Who is to know Shakespeare wasn't a monkey?
lyra
Who is to know Shakespeare wasn't a monkey?
Steven Foong
Sep 30, 05 2:30pm
I refer to SK Wong's letter Who created the Creator then?
</letters/40786>
While Wong has not indicated whether he is a Darwinist or not, I assume
that he is. Furthermore, it is good for me to do so as it will allow me
to address a wider audience.
Complexity, in 'specified complexity', means an event, object or
structure that cannot be produced by chance within a universal
probability bound. Simply stated, complexity is something that the
universe cannot produce within its limited probability resources.
Michael Behe, a biochemist, identified the bacterial flagellum as a
biological system that is irreducibly complex. To counter this problem,
Wong suggested an infinite number of other universes, thus inflating
his pool of probability resources to account for such complexities.
In this case, anything goes - anything is possible. We shall simply
dispense away with all laws of mathematics because, with infinite
probability resources, we can simply explain anything away as chance.
It is entirely possible that Vladimir Kramnik moved his chess pieces
randomly and won the world championship from Gary Kasparov. It will not
surprise me, due to unlimited probability resources drawn from other
universes, if Wong tells me Shakespeare was actually a monkey who by
randomly arranging the alphabets produced Macbeth.
How does Wong know Shakespeare is actually an intelligent designer? He
may just be the correct monkey from an unlimited number of monkeys
randomly arranging the alphabets! And he may not be the only one.
How can anyone attribute my previous letter </letters/40272> on
intelligent design to my intelligence? You simply cannot. I can just be
randomly typing away at my keyboard and producing a publishable letter
to the editor. And why am I replying to a letter that has so much
probability of being generated from a random alphabet generator? If we
are to do any science at all, we need to limit ourselves to our small
and finite universe.
Now, on to Wong's primary objection to intelligent design - who
designed the designer (as opposed to who created the creator)? That's
an interesting question, but not one for design theorists to solve.
Wong alleges that intelligent design is a matter of faith - it is not.
It only becomes theological when it attempts to answer questions it was
not meant to answer. Design theorists only detect design in events,
objects and structures - that X is designed. The
who/what/where/when/why/how is someone else's job.
If I am forced to answer this question, I can only answer from a
theological, not design theory, point of view, that the Designer is the
ever-existing God. That is faith.
Being able to reliably detect design is science. The only plausible way
to render the current method to detect design useless is to prove that
the methods themselves are flawed which, of course, will be replaced by
a strengthened method.
The only bona fide way to throw intelligent design into ultimate
oblivion is to prove that there is no scientific way to detect design
at all. Until that happens, intelligent design remains scientific.
gangleri
The only bona fide way to throw intelligent design into ultimate
oblivion is to prove that there is no scientific way to detect design
at all. Until that happens, intelligent design remains scientific.
As in:
The only bona fide way to throw Strazi Orthodoxy into ultimate oblivion
is to prove that there is no scientific way to detect design at all.
Until that happens, Strazi Orthodoxy remains scientific.
Comment:
In both cases - Intelligent Design and Strazi Orthodoxy - the True
Believers insist that they don't need "proof" as distinct from
"reasonable" cause for subscribing to their Orthodox Belief.
In both cases - Intelligent Design and Strazi Orthodoxy - what is
"reasonable" is in the eye of the beholder.
In both cases - Intelligent Design and Strazi Orthodoxy - what is
"reasonable " is whatever the beholder perceives to be supportive of
his/her own Orthodox Belief.
In both cases - Intelligent Design and Strazi Orthodoxy - what is
"unreasonable" is whatever doesn't accord with Orthodox Belief.
Really?
Well, name one Strazi Believer on HLAS who has (1) changed his mind, or
(2) conceded that his belief may be misplaced.
ignoto
gangleri wrote:
> Re. the following:
>
> The only bona fide way to throw intelligent design into ultimate
> oblivion is to prove that there is no scientific way to detect design
> at all. Until that happens, intelligent design remains scientific.
>
> As in:
>
> The only bona fide way to throw Strazi Orthodoxy into ultimate oblivion
> is to prove that there is no scientific way to detect design at all.
> Until that happens, Strazi Orthodoxy remains scientific.
>
> Comment:
> In both cases - Intelligent Design and Strazi Orthodoxy - the True
> Believers insist that they don't need "proof" as distinct from
> "reasonable" cause for subscribing to their Orthodox Belief.
Comments:
Firstly, you have violated godwin's law- so you lose the argument
automatically Secondly, apodictic demonstrations are possible only in
the formal sciences of logic and mathematics, thirdly a high
probability of an occurence (we might say that one has reasonable cause
for holding that belief) is sufficient to prove the existence of some
fact.
gangleri
What's godwin's law?
By what logical nexus does "probability" translate into 'sufficiency
for proving the existence of some fact'?
ignoto
gangleri wrote:
> Come again.
>
> What's godwin's law?
"Godwin's law (also Godwin's rule of Nazi analogies) is an adage in
Internet culture that was originated by Mike Godwin in 1990. The law
states that:
As an online discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison
involving Nazis or Hitler approaches 1.
...[O]nce such a comparison is made, the thread is over, and whoever
mentioned the Nazis has automatically lost whatever argument was in
progress. Godwin's law thus practically guarantees the existence of an
upper bound on thread length in those groups."
>
> By what logical nexus does "probability" translate into 'sufficiency
> for proving the existence of some fact'?
Ever heard of inductive inferences?
gangleri
Re. Godwin's Law.
I made the point a while back that DEHUMANIZATION of anti-Stratfordians
is standard operating procedures for the most ardent Stratfordians.
There's nothing new in that - the dehumanization of blacks in the US,
Jews in Germany, and Americans in Osama bin Laden-land are cases in
point.
The Strazi (as in Strat=ford) label gets the point across with greater
clarity than any label that I could think of with respect to the like
US/Osama mentality.
Re. "inductive inference".
It has nothing to do with "proving the existence of some FACT" - it's a
means of surmise with respect to some point at issue.
ignoto
Really? When an apple detaches from an tree does it fall to the ground
or shoot off into the stratosphere?
Peter Groves
news:1129080001.8...@g49g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
Name one person who believes that the planet Earth is an oblate spheroid who
has (1) changed his mind, or (2) conceded that his belief may be misplaced.
Peter G.
gangleri
But that "fact" is not scientific - that is, a tentative proposition
which, in principle, is capable of falsification.
gangleri
ignoto
Actually on the Hume/Popper view (which you seem to adhere to) we have
no good reason to think that an apple that detaches from an apple tree
will not shoot off into space rather than fall to the ground. IOW it is
gangleri
gangleri
Popper's proposition that experimental science would get us closer to
the "truth" of the matter at hand is one that is wholly at odds with
Hume's view.
I agree with Hume.
ignoto
gangleri wrote:
> So how would you set up an experiment to test this?
(As i recall):
H(0) Apples always fall to the ground.
H(1) Apples shoot off into the stratosphere.
Go to an orchard, sit down, and wait to see which way the apples fall.
If they fall up, reject H(0); if they fall to the ground reject H(1).
gangleri
"...on principle, it is quite wrong to try founding a theory on
observable magnitudes alone. In reality the very opposite happens. It
is the theory which decides what we can observe. You must appreciate
that observation is a very complicated process. The phenomenon under
observation [your falling apple - insert] produces certain events in
our measuring apparatus. As a result, further processes take place in
the apparatus, which eventually and by complicated paths produce sense
impressions and help us to fix the effects in our consciousness. Along
this whole path - from the phenomenon to its fixation in our
consciousness - we must be able to tell how nature functions, must know
the natural laws at least in practical terms, before we can claim to
have observed anything at all. Only theory, that is, knowledge of
natural laws, enables us to deduce the underlying phenomena from our
sense impressions. When we claim that we can observe something new, we
ought really to be saying that, although we are about to formulate new
natural laws that do not agree with the old ones, we nevertheless
assume that the existing laws - covering the whole path from the
phenomenon to our consciousness - function in such a way that we can
rely upon them and hence speak of 'observation'".
