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Jul 1, 2011, 8:12:58 PM7/1/11
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5 sur 1,900  CABLES DE WIKILEAKS  - les câbles les plus dommageables pour Stanley Lucas et les autres apatrides  seront disponibles au fur à mesure des publications  The Nation et de Haïti Liberté

The Nation:  http://www.thenation.com/authors/kim-ives

Haiti-Liberté: http://www.haiti-liberte.com/archives/volume4-50/U.S.%20Embassy%20Cables.asp

A quand le jugement de Stanley Lucas  

Pour crime contre la nation Haitienne


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2014 
REF: A. PAP 1373 
     B. PAP 1027 
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
1. (C) Summary: Fritz Mevs, a member of one of Haiti's 
richest families and a well-connected member of the private 
sector elite, told Poloff on May 13 that business leaders are 
exasperated by the lack of security in the vital port and 
industrial zone areas of Port-au-Prince and are allegedly 
arming local police with long-guns and ammunition in an 
effort to ensure security for their businesses and employees. 
Kidnappings and carjackings are frightening Haiti's small but 
critical cadre of mid-level employees who work in the 
industrial park and port, and workers have threatened to 
strike unless the security situation improves, Mevs said. 
(Note: This area is either off-limits or LAV-travel only for 
the embassy.  End Note.)  Mevs said that the recent killing 
of gang leader Labaniere is part of the problem, as he used 
to keep rival gangs out of the area.  Mevs also said private 
sector protests against the IGOH for the lack of security 
were misguided and called for a media campaign to mobilize 
opposition against what he described as the true scourge of 
Haiti: a cabal of drug-traffickers, Haitian elite and IGOH 
insiders conspiring with gangs and corrupt cops to undermine 
peace and democracy in the country. In response to embassy 
and private sector prodding, MINUSTAH is now formulating a 
plan to protect the area.  End summary. 
2. (C) Fritz Mevs is a prominent member of one of Haiti's 
richest families. He leads a group of local investors who own 
and operate in Port-au-Prince the Terminal of Varreux (the 
private terminal that handles 30% of Haiti's imports), the 
petroleum storage of WINECO (which encompasses Haiti's 
largest propane gas storage center) and the SHODECOSA 
Warehouse Complex (where, among other things, 90% of the 
humanitarian cargo donated to Haiti is stored). The Mevs 
family has always enjoyed financial control of important 
Haitian economic assets and has shown an ability to roll with 
(and have influence upon) any government that allows them to 
exploit those assets. 
Port Area Suffering from Insecurity 
3. (C) Mevs told Poloff on May 13 that the security situation 
in and around the port and industrial zone area was 
untenable. The district is surrounded by the gang havens of 
Bel Air, La Saline and Cite Soleil, and kidnappers and 
carjackers target traffic along the vital transport link 
(Route Nationale #1) between the port and the Industrial 
Park. Mevs said the crime threat has already forced several 
businesses to close (including the Embassy's GSO operations), 
while employees of others are threatening to strike unless 
the security situation improves. Among those Mevs cited as 
caught in the midst of the "urban warfare" are: CEMEX, TOTAL, 
DINHASA, TEXACO, MADSEN Import-Export, SOGENER, and others. 
Mevs said absenteeism among employees is at an all-time high 
and the flow of essential commodities (oil, gasoline, cement, 
rice, steel, etc.) transiting through the facility is 
adversely affected. Continued disruption, he said, will soon 
result in shortages, inflation, and potentially a collapse in 
support for the transition government.  (Note:  The Director 
General of the National Port Authority has separately 
confirmed Mevs account of the situation outside of the port. 
While security inside the port is acceptable, just outside of 
the gates criminals operate freely.  Gunfire is common and 
workers fear for their lives going to and from work every 
day.  He said MINUSTAH, while present, does not provide any 
real security for employees going into or out of the port. 
End Note.) 
4. (C) Mevs showed Poloff a pile of letters sent from the 
Terminal authority and several of its members to MINUSTAH 
SRSG Valdes, Prime Minister Latortue, HNP Director General 
Leon Charles, and Minister of Justice Gousse over the last 
two months. The letters describe a lengthy list of incidents 
and vulnerabilities - including pipeline sabotage, criminal 
fires, shots fired at offloading vessels, kidnappings and 
murders - and solicit additional, permanent security, often 
in quite desperate language ("we may not hold on for long"). 
The Terminal's large army of security staff are outgunned by 
the heavy weapons fired by the bandits, the letters say, and 
must stand helplessly at the gate, unable to intervene when 
those entering or exiting are hijacked, robbed, shot and at 
times, killed, outside the jurisdiction of the Terminal 
fences. According to Mevs, although MINUSTAH has on occasion 
parked armored vehicles near the Terminal with some success, 
he said criminals regularly force the tanks to move (by 
burning tires or fecal matter nearby), and as soon as the 
vehicles depart, the rampage continues. 
5. (C) Other embassy contacts confirm Mevs' description of 
the deteriorated security situation in the port area. A 
political advisor to the Mayor of Cite Soleil told PolOff on 
May 17 that MINUSTAH was proving to be a poor substitute for 
Labaniere, the gang leader from the Boston neighborhood of 
Cite Soleil closest to the industrial zone who was killed on 
March 30, allegedly in a plot directed by rival pro-Lavalas 
gang leader Dread Wilme. The advisor said that Labaniere (who 
reportedly received money from businesses in the district for 
protection) managed to defend the commercial zone in a way 
that periodic MINUSTAH checkpoints have not. He said bandits 
were undaunted by UN vehicles sometimes parked along Route 
Nationale #1 and that MINUSTAH troops (who, he said, rarely 
set foot outside of their vehicles) were unable to identify 
the bandits from amongst the general populace as Labaniere 
had done. 
