Re: Enter Password For The Encrypted File Setup Building Design Suite 2018 Key
Yvette Pesnell
I'm not aiming for Bank-level security, but it I will try to make it as secure as possible, but it should at least be an obvious upgrade for people that store passwords in unencrypted text files (aim low and avoid disappointment).
Enter Password For The Encrypted File Setup Building Design Suite 2018 Key
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I am going to discourage you from trying at this point. As others have pointed out, your basic failure to understand key concepts (at this point in your learning) means that you aren't in a position to face some of the harder questions in the design of a password manager. I do not mean this as an insult; there is no shame in not knowing certain things.
First you will need to understand encryption much better. There are on-line courses in introduction to cryptography that are very good. Books that I would recommend to someone at your starting point would be Serious Cryptography and Understanding Cryptography. These books do not teach you enough to be able to start to make the kinds of cryptographic design choices that you need in building a secure password manager, as they don't go deep enough into many of the nuts and bolts decisions that need to be made. But you need to start from somewhere.
As mentioned by others KeePass is well-respected and open source, and presumably many of the security design decisions are well-documented (though I haven't looked.) Also note that the data format for KeePass 1.x was designed nearly two decades ago, and although it was well-ahead of its time, you should look at KeePass 2.x for anything you are building today.
Another, simpler, open source password manager is pass. It has a wonderfully simple design, and passes off the encryption to PGP and the synching to git. (A cost of that simplicity is that a great deal of sensitive meta-data remains unencrypted.) You might find it valuable to seek a design in which your program merely employs a well-vetted file encryption tool such as GnuPG/PGP.
It's relatively easy (though still harder than one might think) to develop a password manager for data that will live only on one machine. But once synchronizing data across multiple devices becomes desired property, it impacts almost every other aspect of the design. This is not a reason not to try (once you have developed the basic knowledge and skill). But don't expect to develop something that would be safe and usable by another other than its developer without doing an enormous amount of work.
Welcome to the world of password manager development! Technically we would be in competition, but there are so many people who need to use a password manager who don't even know they exist, that we are all trying to expand the market. I am happy to see another well-designed password manager being offered, but something that is just snake oil and built by people who don't have a deep understanding of some of the problems not only hurts the people who use that system, but it also tarnishes the reputation of password managers in general.
Any decent password manager (including the multiple available commercial and/or open-source ones) use a "master password" or "master key" to protect the stored passwords. This master secret is used to encrypt and decrypt an encryption key (which is totally randomly generated and never stored in plain text, but is stored in encrypted form along with the encrypted passwords), and the encryption key is used to actually encrypt and decrypt the passwords (which, again, are never stored in plain text). The master can either be a key that is stored in some device (like a Yubikey or flashdrive that must be entered before decrypting the passwords), or a password itself that is turned into a cryptographic key by running it through a key-derivation function (essentially a very computationally expensive salted cryptographic hash function).
This is very, very false. A crucial requirement of good encryption is that even if the attacker has the full ciphertext (encrypted data, such as your password save file, and any data typically stored along with it such as a message authentication code and the initialization vector for the encryption) and knows the full details of the algorithm used to encrypt it (such as AES-256 in CBC mode with that known IV and using PKCS5 padding, as implemented in a particular version of the open-source "OpenSSL" tool), the attacker still should not be able to decrypt the data without a brute-force attack on the key, which can be made long enough that such an attack is totally impractical (we're talking "using every processor in existence on earth, you still wouldn't finish before the heat death of the universe" levels of impractical, here). That is what people mean when they say "obscurity is not security"; if your system is secure only so long as the attacker doesn't know exactly how it works, it actually just isn't secure.
Some security people definitely agree with you that they don't want their password vault going to any device they don't control (such as a password manager company's server). However, I don't think you have a good grasp of the actual risks. Done right (and remember, you can verify that it's done right), the password manager company can never decrypt your vault, so even though they hold onto it they cannot peek inside. As mentioned above, even though they have the vault (the ciphertext) and obviously know exactly how it was encrypted (because it was their code that did it), they cannot decipher the contents without the encryption key, and well-designed password managers never store or transmit the encryption key (or any material used to derive it). There is still some risk, because they can try to steal or guess your master key somehow without you knowing that it's happening (for example, by trying to guess your password using an "offline" attack), which they cannot (usefully) do if they don't have the ciphertext (the vault), but it's probably a lot less risk than you thought.
This script won't have a GUI and will be run periodically by cron, so entering a password each time it's run to decrypt things won't really work, and I'll have to store the username and password in either an encrypted file or encrypted in a SQLite database, which would be preferable as I'll be using SQLite anyway, and I might need to edit the password at some point. In addition, I'll probably be wrapping the whole program in an EXE, as it's exclusively for Windows at this point.
