"Charles in Charge" - of evasion
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>On Jan 3, 1:32�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Charles can't discuss.
>
>What's there to discuss when it has been amply demonstrated on
>anything Rand or Kant, you always lose the debate and resort to the
>"Randroid" ad-hom attacks. In this latest example, you claim that
>Kant did not include reference to the "supersensible" in his
>definition of emotion, and I present to you in black and white that he
>did, and you retort with "Randroid!"
>
>Me: The emotional component of a psyche is a complex nexus of human
>instinct and intuition and specific conscious knowledge and not of
>something else as Kant's supersensible /Of Aesthetic judgment, 10, 29,
>etc./
>
>"emotional component . . . is . . not of something else as Kant's
>supersensible"
>
>You: See, you already got Kant wrong. Intuition for him is not a
>supersensible faculty
>
>IOW: "I am ignoring what you said about 'emotion' and I will misdirect
>the discussion -- not on 'emotion' and what Kant said about 'emotion'
>-- but over to 'intuition' "
>
>Me: Discussion over, you weasle [sic].
You're quoting something I wrote two posts back when I thought you had
quoted from the CPR Aesthetic and not the Critique of Judgment on
Aesthetic.
And in fact I carried on the discussion you, even thanking you for
offering your clarifying Kant quote on the subject.
I then carried on past the simple misunderstanding by discussing the
subject you wanted to discuss -
[quote]
Thank you for the excellent quote, Charles. I agree that only emotions
bring with them the SENSE of finality or certainty that can only be
intellectually won by a hypothetical intellectual or supersensible
intuition. And, by implication, the intellect does not bring final or
absolute intellectual certainty because there is no such human faculty
as that of intellectual or supersensible intuition.
The entire Critique of Pure Reason, by its very title, suggests that
the book was designed to wage war on the very idea of intellectual
intuition as a possible human intellectual faculty. That we may
emotionally FEEL absolute certainty is another issue which Kant saved
for the Critique of Judgment. But this feeling should not be confused
with intellectual certainty, and its source is no special faculty of
intuition but, in fact, the harmony of relationship between the
various faculties which creates the representation of finality. It is
easy to confuse the feeling produced by intellectual harmony with
final or absolute certainty."
[/unquote]
As you can see, I discussed "feelings" in the latter half of that
quote.
You came back and accused me of ad hom over some unrelated issue.
I came back and said that Charles can't discuss.
I'm the one who attempted to discuss Kant's views on feelings in a
response that took me some time to compose. You're the one
simplyleveling an accusation that took you 5 seconds to write, and
then bailing on the convo, saying, "Discussion over, you weasle."
Since you're big on winning every debate, Charles, who won this ones?
The one who wrote a two paragraph response in a fruitless attempt to
carry on a conversation with you, or the one who bailed out whining
about "ad hom" and "weasle"?
Charles Bell
> >> Charles can't discuss.
>
> >What's there to discuss when it has been amply demonstrated on
> >anything Rand or Kant, you always lose the debate and resort to the
> >"Randroid" ad-hom attacks. �In this latest example, you claim that
> >Kant did not include reference to the "supersensible" in his
> >definition of emotion, and I present to you in black and white that he
> >did, and you retort with "Randroid!"
>
> >Me: The emotional component of a psyche is a complex nexus of human
> >instinct and intuition and specific conscious knowledge and not of
> >something else as Kant's supersensible /Of Aesthetic judgment, 10, 29,
> >etc./
>
> >"emotional component . . . is �. . not of something else as Kant's
> >supersensible"
>
> >You: See, you already got Kant wrong. Intuition for him is not a
> >supersensible faculty
>
> >IOW: "I am ignoring what you said about 'emotion' and I will misdirect
> >the discussion -- not on 'emotion' and what Kant said about 'emotion'
> >-- but over to 'intuition' "
>
> >Me: �Discussion over, you weasle [sic].
>
> You're quoting something I wrote two posts back when I thought you had
> quoted from the CPR Aesthetic and not the Critique of Judgment on
> Aesthetic.
