Supreme Court - Nothing to Worry About

[George Schiro]

Amy Coney Barrett wrote the following in the conclusion of a law journal
article for Notre Dame Law School in 1998:

Judges cannot - nor should they try to - align our
legal system with the Church's moral teaching whenever
the two diverge. They should, however, conform their
own behavior to the Church's standard. Perhaps their
good example will have some effect.

So unless she was lying - which I am sure she was not, we can reasonably
expect Amy Coney Barrett to either recuse herself or vote the same way as
Ruth Bader Ginsburg did for women's rights and gay rights.

Case closed.


The above statement is from:

Catholic Judges in Capital Cases
https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/527/

...

This puts Catholic judges in a bind. They are obliged
by oath, professional commitment, and the demands of
citizenship to enforce the death penalty. They are also
obliged to adhere to their church's teaching on moral
matters.

The legal system has a solution for this dilemma - it
allows (indeed it requires) the recusal of judges whose
convictions keep them from doing their job. This is a
good solution. But it is harder than you think to
determine when a judge must recuse himself and when he
may stay on the job. Catholic judges will not want to
shirk their judicial obligations. They will want to sit
whenever they can without acting immorally. So they
need to know what the church teaches, and its effect on
them. On the other hand litigants and the general
public are entitled to impartial justice, and that may
be something that a judge who is heedful of
ecclesiastical pronouncements cannot dispense. We need
to know whether judges are sometimes legally
disqualified from hearing cases that their consciences
would let them decide.

...

The other feature which makes this case difficult is
that it involves judges. The religious test clause says
that religion cannot be a qualification for any "office
or public Trust under the United States." Does this
phrase include judges? We said a moment ago that one
purpose of the clause was to head off an establishment
by preventing homogeneity among the lawmakers. It need
not apply to judges to serve that end. But the oath
clause in which the religious test clause appears
speaks of "executive and judicial Officers" - language
which pretty clearly signifies that the framers thought
of a judgeship as an "office." The evident meaning of
the religious test clause is that those whom the first
part of the sentence requires to take an oath shall not
have to swear to any religious propositions. Judges are
required to take an oath by the first part of the
sentence. And we should guard against understanding the
religious test clause too narrowly. People supported it
for more than one reason, and some did so for reasons
that would look to us more like arguments for the free
exercise of religion. James Iredell defended it this
way: "This article is calculated to secure universal
religious liberty, by putting all sects on a level -
the only way to prevent persecution." Isaac Backus
defended the clause because he believed that "nothing
is more evident, both in reason and the Holy Scriptures,
than that religion is ever a matter between God and
individuals." It is certainly inconsistent with ideas
like these to disqualify judges because of their
affiliation with certain religious groups.

III. CONCLUSION

Catholic judges must answer some complex moral and
legal questions in deciding whether to sit in death
penalty cases. Sometimes (as with direct appeals of
death sentences) the right answers are not obvious. But
in a system that effectively leaves the decision up to
the judge, these are questions that responsible
Catholics must consider seriously. Judges cannot - nor
should they try to - align our legal system with the
Church's moral teaching whenever the two diverge. They
should, however, conform their own behavior to the
Church's standard. Perhaps their good example will have
some effect.