When you add a credit, debit, prepaid, or transit card (where available) to Apple Pay, information that you enter on your device is encrypted and sent to Apple servers. If you use the camera to enter the card information, the information is never saved on your device or photo library.
Introduction to User Access Security
Commonly Asked Questions
Policy Issues
User Access Security Countermeasures
User Access Security Checklist
A person with a "need-to-know" has been designated by school officials as having a legitimate educational or professional interestin accessing a record.
Introduction to User Access SecurityUser access security refers to the collective procedures by which authorized users access a computer system and unauthorized users are kept from doing so. To make this distinction a little more realistic, however, understand that user access security limits even authorized users to those parts of the system that they are explicitly permitted to use (which, in turn, is based on their "need-to-know"). After all, there is no reason for someone in Staff Payroll to be given clearance to confidential student records.
It Really Happens!Kim approached Fred cautiously. As the security manager, she knew how important it was to gather information completely before jumping to conclusions. "Fred, my review of our computer logs shows that you have been logging in and looking at confidential student information. I couldn't understand why someone in Food Services would need to be browsing through individual student test scores, so I thought I'd come by and ask you."Fred looked up at Kim as he if was surprised to be entertaining such a question. "Are you forgetting that I'm authorized to access student records?""You're authorized to access specific elements that relate to a student's free- and reduced-price lunch eligibility," Kim clarified. "That's the limit of your need-to-know.""I didn't know that my access was limited," Fred asserted honestly. "I figured that if my password got me into a file, it was fair game."Kim paused, realizing that it might be reasonable for Fred to have assumed that he was allowed to read a file if his password gave him access. "Hmm, I see your point, Fred, but in truth you shouldn't be accessing student record information that isn't related to your legitimate educational duties. I'm not going to make a big deal of it this time, but from now on, limit your browsing to the free- and reduced-price lunch information. In the meantime, I'm going to send a memo out to staff reminding them what need-to-know really means.""And you might want to reconsider how our password system works," Fred added. "It would have beenvery clear to me that I had no business in a file if my password wouldn't get me in."
An organization cannot monitor user activity unless that user grants implicit or explicit permission to do so!
While there is no question that an organization has the right to protect its computing and information resources through user access security activities, users (whether authorized or not) have rights as well. Reasonable efforts must be made to inform all users, even uninvited hackers, that the system is being monitored and that unauthorized activity will be punished and/or prosecuted as deemed appropriate. If such an effort is not made, the organization may actually be invading the privacy rights of its intruders!An excellent way of properly informing users of monitoring activities is through the opening screen that is presented to them. By reading a warning like the one that follows, users explicitly accept both the conditions of monitoring and punishment when they proceed to the next screen. Thus, the first screen any user sees when logging into a secure computer system should be something to the following effect:
Never include the word "Welcome" as a part of the log-in process--it can be argued that it implies that whoever is reading the word is, by definition, invited to access the system.
W A R N I N G !This is a restricted network. Use of this network, its equipment, and resources is monitored at all times and requires explicit permission from the network administrator. If you do not have this permission in writing, you are violating the regulations of this network and can and will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. By continuing into this system, you are acknowledging that you are aware of and agree to these terms.
Commonly Asked QuestionsQ. Is it possible to have a secure system if you have employees who telecommute or work otherwise non-traditional schedules?
A. Yes. While particular countermeasures might need to be adjusted to accommodate non-traditional schedules (e.g., the practice of limiting users to acceptable log-in times and locations), a system with telecommuters, frequent travelers, and other remote access users can still be secure. Doing so may require policy-makers to think more creatively, but each security guideline needs to be customized to meet the organization's needs anyway (see Chapter 2).
Q. Is the use of passwords an effective strategy for securing a system?
A. Just because password systems are the most prevalent authentication strategy currently being practiced doesn't mean that they have become any less effective. In fact, the reason for their popularity is precisely because they can be so useful in restricting system access. The major concern about password systems is not their technical integrity, but the degree to which (like many strategies) they rely upon proper implementation by users. While there are certainly more expensive and even effective ways of restricting user access, if risk analysis determines that a password system meets organizational needs and is most cost-effective, you can feel confident about password protection as long as users are implementing the system properly--which, in turn, demands appropriate staff training (see Chapter 10).
Q. Are all of these precautions necessary if an organization trusts its staff?
A. Absolutely. While the vast majority of system users are probably trustworthy, it doesn't mean that they're above having occasional computing accidents. After all, most system problems are the result of human mistake. By instituting security procedures, the organization protects not only the system and its information, but also each user who could at some point unintentionally damage a valued file. By knowing that "their" information is maintained in a secure fashion, employees will feel more comfortable and confident about their computing activities.
Initiating security procedures also benefits users by: