Gardner and Intrinsicism
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy Speicher wrote in message ...
> >On 11 Jun 2000, Maurice Willey wrote:
> .... snipped agreements and interesting distractions
> >Rand said that truth is contextual. Different contexts (different
> >facts)
> Rand did not characterize different contexts as different
> facts, other than the contents of one's own mental states.
Different facts and different referents are _one_ of the ways that
contexts can differ. There are others such as differing motivations for
cognition, etc.
> >may yield different conclusions. Other than the basic axioms, no
> >conclusion covers all facts.
> We agreed all the way down to this point.
> Are you saying here that differing contexts (mental states) may yield
> differing true propositions about the same referents (external to
> one's mental state facts).
Sure. As we learn more about the referents we can make _more_ true
statements about them than we could when we knew less.
> By differing here I do not mean extensions or expansions of detail,
> but propositions which would contradict each other in some respect.
In the _same_ respect -- and I really mean SAME -- then, no.
Betsy Speicher
You'll know Objectivism is winning when ... you read the CyberNet -- the
most complete and comprehensive e-mail news source about Objectivists,
their activities, and their victories. Request a sample issue at
cybe...@speicher.com or visit http://www.stauffercom.com/cybernet/
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy Speicher wrote in message ...
> >On 11 Jun 2000, Maurice Willey wrote:
> On Monday the little boy asked his Dad "Where did I come from?"
> Whereupon his father explained that the Stork brought him.
> On Tuesday the boy went to school and told his friends that
> the Stork brought him to his family.
> On Wednesday the boy's Mom found out what Dad had said
> and after berating Dad called in the little boy and told him
> the simple facts of sexual biology.
> On Thursday the boy went to school and told his friends
> the new sexual version of where he came from.
> Now, was the little boy's story on Tuesday true?
> Was his story on Thursday true?
I don't know. It depends on whether the boy _understood_ the facts. On
Tuesday he showed a tendency to parrot whatever one of his parents said.
He may have been doing the same thing on Thursday. Having the truth means
not only having the "right answer," but having it for the right _reason_
as well.
> >> It boils down to the standard philosophical statement: Knowledge
> >> consists of justified true belief.
> >I know that is the standard formulation, but I would never state it
> >that way. "Justified" is redundant with "true" and knowledge involves
> >more that "beliefs." KNowledge is not a collection of "beliefs" but a
> >systematic, integrated hierarchy of concepts and their
> >interrelationships,
> Come now, you know better. Justified means coherent,
Very rarely. I graduated as a Philosophy major at the University of
Pennsylvania in 1966. In those days, the professors used "justified"
simply to mean "by the proper method" which, depending on their particular
theory, could mean symbolic logic, consulting your deepest feelings or
intuitions, or taking a poll.
> true means corresponds to facts,
Many moderns (especiall Nominalists) who use the "justified true belief"
formulation deny there is such a thing as facts. They hold that only
"beliefs" exist which are justified as true by demonstrating social
agreement.
> and belief mean that a consciousness actually contains the concept.
If so, knowledge could be a random collection of disconnected facts.
Rand held that human cognition required us to hold our knowledge as an
integrated whole becuase of the inherent limitations (the "crow
epistemology") of human consciousness.
> It is indistinguishable from Rand's
> formulation except by the peculiarly Objectivist terminology she uses.
The "knowledge as justified true belief" formulation is definitely
distinguishable from Ayn Rand's formulation by how modern philosophers use
it to make their case for irrational ideas.
> >> Which is what you were saying, but you were not addressing head-on the
> >> contention at issue - your husband's assertion that one may have a
> >> true belief that is false to fact.
> >That was not his contention.
> This is the quote that seems to be making that contention:
[Excerpts from Stephen's post]
I don't think I should be replying to Stephen's post, because that is up
to him and he chooses not to argue it in this forum. What I will suggest,
however, is that you carefully note _what_ he is saying is true and what
he is saying is false. They are not the same things.
Jim Klein
Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote:
>Having the truth means not only having the "right answer," but having it
>for the right _reason_ as well.
Really? You mean that when we form one of Rand's "first-level concepts,"
those aren't a form of truth because we have no explicit reason behind them?
Do you have _any_ cite from Rand which comes even close to supporting this
assertion?
>What I will suggest, however, is that you carefully note _what_ he is
>saying is true and what he is saying is false. They are not the same
>things.
The _only_ way you can get meaning out of this is to agree with what Ken's
been saying all along. If you don't believe that, then try...explain what
the first "_what_ he is saying" means and what the second "what he is
saying" means.
One of the them sure as hell is _exactly_ Ken's usage. Discover for
yourself, Betsy...explain the _meaning_ of what you wrote.
jk
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote:
>
> >Having the truth means not only having the "right answer," but having it
> >for the right _reason_ as well.
> Really? You mean that when we form one of Rand's "first-level
> concepts," those aren't a form of truth because we have no explicit
> reason behind them?
The "right reason" for forming a first-level concept (defined as one
formed solely from sense perception) is that one perceives it with one's
senses.
Jim Klein
Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote:
>On 13 Jun 2000, Jim Klein wrote:
>
>> Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote:
>>
>> >Having the truth means not only having the "right answer," but having it
>> >for the right _reason_ as well.
>
>> Really? You mean that when we form one of Rand's "first-level
>> concepts," those aren't a form of truth because we have no explicit
>> reason behind them?
>
>The "right reason" for forming a first-level concept (defined as one
>formed solely from sense perception) is that one perceives it with one's
>senses.
This is the Betsy I prefer...incredibly foolish, but at least honest.
jk
Maurice Willey
Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
news:Pine.LNX.4.20.00061...@hypermall.com...
> On 12 Jun 2000, Maurice Willey wrote:
>
> > Betsy Speicher wrote in message ...
>
> On 12 Jun 2000, Maurice Willey wrote:
>
> > Betsy Speicher wrote in message ...
>
> > >On 11 Jun 2000, Maurice Willey wrote:
>
> > On Monday the little boy asked his Dad "Where did I come from?"
> > Whereupon his father explained that the Stork brought him.
>
> > On Tuesday the boy went to school and told his friends that
> > the Stork brought him to his family.
>
> > On Wednesday the boy's Mom found out what Dad had said
> > and after berating Dad called in the little boy and told him
> > the simple facts of sexual biology.
>
> > On Thursday the boy went to school and told his friends
> > the new sexual version of where he came from.
>
> > Now, was the little boy's story on Tuesday true?
> > Was his story on Thursday true?
>
> I don't know. It depends on whether the boy _understood_ the facts. On
> Tuesday he showed a tendency to parrot whatever one of his parents said.
> not only having the "right answer," but having it for the right _reason_
> as well.
>
Betsy, I think you are confusing 'true' with 'valid'. Rand never would
have said that the Tuesday story was true. She might have said it
was valid, in the sense of a valid inference (only personally valid for
the boy. True can never be contrary to fact.
> > >> It boils down to the standard philosophical statement: Knowledge
> > >> consists of justified true belief.
>
> > >I know that is the standard formulation, but I would never state it
> > >that way. "Justified" is redundant with "true" and knowledge involves
> > >more that "beliefs." KNowledge is not a collection of "beliefs" but a
> > >systematic, integrated hierarchy of concepts and their
> > >interrelationships,
>
> > Come now, you know better. Justified means coherent,
>
> Very rarely. I graduated as a Philosophy major at the University of
> Pennsylvania in 1966. In those days, the professors used "justified"
> simply to mean "by the proper method" which, depending on their particular
> theory, could mean symbolic logic, consulting your deepest feelings or
> intuitions, or taking a poll.
>
Could you tell me what Coherent (in philosophical
terms) means other than integrated 'by the proper method'?
In Objectivism the proper method is reason.
> > true means corresponds to facts,
>
> Many moderns (especiall Nominalists) who use the "justified true belief"
> formulation deny there is such a thing as facts. They hold that only
> "beliefs" exist which are justified as true by demonstrating social
> agreement.
>
This is not germane, since Nominalists do not
adhere to the justified true belief definition, but
rather merely justified belief. The definition of Truth
in "The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy" is:
"the quality of those propositions that accord with
reality, specifying what is in fact the case."
> > and belief mean that a consciousness actually contains the concept.
>
> If so, knowledge could be a random collection of disconnected facts.
> Rand held that human cognition required us to hold our knowledge as an
> integrated whole becuase of the inherent limitations (the "crow
> epistemology") of human consciousness.
>
You have snipped out the context. We were talking
about _Justified_ true belief, which eliminates the
crow epistemology problem.
> > It is indistinguishable from Rand's
> > formulation except by the peculiarly Objectivist terminology she uses.
>
> The "knowledge as justified true belief" formulation is definitely
> distinguishable from Ayn Rand's formulation by how modern philosophers use
> it to make their case for irrational ideas.
>
Are you saying that the truth of a concept
depends upon how people misuse it
rather than upon its referents?
> > >> Which is what you were saying, but you were not addressing head-on
the
> > >> contention at issue - your husband's assertion that one may have a
> > >> true belief that is false to fact.
>
> > >That was not his contention.
>
> > This is the quote that seems to be making that contention:
>
> [Excerpts from Stephen's post]
>
> I don't think I should be replying to Stephen's post, because that is up
> to him and he chooses not to argue it in this forum. What I will suggest,
> however, is that you carefully note _what_ he is saying is true and what
> he is saying is false. They are not the same things.
>
I can accept your decision. Besides we have the
same issue in your answer to my Tuesday/Thursday
story.
Cheers.
f
t
b
f
t
b
f
t
b
f
t
b
f
t
b
f
t
b
f
t
b
f
t
b
f
t
b
Maurice Willey
Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
news:Pine.LNX.4.20.00061...@hypermall.com...
> On 12 Jun 2000, Maurice Willey wrote:
>
> > Betsy Speicher wrote in message ...
>
>
>
> > >Rand said that truth is contextual. Different contexts (different
> > >facts)
>
> > Rand did not characterize different contexts as different
> > facts, other than the contents of one's own mental states.
>
> Different facts and different referents are _one_ of the ways that
> contexts can differ. There are others such as differing motivations for
> cognition, etc.
Different facts? Facts are immutable, according to Rand,
referents, concepts and ideas may vary according to
context, but not facts (with the unremarkable exception of
the facts about our ideas about facts).
>
> > >may yield different conclusions. Other than the basic axioms, no
> > >conclusion covers all facts.
>
> > We agreed all the way down to this point.
>
> > Are you saying here that differing contexts (mental states) may yield
> > differing true propositions about the same referents (external to
> > one's mental state facts).
>
> Sure. As we learn more about the referents we can make _more_ true
> statements about them than we could when we knew less.
>
> > By differing here I do not mean extensions or expansions of detail,
> > but propositions which would contradict each other in some respect.
>
> In the _same_ respect -- and I really mean SAME -- then, no.
>
Well, what do you mean by same? If you and I are looking at
the same boulder, then Rand said that we can never come
up with contradictory facts, irregardless of context, about that
same boulder. The ideas we generate relative to those facts
may differ and contradict each other, but not the facts, ever.
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy, I think you are confusing 'true' with 'valid'. Rand never
> would have said that the Tuesday story was true. She might have said
> it was valid, in the sense of a valid inference (only personally valid
> for the boy. True can never be contrary to fact.
Rand did not use the term "valid," as modern philosophers do, to describe
reasoning which follows the rules of formal logic but is factually false.
That was because her view of logic was "the art of non-contradictory
identification" -- of reality. Logic, for her, included the truth of the
premises and false premises made an argument worthless.
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
> > Many moderns (especiall Nominalists) who use the "justified true belief"
> > formulation deny there is such a thing as facts. They hold that only
> > "beliefs" exist which are justified as true by demonstrating social
> > agreement.
> This is not germane, since Nominalists do not
> adhere to the justified true belief definition, but
> rather merely justified belief. The definition of Truth
> in "The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy" is:
> "the quality of those propositions that accord with
> reality, specifying what is in fact the case."
