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Northwestern FL

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maddoxforfun

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On Saturday, October 17, 2020 at 5:57:37 PM UTC-5 northwe...@gmail.com wrote:
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Oct 17, 2020, 7:39:33 PM10/17/20
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Closing the land corridor solves Iran-Saudi escalation

Martin Chulov 16, Middle East Correspondent at The Guardian, 10/8/16, “Amid Syrian chaos, Iran’s game plan emerges: a path to the Mediterranean,” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/08/iran-iraq-syria-isis-land-corridor

Interviews during the past four months with regional officials, influential Iraqis and residents of northern Syria have established that the land corridor has slowly taken shape since 2014. It is a complex route that weaves across Arab Iraq, through the Kurdish north, into Kurdish north-eastern Syria and through the battlefields north of Aleppo, where Iran and its allies are prevailing on the ground. It has been assembled under the noses of friend and foe, the latter of which has begun to sound the alarm in recent weeks. Turkey has been especially opposed, fearful of what such a development means for Iran’s relationship with the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ party), the restive Kurds in its midst, on whom much of the plan hinges.

The plan has been coordinated by senior government and security officials in Tehran, Baghdad and Damascus, all of whom defer to the head of the spearhead of Iran’s foreign policy, the Quds force of the Revolutionary Guards, headed by Major General Qassem Suleimani, who has run Iran’s wars in Syria and Iraq. It involves demographic shifts, which have already taken place in central Iraq and are under way in northern Syria. And it relies heavily on the support of a range of allies, who are not necessarily aware of the entirety of the project but have a developed vested interest in securing separate legs.

The corridor starts at the entry points that Iran has used to send supplies and manpower into Iraq over the past 12 years. They are the same routes that were used by the Quds force to run a guerrilla war against US forces when they occupied the country – a campaign fought by the same Iraqi militias that have since been immersed in the fight against Isis.

The groups, Asa’ib ahl al-Haq, Keta’ib Hezbollah and their offshoots, accounted for close to 25% of all US battlefield casualties, senior US officials have said. They have become even more influential since US forces left the country. And in one of modern warfare’s starkest ironies, in the two years since US troops have returned to Iraq to fight Isis they have at times fought under US air cover.

The route crosses through Baquba, the capital of Diyala province, around 60 miles north of Baghdad. A mixed Sunni/Shia area for hundreds of years, Diyala became one of the main sectarian flashpoint areas during Iraq’s civil war. Along roads that have been secured by militias, which are known locally as “popular mobilisation units”, it then moves northwest into areas that were occupied by Isis as recently as several months ago.

The town of Shirqat in Salaheddin province is one important area. It was taken by militias along with Iraqi forces on 22 September, delivering another blow to the terrorist group and an important boost to Iran’s ambitions.

The militias are now present in large numbers in Shirqat and readying to move towards the western edge of Mosul, to a point around 50 miles southeast of Sinjar, which – at this point – is the next leg in the corridor. Between the militia forces and Sinjar is the town of Tal Afar, an Isis stronghold, which has been a historical home of both Sunni and Shia Turkmen – ancestral kin of Turkey.

A senior intelligence official said the leg between Tel Afar and Sinjar is essential to the plan. Sinjar is an ancestral home to the Yazidi population, which was forced to flee in August 2014 after Isis invaded the city, killing all the men it could find and enslaving women. It was recaptured by Iraqi Kurdish forces last November. And ever since PKK forces from across the Syrian border have taken up residence in the city and across the giant monolith, Mt Sinjar, behind it. The PKK fighters are being paid by the Iraqi government and have been incorporated into the popular mobilisation units. Iraqi and western intelligence officials say the move was approved by Iraq’s national security adviser, Falah Fayadh.