>
In the discussion up to that point I had used the word "feelings" to
mean intuition whereas you implied that I meant emotion. I clarified
I meant intuition but, in order to further clarify the distinction,
defined "feelings" for both intuition (with NO MENTION OF WHAT KANT
HAD TO SAY) and emotion (ABOUT WHICH I DID MENTION WHAT KANT HAD TO
SAY -- in "supersensible"). It was at this point -- quoted above --
you decided to change the subject to what Kant had to say about
intuition, saying what I (actually) had said about Kant and emotion
was not about what (you pretend I said) Kant said about intuition,
and I reminded you that I was not talking about Kant and intuition
(AND NEVER DID), but about Kant and emotion, and then you still
continued to talk about Kant and intuition, claiming that I knew
nothing about Kant and intuition when the fact of the matter I was
never talking about Kant and intuition.
> I then carried on past the simple misunderstanding by discussing the
> subject you wanted to discuss -
>
No, not really.
I don't accept what Kant had to say about emotion or intuition, and
your going on to explain what I already know is not of any use. And
yet again you felt it necessary to bring up "supersensible
intuition" (real or imagined) as if it were relevant to anything I
said even if I cared. About anything relevant to the subject I was
addressing from Kant would have to come by way of his Judgment on
Aesthetics, as I originally and clearly cited, and not CPR or Critique
of Judgment, and you still feel compelled to tell me that I am the one
who does not know anything about Kant.
> [quote]
> Thank you for the excellent quote, Charles. I agree that only emotions
> bring with them the SENSE of finality or certainty that can only be
> intellectually won by a hypothetical intellectual or supersensible
> intuition. And, by implication, the intellect does not bring final or
> absolute intellectual certainty because there is no such human faculty
> as that of intellectual or supersensible intuition.
>
> The entire Critique of Pure Reason, by its very title, suggests that
> the book was designed to wage war on the very idea of intellectual
> intuition as a possible human intellectual faculty. That we may
> emotionally FEEL absolute certainty is another issue which Kant saved
> for the Critique of Judgment. But this feeling should not be confused
> with intellectual certainty, and its source is no special faculty of
> intuition but, in fact, the harmony of relationship between the
> various faculties which creates the representation of finality. It is
> easy to confuse the feeling produced by intellectual harmony with
> final or absolute certainty."
> [/unquote]
>
> As you can see, I discussed "feelings" in the latter half of that
> quote.
>
In no way was that relevant to the discussion I was having even in the
most tangential way by sidetracking into Kant, as you incorrectly
referenced Kant's works in the discussion, but stand ready to accuse
me of not knowing Kant, with me as a mere "Randroid" you will always
use in a last desperate ad-hom argument.
Malrassic Park
Then why did you originally write this:
[/quote Charles IN Charge]
"Feelings" as distinct from "emotions". Intuition [*] is
unconsciously recognized truth (at least, as perceptual memories not
brought to active consciousness) in a non-specific form. The
emotional component of a psyche [**] is a complex nexus of human
instinct and intuition and specific conscious knowledge and not of
something else as Kant's supersensible /Of Aesthetic Judgment, 10, 29,
etc./
[/unquote]
Apparently "Kant's supersensible" (as your limited understanding of
the topic would have it) has something to do with the topic of
emotions or else you wouldn't have mentioned it.
>> I then carried on past the simple misunderstanding by discussing the
>> subject you wanted to discuss -
..
>No, not really.
..
>I don't accept what Kant had to say about emotion or intuition, and
>your going on to explain what I already know is not of any use. And
>yet again you felt it necessary to bring up "supersensible
>intuition" (real or imagined) as if it were relevant to anything I
>said even if I cared. About anything relevant to the subject I was
>addressing from Kant would have to come by way of his Judgment on
>Aesthetics, as I originally and clearly cited, and not CPR or Critique
>of Judgment, and you still feel compelled to tell me that I am the one
>who does not know anything about Kant.
I know that Kant's "Judgment on Aesthetics" [sic] is the first book of
the "Critique of Judgment," yet you just treated them as separate
works in the above quote.
And there is no "Judgment on Aesthetics," it is called the Critique of
Aesthetic Judgment, which is book 1 of the work entitled Critique of
Judgment.
>> [quote]
>> Thank you for the excellent quote, Charles. I agree that only emotions
>> bring with them the SENSE of finality or certainty that can only be
>> intellectually won by a hypothetical intellectual or supersensible
>> intuition. And, by implication, the intellect does not bring final or
>> absolute intellectual certainty because there is no such human faculty
>> as that of intellectual or supersensible intuition.
