "legendary strength" and
> "achievement" in the definitions. So heroism can refer to being
> a-typical, extraordinary.
Nathan Hale was an evil evader. Any man serving today in Iraq who is willing
to give his life in the defense of freedom (for the benefit of surviving
strangers) is not a hero, but an evil puppet of Kant.
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Jerry Story" <jst...@edmc.net>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
The concept of heroism carries the implication of service to another at
great risk or actual sacrifice. Of course nothing can stop Objectivists from
re-defining.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
DMF
> DMF wrote:
> >I wasn't referring to your knowledge of the self-contradictory concept
> >of a "pre-moral choice". I was referring to the fact that the validation
> >of AR's position is self-evident -- to anyone who cares to take a
> >moment of honest introspection and see that focus and thinking require
> >a conscious effort to initiate and sustain and that you have the choice to
> >do it or not. Perhaps I was being a bit presumptuous assuming that you
> >are capable of such a prodigious feat. The fact remains that human
> >consciousness IS volitional and that the choice to use it is the FIRST
> >choice in a hierachy of moral choices.
>
> I just think that if focusing my consciousness was something I had to
> do all the time, out of moral necessity, then sleeping would become a
> necessary evil.
Here, let me help you with another context-dropping, delusional,
misrepresentation of Objectivism -- If a man can't equal the greatness
of an Aristotle, Newton or Rand then he is a dishonest, evading and
morally corrupt parasite.
> I prefer Scott Stephen's clearer idea that heroism requires making
> an extraordinary effort, although you do present that idea however
> obscurely.
Here, let me help you with another context-dropping, delusional,
misrepresentation of Objectivism -- Since AR upheld the heroic
and the heroic is that which requires an extraordinary effort then
by her own standards Saddam, Hitler, Stalin, et.al. are heros.
> And I can't identify "man the hero" with "man the creator"
> with "something from something" with "volitional identification"
> because the logical links are missing.
Perhaps you don't have the required context to understand but
keep studying Objectivism and good luck!
Sincerely,
David
Scott Stephens
> ----- Original Message -----
>>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>>
>> >> HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>> >
>> >
>>Hmmm, ideally man should do the best, not the easy, so its of-man, not a
>>particular man.
>
>
> No, no, no. That doesn' make any sense. It should require absolutely no
> effort to be the "qua" thing. It would be the natural thing to be. You would
> make an excellent Christian with that agonic, tortured sense of life. If
> rationality requires an extraordinary effort then it runs against some very
> basic identifying aspects of human nature which by your description are the
> default qua man.
But there are conflicts between reason and emotions, and there is some
principle in psychology (I forget) that says the heart always wins. I
didn't understand that, until I began attempting to quit smoking. Then I
learned that when I associated enough negative feelings to a cigarette
(failure, dependence, sickness, shame), greater than the single positive
one of satisfaction, I quit craving them.
>>Looking up heroism, I find "legendary strength" and
>>"achievement" in the definitions. So heroism can refer to being
>>a-typical, extraordinary.
>
>
> Nathan Hale was an evil evader.
How so?
> Any man serving today in Iraq who is willing
> to give his life in the defense of freedom (for the benefit of surviving
> strangers) is not a hero, but an evil puppet of Kant.
Soldiers fight for many reasons. Some are professionals, following
orders (they shouldn't though, if they don't believe they are fighting a
just war). Some fight for their buddies. Some trust the government
(suckers). Its our government that sent them there.
Isn't it odd for all the Democrat anti-war rhetoric, not one Democrat is
promising to bring the troops home?
Scott Stephens
> On Mon, 13 Oct 2003 19:55:52 +0000 (UTC), Scott Stephens
> <sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>
> Why is making a heroic effort better than having a natural disposition
> toward some value which requires little or no effort?
Because it demonstrates a greater moral strength and intellectual
honesty. Criticizing your own family or political party is heroic;
criticizing your enemies and political opposition is typical.
>>>Is "the concept of man as a heroic being" an ideal? If it's an ideal
>>>of man, and not just a man, then wouldn't heroism be a moral
>>>requirement and not a question of pre-moral choice?
>>
>>Hmmm, ideally man should do the best, not the easy, so its of-man, not a
>>particular man. Looking up heroism, I find "legendary strength" and
>>"achievement" in the definitions. So heroism can refer to being
>>a-typical, extraordinary.
>
>
> Can there be such a thing as the extraordinary out of context with the
> ordinary? Isn't the former concept genetically dependent upon the
> latter? If so, then why isn't the ordinary of higher value than the
> extraordinary?
>
Your point? The ordinary is of value, the extraordinary of greater value.
>>Its unreasonable to make being extraordinary an ordinary requirement!
>>
>>But as far as idealism, ideally we want to live the best we can, which
>>is a pre-moral choice implicit in our continuing existence.
>
>
> Meaning you ideally want to live up to the best possible within you.
> How do you know what that best possible is?
Reason? Evaluating oneself according to one's values.
>>On the other hand,
>>
>>
>>>if it's only an ideal of a particular man, then why is the essence of
>>>Objectivism the concept of MAN as a heroic being?
>>
>>Again it's unreasonable to make being extraordinary an ordinary
>>requirement. But I would say man can be a heroic being, in that he
>>doesn't have to organize his society in natural ignorance like a wolf
>>pack ("Lord of the Flies"), based on slavery and enslavement but can
>>honor freedom - a higher organizing principle which demands the virtue
>>of rationality rather than stupidity. The more heroic men are, the
>>faster they choose to do the right thing, rather than suffering the
>>repeated object lessons in virtue nature inevitably provides.
>
>
> So "object lessons" are not required to learn what is the right thing
> to do. Then Objectivism is not a consequentialist ethics?
Since the it is based in the metaphysics of reality, I believe it is a
consequentialist ethic.
> It is
> oriented toward the best possible, a heroic ideal which is not
> garnered through experience, but some other way -- through reason
> alone. Wouldn't this make Objectivism deontological by default?
Remember, I'm a mere student of Objectivism. I turn to Gail Wynand's
betrayal of Roark in Fountainhead, and Rearden signing over the rights
to his alloy to the state to protect Dagny in Atlas. Since these were
sins, I take it that Objectivism is deontological in that it asserts
rights and duty over outcome. I had to look up deontology, I haven't had
any formal training. Perhaps you can explain?
>>Nature provides man with the freedom it provides particles, atoms and
>>molecules, organisms and ecosystems, to organize themselves as they
>>will. But man must exercise wisdom to find the long-term path of least
>>resistance rather than the short term path, by deferring gratification.
>>Alas, our attention span is smaller than our wisdom, and our vision
>>exceeds our grasp. But those that make the effort and win the prize,
>>such as America's founders, are true heroes.
>
>
> Are their goals which are valuable, worth making an effort for,
> despite the fact that they may not ever have a chance of being
> achieved within one's lifetime?
Of course,
> Is it therefore possible to achieve
> goals for mankind at large, with one's vision set, not so much on the
> path of least resistance for oneself, but on a path which is easier
> for mankind? With heroic effort as one's standard, then wouldn't it
> require the greatest of heroic efforts to defer gratification forever
> in order to achieve goals that one will probably never get to
> experience?
Possibly not. An Objectivist doesn't enslave others because he
acknowledges the ethical standard of man's life qua man. A man, George
Washington, for instance, that refuses to be a king, but rather a
temporary president and setting an example for posterity, is acting
according to that standard.
A man can so act as an altruistic sacrifice to collective humanity, or
so act in accordance with ethics and reason, so as not to corrupt his
own soul, and sanction usurpers around him, who may be searching for
cause to excuse their evil.
Bert Clanton
Scott Stephens <sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
rs). Its our government that sent them there.
>
> Isn't it odd for all the Democrat anti-war rhetoric, not one Democrat is
> promising to bring the troops home?
Not at all odd.
Reasonable people can disagree about whether the invasion of Iraq should
have happened. I know this both because my own final decision (against)
was marginal and difficult, and because I know reasonable people of good
will who come down on each side of the issue.
But we're there, and IMHO by tearing up the place we incurred a moral
obligation to assist the Iraqis in rebuilding it, and to do this in an
effective way. The only prominent Democrat who wants to just bring the
troops home is Dennis Kucinich, and he's an idiot.
Best wishes,
Bert
--
"Believe nothing ... merely because you have been told it or because it
is traditional or because you yourselves have imagined it. Don't
believe what your teacher tells you merely out of respect for the
teacher. But whatever, after due examination and analysis, you find to
conduce to the good, the benefit, the welfare of all beings--believe
and cling to that doctrine, and take it as your guide."
--Gautana Siddhartha, "The Dhammapada"
HPO Jury = Malenoid
>>the men who believe that the
>> values of their spirit cannot be brought into material
>> reality."
>Rand mistakenly believed that the values of her spirit had been brought by
>her into material reality. (Read the postscript appended to Atlas Shrugged).
>Everybody else knows that the ideal goal of morality (perfection) in
>unattainable to humans by virtue of their mixed genetic heritage of
>rationality and irrationality.
Rand defined man, going along with Aristotle, as a "rational animal,"
and then promptly forgot the "animal" part of it.
.
.
.
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>
>> On Mon, 13 Oct 2003 19:55:52 +0000 (UTC), Scott Stephens
>> <sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>>>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>> Why is making a heroic effort better than having a natural disposition
>> toward some value which requires little or no effort?
>Because it demonstrates a greater moral strength and intellectual
>honesty. Criticizing your own family or political party is heroic;
>criticizing your enemies and political opposition is typical.
Demonstrates to whom? Or are you saying it 'demonstrates' the courage
to live up to one's rationally chosen, as apart from naturally given,
values? It seems that we humans have a natural predilection to going
along with the crowd (e.g., family or political party), but it takes
the courage of personal conviction to go against it. And such courage
is not natural, it is either inspired or developed individually.
>>>>Is "the concept of man as a heroic being" an ideal? If it's an ideal
>>>>of man, and not just a man, then wouldn't heroism be a moral
>>>>requirement and not a question of pre-moral choice?
>>>Hmmm, ideally man should do the best, not the easy, so its of-man, not a
>>>particular man. Looking up heroism, I find "legendary strength" and
>>>"achievement" in the definitions. So heroism can refer to being
>>>a-typical, extraordinary.
>> Can there be such a thing as the extraordinary out of context with the
>> ordinary? Isn't the former concept genetically dependent upon the
>> latter? If so, then why isn't the ordinary of higher value than the
>> extraordinary?