Nominalists use the term "reality" too. They just mean something very
different from what Objectivists mean.
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
> > On 12 Jun 2000, Maurice Willey wrote:
> > > Betsy Speicher wrote in message ...
> > The "knowledge as justified true belief" formulation is definitely
> > distinguishable from Ayn Rand's formulation by how modern
> > philosophers use it to make their case for irrational ideas.
> Are you saying that the truth of a concept
> depends upon how people misuse it
> rather than upon its referents?
I would say that when irrational people usually use non-essential
attributes and/or contradictory referents when employing a well-known
formulation like "knowledge as justified true belief," that rational
people have better ways of communicating their views and should avoid such
formulations.
Jim Klein
Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote:
>I would say that when irrational people usually use non-essential
>attributes and/or contradictory referents when employing a well-known
>formulation like "knowledge as justified true belief," that rational
>people have better ways of communicating their views and should avoid such
>formulations.
I agree with that, but notice that this is far more precise than Peikoff's
usage of "conclusive"...that's pretty tough to pin down too, after all. At
least in this case, you have the English version of "true" to mandate that
the belief is correspondent with reality.
Whatever non-essential or contradictory you find with "justified"
necessarily applies to "conclusive" as well; in these cases they're
basically synonyms.
But that discussion is only about words anyway. When all the details are
stripped away, your problem is that you and your husband believe a statement
can be true even if it's not factual. And that, of course, is an inversion
of an objective epistemology; it's explicitly subjective, dependent as it
is on the state of mind of the subject.
That's pretty well the extent of it, as far as the _ideas_ are concerned.
jk
Maurice Willey
> On 15 Jun 2000, Maurice Willey wrote:
>
> > would have said that the Tuesday story was true. She might have said
> > it was valid, in the sense of a valid inference (only personally valid
> > for the boy. True can never be contrary to fact.
>
> Rand did not use the term "valid," as modern philosophers do, to describe
> reasoning which follows the rules of formal logic but is factually false.
> That was because her view of logic was "the art of non-contradictory
> identification" -- of reality. Logic, for her, included the truth of the
> premises and false premises made an argument worthless.
>
From ITOE, 2nd ed, pb, p43:
"...when a child first learns to differentiate men from the rest of his
perceptual field, he observes distinguishing characteristics which,
if translated into words, would amount to a definition such as: 'A
thing that moves and makes sounds.' Within the context of his
awareness this is a valid definition: man in fact does move and
make sounds. ... When the child observes the existence of cats,
dogs and automobiles, his definition ceases to be valid ... .
[Several more examples of valid but incomplete definitions are
given] ... Observe that all of the above versions of a a definition
of man were TRUE, i.e., were correct identifications of the facts
of reality - and that they were valid QUA definitions, i.e., were
correct selections of distinguishing characteristics in a given
context of knowledge. None of them was contradicted by
subsequent knowledge: they were included implicitly, as non-
defining characteristics, in a more precise definition of man."
Note several things from this passage that are germane to
our discussion:
1) Rand definitively distinguishes true from valid in the
context of definitions.
2) True only requires correct identification of the facts of
reality, and correctness is required for being true.
3) Validity, for definitions, requires correct identification
AND selection of characteristics in a given context.
4) A valid definition cannot be contradicted by subsequent
knowledge.
5) A valid definition can be invalidated by subsequent
knowledge, but not falsified, only subsumed.
Again from Ibid, p49:
"There are such things as invalid concepts, i.e., words
that represent attempts to integrate errors, contradictions
or false propositions ..."
This sems to me to pretty clearly indicate Rand did use
the term invalid to indicate "reasoning which follows the
rules of formal logic but is factually false".
Cheers.
Maurice Willey
Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
news:Pine.LNX.4.20.00061...@hypermall.com...
> On 15 Jun 2000, Maurice Willey wrote:
>
> > Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
>
belief"
> > > formulation deny there is such a thing as facts. They hold that only
> > > "beliefs" exist which are justified as true by demonstrating social
> > > agreement.
>
> > This is not germane, since Nominalists do not
> > adhere to the justified true belief definition, but
> > rather merely justified belief. The definition of Truth
> > in "The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy" is:
> > "the quality of those propositions that accord with
> > reality, specifying what is in fact the case."
>
> Nominalists use the term "reality" too. They just mean something very
> different from what Objectivists mean.
>
What is it that they mean?
Maurice Willey
Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
news:Pine.LNX.4.20.00061...@hypermall.com...
> On 15 Jun 2000, Maurice Willey wrote:
>
> > Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
>
>
> > > > Betsy Speicher wrote in message ...
>
> > > The "knowledge as justified true belief" formulation is definitely
> > > distinguishable from Ayn Rand's formulation by how modern
> > > philosophers use it to make their case for irrational ideas.
>
> > Are you saying that the truth of a concept
> > depends upon how people misuse it
> > rather than upon its referents?
>
> attributes and/or contradictory referents when employing a well-known
> formulation like "knowledge as justified true belief," that rational
> people have better ways of communicating their views and should avoid such
> formulations.
>
Justified true belief strikes me as extremely efficient
and precise in its formulation. I, and I think any
'rational' person would, understand immediately
what it means, all the referents for its terms are clear
and well understood. Its value lies in precisely in the
fact that it forces such clear distinctions between the
use of terms among various differing philosophical
advocates. Why should I abandon such a useful
formulation because some people may read it
irrationally? Especially since its terms do not
contradict Objectivism's tenets.
Irrational people misuse essential Objectivist terms
such as Capitalism, freedom, individual, altruism, and
collectivism far more than they misuse terms like
justified, true, or belief.
Could your objection merely be that the words are not
Rand's?
Cheers.
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
> > Different facts and different referents are _one_ of the ways that
> > contexts can differ. There are others such as differing motivations for
> > cognition, etc.
> Different facts? Facts are immutable, according to Rand,
> referents, concepts and ideas may vary according to
> context, but not facts (with the unremarkable exception of
> the facts about our ideas about facts).
I meant the fact under consideration, being explained, etc. Newton's laws
were not meant to explain, and do not necessarily include, the behavior of
sub-atomic particles even though they are facts.
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
> > On 12 Jun 2000, Maurice Willey wrote:
> > > Betsy Speicher wrote in message ...
> > > By differing here I do not mean extensions or expansions of detail,
> > > but propositions which would contradict each other in some respect.
> > In the _same_ respect -- and I really mean SAME -- then, no.
> Well, what do you mean by same? If you and I are looking at
> the same boulder, then Rand said that we can never come
> up with contradictory facts, irregardless of context, about that
> same boulder. The ideas we generate relative to those facts
> may differ and contradict each other, but not the facts, ever.
Context, context! How many tons does the boulder weight? It depends on
whether you are measuring it in English tons or short tons. Is it heavy?
Compared to what? Can you move it? It depends on whether you have heavy
equipment or you use your bare hands.
It you control for all the differences in subject matter, meanings of
concepts, personal purposes and other things which may be differentt
between two people considering the same facts of reality, then you are
talking about the same thing -- but don't assume it.
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
> > On 15 Jun 2000, Maurice Willey wrote:
> > > Betsy, I think you are confusing 'true' with 'valid'. Rand never
> > > would have said that the Tuesday story was true. She might have
> > > said it was valid, in the sense of a valid inference (only
> > > personally valid for the boy. True can never be contrary to fact.
> > Rand did not use the term "valid," as modern philosophers do, to
> > describe reasoning which follows the rules of formal logic but is
> > factually false. That was because her view of logic was "the art of
> > non-contradictory identification" -- of reality. Logic, for her,
> > included the truth of the premises and false premises made an argument
> > worthless.
> From ITOE, 2nd ed, pb, p43:
>
> [...]
> Note several things from this passage that are germane to
> our discussion:
>
> 1) Rand definitively distinguishes true from valid in the
> context of definitions.
Observe, as I said, that "Rand did not use the term "valid," AS MODERN
PHILOSOPHERS DO, to describe reasoning which follows the rules of formal
logic but is factually false." She does use the concept of "valid,"
however, not only with respect to definitions, but also with respect to
axioms also.
> 2) True only requires correct identification of the facts of
> reality, and correctness is required for being true.
Correct identification of the facts is what it MEANS to be true.
> 3) Validity, for definitions, requires correct identification
> AND selection of characteristics in a given context.
> 4) A valid definition cannot be contradicted by subsequent
> knowledge.
> 5) A valid definition can be invalidated by subsequent
> knowledge, but not falsified, only subsumed.
All true.
> Again from Ibid, p49:
> "There are such things as invalid concepts, i.e., words
> that represent attempts to integrate errors, contradictions
> or false propositions ..."
> This sems to me to pretty clearly indicate Rand did use
> the term invalid to indicate "reasoning which follows the
> rules of formal logic but is factually false".
Not at all. I don't see any premises or syllogisms. Where's the "formal
logic?"
What is "invalid" about an invalid concept is that it is an improper
attempt to make a concept out of a contradiction. To call that "formal
logic" and say that Rand is using the idea of validity as the moderns do,
is really stretching it.
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
> > Nominalists use the term "reality" too. They just mean something very
> > different from what Objectivists mean.
> What is it that they mean?
The most common thing I have heard is reality as a "social construct."
The Blacks have their reality and Whites have a different one, women's
reality is different from men's, and other such nonsense.
Betsy Speicher
> Justified true belief strikes me as extremely efficient
> and precise in its formulation. I, and I think any
> 'rational' person would, understand immediately
> what it means, all the referents for its terms are clear
> and well understood. Its value lies in precisely in the
> fact that it forces such clear distinctions between the
> use of terms among various differing philosophical
> advocates. Why should I abandon such a useful
> formulation because some people may read it
> irrationally? Especially since its terms do not
> contradict Objectivism's tenets.
Hasn't it ever happened to you that some college professor who advocated
"truth as justified true belief" also advocated totally crazy ideas?
> Could your objection merely be that the words are not Rand's?
Not at all. The formulation would have serious problems even if Ayn Rand
endorsed it.
Maurice Willey
> On 15 Jun 2000, Maurice Willey wrote:
>
>
> > > > would have said that the Tuesday story was true. She might have
> > > > said it was valid, in the sense of a valid inference (only
> > > > personally valid for the boy. True can never be contrary to fact.
>
> > > Rand did not use the term "valid," as modern philosophers do, to
> > > describe reasoning which follows the rules of formal logic but is
> > > factually false. That was because her view of logic was "the art of
> > > non-contradictory identification" -- of reality. Logic, for her,
> > > included the truth of the premises and false premises made an argument
> > > worthless.
>
> > From ITOE, 2nd ed, pb, p43:
> >
> > [...]
>
> > Note several things from this passage that are germane to
> > our discussion:
> >
> > 1) Rand definitively distinguishes true from valid in the
> > context of definitions.
>
> Observe, as I said, that "Rand did not use the term "valid," AS MODERN
> PHILOSOPHERS DO, to describe reasoning which follows the rules of formal
> logic but is factually false." She does use the concept of "valid,"
> however, not only with respect to definitions, but also with respect to
> axioms also.
>
>
> > Again from Ibid, p49:
>
> > "There are such things as invalid concepts, i.e., words
> > that represent attempts to integrate errors, contradictions
> > or false propositions ..."
>
> > This sems to me to pretty clearly indicate Rand did use
> > the term invalid to indicate "reasoning which follows the
> > rules of formal logic but is factually false".
>
> Not at all. I don't see any premises or syllogisms. Where's the "formal
> logic?"
>
> What is "invalid" about an invalid concept is that it is an improper
> attempt to make a concept out of a contradiction. To call that "formal
> logic" and say that Rand is using the idea of validity as the moderns do,
> is really stretching it.
>
Perhaps you had better clarify what you mean by "formal
logic".
The "Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy" says:
"FORMAL LOGIC, the science of correct reasoning, going
back to Aristotle's 'Prior Analysis'. Based upon the premise
that the validity of an argument is a function of its structure
or logical form."