..
>> The entire Critique of Pure Reason, by its very title, suggests that
>> the book was designed to wage war on the very idea of intellectual
>> intuition as a possible human intellectual faculty. That we may
>> emotionally FEEL absolute certainty is another issue which Kant saved
>> for the Critique of Judgment. But this feeling should not be confused
>> with intellectual certainty, and its source is no special faculty of
>> intuition but, in fact, the harmony of relationship between the
>> various faculties which creates the representation of finality. It is
>> easy to confuse the feeling produced by intellectual harmony with
>> final or absolute certainty."
>> [/unquote]
..
>> As you can see, I discussed "feelings" in the latter half of that
>> quote.
..
>In no way was that relevant to the discussion I was having even in the
>most tangential way by sidetracking into Kant, as you incorrectly
>referenced Kant's works in the discussion, but stand ready to accuse
>me of not knowing Kant, with me as a mere "Randroid" you will always
>use in a last desperate ad-hom argument.
You side-tracked into Kantian territory when you wrote
[/quote]
and not of something else as Kant's supersensible /Of Aesthetic
Judgment, 10, 29, etc./
[/unquote]
Charles Bell
>
> Then why did you originally write this:
>
> [/quote Charles IN Charge]
>
> "Feelings" as distinct from "emotions". �Intuition [*] is
> unconsciously recognized truth (at least, as perceptual memories not
> brought to active consciousness) �in a non-specific form. �The
> emotional component of a psyche [**] is a complex nexus of human
> instinct and intuition and specific conscious knowledge and not of
> something else as Kant's supersensible /Of Aesthetic Judgment, 10, 29,
> etc./
> [/unquote]
>
Because it was in response to this (where "feelings" is admittedly
vague):
<< *Psyche* is that which is responsible for one's thoughts and
feelings which is nothing other than that which can be gained
epistemologically and not magically by other means, as I suppose
kantians would believe. >>
There are actually four things things listed in the "emotional
component of the psyche": (1) instinct; (2) intuition; (3) conscious
knowledge; (4) NOT of something kantian supersensible. In any case,
the kantian supersensible can only refer to the whole of the subject
of the sentence, rather than to a single part within the predicate,
intuition, as you are claiming.
> Apparently "Kant's supersensible" (as your limited understanding of
> the topic would have it) has something to do with the topic of
> emotions or else you wouldn't have mentioned it.
Yes, to the limited extent that I wanted to include it in the meaning
of "feelings" above.
My definition of "feeling" is not standard by O'ist measure but
epistemological in the O'ist sense nevertheless and far removed from
the magical voo-doo of kantianism as implied by the original post.
>
> I know that Kant's "Judgment on Aesthetics" [sic] is the first book of
> the "Critique of Judgment," yet you just treated them as separate
> works in the above quote.
>
> And there is no "Judgment on Aesthetics," it is called the Critique of
> Aesthetic Judgment, which is book 1 of the work entitled Critique of
> Judgment.
>
There are essentially three divisions of the Critique: a very long
introduction, which I take to be "Of Judgment" because that is the way
it is entitled in my copy; then Part I, "Of Aesthetics" because that
is the way it is entitled in my copy; then Part II, "Of Teleology"
because that is the way it is entitled in my copy. Even with the
mistake of "on" rather than "of", a person discerning of the works of
Kant would know to what I refer by "Judgment on Aesthetics" and it
certainly would not be anything in or around the CPR or *not*
unconnected to the "Critique of Judgment".
>
> [/quote]
> and not of something else as Kant's supersensible /Of Aesthetic
> Judgment, 10, 29, etc./
> [/unquote]
I don't deny that I sidetracked into Kant but it was only on the
subject of "the emotional component of the psyche" in which there can
be asserted a kantian supersensible which I deny exists.
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>On Jan 3, 7:00�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>> Then why did you originally write this:
..
>> [/quote Charles IN Charge]
..
>> "Feelings" as distinct from "emotions". �Intuition [*] is
>> unconsciously recognized truth (at least, as perceptual memories not
>> brought to active consciousness) �in a non-specific form. �The
>> emotional component of a psyche [**] is a complex nexus of human
>> instinct and intuition and specific conscious knowledge and not of
>> something else as Kant's supersensible /Of Aesthetic Judgment, 10, 29,
>> etc./
>> [/unquote]
..
>Because it was in response to this (where "feelings" is admittedly
>vague):
..
><< *Psyche* is that which is responsible for one's thoughts and
>feelings which is nothing other than that which can be gained
>epistemologically and not magically by other means, as I suppose
>kantians would believe. >>
..
>There are actually four things things listed in the "emotional
>component of the psyche": (1) instinct; (2) intuition; (3) conscious
>knowledge; (4) NOT of something kantian supersensible. In any case,
>the kantian supersensible can only refer to the whole of the subject
>of the sentence, rather than to a single part within the predicate,
>intuition, as you are claiming.
Let it go, Charles in Charge. I already said - how many times now? -
that it only looked to me like a reference to the CPR Aesthetic and
intuition. Therefore, I am no longer claiming it, nor have I claimed
it for a large number of posts now. And yet your capacity for crying
about it seems to be as unlimited as one of Kant's Ideas of Reason.
>> Apparently "Kant's supersensible" (as your limited understanding of
>> the topic would have it) has something to do with the topic of
>> emotions or else you wouldn't have mentioned it.
..
>Yes, to the limited extent that I wanted to include it in the meaning
>of "feelings" above.
..
>My definition of "feeling" is not standard by O'ist measure but
>epistemological in the O'ist sense nevertheless and far removed from
>the magical voo-doo of kantianism as implied by the original post.
Your Objectivist views are non-standard when you claim that the human
psyche consists also of instincts.
I don't know what "magical voo-doo of kantianism" means, but in the
sense of making claims without reference to reality, your Objectivist
views on Kant are on a par with the standard. Or should I call it, the
magical doo-doo epistemology of those who support a view on Kant which
is completely lacking in evidence, unless you count the made-up parts
as evidence.
>> I know that Kant's "Judgment on Aesthetics" [sic] is the first book of
>> the "Critique of Judgment," yet you just treated them as separate
>> works in the above quote.
..
>> And there is no "Judgment on Aesthetics," it is called the Critique of
>> Aesthetic Judgment, which is book 1 of the work entitled Critique of
>> Judgment.
..
>There are essentially three divisions of the Critique: a very long
>introduction, which I take to be "Of Judgment" because that is the way
>it is entitled in my copy; then Part I, "Of Aesthetics" because that
>is the way it is entitled in my copy; then Part II, "Of Teleology"
>because that is the way it is entitled in my copy. Even with the
>mistake of "on" rather than "of", a person discerning of the works of
>Kant would know to what I refer by "Judgment on Aesthetics" and it
>certainly would not be anything in or around the CPR or *not*
>unconnected to the "Critique of Judgment".
That is all your personal vernacular, in fact the Critique of Judgment
consists only of the two books or divisions, the introduction in your
copy or any other copy does not count as a division.
>> [/quote]
>> and not of something else as Kant's supersensible /Of Aesthetic
>> Judgment, 10, 29, etc./
>> [/unquote]
..
>I don't deny that I sidetracked into Kant but it was only on the
>subject of "the emotional component of the psyche" in which there can
>be asserted a kantian supersensible which I deny exists.
If you want to know, I will suggest that, speaking to its actual
existence, Kant was a considered agnostic on such matters. And that in
terms of its methodological existence, the supersensible was for Kant
wholly subjective. See the Critique of Teleological Judgment.
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>No, I made a claim as to what Kant said that *emotion* is (of two
>kinds, of course) Section 29 of Judgment . . .
>
> << But even impetuous movements of the mind be they allied under the
>name of edification with ideas of religion, or, as pertaining merely
>to culture, with ideas involving a social interest no matter what
>tension of the imagination they may produce, can in no way lay claim
>to the honour of a sublime presentation, if they do not leave behind
>them a temper of mind which, though it be only indirectly, has an
>influence upon the consciousness of the mind's strength and
>resoluteness in respect of that which carries with it pure
>intellectual finality (the supersensible). For, in the absence of
>this, all these emotions belong only to motion, which we welcome in
>the interests of good health. >>
>
>You see: the sublime kind of emotion and the down and dirty kind of
>emotion (which we welcome in the interests of good health, of
>course!).
I've finally had a chance to research your, as usual, out of context
quote.
You twist the Kantian text in order to accuse Kant of calling "down
and dirty kinds of emotion" (your words) healthy emotions.
The so-called "down and dirty kind of emotion" (that which we welcome
in the interests of good health) includes - as Kant stated in the very
next sentence in the text - "a pleasant exhaustion... an enjoyment of
our wellbeing arising from the restored equilibrium of the various
vital forces." This, Kant then writes, is analogous to the sensation
that arises just after having a full-body massage, although the causes
he is referring to are internal (mental/emotional) and not physical.
Other examples include a superficial type of edification (a sermon
that contains no moral maxims but which one believes to be deeply
edifying), and the kind of experiences that could only be called
entertaining - they relieve boredom and stress.
Kant's point is that these experiences are healthy - they don't sound
unhealthy to me, at any rate - and yet, lacking intellectuality, they
cannot be considered sublime.
But of course you can't be wrong, because you read a Rand book once
and liked it. Was the experience of reading Rand sublime, or merely
"good for you"?
Charles Bell
> Let it go, Charles in Charge. I already said - how many times now? -
> that it only looked to me like a reference to the CPR
> Aesthetic and intuition.
. . . as the previous post:
<< Apparently "Kant's supersensible" (as your limited
understanding of the topic would have it) . . .>
To which I merely responded again.
Which you like to mention it again, so that I can respond again?
>
> That is all your personal vernacular, in fact the Critique of Judgment
> consists only of the two books or divisions, the introduction in your
> copy or any other copy does not count as a division.
>
Oh look! You have mentioned it again.
There are three divisions. There are nine parts to the first division,
the Introduction, "Of Judgment". There are two more divisions called
"Parts" ("Of Aesthetics" and "Of Teleology") , two sections to Part
One, two Books to Section One, a single Book to Section Two; three
divisions to the Second Part: Introduction, First Division, and Second
Division, and an Appendix following on the Second Division of the
Second Part of the Third Division of the "Critique of Judgement".
Charles Bell
> You twist the Kantian text in order to accuse Kant of calling "down
> and dirty kinds of emotion" (your words) healthy emotions.
>
> The so-called "down and dirty kind of emotion" (that which we welcome
> in the interests of good health) includes - as Kant stated in the very
> next sentence in the text - "a pleasant exhaustion... an enjoyment of
> our wellbeing arising from the restored equilibrium of the various
> vital forces." This, Kant then writes, is analogous to the sensation
> that arises just after having a full-body massage,
"This, in the last resort, comes to no more than what the Eastern
voluptuaries find so soothing when they get their bodies massaged . .
"
Yes, you dirty boy, 'tis better than anything you'll find in
Wikipedia, for sure, dude.
> Kant's point is that these experiences are healthy -
Ya, "healthy." F'sure, dood.
> But of course you can't be wrong, because you read a Rand book once
> and liked it.
I think it's clear by now, after all these years on this forum, that
Malrassic Park is simply incapable of avoiding that logical fallacy
known as the ad hominem, and furthermore, his incapability is
precisely due to the fact that Immanuel Kant, his god, relied on it
constantly (particularly in the form of psychologizing) to impress his
personality cult-following. (c) Malrassic Park
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>On Jan 3, 11:34�pm, Malrassic Park <malen...@hotmail.com> wrote:
..
>> You twist the Kantian text in order to accuse Kant of calling "down
>> and dirty kinds of emotion" (your words) healthy emotions.
..
>> The so-called "down and dirty kind of emotion" (that which we welcome
>> in the interests of good health) includes - as Kant stated in the very
>> next sentence in the text - "a pleasant exhaustion... an enjoyment of
>> our wellbeing arising from the restored equilibrium of the various
>> vital forces." This, Kant then writes, is analogous to the sensation
>> that arises just after having a full-body massage,
..
>"This, in the last resort, comes to no more than what the Eastern
>voluptuaries find so soothing when they get their bodies massaged . .
>"
..
>Yes, you dirty boy, 'tis better than anything you'll find in
>Wikipedia, for sure, dude.
Getting a massage is not pornographic, neither is it sublime. It's
just a healthy feeling. Wikipedia is a porno site.