>Your point? The ordinary is of value, the extraordinary of greater value.
Because without the ordinary there could be no extraordinary. So by
opposing the ordinary, the extraordinary defeats itself.
>>>Its unreasonable to make being extraordinary an ordinary requirement!
>>>But as far as idealism, ideally we want to live the best we can, which
>>>is a pre-moral choice implicit in our continuing existence.
>> Meaning you ideally want to live up to the best possible within you.
>> How do you know what that best possible is?
>Reason? Evaluating oneself according to one's values.
I would say that this knowledge of the best possible is pre-moral,
pre-rational, pre-conceptual. And that it comes into conscious
awareness only through moments of aesthetic inspiration. It is, one
might say, an "implicit concept" (pre-conceptual idea) which is made
explicit through the aesthetic response to art, only not even then in
the conceptual form of words. The art form expresses the romanticized
version of the pre-conceptual ideal, stimulating and awakening it into
explicit, although still pre-conceptual, awareness, through our
faculty of aesthetic response.
The artistic symbolization of man's greatness concretizes the
pre-conceptual awareness of man's sublimely heroic stature, awakening
feelings which are invoked by the sense that our imagination is being
stretched beyond its present level.
Witness the almost anti-conceptual form of this experience in the
young man who rides his bike down into Monadnock Valley in The
Fountainhead:
"It did not shock him, not as the sight of it had shocked him. In a
way it seemed proper; this was not part of known existence. For the
moment he had no desire to know what it was."
This scene by Rand indicates that the aesthetic moment is, if not
anti-conceptual, then at least non-conceptual. It is to imply that the
spectacle of Roark's summer resort development should be allowed
to exist for its own sake. It symbolizes the pre-conceptual moment of
aesthetic appreciation and response. Observe also that the summer
resort was, at that point in its development, uninhabited. That is, it
was being unused, it served no function at the present, it existed in
its own right for no other purpose than just to exist. At least, that
is the idea which the aesthetic response encourages or quickens within
us. We all know that the resort was designed to serve some other
purpose than being a giant work of art. But to the young man, such
concepts as 'purpose' were, for the moment, utterly unimportant,
insignificant relative to the sublimity to be found in simply
experiencing without effort. "He had to suspend the possible for a
while longer, to seek no questions or explanations, only to look." The
effort was all Roark's, and the resort was Roark's aesthetic gift.
>>>Again it's unreasonable to make being extraordinary an ordinary
>>>requirement. But I would say man can be a heroic being, in that he
>>>doesn't have to organize his society in natural ignorance like a wolf
>>>pack ("Lord of the Flies"), based on slavery and enslavement but can
>>>honor freedom - a higher organizing principle which demands the virtue
>>>of rationality rather than stupidity. The more heroic men are, the
>>>faster they choose to do the right thing, rather than suffering the
>>>repeated object lessons in virtue nature inevitably provides.
>> So "object lessons" are not required to learn what is the right thing
>> to do. Then Objectivism is not a consequentialist ethics?
>Since the it is based in the metaphysics of reality, I believe it is a
>consequentialist ethic.
The metaphysics of reality is not necessarily reality.
"The more heroic men are, the faster they choose to do the right
thing, rather than suffering the repeated object lessons in virtue
nature inevitably provides." Does that statement imply a deontological
or a consequentialist ethic?
>> It is
>> oriented toward the best possible, a heroic ideal which is not
>> garnered through experience, but some other way -- through reason
>> alone. Wouldn't this make Objectivism deontological by default?
>
>Remember, I'm a mere student of Objectivism. I turn to Gail Wynand's
>betrayal of Roark in Fountainhead, and Rearden signing over the rights
>to his alloy to the state to protect Dagny in Atlas. Since these were
>sins, I take it that Objectivism is deontological in that it asserts
>rights and duty over outcome. I had to look up deontology, I haven't had
>any formal training. Perhaps you can explain?
The first time I ever saw the word "deontology" was while reading a
Rand article on meta-ethics. She stated that "a deontological
(duty-centered) theory of ethics confines moral principles to a list
of prescribed 'duties' and leaves the rest of man's life without any
moral guidance, cutting morality off from any application to the
actual problems and concerns of man's existence." (Causality Versus
Duty.)
In a sense, a deontological ethic opposes consequentialism by saying,
"Consequences be damned." That attitude, I submit, would indeed
require a heroic effort to attain, since we humans are normally
prodded along by the potential consequences, either through seeking or
evading them.
>> Are their goals which are valuable, worth making an effort for,
>> despite the fact that they may not ever have a chance of being
>> achieved within one's lifetime?
>Of course,
>> Is it therefore possible to achieve
>> goals for mankind at large, with one's vision set, not so much on the
>> path of least resistance for oneself, but on a path which is easier
>> for mankind? With heroic effort as one's standard, then wouldn't it
>> require the greatest of heroic efforts to defer gratification forever
>> in order to achieve goals that one will probably never get to
>> experience?
>Possibly not. An Objectivist doesn't enslave others because he
>acknowledges the ethical standard of man's life qua man. A man, George
>Washington, for instance, that refuses to be a king, but rather a
>temporary president and setting an example for posterity, is acting
>according to that standard.
In that case, you may omit my reference to "mankind" and replace it
with "posterity." Then you would be saying that Washington 'enslaved'
himself to this idea of a posterity.
On the other hand, there will indeed be some real beneficiary of
values, if not oneself, then somebody else, in this case, "posterity,"
because practicing moral values is bound to have real, practical
effects, benefits, consequences. If Washington delayed the
gratification received from kingship for life in favor of being
president for a relatively brief span, and he did this for posterity,
then he delayed this gratification for a span of time reaching beyond
his present life -- theoretically to eternity -- in favor of teaching
a lesson, an ideal, to be learned by others throughout history even
after his death.
But I wouldn't say that it necessarily required a heroic effort for
Washington to turn down that position in society. However, we may
still see him as a hero through projecting our own needs for
gratification into the scenario, by imagining ourselves in
Washington's position as being tempted by an extremely gratifying
position in life.
>A man can so act as an altruistic sacrifice to collective humanity, or
>so act in accordance with ethics and reason, so as not to corrupt his
>own soul, and sanction usurpers around him, who may be searching for
>cause to excuse their evil.
I wasn't referring to 'collective humanity' anyway, but that, if
Washington did not himself benefit from pursuing the ideal, then the
example he set must have been intended to at least symbolize an ideal
which mankind at large may benefit from.
David Buchner
> In that it takes an uncommon effort, virtue, to exercise reason which,
> for instance, causes one to realize the proverbial emperor is naked, it
> is an exercise of heroic effort. But in other cases (such as mine, I
> fear) one all to gleefully looks for ways in which abusive traditional
> authority is criminally insane. So there is probably is no heroic effort
> on my part in resisting the pull of authoritarian delusions, it is a
> natural hatred of evil.
Assuming I understand just what you're getting at, I'm not so sure
that's not "heroic." Lots of people still hold up that same criminally
insane traditional authority, as good and proper. They manage to
submerge their own evaluation in favor of being part of the wave of
tradition and popularity. I think you *are* seeing the emporer naked.
[in a different post:]
> Criticizing your own family or political party is heroic;
> criticizing your enemies and political opposition is typical.
But *identifying* your opposition...? Even if everybody else seems to
think they're swell...?
Mindviews
E695mwwmauri...@206.127.4.25>...
> Mindviews <Mind...@hotmail.com> wrote in
> news:c0b90b13.03101...@posting.google.com:
>
> snip
> >
> > The lack of a moral standard does not prohibit rational thought, as I
> > mentioned above.
>
>
> Under Objectivist terminology you cannot have rational thought without a
> moral standard, if by thought you include decision-making. Objectivism
> identifies a moral standard as the set of values by which one makes
> choices. No values, no choices, no rational thought.
What I said before was...
"Also, it is possible to think rationally and make rational
determinations without a moral standard. However, evaluating a choice
is an inherently moral process."
...where I explicitly mentioned that choice is necessarily moral.
This idea is very different from a rational determination, which is
not inherently moral. For a moral choice, you evaluate it as either
good or bad. For a rational determination, you check to see if it is
right or wrong. Rational determination does not imply that you
require a moral standard anywhere that I can see. Essentially, what
this allows you to do is learn even in the absense of morality.
Helen
n.sonic.net>...
> [the man who
> thinks an author's novels are trash and his ideas are
> utter non-sense, but participates in a forum dedicated
> to the study of his works]
Lucky me that I am a woman.
I am twice lucky that this forum, thankfully, is not "dedicated to the
study of his [?] works". You may notice, dearie, that I have no
interest whatsoever in the study of Alissa's, hmm, "works".
Oh, and three times lucky that the stuff you were so creatively
quoting is the typical touchy-feely type of pulp-fiction garbage that
Alissa was so fond of.
-- Helen.
Need
to
feed
the
modbot
tobdom
eht
deef
ot
deeN
Scott Stephens
> On Tue, 14 Oct 2003 08:12:41 +0000 (UTC), Scott Stephens
> <sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>
>>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>>
>>
>>>On Mon, 13 Oct 2003 19:55:52 +0000 (UTC), Scott Stephens
>>><sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>
>>>>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>
>
>>>Why is making a heroic effort better than having a natural disposition
>>>toward some value which requires little or no effort?
>
>
>>Because it demonstrates a greater moral strength and intellectual
>>honesty. Criticizing your own family or political party is heroic;
>>criticizing your enemies and political opposition is typical.
>
>
> Demonstrates to whom?
I could have said requires. A demonstration, an affirmation of a
rational identity to both oneself and others. It reinforces and affirms
intellectual agility and moral strength.
> Or are you saying it 'demonstrates' the courage
> to live up to one's rationally chosen, as apart from naturally given,
> values? It seems that we humans have a natural predilection to going
> along with the crowd (e.g., family or political party), but it takes
> the courage of personal conviction to go against it. And such courage
> is not natural, it is either inspired or developed individually.
The courage probably is more natural, but we learn early in life to fear
exposing abusive authorities that retaliate ("don't talk back to me
young man") and the ridicule of peers. Children notice and comment about
strange people or embarrassing events, having no concept of what is
taboo or rude.
Rationality, reason, logic on the other hand, must be learned and practiced.
>>>>>Is "the concept of man as a heroic being" an ideal? If it's an ideal
>>>>>of man, and not just a man, then wouldn't heroism be a moral
>>>>>requirement and not a question of pre-moral choice?