Einstein made these comments to Heisenberg, who reported them in one of
his books and added:
"I was completely taken aback by Einstein's attitude, though I found
his arguments convincing."
******
Clearly, your aint-it-obvious attitude with respect to the falling
apple would not have made much of a positive impression on Einstein and
Heisenberg.
But, so what!
What did they know that you don't?
ignoto
1. Einstein appears to be talking about the measurement problem in QM,
not apples falling off trees (i would need the reference to put the
quote in context).
2. Einstein makes a number of questionable epistemological assumptions.
> ******
> Clearly, your aint-it-obvious attitude with respect to the falling
> apple would not have made much of a positive impression on Einstein and
> Heisenberg.
3. You are the one that asked for a scientific experiment to test the
theory that apples fall off trees.
4. As i recall the was whether inductive inferences are mere
suppositions or whether they establish something as a fact. My point is
simply that inductive inference do establish facts (like the fact that
apples fall off trees)
> But, so what!
>
> What did they know that you don't?
4. If you are suggesting that Einstein and Heisenberg are infalliable
then you are mistaken.
5. Your (logically erroneous) appeal to authority amply demonstrates
your blinkered obedience to einsteinian orthodoxy.
gangleri
1. Einstein appears to be talking about the measurement problem in QM,
not apples falling off trees (i would need the reference to put the
quote in context).
Comment:
The fact - here's that word again! - that the "context" is unfamiliar
to you falsifies the theory that you know what you're talking about.
2. Einstein makes a number of questionable epistemological assumptions.
Comment:
Name one.
4. If you are suggesting that Einstein and Heisenberg are infalliable
then you are mistaken.
Comment:
Yes, I was suggesting that Einstein and Heisenberg were infallible. :)
5. Your (logically erroneous) appeal to authority amply demonstrates
your blinkered obedience to einsteinian orthodoxy.
Comment:
Watch your English!
An "appeal to authority" may be dumb, but it can never be "logically
erroneous."
lariadna
>>Name one person who believes that the planet Earth is an oblate
>>spheroid who has (1) changed his mind, or (2) conceded that his
>>belief may be misplaced.
>>Peter G.
> gangleri wrote:
> Bertrand Russell.
Please elaborate... I'm not familiar with this.
C.
gangleri
of Relativity_ - here are selected passages from that chapter.
****
Everybody knows that Einstein did something astonishing, but very few
people know exactly what it was that he did. [...] Many of the new
ideas can be expressed in non-mathematical language, but they are none
the less difficult on that account. What is demanded is a change in
our imaginative picture of the world - a picture which has been handed
down from remote, perhaps pre-human, ancestors, and has been learned by
each one of us in early childhood. A change in our imagination is
always difficult, especially when we are no longer young. [...]
In exploring the surface of the earth, we make use of all our senses,
more particularly of the senses of touch and sight. In measuring
lengths, parts of the human body are employed in pre-scientific ages: a
'foot,' a 'cubit,' a 'span' are defined in this way. For longer
distances, we think of the time it takes to walk from one place to
another. We gradually learn to judge distance roughly by the eye, but
we rely upon touch for accuracy. Moreover it is touch that gives us
our sense of 'reality.' Some things cannot be touched: rainbows,
reflections in looking-glasses, and so on. These things puzzle
children, whose metaphysical speculations are arrested by the
information that what is in the looking-glass is not 'real.' Macbeth's
dagger was unreal because it was not 'sensible to feeling as to sight.'
[...]
The theory of relativity depends, to a considerable extent, upon
getting rid of notions which are useful in ordinary life....
Circumstances on the surface of the earth, for various more or less
accidental reasons, suggest conceptions which turn out to be
inaccurate, although they have come to seem like necessities of
thought. The most important of these circumstances is that most
objects on the earth's surface are fairly persistent and nearly
stationary from a terrestrial point of view. If this were not the
case, the idea of going on a journey would not seem so definite as it
does. If you want to travel from King's Cross to Edinburgh, you know
that you will find King's Cross where it has always been, that the
railway line will take the course that it did when you last made the
journey, and that Waverley Station in Edinburgh will not have walked up
to the Castle. You therefore say and think that you have travelled to
Edinburgh, not that Edinburgh has travelled to you, though the latter
statement would be just as accurate. The success of this common-sense
point of view depends upon a number of things which are really of the
nature of luck. Suppose [this that and the other] There is nothing
impossible in these suppositions. But obviously what we call a journey
to Edinburgh would have no meaning in such a world. [...] The idea of
'place' is only a rough practical approximation: there is nothing
logically necessary about it, and it cannot be made precise.
If we were not much larger than an electron, we should not have this
impression of stability, which is only due to the grossness of our
senses. King's Cross, which to us looks solid, would be too vast to be
conceived except by a few eccentric mathematicians. The bits of it
that we could see would consist of little tiny points of matter, never
coming into contact with each other, but perpetually whizzing round
each other in an inconceivably rapid ballet-dance. The world of our
experience would be quite as mad as the one in which the different
parts of Edinburgh go for walks in different directions. [...] The
notion of comparative stability which forms part of our ordinary
outlook is thus due to the fact that we are about the size we are, and
live on a planet of which the surface is not very hot. If this were
not the case, we should not find pre-relativity physics intellectually
satisfying. Indeed we should never have invented such theories. We
should have had to arrive at relativity physics at one bound, or remain
ignorant of scientific laws. It is fortunate for us that we were not
faced with this alternative, since it is almost inconceivable that one
man could have done the work of Euclid, Galileo, Newton and Einstein.
Yet without such an incredible genius physics could hardly have been
discovered in a world where the universal flux was obvious to
non-scientific observation.
Chess One
"ignoto" <igno...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
news:1129082870.3...@g49g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
>
> gangleri wrote:
>> Re. the following:
>>
>> The only bona fide way to throw intelligent design into ultimate
>> oblivion is to prove that there is no scientific way to detect design
>> at all. Until that happens, intelligent design remains scientific.
>>
>> As in:
>>
>> The only bona fide way to throw Strazi Orthodoxy into ultimate oblivion
>> is to prove that there is no scientific way to detect design at all.
>> Until that happens, Strazi Orthodoxy remains scientific.
>>
>> Comment:
>
>> In both cases - Intelligent Design and Strazi Orthodoxy - the True
>> Believers insist that they don't need "proof" as distinct from
>> "reasonable" cause for subscribing to their Orthodox Belief.
>
> Comments:
>
> Firstly, you have violated godwin's law- so you lose the argument
> automatically
If Godwin were God, an old testament god then law's would suffice beyond
reason - therefore is this [transcendentalist belief] sufficient to
establish any fact?
>Secondly, apodictic demonstrations
Not a happy formation, 'demonstrably' being indicated,
> are possible only in
> the formal sciences of logic and mathematics,
Wherefore this 'possibly'? To take the point seriously, is it posited that
only in the 'hard' sciences, hard methodology is ... what? common or
warranted?
> thirdly a high
> probability of an occurence (we might say that one has reasonable cause
> for holding that belief) is sufficient to prove the existence of some
> fact.
can this be said in ordinary prose; that usually the more it happens, this
suffices common attention?
phil innes
Chess One
>> The Strazi (as in Strat=ford) label gets the point across with greater
>> clarity than any label that I could think of with respect to the like
>> US/Osama mentality.
>>
>> Re. "inductive inference".
>>
>> It has nothing to do with "proving the existence of some FACT" - it's a
>> means of surmise with respect to some point at issue.