An influential Iraqi tribal sheikh, Abdulrahim al-Shammari, emerges as a central figure further to the north. He has a power base near the Rabia crossing into Syria, receives support from the popular mobilisation units and is close to the Assad regime in Damascus. “I believe that in our area Iran does not have very much influence,” he told the Observer in Baghdad. “There is nobody here, no major power that is helping us with weapons. Ideologically speaking, the PKK is affiliated with the Kurds of this area, so there is no problem having them here.”

From the Rabia crossing, the mooted route goes past the towns of Qamishli and Kobani towards Irfin, which are all controlled by the Syrian Kurdish YPG militia. Throughout the war the YPG (People’s Protection Units) has hedged its bets, at times allying with the US against Isis, and at other times siding with the Syrian regime. “Iran thinks it has them where it wants them now,” said the European source. “I’m not sure it has gauged the Turks correctly, though.”

Of all the points between Tehran and the Syrian coast, Aleppo has concentrated Iran’s energies more than anywhere else. Up to 6,000 militia members, mostly from Iraq, have congregated there ahead of a move to take the rebel-held east of the city, which could begin around the same time as the assault on Mosul.

Those who have observed Suleimani up close as he inspects the frontlines in Syria and Iraq, or in meetings in Damascus and Baghdad, where he projects his immense power through studied calm, say he has invested everything in Syria – and in ensuring that Iran emerges from a brutal, expensive war with its ambitions enhanced. “If we lose Syria, we lose Tehran,” Suleimani told the late Iraqi politician Ahmed Chalabi in 2014. Chalabi told the Observer at the time that Suleimani had added: “We will turn all this chaos into an opportunity.”

Securing Aleppo would be an important leg in the corridor, which would run past two villages to the north that have historically been in Shia hands. From there, a senior Syrian official, and Iraqi officials in Baghdad, said it would run towards the outskirts of Syria’s fourth city, Homs, then move north through the Alawite heartland of Syria, which a year of Russian airpower has again made safe for Assad. Iran’s hard-won road ends at the port of Latakia, which has remained firmly in regime hands throughout the war.

Ali Khedery, who advised all US ambassadors to Iraq and four commanders of Centcom in 2003-11 said securing a Mediterranean link would be seen as a strategic triumph in Iran. “It signifies the consolidation of Iran’s control over Iraq and the Levant, which in turn confirms their hegemonic regional ambitions,” he said. “That should trouble every western leader and our regional allies because this will further embolden Iran to continue expanding, likely into the Gulf countries next, a goal they have explicitly and repeatedly articulated. Why should we expect them to stop if they’ve been at the casino, doubling their money over and over again, for a decade?”

 

Goes nuclear and triggers follow on nuke wars and prolif

Kaveh L. Afrasiabi 19, Iranian-American political scientist, taught political science at the University of Tehran, Boston University, and Bentley University, visiting scholar at Harvard University, University of California-Berkeley, Binghamton University, and the Center for Strategic Research, Tehran, with; Nader Entessar; 7/2/19, “A nuclear war in the Persian Gulf?” https://thebulletin.org/2019/07/a-nuclear-war-in-the-persian-gulf/

Undoubtedly, there are several significant negative consequences to a US use of nuclear weapons, opening the way for other nuclear-armed states to emulate US behavior, and for many other non-nuclear weapons states to seek their own nuclear deterrent shields. There would also be a huge outcry in the international community causing the US global image to suffer.

Will such anticipated consequences represent sufficient obstacles to prevent a limited U.S. nuclear strike on Iran? With President Trump, who counts on “bomb Iran” billionaire Sheldon Adelson as one of his main campaign contributors, the threshold for using nukes certainly seems to have been lowered.