>>>>Looking up heroism, I find "legendary strength" and
>>>>"achievement" in the definitions. So heroism can refer to being
>>>>a-typical, extraordinary.
> Because without the ordinary there could be no extraordinary. So by
> opposing the ordinary, the extraordinary defeats itself.
So most men cannot be heroic and Objectivism most often is false because
men must be extraordinary to be heroic?
>>>>But as far as idealism, ideally we want to live the best we can, which
>>>>is a pre-moral choice implicit in our continuing existence.
>
>>>Meaning you ideally want to live up to the best possible within you.
>>>How do you know what that best possible is?
>
>>Reason? Evaluating oneself according to one's values.
>
> I would say that this knowledge of the best possible is pre-moral,
> pre-rational, pre-conceptual. And that it comes into conscious
> awareness only through moments of aesthetic inspiration.
Sounds like a Christian explaining their dependence on unctions, or
inspiration from the Holy Spirit for guidance in choices. How can you
have knowledge that is pre-rational or pre-conceptual?
> The art form expresses the romanticized
> version of the pre-conceptual ideal, stimulating and awakening it into
> explicit, although still pre-conceptual, awareness, through our
> faculty of aesthetic response.
Religion! Sounds like you get inspiration from art the way Christians
get inspiration from religious ritual.
But you probably wont make decisions regarding your job, friends or
settle other issues of life according to inspirational whims after
praying to your favorite piece of art, the way Christians are encouraged to.
> "The more heroic men are, the faster they choose to do the right
> thing, rather than suffering the repeated object lessons in virtue
> nature inevitably provides." Does that statement imply a deontological
> or a consequentialist ethic?
I'll SWAG it is both. It is a consequentialist ethic the teaches the
virtue of a deontological ethic. Probably through the same rational
tautology that Rand holds in asserting there are no conflicts between
rational men; rational men will choose not to hold irreconcilable
differences defining conflicts.
Objectivism is consequentialist in terms of reality. Reality is the
ultimate, prime, independent variable. Regarding man, man must choose
his own life as his standard. This is deontological when I consider your
life as sacred to you as my life is sacred to me; I have the same duty
to honor your pursuit of happiness as pursue my own.
> In a sense, a deontological ethic opposes consequentialism by saying,
> "Consequences be damned." That attitude, I submit, would indeed
> require a heroic effort to attain, since we humans are normally
> prodded along by the potential consequences, either through seeking or
> evading them.
Acting reasonably and rationally requires heroic effort. Acting
emotionally ends up requiring willful ignorance, denial, evasion, or
that lacking, damaged self-esteem.
>>>Is it therefore possible to achieve
>>>goals for mankind at large, with one's vision set, not so much on the
>>>path of least resistance for oneself, but on a path which is easier
>>>for mankind? With heroic effort as one's standard, then wouldn't it
>>>require the greatest of heroic efforts to defer gratification forever
>>>in order to achieve goals that one will probably never get to
>>>experience?
>>Possibly not. An Objectivist doesn't enslave others because he
>>acknowledges the ethical standard of man's life qua man. A man, George
>>Washington, for instance, that refuses to be a king, but rather a
>>temporary president and setting an example for posterity, is acting
>>according to that standard.
>
>
> In that case, you may omit my reference to "mankind" and replace it
> with "posterity." Then you would be saying that Washington 'enslaved'
> himself to this idea of a posterity.
If Washington valued and loved the ideal of freedom, man qua man, he
sacrifices nothing. He achieves the manifestation of a rational ideal he
values by purchasing it with a power he could only hold through terror
and despotism, making him in turn a hypocritical despot.
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 14 Oct 2003 08:12:41 +0000 (UTC), Scott Stephens
>> <sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>>
>>
>>>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>>On Mon, 13 Oct 2003 19:55:52 +0000 (UTC), Scott Stephens
>>>><sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>>
>>
>>>>>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>>
>>
>>>>Why is making a heroic effort better than having a natural disposition
>>>>toward some value which requires little or no effort?
>>
>>
>>>Because it demonstrates a greater moral strength and intellectual
>>>honesty. Criticizing your own family or political party is heroic;
>>>criticizing your enemies and political opposition is typical.
>>
>>
>> Demonstrates to whom?
>
>I could have said requires. A demonstration, an affirmation of a
>rational identity to both oneself and others. It reinforces and affirms
>intellectual agility and moral strength.
This indicates that there is not what one would call a *continuum* of
intellectual agility and moral strength, but either the possession of
it to some degree, or the entire lacking of it. After all, there are
only moral blacks and whites, no shades of gray. For while we are
at once demonstrating moral strength, we are at the same time
demonstrating the defeat of its exact opposite, moral cowardice and
hypocrisy.
>> Or are you saying it 'demonstrates' the courage
>> to live up to one's rationally chosen, as apart from naturally given,
>> values? It seems that we humans have a natural predilection to going
>> along with the crowd (e.g., family or political party), but it takes
>> the courage of personal conviction to go against it. And such courage
>> is not natural, it is either inspired or developed individually.
>
>The courage probably is more natural, but we learn early in life to fear
>exposing abusive authorities that retaliate ("don't talk back to me
>young man") and the ridicule of peers. Children notice and comment about
>strange people or embarrassing events, having no concept of what is
>taboo or rude.
>
>Rationality, reason, logic on the other hand, must be learned and practiced.
Well, if we tried to learn it from experience, we would soon fail,
given the abusiveness which we find in the external world.
I submit that the very notion of living in accordance with reason is
not itself a development based in experiment, but a conclusion based
on an examination of the metaphysical nature of man.
>> Because without the ordinary there could be no extraordinary. So by
>> opposing the ordinary, the extraordinary defeats itself.
>
>So most men cannot be heroic and Objectivism most often is false because
>men must be extraordinary to be heroic?
Man by nature strives after the extraordinary. (It is only in very
recent history that art liberals have attempted to reverse this
tendency.) But the very idea of striving tells us that we must begin
from a level that is not extraordinary. If we all managed to attain
the level of the extraordinary, we would soon be induced to find yet
another, higher level of being to subsume back into the ordinary level
of consciousness, thus vanquishing it.
It is necessary always to retain the dualism of ordinary and
extraordinary because of the aesthetic sense of contrast it provides
us, in order to provide for the need to strive after the
extraordinary.
>>>>>But as far as idealism, ideally we want to live the best we can, which
>>>>>is a pre-moral choice implicit in our continuing existence.
>>
>>>>Meaning you ideally want to live up to the best possible within you.
>>>>How do you know what that best possible is?
>>
>>>Reason? Evaluating oneself according to one's values.
>>
>> I would say that this knowledge of the best possible is pre-moral,
>> pre-rational, pre-conceptual. And that it comes into conscious
>> awareness only through moments of aesthetic inspiration.
>
>Sounds like a Christian explaining their dependence on unctions, or
>inspiration from the Holy Spirit for guidance in choices. How can you
>have knowledge that is pre-rational or pre-conceptual?
I wouldn't bring it up if I didn't find traces of this idea in Rand's
writing. "You're a profoundly religious man, Mr. Roark -- in your own
way. I can see that in your buildings," said Hopton Stoddard. "That's
true," said Roark.
>> The art form expresses the romanticized
>> version of the pre-conceptual ideal, stimulating and awakening it into
>> explicit, although still pre-conceptual, awareness, through our
>> faculty of aesthetic response.
>
>Religion! Sounds like you get inspiration from art the way Christians
>get inspiration from religious ritual.
>
>But you probably wont make decisions regarding your job, friends or
>settle other issues of life according to inspirational whims after
>praying to your favorite piece of art, the way Christians are encouraged to.
I find the inspirational moment of the young man on the bike
encountering Monadnock Valley to be more relevant than Christianity,
in this context, the aesthetic inspiration of which gave him "the
courage to face a lifetime." The non-conceptuality of this aesthetic
moment of inspiration -- which borders on the religious because of its
lack of concept -- is seen in Rand's description of the young man's
thought-process at that moment: "It did not shock him, not as the
sight of it had shocked him. In a way, it seemed proper; this was not
part of known existence. For the moment he had NO DESIRE TO KNOW
what it was." And in fact, I would argue that there was no NEED to
know, no need for concepts, and in fact such would only get in the way
of the psychological -- or better yet, spiritual -- transformation of
the boy, through the moment of pre-moral choice, into a young man
possessing the newly-found courage "to face a lifetime." It was only
after some moments had passed that the young man awoke from his
revery, saw Roark sitting a short distance away, and asked him what
the sight was down below in the valley. His desire to know had
returned, but the old self was gone, replaced by a new self possessing
a new-found courage and determination based in his own autonomous
will.
>> "The more heroic men are, the faster they choose to do the right
>> thing, rather than suffering the repeated object lessons in virtue
>> nature inevitably provides." Does that statement imply a deontological
>> or a consequentialist ethic?
>
>I'll SWAG it is both. It is a consequentialist ethic the teaches the
>virtue of a deontological ethic. Probably through the same rational
>tautology that Rand holds in asserting there are no conflicts between
>rational men; rational men will choose not to hold irreconcilable
>differences defining conflicts.
That is part of Rand's anti-Existentialism. Existentialism, like
materialism, does not accept any dualism. Existentialism sacrifices
dualism for pluralism, materialism sacrifices it for monism. Either
way, in order to combat those two evil philosophical forces, Rand must
employ a certain dualism in terms. I explain this dualism, in terms of
the "hero," below.
>Objectivism is consequentialist in terms of reality. Reality is the
>ultimate, prime, independent variable. Regarding man, man must choose
>his own life as his standard. This is deontological when I consider your
>life as sacred to you as my life is sacred to me; I have the same duty
>to honor your pursuit of happiness as pursue my own.
>
>> In a sense, a deontological ethic opposes consequentialism by saying,
>> "Consequences be damned." That attitude, I submit, would indeed
>> require a heroic effort to attain, since we humans are normally
>> prodded along by the potential consequences, either through seeking or
>> evading them.
>
>Acting reasonably and rationally requires heroic effort. Acting
>emotionally ends up requiring willful ignorance, denial, evasion, or
>that lacking, damaged self-esteem.