Given that Rand named the Sections of Atlas Shrugged with
Aristotle's formulations of the fundamental structures of
formal logic, I have a hard time seeing what you are driving
at with the distinction you are trying to make.
"Errors, contradictions and false propositions" refer to
logical reasoning and apply to the phrase "reasoning
which follows the rules of formal logic but is factually
false".
Cheers.
Maurice Willey
Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
news:Pine.LNX.4.20.000615...@hypermall.com...
> On 15 Jun 2000, Maurice Willey wrote:
>
> > Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
>
> > > different from what Objectivists mean.
>
> > What is it that they mean?
>
> The most common thing I have heard is reality as a "social construct."
> The Blacks have their reality and Whites have a different one, women's
> reality is different from men's, and other such nonsense.
>
Nominalists hold that only real 'things' exist. That
properties such as 'big', 'little', 'red', 'old' are mental
inventions that should not be invested in the 'thing'
itself. Likewise with relationships, 'family', 'kind',
'type' and so on are also inventions of our minds
and should not be confused with the real 'things'.
From this position they claim that properties and
relationships only have meaning as 'social
constructs', which doesn't seem completely
alien to the contextual basis for truth that you have
been advocating.
They are not advocating that reality is different
than you and I see it, but that the origin of the
terms we use to describe it is very different.
From that position one can see how they can
move to a cultural basis for terminology as a
determining factor in a world view, but then so
do you wind up there with contextual truth.
Cheers.
Maurice Willey
Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
news:Pine.LNX.4.20.000615...@hypermall.com...
> On 15 Jun 2000, Maurice Willey wrote:
>
> > and precise in its formulation. I, and I think any
> > 'rational' person would, understand immediately
> > what it means, all the referents for its terms are clear
> > and well understood. Its value lies in precisely in the
> > fact that it forces such clear distinctions between the
> > use of terms among various differing philosophical
> > advocates. Why should I abandon such a useful
> > formulation because some people may read it
> > irrationally? Especially since its terms do not
> > contradict Objectivism's tenets.
>
> Hasn't it ever happened to you that some college professor who advocated
> "truth as justified true belief" also advocated totally crazy ideas?
>
Sure, but my response is the same as before, why should
someone's misuse of a term invalidate its correct use?
You didn't respond to my noting that many terms used
by Objectivists "Capitalism, freedom, individual, altruism,
and collectivism" are habitually connected with crazy
ideas and we don't discard them. I don't like the idea of
abandoning concepts because they have been used
irrationally but are not irrational in themselves. That
sounds like conceding the field to me.
Cheers.
Maurice Willey
Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
news:Pine.LNX.4.20.000615...@hypermall.com...
> On 15 Jun 2000, Maurice Willey wrote:
>
> > Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
>
> > > contexts can differ. There are others such as differing motivations
for
> > > cognition, etc.
>
> > Different facts? Facts are immutable, according to Rand,
> > referents, concepts and ideas may vary according to
> > context, but not facts (with the unremarkable exception of
> > the facts about our ideas about facts).
>
> I meant the fact under consideration, being explained, etc. Newton's laws
> were not meant to explain, and do not necessarily include, the behavior of
> sub-atomic particles even though they are facts.
>
OK.
Maurice Willey
Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
news:Pine.LNX.4.20.000615...@hypermall.com...
> On 15 Jun 2000, Maurice Willey wrote:
>
> > Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
>
>
> > > > Betsy Speicher wrote in message ...
>
> > > > By differing here I do not mean extensions or expansions of detail,
> > > > but propositions which would contradict each other in some respect.
>
> > > In the _same_ respect -- and I really mean SAME -- then, no.
>
> > Well, what do you mean by same? If you and I are looking at
> > the same boulder, then Rand said that we can never come
> > up with contradictory facts, irregardless of context, about that
> > same boulder. The ideas we generate relative to those facts
> > may differ and contradict each other, but not the facts, ever.
>
> Context, context! How many tons does the boulder weight? It depends on
> whether you are measuring it in English tons or short tons. Is it heavy?
> Compared to what? Can you move it? It depends on whether you have heavy
> equipment or you use your bare hands.
>
> It you control for all the differences in subject matter, meanings of
> concepts, personal purposes and other things which may be differentt
> between two people considering the same facts of reality, then you are
> talking about the same thing -- but don't assume it.
>
I think at this point we are in agreement, though I am
not certain. The context only comes into play in a
semantic sense, not a metaphysical one. English tons
or short tons do not make a differance in heaviness nor
in how it is measured, only in the scale markings.
Heaviness always implies a comparison. Whether you
move it with hands and levers or I use a bulldozer, the
same amount of force is required. No version of factual
observation can conflict with someone else's
observation of the same thing.
Cheers.
Robert J. Kolker
Maurice Willey wrote:
>
> Nominalists hold that only real 'things' exist. That
> properties such as 'big', 'little', 'red', 'old' are mental
> inventions that should not be invested in the 'thing'
> itself. Likewise with relationships, 'family', 'kind',
> 'type' and so on are also inventions of our minds
> and should not be confused with the real 'things'.
Thus far this is dead on correct. Relationships require
a conscious intellect for their very existence. In reality
devoid of conscious purposeful beings (such as we
are) there would be only atomic things. Aggregates
would not exist, pairs, triples, ... n-tuples of things
would not exist. There would only be unities in and of
themselves and their physical interactions.
In a world devoid of intellect there would still be boiling
water but there would be no temperature scales.
It is always important to distinguish what is "out there" from
what is in our heads. Otherwise we should deceive ourselves
and be confused by our own propaganda.
Bob Kolker
Tom S.
> attempt to make a concept out of a contradiction. To call that "formal
> logic" and say that Rand is using the idea of validity as the moderns do,
> is really stretching it.
>
contemporary use? I've never noticed her claim a difference, though I'm not
an expert by any means.
Thanks,
Tom Scheeler
--
"He that would make his own liberty secure, must guard even his enemy from
oppression; for if he violates this duty, he establishes a precedent that
will reach to himself." -- Thomas Paine
Robert J. Kolker
Betsy Speicher wrote:
>
> Context, context! How many tons does the boulder weight? It depends on
> whether you are measuring it in English tons or short tons. Is it heavy?
> Compared to what? Can you move it? It depends on whether you have heavy
> equipment or you use your bare hands.
The sensible question is "what is the mass of the boulder". The units we use
are mere names for the underlying reality, the mass of the boulder. The
term heavy is meaningless precisely because it does not have a definite
meaning. Fuzzy terms should be used with extreme caution because at
best they convey only a partial impression of reality.
Most of our errors stem not from what is outright wrong, but from what
is incomplete.
Bob Kolker
Betsy Speicher
> "Betsy Speicher" <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
> > What is "invalid" about an invalid concept is that it is an improper
> > attempt to make a concept out of a contradiction. To call that
> > "formal logic" and say that Rand is using the idea of validity as the
> > moderns do, is really stretching it.
> Could you please distinguish between her use of the word "valid", and
> common contemporary use? I've never noticed her claim a difference,
> though I'm not an expert by any means.
Moderns tend to use the word "valid" to apply to formal (i.e.,
syllogistic) logic only. Rand uses the term more broadly to also include
_all_ proper reasoning methods. Thus, axioms are validated (by processes
like Reaffirmation Through Denial) and not proved because proof (and
syllogisms) are based on the axioms.
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
> > Observe, as I said, that "Rand did not use the term "valid," AS
> > MODERN PHILOSOPHERS DO, to describe reasoning which follows the rules
> > of formal logic but is factually false." She does use the concept of
> > "valid," however, not only with respect to definitions, but also with
> > respect to axioms also.
> > [...]
> > What is "invalid" about an invalid concept is that it is an improper
> > attempt to make a concept out of a contradiction. To call that
> > "formal logic" and say that Rand is using the idea of validity as the
> > moderns do, is really stretching it.
> Perhaps you had better clarify what you mean by "formal
> logic".
> The "Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy" says:
> "FORMAL LOGIC, the science of correct reasoning, going
> back to Aristotle's 'Prior Analysis'. Based upon the premise
> that the validity of an argument is a function of its structure
> or logical form."
> Given that Rand named the Sections of Atlas Shrugged with
> Aristotle's formulations of the fundamental structures of
> formal logic, I have a hard time seeing what you are driving
> at with the distinction you are trying to make.
"Formal logic" is logic based on the form of the argument alone.
"Informal logic" deals with all other reasoning.
"Undistributed middle" is a "formal" fallacy while "ad hominem," "ad
baculum," and "hasty generalization" are informal fallacies.
Objectivists use the term "logic" to apply to _all_ reasoning whose goal
is non-contradictory identification of reality, and not just to formal,
syllogistic reasoning (which is very important, of course).
Steve Davis
"Betsy Speicher" :
> Hasn't it ever happened to you that some college professor
> who advocated "truth as justified true belief" also advocated
> totally crazy ideas?
Not to mention a self-referential-- and thus incoherent-- definition of
truth.
--
http://www.stratrant.com
Controversial and provocative essays on
American politics, culture and philosophy.
Maurice Willey
Okay, I think we agree on this. What then is your objection to using
valid in this passage:
"Betsy, I think you are confusing 'true' with 'valid'. Rand never
would have said that the Tuesday story was true. She might have said
it was valid, in the sense of a valid inference (only personally valid
for the boy. True can never be contrary to fact."
Cheers.
Maurice Willey
Steve Davis <st...@pobox.com> wrote in message
news:LhN25.63505$WS3.6...@typhoon.we.rr.com...
>
>
> "Betsy Speicher" :
>
> > Hasn't it ever happened to you that some college professor
> > who advocated "truth as justified true belief" also advocated
> > totally crazy ideas?
>
> Not to mention a self-referential-- and thus incoherent-- definition of
> truth.
>
This was a misquote on Betsy's part. The proposition
is "Knowledge is justified true belief."
Secondly, as Peikoff said, all true definitions are
self-referential, they boil down to the form A is A.
Thirdly, Truth, as used by Betsy and Rand , is not
the same as true, it stands in for a "true idea",
so Betsy's proposition is not that incoherent after
all.
Cheers.
Maurice Willey
Robert J. Kolker <bobk...@usa.net> wrote in message
news:3949E2E3...@usa.net...
I do enjoy your iconoclasm.
Of course, I don't agree. The qualities defined by a
property or relationship exist "out there", any
conceptualization or recognition that they are there
happens "in here". In order for the quality to only
exist "in here" we would have to invent it, and could
then be free to invent any relationship we wanted,
which is clearly not the case. Correspondence is
out there, coherence is in here.
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote in message
> > Objectivists use the term "logic" to apply to _all_ reasoning whose goal
> > is non-contradictory identification of reality, and not just to formal,
> > syllogistic reasoning (which is very important, of course).
> Okay, I think we agree on this. What then is your objection to using
> valid in this passage:
> "Betsy, I think you are confusing 'true' with 'valid'. Rand never
> would have said that the Tuesday story was true. She might have said
> it was valid, in the sense of a valid inference (only personally valid
> for the boy. True can never be contrary to fact."
The boy in your example was claiming something ws true based only on his
father's say-so without any first-hand evidence whatsoever. He took his
father on faith. Ayn Rand held that accepting conclusions on faith is
always invalid -- even if it corresponds with reality.
Ken Gardner, on the other hand ....
Ken Gardner
> Ayn Rand held that accepting conclusions on faith is
> always invalid -- even if it corresponds with reality.
> Ken Gardner, on the other hand ....
On the other hand....what?
Ken
Betsy Speicher
> On the other hand....what?
I'll make my implied question explicit. If you accept an idea which
corresponds to facts, but do it on faith, do you have the truth or do you
have an arbitrary idea held as a floating abstraction?
(I realize that if an idea corresponds to facts, that _somebody_else_ may
have the truth, but I am asking what _you_ have when you take the same
idea on faith.)
Jim Klein
Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote:
>I'll make my implied question explicit. If you accept an idea which
>corresponds to facts, but do it on faith, do you have the truth or do you
>have an arbitrary idea held as a floating abstraction?
>
>(I realize that if an idea corresponds to facts, that _somebody_else_ may
>have the truth, but I am asking what _you_ have when you take the same
>idea on faith.)
By George...you've got it! This is _exactly_ the point I've been trying to
make about _you_ with regard to Objectivism for several years now.
That's why you and Rand can ostensively agree on so many conclusions, even
as your philosophy is precisely the opposite of hers. Well done!
jk
Ken Gardner
> > > Ayn Rand held that accepting conclusions on faith is
> > > always invalid -- even if it corresponds with reality.
> > > Ken Gardner, on the other hand ....
> > On the other hand....what?
> I'll make my implied question explicit. If you accept an idea which
> corresponds to facts, but do it on faith, do you have the truth or do you
> have an arbitrary idea held as a floating abstraction?
No, you don't have truth. The reason is that you have not grasped the
correspondence between the referents of your idea and the facts.
Ken
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy Speicher says...
> > I'll make my implied question explicit. If you accept an idea which
> > corresponds to facts, but do it on faith, do you have the truth or do
> > you have an arbitrary idea held as a floating abstraction?
> No, you don't have truth. The reason is that you have not grasped the
> correspondence between the referents of your idea and the facts.
The person who does this would say, "I HAVE grasped the correspondence --
by faith -- and I just _know_ it is true. Don't you agree it is true?
What is the problem?"
What would you say to that?
Ken Gardner
> > > I'll make my implied question explicit. If you accept an idea which
> > > corresponds to facts, but do it on faith, do you have the truth or do
> > > you have an arbitrary idea held as a floating abstraction?
> > No, you don't have truth. The reason is that you have not grasped the
> > correspondence between the referents of your idea and the facts.
> The person who does this would say, "I HAVE grasped the correspondence --
> by faith -- and I just _know_ it is true. Don't you agree it is true?
> What is the problem?"
> What would you say to that?
I would say what I have said all along: the idea itself is true, but the
person hasn't _grasped_ that it is true, i.e. he has not grasped its
_truth_ in his own mind.
Ken
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy Speicher says...
> > The person who does this would say, "I HAVE grasped the correspondence --
> > by faith -- and I just _know_ it is true. Don't you agree it is true?
> > What is the problem?"
> > What would you say to that?
> I would say what I have said all along: the idea itself is true, but the
> person hasn't _grasped_ that it is true, i.e. he has not grasped its
> _truth_ in his own mind.
He thinks he _has_.
I'll ask again: What would you _say_ to him -- what _reason_ would you
give him -- to show that he hasn't grasped that it is true? If his ideas
and statements correspond to the facts -- as you keep on saying -- what
_more_ does he need?
Meaghan Walker-Williams
Betsy Speicher wrote:
>
> On 20 Jun 2000, Ken Gardner wrote:
>
> > Betsy Speicher says...
>
> > > The person who does this would say, "I HAVE grasped the correspondence --
> > > by faith -- and I just _know_ it is true. Don't you agree it is true?
> > > What is the problem?"
>
> > > What would you say to that?
>
> > I would say what I have said all along: the idea itself is true, but the
> > person hasn't _grasped_ that it is true, i.e. he has not grasped its
> > _truth_ in his own mind.
>
> He thinks he _has_.
This is very telling - isn't it?
>
> I'll ask again: What would you _say_ to him -- what _reason_ would you
> give him -- to show that he hasn't grasped that it is true? If his ideas
> and statements correspond to the facts -- as you keep on saying -- what
> _more_ does he need?
The ability to integrate the logic which results in one's conclusions...
So that one doesn't end up simply parroting other people's ideas with
no real understanding of what one is saying.
That is what is so seductive about Objectivism for some people.
Not very bright people, can, simply by memorizing large amounts of
Rands ideas - present themselves as being truely capable thinkers.
Sadly however, when it is required of them to do more than second-hand
the ideas they end up looking like foolish boobs.
Meaghan Walker-Williams
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy Speicher wrote:
> > On 20 Jun 2000, Ken Gardner wrote:
> > > Betsy Speicher says...
> > > > The person who does this would say, "I HAVE grasped the
> > > > correspondence -- by faith -- and I just _know_ it is true. Don't
> > > > you agree it is true? What is the problem?"
> > > > What would you say to that?
> > > I would say what I have said all along: the idea itself is true,
> > > but the person hasn't _grasped_ that it is true, i.e. he has not
> > > grasped its _truth_ in his own mind.
> > He thinks he _has_.
> > I'll ask again: What would you _say_ to him -- what _reason_ would
> > you give him -- to show that he hasn't grasped that it is true? If
> > his ideas and statements correspond to the facts -- as you keep on
> > saying -- what _more_ does he need?
> The ability to integrate the logic which results in one's
> conclusions... So that one doesn't end up simply parroting other
> people's ideas with no real understanding of what one is saying.
That's the point we have been arguing with Ken Gardner about. Those on my
side say that both correspondence AND coherence (integration without
contradiction into the total context of one's knowledge) is necessary to
have truth. Ken has been arguing that correspondence alone is not only
necessary, but _sufficient_ as well.
Then he's left with his current contradictory claim that someone who
accepts something that corresponds to facts, but does it by faith, doesn't
have the truth after all.
I'd like him to explain, if correspondence is sufficient, why the faithful
guy _doesn't_ have the truth.
Robert J. Kolker
Betsy Speicher wrote:
>
> That's the point we have been arguing with Ken Gardner about. Those on my
> side say that both correspondence AND coherence (integration without
> contradiction into the total context of one's knowledge) is necessary to
> have truth. Ken has been arguing that correspondence alone is not only
> necessary, but _sufficient_ as well.
Correspondence implies coherence (internal consistency). A set of factually
true statements cannot contradict each other, hence form a coherent set.
Correspondence does the trick. A set of statements no pair of which contradict
each other could all be false. Coherence does not imply correspondence, but
correspondence implies coherence.
Bob kolker
Dan Lind
I think what Betsy is asking is:
Ok, a statement must correspond with the facts it refers to in
order to be a true statement. And how do you know when you have
correspondence?
Dan Lind (aka samatar)
Got questions? Get answers over the phone at Keen.com.
Up to 100 minutes free!
http://www.keen.com
Robert J. Kolker
Dan Lind wrote:
>
> Ok, a statement must correspond with the facts it refers to in
> order to be a true statement. And how do you know when you have
> correspondence?
Look and see. How else do you tell when a statement is true?
Bob Kolker
Ken Gardner
> Ok, a statement must correspond with the facts it refers to in
> order to be a true statement. And how do you know when you have
> correspondence?
Dan, do you understand that these are two separate issues?
Ken
Ken Gardner
Bob, you get it.
When Betsy says that the "integration without contradiction" requirement
pertains to coherence, she _doesn't_ get it.
Her position implies, wrongly, that a conclusion that corresponds with
the facts may nevertheless be false -- that's what it means to say that
correspondence is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the
conclusion to be true.
Ken
Ken Gardner
> > I would say what I have said all along: the idea itself is true, but the
> > person hasn't _grasped_ that it is true, i.e. he has not grasped its
> > _truth_ in his own mind.
> He thinks he _has_.
Yeah, he thinks he has, he may even believe that has, but in fact he is
wrong. Why is he wrong? Because his conclusion doesn't correspond to
the facts!
> I'll ask again: What would you _say_ to him -- what _reason_ would you
> give him -- to show that he hasn't grasped that it is true?
In his case, i.e. a person who has accepted a true conclusion on blind
faith, I would point out his inability to point to the facts that lead to
his conclusion, i.e. his inability to grasp the correspondence between
the referents of his conclusion and the facts as they actually are.
> If his ideas
> and statements correspond to the facts -- as you keep on saying -- what
> _more_ does he need?
He needs to _grasp_ that the statement is true, i.e. that the referents
of his statement correspond to the facts. But the referents either
correspond or don't correspond to the facts regardless of whether he
chooses to grasp the nature of the correspondence.
Ken
Dan Lind
Ken,
I am learning to exercise caution in this forum when I believe I
understand something, lol. But yes, I do.
I also think that this may be what Betsy has been driving at.
Dan Lind
Jim Klein
Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote:
>>I would say what I have said all along: the idea itself is true, but the
>>person hasn't _grasped_ that it is true, i.e. he has not grasped its
>>_truth_ in his own mind.
>
>He thinks he _has_.
>
>I'll ask again: What would you _say_ to him -- what _reason_ would you
>give him -- to show that he hasn't grasped that it is true? If his ideas
>and statements correspond to the facts -- as you keep on saying -- what
>_more_ does he need?
If he thinks he has grasped it as a truth but hasn't, then there must be
some evidence indicating that he hasn't. Presumably that evidence would
demonstrate to him that he really hasn't grasped it as a truth.
If you're asking, "What if it doesn't because he doesn't accept the validity
of truth being derived from evidence," then there's not much one can say to
him. And indeed, this is precisely the problem I've faced with trying to
convince you that your epistemology is something other than objective. You
have accepted a very large set of ideas upon faith, but you believe them to
be true [Objectivese meaning] nonetheless. And the reason it's so hard to
demonstrate your error is because so many of the conclusions _are_ true, in
Ken's meaning of the word.
That's why the whole ARIan fraud has been so successful. Nearly all of the
assertions are true [English], even as nearly none of them are derived as
truths [Objectivese]. This is very hard for an uninformed observer to
identify. Luckily Stephen has carried the inversion to its ultimate ends,
so nearly everyone can readily see that a major error is going on.
And nearly everyone has. So really, it turns out the Stephen did have
something of value to offer all along!
jk
Jim Klein
Dan Lind <danlind1...@msn.com.invalid> wrote:
>Bob,
>
>I think what Betsy is asking is:
>
>Ok, a statement must correspond with the facts it refers to in
>order to be a true statement. And how do you know when you have
>correspondence?
I keep telling you...Betsy doesn't hold with your first sentence here. I
mean she might but since her husband explicitly doesn't, her loyalty must be
to him. Personally I respect that in a woman though in Betsy's case it
comes from a general philosophy of allegiance, which I think is less
respectable.
If "a statement must correspond with the facts it refers to in
order to be a true statement," then "Milton Friedman is a red" couldn't be a
true statement since it doesn't correspond with the facts and never did.
And it's not because "it means something else," because it was stipulated
that even _with_ the meaning every English speaker gives it, it was true
even though it's false according to the Speicher Theory of Truth.
Or, there's the example of one's impression of a feigned reality being true
of reality even though it doesn't correspond with the facts, on the basis
that it corresponds with the "facts asserted."
I'm sorry if my style is throwing you off, but you're really missing the
point. Like I keep saying, it's so preposterous that you can't believe
anyone could actually think that correspondence isn't necessary for truth.
Believe it. Then you'll understand how nuking millions of innocent people
for no reason at all (like literally no reason at all) is objectively moral.
jk
Jim Klein
Ken Gardner <kesga...@home.com> wrote:
>When Betsy says that the "integration without contradiction" requirement
>pertains to coherence, she _doesn't_ get it.
>
>Her position implies, wrongly, that a conclusion that corresponds with
>the facts may nevertheless be false --
I don't think that's right; I think she'd say it's arbitrary.
Her position, or at least Stephen's position, is far more foolish than
even this claptrap.
>that's what it means to say that correspondence is a necessary, but not
>sufficient, condition for the conclusion to be true.
Speaking to Stephen's position, which I'm pretty sure is Betsy's "position
du jour," it clearly and unequivocally is a simple coherence theory. If a
given assertion is consistent with all of the other thoughts (which
admittedly arise through evidence) in a person's mind, then it's
automatically true. It's TRUE that Milton Friedman was a red because that
conclusion was consistent with every piece of evidence at Rand's avail.
Feigned reality is actually TRUE because it's consistent with a given set of
FACTS ASSERTED, and to hell with correspondence (or not) with other facts.
IOW, correspondence is NOT necessary to this yahoo and coherence IS
sufficient. This is the only way to read his position in both examples,
with the caveat that he could have been lying about what his position is.
jk
Jim Klein
>> The ability to integrate the logic which results in one's
>> conclusions... So that one doesn't end up simply parroting other
>> people's ideas with no real understanding of what one is saying.
>
>That's the point we have been arguing with Ken Gardner about.
Found someone that doesn't know the details of the discussion, eh Betsy?
>Those on my side say that both correspondence AND coherence (integration
>without contradiction into the total context of one's knowledge) is
>necessary to have truth. Ken has been arguing that correspondence alone is
>not only necessary, but _sufficient_ as well.
But I doubt you can find anyone that doesn't know dishonesty runs deep in
the Speicher household. What a bullshit framing this is. Ken has been
arguing exactly one point, when you haven't been diverting the issue from
ideas to semantics. And that point is that the truth of an assertion versus
its falsity rests upon its correspondence with the facts of reality. This
is such an absurdly simple point that you're taking advantage of nobody
imagining that you could possibly disagree with it.
But spit it out...you _do_ disagree with it, don't you?
Or don't you? Instead of distracting the discussion with your endless
dodges about semantics and integrations and coherence, just answer this
simple question: For any integration I, does its truth or falsity rest upon
its correspondence with reality? Now notice that we're granting that it's
an integration, but we're leaving coherence out of it. According to
you...if a child were exposed to only sticks halfway in water, then the
assertion "Sticks don't actually bend in the water" would be false. But in
the real world, the assertion is true even though it's not coherent with his
other sensory-derived perceptions.
That's because REALITY IS THE FINAL ARBITER. You tell me...what do _you_
think that means?
>Then he's left with his current contradictory claim that someone who
>accepts something that corresponds to facts, but does it by faith, doesn't
>have the truth after all.
>
>I'd like him to explain, if correspondence is sufficient, why the faithful
>guy _doesn't_ have the truth.
Simple..._exactly_ the same way you don't have an objective philosophy.
jk
Maurice Willey
>
>
> Betsy Speicher wrote:
>
> >
> > That's the point we have been arguing with Ken Gardner about. Those on
my
> > side say that both correspondence AND coherence (integration without
> > contradiction into the total context of one's knowledge) is necessary to
> > have truth. Ken has been arguing that correspondence alone is not only
> > necessary, but _sufficient_ as well.
>
factually
> true statements cannot contradict each other, hence form a coherent set.
> Correspondence does the trick. A set of statements no pair of which
contradict
>
> each other could all be false. Coherence does not imply correspondence,
but
> correspondence implies coherence.
>
The coherence at issue is not with the facts of reality,
but with the set of concepts held by the conceiver. It
is not reasonable to expect all a conceiver's concepts
to be correspondent to facts, so there will always be
issues of correspondence inside the conceiver's
mind as guideposts to help ferret out error. I hold, I
think with Ken, that a concept may be characterized as
'true' or a 'truth' objectively when it is is correspondent,
but that I am not permitted to call it true if it is not
coherent with my internal conceptual structure.
Betsy has argued that there is no 'objective' truth
without both correspondence to facts and internal
coherence in some mind or other.
The issue comes to the fore if one asserts that a
statement made for the wrong reason is 'true.' I
hold that true is true, the motivation for making the
proposition is irrelevent to truth content, that is
solely determined by correspondence. Betsy seems
to hold that a 'true' proposition (correspondent) is
not true if it is made for the wrong reasons, that is
it lacks correspondence within the asserter's
conceptual framework.
Cheers.
Ken Gardner
> I'm sorry if my style is throwing you off, but you're really missing the
> point. Like I keep saying, it's so preposterous that you can't believe
> anyone could actually think that correspondence isn't necessary for truth.
Well, to be fair to them, I think they are saying that correspondence is
necessary, but not sufficient. Which amounts to the same thing.
> Believe it. Then you'll understand how nuking millions of innocent people
> for no reason at all (like literally no reason at all) is objectively moral.
Exactly. Because that error, too, is merely a form of accepting a false
and evil conclusion (the initiation of deadly force against millions of
innocent people) as "true" (or "right," or "good") in a certain
"context" -- the one in which they _feel_ that the ends (fighting
terrorists) somehow justifies the means (nuking millions of innocent
civilians).
Ken
Ken Gardner
> >When Betsy says that the "integration without contradiction" requirement
> >pertains to coherence, she _doesn't_ get it.
> >Her position implies, wrongly, that a conclusion that corresponds with
> >the facts may nevertheless be false --
> I don't think that's right; I think she'd say it's arbitrary.
No, if she is saying (as she has) that correspondence is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for truth and that coherence is a sufficient
condition, then this position necessarily implies that a conclusion that
corresponds fully with the facts can still be false. Otherwise,
correspondence would be both necessary _and_ sufficient (which, in fact,
it is) for a statement to be true.
> Her position, or at least Stephen's position, is far more foolish than
> even this claptrap.
I don't see any significant difference in their respective positions.
> >that's what it means to say that correspondence is a necessary, but not
> >sufficient, condition for the conclusion to be true.
> Speaking to Stephen's position, which I'm pretty sure is Betsy's "position
> du jour," it clearly and unequivocally is a simple coherence theory.
Of course.
> If a given assertion is consistent with all of the other thoughts (which
> admittedly arise through evidence) in a person's mind, then it's
> automatically true.
Well, they say "contextually true," or "immutably true in a specified
context" (the OPAR version), but it amounts to the same thing.
> It's TRUE that Milton Friedman was a red because that
> conclusion was consistent with every piece of evidence at Rand's avail.
> Feigned reality is actually TRUE because it's consistent with a given set of
> FACTS ASSERTED, and to hell with correspondence (or not) with other facts.
Right. When the rubber hits the road, what counts for them is not
correspondence, but coherence. Which is why I have said that these
people are Hegelian wolves in Objectivist sheep's clothing.
> IOW, correspondence is NOT necessary to this yahoo and coherence IS
> sufficient. This is the only way to read his position in both examples,
> with the caveat that he could have been lying about what his position is.
Well, with Stephen this is _always_ a possibility.
Ken
Maurice Willey
Dan Lind <danlind1...@msn.com.invalid> wrote in message
news:0325bf00...@usw-ex0105-036.remarq.com...
> Bob,
>
> I think what Betsy is asking is:
>
> Ok, a statement must correspond with the facts it refers to in
> order to be a true statement. And how do you know when you have
> correspondence?
>
Correspondence just is. Coherence is one
criteria for someone to use in asserting
correspondence, but it is not sufficient to
prove it.
Correspondence is demonstrated by
following the procedure Rand laid out
in ITOE. That procedure is intended to
create concepts with both correspondence
and coherence.
Cheers.
Betsy Speicher
> Dan Lind wrote:
> > Ok, a statement must correspond with the facts it refers to in
> > order to be a true statement. And how do you know when you have
> > correspondence?
> Look and see. How else do you tell when a statement is true?
How do you know you have a real correspondence or just an accidental
conjunction of unrelated happenings?
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy Speicher says...
> > I'll ask again: What would you _say_ to him -- what _reason_ would you
> > give him -- to show that he hasn't grasped that it is true?
> In his case, i.e. a person who has accepted a true conclusion on blind
> faith, I would point out his inability to point to the facts that lead
> to his conclusion, i.e. his inability to grasp the correspondence
> between the referents of his conclusion and the facts as they actually
> are.
He can point to the facts that correspond to his conclusion just as you
can. The facts that _led_ to his conclusion are printed in the Bible and
he can point to Bibles too.
Then what do you say?
> > If his ideas
> > and statements correspond to the facts -- as you keep on saying -- what
> > _more_ does he need?
> He needs to _grasp_ that the statement is true, i.e. that the referents
> of his statement correspond to the facts. But the referents either
> correspond or don't correspond to the facts regardless of whether he
> chooses to grasp the nature of the correspondence.
He not only grasps the facts in question; he holds onto them for dear
life. By what standard can you say he did something wrong by accepting,
on faith, something rational people know is actually true? Is there
something more than grasping, by any old method, an idea which happens to
correspond to the facts? And if so, WHY?
Ken Gardner
> He not only grasps the facts in question; he holds onto them for dear
> life.
If he grasped the facts in question, he didn't accept them on blind faith
in the first place -- which was the premise of your original question.
> By what standard can you say he did something wrong by accepting,
> on faith, something rational people know is actually true?
He hasn't grasped how the referents of his ideas correspond to the facts.
But how he came to accept the idea has nothing to do with whether the
referents of the idea correspond to the actual facts, i.e. whether the
idea itself is true or false.
> Is there something more than grasping, by any old method, an idea which h
> appens to
> correspond to the facts? And if so, WHY?
Let me answer your question with a question. Do you understand the
difference between a statement _being_ true or false and someone
_grasping_ that the statement is true or false?
Ken
Betsy Speicher
> In article <0325bf00...@usw-ex0105-036.remarq.com>,
> Dan Lind <danlind1...@msn.com.invalid> wrote:
>
> >Bob,
> >
> >I think what Betsy is asking is:
> >
> >Ok, a statement must correspond with the facts it refers to in
> >order to be a true statement. And how do you know when you have
> >correspondence?
>
> I keep telling you...Betsy doesn't hold with your first sentence here.
But I do.
> I mean she might but since her husband explicitly doesn't,
He does.
> her loyalty must be to him. Personally I respect that in a woman
> though in Betsy's case it comes from a general philosophy of
> allegiance, which I think is less respectable.
> If "a statement must correspond with the facts it refers to in order
> to be a true statement," then "Milton Friedman is a red" couldn't be a
> true statement since it doesn't correspond with the facts and never
> did.
"I didn't accuse them of being Communists. I accused them of publishing a
Communist booklet, which it is," said Rand. She was right. She is still
right. It IS a Communist booklet. Her assessment corresponded to the
facts and always will.
Nonetheless, Jim Klein continues to make wild, emotional, and incoherent
accusations as follows:
> And it's not because "it means something else," because it was
> stipulated that even _with_ the meaning every English speaker gives
> it, it was true even though it's false according to the Speicher
> Theory of Truth.1
> Or, there's the example of one's impression of a feigned reality being
> true of reality even though it doesn't correspond with the facts, on
> the basis that it corresponds with the "facts asserted."
> I'm sorry if my style is throwing you off, but you're really missing
> the point. Like I keep saying, it's so preposterous that you can't
> believe anyone could actually think that correspondence isn't
> necessary for truth.
Nobody on my side of this argument thinks that.
> Believe it. Then you'll understand how nuking millions of innocent
> people for no reason at all (like literally no reason at all) is
> objectively moral.
Nobody on my side of this argument thinks that either.
Betsy Speicher
> In article <Pine.LNX.4.20.000620...@hypermall.com>,
> Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote:
> >> The ability to integrate the logic which results in one's
> >> conclusions... So that one doesn't end up simply parroting other
> >> people's ideas with no real understanding of what one is saying.
> >That's the point we have been arguing with Ken Gardner about.
> Found someone that doesn't know the details of the discussion, eh Betsy?
> >Those on my side say that both correspondence AND coherence
> >(integration without contradiction into the total context of one's
> >knowledge) is necessary to have truth. Ken has been arguing that
> >correspondence alone is not only necessary, but _sufficient_ as well.
> But I doubt you can find anyone that doesn't know dishonesty runs deep
> in the Speicher household. What a bullshit framing this is.
Ken has explicitly said EXACTLY that more than once. It's there on
deja.com for anyone to see. Does "dishonesty run deep" at deja.com too?
> Ken has been arguing exactly one point, when you haven't been
> diverting the issue from ideas to semantics. And that point is that
> the truth of an assertion versus its falsity rests upon its
> correspondence with the facts of reality. This is such an absurdly
> simple point that you're taking advantage of nobody imagining that you
> could possibly disagree with it.
I don't. Unlike Ken, however, I don't think correspondence alone is
sufficient. Like Ayn Rand, I hold that you don't have the truth until you
have integrated it, without contradiction, into the sum total of your
knowledge.
> But spit it out...you _do_ disagree with it, don't you?
> Or don't you? Instead of distracting the discussion with your endless
> dodges about semantics
I never use that term.
> and integrations and coherence,
I definitely do use those.
> just answer this simple question: For any integration I, does its
> truth or falsity rest upon its correspondence with reality?
In part,t. Correspondence is necessary, but not sufficient.
> Now notice that we're granting that it's an integration, but we're
> leaving coherence out of it.
You're half right, Jim. I don't leave coherence out while you are
generally INcoherent. ;-)
Dan Lind
term "grasp" is beginning to seem fuzzy and is begging to be
precisely defined. This could get interesting.
On a different tack, I wonder, Betsy, if you would mind terribly
reading my post on the "Referents" thread, numbered 15 in
RemarQ, and telling me if my description of Ken's opponents'
position fits yours, and if not, where my description is
wrong. Thanks.
Ken Gardner
> Now in addition to the term "context" the meaning of the
> term "grasp" is beginning to seem fuzzy and is begging to be
> precisely defined.
Grasp ----> identify. To observe and conceptualize.
Ken
Fred Weiss
Ken Gardner <kesga...@home.com> wrote:
> Dan Lind says...
>
> > Ok, a statement must correspond with the facts it refers to in
> > order to be a true statement. And how do you know when you have
> > correspondence?
>
Yes, but we would really very much like for you to answer the question.
Thank you.
Fred Weiss
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Jim Klein
>"I didn't accuse them of being Communists. I accused them of publishing a
>Communist booklet, which it is," said Rand.
Oh, I get it...you just don't understand English. Saying "hired two reds"
means that they were reds, not just that they wrote something a red would
write.
jk
Jim Klein
>Like Ayn Rand, I hold that you don't have the truth until you
>have integrated it, without contradiction, into the sum total of your
>knowledge.
Unlike Rand though, you are simply unable to distinguish between HAVING the
truth and BEING true. Regardless of the verbiage, the point stands and the
distinction is valid (both valid and sound for English speakers).
The latter refers to correspondence and the former refers to correspondence
and coherence. It is your explicit argument that correspondence cannot
exist without coherence, and that's false without redefining correspondence
to MEAN coherence.
jk
Fred Weiss
Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> In article <Pine.LNX.4.20.000620...@hypermall.com>,
> Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote:
>
> >Like Ayn Rand, I hold that you don't have the truth until you
> >have integrated it, without contradiction, into the sum total of your
> >knowledge.
>
> Unlike Rand though, you are simply unable to distinguish between
HAVING the
> truth and BEING true.
Citation please where AR makes any such distinction. For one thing she
would never accept the unknowable or any epistemological concept
requiring omniscience - which your "being true" is.
(She does of course make a distinction between knowledge and facts).
>Regardless of the verbiage, the point stands and the
> distinction is valid (both valid and sound for English speakers).
But not the French?
Jim Klein
Fred Weiss <pape...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>>Unlike Rand though, you are simply unable to distinguish between
>>HAVING the truth and BEING true.
>
>Citation please where AR makes any such distinction.
I didn't say she did; I said she was able to make the distinction. And to
that point, Ken has introduced numerous cites indicating this.
>For one thing she would never accept the unknowable or any epistemological
>concept requiring omniscience - which your "being true" is.
What in the world do either of these have to do with the topic at hand?
>(She does of course make a distinction between knowledge and facts).
Of course, but that's not relevant here either. Look Fred, there's only one
issue here. It's not whether integration is required to have a truth...it
is. It's not whether coherence arises from the accurate grasp of
reality...it does. It's not whether the Objectivese meaning of truth is
technically different than the standard English version...it is.
The issue is exclusively _what_ it is that determines the truth or falsity
of any given integration. And THAT is its correspondence with reality,
PERIOD. It's not whether it's coherently integrated, it's not what we call
it, and it doesn't depend on anything else we do or don't know---those all
go to the UNDERSTANDING that it's true, the KNOWING that it's true, the
GRASPING of it _as a truth_ in Objectivese.
But it BEING true rests EXCLUSIVELY on whether the integration is or is not
correspondent with the referents conceputualized.
Now do Dan a favor and save him a week of cutting through the dense
verbiage...the fact of the matter is that you DON'T agree with that, do you?
jk
Fred Weiss
Maurice Willey <mssol...@home.com> wrote:
>
> Dan Lind <danlind1...@msn.com.invalid> wrote in message
> news:0325bf00...@usw-ex0105-036.remarq.com...
> >
> > I think what Betsy is asking is:
> >
> > order to be a true statement. And how do you know when you have
> > correspondence?
> >
>
That is an issue in dispute. I don't accept that there is such a thing
as correspondence all by itself independent of anyone's doing the
corresponding. Your interesting examples of old tablets or closed books
nonetheless don't constitute "correspondence in itself". Tablets and
books are perhaps more like televisions - but men must write the
programs for them and turn them on and watch them. Without men, tablets
and books just contain squiggles - and a television is just a metal box.
Furthermore it will always require evaluation to determine whether a
tablet or book contains correspondence - and that always presupposes a
context of knowledge. It is not and never can be a "just is".
This is a fundamental difference in our views.
Coherence is one
> criteria for someone to use in asserting
> correspondence, but it is not sufficient to
> prove it.
>
> Correspondence is demonstrated by
> following the procedure Rand laid out
> in ITOE. That procedure is intended to
> create concepts with both correspondence
> and coherence.
All of which requires - must presuppose - a given context of knowledge
(and which AR makes perfectly clear - you guys have been equivocating
between her objective concept and your intrinsic concept of "true".)
Jim Klein
Fred Weiss <pape...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>That is an issue in dispute. I don't accept that there is such a thing
>as correspondence all by itself independent of anyone's doing the
>corresponding.
Dan...did you start that music?
>Your interesting examples of old tablets or closed books
>nonetheless don't constitute "correspondence in itself". Tablets and
>books are perhaps more like televisions - but men must write the
>programs for them and turn them on and watch them. Without men, tablets
>and books just contain squiggles - and a television is just a metal box.
Good point...maybe this will divert the issue. Or maybe not.
>Furthermore it will always require evaluation to determine whether a
>tablet or book contains correspondence - and that always presupposes a
>context of knowledge. It is not and never can be a "just is".
This is how I know there's a glint of rationality in there; we just need to
strip you of your allengiance to the Holy Word. Yes, this is accurate and
it helps distinguish the Objectivist view of truth from Intrinsicism.
Here, try this example. Imagine a child whose _every_ perception of a stick
is a stick in the water...hence every single stick appears to be bent.
After a sufficient number of these perceptions, he conceptualizes <stick>
with one of its attributes being that it's bent. Right?
Now imagine that he's beginning to talk. He says "Sticks are bent." The
question is very simple...is that true or false?
Betsy's dodge, which has snookered Dan at least once, is that by "stick" he
means only those instances which he's experienced; hence the assertion is
supposedly true in his meaning of the utterance. But that's wrong, and
abandons Objectivist epistemology on the concept-formation front...the
referent of "stick" is ALL of the sticks with ALL of their attributes. IOW,
it's the _referent_ which controls the meaning, not the placement of the
concept in our conceptual hierarchy. And it so happens that sticks AREN'T
bent, and so the assertion that they are is FALSE. This, in spite of its
coherence "in the context of knowledge" and despite that all of the "facts
asserted" indicate that they are.
>This is a fundamental difference in our views.
So let's try to pin it down, Fred. When that boy utters, "Sticks are bent,"
is his statement true or false?
jk
Ken Gardner
> The issue is exclusively _what_ it is that determines the truth or falsity
> of any given integration.
> And THAT is its correspondence with reality,
> PERIOD. It's not whether it's coherently integrated, it's not what we call
> it, and it doesn't depend on anything else we do or don't know---those all
> go to the UNDERSTANDING that it's true, the KNOWING that it's true, the
> GRASPING of it _as a truth_ in Objectivese.
To quote Rand one more time, "'Facts' are the standard of truth or
falsehood; it is by means of 'facts' that we determine whether an idea of
ours is true or false." This time I'll skip the Peikoff cites as well
(from The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy), but Fred can look them up in the
Lexicon under "Truth."
Ken
Jim Klein
Ken Gardner <kesga...@home.com> wrote:
>To quote Rand one more time, "'Facts' are the standard of truth or
>falsehood; it is by means of 'facts' that we determine whether an idea of
>ours is true or false."
Y'know, that one sentence completely and utterly wraps up the issue, at
least the diverted issue about what Rand's opinion was. Or will we get
little Stephie back in here to explain how it was "her opinion in the
context of her knowledge at the time she wrote it, but wasn't really,
really, really her opinion." Nothing could shock me any more, from him.
It is absolutely incredible that this discussion has occured at
all...firstly that there could be this sort of debate about what "true" and
"false" rest upon, and secondly that there could some question about what
Rand's view was.
These guys have so thoroughly corrupted the philosophy of Objectivism that
they've actually got a sincere questioner like Dan wondering if there are
two sides to the story. How very proud they must be of their fight against
any sort of rationality, wherever it may be found.
jk
Ken Gardner
> >To quote Rand one more time, "'Facts' are the standard of truth or
> >falsehood; it is by means of 'facts' that we determine whether an idea of
> >ours is true or false."
> Y'know, that one sentence completely and utterly wraps up the issue, at
> least the diverted issue about what Rand's opinion was.
Or, the question I keep asking Stephie: what is it about _facts_ being
the standard of truth or falsehood that they don't understand?
> Or will we get
> little Stephie back in here to explain how it was "her opinion in the
> context of her knowledge at the time she wrote it, but wasn't really,
> really, really her opinion." Nothing could shock me any more, from him.
Nah, he doesn't discuss "ideas" here, remember? As if we didn't know....
> It is absolutely incredible that this discussion has occured at
> all...firstly that there could be this sort of debate about what "true" and
> "false" rest upon, and secondly that there could some question about what
> Rand's view was.
You know damn well what started this debate, and why they continue to
fight so hard. But, excuse my French, they're fucked and I think they
know it. Stephie knew it from the beginning, which is the _real_ reason
why he hasn't involved himself in these threads other than to lob his
spitwads at me.
> These guys have so thoroughly corrupted the philosophy of Objectivism that
> they've actually got a sincere questioner like Dan wondering if there are
> two sides to the story. How very proud they must be of their fight against
> any sort of rationality, wherever it may be found.
I'm confident that Dan will eventually come to see clearly what you and I
already know.
Ken
Betsy Speicher
> Robert J. Kolker says...
> > Correspondence implies coherence (internal consistency).
Not necessarily, as I pointed out with my example of stock market prices
corresponding with women's hem lines. In fact, there is a name for the
fallacy of assuming a factual connection when there is only
correspondence. The fallacy is called _post_hoc_ergo_propter_hoc_, or
_post_hoc_ for short. Look it up in a logic book.
> > A set of factually true statements cannot contradict each other, hence
> > form a coherent set. Correspondence does the trick.
Not by itself, it doesn't. You need correspondence AND coherence.
> > A set of statements no pair of which contradict each other could all
> > be false.
Indeed it could. You need coherence AND correspondence.
> > Coherence does not imply correspondence, but correspondence implies
> > coherence.
No, it doesn't. The correspondence could be accidental, a _post_hoc_
fallacy, etc.
Ken Gardner comments:
> Bob, you get it.
> When Betsy says that the "integration without contradiction" requirement
> pertains to coherence, she _doesn't_ get it.
Why not?
> Her position implies, wrongly, that a conclusion that corresponds with
> the facts may nevertheless be false --
Yes, it might be. See above.
> that's what it means to say that correspondence is a necessary, but
> not sufficient, condition for the conclusion to be true.
That's right.
Robert J. Kolker
Betsy Speicher wrote:
>
> Not by itself, it doesn't. You need correspondence AND coherence.
You miss the point. I will try once more. A set of statements in
correspondence
with fact cannot contain mutually contradictory pairs, therefore the set of
statements is coherent (i.e. internally consistent). Q.E.D. Correspondence
implies coherence. Got it? Why is it so. Because all facts exist together and
no statements about two or more facts can be contradictory. What is, is.