How the United States and Iran came to the brink. President Donald Trump complicates the situation by stating that the United States is not seeking war with Iran, while repeatedly threatening to annihilate it. In July of 2018, in response to a statement by Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani, Trump tweeted “NEVER, EVER THREATEN THE UNITED STATES AGAIN OR YOU WILL SUFFER CONSEQUENCES THE LIKES OF WHICH FEW THROUGHOUT HISTORY HAVE EVER SUFFERED BEFORE.”  On May 19, 2019, Trump fired another incendiary volley, threatening the “official end” of Iran in a U.S.-Iran war. Then Friday June 21, 2019 the day after Iran shot down a US military drone, the President said “I’m not looking for war and if there is, it’ll be obliteration like you have never seen before. But I am not looking to do that. But, you (Iran) can’t have nuclear weapons.” In an interview with NBC’s Chuck Todd.

Citing Iran’s military threat, the Trump administration continues to enforce relentless economic sanctions under the guise of a “maximum pressure” strategy, designating Iran’s revolutionary guard a terrorist organization. The administration also is ramping up the US military presence in the Persian Gulf, sending several warships, a Patriot missile battery, an expeditionary force of marines, and nuclear-capable B-52 strategic bombers to the region. The United States has also withdrawn all “non-emergency” personnel in Baghdad and Erbil. These actions add fuel to the growing fear of war—a war sure to involve Iraq, home to both US military bases and powerful battle-hardened pro-Iran Shiite militias.

War could break out in a variety of ways: As a result of Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz (a choke point for the daily transfer of some 19 million barrels of oil), a preemptive strike on Iran’s military and nuclear facilities (in light of Iran’s stated intention to resume aspects of its nuclear activities, banned under the 2015 nuclear agreement), an application of the 9/11 legislation on Authorization of Military Force against al-Qaeda (accusing Iran of being in league with al-Qaeda terrorists), or in response to perceived Iranian mischief (such as the recent sabotage on board several Saudi and UAE merchant ships).

The United States and Iran are not the only regional players, and care must be taken to understand the context and implications of events. As pointed out by a number of US experts in the wake of the most recent attacks on oil tankers, regional rivals such as Saudi Arabia have much to gain from a breakout of war between the U.S. and Iran. The U.S. has echoed the Saudi accusations against Iran and extended them to include blaming Iran for the Yemenis Houthi rebels’ drone attack on a Saudi pipeline on May 14th.

Accusations are one thing, but the big question is, will the Trump administration heed Saudi Arabia’s call for a “US surgical strike” on Iran?  Both the Saudis and Iranians harbor hegemonic ambitions in the region. The Saudis are pushing for a limited US strike to eliminate some of Iran’s formidable naval and missile capabilities, thus weakening their regional rival. But even a limited US strike would increase the likelihood of Iranian forces inflicting serious damage on US military assets in the region, both directly and indirectly through multiple proxy forces.

Iran’s military commanders have warned that the US military fleet is within range of Iran’s short-range missiles. Iran has reportedly affixed anti-ship missiles on hundreds of its fast boats, as part of an asymmetrical “swarming” tactic. Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, has also instructed the country’s military forces to commence preparations for war.

It is worth recalling that Iran is ranked 14th for countries with the most military firepower.  Iran has also devoted considerable attention to upgrading its asymmetrical capabilities, including shifting its formal strategy to an “offensive-defensive” posture—meaning that if the United States moves offensively against Iran, Iran will counter by moving offensively against a regional target of value for the United States. An example of an offensive-defensive move would be if the United States were to use its airbases to launch nuclear-capable B-52 strikes on Iran, Iran could counterattack the US base in Qatar, irrespective of friendly ties with the country.

Iran is in many respects a “regional superpower” with over a half a million active soldiers and another 350,000 reservists; it possesses thousands of guided missiles, over 1,600 tanks, some 500 aircraft, hundreds of military drones, and several surface warships, submarines, and mine boats, in addition to some 3,000 fast boats. These assets indicate that the now seemly imminent conflict with Iran will not be a cakewalk for the United States. This possibility of a costly conventional conflict in our minds increases the likelihood of US conflict escalation to nuclear war.

seemerson19

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Oct 17, 2020, 7:45:05 PM10/17/20
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