6. (C) Meanwhile, a MINUSTAH official told PolOff on May 18 
that the Cite Soleil operation begun on March 31 was indeed 
weakening due to Brazilian and Jordanian troop rotations that 
could last 4-8 weeks. Permanent checkpoints along Route 
Nationale and other areas surrounding Cite Soleil have been 
replaced by rotating outposts concentrated primarily north of 
the commercial district, leaving much of the area described 
by Mevs unprotected. Another MINUSTAH commander confirmed on 
May 20 that UN troops were drawing down, to be replaced by a 
joint HNP-CIVPOL strategy that would effectively block a 
critical section of the highway to all vehicular traffic 
Embassy Port-au-Prince's Response 
7. (C) Charge met with UNSRSG Valdes on May 14 to encourage 
him to dramatically increase MINUSTAH's security presence in 
the area.  Valdes seemed genuinely surprised that the 
situation was so acute.  Following the meeting Charge 
encouraged the French ambassador to reiterate our message 
with Valdes.  In response Valdes instructed MINUSTAH military 
and CIVPOL leaders to develop a plan in coordination with the 
private sector, who rejected an initial proposal as 
unworkable.  On May 19 Ambassador Foley wrote to Ambassador 
Valdes to protest three examples of MINUSTAH passivity in 
response to violence against American citizens.  Ambassador 
Foley again underscored the need for a swift, aggressive 
response to criminal elements in a conversation with Valdes 
on May 20.  Valdes thanked the Ambassador for the concrete 
examples described in the Ambassador's letter.  He said that 
he had often heard reports but never had details with which 
he could confront MINUSTAH military and police leaders. 
Valdes promised a more robust response from MINUSTAH. 
Separately, a MINUSTAH military officer reported to the Core 
Group on May 20 that they were preparing to present another 
strategy to business representatives on May 21.  Ambassador 
Foley warned the Core Group that MINUSTAH's stand-down in 
Cite Soleil put the elections at risk, and that the 
insecurity around the industrial zone risked undermining what 
is left of the Haitian economy. 
Private Sector Arming the Police 
8. (C) In response to MINUSTAH's unresponsiveness, Mevs said, 
a group of merchants from the Terminal conducted an 
unofficial survey of the HNP's weapons inventory and 
requirements. The report (on official HNP letterhead 
indicating some form of HNP cooperation in the effort) 
suggests, for example, that the Port-au-Prince station has 
(2) M-14s, (2) T-65s, and (2) M-1s, and needed (6) M-14s, (8) 
T-65s, and (4) Galils. (Note: Embassy has not independently 
confirmed any of the numbers from the report. End note). The 
undated report shows the HNP has the following country-wide 
-- (65) 12-guage rifles 
-- (11) M-14 
-- (15) T-65 
-- (15) M-1 
-- 82 functioning vehicles 
-- 179 radios 
and the following needs: 
-- (200) T-65 
-- (127) galils 
-- (120) M-14 
-- (43) M-1 
-- (73) 12-guage rifles 
-- 160 vehicles 
-- 249 radios 
9. (C) Mevs said some business owners have already begun to 
purchase weapons and ammunition from the street and 
distribute them to local police officials in exchange for 
regular patrols. Mevs claimed, for example, that Reginald 
Boulos, President of the Haitian Chamber of Commerce, had 
already distributed arms to the police and had called on 
others to do so in order to provide cover to his own actions. 
Mevs says that of the roughly 150 business owners in the 
area, probably 30 have already provided some kind of direct 
assistance (including arms, ammunition, or other materiel) to 
the police, and the rest are looking to do so soon. Contacts 
of the Econ Counselor report from time to time of discussions 
among private sector leaders to fund and arm their own 
private sector armies.  The AmCham Board of Directors at one 
point discussed informally giving non-lethal assistance to 
police stations, such as furniture and microwave ovens for 
police stations, but decided against doing so for fear that 
anything given to the police would quickly be stolen. 
10. (C) Mevs defended the idea of the private sector arming 
the police in general, but he lamented the haphazard manner 
in which many of his colleagues seemed to be handing out 
weapons with little control. He said they were "wasting their 
money" by giving arms to police without knowing if they were 
"dirty or clean" and with no measures in place to make sure 
the arms were not simply re-sold. He also complained that 
funneling the arms secretly would only serve to reinforce 
rumors that the elite were creating private armies. Mevs said 
he was approaching the Embassy in order to find a way for 
these private sector initiatives to be incorporated into 
established inventory and control systems within the HNP. He 
described his conception of a program in which the private 
sector could purchase guns and ammunition on the open market 
and turn the equipment over to the HNP in exchange for a 
receipt and a guarantee that a certain number of 
appropriately-armed HNP would be assigned to a requested 
area. He said, however, that he did not trust either MINUSTAH 
or the HNP to properly control the issuance of weapons and 
hoped that the U.S. would oversee the program. 
Haiti's "new enemy" 
11. (C) In response to the May 11 protest (supported by some 
private sector leaders such as Charles Baker) to demand that 
the IGOH address the security situation, Mevs said their 
target was wrong. He said protesters should mobilize against 
Haiti's real enemy and the true source of insecurity: a small 
nexus of drug-dealers and political insiders that control a 
network of dirty cops and gangs that not only were 
responsible for committing the kidnappings and murders, but 
were also frustrating the efforts of well-meaning government 
officials and the international community to confront them. 