>
> Really? When an apple detaches from an tree does it fall to the ground
> or shoot off into the stratosphere?
what needs resort to inductive references in place of observing what happens
to the apple?
the corollary on shakespearean studies will occur only to the observer and
not to the student who must jump determined hurdles to qualify for a
glittering prize - what this person observes, if anything, is little known
phil
Peter Groves
news:wpB3f.4751$C62.4317@trndny05...
>
> "ignoto" <igno...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
> news:1129082870.3...@g49g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
> >
>
> > probability of an occurence (we might say that one has reasonable cause
> > for holding that belief) is sufficient to prove the existence of some
> > fact.
>
> can this be said in ordinary prose; that usually the more it happens, this
> suffices common attention?
>
> phil innes
>
Peter G.
Bianca Steele
> I had in mind the ideas which Russell set forth in Ch. 1 of his _ABC
> of Relativity_ - here are selected passages from that chapter.
>
> ****
> notion of comparative stability which forms part of our ordinary
> outlook is thus due to the fact that we are about the size we are, and
> live on a planet of which the surface is not very hot. If this were
> not the case, we should not find pre-relativity physics intellectually
> satisfying. Indeed we should never have invented such theories. We
> should have had to arrive at relativity physics at one bound, or remain
> ignorant of scientific laws. It is fortunate for us that we were not
> faced with this alternative, since it is almost inconceivable that one
> man could have done the work of Euclid, Galileo, Newton and Einstein.
> Yet without such an incredible genius physics could hardly have been
> discovered in a world where the universal flux was obvious to
> non-scientific observation.
Indeed, as Popper observes (and as Tom Reedy confirms), this discovery
being impossible to conceive by ordinary means, we should have to
recognize that such a discovery could not be scientific. It would
constitute, at best, mystical speculation. But -- to head off
gangleri's usual contentions in defense of kabbalah -- that does not
describe any of the actual discoveries of genius that make up the
history of science, because in all those cases, we have historical and
biographical documentation describing in just what ways the
discoverers, as someone put it, "stood on the shoulders of giants" who
had preceded them: we are not in fact forced to assume that they
somehow knew of things they could not possibly have observed, received
communications concerning, etc. Just as we know, largely, who Bertrand
Russell spoke with and corresponded with, in order that he came to find
certain ideas interesting and others unimportant.
If we did not have the information, or could not make use of it, we
would have to engage in a futile hunt for some elusive "paper trail,"
the existence of which could be detected only by an apparent
priesthood, reading the historical record's version of entrails, and
making use only of evidence that the "priesthood" after due
consideration determined might be blessed. We would be unable to make
any positive statement of fact without having first checked it with
"the priesthood."
Of course, my point here is somewhat at a tangent from Russell's, who
is making the much simpler point that any scientific discovery could
have been originally intuited only by someone who seemed to see
patterns in the world, rather than a largely random flux.
----
Bianca Steele
gangleri
But -- to head off gangleri's usual contentions in defense of kabbalah
-- that does not
describe any of the actual discoveries of genius that make up the
history of science, because in all those cases, we have historical and
biographical documentation describing in just what ways the
discoverers, as someone put it, "stood on the shoulders of giants" who
had preceded them: we are not in fact forced to assume that they
somehow knew of things they could not possibly have observed, received
communications concerning, etc.
and especially:
that does not describe any of the actual discoveries of genius that
make up the history of science...
Comment - two words:
Johannes Kepler.
ignoto
Chess One wrote:
> "ignoto" <igno...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
> news:1129088543.5...@g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
>
> >> The Strazi (as in Strat=ford) label gets the point across with greater
> >> clarity than any label that I could think of with respect to the like
> >> US/Osama mentality.
> >>
> >> Re. "inductive inference".
> >>
> >> It has nothing to do with "proving the existence of some FACT" - it's a
> >> means of surmise with respect to some point at issue.
> >
> > Really? When an apple detaches from an tree does it fall to the ground
> > or shoot off into the stratosphere?
>
> to the apple?
Ummm, because we can predict what things will do without having to
watch them.
> the corollary on shakespearean studies will occur only to the observer and
> not to the student who must jump determined hurdles to qualify for a
> glittering prize - what this person observes, if anything, is little known
This merely went to science because gangleri took it there. Inductive
inferences are a very common form of reasoning, certainly applicable to
shakespeare studies.
> phil
ignoto
Chess One wrote:
> "ignoto" <igno...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
> news:1129082870.3...@g49g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
> >
> > gangleri wrote:
> >> Re. the following:
> >>
> >> The only bona fide way to throw intelligent design into ultimate
> >> oblivion is to prove that there is no scientific way to detect design
> >> at all. Until that happens, intelligent design remains scientific.
> >>
> >> As in:
> >>
> >> The only bona fide way to throw Strazi Orthodoxy into ultimate oblivion
> >> is to prove that there is no scientific way to detect design at all.
> >> Until that happens, Strazi Orthodoxy remains scientific.
> >>
> >> Comment:
> >
> >> In both cases - Intelligent Design and Strazi Orthodoxy - the True
> >> Believers insist that they don't need "proof" as distinct from
> >> "reasonable" cause for subscribing to their Orthodox Belief.
> >
> > Comments:
> >
> > Firstly, you have violated godwin's law- so you lose the argument
> > automatically
>
> If Godwin were God, an old testament god then law's would suffice beyond
> reason - therefore is this [transcendentalist belief] sufficient to
> establish any fact?
>
> >Secondly, apodictic demonstrations
>
> Not a happy formation, 'demonstrably' being indicated,
A proof can be demonstrated without logically necessity
'Apodictic' as used in logic means absolute or necessary.
Hence an apodictic demonstration is one that is absolute or necessary.
> > are possible only in
> > the formal sciences of logic and mathematics,
>
> Wherefore this 'possibly'? To take the point seriously, is it posited that
> only in the 'hard' sciences,
"hard sciences" is usually taken to refer to physics, chemistry and
biology.
>hard methodology is ... what? common or
> warranted?
Nope.
1. All men are mortal
2. Socrates is a man
3. Therefore Socrates is mortal
Granted that 1 and 2 are true, then 3 is necessarily true.
ignoto
gangleri wrote:
> Re. the following:
>
> 1. Einstein appears to be talking about the measurement problem in QM,
> not apples falling off trees (i would need the reference to put the
> quote in context).
>
> Comment:
>
> The fact - here's that word again! - that the "context" is unfamiliar
> to you falsifies the theory that you know what you're talking about.
Umm, no- it just means that I don't know Einstein's papers off by
heart. It does not follow that i "do not know what I am talking about"
> 2. Einstein makes a number of questionable epistemological assumptions.
>
>
> Comment:
>
> Name one.
I don't do pop quizzes. Why don't you go and do some reading and find
them out for yourself. (Hint: realism, idealism, phenomenalism,
theory/observation, sense-impressions)
> 4. If you are suggesting that Einstein and Heisenberg are infalliable
> then you are mistaken.
>
> Comment:
>
> Yes, I was suggesting that Einstein and Heisenberg were infallible. :)
>
> 5. Your (logically erroneous) appeal to authority amply demonstrates
> your blinkered obedience to einsteinian orthodoxy.
>
> Comment:
>
> Watch your English!
>
> An "appeal to authority" may be dumb, but it can never be "logically
> erroneous."
An appeal to authority may, under certain conditions, be a fallacy of
presumption
gangleri
> Comment:
> Name one.
I don't do pop quizzes. Why don't you go and do some reading and find
them out for yourself. (Hint: realism, idealism, phenomenalism,
theory/observation, sense-impressions)
Comment:
I happen to be pretty well versed in Einstein's epistemological views.
None of them strike me as "questionable".
Your failure to name one falsifies the theory that you knew what you
were talking about when you asserted that Einstein had made "a number
of questionable epistemological assumptions."