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>There are three divisions. There are nine parts to the first division,
>the Introduction, "Of Judgment". There are two more divisions called
>"Parts" ("Of Aesthetics" and "Of Teleology") , two sections to Part
>One, two Books to Section One, a single Book to Section Two; three
>divisions to the Second Part: Introduction, First Division, and Second
>Division, and an Appendix following on the Second Division of the
>Second Part of the Third Division of the "Critique of Judgement".
I finally found my J.H. Bernard edition. It has a Preface, an
Introduction (no special name), a First Part ("Kritik of the Aesthetic
Judgment"), a Second Part ("Kritik of the Teleological Judgment"), and
an Appendix ("Methodology of the Teleological Judgment").
I have no idea where you're getting "Of Judgment" unless yours is an
abridged edition starting with part IV of the Introduction entitled
"Of judgment as a faculty legislating a priori."
Malrassic Park
<cbe...@bellsouth.net> wrote:
>> The so-called "down and dirty kind of emotion" (that which we welcome
>> in the interests of good health) includes - as Kant stated in the very
>> next sentence in the text - "a pleasant exhaustion... an enjoyment of
>> our wellbeing arising from the restored equilibrium of the various
>> vital forces." This, Kant then writes, is analogous to the sensation
>> that arises just after having a full-body massage,
>
>
>"This, in the last resort, comes to no more than what the Eastern
>voluptuaries find so soothing when they get their bodies massaged . .
Kant is using Eastern massage therapy as an analogy for a sort of
"mental massage treatment" that poses as sublime but is not sublime,
only healthy.
Looks like we've found another blank spot in Charles' knowledge banks.
Sublimemassage.com
http://sublimemassage.com/2008/08/20/massageforrsi/
[/quote]
A common type of injury is the repetitive stress injury (RSI). The
most well-known RSI is probably carpal tunnel syndrome, but it's just
the tip of an iceberg. Other repetitive stress injury include thoracic
outlet syndrome, De Quervain's syndrome (inflammation of the thumb
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Repetitive stress can cause problems in your hands, wrists, forearms,
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stress their legs and hip joints can have repetitive stress problems
in their hips, knees, ankles, or feet.
Symptoms of Repetitive Stress Injury
Any repetitive activity, be it work, hobby, or sport, can potentially
cause injury. I sometimes hear people say, "I've been doing this
[insert activity] for years and it never hurt before." That is the
nature of repetitive stress injuries; they develop slowly over time.
Some people are more susceptible to injury than others.
Common symptoms of repetitive stress injury include:
Chronic tightness, discomfort, stiffness, or pain in any part of your
body, especially your hands, wrists, fingers, forearms, elbows, neck,
shoulders, or back.
* Tingling, coldness, or numbness in any area.
* Clumsiness or loss of strength and coordination in your hands.
* Pain that wakes you up at night.
How Can Massage Help Repetitive Stress Injury?
Carpal tunnel and thoracic outlet syndromes involve nerve compression.
What is compressing the nerves? In most cases, tight muscles. Massage
releases muscle tension, which relieves the compression and pain.
Regular stretching is also essential.
In other repetitive stress injury (such as tendonitis or ligament
injuries), muscle, tendon, or ligament fibers are torn. Specific work
on the injured fibers speeds healing by breaking up adhesions (stuck
together tissue) and excess scar tissue and by increasing circulation,
which brings in nutrients and removes waste products.
Regular massage can help any problem caused by tight or injured
muscles or injured tendons or ligaments.
Consider massage before resulting to more drastic treatments. Do
realize it's not a miracle cure and requires a regular treatment
schedule. You must also take responsibility for stretching and making
any needed changes in your activities.
[/unquote]
See, that's what happens when you limit yourself to Rand novels,
Charles in Charge. You think the whole world consists of the content
of Rand novels. You confuse fiction with reality and become naive to
the ways of the world outside your box. Rand novels are nothing more
to you than a sort of mental massage to soothe your fear of dealing
with the real world, they are not sublime.
Kant is just saying that some mental events (not massage therapy) can
be confused with sublimity but in fact lack the principledness which
makes for it.
But I realize you'll do anything to prove you're right, that's how
voluptuaries such as yourself always conduct themselves in debates.