He asserted, for example, that some incidents were engineered 
specifically to frustrate efforts by the IGOH to secure a 
weapons export license waiver from the Department of State. 
Mevs claimed that Colombian drug-traffickers (and allegedly 
the brother of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez) had allied 
with a small cabal of powerful and connected individuals, 
including Youri Latortue, Gary Lissade, lawyer Andre Pasquet, 
Michel Brunache (Chief of Staff to President Alexandre), Jean 
Mosanto Petit (aka Toto Borlette, owner of the unofficial 
Haitian lottery and large swaths of Port-au-Prince property), 
and Dany Toussaint, to create a criminal enterprise that 
thrives on - and generates - instability.   (Note: We have no 
corroborating information linking Brunache to 
drug-trafficking.  He, along with Latortue, Pasquet, and 
Justice Minister Gousse. all worked in Gary Lissade's law 
12. (C) Mevs suggested that some recent kidnappings 
(including that of Dr. Michel Theard - ref B) were actually 
targeted crimes meant to send a message to the people within 
the IGOH that the network was calling the shots. (Comment: 
This obviously contradicts his claim that IGOH insiders are 
involved.  End Comment.)  Mevs claimed that Dr. Theard had 
been passed between several supposedly independent gangs, 
thereby illustrating how the gangs were actually joined 
together by a "central node." It was against this network, 
Mevs argued, that well-meaning Haitians should direct their 
ire, and he called for a mass popular mobilization against 
this unnamed (but apparently obvious) cabal: the "new common 
enemy following the departure of President Aristide." 
13. (C) Fritz Mevs undoubtedly has a strong personal interest 
in convincing us that the port district is in danger and he 
is no doubt biased against those individuals he names who 
work against his interests. Mevs himself is a core member of 
what might easily be described as a rival network of 
influence competing for control of Haiti against the cast of 
characters he has described. Furthermore, it is impossible to 
imagine that Mevs has managed to protect his interests over 
the years without making some accommodation with potentially 
hostile government principals and the associated gang leaders 
at his doorstep (indeed his silence on Aristide's continuing 
role in the violence is curious). While we cannot confirm 
whether the alleged cabal of political insiders allied with 
South American narco-traffickers is controlling the gangs, we 
have seen indications of alliances between drug dealers, 
criminal gangs and political forces that could threaten to 
make just such a scenario possible via the election of 
narco-funded politicians, unless we are able to severely 
disrupt the flow of drugs into and out of Haiti.  One thing 
is clear: it is vital that our plan to equip the HNP through 
strict controls go forward immediately.  In the meantime, we 
will deliver strong messages to Charles and the IGOH (and our 
private sector contacts) against private delivery of arms to 
the HNP.  End Comment. 

E.O. 12958: N/A 
REF: 04 PAP 244 
1. (U) Summary: In the year since Aristide's departure, 
university student groups and other youth-oriented 
organizations have shifted their focus from grassroots 
political activism (the "shock-troops" of the anti-Aristide 
movement - reftel) and returned for the most part to their 
founding principles -- academic reforms, employment, and 
socio-economic development. The transition/election process 
has also afforded an opportunity for student and youth 
organizations to broaden their portfolio to include civic 
education, national dialogue and support for the political 
process. Student groups, once courageous and united in their 
opposition to Aristide, are now divided -- and fearful -- and 
represent little threat to the IGOH, despite their 
dissatisfaction with it (see septel summary of the divided 
student movement). Youth groups in general are bitter that 
their efforts to rid Haiti of Aristide have gone unrewarded, 
and they bristle at being marginalized from the transition 
process. Post is seeking to engage and support those groups 
that seek to play a peaceful role in political and social 
development. End summary. 
Student support strong for elections; weak for the IGOH 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
2. (SBU) Students at first praised the transparency of the 
IGOH but soon began to criticize the lack of tangible results 
and the absence of any engagement with the youth movement. 
Students believe that they were responsible for bringing down 
Aristide and installing the IGOH and begrudge the IGOH for 
ignoring them over the course of the last year. They long for 
a consultative role on issues and are frustrated that they 
have not received any benefits from the IGOH that they 
believe they brought to power. They often say, though with 
little conviction, that they could "rise again" at any moment 
if the IGOH does not respond to their requests for inclusion. 
3. (SBU) The IGOH's loss of credibility among the students 
has damaged student faith in elections as well. One ex-leader 
of the CdC told Poloff that the IGOH had proven itself 
incapable of organizing anything, and it was only the 
international community that gave Haiti an "appearance of a 
State" and kept the bandits from taking power. Others claim 
the lack of any "new blood" among the politicians has 
dampened student enthusiasm. Above all, students are 
resentful that they have not been included in elections 
preparations efforts, and say they are uniquely qualified, 
uncommonly energetic, and ideally placed to help the CEP and 
the international community to implement the registration, 
civic education and voting process, if only the IGOH and the 
UN would let them play a role. 
Students divided, less mobilized 
4. (SBU) There were few instances in the past year where 
students have taken to the streets in a show of force. For 
the most part, students have the same complaints regarding 
the IGOH as the population at large (all talk and no action, 
lack of transparency and inclusion, inept and ineffective) 
but they are more emotional in their hostility. But students 
are more divided -- by ideology and interests -- than before 
and this discord has hindered action. Many students simply 
want to get a job or get out of the country, while their 
leaders seek to join Haiti's insular political class. Leaders 
often inflate scandals and spark crises in order to attract 
press and enter the political conscience. Many old student 
leaders try to prevent new leaders from emerging, and rumors 
are rife that the IGOH (and specifically Youri Latortue) is 
building an "intelligence cell" within the student movement 
for political ends. 