Chess One
>> >Secondly, apodictic demonstrations
>>
>> Not a happy formation, 'demonstrably' being indicated,
>
> A proof can be demonstrated without logically necessity
I only remarked on the term, not its significance - what interests me more
is the application of what we are saying is 'demonstrable, and maybe you
will like to dilate on it after reading my cheating statements below <grin>?
Essentially this is a review of what appears to make sense compared to what
must make sense. And I offer not a conclusion at the end, but a request that
another form of attention needs to accompany process statements in order to
determine what can be said to be true.
> 'Apodictic' as used in logic means absolute or necessary.
>
> Hence an apodictic demonstration is one that is absolute or necessary.
>
>> > are possible only in
>> > the formal sciences of logic and mathematics,
>>
>> Wherefore this 'possibly'? To take the point seriously, is it posited
>> that
>> only in the 'hard' sciences,
>
> "hard sciences" is usually taken to refer to physics, chemistry and
> biology.
>
>>hard methodology is ... what? common or
>> warranted?
>
> Nope.
>
> 1. All men are mortal
> 2. Socrates is a man
> 3. Therefore Socrates is mortal
>
> Granted that 1 and 2 are true, then 3 is necessarily true.
#3. is not necessarily true. It is only true if there is also a constant
either implicit or explicity accepted.
Not all statements contain things which are false, but process can make them
so:
1. Elvis was a man
2. Men went to the moon
3. Elvis went to the moon.
Obviously my statement #3 can be true or false, and is not a continuation of
the logic which is contained in your statement, but substitutes a specific
for a generality [Elvis for men]. Therefore, it is not the logic as-process
which is at fault, but how the logic is applied to content. Equally, we can
therefore not apply logical process alone as method and ignore all else.
Neither can we make the same sort of statement as in this reversal:
1. Men went to the moon
2. Sheila is a woman
3. Sheila did not go to the moon.
Here there are 2 cheats, the first consisting of a play on 'men' as if that
meant male, rather than human-kind, and the second is that we do not know if
Sheila subsequently went to the moon [even if males first went].
This last objection may seem like splitting hairs and making a distinction
without a difference, but to return to the first series of statements, we
assume that Socrates was a man such as we are, and that conditions did not
change in order to make our comparison. Maybe its an okay assumption, but it
invokes a constant which is inferred. It is this inference which is often
tricky! See:-
1. Shakespeare went to Grammar school
2. There he learned to read and write as did all students
3. Going to Grammar school enables all students to write like Shakespeare
This is a final calumny based on another form of cheating - that the
conditions in the statement are sufficient to explain the result.
As an exercise, I think all these things are important in determing the
basis of an argument which claims by virtue of the process alone to deliver
a true result, yet 3 of the above are entirely false, or quite equivocal.
We seem to employ these procedures in our determinations, sometimes we are
even conscious of them, and more rarely, we even promote them as conscious
device. The crux of utilising them to determine true results therefore rests
as much in the statements themselves, rather than the logical attributes
that can be made between A, B, C.
Cordially, Phil Innes
gangleri
A proof can be demonstrated without logically necessity
Comment:
I can see why Einstein's epistemological views don't sit well with you!
A "proof without logical necessity" = a maybe proposition.
Robert Stonehouse
<inn...@verizon.net> wrote:
>"ignoto" <igno...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
>news:1129252622.0...@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com...
>> 1. All men are mortal
>> 2. Socrates is a man
>> 3. Therefore Socrates is mortal
>>
>> Granted that 1 and 2 are true, then 3 is necessarily true.
>
>#3. is not necessarily true. It is only true if there is also a constant
>either implicit or explicity accepted.
>
>Not all statements contain things which are false, but process can make them
>so:
>
>1. Elvis was a man
>2. Men went to the moon
>3. Elvis went to the moon.
>
>Obviously my statement #3 can be true or false, and is not a continuation of
>the logic which is contained in your statement, but substitutes a specific
>for a generality [Elvis for men]. Therefore, it is not the logic as-process
>which is at fault, but how the logic is applied to content. Equally, we can
>therefore not apply logical process alone as method and ignore all else.
I don't know about logic-as-process, but as logic this is
definitely bad. It could be made better logic at the expense
of making it obvious nonsense; say,
All men are called Elvis
Some men went to the moon
Some men called Elvis went to the moon
(DARII)
or
All men went to the moon
Some men are called Elvis
Some men called Elvis went to the moon
(DARII again)
both of which invite the Falstaffian rebuttal, 'I deny your
major'.
>Neither can we make the same sort of statement as in this reversal:
>
>1. Men went to the moon
>2. Sheila is a woman
>3. Sheila did not go to the moon.
>
>Here there are 2 cheats, the first consisting of a play on 'men' as if that
>meant male, rather than human-kind, and the second is that we do not know if
>Sheila subsequently went to the moon [even if males first went].
...
You can't play on words in a syllogism. If you can, it is
badly formed. It might work as:
All women are not-men
Sheila is a woman
Sheila is a not-man
(BARBARA)
No not-men went to the moon
Sheila is a not-man
Sheila did not go to the moon.
(CELARENT)
This is fair as logic and sense. Using singular proper names
is awkward and could cause dispute.
--
Robert Stonehouse
To mail me, replace invalid with uk. Inconvenience regretted
Chess One
"Robert Stonehouse" <ew...@bcs.org.invalid> wrote in message
news:juuvk1h10dabi9224...@4ax.com...
Laugh - this is quite funny - and I mock the same things; and the point of
NOT simply allowing a logical procession or phrases to determine a logical
result, but to have the logical result be based on adequate foundations - so
can the logical sequence be used to determine if contributory content
//makes sense//, ie: "All men are called Elvis".
I would say that it could only work in hypothetical cases - but not
otherwise. Only in an hypothesis can all men be called Elvis.
> or
>
> All men went to the moon
> Some men are called Elvis
> Some men called Elvis went to the moon
> (DARII again)
The contrast is with FALSELY reasoned material - but as we can also see,
TRUELY reasoned material can deliver not logically false, but nonsence
conclusion [Elvis went to Moon].
> both of which invite the Falstaffian rebuttal, 'I deny your
> major'.
>
>>Neither can we make the same sort of statement as in this reversal:
>>
>>1. Men went to the moon
>>2. Sheila is a woman
>>3. Sheila did not go to the moon.
>>
>>Here there are 2 cheats, the first consisting of a play on 'men' as if
>>that
>>meant male, rather than human-kind, and the second is that we do not know
>>if
>>Sheila subsequently went to the moon [even if males first went].
> ...
> You can't play on words in a syllogism. If you can, it is
> badly formed. It might work as:
Yes - I understand it, I said the cheat consists of the play on...
> All women are not-men
> Sheila is a woman
> Sheila is a not-man
> (BARBARA)
>
> No not-men went to the moon
> Sheila is a not-man
> Sheila did not go to the moon.
> (CELARENT)
>
> This is fair as logic and sense. Using singular proper names
> is awkward and could cause dispute.
Unless one is Australian.
Phil
ignoto
That is like saying 1+1=2 is not necessarily true because we might
decide to define 1 as being equal to 45.
A syllogism has rules. One such rule is that the terms of a syllogism
must be kept constant.
> Not all statements contain things which are false, but process can make them
> so:
Well, obviously not all statements contain things that are false,
because if they did then your statment would be manifestly absurd.
By process I suppose you mean (to put it simply) that things change.
Well, yes. But change doesn;t precule logicla examination of things. If
it did then it would not be possible to engage in discourse.
> 1. Elvis was a man
> 2. Men went to the moon
> 3. Elvis went to the moon.
The form of a syllogism is:
General
particular
conclusion
1.Men went to the moon
2.Elvis was a man
3.Elvis went to the moon
Note the equivocation in lines 1 and 2 on the term man/men. IN line 1.
it is used collectively in line 2 it is used particulary but it is not
quantified. So properly we would say:
All men went to the moon
Elvis was a man
Elvis went to the moon
> 1. Elvis was a man
> 2. Men went to the moon
> 3. Elvis went to the moon.
> Obviously my statement #3 can be true or false, and is not a continuation of
> the logic which is contained in your statement, but substitutes a specific
> for a generality [Elvis for men].
You have not given a syllogistic form of reasoning. Your conclusion in
3 is a mere possiblity.
> Therefore, it is not the logic as-process
> which is at fault, but how the logic is applied to content.
Umm, you haven;t even given a defintiion of ''logic as process'', let
alone an adequate example of it.
> Equally, we can
> therefore not apply logical process alone as method and ignore all else.
Obviously not, but I never proposed that logic was the be all and end
all. Logic is the means by which we may discover truths about the world
(not as marlowe would have it, to dispute well- that is the function of
rhetoric). That is the point of applied logic.
I don't know what the point of your ''logic as process'' is, given your
elvis example though, it is plain it is not aimed at the discovery of
truth (as such the name 'logic' is clearly misapplied to your ''logic
as process'')
> Neither can we make the same sort of statement as in this reversal:
>
> 1. Men went to the moon
> 2. Sheila is a woman
> 3. Sheila did not go to the moon.
Properly we might say:
All men went to the moon
Shiela is not a man
Therefore Shiela did not go to the moon.
> Here there are 2 cheats, the first consisting of a play on 'men' as if that
> meant male, rather than human-kind,
Fallacy. Shifting terms. Hence the second line reads not a man (not-X)
rather than 'woman'
> and the second is that we do not know if
> Sheila subsequently went to the moon [even if males first went].
Requiring a syllogism to be predictive is like planting a chunk of gold
in soil, watering it and expecting a tree to grow. Syllogisms are not
predictive.
> This last objection may seem like splitting hairs and making a distinction
> without a difference, but to return to the first series of statements, we
> assume that Socrates was a man such as we are, and that conditions did not
> change in order to make our comparison. Maybe its an okay assumption, but it
> invokes a constant which is inferred. It is this inference which is often
> tricky!
We infer constants all the time. For isntance in the above paragraph
you use X number of words (i can;t be bothered to count them) all of
which you must assume to have a constant meaning (if your statement is
to be be meaningful).
>See:-
>
> 1. Shakespeare went to Grammar school
> 2. There he learned to read and write as did all students
> 3. Going to Grammar school enables all students to write like Shakespeare
You appear to be trying to say:
1.All students that go to grammar school learn to read and write
2.Shakespeare went to grammar school
3.Therefore all students can write like shakespeare
This is not in syllogistic form. The conclusion (3) plainly does not
follow from 1 & 2 (non sequitur).
I suggest you try doing some background reading on syllogisms before
advancing a critique. However we might render the above in a more
palatable form:
1.All students that go to grammar school can read and write
2.Shakespeare went to grammar school
3.Therefore shakespeare can read and write
Which is perfectly acceptable.
> This is a final calumny based on another form of cheating - that the
> conditions in the statement are sufficient to explain the result.
> As an exercise, I think all these things are important in determing the
> basis of an argument which claims by virtue of the process alone to deliver
> a true result, yet 3 of the above are entirely false, or quite equivocal.
The examples of logical ''process'' that you give above all involve
erroneous logic. Hence your claim that you have shown logic to entail
results that are ''entirely false'' or ''quite equivocal'' is plainly
false.
You also fall into self-refutation.
> We seem to employ these procedures in our determinations, sometimes we are
> even conscious of them, and more rarely, we even promote them as conscious
> device. The crux of utilising them to determine true results therefore rests
> as much in the statements themselves, rather than the logical attributes
> that can be made between A, B, C.
In conclusion one may submit that you have no idea what you are talking
about.
ignoto
A "proof without logical necessity"= a probable conclusion
ignoto
"All men are called Elvis" is factually false.
> > or
> >
> > All men went to the moon
> > Some men are called Elvis
> > Some men called Elvis went to the moon
> > (DARII again)
>
> The contrast is with FALSELY reasoned material - but as we can also see,
> TRUELY reasoned material can deliver not logically false, but nonsence
> conclusion [Elvis went to Moon].
You mean, presumably, that a valid deduction can give a false
conclusion. - Aristotle only discovered that what? 2000 odd years ago.
Peter Farey
"ignoto" wrote:
>
> Logic is the means by which we may discover truths about
> the world (not as marlowe would have it, to dispute well-
> that is the function of rhetoric). That is the point of
> applied logic.
To be fair, I believe that *bene disserere est finis logices*
is a quotation taken by Marlowe from Ramus's *Dialectics*,
although it is not clear whether or not Faustus believes it to
be from Aristotle.
Peter F.
pet...@rey.prestel.co.uk
http://www2.prestel.co.uk/rey/index.htm
Peter Groves
news:dita3g$mba$3$8300...@news.demon.co.uk...
>
> "ignoto" wrote:
> >
> > Logic is the means by which we may discover truths about
> > the world (not as marlowe would have it, to dispute well-
> > that is the function of rhetoric). That is the point of
> > applied logic.
>
> To be fair, I believe that *bene disserere est finis logices*
> is a quotation taken by Marlowe from Ramus's *Dialectics*,
> although it is not clear whether or not Faustus believes it to
> be from Aristotle.
>
Probably not, since (perhaps unusually for a Renaissance intellectual), when
Faustus quotes Aristotle he does so in Greek: "Bid <on kai me on> farewell;
Galen, come.> (I quote from memory -- it is of course a textual crux, but
this seems the best solution).
I know it's not evidence of any kind, but Shakespeare never (AFAIR) quotes
Greek.
Peter G.
Peter Groves
extraordinarily good? I would travel a long way (and in Australia that has
a different meaning) to see a good <Faustus>, <Jew> or <Tamburlaine>. Is it
just that theatre companies know that people will come to Shakespeare
anyway, out of a sort of grim cultural duty? I get that impression from our
local Melbourne Theatre Company, who seem to have little faith that
audiences will find Shakespeare entertaining without a lot of rather
desperate assistance.
Peter G
gangleri
A "proof without logical necessity"= a probable conclusion
Comment:
Indeed.
That leaves open the possibility that the "proof" is not valid.
Hence the Popperian notion that a scientific "theory" can never be
certain.
Yet, Popper also held that the "falsification" of a "theory" and its
replacement by another "theory" represented progress towards the true
state of affairs with which the "theory" is concerned - even if we
would never be able to know that state itself.
This view is predicated on the assumption that the axiomatic
pre-suppositions of any given sequence of "better" theories do in fact
represent a true state of affairs.
A few months before his death, Einstein expressly cautioned that such
might not in fact be the case:
"I concede, however, that it is quite possible that physics cannot be
founded on the concept of field - that is to say, on continuous
elements. But then, out of my whole castle in the air - including the
theory of gravitation [General Relativity - insert], but also most of
current physics - there would remain almost nothing."
Last paragraph of Einstein's letter to Michel Besso, dated August 10,
1954, published in ' Einstein - A Centenary Volume', ed. A. P. French,
Harvard University Press, 1979, p. 269.
Mark Cipra
news:a4s4f.19492$U51....@news-server.bigpond.net.au...
> And why, incidentally, is Marlowe so infrequently performed when he is so
> extraordinarily good? I would travel a long way (and in Australia that
has
> a different meaning) to see a good <Faustus>, <Jew> or <Tamburlaine>. Is
it
> just that theatre companies know that people will come to Shakespeare
> anyway, out of a sort of grim cultural duty?