There
are no contradictions in reality, therefore true statements about reality can
contain no contradictions.
Bob Kolker
Betsy Speicher
> I hold, I think with Ken, that a concept may be characterized as
> 'true' or a 'truth' objectively when it is is correspondent, but that
> I am not permitted to call it true if it is not coherent with my
> internal conceptual structure.
It is not just a matter of coherence with you internal mental
contents. It is, more importantly, that you have established
correspondence and coherence by the proper _methods_.
> Betsy has argued that there is no 'objective' truth without both
> correspondence to facts and internal coherence in some mind or other.
.... by the proper method, which would be logic in the _broadest_ sense of
the term (including inductive and deductive reasoning).
> The issue comes to the fore if one asserts that a
> statement made for the wrong reason is 'true.' I
> hold that true is true, the motivation for making the
> proposition is irrelevent to truth content, that is
> solely determined by correspondence. Betsy seems
> to hold that a 'true' proposition (correspondent) is
> not true if it is made for the wrong reasons, that is
> it lacks correspondence within the asserter's
> conceptual framework.
.... and if it is made by the wrong method.
Would you hold that a person has the truth if he gets it by blind faith,
revelation, or "just feels" that it is true?
Robert J. Kolker
Betsy Speicher wrote:
>
> Would you hold that a person has the truth if he gets it by blind faith,
> revelation, or "just feels" that it is true?
You find out the truth by looking, hearing, tasting, feeling and smelling.
The only way to determine truth is by clear perception and integration
of the percepts into a sensible conceptual structure. That is how you get
correspondences between assertions and facts. Looking and
* knowing what you see * is the key to it.
Bob Kolker
Betsy Speicher
> Jim Klein says...
> > >When Betsy says that the "integration without contradiction"
> > >requirement pertains to coherence, she _doesn't_ get it.
> > >Her position implies, wrongly, that a conclusion that corresponds with
> > >the facts may nevertheless be false --
> > I don't think that's right; I think she'd say it's arbitrary.
> No, if she is saying (as she has) that correspondence is a necessary
> but not sufficient condition for truth and that coherence is a
> sufficient condition, then this position necessarily implies that a
> conclusion that corresponds fully with the facts can still be false.
> Otherwise, correspondence would be both necessary _and_ sufficient
> (which, in fact, it is) for a statement to be true.
What do you guys need me for? Certainly not to expound and explain my
views since you seem content to ascribe views to me -- which are often ot
my views at all.
For those who care about the facts, here they are:
My position is NOT "that a conclusion that corresponds with the facts may
nevertheless be false." I hold, instead, that, by the Law of Excluded
Middle, it may be true or not true. There are many different kinds of
"not true" including the false, the arbitrary, the accidental, the
coincidental, the meaningless, etc.
My position is NOT "that correspondence is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for truth and that coherence is a sufficient condition."
I hold, instead, that correspondence is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for truth and that coherence is a necessary bit NOT sufficient
condition for thruth as well.
So why are Ken Gardner and Jim Klein making up bogus "Betsy's views" which
they falsely attribute to me? Do they need straw man arguments to
rationalize their attacks on me and my husband?
It would seem so:
> > Her position, or at least Stephen's position, is far more foolish than
> > even this claptrap.
> I don't see any significant difference in their respective positions.
> > Speaking to Stephen's position, which I'm pretty sure is Betsy's
> > "position du jour," it clearly and unequivocally is a simple coherence
> > theory.
> Of course.
[...]
> Right. When the rubber hits the road, what counts for them is not
> correspondence, but coherence. Which is why I have said that these
> people are Hegelian wolves in Objectivist sheep's clothing.
> > IOW, correspondence is NOT necessary to this yahoo and coherence IS
> > sufficient. This is the only way to read his position in both
> > examples, with the caveat that he could have been lying about what his
> > position is.
> Well, with Stephen this is _always_ a possibility.
===
Ken and Jim don't seem to be letting facts get in the way of their
personal animosity.
Betsy Speicher
> Let me answer your question with a question. Do you understand the
> difference between a statement _being_ true or false and someone
> _grasping_ that the statement is true or false?
I do, but I'd like to hear YOUR explanation based on correspondence alone.
Also please give concrete examples of what you are talking about. I have
no interest in playing word games with floating abstractions.
Betsy Speicher
> Uh oh. Now in addition to the term "context" the meaning of the
> term "grasp" is beginning to seem fuzzy and is begging to be
> precisely defined.
You've noticed. I'll bet you've seen other people who, when they are
losing their case, see confusing the issue and hair-splitting as their
only "out." It may even get down to discussions of what the meaning of
"is" is.
> This could get interesting.
Indeed! Let's watch.
Betsy Speicher
> In article <Pine.LNX.4.20.000620...@hypermall.com>,
> Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote:
> >"I didn't accuse them of being Communists. I accused them of publishing a
> >Communist booklet, which it is," said Rand.
> Oh, I get it...you just don't understand English. Saying "hired two
> reds" means that they were reds, not just that they wrote something a
> red would write.
They were "reds" -- not "Reds." They were Collectivists, not necessarily
Communists, employing collectivist arguments which did not mention or
recognize property rights -- in the alleged defense of Capitalism.
With "friends" like that ...
Ken Gardner
> > > Correspondence implies coherence (internal consistency).
> Not necessarily, as I pointed out with my example of stock market prices
> corresponding with women's hem lines.
You are describing a _coincidence_, not correspondence. In reality,
there is no causal connection between stock prices and hemlines and,
therefore, no _correspondence_ between any claim that they are causally
related and the facts as they actually are.
> In fact, there is a name for the
> fallacy of assuming a factual connection when there is only
> correspondence. The fallacy is called _post_hoc_ergo_propter_hoc_, or
> _post_hoc_ for short. Look it up in a logic book.
Wrong. The fancy Latin literally means, "after this, therefore because
of this." It is the fallacy of holding that because B follows A, A
therefore caused B.
> > > A set of factually true statements cannot contradict each other, hence
> > > form a coherent set. Correspondence does the trick.
> Not by itself, it doesn't. You need correspondence AND coherence.
Dan Lind, are you paying attention? She is literally saying that a
statement whose referents correspond fully with the facts can still be
false if it is inconsistent with one or more of your other ideas -- and,
of course, vice versa.
Ayn Rand held that the _facts_ were the standard of truth and falsehood.
The ARIans are imposing an _additional_ requirement above and beyond the
facts: coherence with other ideas.
> > When Betsy says that the "integration without contradiction" requirement
> > pertains to coherence, she _doesn't_ get it.
> Why not?
Betsy, pull out your copy of Atlas Shrugged and read the sentence
immediately following the sentence that says, "no concept man forms is
valid unless he integrates it without contradiction into the total sum of
his knowledge." This sentence explains the _real_ purpose behind the
integration requirement, a purpose which has absolutely _nothing_ to do
with any alleged "acceptance" of the coherence theory.
Again, you have Rand horribly confused with Hegel.
> > Her position implies, wrongly, that a conclusion that corresponds with
> > the facts may nevertheless be false --
> Yes, it might be. See above.
Your example proves nothing because it is not an example of
correspondence in the sense that Rand used the word, which is the
identical sense in which Aristotle used the word ("to say that what is,
is not, and what is not, is, is false; to say that what is, is, and what
is not, is not, is true....").
> > that's what it means to say that correspondence is a necessary, but
> > not sufficient, condition for the conclusion to be true.
> That's right.
Dan Lind, are you still paying attention?
Ken
Betsy Speicher
> On a different tack, I wonder, Betsy, if you would mind terribly
> reading my post on the "Referents" thread, numbered 15 in
> RemarQ, and telling me if my description of Ken's opponents'
> position fits yours, and if not, where my description is
> wrong. Thanks.
I don't have RemarQ, but now that I have time I will respond to the post
on "Referents" which follows this one and check deja.com for your other
postings on this issue.
Seth David Johnson
> On 21 Jun 2000, Dan Lind wrote:
>
> > Uh oh. Now in addition to the term "context" the meaning of the
> > term "grasp" is beginning to seem fuzzy and is begging to be
> > precisely defined.
>
> You've noticed. I'll bet you've seen other people who, when they are
> losing their case, see confusing the issue and hair-splitting as their
> only "out." It may even get down to discussions of what the meaning of
> "is" is.
*LOL*
Besides the obvious C.I.C. to whom the above alludes, I can think of a few
philosophy professors. Betsy, you are a first-class humorist.
-Seth
Chris Cathcart
>On 21 Jun 2000, Ken Gardner wrote:
>
>> Her position implies, wrongly, that a conclusion that corresponds
with
>> the facts may nevertheless be false --
>
>Yes, it might be.
[Incredulous, I do a double take]
>>a conclusion that corresponds with
>> the facts may nevertheless be false --
>
>Yes, it might be.
Huh?
A conclusion that corresponds with the facts may nevertheless be false?
Is this just more Speicherite nonsense that can be evaded away somehow?
Bimbo Schoolmarm, indeed.
--
Chris Cathcart
*
Rational, Non-Dogmatic Objectivism - http://www.dailyobjectivist.com
Stephen Speicher's Fraud - http://www.deja.com/article/624788881
Jim Klein
Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote:
>On 21 Jun 2000, Ken Gardner wrote:
>> Jim Klein says...
>> > >When Betsy says that the "integration without contradiction"
>> > >requirement pertains to coherence, she _doesn't_ get it.
>> > >Her position implies, wrongly, that a conclusion that corresponds with
>> > >the facts may nevertheless be false --
>>I don't think that's right; I think she'd say it's arbitrary.
>What do you guys need me for? Certainly not to expound and explain my
>views since you seem content to ascribe views to me -- which are often ot
>my views at all.
>
>For those who care about the facts, here they are:
>
>My position is NOT "that a conclusion that corresponds with the facts may
>nevertheless be false." I hold, instead, that, by the Law of Excluded
>Middle, it may be true or not true. There are many different kinds of
>"not true" including the false, the arbitrary, the accidental, the
>coincidental, the meaningless, etc.
Too funny, Betsy! Anyway, are you saying that you _wouldn't_ call arbitrary
what I said you would? It's sort of hard to tell, since you so wantonly
snipped the post to which you're responding, including leaving out the
original claim. But since you've accused me of misrepresenting your
position, maybe you could bother making it clear that you _wouldn't_ call it
arbitrary like I said you would.
BTW, did you clear your theory with Peikoff? So now there's the true,
false, arbitrary, accidental, coincidental, meaningless, and some more to
boot. It's nice to see you do some thinking on your own, such as it is.
>My position is NOT "that correspondence is a necessary but not sufficient
>condition for truth and that coherence is a sufficient condition."
>I hold, instead, that correspondence is a necessary but not sufficient
>condition for truth and that coherence is a necessary bit NOT sufficient
>condition for thruth as well.
Then how come "Milton Friedman is a red" can be true when all it has going
for it is coherence? Remember...the whole point is that even Stephen
admitted that it doesn't correspond with the facts.
>So why are Ken Gardner and Jim Klein making up bogus "Betsy's views" which
>they falsely attribute to me? Do they need straw man arguments to
>rationalize their attacks on me and my husband?
>
>It would seem so:
>
>> > Her position, or at least Stephen's position, is far more foolish than
>> > even this claptrap.
>
>> I don't see any significant difference in their respective positions.
>
>> > Speaking to Stephen's position, which I'm pretty sure is Betsy's
>> > "position du jour," it clearly and unequivocally is a simple coherence
>> > theory.
>
>> Of course.
>
>[...]
>
>> Right. When the rubber hits the road, what counts for them is not
>> correspondence, but coherence. Which is why I have said that these
>> people are Hegelian wolves in Objectivist sheep's clothing.
>
>> > IOW, correspondence is NOT necessary to this yahoo and coherence IS
>> > sufficient. This is the only way to read his position in both
>> > examples, with the caveat that he could have been lying about what his
>> > position is.