5. (SBU) In this estranged environment, most student displays 
of force have been confused, small-scale rallies focused on 
narrow student interests and/or were staged to enhance the 
political image of student leaders: a sit-in at the Primature 
that mobilized no more than 50 backers of Saintilus; a hunger 
strike at the Faculty of Business that mixed its protest over 
the expulsion of a dozen students with a call for the 
overthrow of the IGOH; or a shouting match between 
private-sector backed GRAFNEH (see septel for group 
descriptions) and the more radical Faculty of Social Sciences 
on the security situation and role of MINUSTAH. To date, the 
primary student and youth groups have voiced their 
displeasure with the IGOH mostly in private, and at this 
stage are basically resigned to the idea of replacing the 
government via fall elections. 
Non-student youth organizations 
6. (SBU) The disruption of Aristide's patronage system that 
produced bands of "chimere" youth in targeted neighborhoods 
had two effects. Without viable alternatives, many of those 
who benefited from the handouts reconstituted themselves as 
the soldiers of the organized criminal gangs bent on 
destabilizing the country and living off the spoils of 
lawlessness. On the other hand, according to one organization 
leader, community groups that were passed over by Aristide's 
focus on loyalty rather than ideas, were liberated by the 
dissolution of the patronage system to pursue more 
socio-economic -- rather than political -- goals. Desperate 
to play a role in the transition process, these groups claim 
an existent network on the ground they say is perfectly 
placed to assist the IGOH and the international community 
with anything from disarmament talks to elections 
registration to trash cleanup. 
7. (SBU) As with students, however, many of these 
organizations complain the IGOH and international donors have 
ignored their offers, and assert persuasively that 
initiatives from dialogue to disarmament have failed because 
the government and the UN have attempted to impose solutions 
from above without engaging the population to help solve 
Haiti's problems themselves. They also bemoan Haiti's 
"antiquated" political class and argue that elections would 
be meaningless without a new cadre of modern politicians. 
Although almost unanimous in their reproach of the IGOH (and 
often MINUSTAH) and skepticism of political parties, they 
retain a sense of hope and interest in elections. 
8. (SBU) During a roundtable with the Ambassador on June 7, 
group leaders from the poorer neighborhoods appealed to the 
international community (and the United States in particular) 
to intervene in the neighborhoods and "provide youth with 
alternatives to joining gangs." Jean Enock Joseph from 
Collectif des Notables de Cite Soleil (CONOCS) called for an 
aggressive, organized social policy to fight against misery 
and lawlessness, saying residents were "desperate, but not 
hopeless." Belgarde Berton, who represents over 300 popular 
organizations in the Group of 184, called for the 
international community to work together with local 
organizations to ensure investment goes to the people who 
need it, rather than to a clique of local interests. Carlot 
Paulemon, leader of Rassemblement Nationale des Citoyens 
Organises pour le Development d'Haiti (RANCODHA), an umbrella 
organization of neighborhood organizations, pointed to the 
recent success of a June 4th Community Forum in Cite Soleil 
as a model of "bottom-up" reconciliation unmatched by IGOH 
promises of a grand National Dialogue. (Note: the Community 
Forum was funded in part by USAID via a grant from NDI. End 
note). The groups sent a clear demand for more micro-oriented 
projects and social reintegration on a local scale. 
9. (SBU) Divided and simply scared off the streets by the 
threat of chimere revenge, student groups are unlikely to 
mobilize in a mass, public display of anger against the IGOH. 
Most have by now accepted the inevitability of elections and 
are juggling bids from political parties for support. Without 
a new political personality to motivate them, the diverse 
groups are likely to remain as splintered politically as the 
numerous political parties themselves. It is unfortunate, 
however, that student energy could not be harnessed for good, 
as their support for elections and eagerness to play a role 
have the potential to stimulate greater public enthusiasm. A 
unified and public youth movement for elections and against 
violence would help grant the transition process the public 
relations momentum it needs to overcome the public's 
obsession with security concerns. 
10. (SBU) We have already pointed to the need to introduce 
flexible, quick-start development projects in Bel Air and 
Cite Soleil if and when the security environment permits it. 
Post is making a considerable effort to engage and support 
student and other peaceful, non-political "base movements" in 
these areas to provide a hopeful alternative to the gangs 
that dominate their neighborhoods. But much more could, and 
should, be done. We stand ready to work both independently 
and in cooperation with others to fulfill our pledge if 
MINUSTAH fulfills theirs to pacify the slums. 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
REF: A. PAP 2412 
     B. 04 PAP 1874 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Erna Kerst for Reasons: 1.4 (b 
and d) 
1.  (SBU)  Introduction: The Provisional Electoral Council 
(CEP) officially sanctioned 45 parties to participate in 
upcoming elections.  Traditionally, most, if not all, of the 
political parties have been vehicles to catapult an 
individual into the office of the presidency.  Larger, more 
established, parties such as OPL and Fusion of Social 
Democrats (Fusion) are running candidates at all levels. 
However, TetAnsanm, MOCHRENHA, UNION Pour Haiti 
(MIDH/Lavalas), RDNP, Alyans (KID/PPRH), and relative 
newcomers FRN, JPDN, MPH, MODEREH, KOMBA, and L'Espwa are 
also running several candidates in a majority of the races. 