Well, leaving out the last clause, I think that's it. Outside the very
largest cities, the other Renaissance playwrights are very rarely performed,
in spite of there being a terrific amount of good stuff. Even in Stratford,
Ontario (which is a tourist destination, of course, not a big city), they
seldom do any classical theater other than Shakespeare.
> I get that impression from our
> local Melbourne Theatre Company, who seem to have little faith that
> audiences will find Shakespeare entertaining without a lot of rather
> desperate assistance.
>
> Peter G
>
>
--
"Nothing is so dangerous as being too modern. One is apt to grow
old-fashioned quite suddenly". Wilde, Ideal Husband.
(Play Indiana Jones! Hide the "ark" in my address to reply by e-mail!)
Peter Farey
Peter Groves wrote:
>
> Peter Farey wrote:
> >
> > "ignoto" wrote:
> > >
> > > Logic is the means by which we may discover truths about
> > > the world (not as marlowe would have it, to dispute well-
> > > that is the function of rhetoric). That is the point of
> > > applied logic.
> >
> > To be fair, I believe that *bene disserere est finis logices*
> > is a quotation taken by Marlowe from Ramus's *Dialectics*,
> > although it is not clear whether or not Faustus believes it to
> > be from Aristotle.
>
> Probably not, since (perhaps unusually for a Renaissance
> intellectual), when Faustus quotes Aristotle he does so in
> Greek: "Bid <on kai me on> farewell; < Galen, come.> (I quote
> from memory -- it is of course a textual crux, but this seems
> the best solution).
It certainly makes sense that he would quote someone who was
challenging the supremacy of Aristotle, since it is part of his
argument for rejecting that particular discipline.
> I know it's not evidence of any kind, but Shakespeare never
> (AFAIR) quotes Greek.
No, that might have given the game away, perhaps. Had to make
do with something rather like it in English, I suppose. "To be and
not to be" is metrically satisfactory, but lacks that extra frisson.
Any thoughts?
Robert Stonehouse
<igno...@yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>Chess One wrote:
>> "Robert Stonehouse" <ew...@bcs.org.invalid> wrote in message
>> news:juuvk1h10dabi9224...@4ax.com...
>> > On Fri, 14 Oct 2005 13:29:37 GMT, "Chess One"
>> > <inn...@verizon.net> wrote:
>> >>"ignoto" <igno...@yahoo.com.au> wrote in message
>> >>news:1129252622.0...@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com...
...
Just so. (And a good thing too.) And it's the major premiss.
Hence Falstaff.
...
>You mean, presumably, that a valid deduction can give a false
>conclusion. - Aristotle only discovered that what? 2000 odd years ago.
Yes. I don't claim it's new. Only true!
>
>> > both of which invite the Falstaffian rebuttal, 'I deny your
>> > major'.
...
Robert Stonehouse
<Peter...@prst17z1.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>"ignoto" wrote:
>> Logic is the means by which we may discover truths about
>> the world (not as marlowe would have it, to dispute well-
>> that is the function of rhetoric). That is the point of
>> applied logic.
>
>To be fair, I believe that *bene disserere est finis logices*
>is a quotation taken by Marlowe from Ramus's *Dialectics*,
>although it is not clear whether or not Faustus believes it to
>be from Aristotle.
The word 'logice' meaning 'logic' does not appear before
Cicero, according to Liddell and Scott.
On the other hand, 'disserrere' according to Lewis and Short
has a literal meaning 'set forth in order, arrange
distinctly' from which comes the first meaning 'examine,
argue, discuss' and thence the more common 'speak,
discourse, treat of a thing'. We do not now expect a
'dissertation' to be a rhetorical exercise.
All which suggests that Ramus meant 'the purpose of logic is
good dialectic', and the idea comes from the argument about
whether logic was part of philosophy or a tool of
philosophy, which raged between the Stoics, the Peripatetics
and the Platonists some time around the year dot. Rather a
'point of a pin' argument (Lukasiewicz, 'Aristotle's
Syllogistic' p.13.)
But dialectic, which in Plato was the method of the highest
philosophy, in the Middle Ages became the medieval
disputation still in use in Marlowe's time; a dry-as-dust
affair, itself thick with 'point of a pin' arguments.
Chess One
>> > 1. All men are mortal
>> > 2. Socrates is a man
>> > 3. Therefore Socrates is mortal
>> >
>> > Granted that 1 and 2 are true, then 3 is necessarily true.
>>
>> #3. is not necessarily true. It is only true if there is also a constant
>> either implicit or explicity accepted.
>
> That is like saying 1+1=2 is not necessarily true because we might
> decide to define 1 as being equal to 45.
No its not. Its like saying that 1 apple "+" 1 orange are 2 objects, since
the constant changed.
> A syllogism has rules. One such rule is that the terms of a syllogism
> must be kept constant.
>
>> Not all statements contain things which are false, but process can make
>> them
>> so:
>
> Well, obviously not all statements contain things that are false,
> because if they did then your statment would be manifestly absurd.
True. or erm,
> By process I suppose you mean (to put it simply) that things change.
> Well, yes. But change doesn;t precule logicla examination of things. If
> it did then it would not be possible to engage in discourse.
>
>> 1. Elvis was a man
>> 2. Men went to the moon
>> 3. Elvis went to the moon.
>
> The form of a syllogism is:
>
> General
> particular
> conclusion
>
> 1.Men went to the moon
> 2.Elvis was a man
> 3.Elvis went to the moon
>
> Note the equivocation in lines 1 and 2 on the term man/men. IN line 1.
> it is used collectively in line 2 it is used particulary but it is not
> quantified. So properly we would say:
>
> All men went to the moon
> Elvis was a man
> Elvis went to the moon
Except that would break another rule, that the statement must be possible.
And its not possible to support all men going to the moon, except
hypothetically. And hypothetical arguments may lack the basis of being
possible.
>> 1. Elvis was a man
>> 2. Men went to the moon
>> 3. Elvis went to the moon.
>
>> Obviously my statement #3 can be true or false, and is not a continuation
>> of
>> the logic which is contained in your statement, but substitutes a
>> specific
>> for a generality [Elvis for men].
>
> You have not given a syllogistic form of reasoning. Your conclusion in
> 3 is a mere possiblity.
True.
>> Therefore, it is not the logic as-process
>> which is at fault, but how the logic is applied to content.
>
> Umm, you haven;t even given a defintiion of ''logic as process'', let
> alone an adequate example of it.
True. But the statement is still true even though I haven't given an
example.
1+1=2 is true only if we consider that it follows the allgebra a+a=2a, but
if 1 is not a quantity but a position, as in 'first' or in 'time' then 1+1
is not a viable proposition, since the convention of what "+" means is not
usable.
>> Equally, we can
>> therefore not apply logical process alone as method and ignore all else.
>
> Obviously not, but I never proposed that logic was the be all and end
> all.
Fine. We are in no dissagreement. I am really stating that when logic is
applied to anything much more than pure algebraic forms, then comes
sophistication, and the 'model' we had in allgebra becomes tenuous, and is
in some cases outright corrupted.
Phil
Paul Crowley
news:a4s4f.19492$U51....@news-server.bigpond.net.au...
> And why, incidentally, is Marlowe so infrequently performed when he is so
> extraordinarily good? I would travel a long way (and in Australia that has
> a different meaning) to see a good <Faustus>, <Jew> or <Tamburlaine>.
Have you ever seen a very good production
of <Faustus>, <Jew> or <Tamburlaine> . . ?
IMHO, even the best cannot compare with a
competent production from the top rank of
the canonical plays. The absence of humour,
the tendency to monotone, the remoteness
from our own (or any) human experience, and
the next-to-non-existent characterisation, all
tend to make them a duty rather than a
pleasure.
Paul.
Chess One
"gangleri" <gunnar....@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:1129469552....@g14g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
>> A "proof without logical necessity" = a maybe proposition.