>
I no longer buy into the idea that heroism and effort necessarily
belong together. There is such a thing as heroic effort, no doubt; but
that is not relevant in this context. A hero will often possess
sufficient courage to do things that the normal person would not think
of doing, for which the normal person would require heroic effort. So
"heroism" is often a label placed by others, while the hero himself
does not feel like a hero. In fact, so-called, labeled 'heroes' will
often report that very fact. This is because the heroic act required
no effort. That doesn't make it heroic, but it does make it appear
heroic to others who were sufficiently awed by the heroic act.
Notice that the heroic effort, when it is truly an effort, is often
felt as a resistance to some inner psychological force which tries to
prevent the act. This idea invokes a certain dualism in human nature,
just as the idea of the ordinary and extraordinary in society invokes
a certain dualism there. The latter is seen in Rand's dividing of
mankind into producers and parasites. This dualism is seen even in
Rand's first real hero, Howard Roark, in the incident where he turned
down his first major project, a skyscraper, on principle. He took an
individualistic, egoistic stand against the desires of his employers
to change his original drawings. But he took this stand, not only
against them, but against a certain pressure within himself to
compromise his egoistical principles and allow the building owners
to have their way with his plans. The effort it required to say "no"
to the board of directors was indeed heroic -- but it also implied the
presence of an inconsistent dualism within Roark's soul.
Therefore, what is relevant to the concept of the "hero" is not
effort, but dualism, either in the soul of the hero, or socially, as a
certain perspective coming from those who were awe-inspired by a
heroic act which was not considered heroic, indeed effortless, by the
"hero" himself.
>>>Possibly not. An Objectivist doesn't enslave others because he
>>>acknowledges the ethical standard of man's life qua man. A man, George
>>>Washington, for instance, that refuses to be a king, but rather a
>>>temporary president and setting an example for posterity, is acting
>>>according to that standard.
>>
>>
>> In that case, you may omit my reference to "mankind" and replace it
>> with "posterity." Then you would be saying that Washington 'enslaved'
>> himself to this idea of a posterity.
>
>If Washington valued and loved the ideal of freedom, man qua man, he
>sacrifices nothing. He achieves the manifestation of a rational ideal he
>values by purchasing it with a power he could only hold through terror
>and despotism, making him in turn a hypocritical despot.
You don't know that becoming a king would have made Washington into
a despot. At any rate, it would have set a bad precedent for the
future, opening the way for possible future despots.
Scott Stephens
>>So most men cannot be heroic and Objectivism most often is false because
>>men must be extraordinary to be heroic?
....
> It is necessary always to retain the dualism of ordinary and
> extraordinary because of the aesthetic sense of contrast it provides
> us, in order to provide for the need to strive after the
> extraordinary.
There is a scene in Fountainhead where Keating shows Roark his
paintings, and Roark feels pity and disgust. I took it that it had
nothing to do with the quality of Keatings paintings, but the fact that
Keating would need to have Roark approve of them.
> I find the inspirational moment of the young man on the bike
> encountering Monadnock Valley to be more relevant than Christianity,
> in this context, the aesthetic inspiration of which gave him "the
> courage to face a lifetime."
....
> I no longer buy into the idea that heroism and effort necessarily
> belong together. There is such a thing as heroic effort, no doubt; but
> that is not relevant in this context.
And this context is man as a heroic being in joyful pursuit of
productivity through reason?
> A hero will often possess
> sufficient courage to do things that the normal person would not think
> of doing, for which the normal person would require heroic effort. So
> "heroism" is often a label placed by others, while the hero himself
> does not feel like a hero. In fact, so-called, labeled 'heroes' will
> often report that very fact. This is because the heroic act required
> no effort. That doesn't make it heroic, but it does make it appear
> heroic to others who were sufficiently awed by the heroic act.
I saw an interview of James Bradley (who wrote "Flags of Our Fathers"),
who's father was one of the flag-raisers on Iwo Jima. Such "heroes" have
a profound "survivors" guilt, feeling the dead are far more worthy of
any honor than they. So any credit they accept (as a pretender) is an
insult to those who paid the ultimate price.
> Notice that the heroic effort, when it is truly an effort, is often
> felt as a resistance to some inner psychological force which tries to
> prevent the act. This idea invokes a certain dualism in human nature,
> just as the idea of the ordinary and extraordinary in society invokes
> a certain dualism there.
There are lots of things we are averse to. I don't usually say, "my
bad-self wants to watch cartoons and not do the dishes", or "a demon
made me do it".
> The latter is seen in Rand's dividing of mankind into producers and paras
> ites.
But there are producers and parasites. I suppose it gets gray when you
end up employed by a government contractor; then you are basically
accepting more or less stolen property as payment for producing
something of less or more value.
> This dualism is seen even in
> Rand's first real hero, Howard Roark, in the incident where he turned
> down his first major project, a skyscraper, on principle. He took an
> individualistic, egoistic stand against the desires of his employers
> to change his original drawings. But he took this stand, not only
> against them, but against a certain pressure within himself to
> compromise his egoistical principles and allow the building owners
> to have their way with his plans. The effort it required to say "no"
> to the board of directors was indeed heroic -- but it also implied the
> presence of an inconsistent dualism within Roark's soul.
Why do you redefine a conflict as inconsistent dualism? What you're
getting at is a Christian notion; "God (and the Holy Ghost in us) cannot
be tempted by evil" but we (the flesh, our bad-selves) are. Roark wants
money, Roard doesn't want to prostitute his artistic expression. Roark
has a conflict.
> Therefore, what is relevant to the concept of the "hero" is not
> effort, but dualism, either in the soul of the hero, or socially, as a
> certain perspective coming from those who were awe-inspired by a
> heroic act which was not considered heroic, indeed effortless, by the
> "hero" himself.
Ok, now I see your point. Joyfully pursuing productivity through reason
may not be very heroic at all, for a decent, sane human, unless he
experiences and overcomes significant internal inhibitions, aversion or
conflicts, or his neighbors are inspired by his actions.
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>>>So most men cannot be heroic and Objectivism most often is false because
>>>men must be extraordinary to be heroic?
>> It is necessary always to retain the dualism of ordinary and
>> extraordinary because of the aesthetic sense of contrast it provides
>> us, in order to provide for the need to strive after the
>> extraordinary.
>There is a scene in Fountainhead where Keating shows Roark his
>paintings, and Roark feels pity and disgust. I took it that it had
>nothing to do with the quality of Keatings paintings, but the fact that
>Keating would need to have Roark approve of them.
I don't remember the disgust, just the pity. But I interpret that
scene as illustrating the worst imaginable fate for a human being, to
miss his calling, to waste his talent, to throw away his vision, and
to commit this atrocity against the self, in Peter's case, merely in
order to comply with the opinions of others such as his mother who
thought his becoming an architect would make for a better career
choice.
>> I find the inspirational moment of the young man on the bike
>> encountering Monadnock Valley to be more relevant than Christianity,
>> in this context, the aesthetic inspiration of which gave him "the
>> courage to face a lifetime."
>> I no longer buy into the idea that heroism and effort necessarily
>> belong together. There is such a thing as heroic effort, no doubt; but
>> that is not relevant in this context.
>And this context is man as a heroic being in joyful pursuit of
>productivity through reason?
No, the context is Objectivism.
> > A hero will often possess
>> sufficient courage to do things that the normal person would not think
>> of doing, for which the normal person would require heroic effort. So
>> "heroism" is often a label placed by others, while the hero himself
>> does not feel like a hero. In fact, so-called, labeled 'heroes' will
>> often report that very fact. This is because the heroic act required
>> no effort. That doesn't make it heroic, but it does make it appear
>> heroic to others who were sufficiently awed by the heroic act.
>I saw an interview of James Bradley (who wrote "Flags of Our Fathers"),
>who's father was one of the flag-raisers on Iwo Jima. Such "heroes" have
>a profound "survivors" guilt, feeling the dead are far more worthy of
>any honor than they. So any credit they accept (as a pretender) is an
>insult to those who paid the ultimate price.
Yes, and that places heroism into the context of the morality of
sacrifice.
>> Notice that the heroic effort, when it is truly an effort, is often
>> felt as a resistance to some inner psychological force which tries to
>> prevent the act. This idea invokes a certain dualism in human nature,
>> just as the idea of the ordinary and extraordinary in society invokes
>> a certain dualism there.
>There are lots of things we are averse to. I don't usually say, "my
>bad-self wants to watch cartoons and not do the dishes", or "a demon
>made me do it".
A rational-emotive therapist would actually recommend that method. But
the dualism I am referring is not supernatural.
>> The latter is seen in Rand's dividing of mankind into producers and paras
>> ites.
>But there are producers and parasites. I suppose it gets gray when you
>end up employed by a government contractor; then you are basically
>accepting more or less stolen property as payment for producing
>something of less or more value.
I'm not saying there aren't producers and parasites, only that Rand
accomplishes only societal dualism. However, ignoring the great effort
of moralizing she put into that dualism, I find it more intellectually
productive than you may think.
>> This dualism is seen even in
>> Rand's first real hero, Howard Roark, in the incident where he turned
>> down his first major project, a skyscraper, on principle. He took an
>> individualistic, egoistic stand against the desires of his employers
>> to change his original drawings. But he took this stand, not only
>> against them, but against a certain pressure within himself to
>> compromise his egoistical principles and allow the building owners
>> to have their way with his plans. The effort it required to say "no"
>> to the board of directors was indeed heroic -- but it also implied the
>> presence of an inconsistent dualism within Roark's soul.
>Why do you redefine a conflict as inconsistent dualism? What you're
>getting at is a Christian notion; "God (and the Holy Ghost in us) cannot
>be tempted by evil" but we (the flesh, our bad-selves) are. Roark wants
>money, Roard doesn't want to prostitute his artistic expression. Roark
>has a conflict.
Yes, he has an internal conflict, and in Objectivist terms, such
conflicts go all the way down to the core value-system. If Roark was
tempted even for an instant to agree to compromise, then that
temptation must have its roots in the core of his values, of his soul.
His external life, however, showed no signs of a lack of integrity,
because he always managed to make a successful effort to combat
that other side of himself. But one might reasonably add that Roark's
great though unself-conscious expression of self-control indicated
that there might be something about his self which he had to keep
under wraps.
>> Therefore, what is relevant to the concept of the "hero" is not
>> effort, but dualism, either in the soul of the hero, or socially, as a
>> certain perspective coming from those who were awe-inspired by a
>> heroic act which was not considered heroic, indeed effortless, by the
>> "hero" himself.
>Ok, now I see your point. Joyfully pursuing productivity through reason
>may not be very heroic at all, for a decent, sane human, unless he
>experiences and overcomes significant internal inhibitions, aversion or
>conflicts, or his neighbors are inspired by his actions.
