R9---NU FL AFF v Dartmouth TV NEG
Northwestern FL
Northwestern FL
AFF is new. --
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Northwestern FL
The United States federal government should clarify its commitment to defend the Philippines from an armed attack in the South China Sea can only be activated if there is a substantial implementation of rotational presence in the Philippines, as outlined in the U.S.–Philippine Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.
Raam Tambe
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Tyler Vergho
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Tyler Vergho
No escalation and crisis management checks.
Yu & Kim ’19 [Yun & Ji Young; MPhil in International Relations from the University of Oxford; assistant professor in the Department of Japan Studies, College of Languages and Cultures, Hanyang University; May 2019; “The stability of proximity: the resilience of Sino-Japanese relations over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Dispute”; https://academic.oup.com/irap/article-abstract/19/2/327/5017427; International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 19, Issue 2; accessed 9/3/20; TV]
A bleak picture of Sino-Japanese relations prevails in the current discourse based on the seemingly irreconcilable factors stemming from concerns over international power politics, historical memory, and ideological differences. These factors contribute to a relationship of ‘hot economics and cold politics’ between China and Japan, characterized by a lack of mutual trust. Against this backdrop, the territorial dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu between China and Japan plays a critical role in defining the two countries’ relations.1 In particular, China’s rapid economic and military growth further encourages the alarming analysis of a possible armed conflict between the two regional powers. There are still several pacifying factors in Sino-Japanese relations, such as the alignment of economic interests, extended nuclear deterrence provided by the United States, and the maritime settings in East Asia that favor defensive capabilities (Goldstein, 2013: 69–75). Nevertheless, the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu and the issues of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the East China Sea are two of the most important ongoing disputes between China and Japan that could easily strain the Sino-Japanese relations (Sakuwa, 2009: 519–520). Particularly since 2010, Japanese academics have sounded the alarm, skeptical of China’s self-proclaimed ‘peaceful rise’ and wary of the potentially devastating effect of the precarious Senkaku/Diaoyu territorial dispute (Kawashima, 2014; Matsuda, 2015; Aoyama, 2016). Would the conflict over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands eventually lead China and Japan to an armed clash, escalating into a major security crisis in East Asia?
We argue that the possibility of an armed conflict is extremely low, considering the prior practices in the bilateral crisis management employed by the two countries. The term ‘bilateral crisis management’ is distinguishable from ‘internal crisis management mechanism’ The former refers to high-level political, diplomatic, and military dialog/exchanges, while the latter refers to domestic institutions relevant to crisis management, decision-making processes, executive leadership, and intelligence-sharing mechanism. Some scholars have accused Japan and China of lacking effective internal crisis management mechanism, which will make any clash over the islands difficult to contain (Hafeez, 2015: 73; Bush, 2010). Although this observation may be true, we believe that the two countries have nevertheless engaged with each other actively and successfully through state-to-state ‘bilateral crisis management’ measures, which have been effective in preventing further escalation once conflicts have broken out. And the operation of these measures could account for the resilience of the relationship between the two countries, even during periods of turbulence.
Throughout the late 1990s to early 2000s, the ‘shelved’ dispute remained tranquil as both countries engaged in the active prevention of any escalation over the islands. Downs and Saunders’ insightful examination of the two disputes in 1990 and 1996 demonstrates that the Chinese government prioritized economic development over nationalist goals in managing the crises (Downs and Saunders, 1998). Up until the early 2000s, China and Japan had engaged in ‘active dispute management’ through the limited access of both countries’ nationals to the islands; the avoidance of social mobilization on this issue, especially in China; and, Japan’s constrained use of the islands (Fravel, 2010a).
Raam Tambe
No famine---the poorest are insulated from global markets.
Paarlberg 8—Professor of political science at Wellesley College [Robert, “It's not the price that causes hunger,” New York Times, 22 Apr, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/22/opinion/22iht-edpaarlberg.1.12230340.html, accessed 12 Nov 2016]
It is certainly a troubling instance of price instability in international commodity markets, leading to social unrest among urban foodbuyers. But we must be careful not to equate high crop prices with hunger around the world. Most of the world's hungry people do not use international food markets, and most of those who use these markets are not hungry
International food markets, like international markets for everything else, are used primarily by the prosperous and secure, not the poor and vulnerable. In world corn markets, the biggest importer by far is Japan. Next comes the European Union. Next comes South Korea. Citizens in these countries are not underfed
In the poor countries of Asia, rice is the most important staple, yet most Asian countries import very little rice. As recently as March, India was keeping imported rice out of the country by imposing a 70 percent duty.
Data on the actual incidence of malnutrition reveal that the regions of the world where people are most hungry, in South Asia and SubSaharan Africa, are those that depend least on imports
from the world market. Hunger is caused in these countries not by high international food prices, but by local conditions, especially rural poverty linked to low productivity in farming.
When international prices are go up, the disposable income of some importdependent urban dwellers is squeezed. But most of the actual hunger takes place in the villages and in the countryside, and it persists even when international prices are low.
Raam Tambe
1. Interpret the phrase “conditions under which its defense pact can be activatd” as a term of art – dropped argument. It is most precise – here’s proof it matches the res almost exactly.
Leeds, Brett Ashley, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long. 2002. Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944. International Interactions 28: 237-260.
Most of our attention in designing the ATOP coding scheme was directed toward collecting information about two aspects of alliance agreements. First, we wanted to specify precisely the obligations undertaken by alliance members. We wanted to be able to describe (and ultimately explain) what states promise to do under what conditions. Second, we wanted to identify provisions of alliances designed to manage cooperation among the allies. For example: Do leaders include discussion of burden sharing? Do they create organizations to manage the alliance? Do they require peacetime military contacts? Do they combine military alliance agreements with agreements on other aspects of international cooperation, for instance economic relations or territorial settlements? Do they commit to alliances of long duration, or do they provide frequent opportunities for renegotiation? The ATOP data provide detailed descriptions of the obligations accepted by alliance members, the conditions under which these obligations are activated, and the provisions related to institutional design and alliance management
Tyler Vergho
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