The remainder of the 45 CEP-approved parties are 
concentrating on certain seats where they have regional 
presence.  This message provides capsule summaries of the 
most important political parties, updating ref B.  End 
On the Left 
3.  (U)  Struggling People's Organization (OPL):  OPL was 
originally Lavalas Political Organization, but changed its 
name when Aristide broke from the party in 1994 and created 
Fanmi Lavalas.  The party has a strong national structure 
throughout Haiti.  Its doctrinaire socialist orientation is a 
legacy of the late Gerard-Pierre Charles, the party's 
founder, who became a committed communist while exiled in 
Mexico during the Duvalier era. 
Key Leaders: 
    Paul Denis (presidential candidate) 
    Edgar LeBlanc, Jr. (Secretary General, senatorial 
    Rosny Smarth (National Executive, former PM) 
    Suzy Castor (National Executive) 
4.  (SBU)  Fusion Party of Social Democrats (FUSION): Fusion 
formed following a successful merger of smaller parties 
PANPRA, KONAKOM and Ayiti Kapab in April 2005.  OPL and 
TetAnsanm, both included in the original talks regarding the 
merger, opted out due to differences in the proposed 
power-sharing structure (OPL, the largest of the parties 
involved wanted more influence) and over presidential 
aspirations of the leadership.  According to the party's 
president, FUSION is represented in 24 of the 30 senatorial 
races and 84 of the 99 deputy races.  The party's president 
told the Charge November 22 that Fusion is looking to control 
both houses.  He said that if the party could not win a 
majority, it would work to create a bloc within parliament to 
work with the president (regardless of the president's 
party).  Benoit had earlier told Poloff November 4 that if 
the Fusion presidential candidate wins and Fusion has a 
majority, the party would still have a representative 
cabinet, offering "5 ministers out of 15" to other parties. 
Key Leaders: 
     Serge Gilles (presidential candidate) 
     Victor Benoit (President of party) 
     Robert Auguste (Secretary General) 
     Micha Gaillard (spokesperson) 
5.  (U)  Union Pour Haiti (UNION): A formal alliance between 
center-right party MIDH (Movement to Introduce Democracy in 
Haiti) and the Fanmi Lavalas leadership.  Standard bearer 
Marc Bazin has worked hard to cultivate the Lavalas masses 
who supported former president Aristide.  Bazin is the 
ultimate survivor of Haitian politics; he served in each 
successive government beginning with Jean-Claude Duvalier. 
Key Leaders: 
      Marc Bazin (presidential candidate) 
      Leslie Voltaire (campaign manager) 
      Ivon Feuille (senatorial candidate-South) 
6.  (SBU)  Democratic Alliance (Alyans):  A formal alliance 
between populist party Democratic Unity Committee (KID) and 
the Popular Party for the Renewal of Haiti (PPRH).  The party 
is centered around well-known politician Evans Paul (aka 
K-Plim, his pseudonym from a radio program in which he told 
children's stories).  Paul, a former mayor of Port-au-Prince, 
is extremely popular in the capital, but less so in the 
provinces.  Alyans continues to pursue strategic alliances 
and has been in contact with OPL, Fusion and to a lesser 
extent PNDPH. 
Key Leaders: 
     Evans Paul (presidential candidate) 
     Claude Roumain (PPRH national coordinator) 
On the Right 
7.  (SBU)  National Assembly of Progressive Democrats (RDNP): 
This is perhaps founder and former president Leslie Manigat's 
last run for the presidency.  RDNP has a strong party 
infrastructure, however, Manigat's unrelenting hold on the 
reins of leadership has limited the party's growth. 
Key Leaders: 
     Leslie Manigat (presidential candidate, former President) 
     Myrlande Manigat (Leslie's spouse and campaign manager; 
senatorial candidate-West) 
8.  (U)  Christian Movement for a New Haiti (MOCHRENHA): 
Protestant party with regional strength in Gonaives (hometown 
of the party's founder) and throughout the Artibonite and 
Central Plateau.  Over one thousand supporters crowded a 
downtown Port-au-Prince basketball gymnasium for MOCHRENHA's 
October 8 campaign launch.  Presidential candidate Luc 
Mesadieu promised a university in each of the Haiti's ten 
Departments, increasing the Haitian National Police to 20,000 
and bringing back the armed forces of Haiti.  This last 
promise drew the loudest applause.  Axan Abellard, of 
REPONSE, and rejected presidential candidate Osner Fevry 
(PDCH-II) each spoke in support of Mesadieu's candidacy. 
Key Leaders: 
     Luc Mesadieu (presidential candidate) 
     Sylvio Dieudonne (senatorial candidate-West) 
9.  (C)  Heads Together (Tet Ansanm  Originally a regional 
party with strength in the South, Tet Ansanm gained national 
notoriety after choosing Haitian-American businessman Dumas 
Simeus as its presidential candidate.  The CEP opted to leave 
his name off the list of final presidential candidates due to 
the Nationalities Commission's findings (and ignoring an 
earlier Haitian supreme court ruling in Simeus' favor) that 
he holds an American passport.  The party is fielding 
candidates across the board nationally and may form a 
significant bloc within parliament.  The secretary general, a 
doctor by training and former Aristide Health Minister, 
likely stifled his own presidential ambitions for a chance at 
becoming prime minister. 
Key Leaders: 
     Dumarsais Simeus (disputed presidential candidate) 
     Gerard Blot (Secretary General) 
New Comers 
10.  (SBU) Platform for Hope (L'Espwa/L'Espoir): 
Left-leaning political alliance between ESKAMP (Solidarity to 
Construct a Popular Alternative), PLB (Open the Gate Party) 
and KOREGA, a peasants civic organization.  The party appears 
to be strong in the South, Southeast and Grand Anse 
departments and some cities in the north (ref A).  Despite 
being new on the scene, the party's presidential candidate, 
former president Rene Preval, appears to be the favorite in 
the presidential race.  Other parties fear that Preval is 
strong enough to avoid a second round and some have called 
for parties to consider coalescing around a consensus 
candidate to challenge the former president (septel).  A 
November 3 march of 3000 Preval supporters was tarnished by 
some who engaged in minor violence, robbery and vandalism 
along the route. 
Key Leaders: 
     Rene Preval (presidential candidate; former President) 
     Bob Manuel (campaign manager, former State Secretary for 
Public Security) 
     Joseph Jasme (ESKAMP) 
11.  (SBU)  Committee to Build Haiti KOMBA:  The left-leaning 
Kombit Pour Bati Ayiti ("Combat") was co-founded in February 
2005 by Aristide's Minister of Youth and Sports and a leader 
of the large rural organization, Mouvement des Paysans de 
Papaye (MPP, Papaya Peasants Movement).  Its strong rural 
backing makes KOMBA a force to contend with in this year's 
elections.  When the party was founded, many believed it 
would be the vehicle for former president Rene Preval to 
launch a bid to reclaim the presidency.  To the contrary, 
however, KOMBA's leadership launched tirades against Preval. 
Media reported September 30 that KOMBA will back the 
candidacy of independent Charlito Baker.  Baker introduced 
MPP founder and KOMBA co-founder Jean-Baptiste to the Charge 
November 22 as Charlito's campaign manager. 
Key Leaders: 
     Evans Lescouflair 
     Chavannes Jean-Baptiste (MPP) 
12.  (C)  Mobilization for Haiti's Progress (MPH):  Centrist 
party founded in November 2004 by Haitian-American and 
presidential candidate Samir Mourra.  Mourra failed to make 
it onto the final presidential ballot due to his U.S. 
citizenship.  Mourra has pursued the same legal strategy as 
Dumas Simeus and challenged the ruling before the Supreme 
Court.  The case, pending before the court for over two 
weeks, is now in perpetual limbo due to the natural death of 
a supreme court justice November 27 (preventing the court 
from reaching a quorum and the ability to render a decision 
on the case).   Mourra considers the CEP "corrupt" and 
alleged interim Prime Minister Latortue played a personal 
role in the decision to remove Dumas Simeus from the ballot 
(thereby affecting his own candidacy).  Mourra said he would 
fully support the international community running the 
elections on behalf of the CEP.  MPH is fielding 16 
senatorial candidates and 77 deputy candidates.  Mourra 
claims to be self-financing his campaign and the "4000" 
(including municipal) candidacies of his party. He told 
PolOff that he has spent more than $500,000 USD (Note: Mourra 
runs a mortgage company in Miami Lakes where his family still 
resides. End Note).  MPH's philosophy is economics-based and 
looks to create jobs by concentrating national production on 
agriculture and attracting foreign direct investment. 
Key Leaders: 
     Samir Mourra (presidential candidate) 
     Chrisler Elmira (campaign manager) 
     Herve Leveille (party vice president) 
13.  (U)  Justice for Peace and National Development (JPDN): 
Right of center party founded earlier this year by a former 
Finance Minister who was previously head of the 
Port-au-Prince bar association.  The party was a merger of 
three smaller defunct parties and 23 civic organizations. 
The party is actively pro-FADH (former Haitian military). 
Key Leader: 
     Rigaud Duplan (presidential candidate) 
14.  (SBU)  The Front for National Reconstruction (FRN):  A 
FRN publication states the party's main objective is to 
"contribute to the creation of a modern, developed state, 
respectful of a democratic order..."  FRN is likely to win 
some seats in local and parliamentary elections, particularly 
in Gonaives.  Guy Phillipe, in the news repeatedly since 
early last year for his involvement in the events leading up 
to Aristide's downfall, announced his presidential candidacy 
on July 4, 2005.  For most of the past year, Phillipe has 
been sounding more moderate in an attempt to erase the image 
of him as a rebel leader. He applauded the stepped-up 
vigilance of MINUSTAH and was included amongst political 
party leaders that met with the UN Security Council here in 
April.  A FRN senatorial candidate once told PolOffs "our 
economics is on the right; our social policy is on the left." 
Key Leaders: 
     Guy Phillipe (presidential candidate) 
     Winter Etienne (spokesperson; senatorial 
     Goodwork Noel (National Executive, member of Preliminary 
National Dialogue Committee) 
15.  (C)  Artibonite in Action (LAAA):  This party was 
founded earlier this year and is based in Gonaives.  It is 
only running candidates in the Artibonite region, the most 
notable being the interim prime minister's nephew who is 
running for senate.  This party may have nefarious sources of 
income and has already been implicated in gang-related 
violence in the poorer neighborhoods of Raboteau and Jubilee 
in Gonaives. 
Key Leader: 
      Youri Latortue (senatorial candidate) 
16.  (U)  For Us All (PONT):  An off-shoot of Fanmi Lavalas. 
The party was founded in Jacmel and has limited reach beyond 
the South. 
Key Leader: 
     Jean-Marie Cherestal (presidential candidate, former PM) 

DE RUEHPU #1073 1671912
O 161912Z JUN 06 ZDK
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2011 
Classified By: Ambassador Janet Sanderson for reason 1.4(b). 
1.  (C) President Preval on June 15 announced the nomination 
of current Haitian National Police (HNP) Director General 
Mario Andresol to continue in his position for three more 
years.  The Senate must now approve the nomination by 
majority vote.  The justice and security committee will begin 
examination of his nomination in the coming week.  Andresol 
may face some scrutiny from senate President Joseph Lambert 
and justice and security committee President Youri Latortue, 
both of whom are widely believed to be involved in illegal 
activities.  Bolstered by Preval's direct support, however, 
we expect Andresol to gain Senate approval. 
2. (C) Since replacing Leon Charles as DG in summer, Andresol 
has gained the respect of rich and poor alike, as he has 
attempted to root out corruption within the force, improve 
performance, and combat a wave of kidnapping that peaked at 
the end of 2005, but shows signs of resurging.     Andresol 
enjoys the confidence of Robert Manuel, Preval's closest 
advisor on police and security matters, and Rene Momplaisir, 
Preval's liaison to the poor masses -- and almost certainly 
at least some gang leaders -- in Cite Soleil.   In 
cooperation with MINUSTAH political and disarmament 
officials, Andresol has also quietly entertained feelers from 
several gang leaders in Cite Soleil and other poor 
neighborhoods, notably Amaral Duclonat, who have expressed 
interest in some kind of truce with the HNP.  Andresol also 
collaborated closely with UNPol commissioner Graham Muir in 
repairing the damage over MINUSTAH's release of an HNP reform 
plan Haitians regarded as infringement on their sovereignty, 
and redrafting a reform program that will lead to productive 
cooperation with UNPol and far-reaching HNP reform. 
3. (C) Comment.  Preval's nomination of Andresol is a 
significant step forward.  Andresol has not only promoted 
honesty and integrity within the HNP, but has undertaken 
significant iniiatives, such as the draft HNP rform plan 
with MINUSTAH, that would have almost ertainly come grinding 
to a halt without his contnued leadership.  We look forward 
to maintainingour own close bi-lateral cooperation through 
himand expanding overall multi-lateral coordination as we 
intensify our efforts to rebuild the HNP. 

DE RUEHPU #1407/01 2141901
O 021901Z AUG 06
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2016 
REF: A. PAP 1393 
     B. PAP 1386 
PORT AU PR 00001407  001.2 OF 003 
Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
1. (C) Summary: UN Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (SRSG) Edmond Mulet warned A/S Shannon on July 25 
that provocations by former president Aristide and his 
supporters could erode Haiti's post-electoral stability. 
Mulet said that President Preval's public silence about 
security problems and inability to decide on a strategy have 
made it difficult for MINUSTAH to take concrete measures to 
improve security.  Over the long term, Mulet feared Latin 
troop-contributors' military commitment to Haiti could wane, 
and he encouraged the U.S. to weigh-in with them in favor of 
a continued presence.  Mulet previewed the UNSYG's report on 
Haiti, saying it would call for a one-year extension of the 
mandate and a more active MINUSTAH role on justice and 
security issues.  To improve the security situation, Mulet 
asked the U.S. to expand its drug interdiction efforts in 
Haiti and ease the U.S. embargo on weapons and ammunition for 
the Haitian National Police and UN forces.  A/S Shannon 
assured Mulet of strong USG  support for MINUSTAH and our 
eagerness to see its stabilization mission succeed.  End 
2.  (U) Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon and Ambassador 
Sanderson, along with A/DCM and WHA/CAR Director Brian 
Nichols, met for an hour-long conversation with MINUSTAH SRSG 
Edmond Mulet, on the margins of the July 25 Haiti Donors' 
GOH does not Control Provinces 
- - - - - - - - - - 
3. (C) Mulet described the difficulties facing MINUSTAH and 
the Haitian government.  He rued the "complete lack of the 
state" in Haiti, especially outside the capital, where the 
GOH has been unable to enforce the rule of law.  For example, 
he explained that leaders in the northern town of Ouanaminthe 
have created their own criminal fiefdom.  As a result, drug 
trafficking has become an increasingly alarming problem, 
which is difficult to combat, in part because of the drug 
ties within the Haitian Government.  In this connection, he 
mentioned Senate leader Joseph Lambert and Security 
Commission Chair Youri Latortue -- describing the latter as a 
"drug dealer."  Mulet continued that the judicial system 
could not impose the rule of law, because the Haitian 
National Police (HNP) lacked investigation skills and the few 
judges who have not been corrupted feared ruling against 
drug-related criminals.  Without the basic rule of law, 
MINUSTAH's progress and development work in Haiti have been 
severely limited. 
Aristide Movement Must be Stopped 
- - - - - - - - - - 
4. (C) Mulet also worried that former president Jean Bertrand 
Aristide's influence could continue to disrupt government and 
UN progress in Haiti.  Mulet claimed Aristide has sent agents 
to Haiti to rally support for his return.  These instigators 
have stoked public fear and warned of a new round of violence 
in Port-au-Prince.  Mulet said that at his request, on the 
margins of last month's African Union summit, UNSYG Annan had 
urged South African President Mbeki to ensure that Aristide 
remained in South Africa.  Mbeki reportedly replied that 
Aristide's presence cost the Mbeki government financially 
through security and housing expenses and prompted 
significant political criticism from the opposition.  Judging 
Aristide's continued tenure in South Africa uncertain, Mulet 
urged U.S. legal action against Aristide to prevent the 
former president from gaining more traction with the Haitian 
population and returning to Haiti. 
GOH Unsure on Security 
- - - - - - - - - - 
5. (C) Mulet said he meets nearly daily with Preval and Prime 
Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis on the situation in Haiti. 
Preval frequently has a clear plan of action that he wants 
MINUSTAH to pursue.  However, when MINUSTAH develops 
operational plans based on Preval's wishes, the President 
then changes his mind and proposes an entirely different 
approach.  Preval's indecision has left MINUSTAH planners and 
troops unable to develop a coordinated strategy with the GOH 
in response to the security situation.  Publicly, Preval has 
accompanied his indecision by complete silence, which is 
working to erode his government's credibility.  Mulet said 
that when he encouraged Preval to speak out, the President 
replied that "silence is my best ally." 
Renewed Mandate to Focus on Rule of Law 
- - - - - - - - - - 
6. (C) Mulet previewed the UNSYG's report on Haiti, stating 
that the report would recommend that the 
Security Council extend MINUSTAH's mandate for one-year and 
focus its efforts towards security and the rule of law.  He 
continued that he had initially sought an "executive 
mandate," with greater powers under Chapter VII, the UNSYG 
had encouraged him to seek a more focused force configuration 
within the current mandate.  To achieve that, Mulet said 
MINUSTAH planned to add anti-kidnapping experts, Honduran 
SWAT units, and Peruvian special forces that will allow it to 
take on gangs and crime directly.  Mulet said increased 
MINUSTAH effectiveness in support of democratic institutions 
and economic development will hinge on the ability of the 
donor countries to coordinate their assistance programs.  He 
cited the HNP as an example of the international community's 
failure to work in concert.  Each donor country has pushed 
its own policing model and donor efforts contradicted one 
another.  Mulet suggested that police donors offer a seminar 
for the GOH that explains the various policing models and 
lets the GOH choose. He regretted that the HNP reform plan 
has been "sitting on the Prime Minister's desk" for about one 
month, awaiting final signature. 
Elections Pose Challenge 
- - - - - - - - - - 
7.  (C) In response to A/S Shannon's query, Mulet said that 
he opposed holding municipal and legislative elections later 
this fall.  Under the constitution, Haiti must hold up to 11 
elections during Preval's term, including runoffs.  For 
example, next year, one-third of the Senate will face 
election.  This will entail a nation-wide vote that will cost 
an estimated USD 30 million.  Mulet added that election of 
municipal and local governments will lead to a major 
financial burden on the government, which lacks the 
resources to sustain such a heavy administrative structure. 
Mulet has raised these concerns with Preval and suggested 
that the government amend the constitution to streamline 
these processes.  But, Preval rejected delaying local 
elections, stressing the importance of municipal and local 
government to development of the judiciary and electoral 
council under Haitian law.  Preval reportedly did not want to 
fast track changes in the constitution.  Due to a complicated 
amendment formula, it would take some nine years to effect 
constitutional change, under the existing rules. 
MINUSTAH Could Lose Steam Over Long Run 
- - - - - - - - - - 
8. (C) Over the long-term, Mulet worried that fatigue from 
MINUSTAH's military and police contributors as well as 
Venezuela's possible election to the Security Council could 
jeopardize MINUSTAH's mandate.  Mulet explained that though 
Argentina is committed through February of 2007, it has 
considered lowering its troop commitment to Haiti. 
Meanwhile, Chile has already recuperated three helicopters 
from MINUSTAH, which has significantly limited MINUSTAH's 
mobility.  Mulet reported that the seven South American troop 
contributors are planning a meeting of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs and Defense in Buenos Aires on August 4 to discuss 
troop levels and the MINUSTAH mandate.  In addition, he 
worried that Venezuela's possible election to the Security 
Council could jeopardize Haiti's Chapter VII status.  Mulet 
said that the Venezuelan ambassador to Haiti had told him 
that in Caracas' view Haiti does not require a Chapter VII 
Possible U.S. Roles 
- - - - - - - - - - 
9. (C) Mulet asked for U.S. assistance in a number of areas 
to help bolster the UN's effort in Haiti.  He said that 
increased U.S. anti-drug efforts south of Hispaniola could 
disrupt the drug trade and help Haitian authorities regain 
control in the provinces.  He also asked that the USG carve 
out exceptions for the UN and HNP in its arms embargo against 
Haiti.  While he said that some of the UN military contingents 
brought their own ammunition with them, many of them need to 
re-supply from the U.S.  Finally, he applauded U.S. efforts 
to train South American peacekeepers, which he said directly 
contributed to continued interest by countries such as 
Bolivia to contribute military contingents to Haiti.  A/S 
Shannon assured Mulet of strong USG support for MINUSTAH and 
its stabilization role.  Shannon offered -- and subsequently 
followed through (reftels A and B) -- to press Preval and 
Prime Minister Alexis to 
take more forceful action on security issues, in close 
coordination with MINUSTAH.  Shannon and Mulet agreed that, 
if MINUSTAH fails to stabilize Haiti during this period of 
opportunity, then it is likely the international community 
will have to return to Haiti with a larger and more costly 
operation in the future. 
- - - - 
10. (C) Mulet is an articulate and focused SRSG who has a 
good grasp of the challenges facing his mission despite being 
in his job only seven weeks.  His frustration with Preval's 
inaction and indecision is evident.  Mulet clearly wants 
MINUSTAH to take a more assertive approach to security than 
his predecessor and should enjoy greater political leeway in 
Latin capitals to do so in support of a democratically 
elected government. 

A suivre 
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