I'm pretty sure you're being facetious there. But there has to be a
context of the ordinary from which the extraordinary can stand out in
contrast. This is the simple dualism I am commending here. And even
Objectivists consider such dualism a requirement although they tend to
think of dualism in, as you continue to show, religious terms.
However, dualism as a philosophical problem was I believe first
proposed by Descartes, and he was, according to history, a quite
irreligious man, although not an atheist.
http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/4b.htm#disc
"Descartes's pursuit of mathematical and scientific truth soon led to
a profound rejection of the scholastic tradition in which he had been
educated. Much of his work was concerned with the provision of a
secure foundation for the advancement of human knowledge through
the natural sciences. Fearing the condemnation of the church, however,
Descartes was rightly cautious about publicly expressing the full
measure of his radical views."
(Scholasticism, in case you didn't know, is a theological tradition
founded in the Middle Ages.)
The notion of God was indeed a problem for Descartes, the founder of
modern dualism, in his struggle to preserve science from the
destructive influence of supernatural dogma, as he noted in the
Meditation:
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04744b.htm
"How do I know that God has not so arranged it that I am deceived
each time I add two and three together, or number the sides of a
square, or form some judgment still more simple, if indeed anything
more simple can be imagined."
Maurice Willey
While I might agree with you, Rand does not. She in many places terms it a
moral decision to exercise rational thought, because in order to learn
anything, one must Choose to follow the rational path. One of the uniques
aspects of humanity, under Objectivism, is that we have the choice to be
irrational, to follow whimsical trains of thought. Hence the Objectivist
penchant for emotional diatribes against those who have 'deliberately'
chosen to follow paths ofthought that Objectivist cant has labelled as
'irrational'. Objectivism denies that any exercised choice, including the
choice to simply believe a fact, is free of moral freight.
"...I would say that man's only moral commandment is: Thou shalt think.
But a 'moral commandment' is a contradiction in terms. The moral is the
chosen, not the forced; the understood, not the obeyed. The moral is the
rational, and reason accepts no commandments." - Atlas Shrugged
"The _objective_ theory [of the nature of the good] holds that the good is
neither an attribute of 'things in themselves' nor of man's emotional
states, but an _evaluation_ of the facts of reality by man's cosciousness
according to a rational standard of value. (Rational, in this context,
means: derived from the facts of reality and validated by a process of
reason.)" - What is Capitalism?
"That which you do not know, is not a moral charge against you; but that
which you refuse to know, is an account of infamy growing in your soul." -
Atlas Shrugged
"Man has a single basic choice: to think or not, and _that_ is the gauge of
his virtue. Moral perfection is an _unbreached rationality_ - not the
degree of your intelligence, but the full and relentless use of your mind,
not the extent of your knowledge, but the acceptance of reason as an
absolute." - Atlas Shrugged
Maurice Willey
news:1a8f5fe5.03101...@posting.google.com:
"The pitfall of Bene Gesserit training lay in the powers granted; such
powers predisposed one to vanity and pride. But power deluded those who
used it. One tended to believe power could overcome any barrier . . .
including one's own ignorance." -Reverend Mother Gaius Helen Mohiam
f
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Acar
Helen has to stay on her toes or someone may take her water.
.
.
..
Scott Stephens
> I don't remember the disgust, just the pity. But I interpret that
> scene as illustrating the worst imaginable fate for a human being, to
> miss his calling, to waste his talent, to throw away his vision, and
> to commit this atrocity against the self, in Peter's case, merely in
> order to comply with the opinions of others such as his mother who
> thought his becoming an architect would make for a better career
> choice.
Peter fulfilling his duty for his mothers expectations, as a loving son?
>>>A hero will often possess
>>>sufficient courage to do things that the normal person would not think
>>>of doing, for which the normal person would require heroic effort. So
>>>"heroism" is often a label placed by others, while the hero himself
>>>does not feel like a hero. In fact, so-called, labeled 'heroes' will
>>>often report that very fact. This is because the heroic act required
>>>no effort. That doesn't make it heroic, but it does make it appear
>>>heroic to others who were sufficiently awed by the heroic act.
>
>
>>I saw an interview of James Bradley (who wrote "Flags of Our Fathers"),
>>who's father was one of the flag-raisers on Iwo Jima. Such "heroes" have
>>a profound "survivors" guilt, feeling the dead are far more worthy of
>>any honor than they. So any credit they accept (as a pretender) is an
>>insult to those who paid the ultimate price.
>
>
> Yes, and that places heroism into the context of the morality of
> sacrifice.
The ethics and morality of emergencies and warfare is extreme. You can't
have individuals breaking and running, when men live and die as teams.
Not that other forms of team and group behavior don't require similar
'altruism', since its the team that wins or loses.
>>Why do you redefine a conflict as inconsistent dualism? What you're
>>getting at is a Christian notion; "God (and the Holy Ghost in us) cannot
>>be tempted by evil" but we (the flesh, our bad-selves) are. Roark wants
>>money, Roard doesn't want to prostitute his artistic expression. Roark
>>has a conflict.
>
>
> Yes, he has an internal conflict, and in Objectivist terms, such
> conflicts go all the way down to the core value-system. If Roark was
> tempted even for an instant to agree to compromise, then that
> temptation must have its roots in the core of his values, of his soul.
> His external life, however, showed no signs of a lack of integrity,
> because he always managed to make a successful effort to combat
> that other side of himself. But one might reasonably add that Roark's
> great though unself-conscious expression of self-control indicated
> that there might be something about his self which he had to keep
> under wraps.
So this is the only way Roark could be heroic, if he was capable of
being tempted by evil?
>>>Therefore, what is relevant to the concept of the "hero" is not
>>>effort, but dualism, either in the soul of the hero, or socially, as a
>>>certain perspective coming from those who were awe-inspired by a
>>>heroic act which was not considered heroic, indeed effortless, by the
>>>"hero" himself.
>
>
>>Ok, now I see your point. Joyfully pursuing productivity through reason
>>may not be very heroic at all, for a decent, sane human, unless he
>>experiences and overcomes significant internal inhibitions, aversion or
>>conflicts, or his neighbors are inspired by his actions.
>
>
> I'm pretty sure you're being facetious there.
Sincerely no, but I would be if I said, "the ideal of heroism is to
strive to inspire others to inferiority by besting them, or develop a
destructive alter-ego you can fight against and overcome yourself with".
I haven't studied Nietzche (yet) but I understand he has a grim view of
life, in contrast to the heroic view of Rand.
> But there has to be a
> context of the ordinary from which the extraordinary can stand out in
> contrast. This is the simple dualism I am commending here. And even
> Objectivists consider such dualism a requirement although they tend to
> think of dualism in, as you continue to show, religious terms.
I was born a suburban mystic peasant, my scope is limited. Accident of
birth.
> "How do I know that God has not so arranged it that I am deceived
> each time I add two and three together, or number the sides of a
> square, or form some judgment still more simple, if indeed anything
> more simple can be imagined."
Hypnotists can suggest that numbers will be missing, such that people
will count wrong. Such is the mind and human reason.
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>
>> I don't remember the disgust, just the pity. But I interpret that
>> scene as illustrating the worst imaginable fate for a human being, to
>> miss his calling, to waste his talent, to throw away his vision, and
>> to commit this atrocity against the self, in Peter's case, merely in
>> order to comply with the opinions of others such as his mother who
>> thought his becoming an architect would make for a better career
>> choice.
>
>Peter fulfilling his duty for his mothers expectations, as a loving son?
Yes. That would be a duty to another's authority rather to oneself,
accepting a heteronomous rather than an autonomous code of morality.
>>>>A hero will often possess
>>>>sufficient courage to do things that the normal person would not think
>>>>of doing, for which the normal person would require heroic effort. So
>>>>"heroism" is often a label placed by others, while the hero himself
>>>>does not feel like a hero. In fact, so-called, labeled 'heroes' will
>>>>often report that very fact. This is because the heroic act required
>>>>no effort. That doesn't make it heroic, but it does make it appear
>>>>heroic to others who were sufficiently awed by the heroic act.
>>
>>
>>>I saw an interview of James Bradley (who wrote "Flags of Our Fathers"),
>>>who's father was one of the flag-raisers on Iwo Jima. Such "heroes" have
>>>a profound "survivors" guilt, feeling the dead are far more worthy of
>>>any honor than they. So any credit they accept (as a pretender) is an
>>>insult to those who paid the ultimate price.
>>
>>
>> Yes, and that places heroism into the context of the morality of
>> sacrifice.
>
>The ethics and morality of emergencies and warfare is extreme. You can't
>have individuals breaking and running, when men live and die as teams.
>Not that other forms of team and group behavior don't require similar
>'altruism', since its the team that wins or loses.
Sounds almost as if extreme situations require a different kind of
morality than Rand's, one that surpasses the norm.
>>>Why do you redefine a conflict as inconsistent dualism? What you're
>>>getting at is a Christian notion; "God (and the Holy Ghost in us) cannot
>>>be tempted by evil" but we (the flesh, our bad-selves) are. Roark wants
>>>money, Roard doesn't want to prostitute his artistic expression. Roark
>>>has a conflict.
>>
>>
>> Yes, he has an internal conflict, and in Objectivist terms, such
>> conflicts go all the way down to the core value-system. If Roark was
>> tempted even for an instant to agree to compromise, then that
>> temptation must have its roots in the core of his values, of his soul.
>> His external life, however, showed no signs of a lack of integrity,
>> because he always managed to make a successful effort to combat
>> that other side of himself. But one might reasonably add that Roark's
>> great though unself-conscious expression of self-control indicated
>> that there might be something about his self which he had to keep
>> under wraps.
>
>So this is the only way Roark could be heroic, if he was capable of
>being tempted by evil?
Like I said, I don't see any necessary connection between heroism and
making a great effort, in this case, against evil. So no, that wasn't
the only way he could be heroic.
According to Objectivist theory, even a lowly alcoholic could be
considered a hero if he manages to put down the drink before taking
that first sip, and says "no" to his alcohol addiction. I just don't
see a lowly alcoholic as the hero of a Rand novel. This person must
symbolize an ideal which in his characterization is aesthetically
appealing and inspiring to as great a number of readers as possible.
Besides, the alcoholic is only demonstrating a negative, the refusal
to drink, while Roark demonstrates a positive, the ideal way in
general to live one's life. To recognize this hero is to acknowledge
that some people can stand out from the crowd in extraordinary ways
which surpass the norm by symbolizing through their lives an
intransigent devotion to principles, especially if it goes well
against the odds of finding success. Rand placed Roark in some most
difficult situations which would put a great strain on the integrity
of the average person, but Roark never compromised his principles.
Usually she represented him as accomplishing this seemingly without
effort, without internal conflict or pain, in a state of utter
serenity and indifference to pain, but not always. His feelings about
Keating's paintings also shows that a hero is also capable of great
compassion.
>>>>Therefore, what is relevant to the concept of the "hero" is not
>>>>effort, but dualism, either in the soul of the hero, or socially, as a
>>>>certain perspective coming from those who were awe-inspired by a
>>>>heroic act which was not considered heroic, indeed effortless, by the
>>>>"hero" himself.
>>>Ok, now I see your point. Joyfully pursuing productivity through reason
>>>may not be very heroic at all, for a decent, sane human, unless he
>>>experiences and overcomes significant internal inhibitions, aversion or
>>>conflicts, or his neighbors are inspired by his actions.
>> I'm pretty sure you're being facetious there.
>Sincerely no, but I would be if I said, "the ideal of heroism is to
>strive to inspire others to inferiority by besting them, or develop a
>destructive alter-ego you can fight against and overcome yourself with".
>I haven't studied Nietzche (yet) but I understand he has a grim view of
>life, in contrast to the heroic view of Rand.
I've looked at your previous comment again, which I thought might have
been facetious. It still implies that heroism requires effort. I don't
see productivity as being heroic, it is on the other hand completely
within the norm.
That brings up the more perplexing element of Rand's writing, the
inconsistency in the heroism of her novels versus the normality of her
stated value system. Those values are what we are all doing already;
however, it may require making them explicit in order to follow them
more consistently. But there is nothing particularly heroic or
extraordinary about them per se.
>> But there has to be a
>> context of the ordinary from which the extraordinary can stand out in
>> contrast. This is the simple dualism I am commending here. And even
>> Objectivists consider such dualism a requirement although they tend to
>> think of dualism in, as you continue to show, religious terms.
>
>I was born a suburban mystic peasant, my scope is limited. Accident of
>birth.
I don't know about you, don't need to really, but Objectivism very
often offers its students only a very narrow and limited viewpoint on
these matters. I heard an Objectivist lecture tape (I forget the
teacher's name) on Kant, in which he summed up the Critique of Pure
Reason, a huge complex tome, in the space of a 50 minute class. I
thought he did a fairly decent job working through half the book,
considering the limited time he gave the subject, but then he declared
the second half to be only conclusions based on the first half (which
is false), and ended up only repeating the "party line" about Kant
being evil blah blah.
I know a professor who devoted a year of his life to studying the
Critique of Pure Reason, and even if you think that was longer than
necessary, I can guarantee from my own experience that it requires
much longer than 50 minutes to get down even the bare essentials of
his system. But I suppose I should be grateful that Objectivist
teachers even give a token of acknowledgment to other philosophers
besides Aristotle and, er, Rand.
>> "How do I know that God has not so arranged it that I am deceived
>> each time I add two and three together, or number the sides of a
>> square, or form some judgment still more simple, if indeed anything
>> more simple can be imagined."
>
>Hypnotists can suggest that numbers will be missing, such that people
>will count wrong. Such is the mind and human reason.
That is psychology. Descartes however was making a philosophical
point. The very notion that GOD EXISTS throws even the most trusted
and taken-for-granted knowledge into a state of uncertainty simply
because God allegedly has these supernatural abilities which supercede
our natural, cognitive abilities. So Descartes decided to find a
different starting-point for our knowledge, that which we can know
with absolute certainty: I exist. And even if the Cogito is
unpalatable to Objectivists, it was a step in the right direction away
from God and toward the individual.
Scott Stephens
> On Wed, 15 Oct 2003 23:23:33 +0000 (UTC), Scott Stephens
> <sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>>Peter fulfilling his duty for his mothers expectations, as a loving son?
>
> Yes. That would be a duty to another's authority rather to oneself,
> accepting a heteronomous rather than an autonomous code of morality.
>
What is the difference between heteronomous and autonomous codes? I was
wondering how your Kantian outlook (if you have one, from a little I
read from other's comments in other threads) would justify the moral
primacy of duty, Peter's mother's interests over his own. Perhaps I have
mis-identified you? Not that I consider Kant necessarily evil on account
of Rand's opinion, I often entertain conflicting perspectives regarding
'hard' physical systems amenable to often nebulous tests.
>>The ethics and morality of emergencies and warfare is extreme. You can't
>>have individuals breaking and running, when men live and die as teams.
>>Not that other forms of team and group behavior don't require similar
>>'altruism', since its the team that wins or loses.
>
> Sounds almost as if extreme situations require a different kind of
> morality than Rand's, one that surpasses the norm.
Rand pointed out emergencies and war are not the norm. But team activity
is another issue entirely. You win or lose as a collective, not as
individuals. I often thought of humanity (civilization) as a
super-organism. But I'm beginning to see, until man develops neural
implants and an internet to link high-bandwidth telepathy, the wisdom
and processing power of the best (heroic) individuals will certainly be
dwarfed by those that know how to manipulate the rat-pack by means of
degradation in the direction of the least-common denominator, to the
ends of corruption and limit cycle of destruction and revolution.
>>So this is the only way Roark could be heroic, if he was capable of
>>being tempted by evil?
>
> Like I said, I don't see any necessary connection between heroism and
> making a great effort, in this case, against evil. So no, that wasn't
> the only way he could be heroic.
You can have it both ways. A man is heroic in other's eyes if he exceeds
their capacity, and a man is heroic in his own eyes if he exceeds his
(typical) capacity.
> To recognize this hero is to acknowledge
> that some people can stand out from the crowd in extraordinary ways
> which surpass the norm by symbolizing through their lives an
> intransigent devotion to principles
So it is devotion to principles, not reality and reason that defines a
true hero? A deontological rather than consequentialist ethic? I often
entertain concepts of 'logos' and 'dow', so I'm not being funny. There
are organizing principles in nature, but when examined in detail, they
are principles of which there is hardly a perfect instance. Yet nature
manifests these patterns which our minds naturally profit by identifying
and categorizing.
> I don't
> see productivity as being heroic, it is on the other hand completely
> within the norm.
A duty to be productive? As Jesus Christ said, 'we are unprofitable
servants, what thank have we?'
> That brings up the more perplexing element of Rand's writing, the
> inconsistency in the heroism of her novels versus the normality of her
> stated value system.
Her value system wasn't 'normal' from what I experience as 'normal' -
2nd hander Keatings that look at their neighbors to figure out what
'normal' is. That 'normal' is a measure of charisma - how well you can
ridicule, entertain, deceive and assert dominance. It produces nothing,
it manipulates and controls. It is the aristocracy of pull.
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>> On Wed, 15 Oct 2003 23:23:33 +0000 (UTC), Scott Stephens
>> <sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>>>Peter fulfilling his duty for his mothers expectations, as a loving son?
>> Yes. That would be a duty to another's authority rather to oneself,
>> accepting a heteronomous rather than an autonomous code of morality.
>What is the difference between heteronomous and autonomous codes? I was
>wondering how your Kantian outlook (if you have one, from a little I
>read from other's comments in other threads) would justify the moral
>primacy of duty, Peter's mother's interests over his own. Perhaps I have
>mis-identified you? Not that I consider Kant necessarily evil on account
>of Rand's opinion, I often entertain conflicting perspectives regarding
>'hard' physical systems amenable to often nebulous tests.
A heteronomous moral code would be any that is enforced from outside
the individual, accepted out of a sense of duty to authority.
Autonomous moral codes derive from a personal yet objective sense of
right and wrong. They are objective in the sense that although they
derive from the individual, they are believed to be applicable to
everybody equally.
A problem may arise when an autonomous morality loses its appeal to
autonomy by appealing to the authoritary, as is the case sometimes
with Objectivists. And that is one reason they are sometimes called
"Randroids." They accept Rand's moral code on authority, and then
attempt to dispense it to others merely on their own authority,
including the reasons behind the morality which also must be accepted
on authority as true, without question.
>>>The ethics and morality of emergencies and warfare is extreme. You can't
>>>have individuals breaking and running, when men live and die as teams.
>>>Not that other forms of team and group behavior don't require similar
>>>'altruism', since its the team that wins or loses.
>> Sounds almost as if extreme situations require a different kind of
>> morality than Rand's, one that surpasses the norm.
>Rand pointed out emergencies and war are not the norm.
I remember an article called "The Ethics of Emergencies," but I'm not
sure if it contained any references to warfare.
>But team activity
>is another issue entirely. You win or lose as a collective, not as
>individuals. I often thought of humanity (civilization) as a
>super-organism. But I'm beginning to see, until man develops neural
>implants and an internet to link high-bandwidth telepathy, the wisdom
>and processing power of the best (heroic) individuals will certainly be
>dwarfed by those that know how to manipulate the rat-pack by means of
>degradation in the direction of the least-common denominator, to the
>ends of corruption and limit cycle of destruction and revolution.
That's somewhat the way things are, but not the way things ought to
be.
>>>So this is the only way Roark could be heroic, if he was capable of
>>>being tempted by evil?
>> Like I said, I don't see any necessary connection between heroism and
>> making a great effort, in this case, against evil. So no, that wasn't
>> the only way he could be heroic.
>You can have it both ways. A man is heroic in other's eyes if he exceeds
>their capacity, and a man is heroic in his own eyes if he exceeds his
>(typical) capacity.
I'm having trouble imagining a situation where a man actually
considers himself to be a hero, at least, without any convincing from
others, and thus considers himself heroic "in his own eyes."
>> To recognize this hero is to acknowledge
>> that some people can stand out from the crowd in extraordinary ways
>> which surpass the norm by symbolizing through their lives an
>> intransigent devotion to principles
>So it is devotion to principles, not reality and reason that defines a
>true hero? A deontological rather than consequentialist ethic? I often
>entertain concepts of 'logos' and 'dow', so I'm not being funny. There
>are organizing principles in nature, but when examined in detail, they
>are principles of which there is hardly a perfect instance. Yet nature
>manifests these patterns which our minds naturally profit by identifying
>and categorizing.