>
> A "proof without logical necessity"= a probable conclusion
>
> Comment:
>
> Indeed.
>
> That leaves open the possibility that the "proof" is not valid.
>
> Hence the Popperian notion that a scientific "theory" can never be
> certain.
>
> Yet, Popper also held that the "falsification" of a "theory" and its
> replacement by another "theory" represented progress towards the true
> state of affairs with which the "theory" is concerned - even if we
> would never be able to know that state itself.
Didn't Popper famously say something more than that and which relates to
field theory - that the opposite of one profound truth may not be a
falsehood, but another profound truth!
He was reddressing a kind of exclusivism of any one perspective, so that
having proved "a" there would be no need to look for any "b" but to further
refine "a".
> This view is predicated on the assumption that the axiomatic
> pre-suppositions of any given sequence of "better" theories do in fact
> represent a true state of affairs.
Quite.
> A few months before his death, Einstein expressly cautioned that such
> might not in fact be the case:
>
> "I concede, however, that it is quite possible that physics cannot be
> founded on the concept of field - that is to say, on continuous
> elements. But then, out of my whole castle in the air - including the
> theory of gravitation [General Relativity - insert], but also most of
> current physics - there would remain almost nothing."
Pity he couldn't have met Sheldrake who is a good analyst of scientific
history, as well as a critic of where science has stalled. Its interesting
to note that in his own discipline Sheldrake is strongly resisted by
Darwinists, but his theories are welcome by physicists.
Phil
gangleri
Didn't Popper famously say something more than that and which relates
to field theory - that the opposite of one profound truth may not be a
falsehood, but another profound truth!
Comment:
I remember seeing this point made, but it seems inconsistent with the
thrust of Popper's successive-theories-get-us-closer-to-the-thruth
argument.
Chess One
"Robert Stonehouse" <ew...@bcs.org.invalid> wrote in message
> On Sun, 16 Oct 2005 11:32:08 +0100, "Peter Farey"
> <Peter...@prst17z1.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>"ignoto" wrote:
>>> Logic is the means by which we may discover truths about
>>> the world (not as marlowe would have it, to dispute well-
>>> that is the function of rhetoric). That is the point of
>>> applied logic.
>>
>>To be fair, I believe that *bene disserere est finis logices*
>>is a quotation taken by Marlowe from Ramus's *Dialectics*,
>>although it is not clear whether or not Faustus believes it to
>>be from Aristotle.
>
> The word 'logice' meaning 'logic' does not appear before
> Cicero, according to Liddell and Scott.
So I set off to read The Trivium, but became diverted by reading about
Francis Bacon's inductive logic, but fatally then turned to other ideas
which counter-point Greek logic, and Porphyry [232?-305?] who ressurected a
Neo-Platonic combinative version or Aristotle and Plato - thence to res and
alaquid, and the concept being the 'whatness' of a reality as opposed to
'other' reality.
And from there to the proposition that transcendental concepts elude logical
definition [the thing I was searching for originally]. A commentary runs
that historical discussion [argument!] of these theories of truth depend
much on initial definitions of the concepts. But the ontological aspect does
not, since it is an empirical metaphysic.
This was all much more exciting than reviewing false contingent syllogisms,
with which I already agree with ignoto, and so abandoned entirely to then
regard Obversions, especially O. E. ones which survived, even unto the
author:-
My death's sad tale may yet undeaf his ear.
/Richard II 2.1.1.
Tremble, thou wretch, That hast within thee undivulged crimes
Unwhipped of justice.
/KL 3.2.51-53
A-rambling, Phil
John W. Kennedy
It's spelled "Oncaymaeon" in 1604, which morphs into "Oeconomy" in 1616.
It could easily be the compositors' fault, of course; still it's not the
best possible argument to establish the author as a Greek scholar, as
opposed to someone who picked up a few scraps.
On the negative side, however, I'd say that Shakespeare (just like most
Hollywood producers) thinks of Greeks as just another kind of Roman.
--
John W. Kennedy
"Those in the seat of power oft forget their failings and seek only the
obeisance of others! Thus is bad government born! Hold in your heart
that you and the people are one, human beings all, and good government
shall arise of its own accord! Such is the path of virtue!"
-- Kazuo Koike. "Lone Wolf and Cub: Thirteen Strings" (tr. Dana Lewis)
John W. Kennedy
I think that Marlowe is a rather better poet than playwright, and people
don't generally go to the theatre today for the poetry. (If they did,
verse drama wouldn't be the all but dead art it is at present.)
--
John W. Kennedy
"...if you had to fall in love with someone who was evil, I can see why
it was her."
-- "Alias"
Philling Station
Paul Crowley droned:
> ...the remoteness
> from our own (or any) human experience...
Yes Paul, the theme of Faustus does seem to have little to do with
"our own (or any) human experience". That explains why no other author
has bothered writing anything like it or using the same themes.
(Note to Oxenfordians - this is called sarcasm.)
Peter Groves
news:OVC4f.7861$1X1....@fe12.lga...
> Peter Groves wrote:
> > And why, incidentally, is Marlowe so infrequently performed when he is
so
> > extraordinarily good? I would travel a long way (and in Australia that
has
> > a different meaning) to see a good <Faustus>, <Jew> or <Tamburlaine>.
Is it
> > just that theatre companies know that people will come to Shakespeare
> > anyway, out of a sort of grim cultural duty? I get that impression from
our
> > local Melbourne Theatre Company, who seem to have little faith that
> > audiences will find Shakespeare entertaining without a lot of rather
> > desperate assistance.
>
> I think that Marlowe is a rather better poet than playwright, and people
> don't generally go to the theatre today for the poetry. (If they did,
> verse drama wouldn't be the all but dead art it is at present.)
True, more's the pity. It may not be the whole story, but there's something
in Johnson's remark in his Preface to Shakespeare that "the spectators are
always in their senses, and know, from the first act to the last, that the
stage is only a stage, and that the players are only players. They come to
hear a certain number of lines recited with just gesture and elegant
modulation."
On the other hand, though Marlowe may not be too good at structuring complex
scenes with many characters in the way Shakespeare can, or sustaining a kind
of curve of dramatic action throughout the whole play, there are some fine
*moments* of drama in all of his plays (except, perhaps, <Dido>).
Peter G.
lariadna
>Paul Crowley wrote:
>Have you ever seen a very good production
>of <Faustus>, <Jew> or <Tamburlaine> . . ?
Let's rephrase that... have you ever seen any
production of .... (Marlowe's plays)? And Jarman's
movie doesn't count.
The only 'production' of Tamburlaine I've seen are the
~5-line blurbs in Michael Wood's video, and they were
completely different from what I'd expected. The
Tamburlaine actor was staring at the sky and speaking
in a low raspy voice, when I would have expected a
thunderous speech. (Though it worked in a way, because
it made him seem not quite sane.) So I'm interested in
seeing how different actors would perform these roles.
I'd guess that the 'Jew' is not performed because of the
anti-Semitism, though there might be some adaptation
possible.
C.
Peter Farey
>
> And why, incidentally, is Marlowe so infrequently performed
> when he is so extraordinarily good? I would travel a long
> way (and in Australia that has a different meaning) to see
> a good <Faustus>, <Jew> or <Tamburlaine>. Is it just that
> theatre companies know that people will come to Shakespeare
> anyway, out of a sort of grim cultural duty? I get that
> impression from our local Melbourne Theatre Company, who
> speare entertaining without a lot of rather desperate
> assistance.
And careful selection of *which* Shakespeare play too. Only
about a quarter of the canon - if that - gets even an occas-
ional professional airing anywhere near us. Which are that
year's "set books", and which ones are most likely not to
bore the pants off the kiddy-winks at matinees seem to be
the important criteria for local theatres.
Yet when our local company did Doctor Faustus "in the round"
about five years ago, the place was full every night and the
whole audience seemed to love it!