>
>> Well, with Stephen this is _always_ a possibility.
>
>===
>
>Ken and Jim don't seem to be letting facts get in the way of their
>personal animosity.
Don't flatter yourself, Betsy. After your post just minutes ago about the
correspondence of hemlines to stock prices, as if it even remotely might
have something to do with the correspondence of this topic, one can feel no
animosity toward you at all. Pity is about all there is, presently.
I'll just wait until you lie again before bothering with anything else.
jk
Ken Gardner
> My position is NOT "that a conclusion that corresponds with the facts may
> nevertheless be false." I hold, instead, that, by the Law of Excluded
> Middle, it may be true or not true. There are many different kinds of
> "not true" including the false, the arbitrary, the accidental, the
> coincidental, the meaningless, etc.
In other words, according to you, a conclusion that corresponds fully
with the facts may nevertheless be false, arbitary, accidental, etc.
What counts for you is not whether the referents of the statement
correspond with the facts, but the state of mind of some person in
relation to the statement and the facts. Your position is that the
statement may be true for me, false for you, arbitrary for your husband,
accidental for Fred Weiss, coincidental for Stephen Grossman, and
meaningless for my 14 week old niece -- a position which, of course, is
naked subjectivism.
As Ayn Rand wrote in the letter to Hospers, the _facts_ are the standard
of truth or falsehood. Not someone's subjective state of mind.
> My position is NOT "that correspondence is a necessary but not sufficient
> condition for truth and that coherence is a sufficient condition."
> I hold, instead, that correspondence is a necessary but not sufficient
> condition for truth and that coherence is a necessary bit NOT sufficient
> condition for thruth as well.
But then you are committing yourself to the position that a statement
whose referents correspond fully with the facts is not necessarily true
_because_ of someone's state of mind. Which, again, is naked
subjectivism.
> So why are Ken Gardner and Jim Klein making up bogus "Betsy's views" which
> they falsely attribute to me? Do they need straw man arguments to
> rationalize their attacks on me and my husband?
What's wrong Betsy? You don't like it when someone begins naming the
epistemological errors and evasions that ultimately lie at the root of
your enthusiastic support of an insane and evil proposal to nuke ten
million mostly innocent people as well as Peikoff's even more insane and
evil radio speech on terrorism?
I really don't need to say anything more on this topic to prove my case
that you haven't already said to me in this thread, or what your husband
said in the fraudulent website example that Chris Cathcart keeps posting.
Which, unfortunately for you, won't stop me from wanting to continue to
prove the enormity of the epistemological and moral corruption that you
and other like-minded people are misrepresenting to be Objectivism.
Ken
Jim Klein
Chris Cathcart <cath...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote:
>
>>On 21 Jun 2000, Ken Gardner wrote:
>>
>>>Her position implies, wrongly, that a conclusion that corresponds
>>>with the facts may nevertheless be false --
>>
>>Yes, it might be.
>
>[Incredulous, I do a double take]
>
>>>a conclusion that corresponds with
>>> the facts may nevertheless be false --
>>
>>Yes, it might be.
>
>Huh?
>
>A conclusion that corresponds with the facts may nevertheless be false?
Did she really write that? If so, I think an example is in order.
Could someone please provide an example of a conclusion which corresponds
with the facts but is nonetheless false?
That'd be a neat trick, seems to me. Most likely, it was just Betsy
pretending that "correspondence" with reality means the same thing as
"correspondence" of hemlines with stock prices. But of course it doesn't.
She probably looks for pickets when the umpire yells "Strike three!"
jk
Robert J. Kolker
Jim Klein wrote:
>
> That'd be a neat trick, seems to me. Most likely, it was just Betsy
> pretending that "correspondence" with reality means the same thing as
> "correspondence" of hemlines with stock prices. But of course it doesn't.
A correlation is not a correspondence in the sense that is meant in
correspondence
theory. Correspondence theory says a statement is true if and only if
that which it asserts is a fact. Correspondence theory aligns
statements/propositions with facts. Correlation and cause systems
align entities and events. They are completely different animals.
Bob Kolker
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy Speicher wrote:
> > Not by itself, it doesn't. You need correspondence AND coherence.
> You miss the point. I will try once more. A set of statements in
> correspondence with fact cannot contain mutually contradictory pairs,
> therefore the set of statements is coherent (i.e. internally
> consistent). Q.E.D. Correspondence implies coherence. Got it?
I always had it. Contradictions tell you that something is untrue.
Now what tells you that something _IS_ true?
Betsy Speicher
> *LOL*
Thanks. I try to be. See my "Theory of Humor" web site at
<http://www.compbio.caltech.edu/~sjs/humor.htm>. There was also a radio
program I did on humor for Prodos <http://www.prodos.com> which was up on
his web site in RealAudio about a month ago, but it's probably gone by
now.
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy Speicher <be...@speicher.com> wrote:
> >On 21 Jun 2000, Ken Gardner wrote:
> >> Her position implies, wrongly, that a conclusion that corresponds
> >> with the facts may nevertheless be false --
> >Yes, it might be.
> [Incredulous, I do a double take]
> >>a conclusion that corresponds with
> >> the facts may nevertheless be false --
> >Yes, it might be.
> Huh?
If you hadn't taken my conclusions out of context and omitted all my
examples, those snippets of quotations might have made sense.
But then why be concerned with what I actually wrote when it stands in the
way of your REAL goal -- insulting me?:
> A conclusion that corresponds with the facts may nevertheless be false?
> Is this just more Speicherite nonsense that can be evaded away somehow?
> Bimbo Schoolmarm, indeed.
See what I mean?
Robert J. Kolker
Betsy Speicher wrote:
> Now what tells you that something _IS_ true?
Eyes, ears, hands, nose, tongue and brain. What
else could it be. Using your senses you determine
whether a statement asserts a fact.
"The cat is on the mat" is true if and only if in fact
the cat is on the mat. How do you find out?. See
where the cat is. Your senses do not lie. They
may omit but they don't lie.
Bob Kolker
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy Speicher wrote:
> >My position is NOT "that correspondence is a necessary but not
> >sufficient condition for truth and that coherence is a sufficient
> >condition." I hold, instead, that correspondence is a necessary but
> >not sufficient condition for truth and that coherence is a necessary
> >but NOT sufficient condition for truth as well.
> Then how come "Milton Friedman is a red" can be true when all it has
> going for it is coherence?
I disagree. The pamphlet he wrote is based on collectivist premises
totally at odds with property rights and capitalism. That was the work of
a collectivist.
> Remember...the whole point is that even Stephen admitted that it
> doesn't correspond with the facts.
.... now. If Friedman changed his views and is not a collectivist now, it
doesn't change what he said and what he, in fact, was when he wrote that
pamphlet.
Betsy Speicher
> Betsy Speicher says...
> > > > Correspondence implies coherence (internal consistency).
> > Not necessarily, as I pointed out with my example of stock market prices
> > corresponding with women's hem lines.
> You are describing a _coincidence_, not correspondence. In reality,
> there is no causal connection between stock prices and hemlines and,
> therefore, no _correspondence_ between any claim that they are causally
> related and the facts as they actually are.
So far, I agree.
Now -- How can you _ever_ distinguish coincidence from causality if all
you require is correspondence?
Maurice Willey
Betsy Speicher wrote in message ...
>On 21 Jun 2000, Maurice Willey wrote:
>
>> I hold, I think with Ken, that a concept may be characterized as
>> 'true' or a 'truth' objectively when it is is correspondent, but that
>> I am not permitted to call it true if it is not coherent with my
>> internal conceptual structure.
>
>It is not just a matter of coherence with you internal mental
>contents. It is, more importantly, that you have established
>correspondence and coherence by the proper _methods_.
>
This is a new twist, propriety. What does propriety
entail that coherence does not?
Betsy, this really puzzles me. If we each are speaking
about our own evaluation of our own internal state of
coherence, how are we each to establish that a proper
method has been followed? You are not willing to
grant that there is an objective (external and independent
of a mind) standard of true or false, but now require that
there is one for determining 'proper methods.'
Proper methods must come later than determining
true propositions, as a methodology requires
propositions to carry it out.
It seems clear to me that correspondence comes
first over all else (as Rand states in both PWNI and
ITOE) and then we build coherence at a later time.
>> Betsy has argued that there is no 'objective' truth without both
>> correspondence to facts and internal coherence in some mind or other.
>
>.... by the proper method, which would be logic in the _broadest_ sense of
>the term (including inductive and deductive reasoning).
>
>> The issue comes to the fore if one asserts that a
>> statement made for the wrong reason is 'true.' I
>> hold that true is true, the motivation for making the
>> proposition is irrelevent to truth content, that is
>> solely determined by correspondence. Betsy seems
>> to hold that a 'true' proposition (correspondent) is
>> not true if it is made for the wrong reasons, that is
>> it lacks correspondence within the asserter's
>> conceptual framework.
>
>.... and if it is made by the wrong method.
>
>Would you hold that a person has the truth if he gets it by blind faith,
>revelation, or "just feels" that it is true?
>
However he gets the proposition, if the referents
are facts of reality, and the proposition reports
them correctly, then it is a true proposition.
Whether the proposition is integrated into
useful knowledge requires coherence
(justified true belief).
Cheers.
f
t
b
f
t
b
f
t
b
f
t
b
f
t
b
f
t
b
Meaghan Walker-Williams
Betsy Speicher wrote:
> I always had it. Contradictions tell you that something is untrue.
No - "To arrive at a contradiction is to discover a flaw in one's
reasoning"
(From Rand somewhere in FTNI)
The Contradiction doesnt actually say anything about the truth of a
thing.
It tells you that you are *wrong* about some aspect of your
understanding of it.
The thing is true - or false, indipendent of your understanding of it.
>
> Now what tells you that something _IS_ true?
>
The process of using non-contradictory identification.
Which is why I hate liars and those who support them.
Its hard enough at times to figure out what *is* or is not true - what
with
these imperfect senses and non-omnsicient brains - the process of
doggedly
determining what is and is not true is an endless process as more
knowledge
is accumulated.
People who ADD to the mess and the work involved by purposefully LYING
are evil.
When is your husband going to admit that he lied about Chris Wolf?
MWW
Meaghan Walker-Williams
Betsy Speicher wrote:
> I disagree. The pamphlet he wrote is based on collectivist premises
> totally at odds with property rights and capitalism. That was the work of
> a collectivist.
>
> > Remember...the whole point is that even Stephen admitted that it
> > doesn't correspond with the facts.
>
> .... now. If Friedman changed his views and is not a collectivist now, it
> doesn't change what he said and what he, in fact, was when he wrote that
> pamphlet.
>
Ok.. OR for another example...
Your husband lied about Chris Wolf.
He Honestly Believed that the information he recieved from a second hand
gossip
was the truth, AND he told everybody on this newsgroup what he had heard
- and presented it AS A FACT.
It turns out he was *wrong* and that Wolf did NOT attend the party in
question.
Here is why your husband is a liar then, and a liar today:
Even IF he believed it was true - it was NOT in fact true.
If you say something that is NOT true - even if you believe it to be
true...
you are a liar. Thats why moral people are quick to admit when they have
learned that they mispoke, or said something that wasn't accurate or
true.
An HONEST man would say "you know what.. I'm sorry, I was wrong about
that. Please accept
my apology for having claimed this about you Mr.Wolf"
But your husband is not an honest man.
Your husband claims that because he HONESTLY believed that Wolf HAD
attended the party in the manner
he described - (even if it wasn't true) - That believing it was true -
means he has
no responsibility to apologize for the untruth he told.
In fact - its not so much the original gossip that's makes your husband
a liar...
Its the fact that your husband won't admit to having told an untruth
about somebody
and apologize for it and somehow believes that there is nothing wrong
with having
told a lie simply because he *believed* it was true.
Its about honour.
If I give my word to somebody to do something - and I don't do it... I
have
made a liar out of myself. Its the same principle - but only in reverse.
MWW