We're off in the land of teleology now. And while I'm not exactly sure
what you're saying there, I should add that the search for perfection
originates in your own mind, as a principle assumed to exist in nature
as its natural teleological end. By reflection, we come to think that
perhaps there is also an internal principle of moral perfection
symbolized by the hero, as a teleological end of mankind taking the
form of an archetypical though objectively practical ideal of man.
This quest for the perfect in nature was seen during the Enlightenment
period as a search for signs of its beautiful perfection. This was not
found, but I believe that the young man overlooking Monadnock Valley
had found it, although not as a product of nature, but in the works of
man, or a man, Howard Roark. It is only man's labors that can be
properly viewed as striving purposefully toward perfection, his
perfectability made real through an active, creative process of high
intellect; and when it seems to have been achieved, as apparently the
young man believed, then this lends hope and encouragement to oneself.
Because it had been achieved in nature, on this earth, not in some
supernatural Heaven, and not BY nature or by God through some
ineffable miracle, but by man.
>> I don't
>> see productivity as being heroic, it is on the other hand completely
>> within the norm.
>
>A duty to be productive? As Jesus Christ said, 'we are unprofitable
>servants, what thank have we?'
I don't even understand that Christ quote, and I'm unfamiliar with it.
He is often so obscure with his little parables.
>> That brings up the more perplexing element of Rand's writing, the
>> inconsistency in the heroism of her novels versus the normality of her
>> stated value system.
>
>Her value system wasn't 'normal' from what I experience as 'normal' -
>2nd hander Keatings that look at their neighbors to figure out what
>'normal' is. That 'normal' is a measure of charisma - how well you can
>ridicule, entertain, deceive and assert dominance. It produces nothing,
>it manipulates and controls. It is the aristocracy of pull.
Average (normal) people are productive -- although perhaps not to
their highest potential. While Rand's ethics may not be 'normal' in
one sense -- because it encourages or inspires us to think beyond
what our normal level of functioning -- the virtue of productivity is
certainly far from unusual in every day practice. If it were, then I
hardly think this country (the USA) would be such a workaholic
environment where the average worker works more hours than the
average European worker, according to the latest statistics. We
would instead be a nation of South Sea islanders.
Scott Stephens
> On Thu, 16 Oct 2003 04:44:55 +0000 (UTC), Scott Stephens
> <sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>
>>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>>Rand pointed out emergencies and war are not the norm.
>
> I remember an article called "The Ethics of Emergencies," but I'm not
> sure if it contained any references to warfare.
>
Yes, I was disappointed it didn't discuss the ethics of conscription. I
suppose I can google for references when I've got time. But the idea was
emergency situations shouldn't last, to become the norm.
>>You can have it both ways. A man is heroic in other's eyes if he exceeds
>>their capacity, and a man is heroic in his own eyes if he exceeds his
>>(typical) capacity.
>
> I'm having trouble imagining a situation where a man actually
> considers himself to be a hero, at least, without any convincing from
> others, and thus considers himself heroic "in his own eyes."
>
You've never surprised yourself, by making an effort or obtaining an
outcome that you thought was beyond your capacity?
>>>To recognize this hero is to acknowledge
>>>that some people can stand out from the crowd in extraordinary ways
>>>which surpass the norm by symbolizing through their lives an
>>>intransigent devotion to principles
>
>
>>So it is devotion to principles, not reality and reason that defines a
>>true hero? A deontological rather than consequentialist ethic? I often
>>entertain concepts of 'logos' and 'dow', so I'm not being funny. There
>>are organizing principles in nature, but when examined in detail, they
>>are principles of which there is hardly a perfect instance. Yet nature
>>manifests these patterns which our minds naturally profit by identifying
>>and categorizing.
>
>
> We're off in the land of teleology now. And while I'm not exactly sure
> what you're saying there,
That adherence to autonomous, objective principles is also a heroic duty
to (our) nature,
> I should add that the search for perfection
> originates in your own mind, as a principle assumed to exist in nature
> as its natural teleological end. By reflection, we come to think that
> perhaps there is also an internal principle of moral perfection
> symbolized by the hero, as a teleological end of mankind taking the
> form of an archetypical though objectively practical ideal of man.
Yea, that's it.
> It is only man's labors that can be
> properly viewed as striving purposefully toward perfection, his
> perfectability made real through an active, creative process of high
> intellect; and when it seems to have been achieved, as apparently the
> young man believed, then this lends hope and encouragement to oneself.
> Because it had been achieved in nature, on this earth, not in some
> supernatural Heaven, and not BY nature or by God through some
> ineffable miracle, but by man.
>
And is Roark's achievement is any less heroic because he creates it out
of self-interest, recognizing a duty to preserve the purity of his
artistic vision, rather than as a duty to a patron? Would it be any less
heroic if there was no boy to be inspired by it?
>>>I don't
>>>see productivity as being heroic, it is on the other hand completely
>>>within the norm.
>>
>>A duty to be productive? As Jesus Christ said, 'we are unprofitable
>>servants, what thank have we?'
>
>
> I don't even understand that Christ quote, and I'm unfamiliar with it.
> He is often so obscure with his little parables.
>
Luke 17:9-11
(http://www.biblegateway.com/cgi-bin/bible?passage=LUKE+17:9-11&language=en
glish&version=KJV&showfn=on&showxref=on)
Jesus is saying that servants that do what they are told don't deserve
any thanks, because it is their duty. God made man perfect, principle is
perfect, we ought to be perfect and get no thanks for being what we are
expected to be. Kant was reconciling his faith, so I took it that this
is what you had in mind in saying "I don't see productivity as being
heroic", in contrast to Rand's "heroic view of man".
>>>That brings up the more perplexing element of Rand's writing, the
>>>inconsistency in the heroism of her novels versus the normality of her
>>>stated value system.
>>
>>Her value system wasn't 'normal' from what I experience as 'normal' -
>>2nd hander Keatings that look at their neighbors to figure out what
>>'normal' is. That 'normal' is a measure of charisma - how well you can
>>ridicule, entertain, deceive and assert dominance. It produces nothing,
>>it manipulates and controls. It is the aristocracy of pull.
>
That was a rather extreme statement of mine, but a lot of our morals are
based on being socially-normal.
> Average (normal) people are productive -- although perhaps not to
> their highest potential. While Rand's ethics may not be 'normal' in
> one sense -- because it encourages or inspires us to think beyond
> what our normal level of functioning -- the virtue of productivity is
> certainly far from unusual in every day practice. If it were, then I
> hardly think this country (the USA) would be such a workaholic
> environment where the average worker works more hours than the
> average European worker, according to the latest statistics. We
> would instead be a nation of South Sea islanders.
There are few people who can find and realize a realistic calling in
life, career-wise anyways.
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>
>> On Thu, 16 Oct 2003 04:44:55 +0000 (UTC), Scott Stephens
>> <sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>> I remember an article called "The Ethics of Emergencies," but I'm not
>> sure if it contained any references to warfare.
>Yes, I was disappointed it didn't discuss the ethics of conscription. I
>suppose I can google for references when I've got time. But the idea was
>emergency situations shouldn't last, to become the norm.
No, the idea was that emergencies were not within the norm and
morality should be for everyday life.
>>>You can have it both ways. A man is heroic in other's eyes if he exceeds
>>>their capacity, and a man is heroic in his own eyes if he exceeds his
>>>(typical) capacity.
>> I'm having trouble imagining a situation where a man actually
>> considers himself to be a hero, at least, without any convincing from
>> others, and thus considers himself heroic "in his own eyes."
>You've never surprised yourself, by making an effort or obtaining an
>outcome that you thought was beyond your capacity?
Yes. I called it "luck."
>> It is only man's labors that can be
>> properly viewed as striving purposefully toward perfection, his
>> perfectability made real through an active, creative process of high
>> intellect; and when it seems to have been achieved, as apparently the
>> young man believed, then this lends hope and encouragement to oneself.
>> Because it had been achieved in nature, on this earth, not in some
>> supernatural Heaven, and not BY nature or by God through some
>> ineffable miracle, but by man.
>And is Roark's achievement is any less heroic because he creates it out
>of self-interest, recognizing a duty to preserve the purity of his
>artistic vision, rather than as a duty to a patron? Would it be any less
>heroic if there was no boy to be inspired by it?
"Self-interest" really isn't the right word for what you're
describing. It is too mundane, too common. We are all naturally
self-interested, however inconsistently we may practice it. What you
are talking about is someone who takes either a moral, political, or
perhaps even artistic *stand*, on principle. To stand on principle is
to go against the tide, perhaps even against one's own natural
self-interest which, in Roark's case, would be symbolized by his
desire to see his skyscraper erected despite the changes made to it
by the Board. It is a heroic stand Roark was taking, a stand for
artistic integrity. And it doesn't matter if anybody knew about it or
not.
As we have discussed this topic I have come to the conclusion that
there are two opposing sides to these issues: the natural, and the
rational. Rational self-interest stands in contrast to natural
self-interest. But that rational self-interest is not to be confused
with Objectivist ethics. And I'm not saying that the two sides have to
clash, but they can. And when they do clash, principle, the rational
side, should override the natural side.
There is also rational and natural happiness. Natural happiness is
external, it comes from attaining a goal, and is dependent upon how
well you pursue the technical side of practice in obtaining goals and
on a certain amount of external luck. Rational happiness is internally
generated, it comes from leading a life directed by principles and the
pursuit of moral integrity. The second form of happiness is more
secure, because this internal realm is under your complete control, at
least ideally, while you cannot control the external realm always well
enough to guarantee a continued state of natural happiness.
>>>A duty to be productive? As Jesus Christ said, 'we are unprofitable
>>>servants, what thank have we?'
>> I don't even understand that Christ quote, and I'm unfamiliar with it.
>> He is often so obscure with his little parables.
>Luke 17:9-11
>(http://www.biblegateway.com/cgi-bin/bible?passage=LUKE+17:9-11&language=en
>glish&version=KJV&showfn=on&showxref=on)
>Jesus is saying that servants that do what they are told don't deserve
>any thanks, because it is their duty. God made man perfect, principle is
>perfect, we ought to be perfect and get no thanks for being what we are
>expected to be. Kant was reconciling his faith, so I took it that this
>is what you had in mind in saying "I don't see productivity as being
>heroic", in contrast to Rand's "heroic view of man".
Ok. I just don't see productivity as perfect, it falls under the
heading of the "natural." In order to be productive requires no
special principle, all we have to do is follow society or even just
observe nature to see what the animal kingdom is doing. Anybody
who took a stand at being productive would be laughed at. Maybe
he should also be a hero by eating three squares a day?