Our other source is local amateurs, but the chance of getting
anything other than Romeo and Juliet, Richard III or a Shake-
speare comedy from them is very low.
Paul Crowley
news:1129513267....@g14g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
>
> Paul Crowley droned:
> > ...the remoteness
> > from our own (or any) human experience...
>
> Yes Paul, the theme of Faustus does seem to have little to do with
> "our own (or any) human experience". That explains why no other author
> has bothered writing anything like it or using the same themes.
I don't know how it's been with you, Neil,
but offers for my eternal soul from the
Prince of Darkness have been a bit on the
slow side since the start of the millennium.
Do you think 9/11 could be a factor?
I accept that it is a BIG theme, and perfect
for a grand opera to impress the Empress
of Austria. But it's just not the sort of
thing our poet went for. He did not need
to impress anyone.
Paul.
Chess One
"Philling Station" <Spam...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1129513267....@g14g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
>
>> ...the remoteness
>> from our own (or any) human experience...
>
> Yes Paul, the theme of Faustus does seem to have little to do with
> "our own (or any) human experience". That explains why no other author
> has bothered writing anything like it or using the same themes.
O dear, an encounter with an unread Strat. Try Hughes or Plath.
Phil
Philling Station
Paul Crowley wrote:
> "Philling Station" <Spam...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:1129513267....@g14g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
> >
> > Paul Crowley droned:
> > > ...the remoteness
> > > from our own (or any) human experience...
> >
> > Yes Paul, the theme of Faustus does seem to have little to do with
> > "our own (or any) human experience". That explains why no other author
> > has bothered writing anything like it or using the same themes.
>
> I don't know how it's been with you, Neil,
> but offers for my eternal soul from the
> Prince of Darkness have been a bit on the
> slow side since the start of the millennium.
I always understood you had no soul, Paul.
David L. Webb
"Chess One" <inn...@verizon.net> wrote:
[...]
> Didn't Popper famously say something more than that and which relates to
> field theory - that the opposite of one profound truth may not be a
> falsehood, but another profound truth!
Mr. Innes seems to be confusing Popper with Neils Bohr, who famously
said that.
[...]
> > A few months before his death, Einstein expressly cautioned that such
> > might not in fact be the case:
> >
> > "I concede, however, that it is quite possible that physics cannot be
> > founded on the concept of field - that is to say, on continuous
> > elements. But then, out of my whole castle in the air - including the
> > theory of gravitation [General Relativity - insert], but also most of
> > current physics - there would remain almost nothing."
> Pity he couldn't have met Sheldrake who is a good analyst of scientific
> history, as well as a critic of where science has stalled. Its interesting
> to note that in his own discipline Sheldrake is strongly resisted by
> Darwinists, but his theories are welcome by physicists.
What physicists would those be? Can Mr. Innes identify some
physicists who "welcome" Sheldrake's theories?
[...]
Chess One
"David L. Webb" <David....@Dartmouth.edu> wrote in message
news:David.L.Webb-9305...@merrimack.dartmouth.edu...
> In article <qPy4f.16847$p_.8908@trndny05>,
> "Chess One" <inn...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
> [...]
>> Didn't Popper famously say something more than that and which relates to
>> field theory - that the opposite of one profound truth may not be a
>> falsehood, but another profound truth!
>
> Mr. Innes seems to be confusing Popper with Neils Bohr, who famously
> said that.
I may have been! Though I have seen it attributed to Popper.
> [...]
>> > A few months before his death, Einstein expressly cautioned that such
>> > might not in fact be the case:
>> >
>> > "I concede, however, that it is quite possible that physics cannot be
>> > founded on the concept of field - that is to say, on continuous
>> > elements. But then, out of my whole castle in the air - including the
>> > theory of gravitation [General Relativity - insert], but also most of
>> > current physics - there would remain almost nothing."
>
>> Pity he couldn't have met Sheldrake who is a good analyst of scientific
>> history, as well as a critic of where science has stalled. Its
>> interesting
>> to note that in his own discipline Sheldrake is strongly resisted by
>> Darwinists, but his theories are welcome by physicists.
>
> What physicists would those be? Can Mr. Innes identify some
> physicists who "welcome" Sheldrake's theories?
Do you have a library up there at Dartmouth? Find Sheldrake, Rupert. Consult
Index.
> [...]
lariadna
>Have you ever seen a very good production
>of <Faustus>, <Jew> or <Tamburlaine> . . ?
>IMHO, even the best cannot compare with a
>competent production from the top rank of
>the canonical plays. The absence of humour,
Marlowe has an extremely absurd dark sense
of humor. For example, I read an article about the Duke of
Guise's main speech (in 'The Massacre at Paris'), and it
seems that Marlowe was portraying him as a big fool while
also making him seem very grandiose, yet Guise is not
altogether unsympathetic and still has some of the
Marlovian hero charisma. The Ramus scene also has,
according to some interpretations, a sense of
ridiculousness about it.
It seems very different from Shakespeare's humor,
but I'm not entirely sure, so I'll be cautious about it
until I learn more.
C.
David L. Webb
"Chess One" <inn...@verizon.net> wrote:
> "David L. Webb" <David....@Dartmouth.edu> wrote in message
> news:David.L.Webb-9305...@merrimack.dartmouth.edu...
> > In article <qPy4f.16847$p_.8908@trndny05>,
> > "Chess One" <inn...@verizon.net> wrote:
> >
> > [...]
> >> Didn't Popper famously say something more than that and which relates to
> >> field theory - that the opposite of one profound truth may not be a
> >> falsehood, but another profound truth!
> > Mr. Innes seems to be confusing Popper with Neils Bohr, who famously
> > said that.
> I may have been! Though I have seen it attributed to Popper.
Popper may have quoted Bohr, but that does not justify an attribution
of the quotation to Popper. (As a matter of fact, Thomas Mann also said
something similar, but Mr. Innes's wording above is closest to that of
Bohr's aphorism as it is usually quoted.)
> > [...]
> >> > A few months before his death, Einstein expressly cautioned that such
> >> > might not in fact be the case:
> >> >
> >> > "I concede, however, that it is quite possible that physics cannot be
> >> > founded on the concept of field - that is to say, on continuous
> >> > elements. But then, out of my whole castle in the air - including the
> >> > theory of gravitation [General Relativity - insert], but also most of
> >> > current physics - there would remain almost nothing."
> >> Pity he couldn't have met Sheldrake who is a good analyst of scientific
> >> history, as well as a critic of where science has stalled. Its
> >> interesting
> >> to note that in his own discipline Sheldrake is strongly resisted by
> >> Darwinists, but his theories are welcome by physicists.
> > What physicists would those be? Can Mr. Innes identify some
> > physicists who "welcome" Sheldrake's theories?
> Do you have a library up there at Dartmouth? Find Sheldrake, Rupert. Consult
> Index.
Just as I expected -- Mr. Innes cannot identify any physicists who
"welcome" Sheldrake's theories.
> > [...]
Chess One
"David L. Webb" <David....@Dartmouth.edu> wrote in message
>> Index.
>
> Just as I expected -- Mr. Innes cannot identify any physicists who
> "welcome" Sheldrake's theories.
No David. That is an illogical conclusion from what I wrote. It not only
identifies the level of knoweldge you have, but also your intent to amplify
it.
If you were interested in the subject you would surely investigate it
yourself fueled by such interest. If you were just making a rhetorical
fling... you know, with your usual motif you would write as you do.
Should you ever leave your own school on a day-release program, you might
take in experiments at Yale and MIT <wink> and if you had some interest in
physics, ask about random crystal orientations, and also pendulum
synchronicities; use these as 'key-words'.
The Seventh Square is all forest - however, one of
the Knights will show you the way.
Cordially, Phil Innes
>> > [...]