>>>>That brings up the more perplexing element of Rand's writing, the
>>>>inconsistency in the heroism of her novels versus the normality of her
>>>>stated value system.
>>>Her value system wasn't 'normal' from what I experience as 'normal' -
>>>2nd hander Keatings that look at their neighbors to figure out what
>>>'normal' is. That 'normal' is a measure of charisma - how well you can
>>>ridicule, entertain, deceive and assert dominance. It produces nothing,
>>>it manipulates and controls. It is the aristocracy of pull.
>That was a rather extreme statement of mine, but a lot of our morals are
>based on being socially-normal.
Such social metaphysics is well within the norm, and is even required
for acceptance, I think. But I don't know that taking a stand against
it would produce much out of the effort.
>> Average (normal) people are productive -- although perhaps not to
>> their highest potential. While Rand's ethics may not be 'normal' in
>> one sense -- because it encourages or inspires us to think beyond
>> what our normal level of functioning -- the virtue of productivity is
>> certainly far from unusual in every day practice. If it were, then I
>> hardly think this country (the USA) would be such a workaholic
>> environment where the average worker works more hours than the
>> average European worker, according to the latest statistics. We
>> would instead be a nation of South Sea islanders.
>There are few people who can find and realize a realistic calling in
>life, career-wise anyways.
Finding one's calling is different from being a generally productive
member of society. But I don't see that as particularly heroic either,
just fortunate. I don't see 'finding one's calling' as taking a stand
for or against anything.
Scott Stephens
>>And is Roark's achievement is any less heroic because he creates it out
>>of self-interest, recognizing a duty to preserve the purity of his
>>artistic vision, rather than as a duty to a patron? Would it be any less
>>heroic if there was no boy to be inspired by it?
>
> "Self-interest" really isn't the right word for what you're
> describing. It is too mundane, too common. We are all naturally
> self-interested, however inconsistently we may practice it. What you
> are talking about is someone who takes either a moral, political, or
> perhaps even artistic *stand*, on principle. To stand on principle is
> to go against the tide, perhaps even against one's own natural
> self-interest which, in Roark's case, would be symbolized by his
> desire to see his skyscraper erected despite the changes made to it
> by the Board.
....
> As we have discussed this topic I have come to the conclusion that
> there are two opposing sides to these issues: the natural, and the
> rational.
You might say Roark's natural self-interest would be to want the money
and work, but I doubt he would have any desire to see his creation
disfigured, maimed, by vandals. So his heroism is choosing the rational
(principle) over the natural motive.
> Ok. I just don't see productivity as perfect, it falls under the
> heading of the "natural." In order to be productive requires no
> special principle, all we have to do is follow society or even just
> observe nature to see what the animal kingdom is doing. Anybody
> who took a stand at being productive would be laughed at. Maybe
> he should also be a hero by eating three squares a day?
Perhaps I should have said being creative as opposed to productive. I
find being creative difficult, even more difficult than building
something from another's design, or fixing something broke. It's not
merely vagueness, not having a leader to follow, the risks of failure.
Perhaps its the totality.
It is typical to seek employment, extraordinary to create it. Given the
choice (in my case) between a spiritual plastic-shredder in
business-Baghdad, and high-risk entrepreneurship, the choice is hardly
heroic.
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>
>>>And is Roark's achievement is any less heroic because he creates it out
>>>of self-interest, recognizing a duty to preserve the purity of his
>>>artistic vision, rather than as a duty to a patron? Would it be any less
>>>heroic if there was no boy to be inspired by it?
>>
>> "Self-interest" really isn't the right word for what you're
>> describing. It is too mundane, too common. We are all naturally
>> self-interested, however inconsistently we may practice it. What you
>> are talking about is someone who takes either a moral, political, or
>> perhaps even artistic *stand*, on principle. To stand on principle is
>> to go against the tide, perhaps even against one's own natural
>> self-interest which, in Roark's case, would be symbolized by his
>> desire to see his skyscraper erected despite the changes made to it
>> by the Board.
>....
> > As we have discussed this topic I have come to the conclusion that
> > there are two opposing sides to these issues: the natural, and the
> > rational.
>
>You might say Roark's natural self-interest would be to want the money
>and work, but I doubt he would have any desire to see his creation
>disfigured, maimed, by vandals. So his heroism is choosing the rational
>(principle) over the natural motive.
He certainly needed the money, but most importantly, Roark wanted to
see it built, even if the only satisfaction would be in seeing the
mere form of the original design through the ugly facade. (Remember
Keating's observation that Roark "hates" money; which I think is an
exaggeration but true to an extent.) The rational principle here would
be moral integrity, standing on principle against the temptation to
compromise one's principles for a momentary satisfaction.
The internal is held as more important than the external
accomplishment, the principle of maintaining the integrity of his soul
more important to happiness than the half-satisfaction to be garnered
from compromising.
But exactly what is there, internally, to be maintained against
temptations? It is not exactly psychological, an empirical science
which explores the ever-changing realm of mental states and behaviors.
To focus on the internal in this sense is to reflect on that which is
unchanging, or which should not be changed without interfering with
the life-process itself, the basic core of what it means to be human.
To be a rational human involves more than just using syllogistic
reasoning. The very notion of "rational" implies systematic wholeness.
That may not be by definition of reason, but it is nevertheless
involved in every attempt to be rational. For to be rational is to
assume that there will be no break in the chain of laws, either
internally or externally, and that reality will maintain its
systematicity.
Externally, we are satisfied that nature will always obey its laws.
Internally, this systematic wholeness must be maintained through a
constant effort of volitional vigilance. Nature's "will" is automatic;
ours requires conscious effort against forces which attempt to break
our integrity, whether those forces are social, psychological, or
natural.
>> Ok. I just don't see productivity as perfect, it falls under the
>> heading of the "natural." In order to be productive requires no
>> special principle, all we have to do is follow society or even just
>> observe nature to see what the animal kingdom is doing. Anybody
>> who took a stand at being productive would be laughed at. Maybe
>> he should also be a hero by eating three squares a day?
>
>Perhaps I should have said being creative as opposed to productive. I
>find being creative difficult, even more difficult than building
>something from another's design, or fixing something broke. It's not
>merely vagueness, not having a leader to follow, the risks of failure.
>Perhaps its the totality.
>
>It is typical to seek employment, extraordinary to create it. Given the
>choice (in my case) between a spiritual plastic-shredder in
>business-Baghdad, and high-risk entrepreneurship, the choice is hardly
>heroic.
I see Roark as naturally creative, although the creative process
itself requires effort. He has a creative impulse which, if lacking,
would require an effort to bring out, and cannot easily be faked.
These things come more naturally to some than to others, and I don't
consider it heroic for the former types, I consider it lucky.
Scott Stephens
> But exactly what is there, internally, to be maintained against
> temptations?
The desire to 'fake' reality? People can be faked out, reality can't.
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<sco...@comcast.net> wrote:
>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>
>> But exactly what is there, internally, to be maintained against
>> temptations?
>
>The desire to 'fake' reality? People can be faked out, reality can't.
That was basically answered in the text you snipped from my last
response. Reality, as rational, is a systematic, coherent whole,
grounded in necessary laws which cannot be violated without destroying
the system. To fake reality boils down to the pretense that there are
exceptions to this systematicity, that the laws of nature don't
necessarily always apply. And if that our belief, then we think we can
also fake our own reality by allowing in exceptions to our own moral
principles.
Scott Stephens
> Reality, as rational, is a systematic, coherent whole,
> grounded in necessary laws which cannot be violated without destroying
> the system.
Depends what you mean by 'destroying' the system. I posit a mind is
material, we merely assume the action of mind, consciousness, is
non-material. Action is never present without the subject of the action.
In that case, faked reality is ways resembles electronic systems, which
have reactance. Or perhaps better, economics and accounting. Electrical
energy is likened to value transactions. Lies and delusions are accounts
which may temporarily hold values, but must, sooner or later, be
reconciled with reality. The maintenance of these phantom accounts is an
energy drain in themselves.
> To fake reality boils down to the pretense that there are
> exceptions to this systematicity, that the laws of nature don't
> necessarily always apply. And if that our belief, then we think we can
> also fake our own reality by allowing in exceptions to our own moral
> principles.
There are exceptions, are there not? In dealing with those that do not
operate according to your value system. IIRC Peikoff believes deceiving
the IRS is justified, as they are thugs of an immoral kleptocrasy.
Ragnar and Fransisco in AS practiced deception and aggression.
Nietzsche held their were different philosophies for different classes
of men. Engineers must honor reality to change reality. Economists,
preachers and politicians can print money, preach unreal beliefs and
make deceptive promises. To the extent they are believed, and they hold
to their "values" according to their beliefs, they produce their
outcomes for themselves. Even if it means destroying the peasant they
devour.
Scott Stephens
>>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>
> So man is *required* to make a heroic effort to resist the pull of the
> traditionalist's delusions? Or is it only a matter of arbitrary
> choice?
In that it takes an uncommon effort, virtue, to exercise a reason which
causes one to realize the proverbial emperor is naked, it is an exercise
of heroic effort. But in other cases (such as mine, I fear) one all to
gleefully looks for ways in which abusive traditional authority is
criminally insane. So there is probably is no heroic effort on my part
in resisting the pull of authoritarian delusions.
Rather than a matter of arbitrary choice, its a matter of disposition,
experience and preference.
> Is "the concept of man as a heroic being" an ideal? If it's an ideal
> of man, and not just a man, then wouldn't heroism be a moral
> requirement and not a question of pre-moral choice?
Hmmm, ideally man should do the best, not the easy, so its of-man, not
a-man. Looking up heroism, I find "legendary strength" and "achievement"
in the definitions. So heroism can refer to being a-typical, extraordinary.
Its unreasonable to make being extraordinary an ordinary requirement!
But as far as idealism, ideally we want to live the best we can, which
is a pre-moral choice.
On the other hand,
> if it's only an ideal of a particular man, then why is the essence of
> Objectivism the concept of MAN as a heroic being?
Again it's unreasonable to make being extraordinary an ordinary
requirement. But I would say man can be a heroic being, in that he
doesn't have to organize his society in natural ignorance like a wolf
pack, based on slavery and enslavement but can honor freedom - a higher
organizing principle which demands the virtue of rationality rather than
stupidity.